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STUDIES AND ARTICLES

**ANGLO-SPANISH RELATIONS IN THE NORTH SEA IN THE EARLY
17TH CENTURY. WAR AND DIPLOMACY**

*Porfirio Sanz Camañes**

Abstract

Anglo-Spanish relations, deeply shaken during the governments of Philip II of Spain and Queen Elizabeth I of England, found new ways to understanding from their irreconcilable positions in the generational takeover in the courts of both countries. The foreign policy deployed by Philip II, based on the defense of catholicism and the preservation of an extraordinary territorial heritage, had left important military fronts open on the turbulent European scene. Spain's largest-scale military intervention in Flanders and the defense of its rights to the throne in Portugal, whose kingdom was annexed to the Spanish monarchy in 1580, ended up arousing London's fears before the appearance of a new empire whose dimensions in geography, politics and economics in fact supposed, according to some protestant chronicles of the era, a threat to peace and stability in the world. Peace with England, signed in London in 1604 and ratified in Valladolid the following year, serves to redefine an important period in English-Spanish relations and opened a new Era.

Key words: *Diplomacy, War, North Sea, Spain, England, The treaty of London, XVII Century*

The peace treaties of Vervins, London and the truce of Antwerp, those which determined the period of *Pax Hispanica* established in the course of a decade, marked the pulse in the international relations which began to take shape. The Spanish monarchy, thanks to its skillful maneuvers and its network of diplomats, had managed to make all of those agreements profitable. We should perhaps not interpret these years as simply those of a monarchy financially exhausted and politically conformist that accepts playing a secondary role in a Europe involved in permanent changes. As it can be demonstrated by analyzing the years running from 1620 to 1650, the years of truce and peace made it possible to reorganize finances and recover the war impetus lost following so many years of conflicts.¹ Philip IV's monarchy would

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¹ See, P. Sanz Camañes: "La diplomacia beligerante. Felipe IV y el tratado anglo-español de 1630", *Cuadernos de Historia de España*, nº LXXXIII. Facultad de Letras. Buenos Aires, 2009. pp. 225-245; and "Conveniencia política y pragmatismo religioso en las relaciones entre Felipe

once again situate a numerous plurinational Spanish army at the battlefronts with the aim of recovering lost positions and prestige on the international scene.

In the early 17th century, when attempts were being made between both countries to achieve an agreement which would enable peace to be reached, the expression “*Peace with England and war with the whole world*”,¹ made its way around the gossip corners of the court in London, satisfying the English clientele with the aim of forgetting four decades of falling-out between both countries.

First, it was necessary to bury the past which could be summarized in the certainly unfavorable acceptance towards Spain: “*Spain rather pain*”. The comment, uttered by sir Thomas Chaloner, the English ambassador to Spain in the first years of the 1560s, clearly reflected the trouble encountered by the diplomat in his work in Spain. His long experience acquired in the embassies in France, Scotland, Flanders and Germany was not enough to attend to one of the most important courts in Europe and delve into the ins and outs of Spanish politics.

As pointed out by Chaloner, whose suspicions in the religious sphere had kept him isolated from the circles of power in the Madrid court, the progressive introduction of anglicanism in England and the development of the rebellion in the Netherlands beginning in the mid-1560s started to make English-Spanish relations grow tense. The apparent game of balance kept up until then in the North Sea offered serious symptoms of instability. England, seeking new allies which it would not take long to find among countries or provinces whose proximity to Spain had become complicated: France, the Netherlands and the Ottoman Empire.

The statements by English ambassador Chaloner, the third to tread Spanish soil in the decade from 1559 to 1569, were the best proof of said instability.² The mutual distrust and the network of informers or spies deployed in each country in the years of the Counter Reformation darkened the political climate experienced following the England of Mary I. Rumors about overthrows, conspiracies and plots began to become a part of the vocabulary used between both courts, especially when there were sufficient reasons for the fulfillment of said predictions. The suspicious plots to dethrone Elizabeth I and Spain’s support of the Irish catholics were arguments used by London in facing up to England’s secret collaboration in the Netherlands, which led to

IV y Cromwell”, in P. Sanz (ed.), *Tiempo de Cambios. Guerra, diplomacia y Política internacional de la Monarquía Hispánica (1648-1700)*. Ed. Actas, Madrid, 2012, pp. 311-340.

¹ CH. Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625* (London and New York, 1964), p. 45.

² J. Retamal, *Diplomacia anglo-espyearla durante la Contrarreforma* (Santiago de Chile, 1981), p. 21.

discouragement in the court of Madrid.¹ In fact, the network of spies organized by Bernardino de Mendoza between England, France and Flanders, based as much on resident agents as on traveling emissaries, enabled him to obtain information favorable to the interests of Philip II. What Philippine diplomacy could not stop was that both Guerau de Spés and Mendoza were thrown out of England for their conspiratorial activities.²

1585: the road war

The fall of Antwerp, the “Jerusalem” of some chroniclers of the era, together with the vanishing from the political scene of two dangerous rivals like William of Orange, assassinated by Baltasar Gérard, and the duke of Anjou, made it very clear to Elizabeth I that England’s security was in danger, as was translated in a rough session in the House of Commons agreeing upon English military intervention in favor of the Dutch rebels.³ Events which undoubtedly had an impact on English public opinion, moreover stirring up anti-Spanish feeling in England. A *black legend* began to be fostered which already had a legion of followers in the Isles.⁴

Elizabethan England, through her *Declaration*, went from secret military and financial collaboration to direct intervention, sanctioning the military alliance between the Dutch rebels and the English with the Treaty of Nonsuch, signed in August 1585.⁵ With the treaty not only was England’s position in Europe made clear, but it also reproduced the conflict in America at other levels.

The ideological or religious differences started to become irreconcilable and be above the traditional interests which both countries had in common. On both sides the opponent was religiously disparaged. The Philippine policy deployed and upheld –as pointed out by M. Fernández Álvarez–⁶ in the political-strategic, ideological and economic fields, translated into the *inalienable* nature of the patrimonial lands, dynastic-religious reasons and the monopoly of sailing to the West Indies, was going to be more and more questioned in the northwest Atlantic by Elizabeth I’s England.

¹ E. García Hernán, *Irlanda y el rey prudente* (Madrid, 2000), pp. 49-50.

² D. Dean, *Law-making and Society in late Elizabethan England. The Parliament of England, 1584-1601* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 63 and follows.

³ Calendar State Paper Foreign. (hereafter CSPF), XX (sept. 1585-May 1586), p. 332.

⁴ W. S. Maltby, *La leyenda negra en Inglaterra. Desarrollo del sentimiento antihispánico, 1558-1660* (México, 1971), p. 59 and follows.

⁵ “Declaración de las causas que an movido a la merced de la Reyna de Ynglaterra a dar ayuda y asistencia a la oprimida y angustiada gente de los Estados Bajos”. Richmond, 1/11 de octubre de 1585 (new and old styles). Biblioteca Nacional de España (hereafter BNE), Ms. 9.372. fol. 123r.

⁶ M. Fernández Álvarez, *Poder y sociedad en la España del Quinientos* (Madrid, 1995), p. 244.

The growing antagonism between both countries seemed to be leading said relations to an imminent clash, as the preparation of an Armada by Spain ended up confirming.¹ The disaster of the “*Spanish Invincible Fleet*”, as was disclosed in the circles in London, came about due to several causes, although there were those, especially in England, who did not take long to explain the defeat in religious terms.² Where was the God who supported Spain’s arms to fight against heresy? How was the catholic Philip II repaid for his pious, exemplary conduct? These and other questions have been answered recently in one of our books.³

The years following the Armada or the period called “post-armada” by M.J. Rodríguez Salgado,⁴ from 1589 to 1603, were used to prepare new military strategies for the defense of Spain’s geopolitical and economic interests on three levels: on the one hand, with the design of a plan for the defense of the American Atlantic; likewise, encouraging the Armadas policy, contemplating new attacks on England; and lastly, taking steps to activate Spanish privateering, practiced from the bases in the north of Spain or from Dunkirk, in Flanders.⁵

In the 1590s, Spain alternated diplomatic contacts with England, although without giving up its old idea of intervening in support of the catholic rebels in Ireland with its Armadas policy, developed between 1596 and 1601.⁶ The destabilizing effect it caused on England’s foreign policy and its treasury is beyond all doubt.

This policy of intentions was not free from another policy of appeasement, as can be deduced from the correspondence between both courts in the late 1590s. Beginning in October 1599, the year following Philip II’s death, the first English-Spanish contacts began to be established in order to deal

¹ C. Gómez-Centurión, *La Invencible y la empresa de Inglaterra* (Madrid, 1988), pp. 48-50. On the defeat of the Armada, see also: *State Papers relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada* (Navy Records Society, I and II), ed. J. K. Laughton (1894).

² J. T. Cabot, *La vida y la época de Felipe II* (Barcelona, 1998), p. 171.

³ P. Sanz Camañes, *Los ecos de la Armada*. Madrid, Sílex, 2012.

⁴ M. J. Rodríguez-Salgado, “Felipe II y la crisis Post Armada: Política exterior y rebelión, 1588-1594”, in *IX Jornadas de Historia Marítima*, “Después de la Gran Armada: la historia desconocida (1588-16...)”, *Cuadernos Monográficos del Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval*. Annex to nº 20 (Madrid, 1993), pp. 7-49.

⁵ F. de Bordeje, *Tráfico de Indias y Política Oceánica* (Madrid, 1992), p. 191 and follows; R. A. Stradling, *La Armada de Flandes. Política naval espyearla y guerra europea, 1568-1668* (Madrid, 1992). pp. 34-36. For privateering, see *Further English Voyages to Spanish America, 1583-1594*, ed. I. A. Wright (Hakluyt Society, Second Series, XCIX), 1951; *English Privateering Voyages to the West Indies, 1588-1595*, ed. K. R. Andrews, (Hakluyt Society, Second Series, XCIX), 1959; and *The Principal navigations, voyages and discoveries of the English nation*, ed. R. Hakluyt (Hakluyt Society, Extra Series, I-XII), 1903-1905.

⁶ O. Recio, *El socorro de Irlanda en 1601 y la contribución del ejército a la integración social de los irlandeses en España* (Madrid, 2002), p. 80.

with the matter of peace with England. According to a report entitled “Apuntamientos para la Paz con Inglaterra” (“Notes for Peace with England”), delivered to Philip III and dated January 8th, 1600, the Spanish monarch was advised by some catholic sectors in Ireland and England to be wary of any peace offering on behalf of queen Elizabeth.¹ It is not less true that the Spanish theologians who were favorable to the agreement, confronted with discordant opposing voices, hoped that an alliance with England would open the way to drawing England nearer to catholic theses, at a time when libelous anti-papal, anti-Spanish propaganda speedily made its way around the turbulent triangle shaped by London, The Hague and Paris. As the report pointed out, the aim should be “for the peace to be useful at present for his Majesty and for his friends; and pull out the roots of war”.²

Lasting peace had to have the support of the English catholics, whose situation subjected to the puritanical repression of parliament was more and more delicate, and they only aspired for the susceptible generational takeover in the English court, given queen Elizabeth I’s illness, to enable them to face the future with greater hopes.³ “The more it was in benefit of the catholics in England, the longer peace would last”. Experience proved that dealings with heretics could not be trusted, either: “The heretics are crafty, and in many respects it is good for them to hold talks of peace with Spain, although they have no desire to ever reach it...”⁴

England had stood out, especially after the defeat of the Armada, for the budding activity of its privateering in waters of Spanish jurisdiction, in Europe and in America.⁵ English attempts to destabilize the Portuguese empire had materialized in 1591 with the capture of Santa Elena in the Atlantic, the plundering of Espiritu Santo and some strongholds along the Brazilian coast. Brazil would suffer a new attack by England with the pillage of Pernambuco in 1595. The activities carried out by privateers such as Hawkins, Raleigh and Drake would be occupied later on by other figures such as sir William Monson,

¹ “Relación de un papel que se dio a su Magd, a 8 de enero del year 1600 sobre los ofrecimientos de paz que por entonces se hazian por parte de la Reyna de Inglaterra”. Archivo General de Simancas, Estado (Inglaterra), (hereafter AGS, E), Leg. 2.512 (years 1600), docs. 88 and 89.

² *Ibid.*

³ Letters from duke of Sessa on the sucesión to the throne of England, 11 July 1600. AGS, E (Inglaterra), Leg. 2.511, docs. 35 y 38. “Consulta del Consejo de Estado sobre lo que resulta de la carta de 14 de noviembre de 1600 del duque de Sessa en lo de la sucesión de Inglaterra y investidura de Irlanda”. AGS, E (Inglaterra), Leg. 840, doc. 81.

⁴ “Relación..” AGS, E (Inglaterra), Leg. 2.512.

⁵ London, Southampton, Dorset, Devon y Cornwall, Bristol y Bridgewater fueron los puertos más significativos del corsarismo inglés. K. R. Andrews, *Elizabethan Privateering* (Londres, 1966), pp. 33 and 124; F. de Bordeje, *Tráfico de Indias y Política Oceánica* (Madrid, 1992), pp. 164-179; E. Lorenzo Sanz, *Comercio de España con América en la época de Felipe II* (Valladolid, 1980), Vol. II, pp. 426-428.

sir Robert Mansell and sir Richard Leveson.¹ This series of interventions by English privateers in Spain's area of influence interrupted Spanish colonial trade and tacitly questioned Spain's imperial supremacy.

The initiation of conversations in Boulogne, where the possibility of reaching an English-Spanish agreement was discussed, encouraged the emissaries from Spain, England and the archdukes. However, the contacts, for the time being, ignored the thorniest matters –possession of fortified cities by the queen, free trade, and navigation through the English Channel– in order to focus on questions of priority. Spain upheld the consideration of the Dutch as rebels and its trade monopoly according to papal grants. English support of the Dutch rebels had to cease immediately while from Spain the English-Dutch trade rivalries had to attempt to be exploited which had come from time ago and continued to be buried due to the Spanish-Dutch conflict.²

England, for its part, was not willing to accept pressure from Spain, and even less so in the new times when its privateering traffic was so well-established in those domains. In late July 1600, the lack of agreements on these terms led to the withdrawal of English emissaries called to London. The decree by Elizabeth I to create the English East India Company and the trade block of the Spanish monarchy in Europe and overseas put a definitive end to any hint of reaching an accord between both States. The last of the parliaments convened by queen Elizabeth, in 1601, obtained the political backing for her measures and, following the granting of certain privileges to its members, the approval of a new tax consisting of four subsidies to confront the costly war with Spain.³

The disappearance of Philip II from the political scene and the ascent to the throne of his son, as well as the generational takeover in England, with the rise to power of James I, created a more acceptable diplomatic climate to reach peace, as both courts knew. With this aim, making his way to London via Brussels was Juan de Tassis, earl of Villamediana.⁴ Upon his arrival in the Flemish capital in the early summer of 1603, he stated his first impressions of the political situation in James Stuart's England. Among the secret instructions he carried with him to bring both countries nearer to the signing of peace, "in peace talks ahead", the difficulties Paris posed to any treaty had to be overcome. Likewise, the hardest stumbling blocks for a peace treaty to materialize continued to focus on the same matters: religious questions, matters of a political-military nature and trade matters.

¹ K. R. Andrews, *Elizabethan Privateering* (Londres, 1966), p. 237.

² A. Hassall, *The History of British Foreign Policy from the Earliest times to 1912* (Edinburgo and London, 1912), pp. 115-20.

³ T. E. Hartley, *Elizabeth's Parliaments. Queen, Lords and Commons, 1559-1601* (Manchester, 1992), pp. 40, 48-9 and 144-47.

⁴ "Don Juan de Tassis from Brussels, 4 July 1603", AGS, E (Inglaterra), Leg. 840, doc. 108.

The mutual convenience of Peace

The initially more tolerant attitude of James I, who united the kingdoms of England and Scotland beginning in July 1603, the influence held over the new king by advocates of a lasting peace agreement, such as first secretary sir Robert Cecil, first earl of Salisbury, and the vanishing from the political scene of Raleigh's party – accused of an alleged participation in a plot to dethrone James I – would provide events with a new turn.¹ On the one hand, the English monarch seemed inclined to the rapprochement of positions with regards to Spain, and in this sense deactivated many of the privateering practices carried out by English ships against the Spaniards. Nor did he consider it right to go on backing the rebellion of the Dutch republic against their legitimate sovereign, which would become the cornerstone for Spain to initiate any sort of rapprochement.

At the beginning, the positions were so far apart that the very venue where the talks were to take place was an object of dispute. London and Valladolid were initially ruled out due to the symbolic effect supposed by signing in one of the two host countries. Among the instructions of Juan de Tassis was also the proposal of a marriage between the Spanish infanta Anna and Henry, prince of Wales.² However, the need for the young prince to convert to catholicism soon seemed to be an unacceptable condition for England and the agreement was postponed for the time being.³ Elsewhere, these peace arrangements faced attempted obstruction from Amsterdam, as seen in a letter sent by the Dutch to James I, in which they urged him to a general peace that included the United Provinces, given that any individual arrangement could be fatal to Dutch interests: “may a reciprocal ceasefire be called in Flanders”. In the letter, they defended the rebellion against the king of Spain since 1567, “for having damaged their former privileges”, ending with a warning: “It can be said that changing the state of things would be a downfall not only for England but for the entire world”.⁴

The intensity of the encounters is shown by the concurrence and continuity in which the meetings of both delegations were held, even on eight occasions during the month of June.⁵ At the same, it was becoming necessary in

¹ J. C. Salyer, “Algunos aspectos del Tratado de paz entre Inglaterra y España del year 1604”, *Simancas. Estudios de Historia Moderna* (Valladolid, 1950). Vol. I. p. 371.

² Secret meeting between Tassis and Jacobo I, the 8th of october 1603, on the peace treaty. AGS, E (Inglaterra), Leg. 840 (years 1600-1611), docs. 253-257.

³ CH. Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs..*, p. 123.

⁴ London, 12th of June of 1603. AGS, E (Inglaterra), Leg. 840 (years 1600-1611), docs. 257.

⁵ Talks to the peace the following days: 4 June 1604 (Estado 841, doc. 37); 10 June 1604 (Estado 841, doc. 39); 11 June 1604 (Estado 841, doc. 40); 17 June 1604 (Estado 841, doc.45); 18 June 1604 (Estado 841, doc. 44); 21 June 1604 (Estado 841, doc. 43); 23 June 1604 (Estado 841, doc. 42); and 28 June 1604 (Estado 841, doc. 60).

England to restore the right channels of promotion and patronage for the hispanophile circle in London to recover its role. In July, the earl of Villamediana sent a list with the people and list of pensions which had to be granted.¹ By then the wills of the earls of Dorset, Denbigh, Northampton and Suffolk had been bought off. Apparently proving to be reluctant were the earl of Nottingham, great admiral, and first secretary Robert Cecil. A greater effort had to be made with them and they were each gratified with 3,000 *philips*, or ducats, and their wives were showered with attention.² James I himself and prince Charles would be overwhelmed with some generous gifts, which could range from 16,000 to 20,000 ducats. This handing out of favors to entice those opposed to Spanish politics could cost over 30,000 ducats a year in pensions, without counting the gifts in jewels and other minor details. A way of acting which drew angry protests from the party of sir Walter Raleigh, the famous English privateer. To Raleigh, the treaty would only benefit Spain, an approachable enemy which was in full decline: “The Spanish Empire has been shaken up and has begun to decline in recent years; and it is a philosophical principle that *omnis diminutio est preparatio ad corruptionem.*”³

The Spanish mission in England, not free from difficulties in carrying out its task at hand, would conclude the peace treaty in London on August 28th, 1604, with the symbolic weight it had of doing so in the English city and not in Brussels, as the Spanish delegation had previously proposed. The peace between the two great monarchies of the era stirred up a huge controversy and was the object of no few disputes all over Europe.⁴ Nevertheless, the ratification would take place the following year in Valladolid on June 15th, 1605, with a numerous entourage on the part of the English delegation led by sir Charles Cornwallis.⁵ Annexed to the treaty, several decrees were published which developed certain chapters relative to trade and freedom of worship, granting English traders the same clauses of the treaty agreed upon by both countries in 1576.⁶

Lights and shadows of the Treaty of London

¹ London, 14 July 1604. AGS, E (Inglaterra), Leg. 841 (year 1604), doc. 98.

² *Ibid.*, doc. 99.

³ W. Harris, *An Historical and Critical Account of the Life and Writings of James the First, King of Great Britain... drawn from Original Writers and State-Papers* (Londres, 1753), p. 140; P. Shaw Fairman, *España vista por los ingleses del siglo XVII* (Madrid, 1981), p. 268.

⁴ B. García García, *La Pax Hispanica. Política exterior del Duque de Lerma* (Leuven, 1996), pp. 47 and follows.

⁵ J. Stoye, *English travellers abroad, 1604-1667*. Revised edition (New Haven and London, 1989), pp. 236-9. See, I.A.A. Thompson, “Sir Charles Cornwallis..”, pp. 77 and follows, in P. Sanz Camaño (coord.), *La Monarquía Hispánica en tiempos del Quijote*. Ed. Silex. Madrid, 2005.

⁶ C. Gómez-Centurión, *Felipe II, la empresa de Inglaterra y el comercio septentrional (1566-1609)* (Madrid, 1988), pp. 352-3.

The 34 articles of the treaty of London, which would serve as a base for the later one signed in 1630, referred to clauses of a political-military, economic and religious nature. From the preamble, the period of conflict between both nations was alluded to as well as the disappearance of the deep causes which had encouraged that disagreement.¹

Having had an influence on the signing of the treaty in the political-military sphere was the financial situation which king James I had found himself in when he came to power, with an exhausted treasury due to so many years of war. Facing this situation, the king allowed himself to be guided by the advice of his prime minister, Robert Cecil, earl of Salisbury, to draw positions closer with the two most important European dynasties, the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs.² If the debts of the English crown in the times of queen Mary had reached some 200,000 pounds sterling, England's economic effort to appease the conflict in Ireland, the Netherlands and the aid to the king of France, only between 1594 and 1602, had amounted to 2,750,950 pounds sterling, raising the country's debt to over 400,000 pounds.³ This delicate financial situation had made the already difficult relations between the crown and the English parliament grow tenser.⁴ It is certainly true that Spain's finances were not taking a better course. The military enterprises undertaken between 1588 and 1602 against England, Ireland, France and the Netherlands had emptied the crown's treasury.⁵ With a delicate international situation due to the existence of ongoing conflicts in the northwest Atlantic and the supervision of the recent peace accorded with France in Vervins, Spain faced a sharp financial crisis. In the early 17th century, the annual deficit was over one million and a half ducats and most of the royal income was mortgaged, so it was becoming necessary to

¹ The Treaty is entitled: *Tratado de Paz, Alianza y Comercio, entre el Señor Rey Católico Don Phelipe III, y los Señores Archiduques Alberto e Isabel Clara Eugenia, sus hermanos de una parte y el Serenísimo Rey de Inglaterra Jacobo I, de la otra..*, See J. A. Abreu y Bertodano, *Colección de los Tratados de Paz. Reinado de Felipe III*. Primera parte [Microform]. (Oviedo, 1989), 243-82. The original is in latin (it can be consulted up at the Archivo General de Simancas).

² T. Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution. English politics and the coming of the war, 1621-1624* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 13-14.

³ B. Álamos de Barrientos, *Discurso político al rey Felipe III al comienzo de su reinado* (Barcelona, 1990), p. 46.

⁴ The research papers of J. Loach, M. A. R. Graves, N. L. Jones y T. E. Hartley have been focused in the relations between Crown and Parliament. See, J. Loach, *Parliament and the Crown in the Reign of Mary Tudor* (Oxford, 1986); M. A. R. Graves, *The House of Lords in the Parliaments of Eduard VI and Mary I. An Institutional Study* (Cambridge, 1981); N. L. Jones, *Faith by Statute: Parliament and the Settlement of Religion, 1559* (London, 1982); and T. E. Hartley, *Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I, 1559-1581* (Leicester, 1981); and his work, *Elizabeth's Parliaments*.

⁵ B. García García, *La Pax Hispanica..* p. 161.

find short-term solutions to the conflicts.¹ With these premises, we can point out that Spain and England's financial troubles, an important obstacle in order to deploy a foreign policy which was not conditioned beforehand, ended up bringing nearer the wills of both countries.²

By virtue of the treaty, in the political-military sphere, the parties renounced striking up alliances or militarily or financially supporting any campaign in favor of "enemies, opponents or rebels of the other party". This clause was aimed at removing any possibility of cooperation in war between the English and the Dutch, as the treaty said: "directly or indirectly, by sea, by land, and fresh waters".³ In fact, England's strategic position, especially in the English Channel and the North Sea, was key to the security of Flanders, besides assuring the protection of its ships at English ports. It was moreover hoped that the treaty would make it possible for the way to be opened to a military understanding by means of the recruitment of troops, especially Irish, English and Scottish Catholics. In exchange, a proportion of the silver Spain was to send to pay for Flanders' Armada through the *English Road* would remain in England.⁴ A military assistance also coded in England's desire to rekindle the old English-Spanish project to throw the Muslim pirates out of the Mediterranean. It was also to be expected that with the deterioration in English-Dutch relations, cracks were opened in the bosom of Protestantism, between countries with evident disagreements in the trade sphere. As if that weren't enough, the diplomatic isolation of the United Provinces had to allow the concentration of greater military resources in the wars of Flanders, forget the costly policy of armadas and develop the sea routes between Spain and the Netherlands in a climate of stability and security.

With regards to the English garrisons in the Netherlands, that is to say, the cities of Flushing, Brielle and Rammekens, they had to remain in English hands without being able to hand themselves over to the archdukes, upon finding themselves "tightly obligated by the pacts closed between Queen Elizabeth... and the States of the United Provinces of the Netherlands".⁵ However, England agreed to make two commitments beginning at that moment. In the first place, not to support the Dutch rebels from these cities. And moreover, James I offered to be a mediator with the United Provinces for the

¹ P. Sanz Camañes, *Diplomacia hispano-inglesa en el siglo XVII* (Cuenca, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2002), p. 36.

² J. P. Cooper, "The Fall of the Stuart Monarchy", *New Cambridge Modern History* (hereafter NCMH), vol. IV, pp. 531 and 544-9.

³ "Tratado de Paz, Alianza y Comercio", Chapter 4, p. 250.

⁴ L. J. Reeve, *Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 249 and pp. 255-9.

⁵ "Tratado de Paz, Alianza y Comercio", Chapter 7, pp. 251-2.

archdukes to reach an agreement which would bring lasting peace to the region.¹

The articles included different proof on behalf of both countries, as a sign of good will, such as the handing over of the Spanish hostages that were locked up in the Tower of London by James I. The “reciprocal liberation” was proceeded to of the prisoners of war taken by one party and the other even in the case of being condemned to the galleys, in this situation paying the expenses of their maintenance.² Likewise, the accord also included the prohibition of seizing ships of the signing parties for military uses, “without prior notice to their prince”.³

In the economic sphere, all licenses for privateering and retaliation were suppressed on the part of the English and the Flemish, “being declared null and void”.⁴ With the eradication, at least in theory, of English privateering in the Spanish territories in the Indies, the signing of peace between England and Spain had to force the Dutch to negotiate a reasonable agreement with Spain.

However, it was soon discovered how difficult it was to comply with some of the articles, like the one allowing reciprocity in the use of sea ports between both countries, when just a few months after the treaty was signed, privateers from Dunkirk, Biscay and the English isle of Wight operated in the other country’s territorial waters camouflaged with third flags and with the aim of thus capturing enemy ships.

Free trade was approved between the Iberian Peninsula and the British Isles, according to the traditions in effect before the war, “and enter any port where there was trade before the war, in accordance with the use and observance of the old alliances”. England could trade –with the same advantages– according to what it said in the treaty, “as one’s subjects in the other’s territory”.⁵ One of the thorniest sides of the trade agreement consisted of clearing up the aspects inherent to “navigation towards the Indies”. While the Spanish delegation wanted it to be declared in the treaty “expressly that they cannot navigate to one India or the other”, the English considered this demand out of place, when over the last four decades, they had not only sailed to the New World, but had settled in Virginia and in Labrador.⁶ Spain, aware of England’s ambitions, tried to halt its expansion in America, as could be seen in several fragments of the negotiations.

¹ “Tratado de Paz, Alianza y Comercio”, Chapter 31, pp. 266-7.

² “Tratado de Paz, Alianza y Comercio”, Chapter 28, p. 266.

³ “Tratado de Paz, Alianza y Comercio”, Chapter 26, p. 265.

⁴ “Tratado de Paz, Alianza y Comercio”, Chapter 6, p. 251.

⁵ “Tratado de Paz, Alianza y Comercio”, Chapter 9 y 10, pp. 253-5.

⁶ “Letter from the Condestable de Castilla, on the Peace, to the king Philippe III”. Bruselas, 24th of march 1604. AGS, E (Inglaterra), Leg. 840 (year 1604), doc. 11.

England's insistence during the negotiations on taking away the Spanish king's monopoly on trade with America led jurists to comb the archives and recur to historical tradition, analyzing the English-Spanish peace treaties of 1506, 1515, 1520, 1542 and 1546, the latter two in the times of emperor Charles V, and in which navigation to the Indies was in no way mentioned. In the meeting for peace with Spain held at the assembly of Bologna, in the year 1600, the discussion of this matter was opened once more. Finally, before the tensions and struggles maintained between the Spanish and English delegations, a clause was approved which allowed trade in the domains of the king of Spain "where they formerly used to do so".¹ This ambiguity, leaving out any express mention of trade with America, meant – from the Spanish viewpoint – exclusive possession; that is to say, upholding the monopoly, while the English interpretation of the same terms and the silence before any question regarding Spain's monopoly opened the door to the expansion of English colonization in some territories in America, now strengthened by different investments which saw new possibilities in the Americas.²

With the signing of the treaty, Spain hoped to manage to reduce smuggling and piracy, while the regulation of trade traffic between the British Isles and the peninsula could have repercussions on the increase of exchanges and expansion of certain London industrial sectors. Lastly, nobody was unaware that an English-Spanish treaty, besides favoring the trade of military supplies, gunpowder and warships by means of English merchant ships, would cause serious harm to the Dutch, fostering the economic rivalry between London and Amsterdam. In fact, the Flemish delegation insisted on the absolute cease of all trade and dealings between the English and the Dutch rebels, as one of the main ways to achieve peace. Moreover, the English were forbidden to trade Dutch products in Spain and Flanders, under penalty of incurring heavy sanctions. Lastly, in order to stop the importing of goods from the Dutch rebels, Philip III established the retaliation tax of 30% on the importation and exportation of all goods imported by foreigners.³ The privileges granted to the English, paralyzed due to the conflict, once again came into full effect. Despite the fact that England, in accordance with the treaty, had to break off trade with Holland and Zeeland, the truth is that some smuggling activities continued.

¹ "Tratado de Paz, Alianza y Comercio", Chapter 9. p. 253.

² The tough moment in the Anglo-Spanish relations were between 1585 and 1588. See the works of Haklyut: *Notes framed by a gentleman heretofore to be given to one that prepared for a discovery and went not* (1582); and *Inducements to the liking of the voyage intended towards Virginia* (1585). See K.R. Andrews, *Elizabethan Privateering*, pp. 188-9.

³ C. Gómez-Centurión, Felipe II, la empresa de Inglaterra y el comercio septentrional (1566-1609) (Madrid, 1988), pp. 345-6.

Still, in accordance with the treaty signed in 1604, and later maintained in 1630, with the establishment of guarantees of mutual free trade, English residents were able to trade, with some highs and lows, dedicating themselves preferably to the trade of wool in Bilbao, to that of wine in Málaga or to merchant trade with the Spanish Indies.¹ However, and over time, the infractions committed by both parties were frequent, as is stated in the reports which the ambassadors would send to their respective monarchs in the 1630s.² Embargoes, confiscations and high fines were often imposed on English ships while around those dates, some Andalusian prisons, like that of Seville, began to fill up with Englishmen engaged in trade with the West Indies.³

In the religious chapter, the differences between both countries seemed insurmountable. In fact, they were the ones which at different instants most marked Anglo-Spanish relations. On the one hand, both countries represented the two visible positions in defense of catholicism and protestantism in Europe, while on the other hand, the changes taking place in central Europe as a result of the Thirty Years' War led the Spaniards and English to numerous confrontations and conflicts. In this sense, at the end of Philip III's reign, the words were still very present of Álamos de Barrientos, in his *Discurso Político* addressed to the monarch in 1598, precisely when he was acceding to the throne of the Spanish monarchy: "England is our public enemy because of religion, a very strong cause of enmity, and in the opinion of the prudent, the mightiest of all those existing in nations and which causes the harshest and most perpetual wars; its top people and all the heads of its government recognize neither the apostolic see nor the Roman Catholic Church".⁴

The right hand of the papacy was seen in Spain, as well as the main instrument of papal aggression. As a consequence, the anti-Spanish feeling during the first 25 years of Elizabeth's reign had concentrated on that religious role. Certainly maintaining catholic unity in Europe, seriously threatened by the advance of Islam and the spread of protestantism, had been maxims established in the political guidelines of Philip II, just as they had been with his father, Charles V.

With regards to the treaty, the most important clause referring to religious tolerance remarked the following: "to the vassals of the serene king of England, who come and go to the kingdoms, and domains of said serene king of

¹ A. Domínguez Ortiz, *Los extranjeros en la vida española durante el siglo XVII y otros artículos* (Sevilla, 1996), p. 114.

² J. S. Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean. A study, of the Rise and influence of British Power within the Straits, 1603-1713*, 2 vols. (London, 1904). vol. I, p. 182.

³ A. MacFadyen, "Anglo-Spanish Relations, 1625-1660" (Ph.D, dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1967). pp. 115-125; C [alendar] of S [tate] P [aper] I [reland], 1633-1647, ff. 69 y 74.

⁴ B. Álamos de Barrientos, *Discurso político al rey Felipe III al comienzo de su reinado* (Barcelona, 1990), p. 46.

Spain and archdukes, and stop in them for reasons of trade or business, they will not be bothered for reason of worship, as long as they do not scandalize others”.¹ Indeed, tolerance towards catholicism in England had been one of the maxims upheld by Philip III, so it is not strange that said proposal should turn out strengthened with the ratification of the English-Spanish peace treaty in Valladolid in 1605. However, the existing dynamics in this field made it hard to change in little time a long line of repression towards English catholics, as Joseph Creswell, an influential Jesuit in foreign policy with the British Isles, expressed in a letter to sir Robert Cecil, earl of Salisbury and James I’s main advisor: “They – referring to English catholics – desire to live in peace, and in all obedience and love to their prince, as in all ages and countries they have done than men of any other profession”.² The Gunpowder Plot against the English crown, discovered in November 1605, would lead to a new wave of repression with the approval of a series of severe measures by parliament against English catholics.³ The actions of Pedro de Zúñiga from the embassy in England aimed at buying off certain wills to try to minimize the impact of these measures on catholics: “The king and his ministers were very fearful of the publication of said laws and although some believe that they were not excepted, he thinks – referring to Zúñiga – that a lot could be done in these things with money”.⁴ From Madrid, support would be provided with the sending of different remittances to consolidate his steps.

The freedom of worship was also proclaimed with regards to the communities of foreign traders residing in the Iberian Peninsula. The Flemish experience had probably demonstrated the failure of policies of reform and repression introduced into the Netherlands within the framework of the spirit of the Counter Reformation. The tolerance article would therefore be developed later with a statement by Philip III which accompanied the ratification of the treaty on June 15th, 1605, where the same principles accorded by Cobham-Alba in 1576 were reiterated; that is to say, incorporating the clauses of religious tolerance towards English merchants confronted with the preeminences of the

¹ “Tratado de Paz, Alianza y Comercio”, Chapter 21. p. 264.

² Joseph Creswell (José Cresuelo) to Robert Cecil, conde de Salisbury. Valladolid, 20 June 1605. Cited by A. J. Loomie, *English polemics at the Spanish Court. Joseph Creswell’s Letter to the Ambassador from England* (New York, 1993), p. 200.

³ “The Laws recently passed in the English Parliament in the year 1606 against the Catholics whom they call Recusants” (1606), AGS, E (Inglaterra), Leg. 2.512. There is an english copy, “Las leyes nuevamente hechas..”.

⁴ J. Creswell, *Carta escrita al embaxadir de Inglaterra* (1606)., fol. 4. The Council of State, 12 August 1606. AGS, E (Inglaterra), Leg. 2.512 (year 1606), fol. 121.

Inquisition.¹ Moreover, the council of state delivered a series of measures throughout the month of September to remind of what was stipulated in the 1604 treaty and warn foreign residents in Spain that they were not included in these agreements of tolerance. However, complaints piled up and the cases remained unsolved *sine die*. In late November 1604, the council of state met exclusively to deal with the offences against the English merchants residing in Seville, who were being harassed by the commissioners and inspectors of the Inquisition. The series of offences they were submitted to began in Sanlúcar, where a guard came aboard and witnessed the unloading of the ship. Besides controlling the goods for tax purposes, the products were subjected to excessive duties, beyond all “reason and justice”, and they had to wait twenty days to sell them, a delay which caused them large daily expenses. With so many obstacles and taxes, it was not worth it to trade at Spanish ports given that the guarantees in favor of the English merchants were not being fulfilled.² Throughout 1612 there were numerous memorials and complaints which piled up on the desk of John Digby, England’s ambassador to Spain, so that he would mediate before the humiliating treatment which his country’s merchants were being subjected to.³ This entire series of acts and incidences, with regards to the judicial guarantees of the English merchants in Spain, did nothing more than to demonstrate that despite the signing of peace, there was still a long way to go for the fulfillment of the treaty’s chapters.

The road to a new Era

Since the signing of the Peace of London, English-Spanish relations were marked by negotiations to reach an alliance of matrimony. The so-called marriage project or *Spanish match*, between prince Charles and infanta Mary, was based on the proposal that the greatest catholic power could form a tight alliance with the most important protestant country, avoiding a possible religious war.⁴ The marriage could unite the Stuarts and Hapsburgs in an alliance which would contribute very positively to Europe’s stability, without involving their country in any war and wiping out the danger of an uprising in

¹ C. Gómez-Centurión, “Pragmatismo económico y tolerancia religiosa: los acuerdos de Cobham-Alba de 1576”, *Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea*, 8. (Madrid, 1987), 57-82. Specially, between pp. 62 to 76.

² Council of State. Madrid, 23 November 1604. “Sobre las quejas de los mercaderes ingleses que residen en Sevilla y mandar venir a los comisarios del comercio que residen en los puertos”. AGS, E (Inglaterra), Leg. 2.512 (year 1604), doc. 10.

³ Jacobo I to Pedro de Zúñiga. London, 30th march 1611. AGS, E (Inglaterra), Leg. 2.513 (year 1611).

⁴ On the “Spanish match” there is abundant bibliography in our work: *Diplomacia hispano-inglesa...*, 43. Footnote 7.

Ireland or Scotland.¹ However, the negotiations aiming to specify the terms of marriage ran into serious difficulties from the beginning due to the different agents that intervened – such as the papacy, the catholic sectors in Spain and the English parliament – and the situation was therefore blocked on numerous occasions.

Be that as it may, peace with England had not been able to entirely stanch old wounds and in both countries there was still distrust and suspicion due to certain actions in the past. In 1607, the Venetian ambassador to England, Nicolo Molin, described in an exhaustive report what in his opinion might occur in English-Spanish relations, which in agreement with the rumors going around, seemed headed for war. The desire of certain English sectors to renew privateering, restrained by peace, was opposed by the harshness of Spain's justice towards the English who traded at its ports.²

In fact, nor had peace managed to erase certain stereotypes and clichés maintained between both countries for so long. The image of the English the Spaniards had was still very conditioned by the writings which were circulating around the court of king Philip II and which had warned his successor about the English, who were not to be trusted for different reasons. As Álamos de Barrientos remarked: “for what they have offended us, not only in favoring the rebels in the states of Flanders and the islands, but also in the Indies, and lately in Spain itself”.³

An image fostered by some Italian and Spanish libelists, at the same time defenders of Spanish values and Philippine politics. Tomás Campanella devotes many of the pages of his *De Monarchia Hispanica* to deal with the causes intervening in the constitution and ascent of a monarchy, the factors contributing to its strength or weakness and the orientation of Spain's foreign policy. His work, however, went largely unnoticed in Spain although paradoxically it was widely read elsewhere in Europe, yet another of those contradictions which could not hinder the intentional spreading of certain clichés and images about Don Quixote's Spain.⁴ At any rate, the words devoted to the English and their nation in *Monarchia* are clearly influenced by this wave of opinion, which had fostered differences between both countries: “The Englishman is the least inclined to universal monarchy; however, he greatly harms the Spaniard who so pretends. Elizabeth of England provided an example

¹ Biblioteca del Palacio Real (hereafter BPR). Mss. II/2.108. Doc. 21. “Letter from the marquis of Miravel to the count of Gondomar”. Paris, 21 February 1622.

² K. Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven and London, 1992), pp. 3-4.

³ B. Álamos de Barrientos, *Discurso político al rey Felipe III al comienzo de su reinado* (Barcelona, 1990), p. 46.

⁴ P. Sanz Camañes, “La España del Quijote vista por los extranjeros”, *Revista CIm.Economía*, nº 5. Second semester, 2004 (Toledo, 2005), pp. 291-313.

of it, favoring corruption in both's possessions, in Belgium against the catholic king, in France against the very christian king and helping the heretics with advice and material support, since the island has plenty of ships and soldiers who seize everything Spain has in the north, and scamper to the New World..."¹ Later on, the Calabrian thinker pointed out the substantial differences between both countries, paying attention to two fundamental criteria: religion and dynasty.²

The opinions about Spain making their way around England were not much better. Religion and politics acted, as Trevor J. Dadson pointed out, as dangerous ingredients in any conflict or discussion of identities.³ The royal divorce between Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon had supposed the separation of the Church of England from Rome's control, establishing itself as the head of the new anglican church. The religious differences between catholics and protestants which were to divide Europe in the 16th century would end up turning England and Spain into leaders of two irreconcilable positions.⁴ The anti-Spanish feelings amidst the English people were again stirred up with the marriage between prince Philip and queen Mary, who earned the unpopularity of the English for being believed to have opened the doors to the Spaniards' administrative and repressive machinery in the country, the Holy Office included.

The years of conflict and rivalry of Elizabeth I had led to the confrontation. Remaining behind were the conspiracies plotted by the Spaniards to dethrone the queen, the English collaboration with the Dutch, the privateering in the New World, the defeat of the Spanish Armada, and another series of events which had filled pages of aggravating libel between both countries. Therefore, the succession of James I and his new policy regarding Spain, treaty of London included, was ominous compared to the policy of pride and prestige developed by his predecessor. Lastly, the adventures of Gondomar in London, buying off wills and dismantling the anti-Spanish faction in the English court, together with his alleged friendship with the monarch himself, further heightened the hispanophobic feeling on the Island.⁵ It is not surprising that following the humiliating episode of the duke of Buckingham and the

¹ T. Campanella, *La Monarquía Hispánica.*, pp. 189-90.

² *Ibid.*, p. 191.

³ T. J. Dadson, "La imagen de España en Inglaterra en los siglos XVI y XVII", *Imágenes de España en culturas y literaturas europeas (siglos XVI-XVII)*. ed. J.M. López de Abiada, and López Bernasocchi (Madrid, 2004), pp. 129 and follows.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 136-40.

⁵ "Letter from Girolamo Lando, venetian ambassador in England". London, 27 November 1620, 442. Calendar State Paper Venetian (hereafter CSPV), 1619-21; and Calendar State Paper Domestic (hereafter CSPD), 1619-1623. pp. 132, 197-8, 215, 223, 243-4, 253, 276, 307-10, 333, 346, 352 and 366-7.

prince of Wales in their journey to Madrid with the aim of prodding along the marriage, many of the English longed for the past and felt relieved shortly afterwards, with the breakout of hostilities in 1625, when they decided to take part in the Thirty Years' War on the side of the Dutch.¹ Still, in the middle of the 17th century in a speech to the English parliament, Oliver Cromwell referred to the Spaniards as the "great enemies of England". This "natural enemy", according to Cromwell's statement, had been involved in plots and conspiracies against queen Elizabeth, besides in plans and projects to destabilize Ireland or invade England.² The religious differences and trade conflicts continued to be at the bottom of the matter.

To sum up, peace with England, signed in London in 1604 and ratified in Valladolid a bit later redefined an important period in English-Spanish relations. In fact, the two decades running from 1585 to 1604 were witness to one of the moments of greatest tension in the political game of relations between both countries in the 16th and 17th centuries. The defense of dynasty, religion, strategic interests and those related to trade were aspects which markedly conditioned relations between both countries whose non-aggression in the early decades of the 17th century was largely due to the delicate financial situation both nations were going through to face new military commitments and the series of contractual obligations offered by each party tied in to the signing of a lasting peace.

Finally, the religious and dynastic reasons, all of them reasons of state, acted during the Modern Age as skillful instruments which mediatized and also served to explain the strategies and limits deployed by most of the monarchies. In the case of English-Spanish relations, the religious reasons and the struggles for power, this understood through the political and economic prism, converged in such a way that they served to justify the high costs of interventionist foreign policies for a long time. Indeed, decades of falling-out and confrontation in the fields of Holland and in American waters had fostered the ill will between both nations – according to some observers of the era³ – creating stereotypes and clichés which damaged the other's image and encouraged rivalries between irreconcilable enemies.

¹ T. Cogswell, "England and the Spanish Match", *Conflict in Early Stuart England. Studies in Religion and Politics, 1603-1642*, eds. R. Cust and A. Hughes (London, New York, 1989), pp. 107-33.

² H. Kamen and J. Perez, *La imagen internacional de la España de Felipe II: "Leyenda negra" o conflicto de intereses* (Valladolid, 1980), pp. 37-8.

³ "Relation of England of Piero Contarini, Venetian Ambassador, 1618". CSPV, 1617-1619, pp. 421-2.

**LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE DU SECOND EMPIRE FRANÇAIS
(1852-1870)**

*Iulian Oncescu**

Résumé

La politique étrangère de Napoléon III a eu un triple objectif: la grandeur de la France, l'équilibre européen et le droit des nationalités. A l'aide de la France vont se former ainsi la Roumanie (1859) et l'Italie (1861). Fidèle en quelque mesure aussi à l'esprit traditionnel de l'Empire, Napoléon III a rêvé d'acquérir du pouvoir et de la gloire au-delà des frontières de la France, y compris dans l'espace extra-européen (Asie, Afrique, Amérique). Pourtant, l'expédition de Mexique (1861-1866) a été presque unanimement considérée une grande erreur de Louis Napoléon Bonaparte.

Au niveau européen, si, pendant la période 1856-1865, la diplomatie française a appuyé l'émancipation des peuples du sud-est de l'Europe, néanmoins, après 1866, dans la politique étrangère du Second Empire français, on a essayé un rapprochement par rapport à l'Autriche, pour que la France puisse contrebalancer le pouvoir de la Prusse. Napoléon III a pratiqué aussi une diplomatie personnelle et secrète, souvent en contradiction avec celle officielle. La politique étrangère de la France pendant la période du Second Empire s'est transformée d'une politique locale, régionale, en une politique mondiale.

Mots-clefs: *politique étrangère de la France, Second Empire français (1852-1870), Napoléon III, principe des nationalités, politique mondiale*

Les principes de la politique étrangère du Second Empire français semblaient coïncider avec les intérêts des petites nations.¹ Le Second Empire (1852-1870), de Napoléon III, marquait l'inauguration d'une nouvelle forme de gouvernement et l'interruption d'un esprit politique établi en 1815. Un nouveau régime, un nouvel esprit devaient lui suivre aussi dans la politique étrangère. L'origine révolutionnaire du nouveau système devait être suivie par *une politique révolutionnaire* dans les affaires étrangères.²

Le caractère de la politique extérieure de Napoléon III a mis en évidence une attitude offensive contre les principes établis par le Traité de Vienne (1815),

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¹ Nicolae Corivan, *Din activitatea emigranților români în Apus (1853-1857). Scrisori și memorii* (De l'activité des émigrants roumains en Occident (1853-1857). Lettres et mémoires), București, Editions Cartea Românească, 1931, p. 7.

² *Ibidem*, p. 8.

laquelle s'est manifestée par excellence dans la politique des nationalités.¹ Personnalité originale, captivante de plusieurs points de vue mais difficile à définir, considérant le secret comme principe de gouvernement, l'empereur Napoléon III a intrigué ses contemporains et a représenté un défi pour l'analyse des historiens. Idéaliste, mais froid et calculé, généreux et machiavélique, cultivé et toujours ouvert vers la connaissance mais souvent entêté quant à ses options, sa personnalité est tellement difficile à comprendre qu'on arrive parfois à se demander si sa politique en entier n'a été faite que d'impulsions contradictoires, sans exclure pourtant une certaine cohérence de l'action.² Pour rester le *maître du jeu*, Napoléon III a pratiqué, comme on le reconnaît, une diplomatie personnelle et secrète. Il est intervenu dans des négociations et a même recouru à des émissaires dont les interventions ou initiatives ont doublé ou ont même substitué la diplomatie officielle.³

L'orientation de la politique étrangère de Napoléon III a été interprétée, pendant son époque et plus tard, de manières variées. Nicolae Iorga montra, par exemple, que l'empereur français était caractérisé aussi par un côté rêveur, côté que l'on retrouve souvent dans les hommes, mais lui, de l'autre côté, a pris connaissance de la vie, l'a utilisé et en a abusé; il semble que son plan était d'appuyer les nationalités, mais, en faisant cela, Napoléon III a déterminé la diminution de deux ennemis des traditions napoléoniennes: éloigner les Russes du Danube, arrêter les Autrichiens dans les Carpates, voilà un désir général de l'Europe industrielle, qui voulait assurer le cours du Danube.

I. Donteville, parlant de la politique orientale de Napoléon III, mentionnait que, de la manière la plus discrète possible, la politique des nationalités, chère à l'empereur, s'est affirmée après la Guerre de Crimée. Au Traité de Paris (1856), tous les pouvoirs ont garanti les privilèges de la Moldavie,

¹ *Ibidem*, p. 9; idem, *La politica orientala di Napoleon III e l'unione dei principati romeni*, Iași, Institutul Grafic «Presa Bună», 1937, pp. 2-3; Marcel Blanchard, *Le Second Empire*, Paris, 1950, Collection Armand Colin, pp. 80-81. Voir, pour plus de détails, Gheorghe I. Brătianu, *Napoléon III et les nationalités*, Paris-București, 1934.

² Serge Berstein, Pierre Milza, *Istoria Europei* (L'histoire de l'Europe), vol. IV, Iași, Institutul European, 1998, p. 128.

³ Philippe Séguin, *Ludovic Napoleon cel Mare* (Louis Napoléon le Grand), București, Editions Fundației Culturale Române, 1994, p. 216. Dans la politique étrangère, Napoléon III a été assimilé à un conspirateur. Il tenait ses ministres loin de ce qu'il pensait et ne dévoilait ses projets qu'au dernier moment. Cela a conduit à une série de conflits avec les ambassadeurs ou les ministres des Affaires Etrangères de la France, pendant la période du Second Empire. Les titulaires du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Drouyn de Lhuys, Alexandre Walewski, Edouard Thouvenel, Moustier, La Valette, La Tour d'Auvergne, Daru ou Gramont, pour la plupart du temps, n'ont été que des exécutants. «Les résultats de cette politique personnelle définie sans se faire comprendre ont été brillants jusqu'en 1860, déclinant pendant les années suivantes et devenant désastreux en 1870.» (Thierry Lenz, *Napoléon III*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1995, p. 76).

de la Valachie et de la Serbie. Dans l'histoire diplomatique du Second Empire, tout a été plein de désaccords et de contrastes. Tout était soumis à la volonté d'un seul homme, mais d'un homme ayant des volontés successives et contradictoires, un homme qui voulait ou ne voulait pas, ou bien voulait de nouveau, et qui ne s'engageait définitivement sur une fausse route, qu'après avoir loupé vingt fois la vraie.¹ Cette manière d'agir rend parfois difficile la mission de l'historien qui voudrait suivre exactement les méandres imposés par Napoléon III à la politique française.²

Le Second Empire français a été, en essence, tout à fait autre chose qu'un régime de pouvoir personnel.³ Napoléon III, bien qu'ayant admis une série de

¹ Nicolae Corivan, *La politica orientala di Napoleon III e l'unione dei Principati Romeni...*, p. 7 (note 4). Pour la carrière diplomatique et les actions de la diplomatie officielle pendant le Second Empire français, consulter aussi Patrick Bury, *La carrière diplomatique au temps du Second Empire*, in «Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique», juillet-décembre 1976, pp. 277-298; *Les affaires étrangères et le corps diplomatique français*, Tome I, «De l'ancien régime au second Empire», Paris, Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984 (sous la direction de Jean Baillou), pp. 700-750. Pour la politique étrangère de Napoléon III, voir Pierre Milza, *Napoléon III*, Paris, Perrin, 2004, pp. 306-309; Marcel Blanchard, *Le Second Empire*, Collection Armand Collin, Paris, 1950, pp. 77-78, 80-81; Thierry Lenz, *Napoléon III...*, pp. 75-79.

² Iulian Oncescu, *România în politica orientală a Franței (1866-1878)* (La Roumanie dans la politique orientale de la France (1866-1878)), deuxième édition, révisée et complétée, Târgoviște, Editions Cetatea de Scaun, 2010, pp. 34- 35.

³ Jaques Madaule, *Istoria Franței* (L'histoire de la France), vol. 2, București, Editions Politică, 1973, p. 314. Pour le règne de Napoléon III et la France pendant le Second Empire, voir: Émile Ollivier, *L'Empire libéral. Études, Récits, Souvenirs. Napoléon III*, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, 1898; Pierre De la Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire: Tome Premier*, Onzième édition, Paris, Librairie Plon, 1908; *Tome Second*, Onzième édition, Paris, Librairie Plon, 1908; *Tome Troisième*, Dixième édition, Paris, Librairie Plon, 1910; *Tome Quatrième*, Neuvième édition, Paris, Librairie Plon, 1907; *Tome Cinquième*, Huitième édition, Paris, Librairie Plon, 1908; *Tome Sixième*, Huitième édition, Paris, Librairie Plon, 1910; *Tome Septième*, Septième édition, Paris, Librairie Plon, 1907; Marcel Blanchard, *Le Second Empire*, Paris, Collection Armand Colin, 1950; Adrien Dansette, *Deuxième République et Second Empire*, Paris, Fayard, 1942; idem, *Du 2 décembre au 4 septembre*, Paris, Hachette, 1972; Louis Girard, *Napoléon III*, Fayard, Paris, 1986, pp. 248-487; Alain Plessis, *De la fête impériale au mur des fédérés, 1852-1871*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1973; William H. C. Smith, *Napoléon III*, Paris, Hachette, 1982, pp. 206-344; *Histoire de la France*, sous la direction de Jean Favier, tome 5, François Caron, *La France des patriotes*, Paris, Fayard, 1985, pp. 132-210; Jean Garrigues, *La France de 1848 à 1870*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2002, pp. 68-180; Jean Tullard, *Dictionnaire du Second Empire*, Paris, Fayard, 1995. Pierre Albertini, *La France du XIX^e siècle, 1815-1914*, Paris, Hachette, 1995, pp. 54-64; Thierry Lenz, *Napoléon III...*, pp. 41-113; Jean Garrigues, *La France de 1848 à 1870*, Armand Colin, Paris, 2002, pp. 68-180; Pierre Milza, *Napoléon III*, Perrin, 2004; Jean-Claude Yon, *Le Second Empire. Politique, société, culture*, Armand Colin, Paris, 2004; Walter Bruyère-Ostelles, *Napoléon III et le Second Empire*, Paris, Librairie Vuibert, 2004; Lucian Boia, *Napoleon al III-lea cel neubit* (Napoléon III le mal-aimé), traduction du français par Emanoil Marcu, București, Editions Humanitas, 2008.

pratiques suggérant la démocratie, gardait néanmoins des pouvoirs absolus.¹



Charles-Louis Napoléon Bonaparte
(1808-1873) – Napoléon III, Président de la France (1848-1852),
Empereur de la France (1852-1870)
Portrait officiel de Napoléon III (par Flandrin)

L'empereur, par sa formation, n'a ressemblé pas du tout aux hommes d'Etat de son époque. Il a fait des études complètes et, en particulier, a utilisé son temps libre pour étudier l'économie politique. Il a vu, mieux que tous ses contemporains, la caractéristique de la nouvelle époque qui s'ouvrait en Europe, à savoir le triomphe concomitant de la démocratie et du capitalisme. Selon l'opinion de Louis-Napoléon, la démocratie ne se confond pas nécessairement avec un régime de liberté politique. Le Bonapartisme a consisté en une synthèse de démocratie et d'autorité personnelle. Et le capitalisme a eu pour effet l'accroissement des richesses et leur circulation plus facile, d'où un enrichissement et une ascension progressive du niveau de vie, de manière que, en fin de compte, le capitalisme a agit dans le même sens que la démocratie.²

Le souci principal du gouvernement français devait être l'augmentation de la richesse publique. Le nouveau dictateur a eu l'intention sincère de gouverner pour le peuple, mais sans le peuple, éloquent en ce sens étant son

¹ John R. Barber, *Istoria Europei moderne* (L'histoire de l'Europe moderne), București, Editions Lider, 1993, p. 277.

² Jaques Madaule, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

programme très efficace de modernisation économique.¹

Les conséquences sociales de l'essor économique ont été sérieuses. La société française acquiert, sous le Second Empire, une forme et un système fiscal qui n'ont pas changé pendant 50 ans. A la différence de Napoléon Bonaparte, son neveu n'a pas été un conquérant. Bien qu'en 1852 il déclarait qu'«*Empire signifie paix*», son désir d'ébranler l'ordre de la Sainte Alliance, et la nécessité d'offrir aux Français des compensations capables de substituer le manque de vie politique des premières années de l'Empire, l'ont fait désirer pourtant les interventions militaires. Au moins espérait-il que, une fois les peuples délivrés, on puisse mettre ainsi les bases d'une Europe fondée sur la libre adhésion de ses habitants.² Cet esprit concordait aussi avec la nouvelle hostilité de la France. La population du Second Empire français a connu une hausse rapide; les villages restent stationnaires, mais les villes grandissent (surtout Paris). La grande industrie exploitait les ouvriers et Napoléon III déclarait, le 1^{er} décembre 1852 (style nouveau), «*son amour pour les classes opprimées*», comme étant une des caractéristiques de son gouvernement. La situation des paysans s'est améliorée, beaucoup d'entre eux devenant des propriétaires. La bourgeoisie a profité, à la suite des progrès économique (investissant dans les grandes affaires de France ou de l'étranger – voir le cas de l'Égypte). Non seulement politiquement, mais aussi socialement, le Second Empire a été un régime à l'allure démocratique.³

Vers 1860, la popularité de l'empereur a baissé pourtant, et il a commencé tout de suite à réviser les pratiques impériales tenant compte des principes du libéralisme européen; il a continué cette ligne d'action politique pendant l'entière décennie.⁴ Proscrit, comme tous les membres de la famille impériale, Napoléon III a assimilé sa cause personnelle à celle des peuples opprimés par les vainqueurs de son oncle. Ainsi, à l'étranger, la destruction des traités de 1815 a constitué le but constant de son entière politique, et il est clair que ce but a été approuvé par la grande majorité des Français.⁵

L'empereur a désiré un nouvel équilibre européen basé sur un système de congrès permettant de résoudre de manière pacifiste les problèmes qui pouvaient apparaître entre divers peuples. Il exprimait cela dans une déclaration lue devant le Sénat en 1863: «*Je désire de toute mon âme qu'il vienne un jour où les grands problèmes qui désunissent les gouvernements et les peuples puissent être résolus en pleine paix par un tribunal européen.*»⁶

¹ John R. Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 277. Pour l'économie française pendant le Second Empire, voir aussi Lucian Boia, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-135.

² Serge Berstein, Pierre Milza, *op. cit.*, p. 129; voir aussi Pierre Milza, *Napoléon III...*, p. 308; Thierry Lenz, *Napoléon III...*, pp. 75-79; Lucian Boia, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-78.

³ Jaques Madaule, *Istoria Franței...*, vol. II, p. 317.

⁴ John R. Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 279; Marcel Blanchard, *Le Second Empire...*, pp. 139-153.

⁵ Serge Berstein, Pierre Milza, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

⁶ Apud *ibidem*, p. 130; Pierre Milza, *Napoléon III...*, p. 308.

La politique complexe, changeante, du Second Empire, «*pleine d'hésitations et de retours*», a conduit la France, quand même, finalement, au désastre,¹ mais la cause de ce désastre ne doit pas être attribuée exclusivement à cette politique. Les préoccupations de Napoléon III ont embrassé le monde entier.² La politique étrangère de la France dans la période du Second Empire s'est transformée, ainsi, d'une politique locale, régionale, dans une politique mondiale. Louis Napoléon a voulu, évidemment, mettre la politique étrangère de la France au service de l'idée qu'il s'était fait sur l'organisation et l'évolution du monde.

Une attitude originale et même radicalement nouvelle, laquelle lui sera bien reprochée et qu'il payera cher. Jamais – ni même pendant la révolution – la France ne s'est-elle reconnue expressément une vocation tellement messianique. Et l'empereur a été, probablement, le premier chef d'Etat qui mérite le titre de mondialiste. D'ailleurs, il se le revendique implicitement, lorsqu'il exclame: «*C'était un homme de génie celui qui s'est rendu compte que l'équilibre européen ne se trouve plus comme jadis dans les Alpes ou les Pyrénées, sur la Vistule ou le Pont-Euxin, mais comprend le monde entier.*» En réalité, la France n'a eu une politique mondiale qu'à partir du Second Empire. Et cela est dû à Louis Napoléon.³

Sa politique étrangère part de trois sources d'inspiration, d'ailleurs tellement étroitement complémentaires qu'il est difficile à les distinguer l'une de l'autre: d'abord, le principe des nationalités; ensuite, la reconnaissance de certaines valeurs dont la diffusion s'impose: ordre, progrès, expression populaire; et finalement l'intérêt de la France.⁴

Par les objectifs fixés pour sa politique étrangère, le fait de dénoncer les traités de 1815, comme nous venons de montrer, occupait une place tactique essentielle dans le discours de l'empereur. Ces traités étaient, dans sa vision, la source de tous les maux et de tous les inconvénients d'Europe. Depuis 1830 et surtout après 1848, les nationalités, longtemps en proie à la léthargie du système né à la suite du Congrès de Vienne, se sont éveillées.⁵

¹ Jaques Madaule, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

² *Ibidem*, pp. 322-323.

³ Philippe Séguin, *Ludovic Napoleon cel Mare* (Louis Napoléon le Grand)..., p. 207; Lucian Boia, *Napoleon al III-lea...*, pp. 106-117.

⁴ Philippe Séguin, *op. cit.*, p. 208; Lucian Boia, *op. cit.*, p. 101 – l'auteur apprécie que la politique étrangère de Napoléon III avait un triple objectif: la grandeur de la France, l'équilibre européen et le droit des nationalités. Thierry Lenz montre, lui aussi, que la politique étrangère de la France se concentrait autour de trois idées primordiales: mettre fin à l'Europe résultée à la suite des traités de 1815, promouvoir le principe des nationalités et poursuivre l'expansion coloniale française (*op. cit.*, p. 76).

⁵ Philippe Séguin, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

L'appui de la France allait aider à la naissance de la Roumanie¹ et de l'Italie. Si la question italienne a généré des controverses et le dossier roumain a été généralement ignoré, en échange, l'expédition du Mexique n'a provoqué aucune discussion: elle a été presque unanimement considérée une grande erreur de Louis Napoléon, la plus grande, probablement, car elle a été aussi la plus incompréhensible.² Poursuivant dans une certaine mesure l'esprit traditionnel de l'Empire, Napoléon III a rêvé d'acquérir du pouvoir et de la gloire au-delà des frontières de la France³, y compris dans l'espace extra-Européen.



La guerre de Crimée (1853-1856)

De ce qui est revenu à la France à la suite des traités de 1815, Napoléon III a réalisé un territoire impérial qui avançait jusqu'au Niger. Par l'occupation

¹ Pour la «naissance de la Roumanie», voir aussi René Girault, *Peuples et nations d'Europe au XIX^e siècle*, Paris, Hachette Livre, 1996, pp. 153-156; Lucian Boia, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-162; *Bulletin de l'Académie du Second Empire*, dossier «L'impulsion de Napoléon III pour l'indépendance et l'unité de la Roumanie (1853-1870)», no. 15-16, Paris, 1996-1997, pp. 3-67. L'Union de 1859 des deux Principautés – Valachie et Moldavie – marque un tournant radical dans l'histoire des Roumains. Cet acte a été réalisé grâce à l'action décisive de la France, grâce à Napoléon III. Et c'est toujours grâce à ce pouvoir qu'a eu lieu la Grande Union de 1918. C'est pour cela que tous les Roumains, dès leur enfance même, sont conscients de ce fait et naturellement sont très redevables à la France, gardant dans leur cœur la chère mémoire de tout ce que l'Empereur a fait pour leurs ancêtres et pour toutes les générations qui ont suivi (Dumitru Cîaușu, *Profession de foi*, in *Bulletin...*, p. 12); l'Union des Principautés Roumaines apparaissait comme le premier grand acte de Napoléon III dans la direction de l'application du principe des nationalités. (Paul Henry, *Napoléon III et les peuples. À propos d'une aspect de la politique extérieure du Second Empire*, Paris, Imprimerie Jean Louis, 1943, pp. 11, 13, 55.); voir aussi Bernard Petit, *Napoléon III, parrain de la Roumanie*, in *Napoléon III, Boulogne et Europa* (sous la direction de Bruno Béthouart), Colloque International et Pluridisciplinaire, Boulogne-sur-Mer, 2002, pp. 301-304; voir, pour plus de détails, Iulian Oncescu, *op.cit.*, pp. 54-92.

² Philippe Séguin, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

³ John R. Barber, *Istoria Europei moderne...*, p. 279.

des oasis de l'Algérie, on pouvait voir déjà se dessiner d'un but à l'autre de l'espace saharien les grandes lignes de l'Afrique française, l'empereur manifestant un vif intérêt pour l'administration de l'Algérie, où il fait un voyage retentissant en 1865¹, le premier entrepris en Afrique par un chef d'Etat français. Des événements extraordinaires se sont déroulés aussi dans l'Extrême Orient, des événements dont la vraie importance commence à peine à être perçue, elle aussi.

La guerre de l'opium, menée par les Anglais, a ouvert le commerce européen dans cinq ports de la Chine en 1842. En 1853, les Américains ont brisé la blokada derrière laquelle se trouvait le Japon.

La situation de la Chine sous la dynastie mandchourienne a conduit à une anarchie durable dans ce pays. *Les Taiping* (participants à la guerre des paysans) ont décimé les missionnaires français, ce qui détermine l'expédition sur la Chine de 1858-1860. Le traité de Tientsin ou Tianjin (signé en juin 1858, avec la Grande Bretagne, la France, la Russie et les Etats Unis, dénoncé par les Chinois pendant la même année et ratifié en 1860 à travers la Convention de Pékin), qui met fin à cette guerre, a une importance majeure, étant à l'origine de la transformation de la Chine. Cet intérêt accordé à l'Extrême Orient s'est rendu visible aussi à travers les Français établis en Indochine et à travers l'institution du protectorat sur la Cambodge. En 1867, l'entière Indochine a été occupée.²



Le Duc de Gramont (1819-1880)

Napoléon III a mené une politique spéciale par rapport à l'Amérique, dont les résultats peuvent être déplorés, mais dont le principe pouvait être en quelque sorte soutenu. L'empereur a pensé à la transformation du Mexique en un empire

¹ Pierre Milza, *op. cit.*, p. 524.

² Jacques Madaule, *Istoria Franței...*, vol. II, p. 324; Marcel Blanchard, *Le Second Empire...*, pp. 180-181; Pierre Milza, *Napoléons III...*, pp. 527-529.

catholique et latin capable de s'opposer à la grande république anglo-saxonne et protestante des Etats Unis de l'Amérique. Procédant ainsi, on aurait donné satisfaction aux catholiques français mécontents du comportement de l'Italie, ainsi qu'à certains intérêts financiers, que Morny¹ n'ignorait pas.²

En Europe, dans un autre contexte et à l'esprit de la nouvelle politique, il vaut signaler les oscillations du Paris dans le problème de l'appui pour les peuples du sud-est du continent. Si, dans la période 1856-1865, la diplomatie française a appuyé l'émancipation des peuples balkaniques et la création d'Etats nationaux, comme il est arrivé aussi dans le cas de la Roumanie, du Monténégro, de la Grèce, pourtant cette ligne a été ultérieurement quittée pour faire place à un rapprochement de l'Autriche, pour que la France puisse contrebalancer le pouvoir de la Prusse.³



*Maximilien de Habsbourg,
Empereur du Mexique (1864-1867)*

Les initiatives impériales de la France ont embrassé ainsi le monde entier. Fidèle à l'esprit traditionnel de l'empire, Napoléon III a désiré acquérir du pouvoir et de la gloire au-delà des anciennes frontières de son Empire. Probablement cette vision de gloire internationale a accru considérablement la sympathie dont il jouissait parmi les citoyens français. Une tentative précoce de transformer ces espoirs en réalité a impliqué la France dans la guerre de Crimée. Une initiative qui a valu beaucoup de prestige à la France a été enregistrée

¹ Charles Morny (1811-1865) – demi-frère de Napoléon III.

² Jacques Madaule, *op. cit.*, p. 325. Pour plus de détails sur l'«aventure» mexicaine, voir William H.C. Smith, *Napoléon III...*, pp. 227-247; Marcel Blanchard, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-188; Pierre Milza, *op. cit.*, pp. 529-539; Thierry Lenz, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-87.

³ Nicolae Ciachir, *Istoria modernă universală* (L'histoire moderne universelle), vol. II (1789-1919), București, Editions Oscar Print, 1998, p. 132.

pendant la même année avec la guerre de Crimée, lorsque l'empereur a appuyé les projets de Ferdinand de Lesseps concernant la construction d'un canal¹ liant la Mer Méditerranée à la Mer Rouge. Ce projet, conclu en 1869, a permis à la France de maintenir son influence dans l'est de la Méditerranée jusqu'en 1950. Les troupes impériales françaises ont pénétré aussi en Asie, où elles ont occupé l'Indochine entre 1859-1869, comme nous venons de montrer. Pendant la même période, la France a développé de petits districts et sphères d'influence dans l'ouest et l'est de l'Afrique, qui plus tard allaient se trouver à la base d'un vaste empire édifié sur ce continent.



*Napoléon III et Bismarck, après la bataille de Sedan
(2 septembre 1870)*

Mais, comme on le sait, la tentative de Napoléon III d'étendre son empire sur la terre américaine a conduit à un échec. Tout comme l'Angleterre et l'Espagne, la France a envoyé des troupes au Mexique en 1861, car ce pays n'avait pas acquitté ses dettes aux pays européens.² Face aux menaces américaines, la France a répondu en retirant ses troupes en 1866. Les Mexicains ont exécuté l'empereur Maximilien. Ce dénouement a ombragé l'image de Napoléon III en France. Malgré les résultats inégaux de la politique impériale menée par l'empereur et malgré l'opposition croissante par rapport à son gouvernement autoritaire aux années '70, Napoléon III a continué néanmoins à garder sa popularité.³

Du point de vue de la politique étrangère, les années d'après 1866 ont été évidemment marquées par les efforts de Napoléon III d'endiguer l'influence

¹ Marcel Blanchard, *op. cit.*, p. 179 (Le Canal de Suez a été inauguré en 1869, en présence de l'impératrice de la France, Eugénie); Lucian Boia, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-127.

² John Barber, *Istoria Europei moderne...*, p. 279.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 280.

croissante de la Prusse en Europe ou au moins d'obtenir des compensations pour la France.

Dans ce compliqué jeu politique, il a obtenu seulement la neutralisation du Luxembourg, lequel avait fait partie jusqu'alors de la Confédération allemande et dans la capitale duquel une garnison prussienne avait été stationnée jusqu'au moment respectif. L'ambassadeur de la France à Vienne, Gramont, a proposé, dès le printemps de 1867 même, la conclusion d'une alliance avec l'Autriche-Hongrie, la proposition échouant à cause des réserves précaires de Beust. Lorsqu'on a essayé d'entamer de nouveau cette discussion à Paris, la nouvelle de la catastrophe de l'empereur Maximilien du Mexique a anéanti de nouveau les espoirs français liés à une alliance autrichienne.¹

A cause de l'opinion publique qui a vu dans la personne de Napoléon III un des principaux coupables de la tragédie mexicaine, il y a eu ensuite une raison de plus pour le refus d'une nouvelle offre d'alliance, faite à l'occasion d'une rencontre à Salzburg en août 1867. Ni la visite du souverain autrichien à Paris pendant l'automne du 1867 n'a apporté aucun résultat concret malgré les conversations intenses portées dans la capitale française. Plus tard, en 1869, Napoléon III planifia encore une alliance avec l'Autriche et l'Italie; celle-ci échoue, pourtant, de nouveau, à cause des vastes prétentions territoriales de l'Italie.²

Paul Guériot, l'un des historiens les plus conciliants à l'égard de Louis Napoléon, résume l'ensemble de sa diplomatie de la manière suivante: «*Napoléon III a été la victime de sa propre imagination, déçu par des erreurs généreuses. Il ne voulait pas admettre que, dans sa politique étrangère, le devoir d'un chef d'Etat signifie souvent se maintenir, s'acharner dans l'égoïsme national. Il a voulu être le champion des peuples opprimés, intervenir comme un défenseur de la justice, jouer en Europe et même au-delà de l'Europe le rôle d'arbitre-providence.*»³

¹ Erich Zöllner, *Istoria Austriei. De la începuturi până în prezent* (L'histoire de l'Autriche. Dès ses débuts jusqu'à présent), éd. VIII (trad. par Adolf Armbruster), vol. II, București, Editions Enciclopedică, 1997, p. 513.

² *Ibidem*, p. 514; Pierre Milza, *Napoléon III...*, pp. 543-544.

³ Apud Philippe Séguin, *Ludovic Napoleon cel Mare...*, p. 208.

**OUT OF TARGOVISTE TOWN CULTURAL REBIRTH:
“PROGRESUL” CULTURAL SOCIETY (1876)**

*Ramona Stanciu**

Abstract

Setting up “Progresul” Society, in 1876, meant the invigoration of Targoviste cultural life throughout XIX century; such Society was the first one capable to gather around worthy personalities of the town. Society stated aim was thrivingness of town library, holding of conferences thus aiming cultural life of Targoviste to be alligned to the one similar in the town of Bucharest, it was also an attempt to sally out from everyday life. We mention I.D. Petrescu, D. Condurateanu, Al. Ducea, C. Alessandrescu as some of Targoviste intellectual people who set up basics of such cultural society and who developed a remarkable activity.

Key words: *Romanian culture, Targoviște, “Progresul”, Cultural Society, Armonia, Targoviste personalities*

After having passed through a stage of great establishment and great founders during the first half of XIX, it could be stated that Romanian culture underwent a new stage.¹

Therefore, considering the overall circumstances of the national rebirth and affirmation featuring the second half of XIX century, a high cultural effervescence prevail upon all Romanian provinces. Under such circumstances, culture also rebirth in the former capital of Tara Romaneasca. Targoviste personalities, like I. H. Rădulescu, are nationwide acknowledged. He really tried, in 1870, to commission a book shop in Targoviste having the support of I. D. Petrescu. A sudden change occurred by opening more primary schools, by setting up a secondary school in 1874², but especially by setting up “Progresul” Society in 1876, it is really the first cultural society heard about in Targoviste

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¹ Iulian Oncescu, Ion Stanciu, *Introducere în istoria modernă a Românilor (1821-1918)*, Târgoviște, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2009, p. 281.

² Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Pagini din istoria culturii târgoviștene. Societatea Culturală „Progresul” (1876)*, in Victor Petrescu, Mihai Oproiu, Constantin Manolescu, *Târgoviștea culturală. Studii. Articole. Note*, Târgoviște, Editura Bibliotheca, 2000, pp. 137-138.

and capable to gather town personalities around it.¹ We mention I.D. Petrescu, D. Condurateanu, Al. Ducea, C. Alessandrescu as some of Targoviste intellectual people who set up basics of such cultural society and who developed a remarkable activity.² After setting up the society, its members were informing town officials regarding its mission. By a Notification of “Progresul” Society provided to C Fussea, town mayor, on November 13, 1876, he was informed that *“In this very town, Progresul Society was set up, the mission of the Society is:*

1. To make its members keeping fresh their knowledge by means of discussions.

2. To make town library to becoming blooming.

3. To held some conferences in the school premses.

We are confident that if you also share mission and importance of the mentioned Society, you will be willing to fully support society blooming and prosperity; therefore you are highly requested to make us available a conference room in the boy primary school.

Please receive, Mr Mayor, assurance of my deep consideration,

President Stefan Marinescu

Secretary, C. Alessandrescu³,

Few days later, on November 17, 1876, Stefan Marinescu, president of Targoviste “Progresul” Cultural Society, was appropriately writing to the president of School Committee:

“Progresul Society, set up in this town, as you have been sincerely informed by Notification No. 3 (...), its mission being, among others, blooming of Town Library, is kindly asking you to concede a special library room located in Boy Public Promary School, it si also asking you to provide, to societey care and management, all the books and book shelves and cases school is in property of, along with an inventory sheet, wherefore society appointed, during the meeting held on October 31, current year, Mr G.M.Garbiniu literature teacher at County Secondary School, as lead librarian, and also appointed Mr D.P.Condurateanu an elementary teacher, third grade, at Primary School, as second librarian.

¹ *Ibidem*, p. 138; Mihai Oproiu, Dobrin Pârvan, *Târgoviște. Orașul și împrejurimile sale între 1821-1918*, vol. II, Târgoviște, Editura Biblioteca, 2001, pp. 279-280. For Cultural Society “Progresul” from Targoviste see Central Historical National Archives, Dâmbovița County Department (hereinafter: A.N.I.C., D.J.D.), fond Primăria orașului Târgoviște, dosar 79/1876-1877, ff. 1-7.

² Alexandrina Andronescu, *Catalogul periodicelor dâmbovițene din sec. al XIX-lea*, in „Valahica”, XII-XIII, Târgoviște, 1980-1981, p. 347.

³ A.N.I.C., D.J.D., fond Primăria orașului Târgoviște, dosar 79/1876-1877, f. 1.

*If you deign to approve such measures please let us know shortly thus appropriate actions to be taken mentioned Library to be developed accordingly. Kindly asking you to understand, Mr President, that such actions will not deinvest county and school from property rights but will only patronize and manage it...”*¹

Members of “Progresul” Society aimed blooming of town library and holding some conferences in the school premises² followed by alligning it to the one similar in the town of Bucharest, it was also an attempt to sally out from everyday life.³

Also considering that for society blooming and prosperirty “*it’s certainly necessarily a room from Boy Primary School to be available for holding of conferences and literary evenings*”, committee of “Progresul” Society accordingly requires approval from town hall.⁴

City hall response to such request was largehearted on November 15, 1876, informing such committee “*room located above, in front of the yard corresponding to Boy School premises, where elementary school was located*”⁵, will be made available, also recommending to “Progresul” Cultural Society Committee to care of the existing inventory.⁶

Apart from mayor’s approval room to be made available for Society metings and conferences; mayor was informing that president request will be also notified to Ministry of Public and Culture Instructions.⁷

Therefore, Targoviste town mayor forwards on the same day, on November 15, 1876, a notification to minister of Instructions and Culture showing Progresul Society intention to held conferences in presmises of Boy School but also regarding the aim town library to be invigorated.⁸ The Minister forwaded his reply on November 23, 1876, approving Progresul Cultural Society to use a room from Boy School, yet he disapproved library of No 1 Elementary School to be transferred in order the library to become a town library.

¹ *Ibidem*, f. 4.

² *Ibidem*, f. 3.

³ Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Pagini din istoria culturii târgoviștene. Societatea Culturală „Progresul”* (1876)..., p. 138; Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Societatea Culturală Progresul (1876)*, în „Acta Valahica”, III, Târgoviste, 1972, p. 366.

⁴ A.N.I.C., D.J.D., fond Primăria orașului Târgoviște, dosar 79/1876-1877, f. 2.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 3; Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Pagini din istoria culturii târgoviștene. Societatea Culturală „Progresul”* (1876)..., p. 138.

⁷ A.N.I.C., D.J.D., fond Primăria orașului Târgoviște, dosar 79/1876-1877, f. 1 v.

⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 3.

*The existing library of the mentioned school can not be remised, yet if the premises is appropriate, you are allowed to assign a room to Progresul Society.*¹

We learnt, from the documents available to us, that the first president of Progresul Cultural Society was Stefan Marinescu and Constantin Alessandrescu was the appointed secretary.² Apart from such details, information regarding society activity are quite few, it is therefore a minus for the detailed learning related to its activity.³ On May 24, 1881, a newspaper named “Armonia” was firstly issued under the directorate of C. Alessandrescu who was also the secretary of Progresul Cultural Society.⁴

The newspaper was an weekly issue and was depicting local news agricultural, economical and administration information, news regarding Dambovită educational system, curricula, medical advice, literature and history columns and advertising, as well. Among the authors of “Armonia” newspapers articles and columns we mention C. Fussea, I. Tomsa, C. Carabela, C. Alessandrescu și Al. Vlahuță.⁵ As Alexandru Vlahuta was among the ones having a cooperation and was writing to “Armonia” newspaper, we could assert that he was one of the Targoviste, Progresul Cultural Society founders.⁶

In the first issue of the newspaper, C. Alessandrescu, secretary of “Progresul” Cultural Society, was stating that he was considering himself the son of “great generation” attempting to bring to life and to increase to the maximum extent cultural life of the town: “*What do we want? Who are we?*

We are the members from the great family of the great generation on whose arm band it is written the word “Progress”.

¹ *Ibidem*, f. 6. The answer came in Târgoviște on December 28, 1876.

² Mihai Oproiu, *Societatea Culturală „Progresul”, precursor al lecturii publice târgoviștene*, in Victor Petrescu, Mihai Oproiu, Constantin Manolescu, *Târgoviștea culturală. Studii. Articole. Note*, Târgoviște, Editura Bibliotheca, 2000, pp. 147-148; Mihai Oproiu, Dobrin Pârvan, *Târgoviște. Orașul și împrejurimile sale între 1821-1918*, vol. II..., p. 280.

³ Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Pagini din istoria culturii târgoviștene. Societatea Culturală „Progresul” (1876)...*, pp. 138-139.

⁴ Andronescu Alexandrina, *Catalogul periodicelor dâmbovițene din sec. al XIX-lea*, in „Valahica”, XII-XIII, Târgoviște, 1980-1981, p. 353; Mihai Oproiu, *Societatea Culturală „Progresul”, precursor al lecturii publice târgoviștene...*, p. 148; see: Constantin Manolescu, Alexandru Vlahuță, Duiliu Zamfirescu și Societatea Culturală „Progresul”, in Victor Petrescu, Mihai Oproiu, Constantin Manolescu, *Târgoviștea culturală. Studii. Articole. Note*, Târgoviște, Editura Bibliotheca, 2000, pp. 142-143.

⁵ Alexandrina Andronescu, *Catalogul periodicelor dâmbovițene din sec. al XIX-lea*, în „Valahica”, XII- XIII, Târgoviște, 1980-1981, p. 353; see for the newspaper „Armonia”, pp. 351-353.

⁶ Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Pagini din istoria culturii târgoviștene. Societatea Culturală „Progresul (1876)...*, p. 139; Mihai Oproiu, *Societatea Culturală „Progresul”, precursor al lecturii publice târgoviștene...*, p. 148; Mihai Oproiu, Dobrin Pârvan, *Târgoviște. Orașul și împrejurimile sale între 1821-1918*, vol. II..., p. 280.

The aim of the Society is the one highlighted in the above rows, namely “*progress and blooming of Targoviste town*”, the release wish being cultural society to also cultivate “*literature, science, pedagogy*”, a specific life in the town, “*foreign language translations*”¹, as well.

Alexandru Vlahuta, as a member of Progresul Cultural Society, used his skills for town cultural growth.² Fostering the original literature, he published more poems in the Targoviste publications “Armonia” and “Unirea”, poems he will also publish in the central press. On November 8, 1881, on the occasion of Ion Heliade Radulescu trunk statue exposure, Alexandru Vlahuta, a delegation member of Targoviste Progresul Society, declared himself citizen of Targoviste, he was one of those fighting and aiming for town cultural rebirth. Targoviste Cultural Society was concerned with the events held in the capital accordingly appointing a committee which to represent the town at the great celebrations in Bucharest thus editing post cards and publishing articles related to Ion Heliade Radulescu life and work and also initiating exposure of a statue representing the great writer and culture man who was Ion Heliade Radulescu.

On the occasion of the event held in the capital, namely exposure of Heliade statue, Alexandru Vlahuta recited in University Square the poem named “*La statuia lui Heliade Rădulescu (close to Ion Heliade Radulescu Statue)*”.³

*Another personality of national culture, Duiliu Zamfirescu, lived in Targoviste where he came as a prosecutor in 1881. Apparently, he met here Alexandru Vlahuta in the house of Maria Serdareasa. Throughout his periplus in Targoviste, it is possible Duiliu Zamfirescu to have adhered to the cultural environment created by Progresul Society.*⁴ Period 1881-1883 was one when members of Progresul Cultural Society, mostly intellectuals in the town, started according to society schedule a huge research and documentary work which would show its harvest by means of a series of scientific and pedagogic paperwork. Dambovită newspaper was informing, on August 7, 1885, that the cultural society was bearing a high prestige and its members were attending conferences of rural elementary teachers in Dambovită county.

During such a conference, the county physician Cristescu, also member of Progresul Cultural Society, showed the cause of different epidemic diseases. It seems to be the first conference that made society known in the cultural history

¹ Apud Constantin Manolescu, *Alexandru Vlahuță, Duiliu Zamfirescu și Societatea Culturală „Progresul”*..., p. 143.

² *Ibidem*, pp. 143-144.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 144 (the poem was published in the newspaper „Armonia” in Târgoviște, year I, no. 21, November 22, 1881 and republished by the newspaper „Timpul” no. 258, November 26, 1881).

⁴ Constantin Manolescu, *Alexandru Vlahuță, Duiliu Zamfirescu și Societatea Culturală „Progresul”*..., pp. 145-146.

of the county, it had good feedback among schoolmen in Dambovita who accordingly expressed their wish to attend another cultural events organized by the society.¹

Period 1876-1883 was a first stage in the life of Progresul Cultural Society in Targoviste², when its members deeply wanted to and succeeded to rebirth interest for scientific work and own cultural life of the town. In 1883, Dambovita newspaper announced reorganisation of the society thus marking its second stage of life, the professoral body in Dambovita county also being called upon this time. A new managing committee was appointed, Dumitru Iovitiu was the president, I.D. Petrescu and the priest Ion Diaconescu were vice-presidents, Dumitru Conduratelyanu was cashier, C. Alessandrescu and C. Mihailescu secretaries, and council members were N. Bruneanu, priest Al. Duda and C.I. Nicolaescu.³ At the same time, it is decided "Progresul" newspaper to be edited by society members. As cultural society president, dr. D. Iovitiu, was also the political director of "Armonia" newspaper and three of society members were also members of publishing house council, it was decided the two publications to emerge into one sole newspaper "Unirea", subtitled "Foaia societății Progresul" (Sheet of Progresul Society) in Targoviste".⁴

First issue of "Unirea" publication was released after December 15, 1893, it was a weekly issue. Romanian folklore was a major concern for members of cultural society.

Throughout the second stage of Progresul Cultural Society, after 1883, both scientific and pedagogic works were developed. Some important society member works were issued: I.D. Petrescu (*Radu cel Mare*, printed in Târgoviște in 1884, *Tergoviștea. Schițe istorice și topografice*, printed in Targoviște in 1888, *Descălicarea lui Negru Vodă și cetatea sa după Dâmbovița*, printed in Targoviște in 1894, also "*Colecțiune de poezii originale Albina*", printed in Targoviște in 1895), Dumitru P. Conduratelyanu (school book "*Geografia*

¹ Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Pagini din istoria culturii târgoviștene. Societatea Culturală „Progresul”* (1876)..., p. 139; Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Societatea Culturală Progresul (1876)*..., p. 367.

² Constantin Manolescu, *Alexandru Vlahuță, Duiliu Zamfirescu și Societatea Culturală „Progresul”*..., pp. 145-146.

³ Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Pagini din istoria culturii târgoviștene. Societatea Culturală „Progresul”* (1876)..., p. 139; Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Societatea Culturală Progresul (1876)*..., p. 367; Mihai Oproiu, Dobrin Pârvan, *Târgoviște. Orașul și împrejurimile sale între 1821-1918*, vol. II..., p. 281.

⁴ Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Pagini din istoria culturii târgoviștene. Societatea Culturală „Progresul”* (1876)..., pp. 139-140; Mihai Oproiu, *Societatea Culturală „Progresul”, precursor al lecturii publice târgoviștene*..., p. 148; Andronescu Alexandrina, *Catalogul periodicelor dâmbovișene din sec. al XIX-lea*..., p. 355; (The Union – A page of cultural society Progresul in Targoviste appeared during 1883-1885, but in the collection of C. Alessandrescu was found only number 71, year III, dated June 11, 1885).

descriptivă, fizică, politică și economică a județului Dâmbovița”, released in Targoviste in two editions, in 1887 and in 1890, scientific works, as well, “*Dicționar geografic al județului Dâmbovița*”, printed in 1890), C. Alessandrescu (more geography school books for different counties: Dâmbovița, Dolj, Romanați, an arithmetics for the first rural division¹ and geographic dictionaries for counties: Ilfov, Vâlcea, Muscel, Olt, Prahova) and priest Al. Ducea, author of some theology books released in 1914.²

C. Alessandrescu was editing in Targoviște, in 1913, the collection “*Cultura Săteanului*” made up of two story books by Ion Creanga and by Petre Ispirescu, such collection was one of the first feedbacks related to the Progresul Society effort in spreading culture all around.³

¹ Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Pagini din istoria culturii târgoviștene. Societatea Culturală „Progresul” (1876)...*, p. 140; Mihai Oproiu, *Societatea Culturală „Progresul”, precursor al lecturii publice târgoviștene...*, p. 148; Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Societatea Culturală „Progresul” (1876)...*, p. 368.

² Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Pagini din istoria culturii târgoviștene. Societatea Culturală „Progresul” (1876)...*, pp. 140-141. Among the personalities of Cultural Society „Progresul” we mention I.D. Petrescu, Ștefan Vasilescu (1855-1922), Ioan Fusea, N. Chirculescu, D. Iovițiu (1833-1901) D. Condurățeanu, C. Alessandrescu, N. Bruneanu – Constantin Manolescu, *Alexandru Vlahuță, Duiliu Zamfirescu și Societatea Culturală „Progresul”...*, p. 143; Mihai Oproiu, Dobrin Pârvan, *Târgoviște. Orașul și împrejurimile sale între 1821-1918*, vol. II..., p. 281.

³ Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Pagini din istoria culturii târgoviștene. Societatea Culturală „Progresul” (1876)...*, p. 141; Constantin Manolescu, Mihai Oproiu, *Societatea Culturală Progresul (1876)...*, p. 369.

**THE ROYAL FAMILY OF ROMANIA
AND THE NATIONAL REUNIFICATION WAR**

*Sorin Liviu Damean**

Abstract

The author underline the role of the royal family of Romania in the time of the First World War. The decision to begin the war, at August 14th 1916, on the side of the Entente and against the home country, Germany, has imposed to King Ferdinand enormous personal sacrifices, placing *the sense of duty* above all. As Chief of Army, Ferdinand I stoically suffered privations of war, shared with Romanian troops both joys and defeats in the first part of the campaign. Adverse circumstances forced the Royal Family, the Government and Parliament to leave Bucharest in late November 1916 and to settle in Iași, ensuring the existence of the Romanian state. No doubt, the royal family showed commitment and confidence in the nation, rising to the importance of this historical moment.

Key words: *King Ferdinand of Romania, Queen Mary of Romania, First World War, Romania, diplomacy*

Having ascended the throne on October 11th 1914 [new style], in very special circumstances for the destiny of the Romanian society, King Ferdinand I promised on oath that he would be “a good Romanian”.¹ Although his contemporaries saw in him a man with no will or initiative, he would prove an infinite patience and perseverance in overcoming many obstacles, assuming full responsibility as constitutional Sovereign.²

The years 1914-1916 were marked by the unrest of public opinion and political circles in Bucharest regarding the possibility of achieving national unity and the considerable efforts of belligerent camps to determine the exit of

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¹ *Cuvântări de Ferdinand I, Regele României. 1889-1922*, București, 1922, p. 6.

² The personality of King Ferdinand I was surprised in many specialty papers, among which: Eugen Wolbe, *Ferdinand I întemeietorul României Mari. O biografie*, București, Humanitas, 2006; Ioan Scurtu, *Istoria Românilor în timpul celor patru regi (1866-1947)*, vol. II, *Ferdinand I*, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2001; Neculai Moghior, Ion Dănilă, Vasile Popa, *Ferdinand I văzut de contemporanii săi*, București, Editura Militară, 2006; Constantin I. Stan, *Regele Ferdinand „întregitorul” (1914-1927)*, București, Editura Paideia, 2003.

Romania from the state of neutrality and engaging in conflict.¹ Especially diplomatic representatives of the Central Powers tried, by various means of persuasion, to influence King Ferdinand, reminding him, on any occasion, of his German origin and the membership to the House of Hohenzollern.²

Excessively considered an incorrigible pro-German, the Sovereign “was, for most of the people, an unknown and not be taken into account person, for some a mystery, for nearly anyone a certainty”.³ People from his entourage recalled the highly pronounced modesty and shyness that characterized him.⁴ Less communicative and solitary, Ferdinand I knew to be affable and appealing, even courteous, but he despised those who sought to win favors by flattering him.

Convinced at the beginning of the war of the invincibility of the German troops, the Sovereign did not hesitate to confess to I.G. Duca, ever since October 1914, his position: “if the country believes that its interest dictates to go against the Central Powers, I will not be an obstacle in order to achieve its national ideal”.⁵ Besides, the Monarch proved a remarkable ability in the relations with Austria-Hungarian and German diplomats in Bucharest, stating his intention to maintain neutrality.⁶

It was appreciated – with a touch of obvious exaggeration – that the King was permanently influenced, in the adoption of the most important political decisions, by the people from his entourage. It is true that there was a close collaboration with Ionel Brătianu based on similarities in terms of democratization of Romanian society. Also, in difficult times, when prudence and tact had to characterize any official statement, the Sovereign called Queen Mary’s help. Not infrequently, he supported, with ardor and perseverance, the national claims in his private correspondence with the King of England and Tsar Nicholas II, his cousins-german.⁷

¹ See C. Kirițescu, *Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României. 1916-1919*, vol. I, București, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1989, pp. 111-198; Ion Bulei, *Arcul așteptării. 1914-1915-1916*, București, Editura Eminescu, 1981, *passim*; Ema Nastovici, *România și Puterile Centrale în anii 1914-1916*, București, Editura Politică, 1979, *passim*.

² *Regele Ferdinand I, Amintiri de la cei ce L-au apropiat*, București, f.a., pp. 383-384.

³ Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria Românilor*, vol. X, București, 1939, p. 352.

⁴ Idem, *Regele Ferdinand*, Iași, Editura Porțile Orientului, 1996, pp. 34-36; I.G. Duca, *Memorii*, vol. I, București, Editura Expres, 1992, pp. 135-140; C. Argetoianu, *Pentru cei de mâine. Amintiri din vremea celor de ieri*, București, Editura Humanitas, 1992, vol. III, pp. 112-114; Maria, Regina României, *Povestea vieții mele*, vol. III, Iași, Editura Moldova, 1991, *passim*.

⁵ I.G. Duca, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 129.

⁶ See *1918 la români*, vol. II, București, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1983, doc. nr. 252, p. 836; *România în timpul primului război mondial. Mărturii documentare*, vol. I, București, Editura Militară, 1996, p. 52.

⁷ Maria, Regina României, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 26 și urm.

King Ferdinand, strongly believing in the justice of the national cause, firmly declared, during the Cotroceni Crown Council (14/27 august 1916), that: “The dynasty will follow the fate of the country; victorious with it or defeated with it”.¹ The decision to begin the war on the side of the Entente and against the home country has imposed enormous personal sacrifices, placing *the sense of duty* above all. Impressed by the enthusiasm with which it was greeted on the streets of Bucharest the decision of the Sovereign, V.Th. Canticov noted: “The King played a great card, either a Great Romanian and King of Greater Romania, or without the Throne of Romania and erased from the book of Hohenzollern. The defeat of Romania will be his disaster.”²

After the action of Ferdinand I, the Sigmaringen family did not recognize him any more as a member of the House of Hohenzollern. His brother considered him a traitor of the nation and arms, and Emperor Wilhelm II withdrew his awarded decorations.³ In turn, political circles in Budapest openly expressed their outrage against the “perfidy” of the King, who misled “all diplomatic and military factors belonging to our allies”.⁴

As Chief of Army, Ferdinand I stoically suffered privations of war, shared with Romanian troops both joys and defeats in the first part of the campaign. Drawing up a long memorandum to the U.S. Secretary of State, the correspondent of the newspaper “Times” highlighted the loyal attitude of Sovereignty and unwavering faith in an Allied victory, although arms shipments fail to appear and the cooperation with Russian troops on the Dobrogea front were almost absent.⁵ The newspaper “Universe” also noted: “We are not allowed to know on what part of the front is His Majesty the King, but we are precisely informed that he is on the battle front. This is for the entire Romanian people an opportunity to uplift, a real reason of national pride”.⁶

Adverse circumstances forced the Royal Family, the Government and Parliament to leave Bucharest in late November 1916 and to settle in Iași, ensuring the existence of the Romanian state. Romanian-Russian withdrawal (over 1 million people), the exodus of civilian population, the lack of food, particularly harsh weather conditions, the epidemic of typhus are just some of the issues that illustrated the dramatic situation in Moldova. “In the midst of war misfortunes – I.G. Duca noted – the King was admirable. He faced defeat,

¹ I.G. Duca, *op. cit.*, vol. II, Timișoara, Editura Helicon, 1992, p. 167; Al. Marghiloman, *Note politice*, vol. II, București, Editura Machiavelli, 1994, p. 12.

² V.Th. Canticov, *Impresiuni și păreri personale din timpul războiului României. Jurnalul zilnic. 13 august 1916 – 31 decembrie 1918*, vol. I, București, 1921, p. 4.

³ Sterie Diamandi, *Galeria oamenilor politici*, București, Editura Gesa, 1991, p. 16.

⁴ *1918 la Români*, vol. II, doc. nr. 252, p. 836.

⁵ *Ibidem*, doc. nr. 298, pp. 980-997.

⁶ Apud Neculai Moghior, Ion Dănilă, Vasile Popa, *Ferdinand I văzut de contemporanii săi*, București, Editura Militară, 2006, p. 98.

injustice, humiliation with an unusual inner strength”.¹ Without regretting the step taken, the Sovereign always sought to encourage the Romanian troops, as witnessed by the numerous inspections on the front. With a commitment that stirred admiration, Queen Mary devoted herself to works of charity and care, visiting the wounded in hospitals almost daily.²

The organization of the resistance in Moldova, with the support of the French military mission, called for a more effective cooperation with Russian troops. To overcome the practical difficulties of the realization of this project it was necessary a trip of Queen Mary to St. Petersburg, and an eventual marriage between Prince Charles and Grand Duchess Olga, Tsar's daughter.³ The mission was entrusted, finally, to Prime Minister Ionel Brătianu, who would be accompanied by the Crown Prince. On this occasion, without materializing the envisaged project, new assurances were offered regarding the military support for Romania, and Nicholas II, as an evidence of good intentions, appointed King Ferdinand I as Chief of 18 Infantry Regiment “Vologda”.⁴

In the spring of 1917 there emerge with greater clarity the plans of dethronement of the Sovereign, advanced and supported by German and Austrian diplomats in connivance with some politicians left in Bucharest, in the hope of forming a new government that would sign the separate peace. Several names were mentioned, including: the son of Kaiser Wilhelm II or the brother of the Austro-Hungarian emperor.⁵ Disgusted by the lowness of such attitudes and by the behavior of the occupation forces, Ferdinand I confessed to Nicolae Iorga that, in the case of a meeting with the German Emperor, it was not the King of Romania to be put in an awkward position.⁶

The situation also worsened in Moldova, where Russian soldiers, contaminated by the revolutionary and defeatist propaganda, plotted projects to overthrow and even murder the Royal family. On the other hand, under the influence of the events happened in Russia (February 1917), a group of 10 liberal deputies constituted a so-called Labour Party.⁷ The atmosphere became tenser as the Russian units from Nicolina and Socola – that liberated the socialist Christian Racovski – organized events with red flags and peaceful slogans, preaching the overthrow of the government form.⁸ To calm down the situation, the general Scerbacev made public a Call to the Russian armies on the

¹ I.G. Duca, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 138.

² See the articles from the newspaper of Iași: „Mișcarea”, an XI, 1917, no. 15, 55, 75, 79, 80, 86, 159, 180, and 207.

³ Maria, Regina României, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 128-129.

⁴ „Mișcarea”, Iași, an XI, nr. 21, 27 ianuarie 1917.

⁵ Al. Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 128-129.

⁶ Nicolae Iorga, *Memorii*, vol. I, București, Editura „Națională” S. Ciornei, f.a., pp. 132-133.

⁷ C. Argetoianu, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 191-192.

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 189-190; Nicolae Iorga, *Supt trei Regi*, București, 1932, pp. 242-243.

Romanian front, emphasizing “how harmful to the common cause are such acts of violation against the freedom of a willingly friendly governance”.¹ Trying to avoid future complications in relations with the neighbor in the East, the government hesitated to adopt measures necessary to maintain order. In turn, the Sovereign was to undertake an inspection on the front, at the headquarters of general Averescu in Bacău, where he would be impressed by the existing optimistic atmosphere.²

Convinced of the need to carry out the reforms, King Ferdinand I promised, in front of the Second Army soldiers that he would divide the land to peasants, ensuring them a “broad participation in the affairs of the state”.³ The claims that the decision of the Sovereign was influenced by the events in Russia were nothing but pure speculations. They were denied by the royal message at the opening session of Legislative Bodies (December 1916).⁴ Moreover, the French writer Robert de Flers – who was for a long time in Iași in the royal entourage – denied any influence from outside, recalling that during a hearing, in January 1917, the King had set out, in detail, the agrarian reform.⁵ The Sovereign Proclamation was intended to enliven the Romanian troops in recovery, being a proof of the democratic spirit that would guide the Romanian society after the war. The King would be the first to give an example; Crown Areas would be expropriated with 46,422 ha.⁶

In the summer of 1917, King Ferdinand and Crown Prince were permanently on the front, expressing full confidence in the combatant force of the troops and rewarding with honors those who distinguished in the battles at Mărăști, Mărășești, and Oituz. “Among the soldiers on the front – as stated in an editorial of the newspaper *Mișcarea* – our Sovereign has eternally led the instance of manhood and the proof of gratitude that the country has for the brave defenders of our ancestral land... And on top of all works of charity and relief of suffering occasioned by war, shines Her Majesty Queen Mary”.⁷

The instauration of the Bolsheviks in Russia particularly endangered Romania's military situation. After signing the armistice, in December 1917, there grew the pressure on the Romanian government in order to conclude peace. In a report to Emperor Wilhelm II, Field Marshal von Mackensen pointed out that: “the Romanian army still displays a severe discipline, and the

¹ „Neamul românesc”, Iași, an XII, 25 aprilie 1917.

² Al. Averescu, *Notițe zilnice din război*, vol. II, București, Editura Militară, 1992, p. 130.

³ „România”, Iași, an I, nr. 55, 28 martie 1917.

⁴ Dezbaterile Adunării Deputaților, nr. 1, ședința din 14 decembrie 1916.

⁵ „Mișcarea”, nr. 207, 13 septembrie 1917.

⁶ Dumitru Suciu, *Monarhia și făurirea României Mari. 1866-1918*, București, Editura Albatros, 1997, p. 186.

⁷ „Mișcarea”, nr. 207, 13 septembrie 1917.

King and Queen knew how to gain sympathy in spite of the state of poverty of the war”.¹

In Iași, the opinions over the attitude of Romania were divided. Conservative-Democrats were leading the hypothesis that the Royal Family and Government were leaving the country, which was categorically rejected by King Ferdinand: “How long there will remain a free piece of the national territory, I'll stay here; how long there will remain a soldier and a Romanian flag, I will stay with them, no matter my fate”.² As armed resistance was no longer possible, the Sovereign appointed in January 29, 1918, a new Government, headed by General Averescu to discuss peace terms. In the Prime Minister's view, quite different from that of the concerned partners, Romania, being defeated, could not sign but “an honorable peace”, maintaining the dynasty and territorial status.³ Disappointed by the development of the events following the “Russian disorder”, King Ferdinand did not take into account the advice of his friends, who urged him to protect the royal family and withdraw in foreign territory. “My duty – the King firmly declared to general Constantin Prezan – is to stay here and to die together with my soldiers”.⁴ The same determination had Queen Mary who wrote in her diary: “The King swore me that, whatever happens, I will be allowed to stay with him and his army on Romanian soil, until the last stretch”.⁵

An extremely delicate moment for the Sovereign was the discussion he had in February 1918 with the Austro-Hungarian representative, Czernin, at Răcăciuni (Bacău). The meeting was accepted by the King after long hesitation and only due to the insistence of General Averescu. Recalling “the despicable betrayal of Romania”, Czernin required the immediate sign of peace, within the conditions imposed by the Central Powers. Otherwise, the continuation of the fight was inevitable, which would mean “the end of Romania and of the dynasty”. At King's reply that he would never find a government to accept the harsh conditions of peace, Czernin suggested the creation of a Marghiloman Cabinet.⁶ Deeply outraged by the attitude of Germany, the Sovereign had to declare to Nicolae Iorga the following: “I have never hated anyone. But, because it works like this, I came to hate the people who gave birth to me”.⁷

Although the peace treaty was signed by the Government Marghiloman in April 24 / May 7, 1918, the King demonstrated courage, refusing

¹ *1918 la Români*, vol. II, doc. nr. 332, pp. 1034-1037.

² I.G. Duca, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, București, Editura Machiavelli, 1994, p. 77.

³ *1918 la Români*, vol. II, doc. nr. 332, p. 1066.

⁴ Apud Neculai Moghior, Ion Dănilă, Vasile Popa, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

⁵ Maria, Regina României, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 282.

⁶ *Ibidem*, doc. nr. 336, pp. 1079-1080.

⁷ Nicolae Iorga, *Memorii*, vol. I, p. 311.

systematically to ratify it. Forced to give up working with the Allied Military Mission, the Sovereign withdrew to Bicaz to avoid any contact with the Germans. Here, his bitterness was increased by the unfortunate decision of Crown Prince Carol to leave 8 Regiment-Hunters, whose commander he was, in order to cross the border, accompanied by Ioana (Zizi) Lambrino, and to get engaged to her in Odessa. Thus, the Crown Prince made a double mistake: he left his command post and violated the Statute of the Royal House, which did not allow marriage but with other members of the royal families of Europe. Without insisting too much on this episode, we have to mention that both the King and the Queen were completely confused by the behavior of the Crown Prince, who ultimately accepted the dissolution of the engagement, being punished with 75 days of house arrest at Horaița Monastery (Neamț).¹

In these difficult times, the only satisfaction was represented by the decision of Basarabia to join the Motherland. Basarabian Delegation was met with enthusiasm and confidence, the Royal Family attending the symbolic Dance of the Union in front of the Palace of Iași.²

In late October 1918, Romanian troops joined again the Allies, so the war found us in the camp of the winners. Now the national ideal was fulfilled: the union of all Romanian provinces into one single state, under the scepter of King Ferdinand I. No doubt, the royal family showed commitment and confidence in the nation, rising to the importance of this historical moment.

¹ See Constantin I. Stan, *op. cit.*, p. 130-133.

² Maria, Regina României, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 352.

**THE PARTICIPATION OF RADU R. ROSETTI
AT THE NATIONAL REUNIFICATION WAR**

*Constanțiu Dinulescu**

Abstract

Main representative of the generation that created Greater Romania, Radu R. Rosetti activated for a period of 27 years in the Romanian Army, scanning all the hierarchical steps, from sublieutenant to general. During the First World War, he had a major role in organizing and leading the army, with a heroic behaviour in the battle of “La Răzoare” on the 6th of August 1917, for he was decorated with the “Mihai Viteazul” Military Order.

Key words: *Romanian Army, First World War, General Military Headquarters, French Military Mission, Royal Family*

At the General Military Headquarters

On the 14th/27th of August 1916, when the Romanian army entered the war, Radu R. Rosetti, who was a major at that time, was transferred at the General Military Headquarters, acting as chief of the Operations Bureau, for a period of 116 days, till December the 8th 1916. The General Headquarters was established at Periș, the justification for this option being, that, this location was isolated from the Capital, safe from the indiscretions of journalists and foreign military attaches.

Leading the General Military Headquarters¹ was general Vasile Zottu, chief of the Major Military State, a reasonable person with a highly developed sense of honour, who committed suicide after the Turtucaia disaster² and general Dumitru Iliescu, subchief of Major Military State “*one of our most capable generals, also having the trust of the King and of Brătianu*”.³

While the Romanian Army was slowly but safely advancing in the North over the Carpathians, on the South front, the Bulgarian attacks were

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¹ See the order of the army’s offensive. General Military Headquarters, in Romanian Military Archives, Major Military State’s Fund, Historic Service, *Romania in the world war 1916-1919*, vol. I, Bucarest, 1934, p. 3.

² General Radu R. Rosetti, *Confessions (1918-1919)*, edition elaborated, introductive study and notes by Maria Georgescu, Bucarest, Modelism Publishing House, 1997, p. 101.

³ General Radu R. Rosetti, *Confessions (1918-1919)*, p. 100.

forecasting the Turtucaia disaster.¹ Yet, from the 20th of August 1916, the commander of the Third Army, general C. Teodorescu, was announcing the General Military Headquarters about the violence to the Bulgarian attack: “*On the evening of that day, the commander of the Major Military State was reporting to the General Military Headquarters that the situation was rather difficult, importing that munitions should be sent to the infantry and also to the artillery*”.² On the 24th of August, major Rosetti give the order not to surrender. In the Daily Notes, Alexandru Averescu pointed out general Aslan’s idea to try to advance towards Silistra; major Rosetti, from the Operation Department of the General Military Headquarters, responded that Turtucaia shouldn’t surrender, because new troops will come.³

On the 24th of August/6th of September 1916, Turtucaia was conquered. Over the years, trying to identify the reasons that lead to this defeat, Rosetti wrote, in his memoires, that “*the German-Bulgarian troops had the experience of war and ours didn’t, the German plan forecasting an offensive of the Mackensen’s army*”.⁴ To this, the military historian added: “*the lack of any quality of general C. Teodorescu and the commander of the Third Army, general M. Aslan and also the wrong placing of the initial device of the Romanian-Russian troops from Dobrogea*”.⁵

On the 27th of August/9th of September 1916, Rosetti was sent to Medgidia in a mission to inform the Russian General Zaioncikovski, who was urged to plan a vigorous action of the Russian troops against the Bulgarian-German ones, lead by General Mackensen. Besides, the dialogue of the Romanian officer with the Russian General was completed by the issuance of a written order by King Ferdinand towards the commandement of the 45th Corps Quarters of the Imperial army, in which were mentioned the Romanian divisions 2,5 and 12, to ensure the strengthening the group of armies from Dobrogea. All these facts were specified in the order elaborated by the General Military Headquarters and will be placed under the orders of Mr. General Zaioncikovski. This group will attack the enemy as soon as possible, on the Turtucaia direction, being covered from Dobritch (Bazargik) by a commando, with the mission to hold up the enemy, if it tries to gain advantage from North.⁶

¹ Constantin Kirișescu, *The history of the war for Romania’s reinstatement 1916-1919*, Bucarest, 1989, vol. I, pp. 317-339. Also see, Florin Constantiniu, *A sincere history of the Romanian people*, Bucarest, 1997, p. 297.

² General Radu R. Rosetti, *Confessions (1918-1919)*, p. 110.

³ Marshal Alexandru Averescu, *Daily notes from war*, vol. II (1916-1918) (Our war), edition elaborated, introductive study and notes by Eftimie Ardeleanu and Adrian Pandea, Bucarest, Military Publishing House, 1992, p. 19.

⁴ General Radu R. Rosetti, *Confessions (1918-1919)*, p. 111.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

The adverse evolution of the military conflicts determined the allies to plan operations, such as the Russian General's Alekseev and British General's Robertson. The Russians proposed concentrating some troops on Brașov-Toplița front and on the Brașov-Bucarest, in order to destroy the oil and gas supplies and the retreat of Romanian armies towards East.

Taking into consideration Russian proposals, Romanian General Military Headquarters and major Rosetti, elaborated a paper, in which was proposed to fulfill some fortified lines, connecting the lines from Dorohoi and Botoșani counties and implicating the civilians and prisoners in executing these objectives. The paper was accepted by General D. Iliescu and orders were issued in order to accomplish these tasks.¹

An important moment of the presence of major Rosetti to Periș was the arrival, on the 3rd/16th of October 1916 of the French Military mission lead by General Henri M. Berthelot.² The personality of General Berthelot aroused dissatisfaction in the Romanian side, where General D. Iliescu³ would have preferred his school colleague, Colonel M. Despres, as well as in the Russian side, where General Alekseev⁴ showed it in an open way. In the military historian's opinion, the French Mission was the most loyal collaboration, the French made our cause, theirs.⁵

Rosetti realized the importance of the French military presence, which had great experience that could benefitted to the Romanian officers. Convinced that the Romanian's victory couldn't become reality unless the French were involved and also the French army, Rosetti was one of the closest collaborators of General Berthelot, which was seen as an act of weakness by some military and politicians at that time.⁶

The failure of military actions in defending Muntenia and the pressure from South by the group of armies commanded by Mackensen, determined taking urgent actions. In the Minister Council's session on the 11th/24th of November 1916, at the General Military Headquarters was decided that

¹ *Ibidem*, p. 111, Part I, p. 29 (Annexe, document No.16, p. 14, 15).

² Eugen Bantea, *Berthelot's mission and its views over the French-Romanian relations*, in the volume *The Romanians in the Universal history*, II/1, Iași, University Publishing House, 1987, pp. 149-168 – with the bibliography on the French Military mission sent to Romania. Also see PhD. Colonel Petre Otu, *International Symposium – The presence of the French military mission in Romania 1916-1918*, in R.I.M., 6(40)/1996, p. 22; General R. Rosetti, *Confessions (1918-1919)*, pp. 132-135; C. Kirișescu, *The history of the war for Romania's reinstatement 1916-1919*, vol. 2, pp. 20-21; University PhD. Professor Valeriu Fl. Dobrinescu, Colonel Gh. Nicolescu, *Romanian military documents about the beginnings of Berthelot mission and its relations with Stavka*, in R.I.M., 1996, pp. 23-25.

³ General Radu R. Rosetti, *Confessions (1918-1919)*, p. 132.

⁴ General V. Petin, *Le drame roumain (The Romanian Tragedy)*, Paris, 1932, pp. 22-23.

⁵ General Radu R. Rosetti, *Confessions (1918-1919)*, p. 134.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

authorities, ministries and delegations should be transferred from Bucarest to Iași. Eight days later, the General Military Headquarters will be transferred to Buzău, the same place where Rosetti went, who, in the meantime, at Periș, ensured keeping the connections between armies.

The trespassing of the German-Bulgarian forces over the Danube, at Zimnicea, deepened the state of crisis, in which Romania was at that time. In order to save the Capital, it was decided to engage in the Neajlov and Argeș battles, ending with the defeat of the Romanian armies and the capture of the operations plan by the enemy, at Găești. The Central Powers' troops and the allies troops entered in Bucarest on the 23rd of November/6th of December 1916.

On the 22nd of November 1916, Major Rosetti was advanced to Lieutenant-Colonel.¹ In the qualifying paper, General Rășcanu indicated that Radu R. Rosetti proved, as long as he worked at the General Military Headquarters, a great will to work, devotion and great skill in executing his objectives. On conclusion, General Rășcanu was convinced that Rosetti had "*an open path to reach the highest steps of a military career*".²

Convinced that an officer is in the frontline of the troops, major Rosetti asked, from the 20th of October 1916³, through a raport adressed to the Operations Department of the General Military Headquarters to be in the frontline, because he activated in the state service for a period of two years and three months.⁴ General D. Iliescu's resolution from the 21st of October 1916, refused the officer's request, because the circumstances were not convenient.⁵ The officer's tranference emerged the same time with the appointment of General C. Prezan as chief of General Military Headquarters.

In his memoirs, General Rosetti justly wrote: "*The faith wanted that the time I served at the General Military Headquarters, our army to suffer a series of defeats (...). I was leaving, seen by few as vanquished. Just one moment, I haven't had this feeling and my moral never let me down, because I knew I had done my job and I had a deep sureness in obtaining the final victory. I thought the defeats were just something that would pass. It was proved by our entire historic past*".⁶

¹ *Ibidem*, p. 161; "*I was also advanced, but I wasn't glad, especially that these advencements were made rapidly and without any discernment*".

² Romanian Military Archives, Personnel Direction Fund, f. 33.

³ Romanian Academy's Library, Radu Rosetti Archive (hereinafter: RALRRA), IX, varia 62, f. 38.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ General Radu R. Rosetti, *Confessions (1918-1919)*, p. 166.

Radu R. Rosetti, hero of the battle of “La Răzoare” – the 6th of August 1917

On January 1917, Rosetti received the command of the 55th/67th Infantry Regiment¹ by uniting two divisions – the first one from Piatra Neamț and the second from Bacău. The Regiment was being settled in Vorniceni, near Botoșani.

The new commander wanted to ensure a good technical training of the regiment, as well as rising the moral of the troops, which was in a state of panic following an imminent eviction to Russia, due to military action on the front. Rosetti paid attention to administrative problems, as ensuring food for the regiment, officers' accommodation and with proving everything that was necessary to a military unit during war.

Because when regiments fused, the 55th had C. Dragu as commander, it was decided that Rosetti should have the command of another regiment, namely No. 6 “Mihai Viteazul” Regiment², settled at Horlești, that was under the ferule of the 4th Division, lead by Colonel I. Ghinescu, an ex-colleague of Rosetti at the Superior Military School.

Due to lack of equipments and officers and noncommissioned officers, the new commander forwarded a raport to the 8th Infantry Brigade and to the 4th Division and also to the War Minister, Vintilă Brătianu. The raport³ explained the real situation of the regiment and were proposed measures for a quick reorganization. When typhus broke out, this affected even the No. 6 “Mihai Viteazul” Regiment. In these exceptional circumstances, the commander of the No. 6 “Mihai Viteazul” Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Radu R. Rosetti, took measures to provide food for the troops and ensured a good saniatry climate.

On the 21st of March/3rd of April 1917, Rosetti fell ill with typhus; this episode was reported by Queen Mary in her memoires: “*When I was ready to leave, an officer told me that in a remote village was our friend, Colonel Rosetti*”⁴.

Being at Horlești on the 2nd/15th of April 1917, Queen Mary remembered: “*Most of the time, I was between ill people, who unfortunately were too many (...). At Horlești there was something disturbing. A poor doctor (Weinberg), was taking care alone of hundreds of ailings, in dirty huts, and the*

¹ RALRRA, IX, varia 62, f. 41, The Order of the Major Military state, Folder No. 9977 from the 14th of January 1917.

² The Order of the General Military Headquarters No. 18204/1917, communicated with the 14th Division's Order, No. 1163/4th of March 1917.

³ No. 40 to the 4th Division and No. 1208 to the 8th Infantry Brigade, General R. Rosetti, *Confessions*, vol. III, p. 192.

⁴ Mary, Queen of Romania, *The story of my life*, vol. III, translated from English by Mărgărita Miller Verghi, edition elaborated and notes by Ioana Cracă, Bucarest, Eminescu Publishing House, 1991, pp. 187-188.

regiment's officers, almost all of them, suffered from typhus. They were walking from one place to another in their dirty crowded huts. The ailments were everywhere; I gave them candies, cigarettes and to the illest, brandy and tea (...). The filth inside the improvised infirmaries were beyond my imagination".¹

Radu Rosetti's state of health got worse, so he was moved to Iași, at the "Charity" Hospital, where he would stay until May of 1917, when he was back in war.

Commander Rosetti's activity was highly appreciated by General I. Ghinescu, the commander of the 4th Division. The general pointed out the physical and intellectual qualities and also the bravery of the regiment's commander, later verified on the battle field: "*he is a treasure of the army and deserves to be exceptionally advanced to general*".²

At the proposal of General Prezan, Rosetti accepted, on the 22nd of May/4th of June 1917 to take charge of the 4th/72nd Infantry Regiment, composed by ex-regiments No. 47 (Ploiești) and No. 72 (Mizil).³ With this regiment Lieutenant-Colonel Radu R. Rosetti will participate at the great battle of Mărășești, in the summer of 1917.

At the command of the 47th/72nd Infantry Regiment, Rosetti proved his professionalism, his capacity in administrative and technical organization and, above all, his devotion and selflessness towards the military career.

A detailed presentation of the battle of "La Răzoare" and of the days that foretold it is found in the 47th Infantry Regiment's Journal of Operations.⁴ From "*the notice of the part I had taken in the battle of La Răzoare on the 6th/19th of August 1917*"⁵, elaborated by Lieutenant-Colonel Rosetti, emerges the idea that he took the regiment's command on the 22nd of May/4th of June 1917. This regiment, which fought on Olt's Valley, reajusted in Hârlău's surroundings, although it was in the middle of typhoid fever and typhus.

The command to leave for the battle was executed on the 3rd/16th of June 1917. The regiment had: 56 officers, 2960 soldiers, 590 horses, 100 carriages. The munition consisted in 2775 Lebel rifles, 48 sub-machine guns, 24 St. Etienne machine guns, grenades etc.⁶ On the first days of July 1917, the 47th Infantry Regiment requested to be placed in the first line of war, for it was in Blehani, situated on the second line of the front.

¹ *Ibidem*, p. 192.

² Romanian Military Archives, Personnel Direction Fund, f. 35.

³ RALRRA, II, mss. 3, p. 199.

⁴ Romanian Military Archives, *The 47th Infantry Regiment's Journal of Operations*, ff. 134-146.

⁵ *Ibidem*, ff. 134-138. Also see, General Radu R. Rosetti, *The part of the 47th/72nd Regiment in the war for national reinstatement*, Bucarest, 1926, pp. 64-72.

⁶ General Radu R. Rosetti, *Confessions (1918-1919)*, vol. III, p. 201.

After the regiment crossed over Siret's right bank and settled in Clucerul, it formed a line-up, which was occupied between the 22nd of June and 3rd/16th of July. The sector was inspected on the 10th of July 1917 by General Berthelot, who noted in his Journal: "*I examined the regiment's installation, commanded by Colonel Rosetti; the reserve of the Infantry's Division. All works have been properly made, traced notably and well hidden even to vertical views. In 3 or 4 nights, everything will be ready*".¹

From the 29th of July 1917, the 47th Infantry Regiment received an order to install itself with the first line on the West side of "la Răzoare" forest. In the precursory day of the great battle on the 6th/19th of August, Lieutenant-Colonel Radu R. Rosetti was concerned, as the documents indicated it, with the technical and logistic assurance of the troops, in the context of the enemy's strategic moves, which was, on the 2nd of August, with the infantry, at 1800 meters from our army lines.²

This way, the regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Rosetti was fully prepared to face the enemy. The commander of the 47th/72nd Infantry regiment tried to make contact with the First Battalion, situated on the edge of "La Răzoare" forest, to give instructions for the battle that was to come. Due to the breakage of the phone-lines, Rosetti writtenly reported to the Brigade, the situation on the front and asked for new information from contact officers of the neighbouring regiments.³

An important moment in identifying the enemy's positions was on the 5th/18th of August 1917, when sub-Lieutenant I. Popa, of the Second Battalion offered himself to go into the enemy's entrenchments. He left with five people, in the middle of the day and succeeded in reaching the enemy's lines, destroying an enemy position and bringing a prisoner, who said that, in front of them was the 115th German Division, with a few troops and they thought that, in front of them, were the Russians, not the Romanians.⁴

In his memoirs, General Rosetti remembered that this episode: "*Vintilă Brătianu and General Vouillemin came to the command post. They were in the region for two days, inspecting mostly two services and knowing that I was nearby, they came to see and ask me how was my regiment doing*".⁵

¹ National Archives, Folder 1770 (General Henri M. Berthelot, *The Journal – The French mission in the allied Romania 1917-1918*, the 1st of October 1916 – 5th of May 1919, f. 124). For the Romanian front, 1916-1917, also see Glenn E. Torrey (Emporia State University), *Russia, Romania and France: The reorganization of the Romanian front 1916-1917*, in "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", 1992, January-June, 1-2, Bucarest, Romanian Academy Publishing House, pp. 51-63.

² Romanian Military Archives, *The 47th Infantry Regiment's Journal of Operations*, f. 137.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ *Ibidem*, f. 137, the reverse page.

⁵ General Radu R. Rosetti, *Confessions (1918-1919)*, vol. III, p. 215.

On the morning of the 6th/19th of August 1917, Lieutenant-Colonel Radu R. Rosetti inspected the First Battalion's command post, situated on the Western side of "La Răzoare" forest. Around 10,20 a.m., while a part of the 51st Regiment was retreating, enemy troops were heading to the Eastern part of "La Răzoare" forest. The commander of the 47th Infantry Regiment released an order to Major Drăgănescu to counter attack with a company, the enemy lines. Around 11 o'clock a.m., when Rosetti was wounded, he released an order to Major Mareș, the oldest battalion commander of the regiment, to take charge and, at the same time, to communicate to Major Drăgănescu, to initiate the counter attack.¹

In the closing of his Notice Giving, Rosetti identified the factors that lead to the regiment's success: "I award the success of our resistance and counter attack to the following aspects:

1. Officer's and troop's high moral and their will to erase the disgrace from the night of the 14th of July.
2. The disposition in depth of the regiment.
3. The highly advanced state of defensive works and especially to the fact that we had at least a complete wire netting.
4. The good connection that existed between infantry and artillery, which brought us everything that we requested.²

The actions of the 47th Infantry Regiment were, therefore, presented to the King, although an operative report³, elaborated by the General of Division Eremia Grigorescu, whose estimations needn't any remarks: "*with an extraordinary elan, he vigorously counter attacked, reaching together with the advanced troops Satul Nou (New Village). The commander of this regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Rosetti, in front of his regiment, while leading the attack, was badly wounded*".

In the Notice Giving elaborated by General Ion Popescu, the commander of the 13th Division, showed that Major Gheorghe Drăgănescu confirmed the order received from the commander Rosetti, to counterattack the enemy and to reestablish the situation.⁴

On his turn, chief of the Major Military State of the 13th Division, Colonel Dragu⁵, "*perfect man to be on the front*"⁶, was presenting the content of the facts on the 6th of August 1917 in the Operative Notice Giving: "*In the*

¹ Romanian Military Archives, *The 47th Infantry Regiment's Journal of Operations*, f. 137, the reverse page.

² *Ibidem*, f. 138.

³ Romanian Military Archives, General Military Headquarters' Fund, Folder 824, f. 116 (copy).

⁴ Romanian Military Archives, The 5th Army Corps, Folder no. 56, ff. 260-262 (original).

⁵ Romanian Military Archives, The 5th Army Corps, Folder No. 57, ff. 23-24 (copy).

⁶ "Manuscriptum", year XIV, no. 2(51), 1983, p. 117 (the characterization is made by Ștefan Zeletin, who calls Colonel Radu R. Rosetti "a wonderful theoretician of rare culture").

sector of the 26th Infantry Brigade, under a fierce bombardment and attacked by superior forces, he lost almost the entire First Battalion, which was on the left side of the wing and needed to retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel Rosetti Radu was badly wounded in this moment, by a bullet shot from a machine gun and the command of the regiment passed to Major Mareș”.¹ As a symbol of bravery, Lieutenant-Colonel Rosetti, being in the lead of his soldiers, tersely noted on his map: “I command the (R) Regiment not to walk over my body”.²

On the 8th of August 1917, the commander of the First army, General Eremia Grigorescu, released a daily order, in which he addressed his soldiers, mentioning that in the period of July the 24th – August the 7th, hard and big battles were fought and at Sușița and Siret, proved the entire world that “not even here could anyone pass. Here, the German General Mackensen knew what defeat meant. Mărășești was the grave of German illusions”.³

In his journal, General Henri M. Berthelot noted, on the 21st of August 1917: “Colonel Rosetti was badly wounded and transported to the French Hospital of Notre Dame de Sion (Iași)”.⁴

The heroism of the Romanian soldiers had wide re-echoes in the newspapers of that time, in the writings of the Romanian poets, amongst: Octavian Goga, Ion Minulescu or Mihail Sadoveanu. These, together with Barbu Ștefănescu Delavrancea, Gheorghe Ronetti, Vasile Voiculescu, Eugen Lovinescu, handed a raport to the General Military Headquarters, in which they solicited that a newspaper of the national defense should be edited. Thus, it appeared the first military newspaper from our country – “Romania” –, edited in Iași, starting with the 2nd of February 1917 to the 23rd of March 1918, having Mihail Sadoveanu as managing director and Octavian Goga as chief-editor.

A few days after the memorable battle from the 6th of August 1917, M. Sadoveanu published an article: *On our front-The battle of “La Răzoare”*, where he described the events; “In this cruel and vicious battle, the officers, as always, proved a good moral and quietly waited the moment for counter attack. No weakness, no hesitation (...)”.⁵

“Adevărul”, underlined the deeds of Colonel Rosetti: “are overjoying, were inspiring for the officers, that he lead and for the soldiers of his regiment” (...). In the middle of them he was wounded, raised by his soldiers from the battle field, telling them words to spirit them up: *Onwards boys*”.⁶ At its turn,

¹ Romanian Military Archives, The 5th Army Corps, Folder No. 57/1917, ff. 23-24.

² General-Major Constantin Antip, *In the First World War, The fight of the entire people*, special number, Bucarest, 1987, p. 31.

³ Romanian Military Archives, *Journal of Operations*, the 47th Regiment, pp. 138-139.

⁴ National Archives, Folder 1770, f. 146 (General Henri M. Berthelot, *The Journal – The French mission in the allied Romania 1917-1918*).

⁵ “Romania”, the 15th of August 1917, p. 1.

⁶ “Adevărul”, year XXIV, No. 11322, the 1st of March 1922, pp. 1-2.

“The Family” Magazine”¹, published what an officer wrote, in a letter addressed to Alexandrina Cantacuzino: “*Lieutenant-Colonel Rosetti from the 47th/72nd Regiment acted admirably in these battles*”.

In the “Romanian Nation”, newspaper lead by Nicolae Iorga, was inserted a report that “*Among the Romanian officers wounded in the battles of Mărășești, we mention Mr. Colonel Radu Rosetti and Captain N. Miclescu, whom, His Majesty, the King, for their heroism, decorated them with 3rd class “M. Viteazul” Military Order*”;² the regiment received the same distinction.

The decoration of the 47th/72nd Infantry Regiment with “M. Viteazul” distinction³, was thus motivated: “*For bravery and will to battle, the officers and also the troops, in the battles of Mărășești from 1917. On the day of the 6th/19th of August, while the regiment was in position at “La Răzoare”, the regiment was attacked by huge German armies; the officers, sub-officers and soldiers battled with rage and energy, against the attacks initiated by the enemy, this heroic regiment remained firm on position*”.⁴

The commander of the regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Radu R. Rosetti was decorated “*for the bravery and depth of reach, that lead the regiment in the battle of “La Răzoare” on the 6th of August 1917. By placing the reserve battalion in front of the German troops, giving time for the reserves of the division to interfere with determination on the flank and behind the enemy and to compel it to retreat in disarray. During the battle, while acting in the middle of the troops, he was severely wounded by a bullet from a machine gun*”.⁵

In the qualifying paper from the 22nd of May 1917, his direct chief, colonel Marin Nedeianu, the commander of the 26th Infantry Brigade, noted that Radu R. Rosetti showed that he is a brave officer, skillful and with remarkable energy and activity.

The commander of the 13th Division, General Ion Popescu, noted that “*the beginning of the battle on the 6th of August 1917, found Lieutenant-Colonel Radu Rosetti on the battle field, from where he returned only because he was severely wounded by a bullet (...). The left wing of the 47th/72nd Infantry*

¹ “The Family”, 5th series, year 13/113, No. 7/1452, July 1971. Dialogue with Ion Măneacă, participant at the battle of “La Răzoare”, realized by Stelian Vasilescu.

² “The Romanian Nation”, 15th of August 1917, p. 2.

³ For further details, see: *From the history of Mihai Viteazul Military Order*, in the volume *Mihai Viteazul – Restitutor Daciae*, Craiova, 1993, pp. 7-12.

⁴ “The Official Monitor”, No. 201 from the 28th of November/6th of December 1917. Also see, General Radu R. Rosetti, *The part taken by the 47th/72nd Infantry Regiment in the war for national reinstatement*, Bucarest, 1926, pp. 64-72.

⁵ The High Decree No. 1172 from the 9th of October 1917, in “The Official Monitor”, No. 169 from the 17th/30th of October, pp. 1755-1757. Also see, Romanian Military Archives, Old Generals’ Fund, Folder No. 6, f. 37.

*Regiment, commanded by Radu Rosetti was heavily hit, situation that entirely smashed this wing, facilitating the advancement of the enemy into positions”.*¹

Transferred from the battle field to the French Hospital (No. 141) in Iași² and installed into the Institute building of Notre Dame de Sion, officer Rosetti enjoyed the doctor’s attention, in front with the French surgeon E. Sorrel and was constantly visited by high officials, such as Ion. I.C. Brătianu, Barbu Știrbei and by the Royal Family.

Subjected to a difficult medical procedure, by which his left foot was shortened by 4, 5 centimeters, Rosetti remained in the hospital until the end of October 1917.

On the 1st/14th of September 1917, Rosetti was promoted to Colonel.³ Mentioning this event, the hero of “La Răzoare” noted, in his memoires: “*I didn’t dislike to add another stripe on the tunic and on the cap, but I thought then, as I do it today, that from these hasty advancements, profited to many unselected and it was a mistake. I said it to Vintilă Brătianu. He thought the same, but he told me that many generals, especially Eremia Grigorescu and C. Iancovescu have insisted to be done, under the pretense to give satisfaction to the officer’s body*”.⁴

As a recognition of his military achievements, Colonel Rosetti was awarded by General Cristopher Ballard the “British Distinction for Outstanding Service”, for which he was proposed by the ex-chief of the British Military Mission, Thomson.⁵

The visits made by the members of the Royal family brought him emotions and joy. In his diary, Queen Mary remembered: “*In the French Hospital... I found my old friend, Radu Rosetti, badly wounded at his leg, he has a fractured hip. With soreness, I think about his active role in this ending war. But, he was cheerful as always and passionate, thinking of the battles; he had will to live and was full of enthusiasm. And he never stopped bragging his troops*”.⁶ But the visit that impressed him the most, was that on the 24th of

¹ The High Decree No. 1172 from the 9th of October 1917, in “The Official Monitory” No. 169 from the 17th/30th of October, pp. 1755-1757. Also see, Romanian Military Archives, Old Generals’ Fund, Folder No. 6, f. 37.

² General Radu R. Rosetti, *Confessions (1918-1919)*, vol. III, pp. 220-241 (Chapter X, entitled *Wounded*).

³ The High Decree No. 1330 from the 13th of November 1917 (The Official Monitory, No. 195 from the 16th/29th of November 1917). See, Romanian Military Archives, Old Generals’ Fund, f. 4.

⁴ General Radu R. Rosetti, *Confessions (1918-1919)*, vol. III, p. 224.

⁵ RALRRA, VIII, Acts 100.

⁶ Mary, Queen of Romania, *The story of my life*, vol. III, p. 259.

September/6th of October 1917, from King Ferdinand¹, who decorated him with “Mihai Viteazul” Military Order and embraced the Mărășești’s wounded.

Taking into consideration, just the fact that Rosetti’s active role in the war ended in soreness and his unquestionable qualities in guiding young men, the Royal Family, as a sign of great appreciation, handed him the mission to accompany Prince Nicolae to studies in England. With great relevance is Queen Mary’s letter, received by Rosetti, through his friend Ballif, on the 18th/31st of October 1917, in which she expressed her trust and motifs for the Royal house’s choice, to hand this mission to Rosetti.² The situation in Russia determined the authorities to call off the mission.

The attachment of the commander for the regiment that he lead on the front line is noticed and by the wish to resume the command and continue the battle. Being in hospital, Rosetti received the verses written by the sergeant, Ion Vișoni³, from the 3rd Company, and also a telegram, congratulating him for the New Year. In the latter, there was written: “*The officers and the 47th/72nd Infantry Regiment’s troops wish you many years, full of happiness and joy for the reinstatement of the nation for which you fought as a hero, Commander of the 47th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Dragu (January 1918)*”.⁴

The echoes of the battle of “La Răzoare”, in which Rosetti behaved heroically continued even after the end of the First World War. The well-known historian, Constantin Kirițescu⁵ described in detail, the battle between Romanians and Germans, underlining the bravery of the 47th Infantry Regiment’s soldiers and the distinguished historian Alexandru Lapedatu named – on a reception speech at the Romanian Academy – the day of the 6th of August 1917, “*the day of the brightest battles of our war for reinstatement*”.⁶

¹ General Radu R. Rosetti, *Confessions (1918-1919)*, vol. III, p. 223.

² *Ibidem*, p. 225.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 218.

⁴ RALRRA, IX, varia 61, f. 8.

⁵ C. Kirițescu, *The history of the war for Romania’s reinstatement 1916-1919*, vol. II, Bucarest, 1989, pp. 124-125.

⁶ The Romanian Academy, *Reception speeches, LXV, The Answer of Mr. Alexandru Lapedatu*, Bucarest, 1935, p. 22.

**AMERICAN MEDIA AND OFFICIAL POSITION ON ROMANIA.
THE CASE OF THE CAPTAIN VASILE STOICA. 1917-1919**

*Alexandru Oșca**

Abstract

Romania's decision to enter the First World War was difficult and long training. Officers from Bucharest knew that the Romanian state will not remain neutral until the final of the war; the choice for joining Entente seemed natural, although not unique. By signing secret documents to join the Entente, Romania hoped that its national ideals – the integration of Transylvania, Bukovina and the Banat – would be recognized at the after war Peace Conference and also be fulfilled.

Key words: *First World War, patriots, Transylvanian national ideal, political mission, the American public opinion*

For Europeans, and the desire for union of the Romanians in a single state was not new. In America, however, public opinion was less familiar with Romanian aspirations and reality. Entering the war, the U.S. realized that after its completion, they would have an important role in peace enforcement, and the principle of nationalities would be most important for the establishment or restoration of political entities in Europe. American leaders had no commitment or obligation, had not signed treaties with the powers engaged in the conflict, they were free to focus on application of principles. The Government in Jassy had no other option but to make efforts to achieve, during the war, the sympathy of the public opinion and also of American officials for the Romanian cause. As Romania did not have an embassy in Washington, this was done by a special mission, consisting of three Transylvanian figures, among which the most effective proved Vasile Stoica. His mission was very difficult, both because opponents could find formulas for blocking his message and because of the fact that Romanian diaspora, was not only small but was fragmented, uneven and rather poor.

About Vasile Stoica – the diplomat who served in an immeasurable way Romania during the first half of the last century – many papers and studies have been written, many of his contemporaries recognized and appreciated his patriotism, and his skills as a negotiator and an expert in international relations.

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Other authors have pointed out the sad fate of the patriot who, only for imagined ideological reasons, suffered torture in the prisons of the communist regime, where he died in 1959¹. My study brings additional information about the work of the military Vasile Stoica, wounded twice in the campaign of 1916, but provides the reader essential information about his contribution as a diplomat.

Captain Vasile Stoica was a very interesting character: he was a Transylvanian Romanian, teacher at a secondary school in Sibiu, when that city didn't belong to Romania, and, most important for my demonstration, he was chief editor of the newspaper *Romanul* (The Romanian), a gazette which was printed in Arad, a city very close to the border between Romania and Hungary, nowadays.

Vasile Stoica understood very well the spirit of his age, and together with nationalist intellectuals (scholars) from Austrian-Hungarian monarchy fought for the setting up of *the nation-states*, after the Empire fell apart.

In the autumn of 1911, Vasile Stoica crossed the border from Hungary to Romania, with the intention to enlist in the Romanian army, but the Romanian Kingdom entered the war after two years of neutrality. In order to respect this, the Romanian state refused enlisting a Romanian from Transylvania, so, at the beginning, he made himself noticed through intense media actions in Romania. His paper *The Ardeal's pains*, printed in Bucharest in 1915, was also published in Chicago, in 1917.

When Romania entered in war, on August 15th, 1916 he enlisted, as an officer of the 11th Infantry Division, and fought in the operations from Jiu's and Olt's mountain passes. The Romanian headquarters used him more like an intelligence officer, exploiting his knowledge about the South area of the Ardeal and in Sibiu, behind the enemy lines.

¹ Among the authors who have dealt with this subject, I would like to add the followings: George Buzatu, Florin Valeriu Dobrinescu, Gheorghe Sbucnea (with an interesting study about the relationship of Vasile Stoica with the Romanian diaspora). Important studies have been published recently by Cornel Tucă, Iulian Boțoghină, Vasilica Manea, and other colleagues in military archives. A very complete study was published in 2002 by Alexander Micle (*Vasile Stoica și misiunea politică în SUA – 1917-1918*, în *Diplomație și diplomați români*, Focșani, Editura Pallas, 2002). Personally, I have published several studies on the task of propaganda in the U.S. (most recently in the journal of Academy of Scientists from Romania, nr. 4/2012 about Livius Teiușanu, first Romanian attached to the U.S.). I point out the studies: *Doi ofițeri români pe pământ american, în sprijinul Marii Uniri*, appeared in a collection of studies published under the care of the Centre for Studies of Military Archives, 2010, p. 72. In the same work and study we note the study: *Pledoarie pentru cauza României în America – Vasile Stoica*, p. 75. About the tragedy and humiliation in Romanian prisons experienced by V. Stoica, see: Cicerone Ionitoiu, *Cartea de aur a rezistenței românești împotriva comunismului*, I, București, Tip. "Hrisovul", 1995, p. 154.

The young officer lived, beside his brothers in arms, the Romanian army's drama, being forced to withdraw under the pressure of a very experienced opponent. He was injured twice, the last time in Pitesti, on November 19th, 1916, when he stayed three month in hospital for recovery.

The military way, that Romania had chosen, to carry out its political target, seemed compromised after its failures on the battle field, in the 1916 campaign. The only hope was the media and diplomatic resources, which had to make the entire world be aware of the *Romanian cause*.

This was the moment when the Romanian Headquarter and the Government decided to send Vasile Stoica in the United States of America together with Vasile Lucaciu and Ion Moța. The authorities counted on them being from Ardeal (Transylvania) and hoped they would receive help from the Romanians in the United States, refugees from Transylvania, generations before.

Their mission began with difficulties; the most pressing being the financial one. Although the order to leave was given on April 18th, 1917, they arrived in Washington on the June 29th, 1917, passing from Russia to Japan. Shortly after their arrival, on July 2nd, they met with the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, and later, were received by the Defense State Secretary, Newton Baker and the deputy of the State Secretary, the powerful political man, William Philips.

The mission of the delegation was to create a military legion composed of American Romanians, in order to fight on the West front (France and Italy). The American authorities refused to accept that plan, no matter the explanations. The only way was to make propaganda in the media, to put Romania in the favorable light. Unfortunately, only Vasile Stoica knew English, so that mission was very difficult in war times, too.

The American media was a kind of fortress which the representatives of the foreign countries wanted to conquer. The Romanians arrived there very late, with thin forces and with inexistent financial resources. The Americans preferred the Austrian-Hungarian delegation, which were known as the "prisoners" in the hands of the Germans, and having a civilizing historical role in Central and South-East Europe. Nothing much was known about the Romanians from Transylvania. The senator Gilbert Hitchcock didn't know that in the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy there lived Romanian people, too.

Left alone in his mission, Captain Vasile Stoica began his task helped by Captain Luke Doyle. Through him, he became friends with Ira Bonnet, the chief editor of the influential newspaper "Washington Post". The newspaper upheld the Romanian cause, beginning with its issue of August 4-7, 1917.

Vasile Stoica also made friends inside the “New York Times” (the most powerful American newspaper), as well as at the “Boston Transcript” and “Boston Herald”.

The Romanian officer soon realized that his articles in these newspapers didn't have a great effect, so he started to provide information, drawings and maps to American journalists which wrote leading articles. He was surprised by the positive effect regarding the Romanians, which followed the articles published in the autumn of 1917, in the “New York Tribune” and the union newspaper “McClure”, written by the military historian and analyst Frank Simonds.

Captain Vasile Stoica, according to the methods of that time, held many conferences, especially in Washington and Manchester and contacted many influential persons from the American administration, such as: Newton Baker, Defense State Secretary, Albert Putney, chief of the Middle East Section, senator Hitchcock, president of the Foreign Affairs Committee, John Lewis, the friend of president Wilson.

The most successful contacts were with the former president of the United States of America, Theodore Roosevelt, at his house in Oyster Bay.

A more important echo in the American printing press about the Romanian situation was noticed after the establishment of the “National League of Romanians from America”. This organization led by Vasile Stoica, gathered all famous personalities in America, especially, professor Mrazec and George Danielopol, etc. The date of its creation was July 5th, 1918, when the first Congress was held. Vasile Stoica criticized, in his report, the insufficient support of major Teiusanu, the military attaché in Washington.

Even after the end of the war, Vasile Stoica considered very useful to continue his propaganda activity in the American printing press. With that end in view, he used the presence in America of Doctor Nicolae Lupu, whom he linked into the most powerful levels of American media. Studies of the latter were published by the “University Quarterly” and “Asia”, but the greatest impact had his volume “Romania and the war”. Other newspapers followed on and published information about Romania after the war: “New York Evening Sun”, “Cleveland Plain Dealer” and so on, although there still were unfavorable articles regarding the Romanian cause.

After he managed to catch the American media's attention, Vasile Stoica was asked to hold conferences in most diverse places – including theatres and churches. He described the special occasions on August 7th, 1918, when he spoke in front of the 5000 doctors who attended the medical Congress in Chicago and on November 16th, 1919, when he presented his opinion to the Christian Congress in Pittsburgh, in the lecture room of “Carnegie” Technological University.

The connection with institutions and personalities which had a great influence over the American public was very tight. Vasile Stoica was a close friend of colonel House, leader of a group of specialists, created by President Wilson who had the mission to study the case of each European nation and give the best answers and solutions to the American delegates at the Peace Conference.

The Romanian officer gave this group numerous maps, drawings and statistic tables, all very useful materials according to professors Bowman, Duggan and Korner. He understood that he had to be very explicit and correct in his speeches; for that reason he showed the group the great ethnographic map of the Hungarian professor Paul Bologh, created on statistical information from 1900.

Finally, in his report, Vasile Stoica explained the circumstances which changed the American perception about the *Romanian cause* at the official level.

This materialized in sending an official note to Romania, on November 5th, 1918.

“Our aim – said Vasile Stoica – was to gain the American leading circles on our side, to convince them about the justice of the *Romanian cause*, to prove to them that our wish is to be together with our brothers from the Romanian kingdom”.

An official declaration was very useful, all the more so as Romania, who had signed a separate peace with Germany and the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, risked losing its rights at the Peace Conference. “In August, September, October we went almost from man to man through the American political circles” – wrote Vasile Stoica, and he said that the same way did doctor Lupu and Lahovary. The little Romanian group was helped by the “Middle-European Union”, which, on October 25th, held a conference in Philadelphia and sent the American Government a motion to “...completely understanding the future development of a situation from Lower Danube and from South-East Europe (The Union)expressed its position that the wish of freedom of the four million Romanians be recognized”.

On October 19th, Vasile Stoica presented a report to the most powerful minister of the American Government, mister Franklin Lane, who met him for a two hour discussion. Lane assured him that in the first assembly of the Government he would present the case of the Romanians from Transylvania. After a few days, on October 26th a new report was requested by William Philips, who talked with Vasile Stoica,” an entire morning” about the *Romanian cause*.

An audience was impossible to get, but the persistent Romanian saw the State Secretary, Lansing, immediately.

Almost at the same time, on November 1st, 1918, news, delivered by the American official in Iasi, Vopicka, arrived from Romania, concerning the option of the Romanian deputies from the Parliament in Budapest, that they wished the union of Transylvania with Romania.

The reception in the evening of November 2nd, at the French Embassy in Washington, was the final moment before the American Government decided to support the Romanians. There, the deputy of State Secretary, William Philips was assailed by Tomas Masarik, the Czechoslovakian president, Simic, the Serbian representative and Rusos, the Greek representative.

On the morning of November 4th, the Cabinet gathered and decided to give an official statement of support to the *Romanian cause*, and, in the afternoon, William Bullit called Vasile Stoica to edit the text of the statement. The final form was approved a day later, and, on November 5th, at 5 p.m., it was radioed to Iasi, to the Romanian Government.

Immediately, the Associated Press Agency gave a press release, followed on by many newspapers from America and Europe. This press release said that the American Government supported the hopes of union of the Romanians from Transylvania with their brothers. The press release also acknowledged the dedication and contribution of Captain Vasile Stoica to this decision of the American Government.

**GENERAL TOMA DUMITRESCU (1877-1936)
– A DIPLOMAT OF EUROPEAN RENOWN**

*Cornel Mărculescu**

Abstract

A remarkable military personality, acknowledged both nationally and internationally, General Toma Dumitrescu (1877-1936) from Dâmbovița County had an activity focused on several areas: Commander, General Staff Officer (GSO), diplomat, professor and military theorist. His experience in the diplomatic domain, acquired following the Peace Conference of Paris-Versailles, will trigger new tasks along this line: delegate at the International Conference from Geneva on disarmament and arms trade (April 10 – May 19, 1922), from Lausanne (November 20, 1922 – July 24, 1923), and member in the Military Delegation at the works of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference (1925-1930). During the period January 15, 1926 – June 5, 1927, General Toma Dumitrescu was appointed director (Commander) of the Academy of War (Școala Superioară de Război), remaining in the memory of the teaching staff and of his colleagues there, future officers, as one of those Commanders with an extraordinary professional training. The activity of General Toma Dumitrescu acquired new strengths during the period July 1, 1931 – October 31, 1935, as he was at the same time Commander of the 1st Corps of the Army, participant at the Geneva Disarmament Conference organized under the aegis of the League of Nations (February 2 – June 11, 1934), being part of the Romanian delegation led by Nicolae Titulescu, participant at the meetings of the Supreme Council of Army, and Commander of the 4th Army Corps.

Key words: *General Toma Dumitrescu, diplomat, Paris, Geneva, Nicolae Titulescu, League of Nations*

General Toma Dumitrescu, a renowned personality of Romania and implicitly of the Romanian Army, was born on May 10, 1877, in Racovița Village, Hăbeni Commune, Dâmbovița County¹, the historical territorial

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¹ Dimitrie Frunzescu, *Dicționarul topografic și statisticu alu României, cuprinzindu descrierea a 20.000 nume proprii teritoriale...*, precedatu de *Geografia și statistica țerei* (Romanian topographic and statistical dictionary, with the description of 20,000 territorial names, preceded by the geography and statistics of Romania), București, 1872, p. 228; Honorius Motoc, Mihai Oproiu, *Dicționarul geografic al județului Dâmbovița. Dimitrie Popescu Condurăteanu 1890*

subdivision of Dealu¹, as son of the priest Dumitru Popescu² and of his wife, Ana.³ After graduating from high school, during the period October 1, 1896 – July 1, 1898, he joined the Infantry Academy (Școala de Ofiteri de Infanterie), obtaining the rank sub-lieutenant. The first army unit where he operates as officer is Regiment 4 Ilfov no. 21, where he first accomplishes the role of Platoon Commander;⁴ he is then promoted lieutenant on April 7, 1902 and moved to the Regiment of Roman nr. 14.⁵ Here he served for a year, preparing as well his exam for the Academy of War, which he passed successfully.⁶ In the

(Geographic Dictionary of Dâmbovița County. Dimitrie Popescu Condurăteanu 1890), Târgoviște, Editura Transversal, 2007, p. 66.

¹ “Plasa Dealu (the historical territorial subdivision of Dealu) took its name from the hills with vineyards that cross this territorial unit from north to south. This unit had its capital at Târgoviște until 1883, but since then it merged with the historical territorial subdivision of Dâmbovița and together they form a single such unit called “plasă” by the name of Dealu-Dâmbovița, having its capital Dragomirești.” See Honorius Motoc, Mihai Oproiu, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

² The Old Church from Racovița Village, whose dedication day is the celebration of “All the Saints”, where the father of General Toma Dumitrescu was a priest, was built in 1806 by Hagi Ene Anastasescu and, according to the inscription painted above the door leading to the central area of the church, was repaired in 1890 by the “inhabitants of the commune through the endeavours of the priest **Dumitru Popescu** and of Dumitru Soare, R. Dută, Gheorghe Oprea, D. Musat and of madame Elena Dalles and D. Sambolă. Architects: I. Bălescu, Gheorghe Ionescu, București, 10 XI”. See Mihai Oproiu, *Inscripții și însemnări din județul Dâmbovița* (Inscriptions and notes from Dâmbovița County), Tome II. Colectia Historica, Târgoviște, Editura Transversal, 2003, p. 57; Mihai Oproiu, Honorius Motoc, Marian Curculescu, *Dâmbovița. Localități și monumente* (Dâmbovița. Localities and Monuments), Târgoviște, Editura Transversal, 2006, p. 94; Ion Băncilă, *Monografia comunei Bucsani. 555 de ani de la atestarea documentară* (The Monograph of Bucsani Commune – 555 years since its first documentary mention), Târgoviște, Editura Bibliotheca, 2008, p. 138; Mihai Oproiu, Eduardt Samoilă, Honorius Motoc, Georgeta Toma, *Înfruntând veacurile. Asezări și monumente dâmbovițene* (Lasting through the centuries. Settlements and Monuments from Dâmbovița County), Târgoviște, Editura Transversal, 2009, p. 101.

³ It seems that General Toma Dumitrescu comes from a numerous family with 8 children: Dumitru Dumitrescu, Toma Dumitrescu, Grigore Popescu, Nae Popescu, Zamfira Dumitrescu, Anicuta Dumitrescu, Eufrosina Dumitrescu and Floarea Dumitrescu, married to Lt. Marin Stoica. We use this opportunity to thank Mr. Dumitru Stoica for his precious information and his support. He is the son of Lt. Marin Stoica, the only living descendant of General Toma Dumitrescu, born on April 8, 1928, in Racovița Village, Hăbeni Commune, and now living in Zimbor, Sălaj County.

⁴ Teofil Oroian, *Militari de prestigiu, diplomați cu renume: Generalul Toma Dumitrescu*, în “Revista de Istorie Militară” (Famous military men and diplomats: General Toma Dumitrescu), (from here on quoted as the review will be quoted as RIM), Nr. 5-6 (63-64), București, 2000, p. 6.

⁵ The Archives of the National Defence Ministry, the Centre for the Safekeeping and Study of the Military Archives from Pitești (Centrul de Păstrare și Studierea Arhivelor Militare Pitești “Radu Rosetti”), fond Memorii, Generali Bătrâni (Memoirs, Old Generals), No. 12, General de Divizie Toma Dumitrescu, (from here on quoted as A.M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P. *loc. cit.*), f. 3.

⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 6.

year 1903, Toma Dumitrescu was admitted at the Academy of War (Școala Superioară de Război), the highest military school in Romania. He graduated from it with very good results in 1905, some of his cohort colleagues (cohort XV)¹ being Nicolae Condeescu, Ioan Ghinescu, Constantin Paulian, Nicolae Mihăescu, Alexandru Lupascu, Aurel Alimănescu, Aristide Razu and Marcel Olteanu, first Commander (1912-1918)² of the elite generator of the Romanian society: the Military High School from Dealu Monastery.³

Toma Dumitrescu began his military service with the 14th Artillery Regiment of Roman (November 1905 – June 1906), and then he continued his activity at the Great General Staff (Marele Cartier General) (April 1, 1906 - April 1, 1907), and at the 10th Artillery Regiment (a different gun division, May 10, 1907 – April 1, 1908), being remarked for his exemplary general culture and also for his outstanding military knowledge and an adequate military education, so that he was promoted to the rank of General Staff Officer. Due to the good results he obtained, he was then advanced to the rank of captain based on his own choice (May 10, 1907), according to the High Decree 2298/1907.⁴ For a year and a half (April 1, 1908 – October 1, 1909), he was a professor of military geography and inspector of studies at the Military Academy of Infantry Officers (Școala Militară de Ofițeri de Infanterie)⁵, a position in which he proved true qualities of pedagogue, managing to publish important specialized studies in the Infantry Review (Revista Infanteriei).⁶

When at the Academy of Infantry Officers, Toma Dumitrescu carried out his military practice at the troop, between October 1, 1909 and May 10, 1910, with Regiment 5 Ialomita no. 23, where he commanded the company responsibly, “training the lower ranking men skilfully and diligently and demonstrating real qualities of leader in the application of exercises and manoeuvres, in the activity out in the open”.⁷ On May 10, 1910, he was moved for professional reasons at the Great General Staff, where he operated extremely intelligently and energetically at the Information Office, Second

¹ Mircea Agapie, Dănuț Mircea Chiriac, Ion Emil, Constantin Hlihor, *De la Școala Superioară de Război la Academia de Înalte Studii Militare. Comandanți, profesori, absolvenți. (1889-1995)* (From the Academy of War to the Academy of High Military Studies. Commanders, academics, graduates), București, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 1995, p. 178.

² Constantin Nitescu, *Mănăstirea Dealu și Liceul Militar Nicolae Filipescu* (Dealu Monastery and Nicolae Filipescu Military High School), Târgoviște, Tipografia “Viitorul” Petre G. Popescu, 1932, p. 125.

³ Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, *Omul și opera* (Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen – *The Man and His Work*), București, Colecția Bibliotecii Băncii Naționale, 1996, p. 29.

⁴ A.M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P., *loc. cit.*, f. 3.

⁵ Virgil Alexandru Dragalina, *Viața tatălui meu. Generalul Ioan Dragalina* (My Father’s Life. General Ioan Dragalina), București, Editura Militară, 2009, p. 198.

⁶ A.M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P., *loc. cit.*, f. 30 verso – 31.

⁷ *Ibidem*, f. 36.

Section, completing the study “Description of the Bulgarian Army”. He also became an editor, along with his good friend Marcel Olteanu, for the review “România Militară” (Military Romania)¹, publishing the Bulgarian Rules of Campaign Service (Regulamentul serviciului în campanie bulgar), an extremely significant work concerning the specialized training of the command departments of large military units.² At the same time, working in the domain of military information, he published The Bulgarian Infantry Drill Regulations (Regulamentul de exerciții al infanteriei bulgare) in “Revista Infanteriei” (Infantry Review).³

During the royal manoeuvres of 1910, he proved his skill during the military drills. In the year 1911 he took part, along with the Information Office, to large manoeuvres. Between December 10, 1911 and May 10, 1912, Captain Toma Dumitrescu did a period of service at the 2nd Hunters’ Battalion, “Regina Elisabeta” (Queen Elisabeth), where he commanded the 3rd company doing his best, taking care of the instruction and education of his subordinates, troop and officers... and leading the training of those re-hired in the battalion, so that the Battalion Commander, Lt. Col. Scărlătescu, proposed his promotion to the rank of Major.⁴ During the campaign of the Romanian army in the summer of 1913, he operated as member of the Operative Office of the Great General Staff, and his knowledge and his skills were remarked “both during his work in the office and when working out in the open”, by General Alexandru Averescu himself, chief of the Great General Staff at the time.⁵ On April 1, 1914, on the basis of the High Decree 1148/1914, Toma Dumitrescu was promoted Major⁶ and, at the same time, he was appointed military attaché at the Romanian Consulate of Belgrade. In the period May 1 – August 14, 1916, Toma Dumitrescu was a military attaché at the General Secretariat of the War Ministry, where he was entrusted hard missions, such as the mission of getting in touch with other military attachés; he fulfilled his duties very skilfully and tactfully. At the same time, he went on scouting missions for the fortification works made at Islaz and

¹ Iulia Năstasie, *Viața revistei în anii 1891-1916* (The Review Life in 1891-1916), in “Gândirea militară românească”, new series, year XXII, no. 6, November-December, 2011, p. 184.

² Toma Dumitrescu, *Regulamentul serviciului în campanie bulgar* (Bulgarian Rules of Campaign Service), Abstract, București, 1912, Institutul de Arte Grafice “CAROL GÖBL”, 53 pages.

³ A.M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P., *loc. cit.*, f. 36; Toma Dumitrescu, *Regulamentul de exerciții al infanteriei bulgare* (Bulgarian Infantry Drill Regulations), Abstract, București, Institutul de Arte Grafice “CAROL GÖBL”, 1912, 26 pages; idem, *Jurnal. Războiul Național (1916)* (Journal. The National War (1916)), Edition arranged, introductory study, notes and indexes by Petre Otu and Maria Georgescu, București, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 1999, p. 8; Teofil Oroian, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁴ A.M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P., *loc. cit.*, f. 38 verso; Teofil Oroian, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 42 verso; Teofil Oroian, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁶ A.M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P., *loc. cit.*, f. 3.

Giurgiu, proposing very judicious modifications. As head of the War Yearbook (Anuarul de Război), Toma Dumitrescu improved the battle organization of the small divisions, in agreement with the General Staff leadership of the army corps and divisions. "In all these tasks and works, Major Toma Dumitrescu proved that he possessed all the knowledge of a remarkable troop and General Staff officer, giving him the right to advance in an exceptional way up to the highest headquarters"¹, as the secretary general of the War Ministry, General Dumitru Iliescu appreciated. Once the mobilization decreed, on the night of August 14-15, 1916, Major Toma Dumitrescu accomplished the function of head of cabinet of the General Staff Commander of the General Headquarters, led during the entire campaign of the year 1916 by General Dumitru Iliescu.²

After the replacement of General Iliescu from his function (His Majesty the King reproached him that he had invited around himself mediocre collaborators and not the most reputable people of the Romanian Army), who refused the offer coming from Prezan, namely to remain sub-director of the Great General Staff (he will be sent to France as head of the Romanian mission), General Constantin Christescu followed in this position, while Lt. Col. Toma Dumitrescu was proposed the position of head of the Operative Division (Sectia Operatii), yet he would have had to work with just three people: Prezan, Christescu and Major Ion Antonescu. Toma Dumitrescu

¹ A.M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P., *loc. cit.*, f. 45 verso.

² *During the campaign of the Romanian army of 1916, which represents a dramatic moment of the war for national union and still to date one of the most controversial and discussed moments of the Romanian military historiography, Major Toma Dumitrescu realized a National War Journal (Jurnal al războiului național), which later on became the possession of Ion I.C. Brătianu, who, in his turn, transmitted it to General Radu R. Rosetti in April 1921. After having made a series of annotations, the latter gave it back to Ion I.C. Brătianu. A sure thing is that this journal was discovered at the Manuscript Office (Cabinetul de manuscrise) of the Romanian Academy, among the documents and the manuscripts from the archive of General Radu R. Rosetti, by the well-known military historian Petre Otu, Scientific Director of the Institute for Political Defence Studies and Military History and President of the Romanian Military History Commission, who, together with Maria Georgescu, restored it for the public interested in military history and not only to it, by publishing it in the year 1999, at Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare. See: Toma Dumitrescu, Jurnal. Războiul Național (1916), Edition arranged, introductory study, notes and index by Petre Otu and Maria Georgescu, București, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 1999; Maria Georgescu, Campania anului 1916. Un izvor inedit (Jurnalul generalului Toma Dumitrescu) (Un document inédit de la campagne 1916 – le journal du général Toma Dumitrescu) (An Unpublished Historical Source of the 1916 Campaign. The Journal of General Toma Dumitrescu), in the tome "Securitate națională, politică de apărare și istorie militară în România la sfârșit de mileniu" (National Security, Defence Policy and Military History in Romania by the End of the Millennium), București, 2000, pp. 265-269.*

declined the offer and was invested head of the General Staff of the 15th Infantry Division.¹

Beginning with December 2, 1916 in his quality of head of the General Staff of the 15th Infantry Division, Toma Dumitrescu was present on the front with all his soldierly qualities. For this reason, the Commander of this unit, Colonel (and later on, General) Paul Anghelescu appreciated his qualities for what they really were, considering him “a distinguished General Staff officer, full of impetus and very energetic”. In the triptych year 1917, Toma Dumitrescu found himself in the middle of the battles fought to defend Moldova and the entirety of the Romanian nation, showing his skills and abilities in the coordination of the Romanian troops, so that, based on the proposition of his superiors, Toma Dumitrescu was advanced Colonel on September 1/13, 1917, following the High Decree 1330/1917.²

Moreover, obtaining remarkable results, the Commander of the 6th Army Corps (set up by the Great General Staff, for a better coordination of the large units operating in Bessarabia, on 25 January/7 February 1918, by the Order 7446), General Ion Istrati, as he had known Colonel Toma Dumitrescu as his subordinate, appointed him head of the General Staff of the Corps, and this tandem organized and directed, until April 1918, all the military operations of the Romanian army in Bessarabia.³

In the context of Romania's re-joining the war, in the year 1918, Colonel Toma Dumitrescu was delegated by the Romanian Great General Staff to be liaison officer at the Headquarters of the allied armies from Thessaloniki, on November 28. In his new position, Colonel Dumitrescu was charged by General Constantin Prezan, head of the Romanian Great Headquarters, by means of the telegram no. 998 / December 4/17, 1918, to intervene to General d'Esperey with a view to coordinating the actions with the allies, concerning the move of the Romanian Army over the line of Mures.⁴ At the same time, for a short period, he was also appointed liaison agent by the Great General Headquarters in December 1918, at the French Mission led by General Henri Berthelot. Yet, by means of the High Decree 5548/ February 18, 1919, the

¹ Toma Dumitrescu, *Jurnal. Războiul National (1916)...*, p. 181; Petre Otu, *Mareșalul Constantin Prezan...*, p. 106.

² A.M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P., *loc. cit.*, f. 3.

³ Marin C. Stănescu, *Armata română și unirea Basarabiei și Bucovinei cu România 1917-1918* (The Romanian Army and the Union of Bessarabia and Bukovina with Romania 1917-1918), Constanța, 1999, Editura Ex Ponto, pp. 109-110.

⁴ Ministerul Afacerilor Externe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Direcția Arhivelor Diplomatice (Diplomatic Archives Office), *România la Conferința de pace de la Paris (1919-1920). Documente diplomatice* (Romania at the Peace Conference from Paris (1919-1920) Diplomatic documents), tome I (December 1, 1918 – June 28, 1919), editors: Dumitru Preda, Ioan Chiper and Alexandru Ghișa, București, Editura Semne, 2010, Doc. 36, p. 31.

Great General Headquarters reappoints Colonel Radu R. Rosetti as a military attaché at the Headquarters of the French Troops, to prepare the return of the Romanian troops on the battlefield.¹

Due to his distinguished professional and general culture, for his remarkable qualities, proven during his entire career, Colonel Toma Dumitrescu was entrusted, on December 28, 1918, the task of delegate of Romania at the Peace Conference of Paris-Versailles. His outstanding military training and the relations he established during his career were the main elements that led to his appointment, as military expert, representing Romania in the Aeronautics Commission, at the Peace Conference of Paris (1919-1920)², but also on the recommendation of Colonel Radu R. Rosetti, who proposes him to Ion I.C. Brătianu as an excellent military man. Before leaving for Paris, Colonel Toma Dumitrescu was entrusted by His Majesty King Ferdinand with the task to carry – on His Majesty's behalf – the decoration Order “Mihai Viteazul” (Michael the Brave), to prince Alexander of Serbia, who expressed his great content for the high distinction received.³

In the year 1921, Colonel Toma Dumitrescu was appointed by the Romanian Government to complete a high diplomatic mission, being entrusted the leadership of the Romanian mission in the inter-allied commission for the delimitation of the frontier between Romania and Hungary.⁴ He completed his mission honorably, a fact noticed as well by Take Ionescu, Foreign Affairs Minister in the government led by General Alexandru Averescu (1920-1921), who communicated on October 20, 1921: “I take this chance to communicate that both Your attitude and the notes sent to the Delimitation Commission were

¹ Radu R. Rosetti, *Mărturisiri...*, p. 294.

² See *Istoria politicii externe românești* (The History of the Romanian External Politics), coordinator Ion Calafeteanu, Fundatia Europeană Titulescu, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, p. 227; Constantin Botoran, Ion Calafeteanu, Eliza Campus, Viorica Moisuc, *România și Conferința de Pace de la Paris (1918-1920). Triumful principiului naționalităților* (Romania and the Peace Conference of Paris 1918-1920. The triumph of the principle of nationalities), Cluj-Napoca, Editura Dacia, 1983, pp. 316-317; *Istoria României. Transilvania. Unirea și desăvârșirea statului național unitar* (Romania's history. Transylvania, the Union and the completion of the national unitary state), tome II, chap. IV, coordinators: Marcel Stirban, Gheorghe Iancu, Ioan Tepelea, Mihai Racovițan, Cluj-Napoca, Editura George Barițiu, 1997, p. 788; *Documente din Arhivele Franceze referitoare la primul război mondial* (Documents from the French Archives concerning WWI), selection by Emilia Postăriță and Ielita Gămulescu, București, 1983, p. 356; Ministerul Afacerilor Externe. Direcția Arhivelor Diplomatice, *România la Conferința de pace de la Paris (1919-1920)...*, Doc. 100, p. 88.

³ Radu R. Rosetti, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-309.

⁴ *Desăvârșirea unității național-statale a poporului român. Recunoașterea ei internațională. 1918. Documente interne și externe Februarie 1920 – Decembrie 1920* (The Accomplishment of the union of the Romanian national state), tome VI, coordinators: Ion Ardeleanu, Vasile Arimia, Mircea Mușat. Scientific reviewers: Vasile Alexandrescu, Vasile Vesa, București, Editura Enciclopedică și Științifică, 1986, p. 454.

very well led and realized”.¹ During the period November 1, 1921 – September 30, 1923, Colonel Toma Dumitrescu secured, according to the High Decree 4267/ October 26, 1921, the position of head of the General Staff at the Army Inspectorate II.²

His experience in the diplomatic domain will bring new tasks for him along this line – delegate at the International Conference of Geneva for disarmament and arms trading (April 10 – May 19, 1922)³ and of Lausanne (November 20, 1922 – July 24, 1923)⁴, missions that he completed skilfully and with a great tact, his services being important and real, both for the country and for the Romanian Army. On April 1, 1923, based on the recommendation of the Superior Army Council, Colonel Toma Dumitrescu was advanced to the position of Brigade General⁵, by means of the High Decree 1439 / March 31, 1923. He continued to secure positions of high responsibility in the Romanian Army, becoming – in the year 1924 – head of the 3rd Division of the Great General Staff, his subordinates being the sections: Instruction, Regulations and Historical (October 1, 1923 – October 31, 1924), being praised for his activity.⁶

In order to take on the obligations deriving from our country’s entry into the League of Nations⁷ concerning the “study of the measures that could give all the states the necessary mediation and security guarantees so that armament levels may be set at their lowest numbers in any international disarmament contract”, in 1925 the Military Delegation to the works of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference was constituted. The members of the Romanian delegation who took part in this Commission were: “Head of the delegation – Dimitrie Ghica⁸, Foreign Affairs Minister; Members:

¹ A.M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P., *loc. cit.*, f. 53.

² *Ibidem*, f. 3.

³ *Ibidem*, f. 59.

⁴ I.G. Duca, *Memorii. Războiul. Partea a II-a (1917-1919)*, ediție și indice de Stelian Neagoe, București, Editura Machiavelli, 1994, p. 270.

⁵ A.M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P., *loc. cit.*, f. 56.

⁶ Teofil Oroian, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁷ International organization created on January 10, 1920, following the Peace Conference of Paris (1919), with its headquarters in Geneva, aiming to develop the collaboration between peoples, and the guarantee of international peace and security. Its status was signed by 44 states, of which Romania, as well; it ceased its activity in 1940, being dissolved on April 18, 1946.

⁸ Dimitrie I. Ghica (1875-1967). Romanian jurist, diplomat, politician and statesman, graduate of the Law Faculty of Toulouse and of the Political Sciences Faculty of Paris. Consulate attaché in Paris in 1894 and St. Petersburg in 1894. General Consul in Thessaloniki, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Athens (July 1, 1898 – April 1, 1900; May 16, 1901 – April 1, 1905); Sofia (November 1, 1911 – June 27, 1913); Rome (October 1, 1913-December 2, 1917; February 1, 1928 – April 27, 1931; June 1, 1932 – July 1, 1933); Paris (February 1, 1920 – March 16, 1922); Brussels and Luxemburg (July 1, 1933 – December 15, 1936). Member of the Romanian Delegation at the Peace Conference of Paris (1919-1920), secretary general of the Foreign Affairs Ministry (April 27, 1931 – May 31, 1932), president of

Minister Nicolae Titulescu, Minister Plenipotentiary to London; Minister Constantin Antoniad¹, Minister Plenipotentiary at the League of Nations; Ion Petrovici², university professor; General Nicolae Samsonovici³, head of the Great General Staff; Minister Alexandru Zeuceanu⁴; Minister Savel Rădulescu⁵,

the Consultative Diplomatic Council of the Foreign Affairs Ministry (February 1, 1937). Member of the International Diplomatic Academy in 1927.

¹ Constantin Antoniad (1880-1954). Romanian jurist, magistrate, philosopher, culture historian and diplomat, law school graduate in 1902 and Doctor in Letters and Philosophy of the University of Bucharest in 1907, Secretary General of the Romanian Delegation to the Peace Conference of Paris (1919-1920), arbiter in mixed arbitral tribunals (1921-1928), delegate to the League of Nations (1928-1936), Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Romania to the League of Nations in Geneva (1928-1936) and Bern (1936-1937). Associate Member of the International Diplomatic Academy since 1929.

² Ion Petrovici (1882-1972) is born in Tecuci, yet he completes his secondary studies at Sf. Sava College in Bucharest (1892-1899), after which he joins the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy, becoming the first Doctor in philosophy of a Romanian University, in 1905, with the thesis *Paralelismul psiho-fizic* (Psycho-Physical Parallelism). In the years 1905-1906, he attends philosophy classes in Leipzig and Berlin, and in 1912 he is appointed professor at the University of Iasi. Minister of Public Works (January 1 – December 13, 1921), of Public Instruction (July 14, 1926 – July 14, 1927), of National Education in the Government led by Octavian Goga (December 28, 1937- February 10, 1938), and in 1941 Minister of National Culture in the Government led by Ion Antonescu (December 5, 1941 – August 23, 1944). Titular member of the Romanian Academy (May 24, 1934) and vice-president of this institution between June 3, 1938 and May 31, 1941.

³ Nicolae Samsonovici (1877-1950). Officer, he graduated from the Academy of War (Școala Superioară de Război) in 1912. He was remarked for his talents in the battles from Mărăsești, at the time being Colonel and then head of the General Staff of the 6th Army Corps in 1917 and of the Army I (1917-1918). Brigade General in 1919, sub-director of the General Great Staff (1919-1921), professor and Commander of the Academy of War (1921-1926), head of the General Great Staff (1927-1932), Division General in 1928, Minister of the National Defense (August 11 – October 17, 1932; October 20, 1932 – January 12, 1933; January 14 – November 9, 1933).

⁴ Alexandru Zeuceanu (1874-1950). Romanian jurist, economist, diplomat, Doctor in Law of the University of Paris (1898). He was delegate of Romania for the liquidation of the Austrian-Hungarian Bank (1920), alternate delegate of Romania in the Reparations Commission (section Vienna, 1920), delegate of Romania, with full powers, in the Reparations Commission of the Peace Conference of Paris (1925), Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Madrid (November 1933-September 1935), and since 1935, Minister Plenipotentiary and head of the Financial Delegation of Romania abroad.

⁵ Savel Rădulescu (1895-1970). Economist, diplomat, politician, graduate of the Law Faculty of the University of Bucharest and Doctor in Law of the University of Paris. He was financial counselor and economist since 1928, then director of the Economic Section in the Administration of the Foreign Affairs Minister in 1928, Minister Plenipotentiary (January 1, 1930), undersecretary of state in the Foreign Affairs Minister (October 21, 1932 – August 29, 1936), participant in several sessions of the Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, in different international conferences on economic and financial topics, and to the Disarmament Conference in 1932, president of the Budget Commission of the League of Nations in 1935, associate member of the International Diplomatic Academy in 1935, the closest collaborator of

head of the economic division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; General Toma Dumitrescu, Commander of Army Body; Suppliants: Vespasian V. Pella¹, university professor; technical counsellors and experts: Commander E. Roșca, Aviation Colonel royal subordinate I. Stoicescu, Lt. Colonel Gheorghe Potopeanu, Lt. Colonel B. Alinescu, Major Corneliu Teodorini, secretary of the military delegation; Secretaries: Edmond Ciuntu², first secretary of the Romanian Mission to the League of Nations; Dimitrie G. Buzdugan³, first secretary of the Consulate of London; P. Zănescu, consulate attaché. Among others, private secretaries and typists.”⁴

Nicolae Titulescu, president of the Romanian Commission for the Application of the Armistice Convention (November 1944 – April 1945).

¹ Vespasian V. Pella (1897-1952). Jurist, diplomat and statesman, Doctor in Law, rapporteur at the Interparliamentary Conference in Washington in 1925, delegate at several sessions of the Assembly and of the Council of the League of Nations, member of the National Constituent Assembly (1922-1926), alternate member of the Committee of the League of Nations for the amendment of the Pact of the League of Nations, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Hague (March 15, 1936 – October 1, 1939), Bern (September 1, 1943 – October 1, 1944), delegate at the Disarmament Conference (1932-1934), member of the European Commission of the Danube, president of the International Criminal Law Association (1946), expert at the United Nations (February 1948).

² Edmond Ciuntu (1894-1988). Romanian jurist and diplomat, Consulate secretary, third class, at the Romanian Consulate in Warsaw (1921), permanent delegate to the League of Nations (1923), director of the secretariat of the Romanian Office to the League of Nations (1925), Consulate secretary, class I (1928), Plenipotentiary Minister, class II (1933), Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania to Ankara (1934); to Moscow (1934-1938), member of the Commission for the study of the material and the preparation of the documents for the Peace Conference of Paris (1945), political counselor in the Romanian Commission for the Application of the Armistice (1945).

³ Dimitrie G. Buzdugan (1899 – d.?). Romanian diplomat, son of Gheorghe Buzdugan, graduate of the Faculty of Law of the University of Bucharest. He worked in Paris, London, Rome, going through different positions: consulate attaché, Consulate secretary, Consulate counselor; Minister Plenipotentiary, class II (May 1941), Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister to Zagreb (May 20, 1941 – February 15, 1944).

⁴ Corneliu Teodorini, *Amintiri din cariera generalului Corneliu Teodorini*, in the Archives of the National Military Museum “Regele Ferdinand I” (from here on quoted as Arhiva M.M.N.), collection Manuscrise (Manuscripts), p. 21; Valeria Bălescu, *Dezarmarea în atenția Societății Națiunilor: Problematika militară românească, consecință a dezbaterilor comisiei militare* (Disarmament in the focus of the League of Nations: the Romanian military issue, a consequence of the debates of the Military Commission), in “Armata Română și Patrimoniul Național” (The Romanian Army and the National Patrimony), tome edited by the General Staff, Serviciul Istoric al Armatei și Centrul de studii și păstrare a Arhivelor Militare Istorice, București, 2010, p. 347; Luminița Giurgiu, *Statul Major General și poziția României față de problema dezarmării în perioada interbelică* (The General Staff and Romania’s position on the disarmament issue during the interwar period), in “Gândirea Militară Românească” (Romanian Military Thinking), new series, year XXI, No.1, January-February, București, 2010, p. 192.

General Toma Dumitrescu – a representative of the Romanian military delegation even since the creation of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference, informed, at the beginning of the year 1929, about the atmosphere in Geneva, stating that, beginning with the year 1925, until the end of 1929, when the 6th session of the Conference took place, “things have started to clear up and the debates are about to reach a common denominator.”¹ On October 7, 1929, General Toma Dumitrescu informed his superiors once more about the evolutions at the League of Nations in the disarmament issue, writing a true report on the events that took place during the 6 extraordinary sessions of the Conference, from which we quote: “In the year 1925, over 50 states elaborated and signed a Convention on the control and publicity of the international trade of arms, munitions and war material. Yet, this convention was ratified only by a very small number of states (4), as, if it had been applied, only the non-productive states would have been submitted to this control and they would have found themselves in an unfavourable condition compared to the productive countries. In order for this desire of equality of the non-productive countries to be met, in the end of the previously-mentioned convention, another convention on the control and publicity of private arms production was foreseen as well, a convention called for by Art. 8 from the Pact of the League of Nations and absolutely necessary in order to enforce the first Arms Control Convention, of 1925. Consequently, the League of Nations created a Special Commission, which elaborated in the 1927/1928 sessions a Convention Project on the private arms production etc., relying on the provisions of the 1925 Convention”. Generally, for Romania, General Dumitrescu mentioned that the “application of both the 1925 Convention (traffic) and the issue of production – the 1929 project, are not favourable to us as long as the necessary arms for our security are not available, as during this time we would be submitted to the obligations of publicity foreseen by both of the Conventions, whether we buy materials from abroad or whether we make them in Romania”, whereas “The states that already have the armament they need will not be touched by the provisions of these conventions.”²

Concluding, General Toma Dumitrescu reported: “we endeavoured and we obtained that in both of these conventions the application of the publicity obligations may be suspended for Romania, Poland and the Baltic Countries, as long as Russia does not adhere to these conventions. On the other hand, in the session of August 1929, when the Project of Convention on arms fabrication was discussed, we supported, along with France, Poland and Czechoslovakia, that the publicity of the arms fabrication by the state should be restrained and, at the same time, we supported the French proposition that the Convention on

¹ Valeria Bălescu, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

² *Ibidem.*

arms fabrication be postponed until the end of the works of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference. All these were aimed at gaining time and avoiding the inconveniences that could have been triggered by the application of this convention in the present situation. The Project of Convention that highlights these diverging perspectives was then transmitted to the General Assembly, where it was submitted to the Third Commission (for Disarmament) and a Resolution presented by our delegation was approved, for the organization of a new reunion of the Special Commission, in order to put down a final variant of the Project of Convention, only after the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference would have decided on the Chapter "Publicity".¹ The Commission organized its works during the years 1926-1930 in six extraordinary sessions concerning war material control and trade, armament limitation and reduction².

On the basis of the High Decree no. 97 / January 11, 1926, General Toma Dumitrescu was appointed director (Commander) of the academy of War (Scoala Superioară de Război)³ on January 15, 1926, a dignity that he will hold until June 5, 1927. During all this period, he did not neglect his mission concerning the Disarmament Conference⁴ either and he remained in the memory of the teaching staff and of the trainee officers as one of those Commanders with an excellent professional training who fought "for the application of his solid principles and for the army's intellectual training for war".

He was then Secretary General of the War Ministry. The Minister whose secretary he was, General Paul Anghelescu, showed that he had in Toma Dumitrescu "his most precious and loyal collaborator", who, due to his special merits deserved to be advanced to the rank of Division General.⁵ During the period 1927-1930, the General commanded the 4th Infantry Division, showing "a particular care that the troop and the officers may be well trained, and the people's and the animals' welfare may be assured in the best conditions."⁶ He was then proposed to become Commander of an Army Corps by a Commission

¹ *Ibidem.*

² Viorica Moisuc, *Premisele izolării politice a României (1919-1940)* (The grounds of Romania's political isolation (1919-1940), București, Editura Humanitas, 1991, p. 291.

³ Mircea Agapie, Dănuț Mircea Chiriac, Ion Emil, Constantin Hlihor, *op. cit.*, p. 415.

⁴ *Nicolae Titulescu. Corespondență* (Nicolae Titulescu Letters), Tome I (1921-1931), Part I, tome realized by George Potra, Collaborators: Delia Răzdolescu, Gilbert Monney Câmpeanu, Daniela Boriceanu, Cristina Păiușan, București, Fundația Europeană Titulescu, 2004, Doc. 145, pp. 710-711; George Potra, *Pro și contra Titulescu* (For and against Titulescu), second edition, revised and completed, tome I, București, Editura Fundația Europeană Titulescu, 2012, pp. 533-534.

⁵ A.M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P., *loc. cit.*, ff. 61-62.

⁶ Teofil Oroian, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

made up of Generals Gheorghe Mărdărescu, Nicolae Petala and Paul Anghelescu.¹ Previously, he had accomplished the mission he had received from the Minister of War, namely to accompany General Constantin Prezan to the celebrations from Belgrade, occasioned by the 10th anniversary of the break-up of the Thessaloniki front by the allies. Between November 15, 1929 and April 1, 1930, Toma Dumitrescu commanded the Second Army Corps. As a reward for his special merits and qualities, on May 10, 1930, Toma Dumitrescu was promoted to the rank Division General, being then appointed General Inspector of the Infantry until October 1, 1930.

On July 1, 1931, General Toma Dumitrescu was granted the command of the First Army Corps, Section II, in the Information Office. He was very remarkable during the royal manoeuvres of 1932, when he led both an army corps and an army, demonstrating a superior military culture and appreciating the situations with a lot of competence and a fine judgement. During the period November 1, 1932 – October 31, 1935, the activity of General Toma Dumitrescu was shared between: the Disarmament Conference of Geneva, organized under the aegis of the League of Nations (February 2 – June 11, 1934) – being part of the Romanian delegation led by Nicolae Titulescu², and where he competently represented the military interests of the country –, the meetings of the Superior Council of the Army (where the opinions he exposed relied on a clear judgement) and the command of the 4th Army Corps where, in the little time left available, he closely supervised the activity of the subordinate army corps. At the same time, he took part in the works of the Commission for the Testing of Colonels and Generals, which took place in Pitesti. General Toma Dumitrescu died on October 1, 1936, for reasons yet unknown, as it is shown by the document no. 699/1936, excerpted from the Town Hall of Brasov³, being then buried in Bucharest at Bellu Military Cemetery.⁴

During his career, the activity of General Toma Dumitrescu from Dâmbovița County concerned several areas: Commander, General Staff Officer, diplomat, professor and military theorist. His activity was rewarded and praised by numerous orders and medals, which confirm his highly appreciated military personality, recognized both nationally and internationally, of which we shall mention: the Carol I Jubilee Medal, via the High Decree 5384/1906; “Avantul Tării” (Romania’s Impetus Medal), via the High Decree 6427/1913; “Crucea

¹ A.M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P., *loc. cit.*, f. 65.

² *Istoria politicii externe românești...*, p. 270.

³ A.M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P., fond Registru ofiteri activi – infanterie (Active Officers Register – Infantry), tome III, part I, f. 617.

⁴ The tomb of General Toma Dumitrescu lies at Figure 22, place 34 at the Military Cemetery of Bellu, together with his family: daughter, Florica Angela Climescu (November 7, 1908 – November 9, 1988), son-in-law, Colonel Constantin Climescu (November 1, 1898 – April 27, 1981) and grand-daughter, Dr. Rodica Maria Jujescu (27.08.1929 – 2009).

Comemorativă” (Commemorative Cross), medal with ribbon, via the High Decree 1744/1918; “Victoria” (Victory Medal), via the High Decree 3390/1921; “Steaua României” (the Order of the Romanian Star), in the rank of Officer with Mountain Hunter ribbon via the High Decree 291/1918; “Coroana României” (the Order of the Romanian Crown), in the rank of Peace Commander, via the High Decree 4768/1922; “Steaua României” (Order of the Romanian Star), in the rank of peace Commander, via the High Decree 2/1927; “Legion of Honour” in the rank of Officer (France); “Legion of Honour”, in the rank of Commander (France); “L’Etoile Noire” (Order of the Black Star) in the rank of Commander (France); the Order of the British Empire in the rank of Commander (England); the Order of the Crown of Italy, in the rank of Commander (Italy); the Order of Saint Sava, in the rank of High Officer (Serbia); the Order of the White Eagle, in the rank of Commander (Serbia); the Order of Polonia Restituta, in the rank of Commander (Poland); the Order of Polonia Restituta, in the rank of High Officer (Poland); the Order of Military Merit, in the rank of Great Cross (Spain); the Order of the Saviour, in the rank of Commander (Greece); the War Cross (Czechoslovakia); the Medal of Solidarity, Class 2 (Republic of Panama).¹

¹ M.Ap.N. – C.P.S.A.M.P., *loc. cit.*, f. 2 verso; Teofil Oroian, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

**THE DISMISSAL OF NICOLAE TITULESCU – A PREDICTABLE ACT
WITH PREDICTABLE FOLLOWINGS**

*Alin-Sorin Mitrică**

Abstract

The article reveals an important action of the government Gheorghe Tătărescu: the dismissal of Nicolae Titulescu, 40 days after the primary signature of the Protocol of mutual assistance with URSS and the main consequences of this action.

Key words: *Nicolae Titulescu, dismissal, Maksim Litvinov, King Carol II, Protocol of mutual assistance*

On 29th of August 1936, in Romania took place an important political act, whose consequences will influence the Romanian political life: the dismissal of Nicolae Titulescu, the Minister for External Affairs. After this event, he will leave in exile, dying in 1941, far away from the country, at Cannes, being the saddest but not the quietest witness of the Big Romania's split and of the country's entry in alliance with the Axes powers against the Soviet Union.

Nicolae Titulescu was known for his diplomatic actions between the two world's wars. He was one of those who had signed the Trianon Treaty in Hungary on the 4th of June 1920; he was victorious into the diplomacy's arena against the Hungarian diplomat Appony, into the "process of the Hungarian adepts", he had judged two times the General Assembly of the National League. In the 30' he had tried to rebuild the Romanian regional Alliances, setting up the bases of the Balkan Understanding in 1934 which joint the Small Agreement, built since 1921. But, even if his initiative was a failure, Nicolae Titulescu was the one who told that an allemande-soviet relation was possible and if it was going to happen, this will be one against Romania. Romania has established in 1934 the diplomatic relations with URSS, (interrupted in 1918 by Lenin, the leader of the Soviet Russia), but the question of the eastern Romanian border wasn't covered in the treaties, the great powers who decided the Peace Paris Conference from 1919-1920, beside the Basarabia's Protocol (28 th October 1920), have thought that Romania and URSS would decide on their own the faith of their commune border by signing a following treaty.

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We should say that Nicolae Titulescu as chef of the Bucharest diplomacy was not an agreed person from two points of view: a geopolitical and an internal one.

Starting on 30 of January, when Adolf Hitler was elected Chancellor of Germany, this country was passing to measures which regarded the renewal of the Versailles system: leaving the Nations League, introducing the military system as compulsory and the remilitarization of Rhenania.¹

In Romania, in 1930 Carol II came to the throne, being the one who proposed the dissolution of the political parties' force, setting up towards authoritarianism. On the base of the hostilities against the Soviet Union and against communists, on the internal plan it can be observed the ascension of the right extreme, represented by the "Everything for the Country Party" (which included the outcasts), which on the elections in 1933 won the third position after signing in an non-aggression pact with the National Peasant Party whose leader was Iuliu Maniu.

Unwilling to subordinate the "Legionary Movement", King Carol the second tried himself to create a movement of youngsters and to establish the bases of a unique party, which based on the existent political ground, increased the preference for the right extreme.

In this way, the Nicolae Titulescu's idea of signing a treaty with the Soviet Union brought him several accusations that he is sold to the soviet interests. Germany, unsatisfied because of the orientation of Nicolae Titulescu's policy was towards England and France, did not sustained the presence of Nicolae Titulescu as a leader of the diplomacy. The fact that the Romanian diplomat maintained the Versailles system was a reason of dissatisfaction for Italy, which Nicolae Titulescu blamed for the aggression against Ethiopia and even Poland, worried that a close relation with the USSR – member since December 1934 of the League of Nations, which has already signed treaties with France (on the 2nd of May 1935) and with the Czech country (on the 16th of May 1935)² unable the claims of the Teschen territory, situated within the borders of Czech country.³

¹ Laurențiu Constantiniu, Alin Victor Matei, Andrei Siperco, *Romanian Diplomatic Documents* (it will be quoted RDD), Second Serie vol. 18, the second part, 1st of July – 31 December 1936, Râmnicu Vâlcea, Conphys Print, 2010, p. VII.

² George G. Potra, *Nicolae Iorga – Nicolae Titulescu: interferences*, Bucharest, The European Foundation Print, Titulescu, 2011, p. 61.

³ See: George G. Potra, Certainty and probablity regarding the elements which generated the government's crisis on the 29th of August 1936: Gh. Buzatu, "*The Titulescu File*" from the *Ministry of External Affair sin Berlin*; Gh. Buzatu, Valeriu Dobrinescu, *Responibles and witnesses of the dismissal*: N. Dascălu, *The dismissal of N. Titulescu into the international press*; into the vol. *Titulescu and the peace's strategy* (coordinator Gh. Buzatu), Iași, Junimea Print, 1982, pp. 275-293; 293-300; 300-304; 304-326.

But, the great enemy of Nicolae Titulescu was his own personality – pretty powerful and unwilling to compromise -fact which opposed him to King Carol II, who, preparing the instauration of the autoritary monarchy, did not want to have in front of the Ministry of the External Affairs a man like the great diplomat, well-known worldwide because of his positions occupied till then.

Actually, we can conclude that the idea of the dismissing of Nicolae Titulescu was the direct consequence of the action ordered from inside¹ as well as from outside.²

It is worth mentioning that the desire of Nicolae Titulescu to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union appeared at the same time with the starting of the civil war in Spain, when France and England adopted the strategy of non-intervention, while Germany and Italy supported Franco and URSS wanted the victory of the republicans. The Nicolae Titulescu's option was one of a republican support as well, fact which represented a negative feature of his position.³

Although Carol II wanted to gain a diplomatic victory by signing a treaty with USSR, he knew that Nicolae Titulescu's presence (authorized by the monarch and by the chef of the government Gheorghe Tătărescu on the 12th of July 1935), a well-known member of the gallery of the interwar politic personalities which he despised because he thought they were responsible by the manipulation of the monarchy during his father reign, king Ferdinand (1914-1927) will put him in a corner of shadow in the eyes of Europe.

Nicolae Titulescu himself knew the fact that his inside enemies as well as his outside enemies were numerous, especially after the 7th of March 1936, when he declared: "I realized that my place was not into the Tătărescu's government, because the external policy which I made being legally authorized to do, was in opposition with the internal policy which was being made".⁴

Still, the Titulescu's resignation was denied, but, on the 14th of July 1936⁵, his quality of negotiator for the Protocol of mutual assistance with USSR was reconfirmed.

The victory of Nicolae Titulescu for the Montreux's discussions with M. Litvinov, the People's Commissar for the External Affairs in USSR, was that of signing the agreement, on 21 July 1936, in which the Romanian diplomat mentioned the Nistru as a demarcation line: "article 3: The USSR government

¹ George G. Potra, *Nicolae Iorga – Nicolae Titulescu...*, *passim*.

² The same, *The dismissal of Titulescu. The external conspiracy*, in the "Culture", new serie, an. V, nr. 36 (291), 16th of September 2010, pp. 21-23.

³ RD.D., p. IX.

⁴ Geta Cristina Gheorghe, *The significance of the Protocol of mutual assistance between Romania and URSS (Montreux, 21st of June 1936) into Nicolae Titulescu's vision*. http://istorie.uab.ro/publicatii/colectia_bcss, p. 218.

⁵ George G. Potra, *Nicolae Iorga – Nicolae Titulescu...*, p. 61.

admits that due to its different obligations of assistance, the soviet army could never cross Nistru without a formal demand addressed to the Romania Royal Government, as well as, the Romania Royal Government admits that the Romanian army could never cross Nistru towards URSS without a formal demand addressed to the USSR Government. Article 4: “On the demand of the Romanian Royal Government, the soviet army should retreat immediately from the Romanian territory on the eastern side of Nistru, as well as, on the demand of the USSR Government, the Romanian army should retreat immediately from the USSR territory, on the west side of Nistru”.¹

Still, Maksim Litvinov asked totally discretion regarding this agreement, and after they have signed the official papers in September, they will reveal to the public every detail of it. If, initially the soviet side had its doubts towards this agreement, as it happened in 1935, now it wanted a “quiet which was suspicious”, especially that it was not known if Stalin had authorized these negotiations”.²

At the following question: “What made king Carol II to dismiss Titulescu?” we can answer that the Romanian monarch wanted to respond at the geopolitical movement happened on the 7th of March 1936 – the remilitarization of Rhenania – in which, the political specialists see “the failure of the collective security policy”³ supported by France and by Nicolae Titulescu.⁴

Another idea of this article is that of seeing who had a negative opinion on Titulescu which could influence his dismissing in a moment when the reorientation of the Romanian external policy took place.

The problem of changing Nicolae Titulescu was initiated by the President of the Council of Ministers, Gheorghe Tătărescu on 11th of July 1936, in a “document” for Carol II⁵: “This dismissal will give us the opportunity of revising the personal of the Ministry of External Affairs and of its instruments of propaganda, which, nowadays, in many centers, are fighting only in their own interests and they are building up dangerous abnormalities using the action of defense of the state and government's general interests.”⁶

As it is said in this document, the dismissal of Nicolae Titulescu is followed by the dismissal of several other diplomats like: Savel Rădulescu,

¹ *Ibidem*, p. 219.

² *Ibidem*.

³ George G. Potra, *Nicolae Iorga – Nicolae Titulescu...*, p. 62.

⁴ R.D.D., p. VII.

⁵ George G. Potra, *Punished for supporting him*, <http://www.titulescu.eu/downloads/Studii>, p. 8.

⁶ Nicolae Titulescu, *Diplomatic documents* (edition by George Macovescu, Dinu C. Giurescu, Gheorghe Ploșteanu, George G. Potra, Constantin I. Turcu; introductory study by George Macovescu), Bucharest, 1967, The Policy Print, doc. nr. 470, p. 798.

Constantin Antoniaade, Constantin Laptew, Dimitrie Buzdugan, N. Ciotori, Edmund Ciuntu and Grigore Constantinescu.¹

Nicolae Titulescu was announced that he has been dismissed by a telegram of the Prime-Minister, Gheorghe Tătărescu, in the evening of 29 August 1936², the Prime-Minister using a chosen language, the abandon of the ministry of the External Affairs being seen as an on the spot decision, as an action in the national interests³.

As the historian George Potra⁴ declared, the list of those persons who supported the dismissal of Nicolae Titulescu was: “King Carol II... the first opponent..., Gheorghe Tătărescu (the Prime –Minister), Ion Inculet (the Vice-Prime Minister), Victor Antonescu, Richard Franasovici and Valer Pop (ministries) – so, members of the Cabinet – chefs or not from the party, diplomats and so on, as Octavian Goga, A.C. Cuza, Al. Vaida- Voevod, Gh. I. Brătianu, N. Iorga, Grigore Filipescu, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Constantin Argetoianu, Mihail Manoilescu, Mihail Sturdza, Constantin Cesianu, Viorel V. Tilea, Anton Bibescu, Radu Lecca, Stefan Tătărescu”.⁵

Although Victor Antonescu, the successor of Nicolae Titulescu declared that the change of Nicolae Titulescu did not mean the change of the course of the Romanian external policy, this action those who followed, were showing the opposite.⁶

This action was supported even by Maksim M. Litvinov, on the meeting with Victor Antonescu, on the 19th of September 1936⁷: “Titulescu joined our trust because, being a great patriot, he understood that the Romanian interests were imposing close relations with the URSS. He promoted an open, brave and sincere policy”.⁸

One of the Titulescu’s opponents, the historian Nicolae Iorga criticized the leader of the government Gheorghe Tătărescu because he maintained Titulescu at the Minister of the External Affairs, although he was independent⁹: “But, I think that you have made a mistake when under some pressures, which

¹ George G. Potra, *Punished...*, pp. 6-9.

² Nicolae Titulescu, *The external policy of Romania(1937)* (edition by George G. Potra, Constantin I. Turcu, Ion M. Oprea), Bucharest, TheTitulescu European Foundation, The Encyclopaedic Print, 1994, p. 46.

³ George G. Potra, *Punished...*, p. 1.

⁴ The same, *For and against Titulescu* (selection, foreword, biographical notes, explanations and notes, by George G. Potra), Bucharest, The Titulescu European Foundation, The Encyclopaedic Print, 2002, *passim*.

⁵ George G. Potra, *Punished...*, p. 2.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p.16.

⁷ R.D.D, p. VIII.

⁸ Costin Ionescu (editor), *The Romanian and Sovietic relations. Documents*, vol. II, 1935-1941, Bucharest, The Cultural Foundation Print, doc. nr. 39, p. 87.

⁹ George G. Potra, *Nicolae Iorga – Nicolae Titulescu...*, p. 67.

are not going to be discussed, and which I am not going to discuss, you agreed that a government can make an external policy even with someone that does not belong to it. This is not normally done, no matter what is the value of the person, whatever are his relations, which I admit as being very serious, wonderful relations, which this person, even if he is not governing, he is not going to do the mistake of breaking to his country”¹.

Meanwhile, the replacement of Titulescu was discussed sooner into the Romanian policies circles, as wrote the same Nicole Iorga on the 2nd of September 1936²: in Bucharest, for the Radio: (On what are we supporting on?). Inculeț comes and says how Titulescu was changed from the Minister. They were trying for a long time to dismiss him. But, they need a situation without a platform. I am telling him that they should have asked him to join the party which demanded a uniform government. They regret they did not think of that... He, Inculeț, gave the details, being tired of three years of governing.³

So, between 7 March 1936 and 29 August 1936, the essential elements which were participating at the dismissal of Nicolae Titulescu from the Ministry of the External Affairs were:

1. The “Document” from 11 of July sent by Gheorghe Tătărescu to King Carol II.
2. The Nicolae Titulescu’s resignation which was not accepted by Carol II.
3. The reactualisation on the 14th of July 1936 of the enforcement from 12th July 1935 signed by the monarch and by the Prime-Minister to Nicolae Titulescu for the renegotiation of the Protocol of mutual assistance with URSS.
4. Signing the Protocol of mutual assistance with URSS on the 21st of July 1936.

In conclusion, Nicolae Titulescu was dismissed in the context of the failure of the collective security policy which signal was the lack of reaction regarding Rhenania's remilitarization, action happened on the 7th of March, 1936. We can ask ourselves: Why was not accepted his resignation before the 14th of July 1936? The answer is that king Carol II wanted to be the one who took the last decision. Titulescu’s resignation meant that the king should have named another person who negotiated with URSS and he had not one, so, in this way he was obliged to recognize the German victory, offering satisfaction to the revisionism. This is the reason why he decided to reconfirm Titulescu’s mandate. He went to the Conference in Montreux “dead from the political point

¹ “The Official Monitor” (quoted as O.M.), partea a III-a, The Parliamentary Debates, The Senat, nr. 6, 12th of December 1936, p. 84.

² George G. Potra, *Nicolae Iorga – Nicolae Titulescu...*, p. 230.

³ N. Iorga, *Memorandum. The suicide of the parties (1932-8)*, vol. VII, Bucharest, “The Romanian Habit” Print (Vălenii de Munte), 1939, p. 347.

of view” – the irony’s fate: between the date when they signed the Protocol on the 21st of July and the dismissal from the 29th of August there were exactly 40 days, which really meant his “political commemoration”. The silence required by Litvinov meant in fact that the treaty had not any chance of being signed.

Nicole Titulescu and King Carol knew that the days of the official’s reports between the two of them were counted. The diplomat has ended his mission for the country, the monarch had the “satisfaction of being the one who took the last decision”, and the European policy evolved towards the beginning of the second global conflagration. The Romanian external policy had a certainty: neither Romania, nor the USSR wanted the establishment of the eastern border, fact which would have fatal consequences in the spring of the year 1940.

**DER INTERNATIONALE FRAUENTAG IN DER SOZIALISTISCHEN
FRAUENZEITSCHRIFT „FEMEIA” (1948-1989)**

*Ute Michailowitsch**

Abstract

My analysis is concerned with the International Women’s Day (8th of March) and how this day is celebrated in the Romanian women’s journal “Femeia” during the socialist era from 1948 to 1989 (the biggest women’s journal of that period). The article’s focus is on gender roles transmitted in the March issues or issues that are specifically dedicated to the day and underlines the propagandistic methods of spreading the image of the “New Woman” and thereby giving an insight into the party’s women’s policy.

Key words: *International Women’s Day, Propaganda, Gender Roles, Socialist Women’s Policy*

Der Internationale Frauentag bietet sich für die PCR¹ wie kaum ein anderer Tag als Plattform an, das eigene Parteiprogramm zur Frauenfrage an „die Frau“ zu bringen. Auch in der rumänischen Frauenzeitschrift „Femeia“ wird der 8. März genutzt und für Propagandaziele eingesetzt. Der folgende Aufsatz setzt es sich zum Ziel zu untersuchen, wie der Weltfrauentag in der Märzausgabe der monatlich erscheinenden Zeitschrift aufgearbeitet wird bzw. geht der der Frage nach, zu welchem Wandel es in der Darstellung des Frauentags in der besprochenen Zeitspanne von 1948 bis 1989 kommt.

Als ersten Schritt muss allerdings geklärt werden, wie der Weltfrauentag in der sozialistischen Theorie gesehen wird. Dafür kann ein Artikel von Alexandra Kollontai Aufschluss, der am 17. Februar 1913 in der Pravda erschienen ist, als bestes Beispiel dienen.² In dem Artikel wird die Tatsache unterstrichen, dass der Frauentag Teil der Arbeiterbewegung sei, und mit

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¹ Die Bezeichnung PCR (Partidul Comunist Român [Kommunistische Rumänische Partei]) wird im Folgenden durchgehend für die Kommunistische Partei verwendet. Wiewohl erwähnt werden muss, dass die Parteibezeichnung im Laufe der Geschichte der Partei mehrmals abgeändert wurde, von PCdR (Partidul Comunist din România [Kommunistische Partei Rumäniens] gegründet 1921) zu PMR (Partidul Muncitoresc Român [Rumänische Arbeiterpartei]) 1948 und schlussendlich 1965 zu PCR.

² Alexandra Kollontai, *Women’s Day February 1913*

[<http://www.marxists.org/archive/kollonta/1913/womens-day.htm>], 24. 11. 2011.

Forderungen des bürgerlichen Feminismus nichts zu tun habe, da dieser Feminismus die gleichen Rechte wie der Mann innerhalb einer kapitalistischen Gesellschaft und Ausbeutergesellschaft zu erreichen versuche. Die Arbeiterin habe aber ganz andere Ziele: „Their aim is to abolish all privileges deriving from birth or wealth. For the woman worker it is a matter of indifference who is the ‘master’, a man or a woman”¹. Und weiter erklärt sie, was die Forderungen der Arbeiterinnen seien. „We demand rights for every citizen, man and woman, but we are not prepared to forget that we are not only workers and citizens, but also mothers!”² Es wird hier also klargestellt, dass zwar die Arbeiterrechte der Frau im Vordergrund der sozialistischen Frauenfrage stehen, ohne jedoch zu vergessen, dass diese Frauen auch Mütter seien, was einen ersten Blick auf die propagierte Frauenrolle erlaubt.

Der Wandel des Weltfrauentags in der Zeitschrift „Femeia”

Bei einer intensiven Durchsicht der Ausgaben ist erkennbar, dass sich die Darstellung des Frauentages in drei Etappen oder Kategorien unterteilen lässt. Die erste Phase kann vom ersten Erscheinen 1948 bis 1960 abgesteckt werden. Die nächste Phase bezieht sich auf die Periode von 1961 bis 1973, gefolgt von der letzten Phase ab 1974 bis 1989.

Die Erste Phase 1948 bis 1960

Die erste Phase ist von einer massiven inhaltlichen Propaganda durchzogen, die es sich primär zur Aufgabe setzt, die Frau politisch zu erziehen. Die Gründe für diese politische Erziehungspropaganda sind vielseitig und lassen sich in erster Linie dadurch erklären, dass die PCR versuchen muss, ihre Macht aufzubauen, da sie sich mit der Situation konfrontiert sieht, einerseits über keine breite sowie homogene Parteibasis und -führung, und damit über keine feste innere Parteiorganisation zu verfügen und andererseits, einhergehend mit ihrem bisherigen Status der Illegalität und politischer Unbedeutsamkeit, in der ländlich orientierten rumänischen Bevölkerung, und vor allem unter Frauen, weitgehend unbekannt ist. Es besteht deshalb die Notwendigkeit, abgesehen davon die Partei zu organisieren und zu strukturieren, verstärkt Einfluss auf die Bevölkerung auszuüben, um das Parteiprogramm zu verbreiten und den Machtanspruch dadurch aufzubauen sowie zu legitimieren. In der Frauenzeitschrift wird nun die U.F.D.R. (Uniunea Femeilor Democrate din România, zu Deutsch: Union demokratischer Frauen Rumäniens) mit ihren Aufgaben besonders hervorgehoben, um einerseits der Leserinnenschaft „ihre“ Vertretungsbehörde vorzustellen und das Programm der Union zu vermitteln, und gleichzeitig die politische Aktivität von Frauen

¹ Ebd.

² Ebd.

anzuregen. Adrian Cioroianu weist darauf hin, dass das kommunistische Regime wirklich Frauen als politische Akteure braucht, allerdings natürlich keine frei agierenden, sondern durch die Parteipolitik gelenkte Akteure.¹ Das suggerierte Gefühl, als Frau, was Politik betrifft, endlich auch eine Stimme und dadurch Mitbestimmungsrecht zu haben, wird zunehmend unterstrichen, und kann in der weiblichen Bevölkerung nur wohlwollend der Partei gegenüber aufgenommen werden.

Wofür die Partei eintritt wird in der ersten Ausgabe, der Festaussgabe zum 8. März, dargelegt: „*Das Problem des Erhellens und der Anhebung des kulturellen, ökonomischen, politischen und sozialen Niveaus der Frauen auf dem Land ist die erste Aufgabe, die sich die Union als zu realisierendes Programm gesetzt hat*“². Als weitere Aufgaben werden unter anderem der Schutz des Kindes und der Kampf für den Frieden genannt. Die Titelseiten der Märzausgaben von 1950 (links) und 1951 (rechts) veranschaulichen dies meiner Meinung nach besonders gut.



¹ Vgl. Adrian Cioroianu, *Pe urmerii lui Marx. O introducere în istoria comunismului românesc*, București, Curtea Veche 2007, S. 88.

² *Femeia*, Nr. 1, März 1948 (I. Jahrgang), S. 17.

Gerade in diesem Zusammenhang arbeitet die Parteipropaganda mit Emotionalisierungsstrategien. Emotionen werden hier zur Überzeugung eingesetzt, um im Bereich der Formierung und Festigung von Wahrnehmungsbildern zu wirken. Meiner Meinung nach gehören dazu das Erzeugen, das Übertreiben und Überzeichnen von Fremd- und Eigenwahrnehmungsbildern bis hin zur Stereotypisierung, sowie die Projektion von negativen und positiven Eigenschaften auf diese Bilder. Einige kurze Beispiele aus der Zeitschrift „Femeia“ sollen dies veranschaulichen.

Das erste ausgewählte Beispiel spricht die Leserinnenschaft direkt an: „Frauen der Volksrepublik Rumänien! Die Imperialisten haben durch einen neuen Krieg einen Anschlag auf das Leben eurer Kinder vor“¹. Hier haben wir es mit der Konstruktion eines Wahrnehmungsbildes zu tun, das zuerst an Muttergefühle appelliert und gleichzeitig die Angst vor einem neuerlichen Krieg anspricht. Gleichzeitig entsteht ein positives Eigenbild der rumänischen Frauen als Mütter, die sich um ihre Kinder sorgen und diese schützen wollen, und das negative Fremdbild bzw. Feindbild der Imperialisten, die einen neuen Krieg planen und auch vor Kindern nicht Halt machen. Eine Übertreibung besteht hier vor allem in der Verallgemeinerung der Kriegsbesessenheit aller Imperialisten und der Friedensliebe aller Frauen. Einen noch eindeutigeren Beweis zu diesem letzten Punkt liefert das nächste Zitat, das, wenn auch nicht aus einer Märzausgabe, doch eindeutig unterstreicht, mit welchen Mitteln die Propaganda hier arbeitet und das wohl keiner weiteren Erläuterung bedarf. „Das Exekutivkomitee der U.F.D.R. [Union demokratischer Frauen Rumäniens] ruft alle Frauen, die Krieg hassen, dazu auf, den Friedensappell zu unterzeichnen.“² Zusätzlich wird noch ein Gemeinschaftsgefühl unter den Frauen verstärkt, im Sinne von: „Gemeinsam sind wir stark“, was durch die vermehrte Verwendung der Phrase von „Schwestern im Kampfe“ ausgedrückt wird und gleichzeitig einen motivierenden Optimismus verbreitet. Um Frauen besonders ansprechen zu können bedarf es, wie Kollontai es ausdrückt, „words understandable to her as a woman; [...] in order to stimulate her mind and heart“³. Diese propagandistischen Strategien, die mit Emotionen arbeiten, gelten natürlich für die gesamte sozialistische Zeitspanne und sind in allen Medien (nicht nur Frauenzeitschriften) zu finden.

Im Laufe dieser ersten Phase wird ab dem Jahr 1952 der Internationale Frauentag verstärkt dazu benutzt, auf die Wichtigkeit des Aufbaus des Sozialismus und der bedeutungsvollen Rolle der Frau dabei hinzuweisen. Vor

¹ *Femeia*, Nr. 2, März 1949 (II. Jahrgang), S. 2.

² *Femeia*, Nr. 5, Mai 1950 (III. Jahrgang), S. 5.

³ Alexandra Kollontai, *Women's Day February 1913*

[<http://www.marxists.org/archive/kollonta/1913/womens-day.htm>], 24. 11. 2011.

allem bei der Nationalen Frauenkonferenz vom 8. bis 10. März 1958 wird diese bedeutungsvolle Rolle dadurch unterstrichen, dass der Aufbau des Sozialismus und einer kommunistischen Gesellschaft nur durch „eine aktivere Teilnahme beim Lösen [dieser] großen Aufgabe“¹ seitens der Frauen erreicht werden kann, nämlich durch eine verstärkte Beschäftigung als Arbeiterin in der Industrie.

Was in dieser ersten Phase eindeutig zu sehen ist, ist die Tatsache, dass sich die Frage der Gleichberechtigung der Frau in der Gesellschaft nicht mehr stellt. Mit dem Erfolg der Proletarischen Revolution, der Machtübernahme seitens der Kommunistischen Partei, demnach mit der Lösung der Arbeiterfrage, wurde auch die Frauenfrage gelöst. „Die gängige Stellvertreterpolitik, in der die Lage der Frauen in den herrschenden gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen als Frauenfrage artikuliert wurde, als gingen die so entstandenen Problematiken nur Frauen etwas an, blockierte die Entstehung eines selbstbewussten sozialistischen Feminismus.“² Mit der neuen Verfassung von 1948, die den Frauen gleiches Recht auf Arbeit, Bezahlung, in ökonomischen, sozialen, kulturellen und politischen Belangen etc. gewährleistet, ist das Thema Gleichberechtigung vom Tisch.

Die zweite Phase 1961 bis 1973

Die zweite Phase von 1961 bis 1973 ist von einer grundsätzlich liberaleren und neutraleren Stimmung gekennzeichnet, und gibt, was den 8. März betrifft, zugegebenermaßen nicht viel Neues her. Die Zeitschrift selbst unterscheidet sich in diesem Zeitraum was das Layout und den Großteil der Artikel betrifft kaum von nicht-sozialistischen Frauenzeitschriften, denn die Propaganda hält sich sehr in Grenzen und ist nicht so aggressiv offen erkennbar wie in der Phase davor. Die Tendenz ist dahingehend, den Internationalen Frauentag als Tag des Dankes und „der öffentlichen Anerkennung der Rolle der Frau in der Gesellschaft und der Gefühle gegenüber der Mütter, Schwestern, Ehefrauen und Arbeitsgenossinnen“³ zu verstehen. Es finden sich demnach Dankesgedichte von Kindern und Interviews mit zufriedenen Ehemännern in diesen Ausgaben wieder, die die Auffassung der allgemeinen Frauenrollen widerspiegeln, nämlich Mütter, Ehefrauen und Arbeiterinnen zu sein. Probleme der Doppelbelastung zwischen Arbeit und Familie werden selten bis gar nicht behandelt, obwohl das Problem dennoch unterschwellig bewusst ist, was sich an der neu auftauchenden Rubrik „Werbung“ ablesen lässt, die für Produkte wie Staubsauger und Waschmaschinen etc. zum besseren

¹ *Femeia*, Nr. 4, April 1958 (XI. Jahrgang), S. 4.



² Frigga Haug, *Sozialistischer Feminismus: Eine Verbindung im Streit*, in Ruth Becker, Beate Kortendiek (ed.), „Handbuch Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung. Theorie, Methoden, Empirie“, Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008, S. 53.

³ *Femeia*, Nr. 2, Feber 1970 (XXIII. Jahrgang), S. 1.

Zeitmanagement für die Hausfrau wirbt. Hausarbeit wird weiterhin als Frauenarbeit angesehen. Eine geschlechtsspezifische Arbeitsteilung bzw. eine Diskussion darüber findet auch zum Weltfrauentag nicht statt, was denn Schluss zulässt, dass diese Einteilung „einerseits als gesellschaftlich funktional, andererseits aber auch als machtvoll Instrument zur Etablierung und Bewahrung männlicher Dominanz in Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Politik“¹ gelten kann, fernab von der Behauptung der Partei von der bereits erreichten vollkommenen Gleichstellung zwischen Mann und Frau.

Die dritte Phase 1974 bis 1989

Die letzte Phase, die den Weltfrauentag betrifft, ist von zwei Tendenzen oder besseresagt Frauentypen bestimmt. Einerseits wird der Weltfrauentag als Zeichen der internationalen Frauenloyalität gesehen, andererseits wird der Tag zum reinen Muttertag umfunktioniert. Frauenfreundschaft und die Freuden der Mutterschaft sind ausschließliches Thema. Hierzu habe ich wiederum zwei Titelbilder ausgewählt, die dies veranschaulichen sollen, das linke Bild stammt von der Märzausgabe 1974, das rechte von 1983.



¹ Claudia Opitz-Belakhal, *Geschlechtergeschichte*, Frankfurt/New York, Campus, 2010, S. 74f.

Loyalität wird hier international gesehen und zwar durch Studentinnen unterschiedlicher Herkunft (aus anderen Satelliten- oder sozialistischen Staaten), die in Rumänien studieren. Hier fließt die außenpolitische Position der PCR dieser Jahre mit ein, die die vielen Auslandsreisen des ersten Ehepaars des Landes rechtfertigt und zu neuem internationalem Selbstbewusstsein beiträgt. Genauere Inhalte werden allerdings nicht erläutert, ebenso wenig was denn mit internationaler Loyalität oder Loyalität unter Frauen gemeint sei.

Dem entgegengesetzt steht das nationale Thema der Mutterschaft, welches auf die Demographie-Politik zurückgeht, das rumänische Volk zahlenmäßig zu stärken und die Hauptaufgabe der Frau darin sieht, so viele Kinder wie möglich zur Welt zu bringen. Unterstützt wird dieses Vorgehen dadurch, dass in der behandelten Zeitschrift die Titelbilder zum März vor allem Fotos von Müttern mit ihren Kindern zeigen, wobei zu bemerken ist, dass die Kinder niemals das Alter von 4 bis 5 Jahren überschreiten. Dadurch wird nicht das Erziehen von Kindern oder Jugendlichen in den Vordergrund gestellt, sondern Säuglinge und Kleinkinder werden hauptsächlich mit „Kinder-Bekommen“ in Verbindung gebracht und Frauen, wie Nira Yuval-Davis es ausdrückt, zu „biological reproducers of the nation“¹. An diesem Beispiel ist auch ganz eindeutig zu erkennen, dass der Weltfrauentag als Muttertag dazu benutzt wird, den Status der Frau als Mutter zu bestätigen und diesen Status als einerseits als gesellschaftliche Aufgabe und andererseits als Teil der persönlichen Identität festzuschreiben.²

Exkurs

Für diese letzte Phase von 1974 bis 1989 ist ein kurzer Exkurs angebracht, nämlich was die Position von Elena Ceaușescu betrifft. Es darf nicht vergessen werden, dass ihr zum 8. März, sozusagen als erster Frau im Staat, gehuldigt wird, allerdings haben diese Lobhudeleien keinerlei reale Basis oder auch nur irgendeine Aussagekraft, sie dienen alleine dem Ego der First Lady und dazu, ihren Aufstieg zu legitimieren.³

Es erscheint mir in diesem Zusammenhang notwendig darauf hinzuweisen, dass es grundsätzlich, wenn man die Geschichte des Sozialismus bzw. der Kommunistischen Partei Rumäniens verfolgt feststellen, nur zwei Frauen in die höheren politischen Positionen geschafft haben, nämlich Elena

¹ Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender & Nation*, London, Sage Publications, 1997, S. 37.

² Vgl. dazu: Barbara Wolfe Jancar, *Women under Communism*, Baltimore, London, The John Hopkins University Press 1978, S. 2. „[S]tatus [...] is a comprehensive positioning of the individual in his society. It is the ordering of the stimuli received by a person from his environment to form a concept of his place and identity in the world.“

³ Vgl. dazu Zoe Petre, *Promovarea femeii sau despre destructurarea sexului feminin*, in Lucian Boia (ed.), „Miturile comunismului Românesc“, București, Ed. Universității București 1995. Und: Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Fantoma lui Gheorghiu-Dej*, București, Humanitas 2008, S. 80-83.

Ceaușescu an der Seite ihres Mannes und Ana Pauker, die den Posten der Außenministerin von 1947 bis zu ihrem Sturz 1952 inne hat. Diese beiden Frauen werden auch am 8. März immer wieder als Beispiele für alle Rumäninnen von der Parteileitung präsentiert (im Falle von Ana Pauker zumindest bis zum Zeitpunkt, an dem sie in Ungnade fällt und ihrer Ämter enthoben und angeklagt wird). Ana Pauker wird in der ersten Phase des rumänischen Kommunismus als Idealtyp der politischen Akteurin dargestellt und ist auch tatsächlich (im Gegensatz zu Elena Ceaușescu) durch ihren politischen Einsatz in der Partei und in der Regierung aufgestiegen. Sie wird u. a. als „*kämpferische Revolutionärin, die sich für die Befreiung der Arbeiterklasse einsetzt*“¹ bezeichnet. Das macht sie auch zum Sprachrohr der Frauenpolitik der Partei, wobei ihr die Märzausgaben der „Femeia“ als Medium dienen, und ihre Reden oder Aufrufe an die weibliche Bevölkerung abgedruckt werden. So heißt es zum Beispiel in einer ihrer Reden zum Internationalen Frauentag am 8. März 1950:

*„In unserer Volksrepublik sind den Mädchen und Frauen alle Weg der Bildung, Qualifikation und Fortbildung bei der Arbeit offen, um ihre Fähigkeiten zu entwickeln. Fleißige Frauen, in ihrer Liebe zum Volk, haben an der Leitung der Betriebe und kollektiven Landwirtschaften teil, in der Verwaltung der Dörfer, Städte, unseres Staates. [...] Unser Volk hat Bedingungen für ein besseres Leben geschaffen.“*²

Sie wird dadurch zu, ich möchte fast sagen, einer ersten, wenn auch nicht lange währenden, Ikone der sozialistischen Frauenpolitik Rumäniens.

Im Gegensatz dazu gibt es von Elena Ceaușescu keine abgedruckten Reden zum Internationalen Frauentag, sie äußert sich nicht zur politischen Position der Partei in diesem Zusammenhang, sondern sie wird als Musterbeispiel (wenn auch ein real nie zu erreichendes) beschrieben, der das Volk (und vor allem der weibliche Teil der Bevölkerung) in der Frauenzeitschrift für ihre, ich möchte es überspitzt formulieren, pure Existenz dankt. Es heißt dazu:

*„Anlässlich des 8. März wenden sich die Gedanken aller Frauen in Stadt und Land mit unbegrenzter Zuneigung, tiefem Respekt und Bewunderung der Genossin, Akademikerin Doktor Ing. Elena Ceaușescu zu, bedeutende Kämpferin der Partei und des Staates, Persönlichkeit mit weltweiter wissenschaftlicher Reputation, strahlendes und beseelendes Beispiel des unablässigen Dienstes am Heimatland, Volk, am Sozialismus und am Frieden“*³.

¹ *Femeia*, Nr. 12, Dezember 1951 (IV. Jahrgang), S. 7. Anlass ist hierbei Ana Paukers Geburtstag am 13. Dezember.

² *Femeia*, Nr. 3, März 1950 (III. Jahrgang), S. 5.

³ *Femeia*, Nr. 3, März 1984 (XXXVII. Jahrgang), S. 6.

Diese beiden Beispiele zeigen eindeutig, welcher Unterschied zwischen den politischen Führungspositionen dieser zwei Frauen hier besteht und dass beide zwar am Internationalen Frauentag in der Frauenzeitschrift präsent sind, aber unter ganz anderen Bedingungen.

Zusammenfassung

Alle drei Phasen haben gemeinsam, dass der Internationale Frauentag dazu dient, die Rollen der rumänischen Frau im Kommunismus in erster Linie als Mutter und in zweiter Linie als Arbeiterin zu propagieren und dazu beiträgt, diese Frauenrollen als Frauenidentität festzuschreiben. Die Frauenfrage wird im Zuge der Arbeiterfrage und ihrer Lösung als abgeschlossen betrachtet und bedarf keiner intensiveren Beschäftigung mehr. Geht es in der Anfangsphase ab 1948 in der Zeitschrift noch darum, Frauen politisch zu motivieren, ohne sie jedoch zu sehr in eine aktive Rolle zu drängen, und gemeinsam zum Aufbau einer sozialistischen Gesellschaft beizutragen und vor allem sich für den Weltfrieden einzusetzen, kommt es in der zweiten Phase zu einer Abschwächung dieses Ziels und einer Besinnung auf die Rolle als Mutter und Arbeiterin. Dieses Ansinnen wird vor allem in der letzten Phase ab 1974 insofern verstärkt, dass die Mutterrolle aufgrund der demographischen Politik noch mehr an Bedeutung zunimmt.

Man kann deshalb zu dem Schluss kommen, dass es im Zuge dieser propagandistischen Verwertung der Frauenpolitik der PCR zu Kompensation und einer Romantisierung kommt, die dazu dient, die Rolle der Frau moralisch aufzuwerten, da ihre Rolle in der Mutterschaft und Arbeit mit emotionalen Werten wie Liebe, Treue, Verantwortungsbewusstsein der Kinder, der Familie, dem Volk und Staat gegenüber verbunden werden und durch ihre Verbreitung in der behandelten Frauenzeitschrift über Systemschwächen hinwegtäuscht. Es geht hier vor allem um die Rollen und Typen, die der rumänischen Sozialismus der Frau als „neuem Menschen“ zuschreibt, wobei diese Rollen keine neuen sind und durch die einheitliche Wiederholung dazu beitragen sollen, dass diese im Sinne eines geheimen Einverständnisses verinnerlicht werden. Der Kontext des 8. März scheint dafür wie geschaffen zu sein.

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**BUCHAREST AND THE IVTH WORLD FESTIVAL OF YOUTH
AND STUDENTS (1953) IN WESTERN PRESS COMMENTARIES**

*Marian-Alin Dudoiu**

Abstract

The article aims to depict the standard of living and the degree of freedom of Bucharest inhabitants before and during the Bucharest 4th World Festival of Youth and Students (1953).

We should not forget that, due to the outbreak of the Cold War, the Western journalists from biggest newspapers were usually forbidden informally by their Governments and their publishers to promote exclusively positive views in regard to the Communist States. Those journalists had the unexpected possibility to travel to Bucharest and to freely interview Bucharest inhabitants. Subsequently, the Western press published a dozen of articles on the Festival and some of them were translated in the secret bulletins of the Romanian Press Agency “Agerpres” and they were sent to Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the Romanian Communist leader, to be consulted.

Those articles depicted the unhappy life of Bucharest inhabitants, marked by arrests and convictions, the fear of being spied by the State Political Police, the small wages and the limited supplies of food.

Key words: *Cold War, Détente, Journalism, Propaganda, Romania*

The article aims to determine the standard of living and the state of mind in Bucharest before and during the IVth World Festival of Youth and Students by using Western press articles, which described the Western journalists’ impressions, who were invited at the Festival. The main source of article relied upon Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, held at the Romanian National Archives, that contained translations of Western press articles and translated transcripts of Western radio programs, which were sent by the Romanian Press Agency “Agerpres” to Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the Romanian Communist leader, in order to consult them and to provide recommendations.

Shortly upon the outbreaking of the Cold War (1946-1947), the Soviet Union had not succeeded to finish the production of the Atomic bomb and consequently, the Soviet military power, although nominally in possession of the atomic bomb, had been rising under the United States. According to historian Lawrence S. Wittner, the Soviet foreign policy promoted the foundations of

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International peace movements, with supporters throughout the world, in order to determine the United States and the Western Europe public opinion that the United States should not begin the third World War by attacking the Soviet Union.¹ Consequently, the Soviet Union involved itself in forming the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students. During the détente, those organizations continued their existence in order to be used as propaganda tools because their members were not only Communist states' citizens, but also from the Capitalist and Third World countries (the last meant the former colonies).

During World War Two, the World Youth Council had been formed in order to encourage the youth from the United Nations countries to fight against Fascism and Nazi. In 1945 the Council had been transformed into the World Federation of Democrat Youth; upon the outbreak of Cold War, the Federation, with members throughout the world, had been a keen supporter of Communism and had organized a large number of Festivals, usually in the Communist states – the only capable to support the lodging of approximately thirty thousand young people for two weeks.²

The World Federation of Democratic Youth, held in Prague, published, on February 7, 1953, the decision to organize at Bucharest, in July and August 1953, the third World (Democratic) Youth Congress and the 4th World Festival of Youth and Students under the motto: “No! Our generation will not serve death and destruction!”³ The third Youth World Congress took place between 25th and 30th July 1953.

The Festival offered to the Communist regime of Romania the possibility of engaging into a fantastic propaganda regarding its “achievements”; in this context, the Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry refused granting access visa to several journalists considered to be “provocateur”, as the British Clews of “Manchester Guardian” and Geraint Owen of BBC.⁴ Amongst

¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Peace_Council, accessed on April 5, 2013.

² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Federation_of_Democratic_Youth, accessed on April 5, 2013.

³ Florin Niculescu, *Festivalul Mondial al Tineretului*, București, 1953, în colecția „Anale Sighet”, vol. 7, *Anii 1947-1953: Mecanisme terorii. Comunicări prezentate la al VII-lea Simpozion al Memorialului de la Sighetu Marmației (2-4 iulie 1999)*, Editor Romulus Rusan, București, Fundația „Academia Civică”, 1999, p. 87.

⁴ The Diplomatic Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter: DARMFA), fund Anglia, box Anglia T.C. 1953, file nr. 28 (Telegrame cifrate primite de la Oficiul Londra, iunie-iulie 1953), Decyphered Telegram no. 87450 of 30.07.1953 sent from the Legation of the People's Republic of Romania in London (hereinafter: LL) to Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter: RMFA), signed Babuci 1651, f. 278. Id., f. 24 (Telegrame cifrate trimise la Oficiul Londra, iulie-august 1953), Encyphered Telegrams nos. 85695, 85523 and 85749 of 19, 20 and 21.07.1953 sent from RMFA to LL, signed Cioroiu 5691, 5719 and 5755, f. 90, 96 and 100.

the British journalists, Stanley Clark of “Reuter” Agency, Norman John Mackenzie of “The New Statesman and Nation”, Monty Johnson of “Daily Worker”, Robert Kenneth Macaulay of “Daily Express”, Francis Rona of “Peace News” and Abe Lazarus of “World News and Views” were invited.¹

Journalists’ possibility to travel to the People’s Republic of Romania was easily accepted since the isolation of Romanian Communist Regime had surpassed that of its neighbours. Actually, Alfred Joachim Fischer had written in “Die Neue Zeitung” (Frankfurt) on May 5, 1952: “In Romania, the Iron Curtain has the lesser holes. Many causes explain this special isolation. First of all, Romania is the most important crude oil provider within the Kominform block, except for Soviet Union. They did not wish that even approximate figures of production should be known abroad... Secondly, the Kominform headquarters is here, since, in 1948, it had abandoned, almost on running out, Belgrade – upon the exclusion of Yugoslavia. Therefore, a Communist world center established here and it is not interested in public view, but on blocking the informants” [author’s translation from Romanian].²

Beginning with July 11, the Romanian Government decided to improve the bread and food supplies. “Der Bund” took into consideration the Post-Stalinist détente and it missed the real reason regarding the Festival.³

The 23rd August Stadium seating 80 000 was built, as well as new cultural objectives, 40 000 trees were planted to impress 30 000 foreign guests, including an Irish delegation of 70 people and a British delegation of 1301 people led by Stanley Levenson.⁴ According to the International Edition of the “New York Times”, food was more than enough, although long time before the Festival the women had to wait in a queue, beginning with 5 a.m. in order to be sure they would receive a small ration of food.⁵ The Festival took place

¹ *Ibid.*, Encyphered Telegrams nos. 85515 and 85903 of 18.07.1953 and 24.07.1953 sent from RMFA to LL, signed Cioroiu 5511 and 5899, ff. 61, 124.

² Apud Kataharina Kilzer, *România anilor '50 în presa din R.F. Germania*, în *Anale Sighet*, vol. 8, *Anii 1954-1960: Fluxurile și refluxurile stalinismului. Comunicări prezentate la al VIII-lea Simpozion al Memorialului de la Sighetu Marmației (2-4 iulie 2000)*, editor Romulus Rusan, București, Fundația „Academia Civică”, 2000, p. 950.

³ Romanian National Archives (hereinafter: RNA), Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, f. 724, vol. I, Top Secret News no. 2831 „A venit rândul României” published by “Der Bund” from Bern on July 6, 1953, f. 229.

⁴ DARMFA, fund Anglia, box Anglia T.C. 1953, f. 24, Encyphered Telegram no. 85515 of 18.07.1953 sent from RMFA to LL, signed Cioroiu 5511, f. 61.

RNA, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, f. 727, vol. I, Top Secret News no. 3315 „Fațadă românească” published by the Supplement to International Edition of “New York Times” on August 23, 1953, f. 127.

⁵ *Ibidem.*

between 2 and 14 August 1953, with representatives from 111 countries.¹ The Festival offered 537 concerts, 442 activities performed by delegates, 157 movie projections and a large number of sport matches.²

“Westdeutsche Allgemeine” published the confessions of a Bucharest inhabitant “Everything is a trick, four weeks ago, the shop window was empty, and after the Festival would certainly be empty! Food rations for jobless people are 300 g of bread a day, 150 g meat a week, 500 mL of oil (the only fat) and sugar a month. The working people receive 500 g of bread a day, 300 g meat and 750 mL oil and sugar. To this, a pasta ration is added for children and now, during the Festival, a special ration of oil and sugar”. The lack of places to live was obvious and the Bucharest inhabitants told the correspondent about the building of only two blocks after 1944! As the correspondent didn’t succeed to buy a Czech camera and noticing that the buying of sugar was impossible, although the price was bigger than the one on ration books – although this right existed, he concluded to the presence of products in the shop windows, impossible to be bought, in order to sustain the propaganda for the Communist regime!³

A letter full of criticism was sent from London to Paris by Daniel Norman and published in “Le Monde”. The letter informed the French public opinion about the missing sugar and other food products before the Festival, in order to ensure the necessity of it, and the selling of cookies during it, although they had disappeared for several years! Norman’s discontent was induced by one issue of “Le Monde” dated October 1st, 1952, where Professor Rabau’s positive commentary had appeared, after he had previously visited the People’s Republic of Romania, during Festival, and had declared himself impressed by the quality of the cookies.⁴

The “Nordsee Zeitung” correspondent was impressed by the Festival, but not of the state of Romania. The German guests were waited by Saxons and Schwabs, the German minorities in Romania, in order to be offered fruits, and before the departure they were told: “Don’t forget us!” There was sympathy in Bucharest for the German soldier – a symbol of order and of helping hand. The correspondent noticed that a third of Bucharest inhabitants knew German and they complained about problems regarding food supplies, which had been appearing before the beginning of Festival. The Saxons of Stalin city (now

¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_World_Festival_of_Youth_and_Students, accessed on April 3, 2013.

² F. Niculescu, *art. cit.*, în *loc. cit.*, p. 91.

³ RNA, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, f. 727, vol. I, Top Secret News no. 3314 „Balcan roșu în 1953” signed by Georg Dittrich in “Westdeutsche Allgemeine” of Essen on August 20, 1953, ff. 129-131.

⁴ Id., f. 729, Top Secret News no. 3794 „Situația agricolă din România” published by “Le Monde” on October 21, 1953, ff. 249-250.

Brașov), usually richer than Romanians, had lost their lands and houses and had been deported in other regions, where their standard of living was very low. People who had worked for the former king became a labour force at the Danube-Black Sea Channel, but even then they enjoyed the people's sympathy. Ending the press articles, the correspondent wrote the Romanians and German minorities of Romania hoped the German would bring about the long awaited change.¹

In "Wiener Kurier", Richard O'Regan, the "Associated Press" correspondent, saw Communist Romania as "a police state", where there were "despair and poverty, which except for China, could not be found in the Communist World, unhappy and starved people, who hoped with all their beings that they would be set free by the free world"; talking with Bucharest inhabitants, he also noted the problems of food supplies, that came to an end during the Festival.²

The Bucharest regime denied the accusations, and making use of its means, it succeeded to publish several interviews with attendees at the Festival, as it was the case of a press article appeared in "Der Abend", that highly criticised O'Regan. 300 journalists, correspondents and reporters (including four Americans, one of them being O'Regan) had been invited to the festival. Ignaz Scheinbenstock, "an Innsbruck worker without political views", considered O'Regan's articles a lie because the foreign attendees at Festival had had the possibility of visiting freely Bucharest and Romanians' complaints had regarded the high prices of clothes and the slow process of industrialization [a curious fact, the Communist Regime of Romania had temporarily renounced to continue the process of industrialization in order to improve the quantity of food supplies, author's note], Roberto P., a Torino member of the Italian Social-Democrate Party, had freely visited Bucharest and noted all rich people had appreciated the Communist "achievements", except for the house nationalizations, but the latter had become kindergartens and "clubs", Stefan Anius Graz, "a Catholic student", complained about the activity of United States secret services by providing fake dictionaries for diversion and had mentioned an old man's allegation that the concentration camps moved from Eastern Europe to Western Europe, Olga Hofmann, "stenographer from Bruxelles", who had visited workers' districts, and had chosen randomly the

¹ Id., f. 727, vol. I, Top Secret News no. 3321 „Și în România domnește frica [și] nivelul de trai scăzut. Germanii sunt bine văzuți. O vizită la București” published by “Nordsee Zeitung” of Bremerhaven (West Germany) on August 19, 1953, ff. 90-93; see Addendum.

Ibid., Top Secret News no. 3327 «Și în România s-au produs „erori” și „deficiențe” în sectorul agricol al industriei ușoare» of “Agenzia Romana Informazioni”, f. 104.

² Id., f.726, Top Secret News no. 3239 „Cea mai mare înșelătorie a tuturor timpurilor. O privire în dosul culiselor Festivalului Mondial al Tineretului din București” published by “Wiener Kurier” on August 17, 1953, ff. 79-82.

flats, where upon arrival, had been invited to a snack, Hilde Ruth from Krems had been amazed by the variety of menus (meat, sugar, chocolate and pasta), Johann Mayringer, “a socialist of Sankt Pöfthen”, could visit freely the city, had been impressed the Bucharest inhabitants’ joy of life and also by their confidence in the Communist policies!¹

“Christ und Welt” deplored the honorific presidency of the old Zeppelin engineer Hugo Eckener and accused him of “not understanding his times and the Cold War propaganda” and considered “humorous” a Swedish guest’s discontent regarding the insatisfactory social policy of his country appreciated as a model in the world!²

The “Die Welt” correspondent recounted a German speaking Romanian allegations regarding the lack of food supplies, that had ended before a month the Festival began in order for the food supplies to be stored. The correspondent was dissatisfied with the Romanians’ simple clothing. The Romanians – “a lot could speak German” – had inquired the German guests from which Germany they were; when they were told West Germany, they had looked around in order to make sure they avoided indiscrete watching and had talked about their discontents – many had referred to the small wages used only to buy food for a week, that had determined by compensation the selling of goods and consequently they had wondered what they should do when they would have nothing to sell. Foreign guests had had the liberty to visit whatever they had wanted. During the press conference of Grigore Preoteasa, the deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, the journalists had been answered the first questions, the questions already known by Preoteasa – probably the journalists coming from Communist countries or from the Communist parties of Western Europe –, but when an United States journalists had asked where Ana Pauker was held, translators had refused to continue their activity and Preoteasa “left the so-called press conference”.³

“The Economist” correspondent deplored the unpleasant change of Bucharest after the Festival ended. The change had been noticed by the French delegation who had had to remain another ten days, as the French railway workers had been in a strike. The peace panels had been replaced with the ones of warmongers, the flags with the old red ones (the red flags being three times more than the Romanian flags), the quantities of cookies had been reduced, the

¹ Id., f. 727, vol. I, Top Secret News no. 3329 «„Cea mai mare înșelătorie a tuturor timpurilor”. Participanții la cel de-al IV-lea Festival Mondial al Tineretului răspund ziarului „Wiener Kurier”» published by “Der Abend” from Wien in no. 190 on August 19, 1953, ff. 106-108.

² Id., f. 726, Top Secret News no. 3270 “București și Eckener” published by “Christ und Welt” from Stuttgart on August 12, 1953, f. 224.

³ Id., f. 727, vol. I, Top Secret News no. 3313 „Strălucire falsă pentru oaspeții străini. Ceea ce oaspetele venit la Festivalul Mondial al Tineretului de la București nu trebuia să vadă” signed by Ferdinand Ranft in “Die Welt” from Hamburg on August 22, 1953, ff. 134-135.

white bread had had its price increased, “23 August” Park had been closed, Soviet soldiers reappeared and the streets became slovenly.¹ The press article also appeared later in “Nebelspalter”.²

The West-European and the United States media presented critical analysis of the Communist regime in Romania. The journalists had the possibility to freely interview Bucharest inhabitants, which was used to recount the fear of not being arrested and of not being spied by the secret police, the discontents regarding the low standard of living and the unsatisfactory food supplies. We should not forget that, due to the Cold War outbreak, the biggest Western newspapers’ journalists were informally forbidden, in the majority of cases, by their editors and their governments to publish articles in the exclusive interest of Communist states. Unfortunately, the propaganda continued its way even in the West and “forgot about” the hard labour of ten of thousand workers – the Festival’s true heroes – who had to work several months in primitive conditions in order to complete the cultural and sport buildings.

ADDENDUM

[Author’s translation from Romanian]

Top Secret

No. 3321

“Nordsee Zeitung” of 19.VIII.1953 Bremerhaven – West Germany

«IN ROMANIA [BOTH] THE FEAR [AND] THE LOW STANDARD OF LIVING
RULE. THE GERMANS ARE APPRECIATED. A VISIT TO BUCHAREST

From our special correspondent.

Bucharest. For the Western people, the IVth World Festival of Youth and Students represented a reason to visit the nowadays Romania. For many, it is probable that the “Iron Curtain” and that “something uncertain” related to it, prevented them from this journey, but for many, curiosity defeated fear and prejudices.

The notion of “friendship” was always considered by the youth as an ideal. Arriving from all countries and all continents, the youth shook their hands fearlessly. The youth did not know political intrigue and honestly believed in peace – that was clearly seen, when opening the Festival, the French embraced the Vietnamese.

Among the large number of international representations, the contests, to which important sportsmen, artists and folk artists participated during the Festival, were much appreciated. Those contests took place in ballet, folk dances, pianos and other music instruments, and singing. The youth had the opportunity to demonstrate their mastership, and if talented, they enjoyed state support. To us, only celebrity is taken into account. Young talents are not encouraged, therefore they are usually lost.

¹ Id., f. 729, Top Secret News no. 3861 „Bucureștiul după Festival” published by “Le Monde” on October 24, 1953, ff. 45-47.

² Id., f. 738, Top Secret News no. 4344 „Noapte deasupra României” published by “Nebelspalter” from Rorschach (Switzerland) on December 24, 1953, f. 48.

In Romania, the sympathy for Germans is very great. Because the Germans, who lived there, assumed people would come to Bucharest from Germany, the trains were always in railways stations surrounded by a large number of people. When Germans were found, the shaking of hands could not be stopped. Flowers were thrown in trains, fruits were offered and often we heard the words: “Don’t forget us!”

*In Bucharest, a third of inhabitants could speak German [author’s emphasis]*¹. Therefore the second day, I got rid of my permanent attendant – a woman translator –, to speak more with the people. They were talking with gratitude about the German soldier, who lacked any guilt, applied the order and always helped if necessary.

When public representations of Germans were performed, which happened in the Republic Square during the Festival, all Bucharest stood up. Often, I had to notice I was given priority in shops if I said I am German from West Germany [author’s emphasis].

Usually, prices are high and wages small. Therefore a coat, for example, or a suit costs 800-1000 lei, a simple summer dress 100-170 lei, ½ kg of noodles 9 lei.

A doctor has a 600 lei salary, not even the money for the suit, an experimented primary teacher 400 lei, a qualified worker 300 lei, and an unqualified worker 250 lei. A West German mark could be exchanged for almost 3 lei. Many people told me that shortly before the beginning of the Festival, *shop windows were empty, but later they suddenly became full of products*². No more than three months before the Festival and bread rations were diminished and the butter almost disappeared. At the moment, the meat ration is 1 kg a month.

Often, I heard complaints and I met discontented people. I always noticed that before speaking people were looking around because they feared great dangers: losing the job or being arrested. Most people complained about small wages, high prices, the lack of food and above all the hard pressure upon the people.

Most of the political opponents were arrested. Among them, the Iron Guard members (Antonescu) [sic!] and the Royal House adherents, the latter even today enjoying people’s popularity. They are sent to hard labour and are building, for example, the Danube-Black Sea Channel, under soldiers’ surveillance. The confiscation of land affected especially the German minorities of Romania, who, due to their industriousness, were usually well off. Thus, the Germans from Stalin [the town of Braşov now – author’s note] lost all their properties and were transferred in other regions. In most cases they work in plants being depressed and discouraged. In Romania, the Romanians, as well as the German minorities, are confident in Germans and hope their state of things would change grace to them.

Dr. Ch. K.»
1.IX.1953
MS/PE

***ANIC, Colecția Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, dosar nr. 727, vol. I, Știrea strict secretă nr. 3321 „Și în România domnește frica [și] nivelul de trai scăzut. Germanii sunt bine văzuți. O vizită la București” publicată de “Nordsee Zeitung” din Bremerhaven (Germania de Vest) în 19.08.1953, f. 90-93/[Author’s translation from Romanian] RNA, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, file no. 727, vol. I, Top Secret News no. 3321 “In Romania [both] the fear [both] fear [and] the low standard of living rule. The Germans are appreciated. A visit to Bucharest” published by “Nordsee Zeitung” from Bremerhaven (West Germany) in 19.08.1953, f. 90-93.

¹ Gheorghiu-Dej highlighted the underlined excerpt and noted on the margin: “Don’t tell!”

² We notice Gheorghiu-Dej’s ironical remark to the underlined excerpt: “And this objective”.

LES JOURNAUX COMMUNISTES «SCÎNTEIA» ET «ROMÂNIA LIBERĂ» SUR LA MANIFESTATION DU 23 AOÛT 1984. COURTE ANALYSE SÉMANTIQUE

Harian Gorun, Constantin Cocoșilă***

Résumé

Cette contribution représente une courte analyse de la démonstration du 23 août 1984, présentée par la presse communiste, c'est-à-dire les journaux «Scînteia» et «România liberă». Cette année-là, le Parti Communiste Roumain a célébré la 40-ème anniversaire de la «revolution de libération sociale et nationale, anti-fasciste et antiimperialiste». On doit souligner que le parti communiste s'arroga tous les mérites relatives à l'acte du 23 août quand le pays renonça à la guerre à côté d'Allemagne et allia aux Nations Unies. Les personnages principaux de la manifestation du 23 août 1984 furent le président de la république socialiste, Nicolae Ceaușescu et son épouse, Elena. Le couple dictatorial était accompagné par d'autres figures importantes du Parti Communiste Roumain, par exemple, Constantin Dăscălescu, Emil Bobu, Ilie Verdeț, Nicu Ceaușescu et aussi par des chefs communistes européennes, comme Erich Honecker de l'Allemagne de l'Est. L'entière manifestation et son scénario devaient démontrer le caractère mégalomane et Pharaonique du régime politique communiste de la Roumanie durant ses dernières années.

Mots-clefs: *Nicolae Ceaușescu, le 23 août 1984, défilés, communisme, travailleurs*

Introduction

Les régimes politiques totalitaires du XXe siècle (le nazisme et le communisme) ont accordé une attention particulière à la propagande. Les tyrans de cette période ont pris les éléments les plus choquants, qui symbolisent la puissance infinie d'autres époques historiques. Les dirigeants communistes peuvent être comparés aux despotes orientaux et aux sanglantes monarques médiévaux. La différence est que, si les pharaons et des rois antiques et médiévaux affichaient explicitement leur pouvoir et leur origine divine, les

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dictateurs communistes se présentaient comme des fils de la nation, des gens du peuple, des représentants de la majorité et de ceux qui étaient agacés.

Au-delà de bâtiments mégalomane, de la multitude de fonctions détenues par l'omniprésence dans les lieux chaleureux de la vie, à la mise en forme de la grandiloquence, et «de l'éternité» du régime communiste ont contribué de manière décisive et moments nombreux a contenu «historique».

Le régime communiste roumain¹ a parcouru, en grande partie, deux étapes distinctes: celle du communiste internationaliste dominé par le URSS et celle du communisme national, au moment où les traditions historiques ont été dévaluées par la vulgaire et répétée exploitation.

Dans les deux périodes, on a cultivé obstinément une forme particulière de propagande: les grandes manifestations des travailleurs (défilés). La sémantique de ces défilés est symptomatique pour le décodage de la physionomie du régime politique. Les plus populaires manifestations (défilés) étaient celles du 1 er mai et le 23 août. La première fête internationale du travail («de la solidarité internationale de ceux qui travaillent») a été cultivée surtout dans la première phase du communisme, entre 1945 et 1962/1965). La parade de 1 er mai a été considérée l'expression de gratitude du peuple roumain pour *les frères de l'Est*. Ceux qui défilaient étaient premièrement les ouvriers, mais aussi «leurs frères qui travaillaient les champs». Aux parades du 1er mai on portait les portraits les dirigeants internes, mais aussi «ceux de grands maîtres du prolétariat»: Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Ilici Lénine et Joseph Visarionovich Staline, jusqu'après sa mort. Au moment où on a imposé le «communisme national», le 1er mai n'était plus célébré en grande pompe. Il a été personnalisé la célébration de la fête du travail par travail. La plus grande fête communiste a été le 23 août. Le Parti-État a décrété ce jour-là, la fête nationale de la Roumanie. En fait, en ce qui concerne cette journée, on a déroulé une impressionnante rhétorique de propagande. La rhétorique a vise à la fois la conceptualisation de l'importance de la journée, ainsi que les forces sociales et politiques qui l'ont réalisée. On est parti de la «journée de la libération», à «l'insurrection armée», «insurrection armée anti-fasciste», «la

¹ Voir, parmi autres, Vlad Georgescu, *Politică și istorie. Cazul comuniștilor români 1944-1977*, București, Editura Humanitas, 2008; Dennis Deletant, *România sub regimul comunist*, București, Fundația Academia Civică, 2006; Șerban Orescu, *Ceaușismul. România între anii 1965 și 1989*, București, Editura Albatros, 2006; Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Stalinism pentru eternitate. O istorie politică a comunismului românesc*, Iași, Polirom, 2005; Anneli Ute Gabanyi, *Cultul lui Ceaușescu*, Iași, Polirom, 2003; Pavel Câmpeanu, *Ceaușescu, anii numărătorii inverse*, Iași, Polirom, 2002; Thomas Kunze, *Nicolae Ceaușescu, O biografie*, București, Editura Vremea, 2002; Lucian Boia, *Miturile comunismului românesc*, București, Editura Universității, 1998; Dennis Deletant, *Ceaușescu și Securitatea: Constrângere și disidență în România (1965-1989)*, București, Editura Humanitas, 1997; Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Moștenirea Kremlinului*, București, Editura Venus, 1993.

journée de la délivrance du peuple du joug fasciste», à la pompeuse «la révolution de libération sociale et nationale anti-fasciste et anti-impérialiste». On a continué par reconnaître le rôle décisif de l'armée soviétique libératrice à «l'œuvre patriotique du Parti Communiste Roumain». Mais on doit essayer de déchiffrer le point de vue sémantique une démonstration (défilement), organisé le 23 août 1984.

L'acte du 23 août 1944 est dénommé *révolution de libération sociale et nationale, anti-fasciste et anti-impérialiste*. L'historiographie communiste a accordé une grande attention à la tournure de la politique étrangère de la Roumanie qui s'est produit alors, l'équivalent à un mouvement pour la libération du pays.

Les parades devaient suggérer l'adhésion des citoyens, «les travailleurs» au régime. L'atmosphère est de fête, en ligne avec l'importance attribuée par les communistes à célébrer l'événement.

La hiérarchie communiste. Nicolae Ceaușescu – l'acteur principal

L'arrivée à la tribune de Nicolae et Elena Ceaușescu est accueillie avec des acclamations et des applaudissements de la foule.¹ Ceux qui ont été présents dans la Place des Aviateurs ont applaudi longuement, scandant le nom du parti et de son patron. Après que le couple dictatorial est monte à la tribune officielle, ont eu lieu ici et d'autres dirigeants communistes: Constantin Dăscălescu, Iosif Banc, Emil Bobu, Lina Ciobanu, Ion Coman, N. Constantin, Ion Dincă, Ilie Verdeț, Nicu Ceaușescu, et d'autres, vice- premiers ministres du gouvernement, des membres du Comité Central du Parti Communiste Roumain, du Conseil d'État et du Gouvernement, les dirigeants des organisations de masse et des organismes publics, des représentants des syndicats, des organisations des femmes, des pionniers, des représentants des organisations coopératives et aussi des héros du travail socialiste.² L'ordre spécifié n'est pas aléatoire, il est déterminé par le rang des dirigeants communistes. Cet anniversaire de quatre décennies a bénéficié de la participation d'autres dirigeants communistes de différents états, tels qu'Erich Honecker, secrétaire général du Comité Central du Parti Socialiste Uni d'Allemagne et le président de la République Démocratique Allemande, Li Xiannian, le Président de la République Populaire Chinoise, José Eduardo dos Santos, le Président de la République Populaire d'Angola.³ On a présenté une longue liste de dirigeants communistes, en particulier du Tiers-Monde (Afrique) – présents aux manifestations pour célébrer le 40e anniversaire de la journée du 23 août. Parmi les invités de

¹ «Scânteia», 25 août 1984; «România Liberă», 25 août, 1984.

² «Scânteia», 25 août 1984.

³ «România Liberă», 25 août, 1984.

l'Europe à cet anniversaire, la plus importante personnalité a été Honecker, un véritable «dinosauré» communiste, tel que Ceaușescu.

Il y avait aussi des galeries où ont eu lieu des personnes considérées moins importantes dans la nomenclature communiste, par exemple les journalistes.

La galerie principale, flanqué par des drapeaux tricolores et rouges en particulier, était dominée par un grand portrait de Nicolae Ceaușescu encadré dans l'emblème de la république et du parti. Au dessous du portrait était écrit: «Vive la 40e anniversaire de la révolution de libération sociale et nationale antifasciste et antiimpérialiste».¹ Les drapeaux tricolores et rouges dans le même temps suggèrent le ministère du peuple en faveur du parti, qui était présenté comme l'unique réalisateur des idéaux nationaux, et Nicolae Ceaușescu est considéré comme le porte-étendard dans la lutte du parti, comme un héros de la nation. Pour les communistes, la libération sociale signifie l'égalité de toutes les personnes, l'élimination de la bourgeoisie et des propriétaires fonciers. Étant l'événement du 40e anniversaire, la célébration de l'événement gagnait une plus grande importance. Nicolae Ceaușescu est le personnage principal de la manifestation tout entière. Tout ce qui se passe dans la Place il lui est dédié. Il suit impassible, grave ou déconnecté la «rivière» multicolore des gens qui serpente à travers la tribune. Le flux est entièrement supervisé par le balancement de sa main droite ou les deux mains du dictateur, en signe de salut. Les gestes du dictateur ont été répétés mécaniquement par les autres chefs du parti et d'État.

Les slogans et leur signification

Le faste des parades augmente les anniversaires qu'on appelle «rondes»: 5, 10, 15, 20 ans, etc. À côté des galeries ont été écrits des slogans comme «Vive le Parti Communiste Roumain, le dirigeant essayé de notre peuple vers le socialisme et le communisme», «Vive notre pays libre et indépendant, R.S.R.»². Parmi les autres slogans étaient: «Le Parti-Ceaușescu-Roumanie!», «Le Parti-Ceaușescu-Paix!», «Ceaușescu et le peuple!».³

Sur les tribunes qui se trouvaient de l'autre côté de la place étaient marqués les coordonnés du jubilé: «23 août '44 – 23 août '84» et le souhait: «Vive l'unité indissoluble du peuple qui se trouve autour du P.C.R., dirigée par son secrétaire général, Nicolae Ceaușescu», «Vive la lutte unie des peuples pour un monde plus juste et meilleur sur notre Terre», «Qu'il gagne la cause du socialisme, du progrès, de l'indépendance et de la paix dans le monde entier».⁴

¹ *Ibidem.*

² «Scântea», 25 août, 1984.

³ *Ibidem.*

⁴ *Ibidem.*

Le communisme est présenté comme une forme idéale d'organisation de la société. Cependant, le P.C.R et son dirigeant sont présentés comme des militants pour la maintenance de la paix universelle, en tant que combattants sans peur pour le bien du peuple. En simplifiant ou par omission, on crée l'impression que l'histoire de la Roumanie est identique avec le Parti Communiste Roumain. Avec d'autres occasions, le P.C.R. se présente comme le continuateur des glorieuses traditions de lutte pour l'indépendance et l'unité nationale et pour la justice sociale, et Nicolae Ceaușescu comme la quintessence des victoires du peuple roumain. Le parti communiste est considéré comme la patrie, et Ceaușescu le parti. Par extrapolation, le secrétaire général est identifié avec la patrie. Ceaușescu se présente comme champion de la lutte pour la paix. Il aspire à la première place dans le mouvement communiste international et dans le mouvement des travailleurs, étant caractérisé comme un penseur, visionnaire, théoricien et praticien révolutionnaire. Le résultat des slogans conduit à la conclusion que, pratiquement, le peuple, le parti et Ceaușescu sont une partie. En réduisant à l'absurde, on peut considérer que le secrétaire général et le seul qui compte. Il semble être la création suprême du peuple, et la plupart des grandioses épithètes comme *le fils le plus aimé, le génie des Carpates, un héros parmi les héros, père aimant* et les autres sont relevantes.

Au point de vue de Nicolae Ceaușescu et du P.C.R., le communisme se trouve dans une continue expansion géographique et qui va continuer triompher dans tout le monde. On trouve dans ces slogans la thèse célèbre du Komintern en ce qui concerne l'exportation de la révolution, comme l'illusion de Ceaușescu en ce qui concerne l'avenir d'or de l'humanité. Il suit après l'intonation de l'hymne national d'état de R.S.R. Ce moment marque le début de la «parade militaire et de la démonstration des travailleurs de la capitale». Par conséquent, la démonstration commence avec la parade militaire. On essaye de suggérer «le niveau élevé de formation et l'équipement de l'armée, capable de faire face en cas de guerre», «une grande unité entre l'armée et le peuple». L'armée est présentée comme «la création du Parti Communiste, qui a eu un rôle fondamental dans la gestion et la coordination de l'armée».¹ L'hymne est une compilation de la composition de Ciprian Porumbescu et les paroles proleto-cultistes conçus pour exalter l'idéologie nationale-communiste. Ainsi, à côté du célèbre «Je connais trois couleurs dans le monde» apparaissent des improvisations vulgaires «Il se lève comme un astre, mon glorieux peuple», «des créateurs du nouveau monde» etc.

¹ «Scântea», du 25 août 1984; «România Liberă», du 25 août, 1984.

La parade militaire et la manifestation des travailleurs. L'adhésion des ouvriers à la politique du Parti et du président de la république

De l'armée ont défilé «des bataillons d'infanterie, des parachutistes, des troupes de montagne, des gardes-frontières, des unités de troupes M.I.». Nicolae Ceaușescu est décrit comme le fondateur de la doctrine militaire nationale. «Pendant le défilé militaire le ciel a été traversé par des hélicoptères et des chasseurs-bombardiers IAR 93».¹ L'armée a présenté l'honneur à son commandant suprême. L'armée était destinée à protéger «les réalisations révolutionnaire du peuple, l'indépendance, la souveraineté et l'intégrité territoriale» de thèses si chères au président de la république. On a accredité l'idée que le parti accorde une attention particulière à l'armée populaire. Aux défilés célébrant les anniversaires des «rondes», les forces armées présentent la technique qu'ils ont dans leur dotation: l'aviation, des canons, des chars, des missiles, des transporteurs, des transporteurs de troupes blindés. Il a été une véritable démonstration de force destinée à proposer la préparation exceptionnelle de combat des soldats, des officiers, et des généraux roumains. La démonstration armée fait apparaître deux aspects: d'une part, d'inspirer au peuple la confiance que le pays est protégé et d'autre part, pour intimider ceux qui voudraient attaquer l'absolutisme du régime communiste.

Après la parade militaire a suivi «la manifestation des travailleurs de la capitale». On défile dans des colonnes, dans une atmosphère générale de fête. Premièrement, ceux qui défilent sont les travailleurs industriels de la Capitale, et puis les chercheurs des instituts scientifiques, «les travailleurs des champs agricoles Ilfov» des représentants de la jeunesse de Bucarest, des sportifs dirigeants, «Au pas énergique, dans un alignement parfait, ont fait leur apparition, les gardes de la classe ouvrière. Venus du travail, en face des fournaises ardentes de l'ébullition d'acier, des imposants chantiers de construction du pays, de combattants patriotiques, suivis par des formations de la Croix-Rouge et de la défense civile, des détachements de préparation des jeunes pour la défense du pays. Les travailleurs rapportent à leur secrétaire général les magnifiques réalisations industrielles. V. Nicolescu, un vétéran tourneur dit: *Toutes ces actions étaient en raison de la Loi sur la pensée et l'audace du P.C.R. et du président Nicolae Ceaușescu*».² Le défilé devant la tribune suggère l'adhésion des citoyens de Bucarest à la politique du parti, aux directions fixés par le dictateur dans ses discours. La célébration du 23 août a été destinée à être un bilan des réalisations communistes, du régime de Ceaușescu. D'autres slogans ont été scandés: «Dans le XIIIe Congrès, Ceaușescu réélu», Ceaușescu-Roumanie, la paix et l'amitié», «Ceaușescu-les travailleurs», «Ceausescu-les jeunes», «Notre appréciation et fierté, Ceaușescu-

¹ *Ibidem.*

² *Ibidem.*

la Roumanie», «Ceausescu-paix».¹ «*Un pays qui fonctionne et nous fait préparer pour l'avenir!*», sonnaient dans la Place des Aviateurs la voix des jeunes de U.T.C., et pendant que leur corps étaient incarnés des hauts fourneaux de minerai, ils traçaient le contour de la construction du Grand Canal Danube-Mer Noire, ayant au milieu le portrait de celui qui a créé par son génie créatif les deux décennies d'histoire édifiante de la Roumanie. La voix du président de notre pays est la voix de tout le peuple, employé avec tout son potentiel créatif dans la lutte pour la construction et le progrès d'un nouveau meilleur monde, pour liberté et bonheur».²

En général, les parades des travailleurs commençaient avec ceux des Usines «23 août», où Nicolae Ceaușescu était député de la Grande Assemblée Nationale. Ce développement des forces représente la matérialisation de la pensée de Ceaușescu sur la question de la défense nationale comme l'oeuvre de tout le peuple roumain. En fait, les soldats, les étudiants et les autres devaient remplacer le manque d'appétit de la classe ouvrière. Le commentaire d'annonceur de la démonstration était tellement ridicule et il n'y a pas besoin d'autres interprétations. Nous sommes face à un monde qui a perdu tout l'usage de la raison et pour lequel il n'existe qu'un seul but, c'est à dire la déification du chef.

Considérations finales

Les personnages principaux de la solennité sont Nicolae Ceaușescu et la tribune officielle, le présentateur et les manifestants (les acteurs). L'adhésion «des gens travailleurs» à la politique du parti et la conception de la démonstration va suggérer une nouvelle vie, en abondance, prospère du peuple entier. Chaque groupe des ouvriers va profiter de cette occasion pour rapporter des nouveaux succès dans le combat socialiste. Beaucoup de moments de la parade symbolisent *des chars allégoriques* qui symbolisent des grandes réalisations, l'abondance, le bonheur et l'amour pour chef du parti et du pays. Tous ceux qui portent des immenses toiles de Nicolae Ceaușescu.

L'ordre du cortège de fête exprime à la fois des hiérarchies sociales et des hiérarchies institutionnelles établies par P.C.R et les dirigeants. Toujours, les travailleurs sont les premiers dans le cortège. Cette présence reflète son état de la classe politique au pouvoir. Après, il y a les paysans collectivistes, un allié fiable de la classe ouvrière dans la construction *de la société socialiste multilatéralement développée*. La catégorie sociale la plus défavorisée, les intellectuels ont traversé les derniers en face du dirigeant. L'Armée ouvre toujours les défilés des anniversaires «rondes»; on a après les organes de

¹ «Scânteia», du 25 août 1984.

² «Scânteia», du 25 août 1984; «România liberă», du 25 août, 1984.

répression, la milice, les gardes patriotiques, les détachements de formation militaire des jeunes, l'industrie, l'agriculture et, enfin, la santé, l'éducation et la culture. Les derniers qui saluaient étaient les gens responsables avec l'ordre public et la fanfare militaire. En ce qui concerne les slogans¹, nous précisons qu'ils étaient affichés (écrit), scandés (applaudissements) et construits avec les corps de manifestants, principalement les jeunes et les enfants. La manifestation entière a été accompagnée de la musique militaire, patriotique et des chants révolutionnaires présentés par les annonceurs autorisés et bien-approuvés. Les citations du texte sont en grande partie les mots des annonceurs qui présentaient les acteurs de la parade et leurs grandes réalisations sous la direction glorieuse du Parti Communiste Roumain et de son secrétaire général.

La sémantique des festivités entourant la fête nationale de la Roumanie communiste révèle le caractère mégalomane, pharaonique, superpropagandistique du régime communiste. Tout le souffle du pays va se prosterner aux pieds du dictateur, en lui apportant des offrandes de gratitude.

¹ Voir *supra*, pp. 3-6.

**LES SITES MEMORIELS PEUVENT-ILS ETRE PERENNES
AU RWANDA?**

*Brice Poreau**

Résumé

Presque vingt ans après le génocide, le Rwanda voit apparaître l'émergence de nombreux sites mémoriels. Or, ces sites ont une signification «physique». Ils constituent un endroit de recueillement pour les familles. Ce lieu physique est initialement une idée développée dans le monde occidental. Ces lieux peuvent-ils donc être pérennes dans une société totalement différente, elle-même fondée sur l'oralité? Cet article présente le développement des sites mémoriels et l'enjeu qui y est lié.

Mots-clefs: *Rwanda, génocide, sites mémoriels, reconnaissance, mémoire*

Introduction

Presque deux décennies après les faits, les habitants du pays des mille collines poursuivent, durant chaque printemps, les commémorations du génocide de 1994. Le nombre de victimes n'est pas exactement connu: entre 800.000 et 1.000.000 de rwandais ont été tués.¹ Au lendemain des massacres, des sites mémoriels, en particulier sur les lieux mêmes des tragédies perpétrées par les génocidaires, ont été établis. Depuis 1994, les sites mémoriels, qui ont un emploi multiple, font parti de la vie des rwandais. Ces lieux sont de plus en plus nombreux. En 2012, des projets de création ou d'extension de lieux de mémoires sont toujours en cours.² Ainsi, avant d'avoir une portée symbolique, ces lieux sont avant tout des lieux «physiques». Ils sont délimités par des biens matériels visibles.

Or, le Rwanda a une longue tradition fondée sur l'oralité. Aucun texte ancien, écrit, n'a été retrouvé. Les chants, par exemple, ont été transmis par la langue vernaculaire. La musique, elle aussi, a été transmise de génération en génération non pas par écrit, mais par l'oral. Les différentes cérémonies qui rythmaient la vie des royaumes anciens du Rwanda étaient également présentées aux générations futures par la voie de l'oralité.

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¹ B. Poreau, *Le Rwanda: une ère nouvelle. Comprendre le travail de reconnaissance*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2012.

² Idem, *Le concept de reconnaissance du génocide*, „Analele Universității din Craiova, seria filosofie”, n° 29, 2012, pp. 148-159.

Les sites mémoriels, établis après le génocide, ont pour première particularité d'être «physique». C'est-à-dire, de prime abord, en opposition totale avec l'oralité traditionnelle du Rwanda. De plus, les sites mémoriels sont, peut-être avant tout, une importation au Rwanda d'une vision occidentale. En effet, ces lieux dits de «mémoire» sont théorisés durant les années 1980 en France par les historiens. Et les exemples mis en exergue sont essentiellement des exemples occidentaux. D'ailleurs, aucun site n'est retrouvé qui pourrait correspondre à un site de commémorations et qui ait été créé avant l'arrivée des colons occidentaux au Rwanda. Pourtant ces lieux de mémoire se multiplient depuis 1994.

La construction des sites mémoriaux et l'érection des monuments procèdent du souci du gouvernement de conserver un passé qui risque de s'effriter et de s'éloigner irrévocablement. Dans ce cadre, le nombre des sites mémoriaux et des monuments du génocide augmente sans cesse. Depuis la fin de la transition, en 2003, les preuves du génocide bénéficient d'une attention particulière aussi bien des autorités nationales que locales, ce qui naturellement comporte une implication sur leur nombre.¹

Ainsi, les sites mémoriels du génocide rwandais peuvent-ils être pérennes? Ne sont-ils pas en désaccord avec le Rwanda traditionnel? Ne sont-ils pas une simple approche occidentale des commémorations, notamment celles du vingtième siècle (comme la Shoah), et peuvent-ils exister dans une société totalement différente?

En vue de comprendre les sites mémoriels dans une société rwandaise en pleins bouleversements, et post-génocide, nous allons mettre en avant le rôle de l'oralité, d'une part dans le Rwanda ancien, et d'autre part dans le Rwanda contemporain. Puis, nous examinerons la possibilité d'une pérennisation des sites mémoriels développés depuis 1994. Mais nous allons dans un premier temps établir la situation actuelle de ces sites au Rwanda.

1. Les sites mémoriels au Rwanda: une importation occidentale?

Qu'est-ce qu'un site mémoriel? Il s'agit d'un lieu, physiquement constitué dont un sens triple peut être attribué. Ce sens est matériel, symbolique et fonctionnel. En effet, le matérialisme est intrinsèquement lié au lieu même. D'ailleurs, nous le verrons ultérieurement, la plupart des lieux choisis correspond aux lieux même où se sont produits les massacres au Rwanda en 1994. Deuxièmement, la symbolique est instituée par un travail de mémoire, d'où la notion de «site mémoriel» ou encore «lieu de mémoire». Enfin, l'approche fonctionnelle est identifiée par la tenue de cérémonie, ce que l'on retrouve au Rwanda, chaque printemps à partir du 6 avril jusque début juillet.

¹ Shyaka A. Mugabe, *Réparation et réconciliation au Rwanda, portée et limites de la justice transitionnelle*, Thèse d'université, Louvain-la-neuve, 2009, pp. 232-233.

Le 6 avril correspond au début des massacres, suite à l'attentat tuant alors le président rwandais.

Ce pouvoir de mettre en interaction les deux facteurs, au point d'aboutir à leur «surdétermination réciproque», repose sur la structure complexe des lieux de mémoire qui cumulent les trois sens du mot: matériel, symbolique et fonctionnel. Le premier ancre les lieux de mémoire dans des réalités qu'on dirait toutes données et maniables – le second est œuvre d'imagination, il assure la cristallisation des souvenirs et leur transmission – le troisième ramène au rituel, que pourtant l'histoire tend à destituer, comme on voit avec les événements fondateurs ou les événements spectacles, et avec les lieux refuges et autres sanctuaires.¹

A ce sens triple: matérielle, symbolique, fonctionnelle, peut s'ajouter également une analyse en trois dimensions des sites mémoriels: individuelle, sociale, politique. En effet, pour chaque individu, le site permet la «fonction» de recueillement. Chaque rescapé peut penser à ses proches. Le site a aussi une «fonction» sociale, les cérémonies organisées par des associations de rescapés, comme celles des femmes, permet de tisser et de recréer un lien social au Rwanda. Les sites mémoriels ont enfin une «fonction» politique, voire dans une certaine mesure idéologique. Voici ce que rapporte une analyse du Sénat rwandais en 2006.

Comme le génocide a créé un fossé entre les Rwandais, la mémoire du génocide doit avoir un double objet: d'une part, l'éradication de l'idéologie génocidaire par des mécanismes de prévention et, d'autre part, la réconciliation nationale, un préalable à la reconstruction de l'unité nationale. L'objet de la mémoire officielle ainsi défini et expliqué à la population à travers l'enseignement formel et informel de l'histoire nationale dans des écoles, sur les sites mémoriaux et lors des cérémonies commémoratives contribuera à structurer la vie de notre pays et à lui donner ses contours politiques plus démocratiques.²

Les sites mémoriels, avec leur sens triple, et l'analyse triple qui peut en découler, sont présents au Rwanda dès le lendemain du génocide. Tel fut le cas à Nyarubuye.³ Cet exemple est également un exemple du choix des sites mémoriels. En effet, entre 26 000 et 30 000 personnes furent tuées, alors qu'elles s'étaient réfugiées dans une paroisse.

Un dernier exemple est celui de Nyarubuye. Sur ce site, des dizaines de milliers de Tutsi furent tués. L'idée d'une «protection» des lieux saints, la

¹ P. Ricoeur, *La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 2000, p. 528.

² Sénat, *Idéologie du génocide et stratégie de son éradication*, Kigali, 2006, p. 214.

³ B. Poreau, *Le Rwanda: une ère nouvelle. Comprendre le travail de reconnaissance...*, p. 25.

paroisse en l'occurrence, a aidé les génocidaires a retrouvé les Tutsi et à les exterminer.¹

Lors de la guerre entre 1990 et 1993, avant le génocide de 1994, des massacres eurent également lieu, mais les «lieux saints» n'avaient pas été touchés par ces massacres «isolés». En revanche, en 1994, ces rassemblements de personnes ont favorisé les massacres.

Enfin, il y avait le mythe de l'inviolabilité des lieux de culte qui avait été respectée jusque-là par les perpétrateurs des massacres cycliques des Tutsi. Ce rassemblement d'un grand nombre de personnes menacées à Nyarubuye donne à ce site un cachet spécial et il est à l'origine de l'ampleur des tueries. Le chiffre des victimes varie entre 26.000 et 30.000 personnes tuées.²

Un mémorial est alors inauguré en 1995 sur le lieu même des massacres, toujours présent au cœur de la ville actuellement. Plusieurs réhabilitations du site mémoriel se produiront jusqu'en 2012.

Les sites sont nombreux au Rwanda, et sont divers.

Sur les grands axes routiers, dans des écoles, dans des enceintes des églises, dans des stades et ailleurs au Rwanda sont érigés plus de 1400 sites mémoriaux qui contiennent des tombes dans lesquelles reposent les victimes du génocide des Tutsi. Les endroits de ces sites, les inscriptions qui attirent les passagers tels 'you are the loss that shall never be replaced', 'victimes innocentes du génocide de 1994', 'vous êtes partis si tôt', etc., le caractère morne de ces endroits dont la plupart d'entre eux servirent d'abattoirs humains durant le génocide des Tutsi, les commentaires dans les livres d'or, tout cela montre un pas franchi dans la mémoire du génocide des Tutsi du Rwanda.³

Certains ont une, voire plusieurs fosses communes comme à Nyamata, d'autres n'en ont pas encore, mais des projets sont en cours, comme à Ntarama, ville située à quelques kilomètres de la première. Des murs portent les noms gravés des victimes qui ont pu être identifiées. Le contraste est saisissant entre le nombre de noms inscrits et le nombre de victimes annoncées. Plusieurs milliers de victimes pour le site de Ntarama (site d'une église), alors que seuls quelques dizaines de noms sont inscrits. Ce qui est aussi surprenant est le fait que certains sites, comme Nyamata est toujours «intégré» au sein de la ville. Une école se trouve à une dizaine de mètres du site mémoriel de Nyamata. Ce regard vers le passé, qui tente d'un point de vue historique et historiographique de s'intégrer dans la vie commune des rwandais, est un état des lieux frappant du Rwanda contemporain. Ces sites font partie intégrante d'une reconstruction collective, dans la mesure, par exemple, où les noms des victimes font défaut, le

¹ *Ibidem*, p. 25.

² P. Rutazibwa, *Génocide à Nyarubuye*, Kigali, Editions rwandaises, 2006, p. 92.

³ E. Mutwarasibo, *Le génocide des Tutsi: perspectives de la mémoire et de la sécurité des survivants*, in "Dialogue", n° 187, 2009, p. 85.

recueillement est alors collectif plus qu'individuel. Le Rwanda contemporain est toujours tourné vers son passé, notamment par la marque indélébile des mémoriaux et des commémorations qui y sont données. Les sites mémoriels sont ainsi une marque de la singularité du Rwanda: le génocide de 1994.

Parfois les disparus surgissent là où on les attend le moins: par exemple au cours des cérémonies de mariage, les parents morts sont évoqués. Et l'on voit alors le visage des jeunes mariés s'obscurcir ou une discrète larme tomber face aux caméras indiscrètes. On sent brusquement un frisson et une émotion couvrir l'assistance qui craint que l'apparition des disparus du génocide n'assombrisse la fête, mais vite la vie reprend le dessus.

L'expérience vécue est unique pour les concernés. Ils ne peuvent ni la transmettre ni la partager avec personne d'autre. Impossible: ou bien on l'a vécue ou on ne l'a pas vécue.¹

Si nous ne pouvons citer tous les sites mémoriels du Rwanda, nous pouvons néanmoins décrire le site de Kigali, singulier car basé dans la capitale, où se tiennent de nombreuses cérémonies officielles.

Le mémorial est un site divisé en plusieurs parties: une partie musée, comprenant notamment les photographies d'enfants tués lors du génocide; une partie jardin; une partie de fosses communes; une partie consacrée à quelques archives, ainsi que la place de la flamme. Un tel site physique impose, même s'il ne s'agit pas de constructions architecturales singulières, une émotion d'une intensité sans comparaison à tout visiteur. Le décalage, entre un lieu qui, de prime abord, semble «commun» (le site est situé à quelques kilomètres du centre de Kigali, sur une colline, comme il y en a des centaines au Rwanda), et le souvenir des faits, des massacres qui y ont eu lieu est vraisemblablement ce qui impose cette émotion nécessairement forte. Un mot sur la partie du mémorial consacrée aux photographies des enfants. Plusieurs salles comportent donc des dizaines de photographies d'enfants, photographies remises par les familles, et pour chacune d'entre elles sont mentionnées diverses informations comme le prénom de l'enfant, son âge, mais aussi la façon dont il a été tué. À travers ces preuves du génocide, c'est la vision d'un avenir perdu, mort, qui se dessine.²

Ajoutons qu'à l'intérieur du site mémoriel de Kigali, une rétrospective sur la Shoah y est associée. La comparaison implicitement produite par l'exposition d'éléments historique du génocide de la seconde guerre mondiale, pose ainsi la question de l'importation de l'idée des lieux de mémoire (ou sites mémoriels) au Rwanda. Les sites mémoriels proviennent-ils du monde occidental?

¹ A. Mugerese, *L'univers insondable des rescapés*, in "Dialogue", n° 187, 2009, p. 21.

² B. Poreau, *Le Rwanda: une ère nouvelle. Comprendre le travail de reconnaissance*, p. 19.

Nous répondons par l'affirmative. Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) fait remonter les lieux de mémoire à une tradition gréco-latine.

La tradition qui procède de cette «institution oratoire», pour reprendre le titre du traité de Quintilien, est si riche que notre discussion contemporaine portant sur les lieux de mémoire – lieux bien réels inscrits dans la géographie – peut être tenue pour l'héritière tardive de l'art de la mémoire artificielle des Grecs et des Latins, pour lesquels les lieux étaient les sites d'une écriture mentale.¹

Pourtant, la théorisation d'un lieu de mémoire est très récente. Pierre Nora, ayant dirigé *les Lieux de mémoire*, va mettre en exergue ce concept de lieux de mémoire, particulièrement développé durant le vingtième siècle.

La curiosité pour les lieux où se cristallise et se réfugie la mémoire est liée à ce moment particulier de notre histoire. Moment charnière, où la conscience de la rupture avec le passé se confond avec le sentiment d'une mémoire déchirée: mais le déchirement réveille encore assez de mémoire pour que puisse se poser le problème de son incarnation. Le sentiment de la continuité devient résiduel à des lieux. Il y a des lieux de mémoire parce qu'il n'y a plus de milieux de mémoire.²

En reprenant de très nombreux exemples de lieux de mémoire et de symboliques associées, Pierre Nora théorise ainsi les trois sens donnés à ces sites, institués de la sorte durant le vingtième siècle, essentiellement dans les sociétés occidentales. De nombreux exemples sont issus de l'histoire de France. L'exemple du site de Kigali au Rwanda, avec la comparaison implicite entre le génocide de 1994 et la Shoah est également une preuve en faveur de l'importation de la notion occidentale des sites mémoriels. Pourtant, le Rwanda ancien est fondé sur l'oralité. Cette oralité peut-elle être en accord avec les sites mémoriels actuellement visibles dans de nombreuses villes du pays des mille collines? Les sites mémoriels sont-ils pérennes au Rwanda?

2. L'oralité dans la culture rwandaise et la pérennisation possible des sites mémoriels

Les seules sources disponibles pour l'étude historique du Rwanda ancien sont, outre les sources de type archéologiques, des sources uniquement orales transmises de génération en génération. Jan Vansina évoque cette difficulté dans l'étude des royaumes anciens du Rwanda.

(...) Les sources orales sont évanescences et de ce chef il convient de leur appliquer une critique appropriée avant de les utiliser. (...) Trop souvent les auteurs ont utilisé l'un ou autre énoncé oral de façon isolée sans se soucier de sa

¹ P. Ricoeur, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

² P. Nora, *Entre Mémoire et Histoire*, in P. Nora et al., *Les lieux de mémoire*, vol. 1, *La république*, Paris, Gallimard, 1984, p. 25.

représentativité ou de sa valeur intrinsèque. C'est d'ailleurs la faiblesse principale des synthèses anciennes.¹

Bien qu'interprétée comme une difficulté supplémentaire pour les historiens, la culture rwandaise orale est fondamentale pour la compréhension actuelle de la situation du pays. L'oralité prend une place *princeps* dans la culture rwandaise. Les exemples, aussi bien au sein du Rwanda pré-colonial, que du Rwanda actuel, sont nombreux. La musique, avec l'instrumentation et les chants, est un exemple de transition entre le Rwanda ancien et le Rwanda actuel. L'oralité y est omniprésente. Il n'existe pas de partitions. Un exemple d'instrument est l'*inanga*. Il correspond à une cithare.² Associée à cet instrument, une typologie de chants anciens existe également. Mais aujourd'hui encore, cet instrument est employé par la jeunesse rwandaise.

Dans le Rwanda ancien, les chants, contes et autres genres lyriques sont des éléments fondamentaux de la culture. Au vingtième siècle, Alexis Kagame a entrepris une écriture des sources orales précitées. Les ouvrages de Kagame seront publiés dans les années 1940-1950, puis reprises puisqu'elles sont uniques.³ Voici une description du personnage de Alexis Kagame par Jean-Pierre Chrétien:

Au Rwanda, l'abbé Alexis Kagame, protégé à la fois par les pères blancs qui l'avaient formé et le roi Mutara publié en 1943 (...) une première histoire dynastique (...) devenu un idéologue de la monarchie tutsi dans les années 1950 (...) Kagame a imposé durablement une vision «hamitique» de l'histoire ancienne de son pays. Historien et source à la fois, il est arrivé à convaincre qu'il était aussi bien dans l'intimité des biru (...) que dans la lignée d'une historiographie médiévale classique (...).⁴

Dans son *introduction aux grands genres lyriques*, Kagame évoque ainsi la poésie guerrière, la poésie pastorale ou encore la poésie dynastique. Les textes qu'il rapporte et qu'il a obtenu des Aèdes, sont des textes déclamés de génération en génération uniquement par les possesseurs de ces poésies, par exemple (ici les Aèdes).

Tout poème est en soi invariable dans le texte qui vous est déclamé. Ceci est un principe général.⁵

Kagame livre une traduction (sa traduction) des poésies qu'il a recueillies durant de nombreuses années. Ces poésies livrent des scènes de la

¹ J. Vansina, *Le Rwanda ancien: le royaume Nyiginya*, Paris, Karthala, 2001, p. 12.

² P. Poreau, *Extension de la théorie de la reconnaissance, l'exemple du génocide rwandais*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2011, pp. 23-24.

³ L. de Heusch, *Mythe et société féodale, le culte du kubandwa dans le Rwanda traditionnel*, in "Revue des sciences sociales des religions", volume 18, n°1, 1994, p. 133.

⁴ J.P. Chrétien, *L'Afrique des grands lacs, 2000 ans d'histoire*, Flammarion, Paris, 2003, p. 21.

⁵ A. Kagame, *Introduction aux grands genres lyriques de l'ancien Rwanda*, Kigali, Editions universitaires du Rwanda, 1969, p. 154.

vie des royaumes anciens du Rwanda. Cet art oratoire perdue toujours pendant le vingtième siècle, malgré la colonisation. Ainsi, il cite un poème pour Mutara III dont voici un court extrait:

Donne-moi audience, que je te fasse une confidence:/je n'ai pas tardé à cause de grandes possessions bovines, /je ne me suis délié de toi par l'abondance de lait: /j'ai été dépossédé (de vaches) par qui ne les avait pas données,/ et cela me causa une peur instinctive de me montrer. /Ayant pensé au désagréable logement où je m'étais couché /ô logeur en voyage, du Munificent, /je me convainquis qu'il n'y avait pas pire logement; /tel que je l'ai trouvé, fasse le ciel qu'il s'évanouisse à jamais./Dieu est le seul à savoir se rappeler chaque chose,/Lui qui m'a protégé en un combat sans merci,/ô l'inattaquable, du raconteur,/de sorte que je me promène encore dans ce Rwanda.¹

Ce poème est aussi la preuve de l'intégration de la colonisation dans une culture rwandaise plus ancienne. En particulier, la religion est présente avec une vision clairement occidentale. L'oralité de la culture rwandaise, fondatrice de celle-ci, est pourtant fragile. Les tentatives de mise par écrit, comme les textes publiés par Alexis Kagame, peuvent souffrir d'une interprétation subjective, en particulier dans la traduction. En effet, le vecteur de cette oralité de génération en génération est la langue employée: le kinyarwanda.

Quant à la langue, imaginons un instant que les Rwandais revenus de tous les horizons n'aient pas une langue commune! Il leur serait bien difficile de communiquer. Au contraire, la langue maternelle est là, parlée et comprise par 93% de la population, à côté du swahili (1,46%), du français (1,6%) et de l'anglais (0,19%). La langue rwandaise a été, tout au long de notre histoire, la gardienne de nos trouvailles, de notre expérience dans l'action et dans la pensée, de notre conception du monde, de nos heurs et malheurs. Dans notre manque d'écriture et dans notre tradition orale, elle est restée le grenier fidèle de nos moissons de culture à travers les âges. Elle a été notre éducatrice pour nous transmettre notre culture. Elle nous a transmis la tendresse de notre mère, elle nous a transmis la fermeté paternelle, grâce auxquelles nous sommes devenus solides sans être amers. Nous ne pouvons nous en passer qu'à regret et forcés.²

Le Rwanda contemporain voit émerger cette tradition orale. La jeunesse rwandaise utilise la musique pour faire vivre la tradition orale. Pourtant, mal interprétée, plus spécifiquement par les traductions faisant suite à la colonisation, cette tradition peut sembler contre-productive.

L'oralité est donc bien présente, et est un aspect fondamental de la culture rwandaise. Ainsi, des éléments ne faisant pas partie de cette oralité, peuvent-ils s'intégrer au sein de la culture rwandaise? Notamment, qu'en est-il des sites mémoriels?

¹ A. Kagame, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

² S. Sebasoni, *Le Rwanda, reconstruire une nation*, Kigali, Editions rwandaises, 2007, p. 12.

De prime abord, un site étant «physique», il est en opposition avec l'oralité, insaisissable. Cependant, nous avons rappelé le sens triple donné aux lieux de mémoires: matériel, symbolique et fonctionnel. Le premier sens est effectivement en contradiction avec la culture rwandaise ancienne et contemporaine. En revanche, les deux autres sens peuvent tout à fait s'accorder avec le système de l'oralité rwandaise.

En effet, comme le précise Célestin Kanimba Misango, la vocation des sites mémoriels consiste avant tout à former et à informer.

La vocation du site mémoriel consiste aussi à former et informer. Il est érigé pour être un lieu de recherche, de mémoire et d'éducation indispensable pour les générations futures. Son objet est de réunir, de produire et de publier une documentation spécifique, de la mettre à disposition des chercheurs et du public, surtout de la jeunesse, afin d'informer le plus possible sur le génocide, l'idéologie divisionniste, les droits fondamentaux de la personne. Le concept de site se fonde sur quatre éléments: mémorial, espace de documentation, cimetière et jardin de recueillement. Le site est un espace de réflexion, de rencontre et d'animation ouvert au public pour que la mémoire reste vivante.¹

Les sites mémoriels, à travers leur fonctionnalité que nous avons pu voir, et leur sens triple, vont pouvoir faire partie du travail de mémoire et du travail de reconnaissance.

«Ces sites portent en eux l'injonction du souvenir, d'où la nécessité de les aborder»².

La nécessité de la reconnaissance du génocide, ou processus perpétuel de l'interprétation des faits est ressentie notamment durant les difficultés rencontrées par le Tribunal International pénal pour le Rwanda (T.P.I.R) et par la mise en place des Gacaca, ces tribunaux locaux permettant de juger les génocidaires. La mise en place de lieux physiques était alors fondamentale.

Face aux dénégations et aux oblitérations, la mémoire du génocide apparaît comme fondamentale. C'est dans cette optique qu'à partir de 1996, les autorités rwandaises décident d'exhumer des milliers de corps dans des «sites d'extermination» afin de ne pas oublier et surtout de prouver le drame passé. De fait, comme l'explique Catherine Coquio, «en exposant les morts dans la position où ils furent tués, les sites signifient le meurtre collectif et transforment les cadavres en “témoins” muets de la catastrophe». Cette décision permet également à certains rescapés de retrouver la trace des leurs et ainsi d'enclencher un travail de deuil. D'aucuns, parmi les survivants, expriment

¹ Misago C. Kanimba, *Les instruments de la mémoire*, in “Gradhiva” [En ligne], 5 | 2007, mis en ligne le 03 décembre 2010, édition numérique, paragraphes 38 et 39.

² A. Rudacogora, *Mémoire des sites et sites de mémoire au Rwanda après 1994*, in “Etudes rwandaises”, n°9, 2005, p. 148.

toutefois leur ressentiment à l'égard d'un pouvoir qui traite sans respect les ossements des victimes, parce qu'il ne s'agit pas de leurs proches.¹

L'enjeu des sites mémoriels, de la reconnaissance du génocide, et de la mémoire est celui d'un Rwanda nouveau, uni.

À ce stade, les Rwandais coexistent sans «s'entendre» sur ces questions. Hormis certaines exceptions, ils se taisent ou se «mal-entendent». Il ne s'agit pas ici de décortiquer l'ensemble des malentendus charriés par le flot des violences passées, mais de s'interroger sur l'articulation entre «mémoire» officielle et mémoires vives dans le cadre d'une société en état de choc.²

Notons que l'approche «physique» des sites mémoriels, comme la constitution du lieu, ainsi que le fait de «montrer» des ossements, a posé et pose toujours des interrogations chez les rwandais quant au bien-fondé de la méthode employée.

Néanmoins, l'oralité se retrouve dans les sites mémoriels, et c'est cet élément fondamental qui permet d'être en faveur d'une pérennisation des lieux de mémoire.

En effet, tout d'abord, en étant un lieu de recueillement pour chaque individu, l'oralité de tout un chacun existe et peut émerger. C'est une possibilité de retrouver ses proches disparus pour les rescapés du génocide notamment. C'est une possibilité de se remémorer comme au temps des royaumes anciens.³

Deuxièmement, c'est un lieu de commémoration, non plus sur un plan de l'individu, mais sur un plan social, en groupe. Les commémorations se poursuivent toujours aujourd'hui. Elles sont un lieu d'expression, utilisant le kinyarwanda, des souffrances toujours encourues dans le pays des mille collines. C'est ce que nous avons pu observer lors des commémorations du génocide en 2012, notamment juste après la proclamation de la fin des Gacaca.

Enfin, il s'agit d'un lieu oratoire politique. La dimension nationale est en effet présente. La volonté même du pouvoir en place est affichée dans toutes les rues de la capitale, «la réconciliation» est fondamentale pour P. Kagame, actuellement président du Rwanda. Néanmoins, il ne faut pas occulter les difficultés majeures rencontrées à ce jour. Les sites mémoriels sont donc un moyen, apparemment en cours d'intégration dans la culture rwandaise.

Conclusion

Les sites mémoriels, bien qu'étant «physique», peuvent susciter une certaine incompréhension pour les rwandais dont la culture traditionnelle est

¹ V. Rosoux, *La gestion du passé au Rwanda: ambivalence et poids du silence*, in "Genèses", tome 4, n° 61, 2005, p. 37.

² Idem, *Rwanda, l'impossible «mémoire nationale»?*, in "Ethnologie française", Vol. 37, tome 3, 2007, p. 409.

³ P. Del Perugia, *Les derniers rois mages*, Paris, Payot, 1993.

fondée sur l'oralité, par le vecteur de la langue, le kinyarwanda. D'autant plus, que la théorisation de «lieux de mémoire» ou «sites mémoriels» est essentiellement occidentale, c'est-à-dire émanant d'une culture extérieure à celle où ces sites sont implantés.

Pourtant, s'il semble difficile de concilier les sites physiques et l'oralité, ils ont été créés et développés quelques mois seulement après le génocide, et les projets en cours concernant des sites mémoriels sont nombreux actuellement dans toutes les régions du Rwanda.

Ce travail est apparu absolument nécessaire, il fait d'ailleurs partie de la reconnaissance du génocide, ou processus perpétuel de l'interprétation des faits.

Et, en fait, les sites mémoriels ne sont pas incompatibles avec l'oralité culturelle rwandaise. Il semble, au contraire, qu'ils permettent cette oralité dans un contexte aussi singulier que celui du pays des mille collines. Dans le *processus perpétuel de l'interprétation des faits*¹, les sites mémoriels ont donc une place *princeps*. Ils peuvent permettre de lier le Rwanda ancien et le Rwanda post-génocide. Ils peuvent permettre également le devoir de mémoire, la lutte contre le négationnisme, tout en réalisant une approche bénéfique pour la réconciliation. Il n'en reste pas moins que ces lieux de mémoire ou sites mémoriels doivent être totalement intégrés à la société rwandaise, sans être une copie d'une émanation occidentale, afin qu'ils soient pérennisés et utiles.

¹ B. Poreau, *Extension de la théorie de la reconnaissance, l'exemple du génocide rwandais*.

100 YEARS OF ALBANIAN INDEPENDENCE

*Dumitru-Valentin Pătrașcu**

Abstract

On November 28th, 2012, Albania celebrated one hundred years since it proclaimed its independence from the Ottoman Empire sovereignty, in the context of the so-called “Oriental Crisis” that led to the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. We engaged in this study aiming to highlight the close Romanian-Albanian relations and to emphasise the well-known Romanian support for the Albanian leaders in their efforts to achieve the independence of Albania.

Key words: *independence, Albania, Ottoman Empire, Aromanians, nation*

After the battle of Kosovopolje (June 28, 1389), the Ottoman Turks conquered a series of Albanian territories, including the towns of Kruja, Shkoder, Korçea și Permet, so, as a result, in 1415, Kruja became an important Ottoman fortress.¹ During the year 1417, the Ottomans conquered Vlore, Berat and Gjirokaster.² Later on, the Sultan Murad the IInd deployed considerable Ottoman garrisons in the center and south of the Albanian territories, settling them definitively throughout the year 1423³. In the end, in 1431, the conquered Albanian territories were included in a sandjak, as part of the Rumelia vilayet.

The Albanians’ struggles for freedom continued under the leadership of the national hero Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbeg. Born in 1412, Skenderbeg had been taken prisoner by the Ottomans when he was only a child and completed his education at Istanbul. In 1438, Skenderbeg was appointed Subashi at Kruja and, in 1440, he became the Sandjak-Bey of Dibra.⁴ During this period he established secret connections with several Christian states, aiming at starting an anti-Ottoman revolt in the Albanian territories.⁵

The incursion of the Christian troops in the Balkans during the years 1442-1443 determined Skenderbeg to raise the flag of revolt against the Ottomans and to proclaim, on November 28, 1443, the foundation of an

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¹ Kipi Kycyku, *The History of Albania*, Bucharest, Corint Publishing House, 2002, p. 43.

² *Ibidem*.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

Albanian state with the capital at Kruja.¹ Following a series of victories against the Ottoman forces, at the beginning of the year 1444, a large part of the Albanian territories were liberated.²

After Skenderbeg's death, which occurred on January 17, 1468, the Venetians conquered a large part of the Albanian shore and, in 1478, the Ottomans conquered Kruja.³ Subsequently, until the end of the XVth century, the Ottomans conquered all Albania, except for the port of Durrazzo (Durrës), occupied by the Venetians until the year 1501.⁴ After the conquest, a large part of Albanians converted to Islam, in order to benefit from a more favorable fiscal system. Several Viziers of the Ottoman Empire, such as the Koprülü family, would trace their origins from the Albanian population.

In the first years of the XIXth century, in Janina, a powerful military leader, Ali Pasha Tepelana, would distinguish himself and challenge the Ottoman Sultan's authority. After he was granted the title of Pasha in 1786, Ali conquered the town of Yanina. He confiscated the fortunes of the feudal rulers in the area and, in 1797, he was appointed governor of the Terhalla Sandjak.⁵ Under these conditions, Ali Pasha controlled Toskeria, Epirus and Thessaly, with a population of 1.5 million inhabitants, formed of Albanians, Greeks and Wallachians.

Ali Pasha's relations with the sultan from Istanbul gradually deteriorated, so that, in 1813, the Pasha of Janina refused to intervene against the Serbian insurrection. As a result, in June 1820, the sultan's troops attacked the Pashalik of Janina⁶ and decapitated Ali Pasha Tepelena. After this event, numerous revolts started in the Albanian territories. Thus, in 1847, a strong anti-Ottoman uprising broke out and spread in Albania's southern regions.⁷ After 1850, rebellions took place in: Shkoder, Gjakova, Mirdita, Prizren and Peja.⁸

The San Stefano peace treaty, which stipulated the formation of a large principality of Bulgaria within the Ottoman Empire and which was supposed to include also the territories inhabited by the Albanians from Macedonia, determined the Albanian patriots to found, in 1878, the Prizren League.⁹ In this respect, the Prizren League submitted a protest to the Berlin Peace Congress.

¹ *Ibidem.*

² *Ibidem.*

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 47-48.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 48.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 51.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 53.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 54.

⁸ *Ibidem.*

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 57.

Meanwhile, an army formed of voluntaries was created, with the mission to protect the territories inhabited by the Albanians.¹

On July 1st, 1878, the General Assembly of the Prizren League took place, attended by representatives from all Albanian regions, during which a document was adopted, granting to the Prizren League the power to proclaim mobilization, to create local tribunals and to set taxes in order to constitute its own budget.² The Berlin Peace Treaty stipulated that the Albanian territories which, according to the San Stefano treaty, were to be part of the autonomous Bulgarian principality would remain under Ottoman sovereignty, while Greece received the Albanian territories from Çeameria³, and Montenegro obtained the regions: Podgorica, Plav, Gucia, Rugova and Kolašin. Under these conditions, in November 1878, a new assembly of the League took place in Prizren, during which a program was adopted, stipulating Albania's autonomy within the Ottoman Empire.⁴

Romania supported the Albanians' and Bulgarians' struggles to free themselves from Ottoman domination and, as a result, numerous Albanians and Bulgarians persecuted by the Ottoman authorities sought refuge in our country. In 1844, the first Albanian language primer was elaborated by a group of Albanian refugees settled at the north of the Danube. Subsequently, during the year 1878, the "*Albanian League*" was founded in Bucharest. This city also hosted the creation of numerous other Albanian associations, such as: "*The Albanian Writers' Association*" (1880), the "*Drita*" Association (1884)⁵, the "*Bashkimi*" Association (1909), while papers and magazines such as: "*Athdeu*", "*Shqiptari*", "*Sqiperia*", "*La renaissance d' Albanie*", "*The Albanian Star*" were published in Albanian, French and Romanian.

The first committee of the "*Drita*" (Light) Cultural Association was formed, almost exclusively, of Romanians. The Association's first chairman was V. A. Urechia, D. Butculescu was vice-chairman and the first censors were doctor Leonte and M. Deșliu. Until 1887 the "*Drita*" Cultural Association opened branches in: Brăila, Focșani, Călărași and Mărășești. By its own financial means, this association published manuals in the Albanian language and supported the publishing of some publications in the Albanian language. Thus, in 1887, the paper "*Drita*" appeared in Brăila, while the weekly magazine "*Shqiptari*" (The Albanian) was edited in Bucharest in 1888.⁶

¹ *Ibidem*, p. 58.

² *Ibidem*.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 59.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 60.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 62.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 63.

Starting with 1886, the first Albanian printing house functioned in Bucharest, on the Lipscani Street, where publications in the Albanian language were edited, both for the Albanian community in Romania and for the Albanian people from the territories found under Ottoman domination.

In 1897, the “*Shqiperia*” magazine (Albania) was published in Bucharest under the editorial supervision of Visar Dodani and, in 1898, the first issue of the “*Ylli i Shqiperise*” (The Albanian Star) appeared, written in Albanian, Greek and French.¹

Even since 1903, when the first issue of the “*La renaissance d’Albanie*” publication appeared, the editorial board approached the matter of adopting an anthem of the Albanian people. Finally, both the text of the Romanian song: “*Our flag reads unity!*” and the melody composed by Ciprian Porumbescu were adopted as the Albanians’ anthem, having been taken from the “The Social Song Collection for Romanian Students”, appeared in 1880. The only exception was the first line in the first stanza, so that, instead of: “*Our flag reads unity!*”, Albania’s anthem began with the line: “*Let us unite around the flag!*”.

Referring to the support granted by the Romanian government to the Albanian national movement, N. Naco, one of the founders of the “*Drita*” Society and future counselor of King Zogu I of Albania, stated: “*While Albania’s sons are lingering in this drowsiness, the great, noble men of Romania, driven by a true fraternal love, warmly embrace us, offer shelter to save us, encourage our enterprise, while also offering us money to continue the work we have started*”.² In the same article from “*Shqiptari*”, N. Naco declared that: “*On matters regarding Macedonia, Albania and Epirus, we, the Albanian-Romanian from the Peninsula [Balkan – author’s note] have the right to make our voices heard*”.³ Further on, N. Naco showed that: “*We [the Albanians – author’s note] see no differences between our two Romanian and Albanian sister nations, but we fight for one’s interest as for the other’s*”.⁴

In an article published on September 26th, 1878 in the “*Timpul*” (Time) newspaper, Mihai Eminescu declared that: “*There is no state in Eastern Europe, there is no country from the Adriatic to the Black Sea which does not comprise fragments of our nationality [Romanian – author’s note]. Starting from the shepherds in Istria, to the morlaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, step by step we trace fragments of this great ethnic unity in the mountains of Albania, in Macedonia and Thessaly, in the Pind, as well as in the Balkans, in Serbia, in*

¹ *Ibidem*.

² N. Naco, *God speed!*, in „*Shqiptari*”, Bucharest, no. 10/1888.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

Bulgaria, in Greece, beyond the Nistru River, reaching as far as Odessa and Kyiv".¹

Later on, in an article published in the "Timpul" newspaper on May 3rd, 1880 Mihai Eminescu announced, by quoting the Viennese press, that, on May 7th, 1880 the Prizren League newspaper, "Shkoder" would appear for the first time, written in Albanian and Turkish and presenting on the front page a proclamation which read that "*Albania has ceased to be under the Padishah's sovereignty*".² Mihai Eminescu concluded that: "*Although this nationality's [Albanian – author's note] branches are numerous, (...), the main ones are the Ghegs and the Tosks (...), bearers of the two main dialects. The Tosk region consists of Southern Albania, while the Ghegaria or Ghegania of the Northern one. The latter are Catholics, the former are Eastern Greek Orthodox. These other important branches are the Arber and the Ckemi. The Ckemi region is called Epirus in Albanian. Finally, there are often mentions about the Mirdites, Catholic soldierly people, whose name means <<blessed>>*".³

In August 1878 a commission was created, with the mission to draw the borders of Montenegro. After the 1877-1878 war ended, the Albanians simply took control of many of the regions where the Turkish troops had been withdrawn from and also defeated the Montenegro forces. These Albanian victories determined the Great Powers to decide that, instead of the Gusinje and Plav districts, Montenegro would receive the Ulcinj port, but the Albanians also opposed to this cession.⁴

In May 1881, the Great European Powers decided that Thessaly would be ceded to Greece, while Epirus would be divided, as the little district of Arta from the region's southern part was to be given to Greece.⁵

At the beginning of the year 1881, the Ottoman Empire decided to put an end to the Prizren League and conquered Prizren the same year.⁶ The Ottoman government re-established the centralized administrative government, several Albanians were appointed in official positions, but no political autonomy was instituted.

In November 1897 and in January 1899, two meetings of some Albanian political organizations took place at Peja.⁷ Following these meetings, Haxhi Mulla Zeka, the leader of the radical group, whose goal was to unite all four

¹ Mihai Eminescu, *Romanians abroad*, anthology, foreword and comments by D. Vatamaniuc, Bucharest, SAECULUM Publishing House, 2000, p. 17.

² *Ibidem*, p. 68.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 69.

⁴ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, vol. I, Iași, European Institute Publishing House, 2000, p. 323.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 324.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

vilayets in an autonomous Albanian region, was elected as chairman of the Albanian League. The Ottoman authorities' reaction was prompt and, in 1902, Haxhi Mulla Zeka was executed.¹

In 1899, the "Albanian Students's Society" from Romania was founded by the initiative of Dervish Hima and, a year later, this organization changed its name into "Shpresa" (Hope).²

On August 2nd, 1903 the armed insurrection of the Macedonian Internal Revolutionary Organization broke out against the Ottoman forces in Macedonia. The fate of this revolt was decided on July 28th, 1903, by a meeting organized at Smileva, near Bitolia.³ The armed forces of the Bulgarian revolutionaries liberated a part of Macedonia, by conquering the town of Kruševo. The inclusion of territories inhabited by Albanians in the newly created republic of Kruševo triggered a reaction from the Albanian armed groups. Thus, in November 1905, the Committee for the freedom of Albania was created at Bitolia and, in January 1906, Bajo Topulli organized guerilla units destined to fight both against Ottoman troops and against the Bulgarian and Greek terrorists from Macedonia.⁴ In September 1906, this organization planned the assassination of the Greek Metropolitan Bishop from Korçe.⁵

After the victory of the Young Turks, supporting manifestations were organized in the Albanian territories, in a hope that this would lead to autonomy within the Ottoman Empire.⁶ The Albanians invested a great deal of hope in the victory of the Young Turks, as 20 000 Albanians took part in the revolt. In August 1908, the Romanian Consul at Yanina reported that: "*The Albanians have engaged in this endeavor with wonderful energy and enthusiasm, they have already opened schools in several towns, such as Vlora, Gjirokaster and Berat and perhaps they will soon introduce their own language in (...) the state's Islamic schools. For the Aromanians, the strengthening of the Albanian ethnic group is, in these parts, a matter of life, as the two poor nations have always manifested sympathy towards each other*".⁷

The introduction of compulsory military service to the Albanians, as well as of some taxes, along with the closing of the Albanians schools led, in February 1909, to the start of several revolts in the mountainous regions of Peja, Gjakova and Dibra. Subsequently, the revolts spread to the Shkoder

¹ *Ibidem*.

² Kopi Kyçyku, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

³ Idem, *History of Macedonia*, Bucharest, Corint Publishing House, 2003, p. 66.

⁴ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 86.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ Apud Kopi Kyçyku, *History of Macedonia*, p. 68.

region.¹ In September 1909, the Albanians leaders organized a new meeting at Elbasan. During the same year, the Albanian language schools were reopened.²

In 1909 and 1910 the Young Turks sent troops to quell the revolts from the Albanian territories, the one in Kosovo, in particular.³ In March 1910, a revolt broke out in Priština and quickly spread in Kovoso and was suppressed after three months by the Ottoman troops.⁴ The revolt resurfaced and, in a hope to end it for good, the Sultan made a visit in Kosovo in June 1911, when he announced he would grant amnesty to all who surrendered.⁵

On June 23rd, 1911, at Gerca, the Albanians organized an assembly during which a memorandum was voted, consisting of 12 claims addressed to the Sublime Porte. The claims were: the recognition of the Albanian nation, the unification of the Albanian vilayets under Albanian administration, the reopening of the Albanian language schools. Although it opposed Albania's autonomy, the Ottoman government signed the Podgorica agreement (August 1911) with the Albanian insurgents, but this didn't lead to granting autonomy to the Albanian territories.⁶

In April 1912, revolts broke out in more areas inhabited by the Albanians, which caused the Ottoman government to simply lose control of the region.⁷ After several months, in August 1912, the Albanian rebels conquered Skopje, which, in September 1912, determined the Porte to accept a part of the Albanians' claims.⁸

The start of the First Balkan War, on October 18th, 1912 would offer the Albanians the opportunity to proclaim their independence.⁹ Under these circumstances, Ismail Qemali arrived in Bucharest in October 1912. Shortly after, he declared: "*During this war, Albania's eyes are turned towards Romania. We are sure that the Romanian government would not let an injustice happen to us*".¹⁰

During the First Balkan War, Montenegro tried to conquer the town of Shkoder, while Greece was trying to conquer Janina.¹¹

The proclamation of Albania's independence was prepared within a meeting of the Albanian community in Romania, which took place in

¹ *Ibidem.*

² Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 87.

³ Kopi Kyçyku, *History of Macedonia*, p. 69.

⁴ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 87.

⁵ Kopi Kyçyku, *History of Macedonia*, p. 69.

⁶ Idem, *History of Albania*, p. 69.

⁷ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 87.

⁸ *Ibidem.*

⁹ Kopi Kyçyku, *History of Macedonia*, p. 73.

¹⁰ Idem, *History of Albania*, p. 70.

¹¹ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 95.

Bucharest. The proclamation of Albania's independence was read at Vlore, on November 28th, 1912 by Ismail Qemali within a gathering attended by representatives of all the territories inhabited by the Albanians.¹ The Albanian government led by Ismail Qemali imposed its authority in the center and north of Albania, except for the town of Shkoder, placed under the control of an international military commission.²

On December 17th, 1912 the Conference of Ambassadors in London opened, chaired by the British Ministry for External Affairs, Edward Grey.³ By the proposal of Austria-Hungary and Italy, on July 29th, 1913, the London Conference decided to recognize the independence of Albania.⁴ Previously, on March 22nd 1913, the participants at the London Conference had decided that the Albanian territories: Tetovo, Dibra, Struga, Gostivar, Kercova and Kosovo were to be integrated within Serbia and Montenegro.⁵ Another decision of the London Conference, adopted on August 11th, 1913 stipulated that the largest part of the Ckem region would be ceded to Greece.⁶ The configuration of Albania's southern and eastern borders was finalized by the conclusion of the Florence Protocol on December 17th, 1913.⁷ The Great Powers obliged Montenegro to evacuate the town of Shkoder and the result was an Albanian state with a surface of approximately 28 000 square kilometers and a population of 800 000 inhabitants.⁸

On March 7th, 1914, the German prince Wilhelm of Wied took the throne of Albania. The new King was faced with revolts in different regions of the country, as the rebels from the south of Albania were supported by the Greek state.⁹ Soon after, the king lost control of the rural areas and his authority was confined only to a small region which included the towns of Durres and Vlore. Under these conditions, on September 3rd 1914, King Wilhelm of Wied was forced to abdicate and leave the country.¹⁰ After his abdication, Albania was divided into occupation areas under the control of foreign armies. Thus, on October 27th, 1914, Greece occupied Northern Epirus and, on October 30th, 1914 Italy occupied the island of Sazani. Two months later, Italy also occupied the port of Vlore on the Adriatic Sea.¹¹ On June 8th, 1915, Montenegro's troops

¹ Kopi Kyçyku, *History of Albania*, p. 70.

² *Ibidem*, p. 72.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 73.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 98.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 99.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ Kopi Kyçyku, *History of Albania*, pp. 74-75.

entered Albania and, on June 27th, 1915, the occupied the town of Shkoder, while the Serbian troops advanced to Durres.¹

The Treaty of London, signed in April 1915, stipulated that Italy would enter the war against Austria-Hungary. The treaty's territorial provisions stipulated that Italy would annex the southern Tirol, Trentino, Gorizia, Trieste, Istria, a part of Dalmatia, as well as the island of Sazani and the town of Vlore.²

Until January 1916, Serbia's and Montenegro's forces were evacuated through Albania, towards Thessaloniki. The northern and central regions of Albania were occupied by Austria-Hungary's troops, as a result of Serbia's and Montenegro's withdrawal. Meanwhile, Bulgarian troops entered Albania and seized the town of Elbasan.³

Throughout the year 1916, the Italian troops occupied the regions of Vlore, Himara and Tepelene and, during September and October 1916 they invaded the regions of Gjirokaster, Saranda, Permet and Leskovik, driving away the Greek troops which had taken possession of these areas.⁴ In the autumn of 1916, the French troops which left from Thessaloniki entered the Albanian territories and occupied Korcea, Gora and Opar.⁵

At the beginning of 1917, the Italian troops conquered Erseka, so that the entire Albanian territory was under the warring states' occupation. On the Albanian territory, there was a front line on the Vlore – Berat – Pogradec direction.⁶

In the period 1916-1918, the Kosovo region was under Bulgarian and Austrian-Hungarian occupation.⁷ Kosovo had been taken over during the First Balkan War by the Serbian army, which afterwards entered Macedonia and seized the town of Skopje.⁸

In June 1913, Bulgaria attacked its former allies from the First Balkan War, Serbia and Greece. Under these circumstances, Serbia and Greece were joined by Montenegro, the Ottoman Empire and Romania.⁹ The Romanian army's intervention led to a quick defeat of Bulgaria, which was forced to accept a cease of hostilities in July 1913.

¹ *Ibidem.*

² Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 113.

³ Kōpi Kyçyku, *History of Albania*, p. 75.

⁴ *Ibidem.*

⁵ *Ibidem.*

⁶ *Ibidem.*

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 76; Gheorghe Zbucnea, *History of Yugoslavia*, Bucharest, Corint Publishing House, 2001, *passim*.

⁸ Stefano Bianchini, *The Yugoslavian Problem*, Bucharest, ALL Publishing House, 2003, p. 25.

⁹ See Gheorghe Zbucnea, *Romania and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). Pages from the History of South-Eastern Europe*, Bucharest, Albatros Publishing House, 1999, *passim*.

In a telegram dispatched by the Romania Prime-Minister, Titu Maiorescu, to the Romanian plenipotentiary in London on 4/17 June, 1913, it was specified that: *“Incorporating them within Albania is the best guarantee for the Macedo-Romanians, if the foundation of an autonomous Macedonia is impossible”*.¹

After the end of the Second World War, on July 10/23 1913, Titu Maiorescu notified King Charles I that *“the Turkish Ministry Sefa-Bey has made known to me today that Turkey would have an interest in participating at the discussions regarding the peace preliminaries in Bucharest”*.² In the same document addressed to King Charles I, Titu Maiorescu stated that *“I cannot approve as long as the talks which are to follow in Bucharest, either for a preliminary or a definitive peace, will exclusively concern the exchange of territories between Christian states”*.³

The peace treaty that put an end to the Second Balkan War was signed at Bucharest on July 28/ August 10, 1913 and settled the territorial clauses through which Macedonia, freed from the domination of the Ottoman Empire, was divided among the states which were allied during the First Balkan War.⁴

In 1912, Macedonia had a surface of approximately 65 000 square kilometers and a population of 2 342 524 inhabitants⁵ and, according to the Bucharest Peace Treaty, was divided among: Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Albania. At the end of the First World War, Albania was under foreign occupation and, on January 18th, 1919, England, France and the USA signed a memorandum in Paris, recognizing Italy’s sovereignty over the port of Vlore and the Italian mandate over the entire Albania.⁶

On January 29th – 31st, 1920 a National Albanian Congress took place, during which the Italian protectorate was rejected and there were elections for the supreme bodies of the Albanian state whose capital was established at Tirana, in February 1920.⁷

According to the stipulations of the Tirana protocol, signed on August 2th, 1920, Italy committed itself to withdraw the troops from the town-port of Vlore and to respect Albania’s sovereignty over this territory.⁸ The Italian troops continued to occupy the island of Sazani. At the end of the year, on

¹ Apud Titu Maiorescu, *Romania, The Balkan Wars and the Cadrilater*, doc. no. 65, Bucharest, Machiavelli Publishing House, 1995, pp. 213-214.

² *Ibidem*, doc. no. 90, p. 227.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ *Ibidem*, doc. no. 99, pp. 232-239.

⁵ Kopi Kyçyku, *History of Macedonia*, p. 17.

⁶ Kopi Kyçyku, *History of Albania*, p. 76.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 77.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

December 17th 1920, Albania was admitted as member of the League of Nations.¹

On December 2nd, 1922 a government led by Ahmed Zog, former Minister of Internal Affairs, was formed at Tirana. At the end of the same year, a liberal political movement, led by bishop Fan S. Noli, was formed in order to oppose the government.² On February 23rd, 1923, Prime Minister Ahmed Zog was wounded in an assassination attempt³, presented his resignation after this incident and sought refuge in Yugoslavia and, later on, in Italy and Greece.

On May 5th, 1924 the “Bashkimi” society initiated a revolt against the government led by the great land owner Shefqet Verlaci. After taking control over the towns of Shkoder, Permeti, Berat, Fieri and Peshkopia, on June 10th, 1924, the insurgents also took the country’s capital, Tirana.⁴ After these events, a government led by Fan Noli was formed, but, on December 24th, 1924, the troops supporting Ahmed Zog and benefitting from foreign aid succeeded to overthrow this government.⁵

On January 21st, 1925 the Constituent Assembly proclaimed the Albanian Republic and, on January 31st, 1925, Ahmed Zog was proclaimed President of Albania and also Prime Minister of the Government.⁶ Gone into exile, Fan Noli would become the chairman of the National Revolutionary Committee created on March 25th, 1925 at Vienna with the help of the Balkan Communist Federation.⁷ Born in an Orthodox family from Thracia, Fan Noli studied in Greece and lived at Athens for a period. After studying in the USA, he settled in Albania, where he became bishop of the Orthodox Church in the year 1908.⁸ In 1920, both Fan Noli and Ahmed Zog, the latter born in 1895 in the family of the ruler of Albania’s central district Mati, participated as delegates at the Lushnje Congress.⁹

During his exile in Yugoslavia, Ahmed Zog gathered an army of 1 000 soldiers and former officers from the Serbian army and from the czarist army that had fought against the Bolsheviks under the command of general Wranghel.¹⁰ After receiving weaponry from the Belgrade government, Ahmed

¹ *Ibidem.*

² *Ibidem*, p. 79.

³ *Ibidem.*

⁴ *Ibidem.*

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 80.

⁶ *Ibidem.*

⁷ *Ibidem.*

⁸ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 166.

⁹ *Ibidem.*

¹⁰ *Ibidem.*

Zog's army entered Albania in December 1924 and, in January 1925, overthrew the government led by Fan Noli.¹

On January 30th, 1925, Ahmed Zog addressed to Benito Mussolini in order to establish cooperation relations between Albania and Italy.² As a result, Albania benefitted from a massive economic aid from Italy. Thus, the Italian bankers founded the National Bank of Albania. In its turn, this institution founded the Society for the Economic Development of Albania³ which granted loans for the construction of roads, bridges, ports etc. Subsequently, on November 27th, 1926, a "Pact of friendship and security" was signed at Tirana between Italy and Albania, a document which instituted Italy's protectorate over Albania.⁴ The pact was a defensive alliance, valid for 20 years, while also stipulating that the Vlore port was to be open for Italian vessels.

In September 1928, Ahmed Zog summoned a new Constituent Assembly which proclaimed him King of Albania⁵, and, after just three months, in December 1928, a new Constitution was adopted, stipulating that the ministers were appointed by the king, who had the right to promulgate the laws voted by a Parliament formed of a single Chamber and consisting of 57 members.⁶

On April 7th, 1939 troops from Fascist Italy disembarked in the Albanian ports of Durres, Vlore, Saranda and Shengjin. The Albanian resistance was quickly defeated and King Zog I left the country and went into exile in Greece.⁷ On April 12th, 1939, a National Assembly was summoned, which voted, under the surveillance of the Italian occupation troops, Albania's unification with Italy. Afterwards, on April 16th 1939, an Albanian delegation offered the crown of Albania to the king of Italy Vittorio Emanuele III.⁸ Besides the 100 000 Italian soldiers stationed in Albania, another several thousand civilians came with the goal of colonizing the country.⁹ At the end of June 1939 the Albanian Fascist Party was created, while the Italian propaganda supported the Albanian nationalist who aimed at creating a Great Albania by uniting Kosovo and the Ckemi region with Albania.¹⁰

On April 6th, 1941 the German Army invaded Yugoslavia, the Hungarian troops entered Vojvodina, while the Bulgarian army made its way

¹ *Ibidem*, p. 167.

² Kopi Kyçyku, *History of Albania*, p. 81.

³ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 168.

⁴ Kopi Kyçyku, *History of Albania*, p. 81.

⁵ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 168.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ Kopi Kyçyku, *History of Albania*, p. 82.

⁸ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 199.

⁹ Kopi Kyçyku, *History of Albania*, p. 84.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

into Thracia and Macedonia. Shortly after, on April 17th 1940¹, the truce was signed at Belgrade. The dismemberment of Yugoslavia allowed Italy to occupy Albanian territories from Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo and, on August 7th, 1941, a Great Albania was formed, comprising a large part of Kosovo and territories from Macedonia and Montenegro.²

In October 1940, the Greek army launched a counter-offensive and seized a part of Albania's southern regions.³ Despite these successes, the Greek army failed to drive the Italians away from Albania.

Northern Albania hosted the foundations of armed forces such as "Balli Kombetar" (The National Front), led by Mehdi Frasheri, a Republican Nationalist, close to the Social Democratic Party and hostile to Communists, and "Legaliteti" (The Legality), a movement led by Abas Kupa, created in Belgrade with British help and oriented towards supporting the monarchy.⁴ The latter's goal was to ensure that the former king, Ahmed Zog, would regain the throne of Albania.⁵ Another force which opposed the Italian occupation was the Albanian Communist Party, founded on November 8th, 1941 and led by Enver Hodja. A couple of months after its foundation, the Albanian Communist Party were subject to a "bloody and radical cleansing".⁶

At the Albanian Communist Party conference at Peja, on September 16th, 1942, the National Liberation Front was created, reuniting, along Communists, all the anti-fascist forces in Albania.⁷ It was only in August 1943 that Abas Kupa, unhappy with the increasing influence of the Albanian Communist Party, decided that his movement would leave the National Liberation Front.⁸

Few days after Benito Mussolini was assassinated, Enver Hodja delegated one of his most trusted people to participate, between 1st and 2nd of August 1943, to the creation of a National Salvation Committee, during a conference organized not far from Kruja. Membership of the committee would be equally split between the "Balli Kombetar" movement and the Albanian Communist Party.⁹ Benefitting from logistics support and counselors from the Yugoslavian partisan movement led by Iosip Broz Tito, Enver Hodja renounced the Albanian Communist Party's involvement in an eventual Public Salvation

¹ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 216.

² Kupa Kyçyku, *History of Albania*, p. 84.

³ Jean François Soulet, *The History of Eastern Europe from the Second World War until present*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2008, p. 30.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 31.

⁵ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 249.

⁶ Jean François Soulet, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 34.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 38.

Committee, which triggered a veritable civil war between his forces and the “*Balli Kombetar*” movement.¹

After Italy capitulated, in September 1943, the German army seized Tirana, the most important coast towns and regions, while the Albanian partisans controlled the mountainous areas.² During a congress organized in May 1944 at Permet, the Anti-Fascist Council for National Liberation was created and led by Enver Hodja.³

In October 1944 a temporary government was constituted, with Enver Hodja as Prime Minister, who also held the Defense and External Affairs ministries.⁴ It was only in November 1945 that this government was officially recognized by the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, as the latter two requested the organization of free Parliamentary elections in December the same year.⁵

At the elections held in December 1945, the Democratic Front, dominated by Communists, obtained 93% of the votes. The new legislative assembly proclaimed the People’s Republic of Albania in January 1946⁶ and adopted as anthem the song “Anthem for the flag”, the same as in 1912. Despite all these, Enver Hodja was only received at Kremlin in July 1947 and Albania was not invited by the USSR to create the Kuominform.⁷

The Albanian partisans grouped in the National Liberation Army, led by Mehmet Shehu, had succeeded in freeing some southern mountainous regions even since the end of 1942. Tirana was liberated on November 17th, 1944 and the port of Shkoder on November 29th 1944 so that Albania regained its freedom without any USSR aid, while the Albanian partisans even participated at the operations destined to free some Yugoslavian territories.⁸

The German troops’ withdrawal from Kosovo allowed Iosip Broz Tito’s partisans to take control of this region. Although the Yugoslavian Communists had repeatedly declared at the Congresses of Dresden, in 1928, and Zagreb, in 1940, that they favored Kosovo’s cession to Albania, after gaining political control, Iosip Broz Tito opposed this cession and the region was integrated within the Republic of Serbia.⁹

In July 1946, a treaty of “*reciprocal friendship, cooperation and aid*” was signed between Albania and Yugoslavia. Similar agreements were

¹ *Ibidem*.

² Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 249.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 250.

⁴ Jean François Soulet, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 43.

⁶ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 270.

⁷ Jean François Soulet, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁸ Idem, *The Compared History of Communist States since 1945 until Present Times*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 1998, p. 35.

⁹ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 270.

concluded with Bulgaria and there were even talks regarding the eventuality of constituting a federation formed of the three Balkan states.¹

The Albanian Constitution adopted in 1946 resembled the Yugoslavian one and there were a significant number of Yugoslavian counselors in Albania, which triggered the reaction from some Albanian officials, such as Nako Spiru, the chief of the State Commission for Planning. Finally, he committed suicide in 1947, as he had failed to gain support in the Albanian Communist Party.²

In July 1947, the Yugoslavian government offered to Albania a loan amounting to 40 million Dollars, representing 58% of the Albanian annual budget.³ Subsequently, in February-March 1948, the adepts of a close collaboration with Yugoslavia succeeded in obtaining the exclusion from the Party of Mehmet Shehu, the Army Chief of Staff.⁴

After Yugoslavia was expelled from the Kominform in June 1948, the Yugoslavian counselors were expelled from Albania, the economic agreements with Yugoslavia were denounced and there were appeals to the USSR to grant economic aid to Albania. In October 1948, Koçi Xoxe was dismissed from the Ministry of Interior and Mehmet Shehu resumed his position as Army Chief of Staff.⁵

In November 1948, the first Congress of the Albanian Communist Party was organized, during which Enver Hodja accused Koçi Xoxe as having been the main responsible for the difficulties Albania was facing.⁶ Under these conditions, Albania was admitted into Kominform at the end of 1948.

Even since 1944, the Albanian Communist Party nationalized the industrial enterprises, the banks and transportation and the first centralized economic plan was elaborated in 1947, on a period of 9 months. The second plan was elaborated in the period 1949-1950.⁷

In January 1949, the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance was constituted and consisting of: USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Subsequently, the organization was also joined by the German Democratic Republic and Albania.⁸ The month of May 1955 marked the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact, a military alliance formed of: USSR, The German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania and Romania.

¹ *Ibidem*, p. 299.

² *Ibidem*, p. 300.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 301.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 342.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 326.

The agrarian reform from August 1945 led to the expropriation of the great land estates. Despite these measures, in 1955, around 87% of the agricultural production was provided by private land properties.¹ However, in 1960, over 87% of the agricultural production came from agricultural cooperatives and state farms.² In 1976, Albania announced it no longer needed imports as it could sustain itself only with internal resources.³

Enver Hodja, the leader of the Albanian Communist Party, was born in 1908 in a Muslim family. Between 1930 and 1936 he lived in France and, after he returned in Albania, he became a French teacher.⁴ After gaining absolute control over Albanian Communist Party, Enver Hodja gave up the Prime Minister position in favor of Mehmet Shehu in 1954.⁵

During a Kominform reunion, held at Bucharest, in June 1960, when the Albanian delegation supported the Chinese delegation, USSR ceased the economic aid which it had been granting to Albania. Later on, the Soviets supported Kiri Belishova and Koco Tashko in their attempt to remove Enver Hodja from power, but the putsch failed. The Soviet – Albanian conflict would lead to the ceasing of any official relations between USSR and Albania in December 1961.⁶

On September 13th, 1968, after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, the National Assembly of Albania announced the country would leave the Warsaw Treaty.⁷ Subsequently, Albania's Communist government continued the country's isolation policy and refused to participate at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held at Helsinki in 1975.⁸ In 1978, China, Albania's new supporter, addressed a protest notification to the Albanian government and announced the denouncement of all bilateral economic agreements and the ceasing of all loans and economic aids granted so far.

After Enver Hodja's death, which occurred on April 11th, 1985, the economic crisis in Albanian deepened and the leadership of the Albanian Labor Party was assumed by Ramiz Alia. In 1990, numerous protests sprang throughout different cities of Albania. Thus, on March 26, 1990 a anti-Communist revolt broke out in town of Kavaja and, in December, demonstrations took place in: Tirana, Durres, Elbasan, Shkoder and Kavaja.⁹

¹ *Ibidem*, p. 342.

² *Ibidem*.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 341.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 343.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 344.

⁷ Kopi Kycyku, *History of Albania*, p. 110.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 114.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 119.

On December 12th, 1990, the first opposition party from Albania was constituted, called the Democratic Party and led by Azem Hajdari, a Law student¹, and the first free elections took place on March 31st, 1991.² In 1990, Albania's population numbered around 3 300 000 inhabitants, many of these people choosing to emigrate in countries such as: Greece, Italy, Germany and USA. According to the national survey performed in the year 2011, Albania's population was 2 831 741, while Tirana had 433 000 inhabitants. Officially, there are 140 000 Aromanians living in Albania, but the Aromanian Association from Albania estimates the real figure to be around 400 000.

Priest Dumitrache Verga, parish of the Romanian church in Korçea, one of the founders of the Aromanian Association from Albania stated in 2008 that *"Our biggest problem is that Romania does not offer us a more consistent political support, doesn't make us feel as brothers. On the other hand, Greece offers advantages, workplaces and pensions to those that declare themselves as Greek, (...) Greece offers 320 Euro a month as pension to Aromanians, only for having declared themselves as Greek"*.³

On April 1st, 2009, Albania joined the EU, together with Croatia, after having its armed forces restructured and reduced from 65 000, in 1988, to 14 500 soldiers, in 2009. On April 28th, 2009, Albania submitted the official application to join the European Union, presenting one of the most dynamic economies in the Balkans.

¹ *Ibidem*.

² *Ibidem*, p. 122.

³ See the interview taken by Claudiu Târziu to Dumitrache Verga, parish priest of the „*Transfiguration*” Church from din Korçea, *God won't let us lose our language*, in „*Formula As*” magazine, year XVIII, issue 842/October 2008, pp. 26-27.

**THE ISRAEL – TURKEY – PALESTINE TRIO – WHERE TO?
TURKEY IS MAKING A POINT: THEY ARE FIT AND WILLING TO
MEDIATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS**

*Ariadna Anamaria Petri**

Abstract

President Obama's recent visit to Israel, the Palestinian Territories and Jordan attempted to jump-start the stalled peace negotiations and made a very bold point by first resolving the dispute between Turkey and Israel. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey maintained a good relationship with both Israel and the Palestinians and is a strong candidate for the role of mediator in their protracted conflict. Some qualities that support its bid include a good economic, commercial and military relationship with Israel; historic, cultural and religious ties with the Palestinians, a supportive Sunni majority, a strong alliance with the US and NATO membership and willingness to act as a mediator to reinforce its position as a regional power.

Key words: *Israel, Palestine, Turkey, mediation, Ottoman Empire*

Background of relations in the 20th century

After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, the Republic of Turkey underwent a very fast and profound process of reform of the state, including establishing governing principles of secularism and representative democracy, along with comprehensive legal, economic and land reforms, language, literacy and even family names or clothing. The Turkish society, in decay for centuries and finally defeated with the Allied Invasion of Istanbul in 1920, was now again, under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, on a path of progress and affirmation, first at home and then in the international arena.

In this context, the emerging Turkish Republic prioritized strategic interest and economic development over nostalgia or paternalistic affiliation for the population and problems of Palestine as an ex-colony. This policy of disengagement, before and after the take-over by the British Empire in the form of their Mandate for Palestine (1919-1947) was just the natural position of a defeated empire, trying to redesign itself as a regional power. All its subsequent

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actions in the Middle Eastern platform, and especially with regards to Israel and the Palestinians have to be understood in this context.

The reciprocal positioning of modern Turkey and the State of Israel since its declaration of Independence on the 10th May 1947 have some important thresholds for the subsequent relation between both of them and the Palestinians, as well as for the Palestinian – Israeli conflict. For the *statu nascendi* which Palestine is claimed to be, it is important when regional powers or the late and the new colonial powers talk, in what terms and what they talk about. And it matters for the whole world, because the Israeli-Palestinian struggle for land and peace is no longer a local or regional conflict. Since the Palestinian problem was put on the Global Agenda in 1988 with the *Declaration of Independence of Palestine*¹ and increasingly with the First and Second *Intifads* or the deaths of Yasser Arafat² and other leaders – notably Ahmad Jabari³ – the Middle East conflict is a compulsory statement in Western elections for candidates to positions of heads of state and scores important points, as was patent in the last US elections.

The current changes in the relationship between Turkey and Israel have to be understood in the context of the cyclical frost and thaw they have experienced since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Turkey was the first Muslim majority country to recognize Israel and since then relations improved – broadly speaking – until the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s the disappearance of the USSR from the bipolar structure of power and the re-ordering across regional axes offered both Turkey and Israel the opportunity to affirm themselves and leave aside occasional antipathies for strategic and economic gains. Cagri Erhan and Omer Kurkcuoglu (2010: 868-871) outline five principal reasons for the thaw in relations, ranging from ideological and diplomatic to military and economic:

1. The desire to affirm and increase their regional power in the prospect of a new regional order with the Peace Process in the Middle East seemingly advancing.

¹ Avnery, U., (07/07/2012) „Poisoning Arafat” from Uri Avneri’s Column <http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/channels/avnery/1341587176> retrieved 2/12/2012 and The Speech of Yasser Arafat at the United Nations General Assembly, Geneva, 13th December 1988 available at <http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/arafat88-en> retrieved 2.12.2012

² Ibid. 1 Avnery notes: “[B]eyond personal considerations, Arafat was the man who was able to make peace with Israel, willing to do so, and – more important - to get his people, including the Islamists, to accept it. This would have put an end to the settlement enterprise. That’s why he was poisoned”.

³ Israel’s targeted killing of 14/11/2012 gave rise to a 12 days war between Israel and Hamas, killing 5 Israelis and 148 Palestinians, <http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/why-did-israel-kill-jabari.premium-1.482224> retrieved 28/11/2012

2. The Turkish effort to attract the support of the Jewish lobby, primarily in the US, but also in several European countries, for a range of issues such as the continuous Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus or the standing towards the alleged Armenian Genocide.

3. Natural alliance between two democracies who both had tensions with Syria, Iran and Iraq (Turkey because of the Kurdish issue, Israel for geo-strategic reasons).

4. In its assiduous drive to modernization and westernization, Turkey felt closer ties with Israel, embarked on a similar accelerated development project, than other autocracies or dictatorships in the Middle East, which opened numerous formal and non-formal cooperation paths.

5. Both were attracted to contributing to the US-led New World Order in the Middle East in order to ensure for themselves the best positions possible. This drive was fueled, in the case of Israel, by the historical special relationship, and for Turkey through the increasingly pro-active approach of the US for reaching this goal (through soft and hard-power measures, classical and public diplomacy as well as military intervention). As a member of NATO from 1952, but also following an extended collaboration with the US, it was only natural for Turkey to approach Israel, itself an aspiring member of NATO, but already having the most significant military, technological and economic cooperation with the USA.

Highlights of the Turkish-Israeli relation

Historically, the relationship between the two regional powers has been tighter in secrecy than it was shown to the media and the public. The first *Intifada* (1987-1993) triggered the condemnation of the Turkish Grand National Assembly towards "the violent actions of the Israelis against the Palestinians living in the occupied territories and the inhuman violation of Palestinians' human rights"¹. Furthermore, Turkish foreign minister Mümtaz Soysal announced in 1994 that what Israel calls terrorism is in fact Palestinians "trying to defend their rights"². Another incident which rose eye brows and upset Tel Aviv was the 1994 visit of Prime Minister Tansu Çiller to the Palestinian leadership, without Israel's authorization.

Otwithstanding these minor incidents, most of them in response to Israeli misconduct vis-à-vis Turkey, the decade of the 1990s saw a flourishing of political and economic cooperation. The 2000s, however, started badly, with an April 2000 decision of the Israeli government to introduce information in

¹ Gruen, G. "Dynamic Progress in Turkish-Israeli Relations", *Israel Affairs*, Summer 1995, p. 50.

² *Cumhuriyet* News Agency, Nov. 5, 1994; quoted in Amikam Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie", *Middle East Quarterly*, June 1998, p. 22.

textbooks about the Armenian Genocide – denied by the Republic of Turkey. In response, no member of the Turkish cabinet attended the Israeli National Day Reception in Ankara on the 10th May 2000. Another severe blow was dealt by the Gaza Freedom Flotilla incident on the 31st May 2000, when the Israeli Defense Forces attacked a humanitarian aid convoy sailing to Gaza, in which eight Turkish and one American citizens were killed¹. Prime Minister Erdogan requested an official apology and compensation for the bereaved families from Israel, which were never received, as well as an end to the blockade of Gaza. Since Israel was unwilling to do so, the mutual boycott of celebrations and suspension of diplomatic relations continued between the two states² until Obama's last-minute intervention in March 2013.

Another unpopular episode both with the Turkish public and the Islamic government of Erdogan (in power since 14/05/2003) was the US-led elimination of Saddam Hussein. Although a NATO member since 1952, Ankara declined involvement in the invasion of Iraq, for reasons of regional, religious and popular apathy.

The trigger for the repeated deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey was the 2008-2009 Israeli invasion of Gaza, which resulted in the death of 1,407 Palestinians and 13 Israelis, as well as the destruction of over half of the infrastructure in Gaza³. Turkey saw this aggression as highly detrimental for the peace process in the Middle East and conditioned the resumption of diplomatic relations by a full state apology and comprehensive compensation for the Mavi Marmara Flotilla victims, as well as lifting the blockade in Gaza. It was only in March 2013 that US President Barack Obama managed to persuade Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to comply with Turkish demands, which are based on standard norms of international law, confirmed by the UN both for the flotilla and for the Gaza blockade, and thus resume full diplomatic relations.

What can Turkey bring to the negotiating table?

A balanced historic relation with both Jewish-Israelis and Arab-Palestinians. Even if the main consideration remains strategic interest and the

¹ Palmer, G.; Uribe, A; Itzhar, J. C.; Sanberk, S. Ö. (2 September 2011). "Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident". United Nations, retrieved 1/12/2012, available at

http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf

² Ravid, B. (01/11/2012) *Diplomania* Column in Ha'aretz Newspaper, available at <http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/diplomania/the-latest-casualty-of-strained-turkish-israeli-relations-independence-day-ceremonies.premium-1.473844> Retrieved 1/12/2012

³ From the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights Press Release No. 36/2009 <http://web.archive.org/web/20090612193512/http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/PressR/English/2008/36-2009.html> retrieved 15/04/2013

desire to consolidate its regional power position, Turkey is no outsider to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Turkish UN Delegate illustrated the balanced position that was to be Turkey's foreign policy on the Israel-Palestine question in an address prior to the 1947 Partition vote: both in the Middle Ages and during the Second World War, the Jewish community lived prosperously and in full possession of all civil liberties¹. The double sided interest was expressed as the preference of Turkey that the Jewish Agency remained a community, rather than a state and at the same time, "the Turkish nation sincerely desires to see the new Arab states happy and prosperous"². For this as well as other considerations, such as the fear of a strong left-wing and pro-Russian inclination of a possible Jewish state, Turkey eventually voted against the UN Partition Plan for Palestine³.

Good economic ties. Although the Welfare party in Turkey is traditionally more suspicious of Zionism, and therefore of close ties with Israel, Ankara has been trying to increase, rather than halt cooperation and solidarity with Islamic countries. Nonetheless, two important agreements were signed with Israel as early as 1997, while the Welfare Party was in power. Despite diplomatic tensions, trade increased from \$449 million in 1996 to more than \$1.2 billion in 2002. This remarkable acceleration continued with bilateral trade increasing 14.6% per year, on average, from 2002 to 2008. From 2010 to 2011, trade increased by 30.7%, far surpassing the growth that occurred during the height of Turkish-Israeli ties.

On the Palestinian side, in addition to in-kind contributions of food of \$6.6 million, Turkey also provides financial support to UN Relief and Works Agency. Since 2009, the Turkish Government has more than doubled its contribution to the agency, reaching an annual sum of \$1.25 million in 2012⁴. Turkey also chairs the Working Group on Financing UNRWA in New York, and is a member of the Advisory Commission comprising UNRWA's major governmental supporters, thus extending a helping hand whenever possible.

Participation in International Bodies for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Between 1948-1962 Turkey was a member of the Palestine Conciliation Committee, a last minute cover-up body created by the British Administration before withdrawing (Eran, 2002:126). This Committee

¹ Speech of Huseyin Ragip Baydurx, 54th meeting of UNGA, 12 May 1947, United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 1st special session, Vol. 3, 1947, plenary meetings and committees, p. 259.

² Ibid.

³ For a detailed analysis of the bilateral relation between the Jewish Agency and the Ottoman Empire / the Republic of Turkey see Patten, H. (July 2008) "The Genesis of Turkish Views on Partition and Conciliation", Israel Affairs, Vol.14, No.3, pp.538-551.

⁴ UN News Service, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2012/08/mil-120802-unnews04.htm> retrieved 26/11/2012.

ultimately failed to achieve any of its goals, but it was still the first indication of a desired active neutrality for Turkey.

The extensive collaboration with Israel visibly impacted Turkey's relationship with the other Arab states, too, but Ankara's policy of balance was reinstated by a rapprochement towards the Palestinians during and after the Second Intifada in 2000. It was formalized as president Suleyman Demirel became a member of the UN Investigation Committee appointed to look into the uprising, which produced the Mitchell Report¹: Ariel Sharon's visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque on the 28th September 2000, escorted by over 1,000 police officers fueled intense protests from Muslim believers in Turkey², as well as a bold diplomatic message from leaders of Islamic states³.

A further action aimed at regaining its essential neutrality for any significant role in a mediation process is the 7 October 2000 Turkish vote in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1322 against Israel, condemning the above-mentioned incident. Turkey then hardened its position during 2001-2002.

Mediation efforts. After the election of Ariel Sharon on the 6th February 2001, the Turkish effort for mediation was stepped up, with Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, commuting between Israel, the Palestinian Territories and Egypt, trying to resume a policy of neutrality and resolve the problem of fluctuating relations with Israel and the Arab world, which was creating increasing tensions with both.

After the election of Hamas in Gaza, in what were widely regarded as free and fair elections, Erdoğan declared: "Hamas must be disarmed [...] Hamas had some habits. But these are old. Hamas has to give up old habit and attitudes, because they will manage a country now! ⁴" Ankara recognized the unrest caused by the emergence of a Hamas government in Tel Aviv and again offered to mediate: "Turkey can carry the role of mediator between Israel and Palestine in the new era" ⁵. This offer hasn't greatly inspired any of the parties, since no major ensuing activity is reported.

¹ Mitchell, G., Demirel, S., Jagland, T., Rudman, W. and Solana, J. (20 May 2001). " Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee", available at http://www.mideastweb.org/mitchell_report.htm Retrieved 1/12/2012.

² "Turkey Condemns Israel's closure of Al-Aqsa", Retrieved 1/12/2012 from <http://www.islamicinvitationturkey.com/2009/10/06/turkey-condemns-israels-closure-of-al-aqsa/>.

³ Tunisia, Morocco and Qatar severed their relations with Israel, Egypt and Jordan recalled their Ambassadors, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait pledged funds for the Palestinians and many arab countries airlifted injured Palestinians to their hospitals. Maddy-Weitzman, B., "The Arab World and the Al-Aqsa Intifada" *Tel Aviv Notes* (23/11/2000).

⁴ *Zaman News Agency*, Erdogan offers Hamas and Israel to mediate, from http://www.zaman.com.tr/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?haberno=251095 retrieved 19/11/2012.

⁵ *Ibid*.

After the successful UN bid for upgrading Palestine's status to non-member state, Recep Erdogan offered himself to Israel, Palestine and the international community as a mediator, with no response as yet. He considered the voting so important, that he sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu to convey the message: "it is not an option but an ethical, political, strategic and legal obligation for the international community to recognize the right to self-determination and the right to a state granted to the people of Palestine by a resolution adopted by the United Nations in 1947"¹. Thus he also recalled the basis of international law upon which the Turkish help would be based.

The vision presented by Ankara offers "a flexible, but values-based strategy since the beginning of the process and presents a common vision to parties of a dispute"² Furthermore, Turkey pledges competence on all dynamics of the problem and long-term commitment, which is congruent with all the arguments presented above.

Turkey's efforts to increase their know-how in mediation and global awareness on its importance for the conduct of international relations include initiating the first UN resolution on mediation (2010), organizing the "Friends of Mediation Group" under the auspices of the UN (with 42 members as of June 2012) and a series of international conferences entitled "Enhancing Peace through Mediation"

According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Turkey attaches special importance to preventive diplomacy, pioneers a great deal of mediation attempts in a wide geography and endeavors actively for the peaceful settlement of disputes. [Furthermore it considers preventive diplomacy to be] the most effective and economic method in terms of settlement of disputes, but also from the reality that reduction of potential disputes and conflicts will directly contribute to Turkey's development³.

Its portfolio of mediation efforts have included conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan, Serbia and Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Pakistan. Furthermore, Turkey has an ideally suited location at the crossroads between Asia, Africa and Europe, with participation in fora and councils

¹ The minister further added: "the non-member observer state status is just an initial step and that the oppression and injustice having been imposed on the people of Palestine for decades will not be considered as complete until the flag of the Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital, waves, as a full member, in the United Nations among the other flags, on the basis of a two state solution reached through peace within the borders of 1967". Retrieved 20/11/2012 from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-minister-davutoglu-it-is-not-an-option-but-an-ethical.en.mfa>

² *Resolution of Conflict and Mediation* Chapter on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/resolution-of-conflicts-and-mediation.en.mfa> retrieved 19/11/2012.

³ *Ibid.*.

belonging to these three continents and beyond. Due to all this experience, regional peace interest, as well as its common history with Jews and Palestinians, Turkey can be the ideal mediator between Israelis and Palestinians.

Similar problems. The Turkish problems with the Kurds were at their height in the 1990s, and the military, diplomatic and economic collaboration with Israel was seen as an attempt by the two powers to exchange not only tactics, but possible solutions to the problems. However, the nature of the historic, religious and cultural relationships was different, as were the military power and the aims and visions of sustainability of the two states regarding the groups under their control or occupation¹. Nevertheless Turkey has managed to deal with its issues in a quite satisfactory manner, whereas Israel not only has been unable but also unwilling to reach an end to their conflict with the Palestinians. In the wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Ankara found out that Tel Aviv was arming and training the Kurdish rebels in Northern Iraq. Turkey was shaken and very troubled by the news, and severed diplomatic ties even more.

A series of high-level meetings and official visits were exchanged by Turkish and Palestinian leadership in 2012: Prime Minister Erdogan received a *Doctor Honoris Causa* PhD from Al-Quds University of Jerusalem² and President of the PNA Mahmoud Abbas addressed the Turkish Parliament³. In the midst of harsh criticism that it should give and do more for the Palestinian cause⁴, Turkey was fast to offer 6.6 million USD for food aid.

Conclusion

Turkey was the first Muslim state to formalize relations with the State of Israel upon its creation in 1948. Since then, the relations between these two only 'democratic' and 'non-Arab' states in the region (Ergemir, 2010:25) have evolved, both in substance and in their influence on regional forces. And Turkey also has good relations with the Palestinians and other nations in the Middle East. But Israel's reaction to the Palestinian UN bid for an upgrade of

¹ For a detailed analysis of the parallels between the PKK and PNA's relationships to Turkey and Israel respectively see "Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-2006", Oran, 2010.

² Andalou News Agency reports "Erdogan said Turkey considered Jerusalem a city of Tolerance" 21/09/2012 available at <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/83753--al-quds-university-decorates-turkish-premier-with-honorary-degree> .

³ Andalou News Agency reports <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/109919--palestine-president-to-address-turkish-parliament> retrieved 10/12/2012.

⁴ Rossett, C. (10/12/2012) "Turkey's two faceted aid" researched for Forbes Europe available at <http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/04/turkey-gaza-humanitarian-united-nations-opinions-columnists-claudia-rosett.html> retrieved 9/1/2009.

status, as well as the pre-emptive aggressions on Gaza left the relations between the two regional powers limping again.

Aware of their part of guilt, Mark Regev, a spokesman for the Israeli prime minister, declared since 2011, in an interview with Maclean's: "Israel deeply regrets the deterioration in our relationship with Turkey. We want to try to turn things around, and we hope that the Turks will be a partner in that effort"¹.

There seems to be a pattern of proportionality in the responses of Israel and Turkey to each-other's actions, which seems to be a special treatment, "only for friends" that Israel doesn't share with other states in the area. Its intrusive and excessively violent attitude towards other states is inversely proportional to their size and power. This was the Israeli mode of interaction in the South Sudan secession, 1982 Lebanon invasion, Jordan, Egypt and others. But the enduring economic relations and strategic alliance have maintained the friendship with Turkey. Such friendship is an excellent base for a mediator in the conflict, and this article has presented some economic, geographic, historic and strategic aspects of this cooperation, as well as a pallet of arguments in favor of Turkey mediating between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Turkey has been softly making the statement, gathering points and building its CV as a mediator, but it is probably time that it made a direct bold and assertive offer, and an indirect point to international actors, showing the dire need for Turkey's involvement at such a delicate moment in the existence of the two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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¹ Petrou, M. (10/3/2011) *Israel Alone* Maclean's, Vol. 124, Issue 38.

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NOTES AND REVIEWS

Porfirio Sanz Camañes (ed.), *Tiempo de cambios. Guerra, diplomacia y política internacional de la Monarquía Hispánica (1648-1700)*, Madrid, Actas Editorial, 2012, 511 p.

We recently received, a new book, regarding the international relations of the 17th century, from the perspective of the recent researches, expressed by valuable historians in the international seminar organized in Ciudad Real, Spain, in the period of 29th – 30th of March, 2011.

The coordinator of this book is a prestigious historian of the Spanish modern historiography, **Porfirio Sanz Camañes**^{*}, who was preoccupied by the investigations regarding the relations of the Spanish Monarchy with the European states, especially with the British Monarchy, along the 17th century.

The book consists of 18 studies and articles, signed by researchers and professors from prestigious academic institutions from Spain, England and Argentina.

An attractive subject, especially in the last decades, is the decay of the Spanish Empire in the 17th century. From this point of view, the studies that compose the present book are part of the directions in the investigation of the complicated political, diplomatical and military mechanisms, that characterizes the content of international relations of this century.

Grouped in a few larger themes regarding the problems of the relations between the major European states, the studies and articles are disclosing the role of the Spanish Monarchy during the reign of King Charles II (author: Christopher Storrs, pp. 21-54) and the international politics of the Spanish Monarchy, reflected in an epistolary study, between Philip IV and Maria de Agreda (by Ana Morte Acin, pp. 143-166). In the same panel, can be included the articles signed by Magdalena de Pazzis Pi Corrales – regarding the relations between Spain and Sweden (1648-1700) (pp. 249-282) and Manuel Rivero Rodriguez, concerning the aspects of the Spanish politics and diplomacy in Italy (1648-1664) (pp. 365-386).

Seen from another perspective, the military one, the evolution of the Spanish Monarchy along the 17th century, demonstrates the transformations occurred inside the army, from the strategic and legislative changes, analyzed by Enrique Martinez Ruiz (pp. 97-118), to the Spanish participation in the wars of the Holy League (1683-1699) (pp. 221-248), signed by Ruben Gonzales Cuerva.

Besides, the other articles that compose this book approaches same interesting subjects and constitutes an useful instrument for all researchers.

Constanțiu Dinulescu

^{*} The Spanish historian also coordinated another book, entitled *Spain and Romania. Territories, societies and frontiers*, published in 2006, in collaboration with the historians from Valachia University in Târgoviște.

Dinică Ciobotea, Aurelia Florescu, *Biserica Sf. Gheorghe Nou din Craiova – Ctitoria Stoenescilor (L'église Saint George Nouveau de Craiova – la fondation de Stoenescu)*, Craiova, Editura de Sud, 2011, 132 p., 10 planșe, 42 p. anexe

En 2011, à l'Editure du Sud, a apparu une monographie consacrée à l'un des célèbres églises de Craiova, fondé de marchands Stoenescu, menée par deux chercheurs renommés.

Ils ne sont pas le premier succès de son genre, au fil du temps, ils ont réalisé de nombreuses et précieuses œuvres consacrés aux bâtiments de culte de l'Olténie et leurs fondateurs. La monographie a été voulue et soutenue par la Pontbriant Stoenesco, neveu de Eustathius Stoenescu connu artiste platique à Roumanie et à l'étranger. L'oeuvre, intitulé L'église Saint George de Craiova fondée de marchand Stoenescu, est divisé en trois chapitres, suivis d'un riche matériel iconographique et une intéressante annexe représentant l'essai du V.G. Paléologue *Introduction à l'étude critique de l'œuvre du Saint-George*, apparu en 1941.

Dans le premier chapitre, divisé en deux sous-chapitre, après les auteurs présentent les principales étapes historiques de la construction d'églises à Craiova, ville de résidence de la province historique Olténie, ils présentent l'église de Saint George fondé de Stoenescu. L'église, sous le patronage de Saint George, a été construite entre 1755-1776 par Milco Stoenescu et Hagi Constantin Stoenescu sur la place d'autre édifice religieux de bois. Durant cette période, dans la ville Craiova ont été construit de nombreuses églises: Obedeanu, Saint-Spiridon, Sainte Trinité-Știrbei, Saint-Nicolas-Ungureni Ganescu, St. John-Sébastien toutes les fondations des boyards, les commerçants et artisans organisés en corporations et les entreprises.

L'édifice religieux construit par la famille Stoenescu a été doté avec de nombreux domaines: Zmărdăștețul, Brădești, Scaești, Drăghiceni, Cacaletți (Castranova), de vignobles, de vergers et de commerces.

Construit dans un style *brâncovenesc*, avec deux rangées de niches et ceinture sculptée, selon assertion de l'historien Nicolae Iorga, l'église a survécu sans aucune intervention ou réparation jusqu'au tremblement de terre de 1838, quand il y a eu des fissures dans les temples, les anvon et les clochers. En 1848, le bâtiment a été réparé par Statie Enache Stoenescu.

Tombé en ruine en 1911, le bâtiment a été restauré entre les années 1913-1916 et 1923-1941 par les architectes Pierre Abraham et Henriette Delavrancea Djibory

La peinture de l'église a été réalisée par Barbu Craiovescu Chamberlain, et puis par Constantin Petrescu et Eustathius Stoenescu.

Le chapitre II est consacré à l'analyse de l'arbre généalogique de la famille Steoenescu. Basé sur une série de documents dont beaucoup sont inédites, les deux spécialistes ont pu reconstituer l'histoire de cette ancienne famille jusqu'au seizième siècle. Basé sur une série de documents, les deux spécialistes ont pu reconstituer l'histoire de cette famille dont la longueur jusqu'au seizième siècle.

Dans le troisième chapitre, les auteurs présentent la taudis de Saint-George, composée de marchands assis autour de l'église du même nom et de ses personnages principaux.

Si en 1835, la tadis était habitée 76 familles (environ 380 personnes), en seulement trois ans, le nombre d'habitants a augmenté considérablement, atteignant 93 familles (465 personnes).

Dans cette tadis ont vécu de nombreuses familles aristocratiques qui ont influencé le développement économique, sociale et politique de l' Olténie du XVIIIe et XIXe siècles. Parmi eux, on peut citer les nations: Urdăreanu, Gârbea et Racovița liés à d'autres familles aristocratiques Brăiloi, Crețulești, Glogovenii.

L'oeuvre fait partie d'une série de monographies publiées sous la signature du professeur Dr. Dinică Ciobotea représentant des outils importants pour les historiens et critiques d'art et pour les personnes intéressées de l' activités culturelles de l'ancienne colonie de boyards Craiovești.

En Craiova, la vie spirituelle connue en effervescence religieuse dans la fin du XIXe siècle à cause des gens avec amour pour la nation, le pays et la ville. L'église Saint George n'est pas seulement un monument de l'architecture et du peinture *postbrâncovenească* peinture originale, mais aussi un lieu d'élévation spirituelle.

Ileana Cioarec

Mihaela Damean, *Personalitatea omului politic Dimitrie A. Sturdza (The Personality of the Politician Dimitrie A. Sturdza)*, Târgoviște, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2012, 244 p.

We would like to signal here the appearance of a valuable work, dedicated to one of the most remarkable personalities of the 19th century: Dimitrie A. Sturdza (1833-1914). This tome is welcome in the landscape of the Romanian historiography, especially as this illustrious figure has been less studied by historians.

Mihaela Damean's research has been written especially from the perspective of the personality of the liberal politician. Her work relies on a series of archive testimonies found at the Central National Historical Archives of Romania from Bucharest, the Royal House Fund, and on the documents present in the collection donated by D.A. Sturdza to the Library of the Romanian Academy. Besides, the author has studied a rich bibliography.

This book is structured into five chapters, which approach: I. The Forging of the Statesman' Personality, II. The Role of Dimitrie A. Sturdza in the Edification of the Constitutional Monarchy Regime, III. D.A. Sturdza and the Governance Exercise (1878-1888), IV. D.A. Sturdza, Head of the National Liberal Party and Prime Minister and V. Dimitrie A. Sturdza according to His Contemporaries.

Practically, the life of D.A. Sturdza is analyzed especially from the perspective of his political activity, beginning with 1857 until 1908, without omitting any important aspects of his biography. The work is accompanied by a vast bibliography but also by a series of documentary annexes.

Member of an old and prominent boyar family of Moldova, D.A. Sturdza began his political life at the early age of 23, immediately after coming back from his

studies in Germany, joining the National Party of Moldova (Partida Națională din Moldova) and fighting for the Union of the Romanian Principalities. A few years later, in 1859, at the age of 26, he begins his governmental career, being Secretary of State at the Public Works Ministry in the Moldavian Government led by Ion Ghica. In his entire political activity, D.A. Sturdza was minister eight times, in almost all the then ministries (Public Works, Cults and Public Instruction, Finances, Foreign Affairs), and four times prime-minister (1895-1896, 1897-1899, 1901-1904 and 1907-1908). At the same time, he has almost always been a member of the Romanian Senate, being its president as well.

A founding member of the National Liberal Party, he was also its president, from 1892 until 1909. His political career was not always linear, yet, with tact and ability, he knew how to get over the more difficult periods.

D.A. Sturdza had the privilege of collaborating with the reigning prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza, but also with Carol I, this latter collaboration being long-lasting and based on respect and consideration.

Mihaela Damean shows that she has only focused on the politician's personality, a subsequent analysis of the entire life and activity of D.A. Sturdza remaining to be achieved after having gone through the entire documentary patrimony.

The topic approached has required a particular effort to go deeper into the existing information, because of the richness of the published and unpublished sources, and of the special or general works dedicated to a quite vast period of about 50 years, which contains almost all the major events of the development of Modern Romania. The special value of this work is given especially by the richness of the sources covered, especially of the unpublished ones.

The work *Personalitatea omului politic Dimitrie A. Sturdza* (The Personality of the Politician Dimitrie A. Sturdza) is a sure success from a historiographic perspective, and we would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the author for it. Such a volume is welcome, contributing to the knowledge of the life and activity of D.A. Sturdza and also to the clarification of some essential aspects of the Romanian 19th century history. Certainly, it will draw not just the historians' attention but also the interest of all history lovers.

We would also like to congratulate Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House of Târgoviște for its initiative of publishing this remarkable book.

Iulian Oncescu

Marius Silveșan, *Bisericile Creștine Baptiste din România între persecuție, acomodare și rezistență (1948-1965) [The Baptiste Christian Churches from Romania among persecution, accommodation and resistance (1948-1965)], Târgoviște, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2012, 410 p.*

We have been witnessing lately new historiographical, memorial issues and, why not, some of them even journalistic about the evangelical believers in the

Romanian communist regime, although they are better known under the name of evangelicals. The weak, but promising start of a new generation of historians gives us the hope that over the coming years to point out, at least by and large, which was their status and role in the post-communist Romania.

Starting from PhD thesis sustained in 2010 at the University of Bucharest coordinated by Professor Dinu C.Giurescu, the work of the historian Marius Silveșan leads us into the Baptist community during the years of Romanian stalinism. These were probably the most troubled years of communism in our country, a fact that arises from some realities face at that time: the crowded prisons with political, and religious prisoners and the mass deportations. The years 1948-1965 were also characterized by multiple national transformations: collectivization, five year plans, nationalization and there's no doubt that these changes affected the communities and the Baptist believers.

Still from the title it is clearly that the volume involves three approaches: persecution accommodation and resistance. The Baptist churches had been recognized as a legal cult since 1944. But, between the public discourse and reality there was a big difference. Marius Silveșan sought to emphasise this difference, proving bringing proofs in order to sustain the idea of persecution. The slogans according to which there was religious freedom are in total contrast with the historical realities of that period. The regulations, assignations, dismissals, the investigations, assassinations- to list only a few of them- were realities faced by the Baptist believers and others like them, although the legal denominations had religious rights recognised by the Constitution, and the Decree no. 177 (1948).

Starting from the sources of the archives, most of them revolutionary, dr. Marius Silveșan has carried out a summary of great necessity for both the Baptist believers as well as for other evangelical denominations and historians interested in this period.

The complexity of the book is apparent both in the contents, as well as its bibliography, a fact that proves the professionalism with which it was approached.

The volume is structured in several sections with different approaches. Chapter I – „*Social, political, institutional and legislative changes in the first decades of communism in Romania*”, “*Social, political, institutional and legislative changes in the first decades of communism in Romania*”, introduces the reader into the social, political and cultural life of the period.

When we refer to the religious life, we have in mind the Constitution that guaranteed religious freedom, at least de jure. In Chapter II – “*Baptist Christian Churches and the dynamics of the religious life between the years 1948-1965*”, – the author shows us who are the Baptist believers, as well as their dynamics. Following the history line until 1856 when the first Baptists were recorded in Romania, Silveșan emphasizes their development over time, until the end ' of 1980s. In this section, any reader can get acquainted with the internal mechanisms of the Baptist denomination. Chapter III – “*The Baptist pastors – A life dedicated to ministry?*” – is a collection of five portraits preceded by a historical approach on the rules of the entitlement to preach at that time. Chapter IV – “*The Theological Education*”, – presents the institution that prepared the Baptist pastors for ministry, in this case the Baptist Theological Institute in Bucharest. In that period some Baptist pastors (such as Alexa Popovici and Ioan

Bunaciu) completed their theological studies at other theological centers such as the Orthodox Theological Seminary from Bucharest or the Protestant Theological Seminary from Cluj-Napoca. In Chapter V – *“The harmony between religious denominations – a factor of popular democracy”*, – we find the relationships of the Baptist denomination with the Romanian Orthodox Church and other Evangelical denominations (in 1950 the state united all Evangelical denominations in the Federation of Evangelical Denominations from The Popular Republic of Romania; this federation included the following denominations: Baptist Church, Adventist Church, Pentecostal Church, Evangelical Church) and similar churches from abroad (the external relations were carefully monitored and governed by authorities). Chapters VI – *“The Baptist churches between persecution and accomodation”*, – and VII – *“The response of the Christian Baptist churches to the constraints of the state. Actions of questioning and response”* – defines the idea of oscillation of the Baptist leaders between accommodation and resistance. The biographies, portraits, personal histories that the author emphasizes with their lights and shadows, are very interesting and presented in an authentic style on the principle *sine Ira et studio*. Some of the Baptist leaders had to endure persecution for their beliefs, while others made compromises. From the actions of questioning of the oppressive system that limited the freedom of faith proclaimed by the Constitution, we can mention various reports of the pastors, illegal baptisms, the founding of the Committee for the Defense of Religious Freedom and of Conscience (A.L.R.C.), and so on. It is important to mention the fact that these actions did not register only between the years 1948-1965, but also during the Socialist regime and, in particular, in the years '70 and '80. The impressive work of dr. Silveșan ends with conclusions and opinions of some key figures from the Baptist community and not only. The bibliography is followed by 10 annexes with documents and photos, as well as an index meant to help the reader in finding the information he looks for.

I do not intend to end my paper without presenting a few opinions of some well-known historians, as they are presented in the book. The introduction is written by PhD Ecaterina Lung (University of Bucharest), who emphasises that “It must be stated from the beginning that the book is about a denominational history, written by a member of the Baptist community, but at the same time, it should be stressed that it is a history written with scientific objectivity and in compliance with all the requirements of professional ethics. The insight that Marius Silveșan can have into the subject allows him to understand better the phenomena and to explain them to those less familiar with these. At the same time, the status of historian, acquired at the University of Bucharest, helps him to overcome easily the fact that he is a member of the Baptist denomination and “do his job” correctly and well-balanced. PhD Adrian Cioroianu (University of Bucharest): “The main merit of work consists, I believe, in the theme itself: there's no doubt that the history of this religious minority from Romania is one of the chapters of national history which must be known and investigated better, in the context of the religious life in the first two decades of Communist Regime”. PhD Alexandru Neagoe (The West University of Timișoara): “The purpose of the thesis is to establish the historical truth about the relationship between the communist State and the Baptist churches as it can be reconstituted by means of an attentive analysis of genuine documents [...] and the scarce bibliography available in books and magazines”. PhD

Cristian Barta (Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca): “The subject treated by Mr. Marius Silveșan is of high interest and completes with professionalism the stage of the research in the relationships between the state and Christian churches in Romania in the first two decades from the issuing of the Law on religious denominations by the communist regime (1948). Academist Dinu C. Giurescu, the scientific counsellor of the doctoral thesis that represents the starting point of the present work states that: “an orderly exposure follows the plan of a work designed to present and analyze a theme which had not been the studied before, in this case the Baptist church between the years 1948-1965”.

Even though the book is addressed to a certain public that is acquainted with this subject, we appreciate the historical magnitude and complexity of the volume and its framing in the Romanian historiography on the relationships between the state and churches during the Communist regime. Baptist churches have always militated in favor of religious freedom, faith and conscience, and also for the separation between church and state. These principles made them to endure courageously the post-communist years of oppression, and on the other hand, to oppose the State’s interference in the internal affairs of the Church.

I congratulate PhD Marius Silveșan, hoping that the issuing of this work will bring clarity in the relationships between the Romanian communist state and Romanian Evangelical churches, and the Baptist church in particular.

In conclusion PhD Otniel Ioan Bunaciu, the president of the The Baptist Union of Romania considers that “the work of Mr. Marius Silvesan represents an important contribution in the research and understanding of a complex past. The author uses a balanced historical approach of the events from the post-communist period and in consequence, this work avoids the subjectivity of personal interpretations, by trying to clarify and to lead the reader to a better understanding of a past that has left its mark on the religious life of the Baptists from Romania up to the present”.

Bogdan Emanuel Răduț

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