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THE HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF JITIANU MONASTERY

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Abstract

The historical monuments with religious items are, essentially, a spiritual and material portion for every nation. They highlight the artistic skills and present certification of social, historical, political, economic and religious life. Every monastery and historical monument highlights the past, and offers in present, the acknowledgement of the founders and events of that time.

The monasteries aren't just a place for pray, but a shrine, of a high spiritual value that contributes to creation and cultivation of national culture of a nation, where are the highest national ideals and the finest traditions.

Jitianu Monastery is one of the oldest monasteries of county Dolj, which now has a valuable collection of religious art, various genders, painting on wood, painting on glass, sculpture, silverware, embroideries of old Romanian artistic creations and traditional art, this collection being the fruit of the action of Oltenia Metropolitans Firmilian Marin, Teoctist Arăpaş and Nestor Vornicescu.

Key words: *Jitianu Monastery*, *Oltenia*, *architectural elements*, *collection of icons*, *church*

The history of monasteries in Oltenia

Oltenia land nowadays has a strong historical burden, ruled by important events that marked historical, social and economic development of collectivity. This thing is confirmed by testimonies that are "from the ages of Dacian and Dacian-Roman settlements, from Dierna and Drobeta, to Sucidava on Danube, to Pelendava, on Jiu, then, towards the sunrise, to Romula, Buridava, Acidava".[1] All of these settlements highlight the ancient origin of human in these places and along with the art and religious culture monuments become testimonies of millenary spiritual life and of an intense cultural preoccupation.

As they residences were built, some modest and some more imposing, people also have built nearby a place of worship, at first from wood, then stone and brick. They beautified them architecturally, they painted them, decorated with religious items and then hallowed them. Some of those values were kept almost untouched, other need the hand of the restorer specialist, but all, generally, talk about the existence of their ancients.[2]

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[1] Teodora Voinescu, *Comori de artă bisericească*, Craiova, Editura Arhiepiscopiei Craiovei, 1980, p. 17.

[2] Radu Constantinescu, Mircea Sfîrlea, *Monumente religioase, biserici şi mânăstiri celebre din România*, Bucureşti, Editura Editis, 1994, p. 15.

Monasteries are not just a place where national culture is preserved, but a place where the authentic national culture was created.[1] It is noted that, over the time, monasteries have played multiple roles in the Romanian society, from religious establishments, cult sanctuaries and places of prayer, teaching and working, to places of exile and punishment for the guilty ones, fulfilling the functions of prison or reformatory penitentiary.[2]

Each of the monasteries "has a legend, but free of it a true history, highlighted by researches of archaeologist, historians and specialists in the art and culture field".[3] This fact can be seen to the monasteries from Oltenia: Vodiţa, Tismana, Polovragi, Lainici, Cozia, Topolniţa etc. and implicitly, to the representative monasteries from county Dolj: Sadova, Coşuna, Popânzăleşti, Maglavit, Cârcea, Jitianu.

Sadova monastery is founded by aristocrats of Craiova. The first church, with the titular saint St. Nicholas, was made of wood, at the end of the XVth century, being documentary reminded on 1530 and rebuilt by Matei Basarab in 1633 from stone.[4] In the rebuilding moment were built cells for monks and next to them a little church with brick wall, present nowadays, named "bolniţă", serving for the service made over the week. Around the monastery, it was built a defensive wall of brick[5], today remained only the ruins. Over the centuries, more ample restorations of the monastery took place in the years of 1702, 1852 and 1903.

Coşuna Bucovăţ monastery dating from 1843 has the titular saint St. Nicholas. It was restored in the years 1571-1572 by the great ban Ştefan and his son Pârvu. Architecturally, the church is of high value, its frontages being made of brick and coating, disposed in panels. The internal frescos are since 1554 and they are among the most valuable paintings from Muntenia in that century. The painting was affected after an earthquake, fin 1873, when the church was repainted and became parochial church. It was changed back into monastery, after the 1st World War. The monasteries Popânzăleşti, Maglavit, Cârcea were founded in XXth century.

It is well known that the monastery is a place to pray, where is commitment, the volition is whipped and the faith is harden, where conviction is burnished, the sin is banished and the personality is harden, as well as spiritual oasis where a lot of life pilgrims found mental strength and peace of mind.[6]

The historical development of Jitianu Monastery

Jitianu Monastery is 10 km from Craiova, on the road to Calafat, in the locality of Branişte, county Dolj. Tradition says that this monastery is built on shrines of blood of heroes. A big part of historians placed here the Rovine, meaning that marshy place where

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[1] P.F. Christodoulos, Athens Archbishop and All Elada, *Monahismul şi lumea*, in "Revista Mitropolia Olteniei", no. 5-8/2003, p. 47.

[2] Cristina Ilie Goga, *The Transformation of Detention in Romania: From Exile to Main Punishment*, in "International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences", no. 56/2015, p. 59.

[3] Radu Constantinescu, Mircea Sfirlea, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 68.

[5] Alexandru Toma Firescu, Ionuţ Adrian Pătularu, *Biserici şi aşezări doljene*, Craiova, Editura Mitropolia Olteniei, 2005, p. 241.

[6] Theoharis M. Provatakis, *Meteora – Istoria mânăstirilor şi monahismului*, Atena, Editura Michalis Toubis, 1998, p. 7.

the ruler Mircea cel Bătrân had the famous fight in 1394, when he conquered the Turkish lead by Baiazid Fulgerul padishah.

According to the same tradition, on the highest place where the monastery is built now, as a gratitude to God for the received help, the ruler Mircea cel Bătrân built a church of wood, with titular saint St. Dimitrie Izvorâtorul de mir, a military saint that helped Christians many times in their fights against Turkish, a saint whereat the ruler had a great devoutness and whom he asked the intermediation to God before some tough attempts that Romanians got through.[1]

About Jitianu monastery was few written, that because of the lack of documents. The charters, documents and its books were probably taken by Greeks that left it in 1864, in the event of impropriation, the monastery being bowed to Saint Paul Apostle from Athos Mountain.[2]

There also were in its history other circumstances of afflictions that contributed to the extinction of the documents: so as, from a documentary mention, on 22nd of February 1779, it comes up that "the holy monastery Jitianu had estate books since period when riot fell in Bistriţa monastery in the cave, as they have fallen in many monasteries and aristocrats, as all Craioveşti aristocrats and Bistriţa abbot know, that thieves were in that cave".[3] The mentioned document refers to the period of approximately 20 years when Wallachia was claimed as negotiation price in the conflict of Ottoman, Habsburg and Czarist Empire.

In the year of 1718, by peace from Passarowitz, Oltenia and Banat fell under Austrian domination until year of 1739, when Oltenia came back to Wallachia by peace from Belgrad. Because of these conflicts, the monastery's archive was partially indemnified in the cave from Bistriţa monastery.

Another document, dated 7th of October 1782, which represents an application of Dionisie abbot from Jitianu for Caragea ruler, shows that "in war periods, it happened that the Turkish took the books".[4] Those said probably refer to what was left from the archive in the monastery.

So, we can conclude that the historical news about Jitianu Monastery are largely missing because they were stolen when they were at Bistriţa Monastery, either they were taken by Turkish either by the Greek monks. We still find a few documents in State archives.

Regarding the founders of Jitianu Monastery, some historians accredited the idea that the settlement "was built by Madame Bălaşa, the wife of Constantin Basarab, in 1654-1658"[5], other considered that the founder is "Vicar Novac, during reign of Mihai Viteazul"[6], or that "it is another foundation of Craioveşti, built by wall with enclosure

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[1] *Monografia Sfintei Mânăstiri Jitianu*, Craiova, Editura MJM, 2008, p. 8.
[2] T.G. Bulat, *Ştiri noi despre Mânăstirea Jitianu (Dolj)*, in "Revista Mitropolia Olteniei", no. 5-6/1967, p. 430.
[3] *Ibidem.*
[4] T.G. Bulat, *op. cit.*, p. 430.
[5] Protosinghel Theofil S. Niculescu, *Sfintele Monastiri şi schituri din România: ctitorite de vlădici, călugări şi preoţi, boieri, negustori şi săteni*, Drobeta Turnu Severin, Editura Mânăstirea Vodiţa, 2002, p. 108.
[6] Nicolae Stoicescu, *Bibliografia localităţilor şi monumentelor feudale din România. I – Ţara Românească (Muntenia, Oltenia şi Dobrogea)*, vol. I, *A-L*, Craiova, Editura Mitropolia Olteniei, 1970, p. 392.

and settled in a grove"[1] that, according to tradition, they built it "in the place of a church of wood founded by Mircea cel Bătrân after the victory from Rovine, where the soldiers of Mircea cel Bătrân gave a good hiding to the Turkish that came to rob the country, facing them in the marshes around Jiu".[2]

Most of the historians reached the conclusion that Madame Bălaşa built, in Jitianu, a new place for the monastery. Located in the middle of a forest and surrounded by a lake, in the period when the monastery was visited by Paul from Alep, "the new church was under construction, the current one, the building of the decedent Madame Bălaşa of Constantin Şerban ruler".[3] Despite this information, it is generally considered that "its founders are others, namely the Craioveşti aristocrats that built this monastery by the spirit of devoutness, but also with the thought of defending, especially against Islamic, they were having a Christian politics".[4]

An argumentation that Jitianu Monastery was built on these lands is the successive care that had for it, first Radu Voda Serban – 1602-1610, then son of Constantin by his wife Madame Bălaşa, followed by Şerban Cantacuzino Vodă, nephew of daughter of Radu Vodă Şerban, Constantin Vodă Brâncoveanu, even Ştefan Cantacuzino.

There are historical documents that attest the existence of Jitianu Monastery before the building of its halidom by Madame Bălaşa: "The Charters of decedent Pătraşco Voevod – March 1554 – December 1557, the son of Radu Voievod "from the year of 7066 for half of village Jamnic that is bowed to Jatiian Monastery". This would be the first written testimony that mentions the existence of the monastery in the XVIth century, so not far from the glory period of the Craioveşti".[5]

In conclusion, "based on those news and hypothesis, it can be said that Jitianu monastery was built by Craioveşti aristocrats, on the land that can be linked by the name of Jitianu High Steward, who was part of the council of Neagoe Basarab, next to Barbu, the great ban, and others".[6]

In an old inscription, it is mentioned that "this Holly Jitian Monastery, slipped after a time and the monks didn't have where to go, that is why the vicar Luca Egumenul from St. Agora began to build but it remained callow, that is why Petre Obedeanu vel arm, end it, beautifying it with paintings, adding cells in the days of Mr. Io Constantin Basarab Brâncoveanul".[7]

Restorations of the monastery took place in the year of 1701 when the monarchist enclosure was finalized, adding up a few cells, and to the church was added a close porch that was also painted. This porch became a kind of close narthex for the current church. The bell tower, sticked directly to the mentioned porch, was added later, in 1787. It is a

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[1] Constantin Şerban, Victoria Şerban, *Oraşul Craiova şi împrejurimile sale, după un manuscris german inedit din sec. al XVIII-lea*, in Muzeul Olteniei Craiova, *Oltenia studii şi comunicări – Istorie, etnografie, ştiinţele naturii*, Craiova, 1981, p. 41.

[2] Zaharia Garău, *Noi argumente privind localizarea bătăliei de la Rovine, lângă Craiova. O ipoteză de lucru*, in Muzeul Olteniei Craiova, *Oltenia studii şi comunicări – Istorie, etnografie, ştiinţele naturii*, Craiova, 1981, p. 32.

[3] Radu Creţeanu, *Monumente istorice din cuprinsul Mitropoliei Olteniei în lumina relatării lui Paul de Alep*, in "Revista Mitropolia Olteniei", no. 11-12/1967, p. 921.

[4] T.G. Bulat, *op. cit.*, p. 431.

[5] *Ibidem*, p. 433.

[6] *Ibidem*, p. 441.

[7] Protosinghel Theofil S. Niculescu, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

massive construction because it had a strategic role too. It was the period when the Turkish came from the south of the Danube in small bands/crews by 10-20 people, having a lot of robberies. To their attack could have been successfully opposed a construction enough fortified. This is why the bell tower looks disproportionate among the church, being a warehouse of goods and defence tower, with double walls; in the year of 1812, the archimandrite Dorotei Craioveanul won his right to be among the painters, doing the first big restoration of the whole sanctuary, church and cells, according to an inscription that unfortunately does not exist in the present. Major restorations took place in the years of 1852 and 1932, when it took the appearance of today.[1]

In the period of the ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza, after the impropriation, the Jitianu monastery, practically, stopped existing. The monks were sent in other parts and the sanctuary was given to the neighboring locality Balta Verde that had no church, receiving the status of parochial church. In the cells of the monastery, it had been organized the first High School of Agriculture (1864-1873), then it was moved to Herăstrău, where it exists nowadays the University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinary Medicine from Bucharest (the former Agronomic Institute Nicolae Bălcescu). From this period, at the entrance remained the didactic meadow of mulberries, which is almost 150 years old and is a monument of nature.

During the Independence War from 1877, the church of the monastery was used as warehouse of missile bodies, and the annexed buildings served as hospital for the Romanian soldiers and Turkish prisoners. As a consequence of some earthquakes that took place at the beginning of XX century, the church was damaged and hence, at the beginning of the 1st World War (1914), it had to be closed for religion because of the ruin status it was in.

In the year of 1952, the Queen Elena (the mother of the King Mihai) passed by train nearby the monastery towards the royal domains from Segarcea. Nicolae Iorga was part from her retainers, who was the president of Historical Monuments Committee. The learned politician informed the queen about the whole history of the monastery. Impressed, the queen wanted to visit it at her return, thing that actually happened. Seeing its condition, the queen asked Nicolae Iorga to make sure the sanctuary will be reopen as monastery of nuns.

The sanctification of the church took place in the year of 1932 by archimandrite Efrem Enachescu and was given back to the religion, as parochial church of the locality Balta Verde, county Dolj. In the summer of 1933, the Bishop Vartolemeiu re-founded the monastery sending the abbes Fevronia Miclaus with 8 monks to Jitianu, and starting with the year 1934, the current cells were built on the old foundations. With this occasion, inscriptions of old cells was found buried between ruins, and they were written on stone with the following content "those lines that are from the foundation with all the expense and diligence were made by the holly archimandrite vicar Kir Antim, St. Paul from the St. Mountain Prior Jitianu and for the eternal memory 1813".[2]

In the year of 1960, the monastery was dissolved, here remaining only the monarchy Valentia Ciucurica, in order to keep it open and ensure a minimum guard. Its listening was

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[1] Radu Constantinescu, Mircea Sfîrlea, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
[2] Protosinghel Theofil S. Niculescu, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

related to the annexed housekeeping of Craiova Archiepiscopacy, founded here by Firmilian Metropolitan.

In the period, when he was the Metropolitan of Oltenia (1973-1977), the Teoctist Patriarch was also concerned about the fact that this monarchist enclosure not to remain with lack of religious life. He took the initiative to organize a museum there, which would shelter the icons collection of Craiova Archiepiscopacy. The existence of this collection could justify, theoretically around, a monachal parish with preparation of museum, guide and restorers of artworks. Unfortunately, the political regime of that period, hostile for the church, didn't allow that. Only in 2001, by initiative of the Metropolitan Teofan of Oltenia, the Jitianu monastery became monastery of nuns, until 2009, when the current Metropolitan of Oltenia Irnineu changed it in monastery of monks.

Architectural elements of Jitianu Monastery

The church of the monastery, architecturally, has a triconic plan and a deep altar, with bays for anaphora and diaconicon, being separated by the rectangular aisle and the square narthex by a wall iconostasis. The altar is vaulted and has a semi-calotte elongated towards west. The aisle tower stands by the pendants on four arches and on pilasters that flank the lateral apses. In exterior, it has 12 sides. The aisle is separated by the narthex by a vaulted wall with a perfect calotte, standing on four pendants of building placed in the corners of the room.[1] The narthex supports an arch on pendants by the columns.

Ghika-Budești claimed that the pedants of the church are more massive that it used to be for the XVI century, claiming that the church is dated in the following century. The high area of the church is separated by the lower one by a "belt formed by a flanked tor with two strings of saw teeth surrounding the church, splitting the frontages in two registries. The report between the two registries with arches is of 3/1 (considering the pedestal and cornice). The niches between the two registries are flat and have feet and the space between arches of brick apparently left, they succeed with grace on the frontages".[2]

The side apses of the aisle are polygonal with five sides and it is not directly recorded to the rectangular of the church. Between those are interposed the corners of a kind of rhomb, having a similar function buttresses, met to a few moments from the second half of XVI century and the beginning of the XVII century, as for example St. Archangels – Târgoviște, Bălteni – county Ilfov, Comana – county Giurgiu, Strejeștii de Jos – county Olt, Călinești – county Prahova, Mihai Vodă – Bucharest (only towards west).[3]

"The pedestal is marked by a strong tor that turns back in a right angle on the former west frontage, as well as the cornice formed of two strings of tiny teeth, whose original part could be seen in the vault room of bell tower. Only the alcoves of the tower have the archivolts marked by two lines of teeth arches. The window frames, with the opening extremely narrow, dates from the restoration from 1928-1930, realized under the guidance of the Committee of Historical Monuments. The only original – lack of profile – seems to be the one from the south niche of the aisle".[4]

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[1] Teresa Sinigalia, *Repertoriul arhitecturii în Țara Românească 1600-1680*, vol. I, București, Editura Vremea, 2002, p. 217.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 218.

[3] *Ibidem*.

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 219.

After the restoration in 1928-1930, the church was covered in shingles, as it was in XIX century. As it is showed at the moment, the church could be from the second half of the XVI century or the first century from the XVII century, the massiveness of the tower approaching it of Căluiu.

The semi-shrouded exonartex from the west of the church also arises, dating problems. Obviously, of another kind and another era than the church, this – along with the massive bell-tower, with manor appearance, that surmounts – presents, however, externally, elements that its performer wanted as rappels at the monument which was addresses: the recording in the strict limits of the narthex width, the first belt that continues it, as width and as shape, the church, the registry of arches placed continuing the higher one on the main body, the arches in full centre of the porch opening and the sound windows. The tors a little bit prominent of high registries as the ones that separate the alcoves from the level of the bells rooms, present the rounded profiles very discrete.[1]

Above the vaulted exonartex with a calotte are two more floors, one intermediary separated in two rooms, one serving as vault, with just one opening corresponding to an initial balcony – and the second one for the bells room, a perfect point of notice at the same time.

Of unusual massiveness, net contrasting with the church and even denying it for some points of view, the tower should have had a proper history, totally unknown today.

In 1656, Paul of Alep mentioned the recent finalization of the church that had five towers. In this case, the most plausible is to consider either that the author refers to internal vaults, counting the tower of the aisle, the semi-calotte of the side apses, the narthex calottes and exonartex, either that it considers the number of crosses: one for the altar, three for the aisle and one on the bell-tower. This tower is nearly safe resulted from the contribution of Madam Bălaşa who restored the whole monastery, the rigor and vaulting of the whole church may come to her, for it may have suffered because of some earthquake.

The first documentary mention of the tower is the inscription painted in 1835 that mentioned a restoration from 1701: "…the patron Petre Odobeanu val arm, started and ended, beautifying the porch with painting… in the days of Io Constantin Basarab voivode, 1701…".[2]

Compared to Strehaia monastery, "this tower presents as defensive settlements an intermediate level, instead of royal tribune, external doors preceded by balconies that the defenders could exit. Considering their settlement on the entrance sides, it could be assumed that they also served as throwing holes, for the simple noticing and throwing being enough sound windows and possible throwing holes (probably plugged today), as in Segarcea. The church was restored in 1813 and in 1853, year when the internal painting was executed".[3]

The church painting as architectural ensemble presents various styles, in the aisle and narthex stand out the iconographic representations as paintings and lockets, having influences from the western style, being known by Tătărescu and her school. On the western wall of the aisle is painted as founder the Archimandrite Dorotei, resulting that

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 220.
[2] *Ibidem*, p. 221.
[3] *Ibidem*, p. 222.

the painting remains from the period of his life. The name of the author of the painting is unknown, but it seems that he is German native, having predilection for the renaissance style and catholic iconographic painting realized in oil colors.

After the restoration, the church was sanctified again in 1932, in Pisania located on the wall of the aisle being written: *It was built from foundation this saint and spiritual church to be a sanctuary with the expense and diligences of the voivode of Walachia Constantin Basarab Carnu, years from Hristos and the Master 1654-1658. At the beginning, the former Jitianu Monastery with the titular saint T he Great Martyr and Vexil of Dimitrie. Nowadays, between 1920-1932, was rebuilt with the help of God, work, diligence and expense of the Committee of historical monuments from Bucharest, the restoration committee of Dolj, Dolj Prefecture, as well as the Christians from the villages Balta-Verde and Branişte. The ruler of Romania for rounded borders being Ferdinand the 1st king. In the Bishop seat of Râmnicu, the new Severin, Bishop and master of the faithfully herd and fearful of God D.D. Vartolomeu. The President of the Committee of Historical Monuments in these years was the professor Nicolae Iorga and the director N. Ghica-Budeşti. 13th of November 1932. Vicar Titus Locusteanu.*

In Pisania from the narthex of the church were added the restoration works carried out after de earthquake from 1977, when important damages intervened. So the following are related: *With the volition of the Father, with the help of the Son and with the achievement of Holy Spirit, it was restored and consolidated this holly church with the titular saint of Saint Great Martyr Dimitrie, serious damaged after the earthquake from 4th of March 1977, during 1978-1989, by the care and the diligence of I.P.S. Dr. Archiepiscopacy Craiova and the Metropolitan of Oltenia. The church was sanctified by I.P.S. Dr. Nestor Vornicescu on 20th of July 1989. Bless God the ones that love the ornament of Your house.*

During the 10 years as the church was restored, the roof was replaced with the current one from copper. From this date on, the church took the appearance that has today, the porch under the bell-tower being painted as well. The Metropolitan Nestor disposed to be painted in the porch only the Romanian saints, in Byzantine style. Moreover, he even anticipates and puts on the wall the scene of Brancoveni martyrdom, although on that date they weren't sanctified (the sanctification took place in the year of 1993). In that event Î.P.S. Nestor adds the second titular saint, the Saint Prophet Ilie Tesviteanul.

After that the Committee of historical monuments, in the year of 1925 drafted a project of restoration that was executed between the period of 1928-1930, were built by the initiative of the abbess Fevronia Miclăuş, in the year of 1936, the enclosure, the prior house and new cells above the old basements.

The basements are the original ones, the bigger one being formed by two naves, vaulted in strengthen semi-cylinder with doubles, a system met on the monasteries basements and aristocratic houses until the end of the XVII century. The little basement is actually a cellar with direct entrance from the yard, which was used as kitchen. In the year of 1813, by the attention of Prior Antim, the houses were restored or partially rebuilt. In some of the high ground floors, the one rebuilt in 1936, it was assembled the Collection of spiritual art of Craiova Mitropoly.[1]

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[1] *Ibidem*, pp. 223-224.

The collection of icons and religious painting

The Jitianu Monastery also has a Collection of icons and religious painting, interesting by the wealth, the originality and the variety of the pieces that contains it. The collection contains the main styles of old Romanian art: icons painting, embroidery, silvery, wood sculpture, stone sculpture, mainly in the counties Dolj, Gorj and Mehedinti.

The collection from Jitianu Monastery illustrates differently "the late phases of classic art development – XVIII and XIX century"[1] and outlines, mostly regarding the painting and sculpture of wood, the phase in which it "manifests the interesting phenomenon of interferences between brancovian art – from the end of the XVII century and the first decades of the next century – and the rich fund of traditional rustic art that in this period knew a great flowering. It is highlighted the transition processes from the late aspects of Romanian medieval art towards the modern shapes of the painting and sculpture of XIX century".[2]

The existing icons in the collection of the monastery have mostly unknown authors. There is few data about biography and the activity of some artists that left in discrete appearance, with humility, the signature – usually just the forename and the qualification of "painter" – on some of the icons existing here. Among those who signed those works are reminded: Petru Zugravu, who painted an icon from 1846 and another Petru Zugravu from Craiova who painted in the years of 1836-1837.

The action initiated by the Metropolitans of Oltenia, above mentioned, was the fact of identifying and ensuring a good preservation of some religious cultural values, mostly those exposed to injury. The pieces are from the old church, mainly from Oltenia area, but also from other areas of the country. This is how it was founded after decades of investigations the collection of religious art objects from Jitianu Monastery. Concerning the painting, it is to be mentioned the fact that, except one piece, which is from the XVII century, most of the objects are from XVIII, XIX and XX centuries.

The wood sculpture is found in many objects as excerpts of iconostasis, royal doors, pieces of religion, furniture, entrance doors of the church, objects that give us the reason to know our artistic patrimony from wood art field. Although limited as number, the works kept in Jitianu Monastery are "for seeing the gradual changes of the repertory of sculptured motives, the technique and the shapes used during the second half of the XVIII century, in late creations of sculpture of wood on the territory of Oltenia".[3]

As in the case of icons painting, we assist to the delineation "of a new vision, where the polychrome and the gold impressed the richness of works of Brâncoveanu style, will be gradually replaced by the simplicity of the natural wood carved or the, at most, covered by a simple coat of paint or other preparation. The sculpted motives are treated in a more free shape, more close to the nature, and the decorative elements of traditional style go under the artisans chisel of late medieval period, marking the passing to a new artistic creation".[4]

Between the pieces of this style existing in the collection are reminded the entrance door of the church from Bengeşti, county Gorj that is from the first half of the XVIII

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[1] Teodora Voinescu, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 7.

[3] *Ibidem*, p. 34.

[4] *Ibidem*.

century and the door of the church from Preajba (Dolj) dated on 1778. There are more other royal doors, but also excerpts of iconostasis from other churches from Oltenia area.

In the collection there is also silvery, the pieces of this style being more recent and has various sources. Some of them are the work of some local artisans from the centers of the most important cities, some of them are Russian and other are from Central Europe workshops, reached to us as a consequence of some donations. The locked crosses, bowls, candles, locked books, holy discs, the box for holy relics are the pieces of silver of Jitianu Monastery collection.

Among those mentioned above there are also some other exponents as: icons on glass, some other religious seals, wood and stone crosses. There is a collection of crosses of stone dated from the second half of XIX century. Their particularity consists in the fact that, regarding the shape, they represent two different kinds, one as religious seal, and other as prism with the top rounded. According to some traditions, the crosses as religious seals were for the graves of men and the others for the graves of women. Although the inscriptions with the name of the deceased don't confirm today the same precise destination, we can assume that the customs was lost by time. Concerning their size, that indicates the age of the deceased, some of them being bigger, some of them – of course destined to children graves – smaller and smaller.

Conclusions

Preserving the national cultural identities, the heritage of identity values and identifying the values are the only forms in which Romania will be able to keep up with the ideals common at European level.[1] Therefore, the iconographic patrimony of an extraordinary value historically, artistically and religious of Jitianu Monastery revives the past of spiritual values, preserving the history of our nation, constituting an inseparable part of historical and religious cultural patrimony of Oltenia and claims from the authorities and specialists, custodians and cultural managers, the greatest responsibility, attention and caring (conservation and restoration), only in this way it can be ensured the perenniality of those values of national cultural patrimony.

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[1] Andreea Mihaela Niţă, *Cultural phenomena and processes in contemporary society – determinants of cultural policies*, in "Revista de Ştiinţe Politice", no. 32/2011, p. 68.

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ENGLISH TRAVELLERS IN THE ROMANIAN AREA (18TH CENTURY)

Iulian Oncescu[*]

Abstract

Out of the numerous foreign testimonies written by foreigners about the Romanians in the 18th century, some of the most important are those left behind by English travellers. Out of the English travellers who went through the Romanian area and wrote about the Romanians in the 18th century, we shall mention: Edmound Chishull, William Lord Pagett de Beaudesert, James Jeffries, John Bell of Antermony, Sir James Porter, Lady Clarrissa Porter, Frederick Calvert Lord Baltimore, William Eton, John Petty, Jeremy Bentham, Lady Elisabeth Craven, Sir William Sidney Smith, Robert Townson, John Sibthorp, James Dallaway, John B.S. Morritt, Robert Stockdale, Randle Wilbraham, Philip Jackson, John Jackson, Tomas Hope. Our study only aims to highlight the main 18th century travellers in the Romanian area and a few of their testimonies about the Romanians.

Key words: *English travellers, Romanian area, 18th century, foreign testimonies, Romanians*

The foreign travellers of the 18th century have left behind testimonies about the Romanians, which have become part of the category of historical sources. Practically, these narrative sources are considered historical sources from which one can realize the condition of the Romanian society during the period 1700-1800. Actually, Transylvania, Moldova and Walachia represented a permanent concern in the travelogues of those who went through the Romanian area or lived there for a while. A part of the narrative sources of the 18th century are therefore represented by diaries of foreign travellers, notes of politicians, diplomats, army members, missionaries, journalists, writers or even simple travellers.

As the interest of the great powers, especially of Russia and Austria, in the SE of Europe grew, especially in the context of the Austrian-Russian-Turkish wars that took place mainly at the Lower Danube, there appeared *memoirs* written by politicians and diplomats presented to European monarchs about Romanian reigning princes, but also *travelogues* written by different personalities that went through the Romanian area.[1]

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[1] *Istoria Românilor* (The Romanians' History), vol. VI, *Românii între Europa clasică şi Europa luminilor (1711-1821)* (The Romanians between Classical Europe and the Europe of the Enlightenment: 1711-1821), coordinators Paul Cernovodeanu, Nicolae Edroiu, Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 2002, p. XXXVII. ("Diaries or travelogues constitute a narrative genre full of comparative observations and details on the conditions in the Romanian Countries, on the appearance of the human settlements and of their inhabitants, on their traditions and customs, on the climate, relief, soil, and treasures of the underground". *Ibidem*, p. XXXIX). For travelogues as a historical source, see the interesting study elaborated by Ovidiu Cristea, *Relaţia de călătorie ca izvor istoric* (The Travelogue as a Historical Source) in *Societatea românească între modern şi exotic văzută de călători străini (1800-1847)* (The Romanian Society between Modern and Exotic Viewed by the Foreign Travellers: 1800-1847), coordinators Ileana Căzan, Irina Gavrilă, Bucureşti, Editura Oscar Print, without year, pp. 13-26.

As we mentioned on a previous occasion[1], the definition of the foreign traveller was formulated in the Romanian historiography even since the year 1968 by Maria Holban in the *Introduction* to the first volume of the series *Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries). *"The foreign traveller"* represented a broad notion comprising all the people that went through the Romanian Countries on different occasions or who lived here for a while and left a testimony about what they saw here.[2]

Namely, out of the foreign travellers that went through Moldova, Walachia, Transylvania and who left a series of testimonies on the Romanians, most of them were Westerners: French people, English people, Italians, Germans, Austrians. On different missions in the agitated context of the Phanariote century, or participating to different wars between the great European powers or simple occasional travellers, as missionaries, writers, journalists, officers, diplomats, they left to the posterity a series of works, especially memories, from which one can find almost all the features of the Romanian society. The merit of these travellers is all the more significant not just because they contributed to making the Romanians known in Europe, but, to a certain extent, some of them participated to the renewal of the Romanian people during this period.[3]

Consequently, our approach aims, in this sense, to return to the main English travellers of the Romanian area during the period 1700-1800. Whether they were just passing through the Romanian area or they lived for a longer while here, the English travellers left a series of testimonies on the Romanians.[4]

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[1] Iulian Oncescu, *French travellers' writings concerning the Romanians in the 18th century*, in "Analele Universităţii din Craiova" (The Annals of the University of Craiova), Istorie (History), year XVIII, no. 2 (24)/ 2013, November, Craiova, Editura Universitaria, 2013, p. 34.

[2] *Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. I, tome arranged by Maria Holban (editor-in-chief), Maria Matilda Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Paul Cernovodeanu, Bucureşti, Editura Ştiinţifică, 1968, p. XIII; see also Paul Cernovodeanu, *Imaginea celuilalt: tipologia imaginii societăţii româneşti în viziunea călătorilor străini (sec. XVIII – prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea)* (The Image of the Other: the Typology of the Image of the Romanian Society in the Vision of the Foreign Travellers: the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century), in *Oraşul românesc şi lumea rurală. Realităţi locale şi percepţii europene la sfârşitul secolului XVIII şi începutul celui de-al XIX-lea* (The Romanian Town and the Rural World. Local Realities and European Perceptions at the End of the 18th Century and the Beginning of the 19th Century), volume arranged by Ileana Căzan and Daniela Buşă, Muzeul Brăilei, Editura Istros, 2004, p. 8.

[3] Nicolae Isar, *Mărturii şi preocupări franceze privitoare la români. Secolele XVIII-XIX*, Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2005, p. 7.

[4] For the English testimonies of the 18th century in the Romanian area, see *Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. VIII, volume arranged by Maria Holban (editor-in-chief), M.M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Paul Cernovodeanu, Bucureşti, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1983, pp. 192-216, 217-224, 540-548; *Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. IX, volume arranged by Maria Holban (editor-in-chief), M.M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Paul Cernovodeanu, Bucureşti, Editura Academiei Române, 1987, pp. 192-199, 490-492, 493-496; *Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. X, part I, volume arranged by Maria Holban, M.M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Paul Cernovodeanu (editor-in-chief), Bucureşti, Editura Academiei Române, 2000, pp. 277-284, 666-672, 704-715, 716-728; *Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. X, part II, volume arranged by Maria Holban, M.M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Paul Cernovodeanu (editor-in-chief), Bucureşti, Editura Academiei Române, 2001, pp. 1071-1083, 1087-1113, 1174-1178, 1201-1209, 1210-1219,

We can appreciate that during the first half of the 18th century, the number of the British travellers in the Romanian area was lower, and it grew after the year 1774. In this context, in the 18th century, a series of English travellers went through the Romanian Countries and wrote about the Romanians: Edmound Chishull[1], William, Lord Pagett de Beaudesert[2], James Jeffries[3], John Bell of Antermony[4], Sir James Porter, Lady Clarrissa Porter[5], Frederick Calvert Lord Baltimore[6], William Eton[7], John Petty[8], Jeremy Bentham[9], Lady Elisabeth Craven[10], Sir William Sidney Smith[11], William Hunter[12], Robert Townson[13],

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1232-1249, 1281-1287, 1288-1294, 1358-1368; Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria Românilor prin călători* (The Romanians' History through Travellers), edition arranged, introductory study and notes by Adrian Anghelescu, MCMLXXXI, Bucureşti, Editura Eminescu, 1981, pp. 349-354, 359-361, 401-402. See also, for the English travellers of the 18th century, Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria relaţiilor române. Antologie* (The History of the Romanian Relations. Anthology), edition arranged and notes by Florin Rotaru, translation by Anca Verjinschi, Bucureşti, Editura Semne, 1995, pp. 108-126 (chap. III, *Musafiri englezi în epoca fanarioţilor* (English Guests in the Phanariote Times); Elena Butoescu, *British Travellers in Wallachia at the End of Eighteenth-Century: Some Consideration Regarding the Negative Aspects*, in Anuarul Institutului de Cercetări Socio-Umane "Gheorghe Şincai" (Yearbook of the "Gheorghe Şincai" Socio-Humanistic Research Institute), XIII, Târgu Mureş, 2010, pp. 11-21.

[1] *Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. VIII, pp. 192-216; Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria românilor prin călători* (The Romanians' History through Travellers), 2nd edition, completed, vol. II, Bucureşti, Editura Casa Şcoalelor, 1928, pp. 72-77.

[2] *Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. VIII, pp. 217-224; see also Paul Cernovodeanu, *Contributions to Lord Paget's Journey in Wallachia and Transylvania* (1702), in "Revue des études sud-est européennes", Tome XI-1973, n. 2, Editions de L'Académie Roumaine, pp. 275-284.

[3] *Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. VIII, pp. 540-548.

[4] *Ibidem*, vol. IX, pp. 192-199.

[5] *Ibidem*, pp. 490-492.

[6] *Ibidem*, pp. 493-496.

[7] *Ibidem*, vol. X, part I, pp. 277-284.

[8] *Ibidem*, pp. 666-672; see also Costin Feneşan, *John Petty – un călător englez prin Transilvania şi Ţara Românească (1784)* (John Petty – an English Traveller through Transylvania and Wallachia: 1784), in "Revista Arhivelor" (The Archives' Review), LXXXVI (2009), 1, pp. 264-284.

[9] *Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. X, part I, pp. 704-715.

[10] *Ibidem*, pp. 716-728; Nicolae Iorga, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-255.

[11] *Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. X, part II, pp. 1071-1083.

[12] *Ibidem*, p. 1087-1113.

[13] *Ibidem*, p. 1174-1178.

John Sibthorp[1], James Dallaway[2], John B.S. Morritt, Robert Stockdale, Randle Wilbraham[3], Philip Jackson[4], John Jackson[5], Tomas Hope.[6]

Next, we shall mention just a few of the English travellers that went through the Romanian area during the period 1700-1800 and their testimonies about the Romanians. At the beginning of the 18th century, in the year 1702, two travellers will stand out in this context, namely: Edmound Chishull and William Pagett. Actually, Edmound Chishull (1670/1-1733) crossed the Romanian area (Wallachia and Transylvania) in the year 1702 as part of the suite of Lord Paget, formerly an English ambassador to Turkey who was going back to England after having secured this position for 8 years. Edmound Chishull had known Lord Paget since 1701, the year when he decided to leave Turkey. His travellogue begins with the moment when the English ambassador was leaving the Ottoman Empire and continues with the way he travelled through Wallachia, Transylvania, Hungary, Austria, Prussia, Hanover and Holland. However, before getting to England, Edmound Chishull left Lord Paget's suite, arriving home later, on May 15, 1703. His travellogue was published many years later, in the year 1747, by his son, in London, under the title *Travels in Turqkey and back to England*. In this context, Edmound Chishull goes through Wallachia and Transylvania.[7]

This part of the voyage through the Romanian area was translated, in Romania, by Caterina Piteșteanu under the title *Călătorie prin Țara Românească* (Voyage through Wallachia) (1702) in "Buletinul Societății Regale de Geografie" (The Bulletin of the Royal Geographic Society), XLI (1922). Edmound Chishull's text was used as well by the historian Nicolae

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[1] *Ibidem*, pp. 1201-1209; see also Eric D. Tappe, *John Sibthorp in the Danubian Lands, 1794*, in "Revue des études sud-est européennes", Tome V-1967, n. 3-4, Editions de L'Académie Roumaine, pp. 461-473; Trevor J. Hope, *John Sibthorp's Last Expedition to the Balkans: the Accounts of Sibthorp and Dallaway about their Travels in 1794*, in "Revue des etudes sud-est européennes", Tome XII-1974, no. 1, Editions de L'Académie Roumaine, pp. 87-102.

[2] *Călători străini despre Țările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. X, part II, pp. 1210-1219.

[3] *Ibidem*, p. 1232-1249; see also Eric D. Tappe, Trevor J. Hope, *A Cambridge Don and His Companions in the Balkans (1794)*; *Some Unpublished Correspondence of Robert Stockdale, John B.S. Morritt, Randle Wilbraham*, in "Revue des études sud-est européennes", Tome XVIII-1980, n. 4, Editions de L'Académie Roumaine, pp. 591-615.

[4] *Călători străini despre Țările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. X, part II, pp. 1281-1287.

[5] *Ibidem*, pp. 1288-1294.

[6] *Ibidem*, pp. 1358-1368.

[7] Edmound Chishull (1670/1-1733) was a graduate of the University of Oxford, the college Corpus Christis (1693). A few years later, he travelled to the Levant, arriving in Smyrna, where he held the position of chaplain, between the years 1698-1702. In the year 1702 he resigned from this position and left for England, being part of the suite of Lord Paget, formerly an English ambassador at the Porte between the years 1693-1701. The Lord's convoy left Adrianopol on April 8, 1702 and was made up of 71 chariots and 6 carts. Out of the Lord's company, Chrishull mentions Paget's brother, George Montague and Gangain. Edmound Chishull. After having left, at a certain moment, the Lord's suite, before the arrival to England, he returned home on May 15, 1703. Until the end of his life, in 1733, he secured various positions in the hierarchy of the Anglican Church (*Călători străini despre Țările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. VIII, pp. 192-194).

Iorga in *Istoria românilor prin călători* (The Romanians' History through Travellers), 2nd edition, completed, vol. II, Editura Casa Şcoalelor, Bucureşti, 1928, pp. 72-77.[1]

In his turn, William, Lord Pagett de Beaudesert (1637-1713) or William Pagett, although he had travelled abroad since his youth (1656) only after the recognition of William of Orange at the throne of England in 1688, becomes ambassador in Vienna, a position that he secures during the period 1688-1693. After the year 1693, he is appointed ambassador of England to Constantinople, where he stayed until the beginning of the year 1702. Paget deployed an important diplomatic activity in the Ottoman Empire being one of the artisans of the peace of Karlowitz (1699), concluded between the Austrians and the Turks. In April 1702, William Pagett will leave Adrianopolis, heading for London, and his way back took about a year, staying longer in Wienna (July-November 1702) and in Bavaria. On his way to England, Pagett went through the Romanian area, travelling through Wallachia and Transylvania. Beside the *Travelogue* drafted by Edmound Chishull, which described the voyage of the Lord from Turkey to England and which was presented by us above, there was also another diary entitled *Anonymous Latin Diary* written by another member of the delegation of the English ambassador regarding the way back to England. This diary of Pagett's voyage was signed by the English historian E. Tapee in an article entitled *Documents Concerning Rumania in the Paget Papers,* published in The Slavonic Review, XXXIII, no. 80 (dec. 1954), pp. 201-210. In this article Tapee signals some incongruities between the *Diary* of Edmound Chishull and the *Latin Anonymous Diary.* Out of the Romanian historians who have written about the passage of Pagett through the Romanian area, we shall remind here the contributions of: Paul Cernovodeanu, *Contributions to Lord Paget's Journey in Wallachia and Transylvania* (1702), in "Revue des études sud-est européennes", Tome XI-1973, n. 2, Editions de L'Académie Roumaine, pp. 275-284; *Arhiva diplomatică a lordului Wililiam Paget* (Lord Paget's Diplomatic Archive), in "Revista Arhivelor" (The Archives' Review) (1975); *Din legăturile Bisericii Răsăritului cu Ambasadorul Angliei la Constantinopol, lordului Wililiam Paget (între anii 1693-1702)* (On the Relations between the Eastern Church with the English Ambassador to Constantinople, Lord William Paget (1693-1702)), in "Biserica Ortodoxă Română" (The Romanian Orthodox Church) (1976).[2]

Certainly, towards the end of the 18th century, the number of the English travellers in the Romanian area and their testimonies on the Romanians became increasingly numerous. Here, we shall remind of just two of them, namely those left by Jeremy Bentham (who went through Wallachia in the year 1785), and Lady Elisabeth Craven (who crossed Wallachia and Transylvania in year 1786).

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 194. See, about the voyage of Edmound Chishull through Wallachia and Transylvania, the Romanian translation from *Travels in Turqkey and back to England* (pp. 76-105), in *Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. VIII, pp. 195-206.

[2] William, Lord Pagett de Beaudesert (1637-1713), was born in the year 1637, being the 6th person known by this title. Pagett had gotten involved in the English politics from a young age, holding a position in the House of the Lords even since the year 1678. He was ambassador of England to Vienna (1688-1693) and to Constantinople (1793-1702). After having been appointed in the year 1705 to Vienna, Paget was to die in London in the year 1713 (*Ibidem*, pp. 217-218). See, for William Paget's travel through Wallachia and Transylvania the Romanian translation *Jurnalul anonim latin* (Anonymous Latin Diary), in *Ibidem*, pp. 219-224.

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)[1], known as an apostle of utilitarianism, travelled, between the years 1783 and 1787 several times to Europe, and on this occasion he visited countries such as France, Italy, Turkey and Russia. Actually, he remained for two years in the south of Russia, in region of Kerson, on the estate of Potemkin of Kriceva, where his brother Samuel, a naval engineer and constructor, was hired to build fluvial and maritime ships in a shipbuilding yard.

On the occasion of the voyage from Constantinople to the south of Russia, in the year 1785, Jeremy Bentham also crossed the Romanian area, being in Bucharest in December, the same year. We find out the details of his passage through Wallachia and Moldova in the winter of the year 1785-1786 from his letters addressed to his penfriend of Constantinople but also to his father in London. A part of this correspondence of Jeremy Bentham was to be published later on in the year 1950 by the English historian E.D. Tapee, in "The Slavonic Review", XXIX, nr. 72 (1950), pp. 66-77, under the title *Bentham in Wallachia and Moldavia*.[2]

A traveller who went through the Romanian area toward the end of the 18th century was also Lady Elisabeth Craven (1750-1828).[3] Leaving England in the year 1785, she travelled through Europe visiting several States: France, Prussia, Italy, Russia, Turkey. Arriving in Russia she took a trip to the capital of the Ottoman Empire, Constantinople, where she had close relations with the ambassadors of Russia and France. On the recommandation of the latter, she received a travel authorization to travel through Bulgaria and Wallachia to get to the boundaries of Transylvania and from here to Vienna. Under these circumstances, in July 1786 Lady Elisabeth Craven crossed Wallachia, visiting its capital, Bucharest, where he was a guest of the ruler Nicolae Mavrogheni (1786-1789).[4]

In Romania, the passage of Elisabeth Craven through Wallachia in 1786 was described by Ionescu Gion, *Din Istoria Fanarioţilor. Studii şi Cercetări. Nicolae Mavrogheni şi Lady Craven* (On the History of the Phanariotes. Studies and Researches. Nicolae Mavrogheni and Lady Craven), Bucureşti, 1881, pp. 203-206; Idem, *Istoria Bucureştiului* (The History of Bucharest), Bucureşti, 1889, pp. 531-532, 680-681; N. Urechia, *O călătoare engleză în Ţara Românească* (An English Traveller Woman in Wallachia), in "Propilee Literare", year II (1928), no. 21, pp. 18-20; *O aristocrată engleză în Ţara Românească spre sfârşitul secolului al XVIII-lea* (An English Aristocratic Woman in Wallachia toward the End of the

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[1] Born in London in 1748, he becomes the father of the English liberal radicalism. At the age of 19, he finished his studies at the University of Oxford, but he will not embrace the profession of lawyer in England. Even since his youth he knew several languages, such as French, German, Italian, Spanish, Russian and even Chinese. (*Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. X, part I, pp. 704-705).

[2] *Ibidem*, pp. 704-707. See for Jeremy Bentham's voyage through Wallachia and Moldova the Romanian translation of the English text published by E.D. Tapee, *Bentham in Wallachia and Moldavia*, in *Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. X, part I, pp. 707-715.

[3] Her best known work is the travellogue published in London in the year 1789 under the title *A Journey Through the Crimea to Constantinopole in a Series of Letters of Elisabeth Craven*, a work also in French and German variants, translations that appeared during the same year. (*Călători străini despre Ţările Române* (Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries), vol. X, part I, pp. 716-718).

[4] *Ibidem*. See for the voyage of Elisabeth Craven through Wallachia, the Romanian translation from *A Journey through the Crimeea to Constantinopole in a series of letters of Elisabeth Craven*, Londra, 1789, in *Ibidem*, pp. 719-728.

18th century), in *Ibidem*, year III (1929), no. 22-24, pp. 21-22; C.I. Karadja, *Călători străini prin Turnu Roșu* (Foreign Travellers through Turnu Roșu), in "Arhivele Olteniei" (The Archives of Oltenia), III, (1924), No. 12, pp. 103-104; Ioana Rosetti, *Sur les recits de quelques voyageurs anglais en Transilvanie (1603-1867)*, in "Revue historique du sud est europeen", XI, (1934), No. 10-12, p. 535; A. Poenescu, *O englezoaică în București lui Mavrogheni Vodă* (An English Woman in the Bucharest of Mavrogheni Voivode), in "Gazeta Municipală", VI, (1937), No. 299 (14 November), pp. 1-2; Nicolae Iorga, in *Istoria românilor prin călători* (The Romanians' History through Travellers), 2nd edition, completed, vol. II, București, Editura Casa Școalelor, 1928, pp. 249-255.[1]

Our study has only aimed to highlight the main English travellers that went through the Romanian area during the 18th century and a few of their testimonies about the Romanians.

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 718.

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A MODERN "ODYSSEY" – THE "ELGIN MARBLES"

Florian Olteanu[*]

Abstract

The article reveals the main aspects concerning the way of a group of sculptures from the Parthenon, which were selected by Lord Elgin a British Diplomat accredited at Constantinople who conducted an expedition in Athens bribing the Ottoman authorities. The modern "Odyssey" started in 1800, until 1803, when Elgin tried to move the marbles on a ship which sank in the Greek waters. After the recuperation of marbles, Lord Elgin took them in Great Britain. Having great financial problems, he decided in 1816 to sell the marbles at the British Museum.

The article offers fragments of three documents in which we intend to show that the Lord Elgin tried using non-orthodox methods to remove the marble structures from their original place and to take them away to transport by sea in Great Britain.

Key words: *Lord Elgin*, *Parthenon*, *sculptures*, *expeditions*, *Athens*

In the Modern Age, the lack of legal settlements in the field of the protection of historical monuments offered the occasion on a very high scaled traffic of antiquities form Egypt, Mesopotamia, Italy and Greece.

At the beginning of the XIXth century, Greece was still on Ottoman occupation. The Ottoman Empire had a corrupt and abusive local administration which allowed to the representatives of the Great Power to be moral authors of many of abuses, especially on cultural field.

It was a competition between France and Great Britain for having an influence over the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain would to control the relation with the Turks against the ascension of Napoleonic France, especially after the failure of the Oriental Expedition done by Napoleon at the end of XIXth century.

This competition was conducted in the field of culture and Antiquities. The British diplomacy intended to have the permission to make excavations in the classical ruins of Athens.[1]

The Parthenon it is one of the famous construction of the classical Greek Antiquity. Dedicated to Athena Parthenos goddess, it was built on the highest place of the city of Athens, the Akropolis.[2]

The decision of rebuilding the complex of Akropolis after destruction of 480 B.C. by the Persian Army, conducted by King Xerxes belonged to Perikles, the most important figure of Athenian politics in the Vth century B.C.

Its construction began in 447 B.C., in the moment of apogee for the Athens as the chief city-state of the Delian League. The construction of the structure was ready in 438

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[1] *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, "Elgin Marbles" accessed on 4 November 2015.
[2] Jeffrey M. Hurwit, *The Athenian Acropolis: History, Mythology, and Archaeology from the Neolithic Era to the Present*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 161-163.

B.C. The all decorations (friezes and metopes) were finished in 432 B.C. The Temple of Parthenon was considered as the "summum of the Dorian architectural order".[1]

The Akropolis constructions with Parthenon were a symbol of the highest political level reached by Athens as a city-state and also by the Athenian democracy in the entire Ancient World.

The decorations (friezes and metopes) presented moments of the great history of Athens, including the moments of great wars as Marathon and Salamis battles against the Persians.

The Temple of Parthenon was used as treasury for the Delian League, and in the late Antiquity, precisely in the first Byzantine era (VIth century A.D.) became a Christian Church, dedicated to the "Theotokos Mary", "Mary – the Mother of God".

After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the Parthenon became a Turkish Mosque.

In the time of Turkish-Venetian War, during on a siege, on 26 September 1687, a Venetian bomb destroyed the Parthenon which was transformed by the Turkish army which defended the Akropolis in gunpowder magazine.[2]

In modern ages, the interests for the Antiquities of the Westerns Museums produced a lot of abuses. One of the most known abuse was the "Elgin affair".

In the summer of 1800 he formed a team of artists conducted by the Italian painter Lusieri and assisted by the confident of Lord Elgin, Philip Hunt. The team of archaeologists, artists (sculptors, painters) started to draw most important pieces of the Parthenon.

Lord Elgin was the British Ambassador at the Constantinople, between 1799 and 1803.

Lord Elgin took in a totally illegal manner some important pieces for the Parthenon in 1801-1803. He and his assistant, Philip Hunt used their influence to obtain illegal those pieces.

"The Elgin Marbles"[3] represent large portion of decorations, as metopes, friezes, pediment sculptures belonging to the Parthenon.[4]

Lord Elgin and Philip Hunt claimed that they had the acceptance of the Turkish governor to remove the pieces, but the documents discovered show that the "removing" was an operation including a local movement not a relocations of the marble pieces on boat with destination Great Britain.

We can see the "Letter of Acceptance" (in diplomatic language "Firman") offered by Constantinople which provided him only the right to study the Akropolis of Athens to remove some pieces, but do not take them away from there and to bring them in England:

"e quando volessero portar via qualche pezzi di pietra con vechie inscrizioni, e figure, non sia fattà lor'oposizione, vi s'è scritta e spedita col NN. la presente lettera, afin che dopo compreso il soggetto della med.a essendo chiaro l'impegno dell' Excelso Impero dotato d'esimie qualità, acciò vengano favorite simil istanze, conforme richiedono l'amicizia, 50 sincerità, alleanza, e benevolenza ab antiquo esistenti, e colla vicendevol accettazione d'ambe le parti, manifestam.e crescenti frà la Sub.e sempre durevole Corte

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[1] Heiner Knell, *Perikleische Baukunst. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft*, Darmstadt, 1979, pp. 6-11.

[2] Theodor E. Mommsen, *The Venetians in Athens and the Destruction of the Parthenon in 1687*, in "American Journal of Archaeology", Vol. 45, No. 4 (October-December 1941), pp. 544–556.

[3] Brian Cook, *The Elgin Marbles*, Londres, British Museum Publications Ltd., 1984, pp. 18-19.

[4] Jenifer Neils, *The Parthenon: From Antiquity to the Present*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 5-9.

Ottomana, e frà quella d'Inghilterra, (...) e non si faccia opposizione al portar via qualche pezzi di pietra con inscrizioni, e figure, e nella su rifferita maniera operiate, e vi comportiate. (Sottoscritto Sejid Abdullah Kaimmecam)".[1]

Here is also the English translation:

"*A letter from H.E. the Kaimacam Pasha, addressed to the Justice [Cadi] and also to the Voivode of Athens, for Lord Elgin giving him permission to excavate and remove objects from the Acropolis of Athens, including the Parthenon temple.*

(...) and when they wish to take away some pieces of stone with old inscriptions, and figures, that no opposition be made, here for you is the present letter written and delivered by X [name unknown], so that, after its subject is understood, be clear that it is the pledge of this Excellent Empire endowed with eminent qualities, that such requests be favoured in conformity with requirements of friendship, sincerity, alliance, and good-will existing ab antiquo, and with the mutual acceptance on both sides, manifestly growing between the Sublime and ever durable Ottoman Court and that of England, (...) nor hinder them from taking away any pieces of stone with inscriptions, and figures, and in the aforesaid manner conduct and comport yourselves.

(signed) Sejid Abdullah Kaimmecam".[2]

The sections presented on bold letters offer to us the situation of removing the pieces *in situ*, there is no specification of removing them directly to England.

In other letter, his assistant, Philip Hunt talks about the bribe that he gave to the Turkish authorities (Kaimmecam – Political Coordinator and Voivod-Military Guard Coordinator) to have the access on the Akropolis. It was necessary to act in this way for accomplishing his mission (the removal of marble decorations):

"*Athens, August 21 1801*

My Lord

My second visit to this celebrated City has been attended with circumstances equally honorable to the English Nation and Lord Elgin's Embassy; Hitherto access to the Temples in the Acropolis has always been difficult, and attained only by bribes to the Governor, demanded in a manner equally arbitrary and insolent, and proportioned according to the supposed rank or eagerness of the individual. -Your Lordship will be glad to know that in consequence of the remonstrances I made here in the Ambassador's name, we have He has been able to establish the right of every English visitor to enter the Citadel freely (...),

Your Lordship's most devoted & obliged servant, Philip Hunt".[3]

After these destructive actions, with the complicity of the Turkish local government of Athens, it is considered that a half of the remains of the Parthenon decorations were taken by Lord Elgin and his team.[4]

In 1803 all the marbles stolen from Parthenon were charged on the vessel "Mentor" which belonged to Lord Elgin. In the same year, Lord Elgin has dismissed all his artist employees, excepting Lusieri. Because of a storm and other sailing problems, the "Mentor" sank near Cerigo. Until 1806, after long discussions, and after paying well a team of amateur divers, Lord Elgin could see the marbles of the Parthenon out of the sea waters.

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[1] https://www.britishmuseum.org/.../firman_-_letter_of_permission.aspx, accessed on 1st November 2015.

[2] www.britishmuseum.org/.../t/translation_of_elgins_firman.aspx, accessed on 3 November 2015.

[3] *Ibidem.*

[4] https://www.britishmuseum.org/explore/highlights/article_index/l/lord_elgin_and_the parthenon s.aspx, accessed in 6 November 205.

In 1816, Lord Elgin succeeded to sell the marbles of Parthenon to the British Museum for 35 000 Sterling Pounds instead of 75 000 Sterling Pounds which he would at the first offer.[1]

We can observe that the access on the Akropolis was obtained by bribe, a cruel reality in all the regions occupied by Turkish Empire.

We can consider that the Ottoman Empire used the Ancient Greek monuments, illegally to obtain the help of the British against the France of Napoleon which was influent at that time. Lord Elgin, illegally used its influence as Ambassador to take that pieces away and to sell them to the British Museum, for his personal welfare.

The "Elgin Marbles" represent today an object of negotiation between Greek and British Governments. Greek Ministry of Culture Melina Mercouri was, starting from 1983, a strong advocate for the cause of restitutions of "Elgin Marbles" to the Greek Government.

The question is still a problem between the British and Greek governments. We can only consider that facts presented could imagine a possible fraud during the excavations and transportation of the "Elgin marbles" form Greece to the Great Britain.

This is one of an entire list of examples in which a lot of important pieces of art, architecture, jewelry could have a circulation between states in the absence of an adequate control by the authorities.

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[1] Christopher Hitchens, *The Elgin Marbles: Should They Be Returned to Greece?*, London, 1998, pp. 10-11.

ASPECTS OF THE ROMANIAN-SPANISH RELATIONS BETWEEN 1869-1870

*Denisa Victoria Dragomir**

Abstract

The article *Aspects of the Romanian-Spanish relations between 1869-1870* is based on the reports of the Romanian diplomatic agent in Paris, I. Strat referring to the General Prim's attempt to establish a Consulate General in Bucharest in 1869 and the intervention of the Romanian diplomacy in the Leopold of Hohenzollern's candidacy to the Spanish throne.

The controversial nomination of Viscount D'Ecquevillier as Consul-General put the Romanian diplomacy in a perdicament, but the establishment of the Consulate was dropped because of Prim's concerns to find a King for Spain. The Hohenzollern candidacy brought gradual deterioration of Napoleon III trust in the good intentions of the Romanian Prince and Strat quickly intervened to ward off threats to the political stability of Romania.

Key words: *Viscount D'Ecquevillier, Hohenzollern candidacy, Romania, Spain, I. Strat*

After the Revolution from 1868, Spain knew different forms of leaderships: two years of provisional government, the monarchy of Amadeo of Savoy and the ephemeral First Spanish Republic.[1]

In this context, the establishment of some diplomatic Romanian-Spanish relations was hard to conceive, the two states being concerned with internal affairs. However, in 1869 there was a notable attempt. Juan Prim y Prats, the prime-minister of Spain, due to personal reasons, created a Consul-General post at Bucharest for Viscount D'Ecquevillier. The Romanian diplomatic agent in Paris, I. Strat, addressed a letter to Prince Carol regarding this theme, in which he was drawing attention to the reputation of the new consul. Strat was saying that the Viscount was well known in Bucharest, being notorious due to his behavior and antecedents more than suspicious. But the diplomat didn't go into details about the nature of these allegations. As soon as he learned about the strange nomination, he contacted the Minister of Foreign Affairs to alert about the unpleasant situations that could have been caused by the decision of the Provisional Government in Madrid. Dimitrie Ghica wrote him, suggesting to talk to Olozaga, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, about the hardships of this matter and to ask him to intervene with his superiors to revoke "the thoughtless nomination".[2]

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[1] Jerónimo Becker, *Historia de las relaciones exteriores de España durante el siglo XIX*, tom II, *(1839-1868)*, Establecimineto Tipográfico de Jaime Ratés, tomul III *(1868-1900)*, Madrid, Editorial Voluntad, 1924, 1926, *passim*; José María Jover Zamora, *España en la política internacional: siglos XVIII-XX*, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 1999, *passim*; Javier Paredes (coord.), *Historia contemporánea de España (siglo XIX)*, Barcelona, Ariel, 2008, *passim*. José Ramón Urquijo Goitia, *Gobiernos y Ministros Españoles en la Edad Contemporánea*, Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2008, *passim*.

[2] Serviciul Arhivelor Naţionale Istorice Centrale, Bucureşti (National Historical Central Archives Service, Bucharest, hereinafter: S.A.N.I.C), fond Casa Regală, dosar nr. 47/1869, f. 1.

We note that the situation had to be treated with caution because the leader of the Provisional Government considered the affair as resolved. The revocation could create friction with the political power from Madrid, if the subject was not delicately approached. D'Ecquevillier, also, was in the possession of a letter from General Prim to Carol which should facilitated the installation of the new position.[1] This was specifically created for the Viscount, because Prim insisted, ignoring the fact that the Spanish budget didn't have resources for such a luxury. Behind the decision, it was apparently, the friendship between the general and d'Ecquevillier, who was known in the highest Spanish diplomatic circles.[2]

In the letter, Prim was using "the warmest" terms referring to Carol, and was expressing the sympathy of the Spanish people for Romania, asking him to provide a warm welcoming to "the First Agent that Spain had sent to his sister".[3] So the first attempt to establish some diplomatic ties with Romania was made from arbitrary reasons that General Prim was hiding under the guise of common Latin origins.

Strat sent Carol a copy of the report that was addressed to D. Ghica, a sign that the amicable settlement of the matter was of great importance. The meeting was conducted in an atmosphere marked by the exceptional courtesy of Olozaga to the Romanian agent.[4] The latter showed the reserves of the Romanian Government for the appointment of "an individual like Mr. D'Ecquevillier", exposing the facts which were affecting his credibility. He informed the Ambassador that the situation was even worse because it was about the first representative Spain was going to send to Romania.[5]

The will of the Romanians was to establish closer relations with a country with the same origin, regretting a lot that its first choice was such an unhappy one. "I made him understand, said Strat in the report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that apart from the issue of decency to Spain which requests to be worthy represented and the fears more than legitimated of our Government against a person with a so notorious ugly behavior, it remains the matter of the consular corps from Bucharest (...)".[6] Strat convinced Olozaga that the foreign diplomats from the Romanian capital would have avoided any contact with the Viscount. Even if the Romanian Government had accepted the credentials, they feared that daily conflicts and complications had occurred with the other consuls. The Spanish Ambassador accepted the justice of I. Strat's arguments, regretting the choice of this shadowy person due to "some inherent inconsistencies from any provisional government".[7]

Olozaga pledged to intervene with the Madrid Government to identify a way out of the impasse. Strat appreciated that the Spanish Ambassador was very anxious because of the friendship of D'Ecquevillier with General Prim, which he saw as the main obstacle in revoking the nomination. The Romanian agent in Paris dared to express his opinion, declaring himself unequivocally against accepting the new Spanish consul. To earn some time before Madrid would have revoked himself the appointment, he advised to postpone the presentation of the credentials held by the Viscount from one day to another,

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[1] *Ibidem.*

[2] *Ibidem*, f. 4.

[3] *Ibidem*, f. 6.

[4] *Ibidem*, dosar nr. 34/1870, f. 2.

[5] *Ibidem*, dosar nr. 47/1869, f. 2.

[6] *Ibidem*, f. 3.

[7] *Ibidem.*

inventing various excuses. He approximated that he was going to receive a definitive answer from the Spanish capital in three or four weeks. If the credentials were canceled the situation would be resolved to the satisfaction of both governments, but not to that of the Viscount. A bit more complicated, it would have been if Madrid has insisted to maintain the nomination, because it would have obliged Bucharest to make a formal rejection citing "the disturbing records of the individual in the country".[1]

It is not known the Spanish response to the request of the Romanian Government, but the establishment of the Consulate was dropped because of Prim's concerns to find a King for Spain. D'Ecquevillier lost the main support when Prim was shot by an unknown person in 1870 in Calle del Turco.

The next notable episode of the Romanian-Spanish relations in this period was generated by Leopold of Hohenzollern's candidacy to the Spanish throne.

In early March 1870, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, Olozaga, visited personally I. Strat to ask him to see that a letter from the Regent of Spain, Serrano, arrives into Carol's possession.

The Romanian agent observed that beyond the very flattering gesture, both for Carol and for the country that he was leading, there were other hidden intentions. The personal visit was contravening to customary diplomatic rules, because in the French capital the ambassadors weren't even visiting the recognized Plenipotentiary Ministers and holders of an official position. The rigidity and the severity of the Spanish Ambassadors in formalities and ceremonies were other clues that intrigued him.[2]

In a letter dated March 21, 1870, to Carol, he confessed his surprise for the visit, the only explanation being the receiving of specific instructions from Madrid. The kindness and the courtesy which characterized the Ambassador were not sufficient reasons for a politician so important in Spain and a close friend of the Emperor to appear unexpectedly to a mere diplomatic agency of a vassal country of the Ottoman Empire and ask for a meeting. All were showing, in the perception of Strat that "this exaggerated politeness is not at all foreign to some rumors circulating again for a few weeks, and who assigns people that are actually the masters of Spain destinies, the intention to call up the question of offering the Spanish crown to a prince belonging to one of the greatest families of Germany".[3]

Strat corroborated the negotiations in the summer of 1869 with the newest rumors and concluded that indeed in Madrid they were working to bring a German to the throne which before belonged to the Bourbons. He was telling Carol he would not have been at all surprised that soon, the Spanish authorities would make a direct proposal to his brother, Leopold, or to another person who had ancestral ties of friendship or kinship with the Hohenzollern family.[4]

From the file that contains Strat's letter to Carol, it is missing, unfortunately, the Regent of Spain's letter, so we can advance only hypotheses about its content: either Serrano conveyed greetings to the Prince in the attempt to win his goodwill toward the candidacy, or they spoke openly of electing Leopold as King of Spain.

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[1] *Ibidem*, f. 4.

[2] *Ibidem*, dosar nr. 34/1870, f. 1.

[3] *Ibidem*, f. 2.

[4] *Ibidem*.

In the French capital, I. Strat has witnessed the gradual deterioration of the imperial trust in the good intentions of Carol and the contouring of some serious threats to the stability and the leadership of Romania. Leopold's candidacy to the Spanish throne torched the public opinion which accused new bismarckian machinations intended to isolate France on the continent. The fear that in case of a Franco-Prussian war, the King of Spain would intervene for his German relatives, would have forced Napoleon III to keep an eye on the Pyrenees border. The Duke of Gramont statement in front of the legislative bodies seemed essentially to Strat "the true reflection of what every French man thought on this topic".[1] Complications had arisen because the Romanian Prince family's connection with Leopold. According to the Constitution from 1866, this one was the eventual successor of his brother in the absence of male descendants. Napoleon III and his government knew Carol's privileged position in the Hohenzollern family due to his high rank and of his relatives' affection. The conclusion they had reached to was that the Prince not only he knew for a long time about the secret negotiations with the Spaniards, but he even "played a leading role in this business", being "the quasi-promoter and the most zealous partisan of this combination" that the French people thought dangerous for its interests.[2]

The Romanian agent saw how Carol's opponents use the circumstances to boost rumors and feed the suspicions of the French Government, who treated the Romanian Prince as an enemy, deciding if war broke out with Prussia, he was going to be dethroned. Strat argued the French didn't remain at the stage of intention but got in touch with "the whole legion of disgruntled and secret agents which have been requesting for years the support of France to stage a coup in Bucharest and reverse the present order of things, and the negotiations were on the road and soon appeared to lead to a complete understanding between France and the agitators of different shades and categories that had quickly given their hand not to miss this excellent opportunity to reach their goal".[3] Strat said that also Austria-Hungary had been called to this conspiracy, to reach the goal quickly and in a more secure way, although it was not necessary his help.[4]

It seems that the Romanian agent had been informed in time by a high rank French official, whose name was not disclosed. The next step he made was to discuss with the Duke of Gramont. The two men revealed their intentions. Strat questioned about the authenticity of the overthrow plan, and the Duke confirmed it.[5] The French Foreign Minister concluded by adding that the overthrow of Carol in the event of a Franco-Prussian war was meant to provide "some satisfaction to the public opinion that repeatedly criticized the Emperor that put a Hohenzollern on the Danube".[6]

Strat has done everything possible to persuade the Duke that the Romanian Prince was not involved in the candidacy of his brother, that he was not aware, even more if he would have made a conspiracy he would have done it for the benefit of France and not against it. However, the complicated situation could not be changed by a single

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[1] *Ibidem*, dosar nr. 48/1870, ff. 2-3.

[2] *Ibidem*.

[3] *Ibidem*, f. 4.

[4] *Ibidem*.

[5] *Ibidem*.

[6] *Memoriile Regelui Carol I al României. De un martor ocular*, vol. II *(1869-1875)*, Bucureşti, Editura Scripta, 1993, p. 109.

diplomat denials and Strat had to act quickly. He asked Gramont to give him five or six days to inform Carol and to raise irrefutable evidences of his sympathy to France and Napoleon III.[1]

Under the pressure of the moment he decided to go to Sigmaringen and talk to Karl Anton. He detailed the issue, highlighting its dangers and how Carol and Romania would have benefited from Leopold's renunciation to the candidacy. The discussion was very sincere, Strat disclosing everything that he knew, including "the campaign that the French Government was preparing actively to make impossible the reign of Hohenzollern in Madrid, even if the war against Prussia would have been disadvantageous for France".[2]

Karl Anton had carefully analyzed the arguments for and against the candidacy of his son, the balance tilting towards withdrawal. Being in the possession of the original document which was confirming this decision, Strat went to Gramont hoping that the danger could be avoided. He said the act of great importance from which Spain regained freedom of action and France saw its fears dispelled that a Prussian will reign in Madrid, was due to Prince Carol.[3] Specifically, Karl Anton had foreseen the devastating effect that the hostility of the French Second Empire would have had on Romania, led by his son and chose to exempt him from unnecessary complications.

Strat appreciated that Romania has benefited from his quick intervention. After this, not only Prince Carol regained the confidence of Napoleon III, but Romania has consolidated its position in addition to France, as was evidenced in the message sent by the Emperor to the Romanian agent through a close friend. Napoleon III's words were recorded in the report to Carp. It was communicated to Carol he could continue to rely on the imperial support and wait "calmly and confidently the events". It seemed Gramont "fired his assassins" as a result of this radical change. Among them, were nominated D. Brătianu, Cuza's various agents and dissatisfied pretenders to the throne, who were warned that France did not support them and wanted to help the Prince get rid of the agitators from Romania. Instructions to this effect were also received by A. Mellinet, French Consul in Bucharest.[4]

On July 21 and 22, Strat sent home two telegrams, one to Carol and another one to P.P. Carp in which he was announcing that France approves Carol's domestic politics and that the change of attitude was due to Leopold's candidacy withdrawal.[5]

He hoped that the French-Romanian relations enter into a new era, taking advantage of the trust capital achieved by withdrawing Leopold's candidacy that French assigned to Carol's influence. "Therefore, due to this happy and productive incident, today we can defend our interests here, and the position of Prince Carol's agent consolidated unlike any era".[6]

The urgency of the situation motivated the initiative to go to Sigmaringen without obtaining the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as stipulated in the procedure.

Unfortunately, some newspapers have drawn the wrong conclusions from the visit to Prussia, writing that the Prince had been involved in the whole affair of the candidacy to

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[1] S.A.N.I.C., fond Casa Regală, dosar nr. 48/1870, f. 5.

[2] *Ibidem.*

[3] *Ibidem*, ff. 5-6.

[4] *Ibidem*, ff. 6-7.

[5] *Ibidem*, dosar nr. 46/1870, f. 1, dosar nr. 47/1870, f. 1.

[6] *Ibidem*, dosar nr. 48/1870, f. 7.

the Spanish throne. P.P. Carp admonished Strat, saying that his actions have damaged Carol. In a letter from July 28, Strat was accused that due to this incident, he provided the opposition press an opportunity to attack the Prince. Offended by the recriminations brought, the diplomat replied through a report detailing the whole matter. He wrote to Carol to be sure that he learns also his version of the story. He couldn't explain why an incident which brought Romania advantages and which he "saw as a providential happiness" for the country and its leader, became the reason for Bucharest's disapproval.[1]

He proudly admitted that he was in Sigmaringen not for a private matter nor as a devoted servant of the Dynasty, but as an agent of Carol and this quality has turned the withdrawal of the candidacy to the Spanish throne in an important matter for Romania, to which the French diplomacy has diametrically changed its viewpoint in a very short period of time. However, his actions have allowed the removal of dangers that threaten the country's stability. He argued he carefully calculated his movements, taking into account all the consequences: "An approach like the one I made and the publicity that we allowed the subject, would have been unqualified actions for me if I hadn't been sure that all this would be for the benefit of your Highness and for that of Romania".[2]

If his reasons were not enough, the agent was ready to resign.[3] Carol did not consider this measure as necessary and the fall of 1870 found him in the same position following the plot of Cuza's agents.[4]

Unfortunately, Romania could not take advantage of France's new attitude because the war with Prussia eventually broke out; Napoleon III was defeated at Sedan, and his Empire replaced by a republic.

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[1] *Ibidem*, f. 1.

[2] *Ibidem*, f. 2.

[3] *Ibidem*, f. 8.

[4] *Ibidem*, dosar nr. 56/1870.

THE BRITISH MODEL OF GOVERNMENT:
A GUIDE FOR THE ROMANIAN TWO-PARTY SYSTEM (1866-1914)

*Cosmin-Ştefan Dogaru**

Abstract

The two-party system of government was used in Great Britain and was later assumed by other European states along history. This model of government was also used in Romania beginning with the reign of Charles I. Here, this system was created gradually, along several stages which included the two political parties governing alternatively and, later, the birth of the two governmental parties, the National-Liberal Party (1875) and the Conservative Party (1880). Charles I supported the idea that the liberals and the conservatives should come alternatively to power and managed to establish the two-party system, rotating the two parties at power, with the purpose of maintaining a steady climate in the Romanian political regime.

Key words: *two-party system, British model, Charles I, liberals, conservatives*

This paper wishes to make an analysis of the way in which the British model of governing was applied in the Romanian political regime. The acceptance of this model led, step by step, to the establishment of a two-party system, a system which had its own specific characteristics, based on the way in which the Romanian political life evolved. The working strategies had two lines of research: the critical analysis of the documents used and the comparison.

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In literature, a *system of parties* can be taken into consideration and analyzed as a part of a well-structured political system: "political parties are important not only because of the range of functions they carry out (representation, elite recruitment, aggregation of interests /.../ but also because the complex interrelationships between and among parties are crucial in structuring the way political systems work in practice. This network of relationships is called a party system".[1]

The political scientist Maurice Duverger, when making a detailed research on the political parties' development, concluded that «des partis <<bourgeois>> du XIXe siècle qui survivent toujours sous la forme des partis conservateurs et liberaux /.../ ne cherchent pas a multiplier leur adhérents ni á encadrer de grandes masses populaires, mais plutot a grouper des personnalités».[2] More, the author discusses the fact that «le suffrage censitaire a d'abord engendré un bipartisme <<bourgeois>>, caractérisé par l'opposition des conservateurs et des liberaux, dont l'infrastructure sociale et idéologique était assez variable suivant les pays. En général, les conservateurs s'appuyaient surtout sur l'aristocratie et la paysannerie; les liberaux, sur la bourgeoisie commerçante, industrielle et

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[1] Andrew Heywood, *Politics*, third edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 282.
[2] Maurice Duverger, *Les partis politiques*, la dixième édition, Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1976 [1951], p. 43.

intellectuelle des villes». As regarding the doctrine point of view, the author emphasized that «les conservateurs prônaient l'autorité, la tradition, la soumission à l'ordre établi; les liberaux, individualistes et rationalistes, se réclaimaient des révolutions américaine et française, et des idées de liberté et d'egalité qu'elles avaient lancées dans le monde».[1]

In his area of research, Duverger puts forward what he defines as a system of parties (a term used by Maurice Duverger) thus: «on considère /.../ le systeme des partis existant dans un pays comme le résultat de la structure de son opinion publique. Mais l'inverse est également vrai: la structure de l'opinion publique est dans une large mesure la conséquence du système de partis, tel qu'il résulte des circonstances historiques, de l'evolution politique et d'un ensemble de facteurs complexes où le regime électoral joue un rôle preponderant. Les rapports entre opinion et partis ne sont point à sens unique: ils constituent un tissu d'acteurs et de réactions reciproques, étroitement emmêleés».[2] In this context, we can accept the opinion that the two political blocs functioned in that era as elites parties.

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From a general perspective, the two-party system can be expressed in the following terms: "a two-party system is duopolistic in that it is dominated by two 'major' parties that have a roughly equal prospect of winning government power".[3] Andrew Heywood describes the party system using three useful criteria: "although a number of 'minor' parties may exist, only two parties enjoy sufficient electoral and legislative strenght to have a realistic prospect of winning government power; the larger party is able to rule alone /.../ the other provides the opposition; power alternates between these parties; both are 'electable', the opposition serving as a <<government in the wings>>".[4] This system can be identified over time in states like Australia, Great Britain, Canada, USA, Romania, New Zealand etc., functioning in different periods in history, applying the criteria mentioned above based on the specific characteristics of every state.[5]

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As for Romania, when prince Charles I ascended to the throne in 1866, he found a fragmented political class from the point of view of the political structure as well as from an institutional point of view, a fact that created a lot of obstacles between the prince and a part of the time's political elite. In this way, this was a time when Charles I has to "adapt himself to the realities of his new homeland, to get acquainted with the parliamentary system and mechanism, with customs and traditions, with the statesmen and Romanians desires".[6] At that moment, the political class's structure was created through the existence of two political trends, which manifested themselves from the time of Alexandru Ioan Cuza's reign: the liberal and the conservative. They generated in time several political blocs which will later merge and form the first Romanian political parties.

The role of Charles I was decisive in the evolution of the two-party system, as he always sustained the idea of ensuring the political stability and the existence of a balance between the two political forces: "swinging between liberals and conservatives /.../ he made possible for Romania to know an alternation in forming the governments of these

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 300.
[2] *Ibidem*, p. 490.
[3] Andrew Heywood, *op. cit.*, p. 284.
[4] *Ibidem*.
[5] *Ibidem*.
[6] Sorin Liviu Damean, *Carol I al României 1866-1881*, București, Editura Paideia, 2000, p. 99.

two major political blocs, very similar with that between Tory and Whig parties, which was very characteristic for England /.../ Yet, while in England the moment when the power was transferred between the two governmental parties was decided by the electorate by means of elections, and the results were not significantly influenced through pressure from up downwards, and the governments were created as an expression of the Parliament's majority, in Romania, the decision of both the moment and the conditions in which it occurred was made by the head of the state, while the electors were summoned only to attest a decision already taken by the executive power".[1]

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The British model of government as it was applied in Romania led to the development of the *two-party system*, who had nevertheless a series of particularities which were specific for Romania. The development of this system also led, as a matter of course, to the construction and consolidation of the political elite. "The mechanism of alternation to power of the conservatives with the liberals has perfected in time, as the political forces who participated consolidated. Since the beginning of Charles I's reign until 1895 this system functioned in various experimental ways, the parties having unequal periods of governing, with alliances between political blocs (1866-1871) or between parties and political blocs (conservatives-junimists, 1888-1895)"; gradually, after the two-party system became steady, we can talk, after 1895, about "a kind of organized alternation, who didn't exceed four years (the length of the executive term of office) and who had almost equal periods of governing between liberals and conservatives".[2]

From a general perspective, we can observe that in 1866 terms like "liberal party" and "conservative party" were constantly used in the Romanian society, but these structures didn't behave like modern institutions. The forming of the two governmental parties was a gradual process, determined by the realities in the political life of that time and the characteristics of the Romanian society as a whole: "The establishment of modern Romanian parties does not have a fixed date: 24 of May 1875 for the National-Liberal Party and 3 of February 1880 for the Conservative Party, but is a process who took about two decades to conclude".[3]

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The system of parties had an important role in the Romanian political regime, being closely linked to the *electoral system*: "the census suffrage system as it appears in the electoral setting in 1866 reflects an elitist structure of the state".[4] If we take as a model the British political system and we make a comparison with the Romanian political system, we can emphasize the fact that: "in the Principalities we find a higher census suffrage in 1866 than the census suffrage in England".[5]

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[1] Tudor Drăganu, *Începuturile şi dezvoltarea regimului parlamentar în România până la 1916*, Cluj, Editura Dacia, 1991, pp. 259-260.

[2] Cosmin-Ştefan Dogaru, *Bipartidismul românesc. Implicarea lui Carol I şi a liderilor politici în funcţionarea alternanţei la guvernare (1895-1914)*, in "Analele Universităţii Bucureşti, Seria Ştiinţe Politice", Anul X, 2008, p. 5.

[3] Ioan Scurtu, Ion Bulei, *Democraţia la români 1866-1938*, Bucureşti, Editura Humanitas, 1990, p. 44.

[4] Sorin Radu, *Modernizarea sistemului electoral din România (1866-1937)*, Iaşi, Editura Institutul European, 2005, p. 12.

[5] Mattei Dogan, *Analiza statistică a "democraţiei parlamentare" din România*, Bucureşti, Editura Partidului Social-Democrat, 1946, p. 9.

When we look at the political life of that time, we can notice that the partisan aspect becomes clearer together with the development of the two governmental parties and, after 1895, with the establishment of the Romanian two-party system, which contributed to the emergence of a political culture, even if it was not always very clear for the citizens of that time. Following the same logics, "we can also say that the census suffrage system in Romania became capable of receiving a certain education".[1]

The census suffrage played a very important role at that time in the development of the two-party system. The electoral formula was based on *the system of majority in only one round of vote*. At that time, the political mandate was gained with the biggest number of votes, and that led undoubtedly to a lack of proportionality in the way the citizens were represented [see the British model – *winner take all*].[2] After 1871, when some aspects in the political life became clearer, the party who had won the elections gained an absolute majority in the legislative, being a support for the government. The experience of governing helped both political forces to gradually evolve into two modern political parties. From this point of view, "this governmental majority in the Parliament was formed by one of the two governmental parties who came alternatively to the rule of the country and to the conduction of the parliamentary elections".[3]

The Romanian political regime encouraged the game of power, which was based on a series of well-structured coordinates: "the governing of the country must be entrusted alternatively to the two parties /.../ when they came to power they have to require the complete trust of the two constitutional factors /.../ the country and the Crown".[4] Although the vote had the form of a census suffrage, the indirect participation of the citizens was done through a series of public manifestations: street demonstrations, public meetings etc., generating a more active, even if indirect, political life.

The characteristics of the electoral behaviour of that time suggest a pragmatic relationship between candidates and party members, between people inside the party and sympathizers, with the purpose of creating powerful connections, regardless of the political identity. The conservative Titu Maiorescu made a suggestive remark on that regard: "*when you are a winner for a while in this political battle, therefore, when you enter the government the necessity to apply your ideas takes the form of the administrative apparatus, that is the clerks /.../ It is a natural thing to make contact first with your known sympathizers and, thus, they receive the executive offices*".[5]

Inside the political regime, the elections had at least two aspects that are worth taking into consideration. First, regarding the administrative apparatus, the accent laid on loyalty. Second, we should not forget the political aspect, which was very strong, and manifested itself by a politicization of the administrative structure, regardless of the political ideology. Titu Maiorescu also discusses the way the political regime of 1866 was created, bringing

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[1] Mihail Manoilescu, *Rostul şi destinul burgheziei româneşti*, Bucureşti, Editura Cugetarea Georgescu Delafras, f.a., p. 216.

[2] Jeffrey Kopstein, Mark Lichbach, *Comparative Politics. Interests. Identities and Institutions in a Changing Global Order*, third edition, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 59.

[3] Mattei Dogan, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

[4] Alexandru Papacostea, *România politică. Doctrină. Idei. Figuri. 1907-1925*, Bucureşti, Tipografia "Bucovina" J.E. Torouţiu, f.a., p. 6.

[5] Titu Maiorescu, *Discursuri parlamentare cu priviri asupra desvoltării politice a României sub domnia lui Carol I (1888-1895)*, vol. IV, Bucureşti, Editura Albatros, 2003, p. 195.

into discussion the European models which functioned as an impulse for the political elite of that time: "*this was the way it was done, this was the way things were established in the state from where the system was brought, in England; this was also the way it was done in Belgium, a continental state closer to us, from where we have copied in a more direct manner our system*".[1]

In the same political framework, Alexandru Lahovari made a subtle comparative parallel between the behaviour/actions of our politicians and the politicians from other countries: "*even if in our battles we are whites and reds, regarding the strangers, regarding the country's rights, we are only Romanians*"[2]; inside the country there was a desire for balance, aiming to accomplish the national objectives, which were regarded as being more important than the singular, individual or group interests.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the liberal Eugeniu Stătescu spoke, in 1886, about the connection issues of the new political order. These had to be maintained and respected in order to consolidate the Romanian state: "*the hereditary monarchy, embodied by the person of Charles I and his dynasty, on one hand; liberty and democracy, on the other hand! These are our principles of governing. These are the principles from which all of our deeds sprung, since the liberal party is in power, and in which we have always found power and a line of conduct as a government!*".[3] Stătescu also presented, in a suggestive manner, the useful mechanism of the alternation to power of the two political forces: "*coming to power in turns, as the circumstances and country's interests will call to lead the affairs sometimes ones, or the others*".[4] Gradually, both the liberals and the conservatives got used to the mechanism of alternation to power, this mechanism became a necessary political practice in consolidating the institutions and in reforming the state.

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After 1881, the game of power changed between the constitutional monarchy and the political class, and this gave birth to a useful and rational relationship between Charles I and the two governmental parties, the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, with the purpose of accomplishing their shared objectives. In this context, Charles I and the politicians expressed their opinions in favour of sustaining a political stability, that will allow the existence of some measures, norms, laws for consolidating the political regime and the Romanian society. In time, there had been a lot of changes in the society, and also in the political life: "*in these twenty years, 1880-1900, we have the reign of king Charles I in all its splendour. A quiet reign, one we can't find in all of our past*".[5]

The governing dynamic between the two political blocs helped, one way or another, the development of these two governmental parties, also sustaining the two-party system, which went through a series of stages, based on: exercising the power; the experience the politicians gained inside the Government, Parliament etc.; the many election campaigns; the relationship between Charles I and the difficult political class; the election system with its own characteristics; the mechanism of *government alternation* ("governamental rotation", 1895-1914). The strengthening of the two-party system was done, gradually, after Romania became kingdom in 1881, making possible a better partnership between Charles

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 410.

[2] Alexandru Lahovari, *Discursuri politice*, Bucureşti, Editura Tipografia de Litere DOR. P. CUCU, 1905, p. 150.

[3] Eugeniu Stătescu, *Partidul Naţional-Liberal faţă cu grupurile politice de astădi*, Bucureşti, Tipografia Curtei Regale F. Göbl FII, 1886, p. 5.

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 24.

[5] C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Mărturisiri*, Bucureşti, Editura Minerva, 1990, p. 31.

I and the two parties. The prince and then the king carried out successfully the role of a moderator in a political regime which was created, initially, after a foreign pattern (Belgian and especially English) but which managed, in time, to get specific characteristics. The mechanism of *government alternation* ("governamental rotation", 1895-1914) helped the two-party system in Romania to became permanent, a common institution of that era, and also a specific particularity of the political regime.

The role of Charles I proved to be decisive in the game of power, especially after the consolidation of the monarchy, when Romania was proclaimed a kingdom. So, we can understand that in that time the crown "becomes the pivot around which the entire political life of the country revolves", and all the social classes identify the monarchy as "the source of power and that explains the traditional pilgrimage to the Royal Palace, that took place after each public meeting".[1]

When the government underwent a process of dismissal, the opposition used a series of methods to provoke the fall of the government (street manifests, public meetings, Parliament and press attacks, parliamentary obstruction [endless discussions in the Parliament] etc.). The climax was "the traditional pilgrimage to the Royal Palace", but King Charles I, especially after the growing influence of the constitutional monarchy, was not impressed by these tricks used by the opposition.

King Charles I, who was always concerned by the internal issues of the country, described in his letters such a graphic incident: "*the opposition adopted the parliamentary obstruction system to baulk the budget vote and thus to force the government's resignation, or to dissolve the legislative bodies*".[2] The budget vote was undoubtedly a very big stake for the cabinet, and the opposition made use of all the possible instruments to attack the power. From this point of view, Charles I was a big supporter of voting the country's budget and he also wanted to maintain a political balance, capable to frame two political forces for ensuring a steady context.

At that time, the process of designating the new government followed some steps: first, once the cabinet resigned, Charles I named a new prime-minister, according to his constitutional prerogative; in the second stage, the new designed prime-minister had the duty to organize the elections; last, but not least, the prime-minister's political block gained the confidence of the voting electors, winning the majority of the mandates in the legislative.

Inside the political regime, organizing the elections met some particularities which were specific with the social-political realities. Regardless of the political ideology, the political practice meant the use of some persuasive methods, but coercion methods were also used on a regular basis, and we even met situations like "forging the election results. The policeman and the magistrates became ward heelers".[3] In fact, the monarch held a strong position, rejecting these methods, which were unproductive for the health of the political regime: "*the oppositon /.../ gives them money for political demonstrations*".[4]

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[1] Gheorghe Tătărescu, *Regimul electoral și parlamentar în România*, București, Editura Fundației PRO, 2004, p. 120.

[2] *Scrisorile Regelui Carol I din arhiva de la Sigmaringen 1878-1905*, studiul introductiv, stabilirea textului, traducerea, adaptarea și notele de Sorin Cristescu, București, Editura Paideia, 2010, p. 149.

[3] Ion Bulei, *În Vechiul Regat*, București, Editura Tritonic, 2013, p. 129.

[4] *Jurnal. Carol I al României*, vol. I *(1881-1887)*, stabilirea textului, trad. din lb. germană, studiu introductiv și note de Vasile Docea, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2007, p. 300.

Another practice we come across that period of time is suggestively described by the conservative Constantin Argetoianu, who said about this process of elections: "*the main, almost exclusive concern of the candidate was the visits, because in the small electoral college every elector had to be visited and convinced /…/ each party also held a public meeting, at the time of the electoral campaign, but it served more to entertain the city's population and to supply the temporary leaflet with some doctrine*".[1] With time, as a consequence of the two-party system, in the elective competition grew a pragmatic and rational relationship between the two parties, liberal and conservative, and the elective body. Every side had well-defined duties in the Romanian political regime.

After 1881 and especially after the stabilization of the two-party system, the political game had king Charles I as a major character as, according to his prerogatives, he assigned the prime-minister, giving him a powerful position inside the political regime. In that era, there were subtle or direct attacks at the king, with the purpose of calling the opposition to power, though unsuccessful. In this well-defined frame, the opposition, no matter of the political ideology, used a series of strategies, persuasive methods and coercive ones, but they did not work because Charles I had a very strong personality. Moreover, the monarch maintained his own personal political convictions, which he often affirmed publically with the purpose to correct the actions of some politicians. Sadly, the political attitude of some of the leaders of that time obstructed the well-functioning of the state, but Charles I proved to be above the political passions and moderated some actions which could prevent the normal development of the Romanian political regime.

As an example, there were situations in which the opposition's "concern" regarding the safety of Charles I became a central issue. In a letter to his brother Leopold, on 22 September/ 4 October 1886, the king made a vexing confession: "*unfortunately, they make use of every means, and one of the most influential members of the opposition told me that, considering the situation, they can no longer guarantee the safety of my person. I have enough courage not to allow this sort of threats to make me step aside from accomplishing my duty /…/ we will never have a situation like in Bulgaria*".[2] Once more, the king supported a political stability regardless of the unproductive discussions that arose in the political life. Regardless of the situation, his role as a mediator was decisive for the well-functioning of the Romanian state. These kind of "issues" regarding the safety of Charles I, which were laughable and unrealistic, appeared also in 1870-1871, when there was a more tensed political situation.

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The mechanism of alternation between the two important parties in government that also functioned and was maintained in other European countries for a long period of time, was defended both by the monarch and by the Romanian political elite, and a necessary and tacit relationship between the constitutional monarchy and both of the government parties was formed. The British classical model of governing which was applied in the Romanian political regime proved to be useful and undoubtedly consistent in many aspects with our country, being a viable model which generated political stability.

We can agree that the evolution of the Romanian two-party system went to different stages, but the stabilization of the political mechanism was accomplished in the last period

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[1] Constantin Argetoianu, *Pentru cei de mâine, Amintiri din vremea celor de ieri*, vol. I *(1888-1898, 1913-1916)*, Bucureşti, Editura Albatros, 1991, p. 53.
[2] *Scrisorile Regelui Carol I din arhiva de la Sigmaringen 1878-1905*, p. 142.

of Charles I's reign (1895-1914), where the mechanism of *government alternation* ("governamental rotation") meant a useful instrument for Charles I to successfully accomplish his political vision, and he managed to impose a proper behaviour in the political life. At the same time, this political mechanism had a series of specific characteristics because of the behaviour of the politicians, the political practice, the social-political reality, but also of the Monarch's involvement in the well-functioning of the Romanian political regime.

Romania of the time of Charles I generated a lot of concerns, but with all the drawbacks and failings of the political regime, the so-necessary process of modernization of the young Romanian state could take place.

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ROMANIANS AND ITALIANS: CULTURAL CONVERGENCES DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19ᵀᴴ CENTURY

Laura Oncescu[*]

Abstract

The second half of the 19ᵗʰ century offered the young Romanians the possibility of travelling to different parts of Europe in order to continue or complete their studies, in order to take over cultural models or simply to get in touch with their civilization and culture. Traveling also to Italy, these young people – of whom we shall remind here of Simion Bărnuțiu, Alexandru Papiu Ilarian, Iosif Hodoș, Vasile Alecsandri, Ciprian Porumbescu, Elena Ghica – interacted with various Italian personalities and brought to Romania models of a culturally advanced society. In their turn, many of the Italian scholars – including Niccolo Tommaseo. Giovenale Vegezzi Ruscalla, Marc Antonio Canini, Angelo de Gubernatis, Brute Amante, Tullio Massarani, Carlo Tenca, Gabrielle Rosa, Cesare Correnti, Aleardo Aleardi, Giovanni Prati, and Adolfo Tossani – were interested in the origin of the Romanian people and published in their works a series of studies in this sense. The common origin of these two peoples, the sharing of the same national ideals but also their permanent affinity permitted, in time, the development of some intense relations that will crystalize, later on, during the second decennium of the 20ᵗʰ century, into the creation of the Romanian School of Rome.

Key words: *cultural convergences, Romanians, Italians*, 19ᵗʰ *century, modernization*

During the second half of the 19ᵗʰ century, both the Romanians and the Italians were in full process of creation of their unitary and modern states. The contacts with Italy were more noticeable, the Italian society giving the young Romanians models and inspiring to them not just ideas of Romanity but also ideas of social and political freedom.

Thus, Simion Bărnuțiu, Alexandru Papiu Ilarian and Iosif Hodoș were among the Romanians who studied in Italy during this period. Simion Bărnuțiu knew Italy beginning with the autumn of the year 1852. Visiting Trieste, Venice, Verona, Milan and Pavia to acquire a culture worthy of making him useful to his nation, he became familiar with the works of Boethius (who wrote here his famous *Consolation of Philosophy*) and Petrarch.[1] Alexandru Papiu Ilarian, fomerly a disciple of Simion Bărnuțiu at Blaj and a fighter in the 1848 Revolution, and Iosif Hodoș also completed their studies in Italy, but they chose Padua. About them, Alexandru Marcu mentioned the fact that they were living in a house which "we have been able to identify according to the address of a letter from Bărnuțiu (of December 11, 1852), Contrada Sal Vecchio, near the Dome and the University, in the

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[1] Alexandru Marcu, *Momente de Artă și Cultură Italiană* (Moments of Italian Art and Culture), Timișoara, Editura Fundației Oliviero Varzi, 1943, p. 108.

Great Square (Prato della Valle) of Padua, at a stone's throw from the center of the city, in the old, noisy, poor area of this town".[1]

The three Romanians became acquainted with the works of Carlo Cattaneo, a historian, economist and politician, insisting mainly on one dedicated to the Romanian language, "Del nesso fra la lingua valacca e l'italiana" ("On the Similarity between the Wallachian and the Italian language"), the first basic study published in Italy about the Romanian language. Cattaneo accentuated the prominent role of the vernacular, the only keeper of the Latin core, and proposed that along with the acquisition of the European civilization, the Romanians should accept other influences as well. At the same time, he invites the Italians to know the Romanian language, giving them to study several grammars and dictionaries that he knew, because the study of the Romanian language by the Italians could have thrown a new light on the vernacular Latin prototype that they both were coming from.[2]

Yet, Simion Bărnuţiu, Iosif Hodoş and Papiu Ilarian, studying the work of Cattaneo, will discover as well some imprecisions that they will try to fight (namely Cattaneo's affirmation that the Romanians do not have a true literature, but only grammar studies, demonstrating by this an unprecedented philological exaggeration). In a so-called "dissertation", Papiu Ilarian and Iosif Hodoş come up with an answer to what Cattaneo had written; they focus on the Romanians' past, invoking popular traditions dating since the times of the Romans (in relation to birth, death or marriage) precisely to highlight the "purity" of the Romanians' Latinity.[3]

In his turn, Bărnuţiu mentioned that the Romanians doubtlessly had a national literature, well represented by Ion Heliade Rădulescu, Grigore Alexandrescu, Cezar Bolliac, Theodor Rosetti, and Andrei Mureşanu, who were not just authors of grammars and philologists, but also poets. Among the personalities that Simion Bărnuţiu met in Italy, there was also Carlo Gambini, considered the father of the Italian glottology and author of a *Dictionario domestico pavese-italiano*, which Bărnuţiu used a lot in his study of the parallelism between the Romanian and the Italian language.[4]

Being at studies in Italy, Simion Bărnuţiu sent Titu Maiorescu a series of letters informing him on the latest researches and philological studies appeared in Italy, being interested especially in the issue of the Italian alphabet and in finding a unitary ortograph for the two countries. For this reason, he suggested the idea of the creation of a Philological Academy, directed by Timotei Cipariu, August Treboniu Laurian and Titu

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[1] Idem, *Simion Bărnuţiu, Alexandru Papiu Ilarian şi Iosif Hodoş la studii în Italia, (Cu documente inedite)* (Simion Bărnuţiu, Alexandru Papiu Ilarian and Iosif Hodoş at studies in Italy), Academia Română – Memoriile Secţiunii Literare (The Romanian Academy – The Memories of the Literary Section), series III, tome VII, Bucureşti, 1935, p. 46.

[2] See, for more details, the studies of Carlo Cattaneo on the Romanian language, Carlo Ghisalberti, *Nazione e lingua in Carlo Cattaneo. Lo scritto "Del nesso fra la lingua valaca e l'italiana"*, in "Clio", anno XXXV, no. 1 (gennaio-marzo 1999), Edizioni Scientifice Italiane, pp. 27-37.

[3] See, for more details, about this polemic between the Transylvanians studying in Italy and Cattaneo, Alexandru Marcu, *Simion Bărnuţiu, Alexandru Papiu Ilarian şi Iosif Hohoş la studii în Italia…*, pp. 53-58.

[4] George Lăzărescu, *Prezenţe româneşti în Italia* (Romanian Presences in Italy), Bucureşti, Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică, 1995, p. 54. See also Alexandru Marcu, *Simion Bărnuţiu...*, p. 75.

Maiorescu, to work in order to obtain this ortographic unification, a suggestion that was to lead, not many years after that, to the creation of the Romanian Academy.[1]

The year 1854 crowned all the efforts of the three Romanians, as they obtained the title of Doctor in Law, with maximal appreciations, Iosif Hodoş and Papiu Ilarian on January 10, 1854, at the University of Padua, and Simion Bărnuţiu on June 7, 1854, at the University of Pavia. On his return to his homeland, Simion Bărnuţiu stopped for a short while in Milan and in Verona to improve his knowledge of agrarian economy[2], for the same purpose of modernizing the Romanian agriculture. Influenced by Romagnosi and Cattaneo, Bărnuţiu tried to adapt the economic standards of the West to the situation in his country, wishing to find solutions to problems such as: how to increase soil fertility, how to put to a better use the technical and scientific knowledge, because, as he was saying, he had found in the economy and the education of Lombardia a very good model, adaptable to Transylvania. In the country, Simion Bărnuţiu created, in Moldova, in Iaşi, a true school, by which he set the scientific foundations of the Romanian public law. In his turn, Iosif Hodoş published a "Discurs despre istoria literaturii italiene" (Discourse on the History of the Italian Literature) in "Familia" in 1866, and, for his vast culture, he was elected among the first members of the Romanian Academy, in 1866, along with Alexandru Papiu Ilarian. The permanent character of the philological preoccupations in the activity of Simion Bărnuţiu can also be noticed indirectly, by the style adopted in his later studies. Just like Ion Heliade Rădulescu, Bărnuţiu considered that it is necessary to remove the compromised words of foreign origin from the Romanian language and to replace them with terms adapted from the Italian.[3]

Convinced of the usefulness of an assimilation as rich as possible of the Italian language and culture, in favor of the spiritual emancipation of the Romanian people, Bărnuţiu, Laurian and Hodoş expressed their support for a bright relation between us and a civilization worthy of becoming totally familiarized with. The boundless admiration for Italy and its culture even led to the idea of the creation of some Italian colonies to support the development of the Romanian industry, approaches taken over, later on, also by Marc Antonio Canini.[4]

Another Romanian, George Murnu, dedicated a whole work to Italy. Dealing with the study of the monuments of the antiquity of Rome, he highlighted the brilliance and great

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[1] Alexandru Marcu, *Simion Bărnuţiu...*, pp. 101-102.

[2] Ştefan Delureanu, *Impressioni romene sul Lombardo-Veneto*, excerpt from "Atti del LII Congresso di Storia del Risorgimento Italiano" (Cagliari 10-14 Ottombre 1986), Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano, Biblioteca Scientifica, vol. XXII, 1988, pp. 423-425.

[3] Alexandru Marcu, *Simion Bărnuţiu...*, pp. 129-130.

[4] Marc Antonio Canini, a poet, writer, philologist, and journalist, studied Law in Padua. He was the initiator of the publication "Buletinul războbelului din Italia" (Italian War Bulletin) in Bucharest and was known during his epoch by the activity undertaken in Romania in the context of the French-Sardinian-Austrian plans. See in this sense Raluca Tomi, *Imaginea constituirii regatului italian în presa din Principate (1859-1861)* (The Image of the Constitution of the Italian Kingdom in the Press of the Romanian Principalities (1859-1861)), in *Identitate naţională şi spirit european. Academicianul Dan Berindei la 80 de ani* (National Identity and European Spirit. The Academician Dan Berindei at 80), Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, pp. 395-401; for the activity of Marc Antonio Canini in the Romanian area see also Nicolae Iorga, *Un pensatore politico italiano all'epoca del Risorgimento: Marc Antonio Canini*, Excerpt from "Bulletin de la Section Historique de l'Academie Roumaine", tome XX, Bucarest, 1938.

architectural art of the Italian capital. He was mentioning: "The idea of being related to Rome has given us pride and strength, it has united us under the same flag, it has covered the rags of our poverty and humility with the purple of dignity, it has enlarged the sky of our ambitions and has exhorted us towards higher aims, towards greater ideals".[1]

Beside the previously-mentioned personalities, other Romanians have also been interested in Italy. Among them, Vasile Alecsandri occupied a special place. By the merit of having introduced the topic of the Italian exoticism in the Romanian literature, Vasile Alecsandri was one of the creators of modern Romania. Marc Antonio Canini, publishing in 1879, in Paris, the brochure *La vérité sur la question israélite* (The Truth in the Israeli Matter), found the opportunity to sneak in the hint that the Moldavian poet was the descendant of a Jew of Trieste, Italy, named Isacco Alecsandri. Actually, the poet himself also claimed that he was originary from Venice, his relations to Italy being largely dominated by this faith. Vasile Alecsandri undertook, in time, numerous voyages to Italy, yet his role in a closer connection between the Romanians and the Italians became obvious especially in the context of the year 1859, when he was appointed an ambassador of the Romanian cause in the West. Alecsandri's mission to King Victor Emmanuel and Cavour proved to be a real success, especially if we consider the critical circumstances in which he was to represent the Romanians' interests in the West (the French-Sardinian plans of driving the Austrians away from the north of Italy and then the actual outbreak of the war).[2]

In this context, Vasile Alecsandri met Giovenale Vegezzi Ruscalla[3], a good friend of the Romanians, as Alexandru Marcu called him. Born in 1818, Ruscalla was now at full glory of his activity, dedicated both to the affirmation of the Romanian history, language and literature in Italy, and to the recognition of our cause. In the year 1859, Ruscalla had read the work of Alecsandri, which he had largely translated and made known to the Italian public. To prove the affinity between the Romanian and the Italian language, Ruscalla declared the verses of Alecsandri strictly literary and exhorted his conationals to imitate his example, collecting their own folklore. We can say that the friendship between the two was created based on Ruscalla's desire to make our popular literature known in Italy, as his collector and editor was precisely Vasile Alecsandri.[4]

Vasile Alecsandri will return to Italy, in Turin, on a second mission, in the spring of the year 1861, and later on, in 1882, he undertook his much-awaited voyage in Europe.

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[1] Zaharia Sângeorzan, *Pelerini români la columna lui Traian* (Romanian Pilgrims at Trajan's Column), Bucureşti, Editura Sport-Turism, 1979, pp. 79-80.

[2] See, for more details, about the evolution of these plans and about the policy of Cavour, in general, Alexandru Marcu, *Conspiratori şi conspiraţii în epoca Renaşterii politice a României, 1848-1877* (Conspirators and Conspirations during the Age of Romania's Political Renaissance), Bucureşti, Editura Cartea Românească, 2000, pp. 164-285.

[3] See, about the relations between Vegezzi-Ruscalla and the Romanian people, T. Onciulescu, *Giovenale Vegezzi-Ruscalla e i romeni*, in "Ephemeris Dacoromana", Annuario della Scuola Romena di Roma, IX, Roma, 1940, pp. 351-445.

[4] Alexandru Marcu, *Vasile Alecsandri şi Italia* (Vasile Alecsandri and Italy), Bucureşti, Cultura Naţională, 1927, pp. 92-94; regarding the connections between Giovenale Vegezzi Ruscalla and the Romanians, see, for more details, Idem, *Un fedele amico dei Rumeni: Giovenale Vegezzi Ruscalla*, excerpt from: "Il Giornale di Politica e di Letteratura", anno II, quad. VIII, agosto 1926.

During this last period, Alecsandri met the great Italian scholar Ascoli, one of the most brilliant representatives of modern glottology.[1]

The well-known Romanian composer Ciprian Porumbescu also travelled to Italy. He visited Trieste, Venice, Genoa, Nervi, Roma, Florence, and Napoli. In Genoa, he met Giuseppe Verdi and came in real touch with the sound of his music, yet what impressed him the most was the divine beauties of the Eternal City.[2] In his correspondence, he was communicating impressions with the impetus of a true romantic. Writing to his brother, he was mentioning: "Venice is splendid but not beautiful; it is full of a holy seriousness and yet unfaithful".[3]

Another much appreciated Romanian in the European intellectual world was Elena Ghica, a grand-daughter of Alexandru Ghica, ruler of Moldova, known under the pseudonym of Dora d'Istria. Highly erudite, Dora d'Istria studied music and painting under the guidance of Italians masters, so that the year 1848 found her at studies in Venice. In the year 1861, she returned to Italy, her arrival here being greeted by Garibaldi as a "heroical sister, a soul opened to the noblest aspirations".[4]

A highly intelligent woman, very perceptive and endowed with a rich sense of beauty and of the literature, Dora d'Istria was a personality that was little known in our country. Dedicating to her several articles in "Trompeta Carpaţilor", Cezar Bolliac solicited the Romanian authorities to officially consacrate her qualities, by publishing at least a part of her works that were already known abroad. In the year 1868, Bartolomeo Cecchetti, professor of paleography and director of the National Archives of Venice, dedicated a monograph to her, by which he publicized the writer's works. Due to her scientific qualities, Dora d'Istria was a member of numerous academies of Italy, (member of Minerva Academy of Turin, member of Raffaello Academy of Urbino, of the Pythagorean Academy of Napoli) but also from other European countries, France, Greece, and Turkey.

At the same time, many young Romanians completed their studies at various universities of Italy. Thus, most of the Romanian marine officers that wanted to be trained at naval academies from abroad, turned their attention to Italy, where the educational system was highly efficient and the fleet was considered as one of the best in the world. The Naval Academy of Livorno was an example in this sense. After they were concluding their one-year apprenticeship on the ship *Etna*, the Romanian scholarship beneficiaries were put ashore and became *Guardia marina*, then they returned home, being hired on one of the ships of the Romanian navy. Out of these Romanian graduates, we shall remind of: Petre Mihail, Nicolae Chiriţescu, Alexandru Popovici, Constantin Pogonaru, August Roman, Iacob Filip, Silviu Bucescu, Mircea Iliescu, Ion Miriţeanu, Pantelimon Popovici, Alexandru Constantinescu, Constantin Ionescu, Nicolae Gonta, Vasile Năsturaş, Emilian Ionescu, Alexandru Cătuneanu, Vasile Scrodea, the latter securing an official position as a military attaché to the Romanian Legation of Rome.[5]

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[1] Ascoli, professor of philology at the University of Milan and director of the Archived of Italian Glottology, dealt mainly with researches concerning the Romanian language. See Alexandru Marcu, *Vasile Alecsandri...*, p. 137.

[2] George Lăzărescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-91.

[3] Zaharia Sângeorzan, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-74.

[4] George Lăzărescu, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

[5] Horaţiu Bodale, *Bursieri români la Academia Navală de la Livorno în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea şi începutul secolului XX* (Romanian scholarship beneficiaries at the Naval Academy of Livorno

By a direct contact with Italy, the Romanian people acquired the necessary force to fight against the Hungarians', the Austrians' and the Russians' de-nationalization tendencies, becoming aware of their Latin origin. Thanks to their contacts with Italy, the Romanians have found the origins of the Romanian literature, which, after having received other Western influences as well, especially French, will manage to make out of the ideal of rustic life a real art. In this way, in just one century it will produce the genius of the "Morning Star" of the Romanian poetry, Mihai Eminescu, the ballads of the Transylvanian George Coşbuc, the translator of Dante's *Divina commedia*, Caragiale's commedy, the historical drama of Delavrancea, the novel of Duiliu Zamfirescu, Mihail Sadoveanu and Liviu Rebreanu.[1]

Many of the Italian men of letters were interested in the origin of the Romanian people, realizing a series of studies in this sense. Even since the first decennium of the 19th century, Giuseppe Mezzofanti was holding, at the Academy of Sciences of the Institute of Bologna, a discourse on the Wallachian language, in which he was reaching the conclusion that the Latin language is part of the vocabulary of the Romanian language. Giacomo Leopardi, studying the Romanian language along with the other Romance languages, was mentioning that the Romanians' interest in Latinity was generalized to such an extent in Italy toward 1825 that it can no longer be missing from the preoccupations of any Italian scholar or thinker.[2]

The one who introduced Leopardi to the Romanians was Iosif Hodoş, who, publishing a history of the Italian literature, was presenting Leopardi as a passionate minstrel of the human sufferings. The Romanian literature, dominated towards the end of the century by the poetical personality of Eminescu and by the critique of Titu Maiorescu, proved to be very sensitive to the lyric poetry of Leopardi. Maiorescu himself, the reformer of the Romanian literature, stated that the lyrics of Leopardi are not just worthy of admiration, but even superior to those of Victor Hugo. Duiliu Zamfirescu, the translator of Leopardi and Carducci, was writing: "I have to say that the better I understand Leopardi, the less I dare to translate him. The infinite delicacy with which his voice goes up to the sky, the content of his expressions, its absolute coincidence with the images, give me the impression that it is better for them to remain untouched".[3]

A significant echo in the Romanian Countries, around the 1848 events, was triggered by Silvio Pellico's works, *Le mie prigioni* and *I doveri degli uomini*, the latter appearing in our country under the auspices of the Literary Association (Asociaţia Literară) and in the printing press of C.A. Rosetti.[4]

However, out of all the Italian writers who have dealt with the Romanian language and with its Latinity, a remarkable figure was especially Niccolo Tommaseo. Studying the Romanian language by comparison to the other Balkan languages, and especially in

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during the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century), in "Anuarul Şcolii Doctorale Istorie. Civilizaţie. Cultură" (Annuary of the History Doctoral School. Civilization, Culture), I, Cluj-Napoca, Presa Universitară Clujană, 2005, pp. 276-277.

[1] Claudiu Isopescu, *L'Italia e le origini della nuova letteratura romena*, excerpt from "Il Giornale di Politica e di Letteratura", anno V, quad. II-III, febbraio-marzo 1929 – VII, p. 20.

[2] Alexandru Marcu, *L'Italia in cerca della latinitá dei rumeni*, Bucureşti, 1927, p. 12.

[3] Idem, *Momente de Artă şi Cultură Italiană…*, p. 124.

[4] George Lăzărescu, *Civilizaţie italiană* (Italian Civilization), Bucureşti, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1987, pp. 253-254.

relation to the vernacular Latin, he adopted an attitude favorable to the internal fights for the deliverance of the whole Romanian nation and for its national unity. Thus, he was writing, in 1859, a manifesto addressed to the Transylvanian soldiers, who, enrolled in the Habsbourg army, were fighting against Italy, asking them to join their brothers of the Italian Peninsula. Along with the political and cultural renaissance of the Romanian people, the Romanian popular literature became increasingly better known among the Italian literates (especially with Cesare Cantù and Arturo Graf, the latter spending his adolescence in Romania), as well as the erudite literature, studied by the publicist Giovenale Vegezzi Ruscalla and the Venetian Marc Antonio Canini, an agent of Mazzini in the East, who later on published a vast anthology of the universal lyric poetry, an important part of it being dedicated to the Romanian literature.[1]

Giovenale Vegezzi-Ruscalla, also called the "dean of the philo-Romanians", founded, towards the end of his life, the *Greek-Latin League*, aiming to reunite, in this association, representatives of all the nations of Greek and Latin culture.[2]

Toward the year 1860, the interest of the Italian political and cultural world in the Romanians and in the destinies of their Romanity grew. It is the moment when the best-known philo-Romanians of the 19th century emerge: Angelo de Gubernatis, Brute Amante, Tullio Massarani, Carlo Tenca, Gabrielle Rosa, Cesare Correnti, the one who highlighted the affinity between the Romanians and the Italians and the other "Italy that preserved more faithfully than us the name of Roman"[3], and Luigi Cazzavillan, who founded, in Bucharest, the newspaper "Universul".[4]

It is also during the second half of the 19th century, when the Italian literature was heading towards a "second romanticism", that its best-known representatives, Aleardo Aleardi and Giovanni Prati, found in the history of the Romanian people the sources of their inspiration, to realize true romantic works in which our history occupied a prominent place. Aleardi's poem, "I sette soldati", was inspired by the life of the Romanians of Transylvania, being at the same time one of the most inspired achievements of the Veronese poet.[5]

Marc Antonio Canini and Carlo Tagliavini showed interest for Mihai Eminescu's poetry. Canini, in his work, *Libro dell'amore*, inserted translations of Eminescu's verses, whereas Carlo Tagliavini, a young Italian philologist, was presenting Eminescu in a very complex manner.[6]

Author of the volume *Amore e dolore*, Marc Antonio Canini supported and even managed to attain the creation, in 1884, of a course of Romanian language and literature at the Superior School of Commerce of Venice.[7]

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[1] Alexandru Marcu, *Momente…*, p. 56.

[2] Camil Mureşanu, *Periodici e personalita illustrativi per le relazini italo-romene nel XIX secolo*, in "Annuario", anno 2 (2000), a cura di Şerban Marin, Ion Bulei, Venezia, p. 458.

[3] Bianca Valota Cavallotti, *Prenipoti di Traiano, Roma, L'Italia e l'imagine di se dei romeni*, Bucarest, Casa Editrice della Fondazione Culturale Romena, 2000, p. 120.

[4] Alexandru Marcu, *L'Italia in cerca...*, p. 15.

[5] Idem, *Momente...*, p. 58.

[6] Nicolae Iorga, *Conferenze italiane sulla nazione romena*, Milano, Ulrico Hoepli Editore, 1927, pp. 21-22.

[7] Camil Mureşanu, *op. cit.*, p. 459; see also Dumitru Irimia, *Eminescu e Venezia*, in *Dall'adriatico al Mar Nero: veneziani e romeni, tracciati di storie comuni*, a cura di Grigore Arbore Popescu, Roma, 2003, pp. 263-264.

His close ties with Vasile Boerescu, the director of the daily *Naționalul* (The National), allowed Canini to publish in its pages a long series of articles, at the same time translating in Romanian, along with G. Valentineanu, Italian works that were going to be played on the scenes of the Romanian theatres.[1]

Towards the end of the 19th century, another Italian, Adolfo Tossani, was presenting the children of Italy a summary of a voyage that he had made to Romania. His work, entitled *Dall'Arno al Mer Nero, impressioni e ricordi*, provided a short description of Transylvania and Walachia, the author insisting mainly on our country's past.[2]

These Romanian-Italian cultural meetings coincided with the creation, later on, during the second decennium of the 20th century, of the Romanian School of Rome. Constituting the accomplishment of the cultural-patriotic ideals of the great historian, philosopher and archeologist Vasile Pârvan, deeply aware of the importance of the existence of such a Romanian cultural center, *Academia di Romania*, as the School of Rome is now called, was to spread in the Eternal City the fundamental historical truth, vital for us, of the cohabitation of the Dacian people with the Roman one.[3]

Italy holds even to this day numerous documents that refer to the Romanians, especially in the Archives of Vatican, of the Institute De Propaganda Fide, in the Borghese fund, villa Panfili Doria, the State Archives of Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Florence, Livorno, inestimable acts, true treasures of our history, not to mention Trajan's Column, on whose bassoreliefs are reproduced, amazingly faithfully, real scenes, a living chronicle of the epoch of the birth of the Daco-Roman people.

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Idem, *Quelques voyageurs occidentaux en Orient*, in "Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen", nr. 1-3, 1932.

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[1] Francesco Guida, *L'Italia e il risorgimento balcanico. Marco Antonio Canini*, Roma, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1984, pp. 120-122.

[2] Nicolae Iorga, *Quelques voyageurs occidentaux en Orient*, in "Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen", nr. 1-3, 1932, pp. 81-82.

[3] George Lăzărescu, *Școala Română din Roma* (The Romanian School of Rome), București, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 2002, p. 25.

Idem, *Un pensatore politico italiano all'epoca del Risorgimento: Marc Antonio Canini*, Excerpt from "Bulletin de la Section Historique de l'Academie Roumaine", tome XX, Bucarest, 1938.

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THE AUTONOMY OF ALBANIA UNDER PROTECTORATE AND ADMINISTRATION OF AUSTRO-HUNGARY DURING THE WWI

Selim Bezeraj*, Bujar Dugolli **

Abstract

This paper attempts to show the way in which Albania progressed towards independence under the auspices of Austro-Hungary. The paper also explores the declaration of autonomy of Korca, the development of the war against the Central Block, and the reduction of the Austro-Hungarian influence on the Albanian people, the main premises that stirred much resentment in order for Austro-Hungary to take its decision leading to 23 January 1917 for a special announcement to put Albania under its protectorate. Also, it highlights the movement of the Austro-Hungarian army which conquered most of the territory, passing the Albanian border in pursuit of the Serbian and Montenegrin army, and later passed into central and southwestern Albania.

In particular, the remainder of this paper focuses on the manner in which the Albanians accepted the presence of the Austro-Hungarian army in the Albanian territories, as well as what the image of Albanians was to the Austro-Hungarians. Also, what was the level of cooperation between Albanians and the Austro-Hungarian administration and what were their administrative practices? The paper concludes with identifying inconsistent and frustrating points between the Austro-Hungarian administration in Albanian territories and the population which responded to the regime of the Austro-Hungarian military authorities.

Key words: *Autonomy, Albania, Austro-Hungary, the Protectorate, influence*

Introduction

During World War I, northern Albania, central Albania and southwestern Albania, up to the Vjosa River, was an area of Austro-Hungarian mastership. As such, it appeared at that time that it was the largest area under Austro-Hungarian occupation.[1]

Although Austro-Hungary had not made any official statement on its attitude towards Albania during the first part of World War I, in diplomatic and military circles it had been discussed. However, in the diplomatic circles of the government of Vienna, there were different views about the future of Albania.[2] On January 7, 1916 when the Austro-Hungarian army broke the Serbian army and the Montenegrin army was captured, there was a meeting of the Council of Ministers of Austro-Hungary in which different views on the political future of Albania were discussed. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Buriani, thought it was necessary to preserve the independence of Albania. This would be possible only if other Albanian regions which were given to Serbia and Montenegro after the Balkan War at the Conference of Ambassadors in 1913 joined.

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[1] ValentinaDuka, *Histori e Shqipërisë 1912-2000*, Tiranë, SHBLU, 2007, p. 89.
[2] Paskal Milo, *Politika e Jashtme e Shqipërisë 1912-1939*, vol. I, Tiranë, Toena, 2013, p. 282.

Also, he thought that, if governed correctly, Albania may well develop as an autonomous state.

1. Diplomacy of Austro-Hungary and the status of Albania in the years 1916-1918

Austro-Hungary should have done this by exercising an effective protectorate over Albania, rather than by annexing it, and making it a country that could stand on its feet. Consolidating independence in this country and joining the defense policy of the Central Block would serve the interests of Austro-Hungary in the Balkans. The existence of an Albanian State would prevent the intervention of Italy, excessive expansion of Bulgaria, and the emergence of Serbia in the Adriatic Sea. Buriani's idea was to make a probe with an autonomous Albania under the auspices of Austro-Hungary. If the probe failed, nothing would be lost and other measures could have been taken. With the existence of the Albanian state under the protectorate of Austro-Hungary, Buriani thought the best approach was to solve the problem of the Albanian resistance and join the Albanians over Austro-Hungary in order to avoid the influence of the Entente Powers' propaganda. Also, Buriani thought that Greece could be given some land from the territory of southern Albania to maintain neutrality, since according to him, the territory given to Greece would not play a major role if territories under the occupation of Serbia and Montenegro would join Albania. Also, the realization of Albanian independence under the auspices of Austro-Hungary, according to Buriani, would depend on the outcome of the war since Italy would not voluntarily relinquish the position it had in the Adriatic.[1]

Count Tisra was less optimistic than Buriani about the possibility of future development of Albania. He thought he should not attempt to transfer the country into a model state because any failure of a probe would be regarded as a defeat of Austro-Hungary. It would not be an easy job to keep away foreign influences from Albania, especially the Italian ones.

Meanwhile, the Chief of General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian army, Conrad von Höztendorf, had a different opinion that was somewhat anti-Albanian. He went so far as to support an option for partitioning the Albanian state between Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece, linked to the Central Block.[2] According to Conrad, this fragmentation could prevent Italian intervention in Albania in the best manner. He was against the establishment of the protectorate in the Albanian state.[3] During the meeting, none of the participants had any disagreement or objections to the territories that would be given to Greece. These different views on the political future of Albania, in diplomatic and military circles of Austro-Hungary, remained almost unchanged until near the end of World War I.[4]

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[1] Archive of the Institute of History, Tirana (AIH), Haus-Hof und Staatsarchiv, (HHStA), Politische Archiv (PA), A-IV-239, *Protocols of the Council of Ministers of Austro-Hungary 1914-1918.*

[2] AIH, HHStA, PA, Vj-26-7-721, *Telegram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Austro-Hungarian sent to consul Szillasy in Athens*, 23 May 1916, Vienna.

[3] AIH, HHStA, PA, Vj-26-7-735, *Report of consul Szillasy sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna*, 26 May 1916, Athens.

[4] Muin Çami, *Shqipëria në marrëdhëniet ndërkombëtare 1914-1918,* Tiranë, Akademia e Shkencave të Shqipërisë, 1987, p. 253.

Austro-Hungarian diplomacy thought through the observance of nationality, religion, property, local laws and customs to ensure that Austro-Hungary permanently practiced effective monitoring over the land and its administration.[1] But, as noted, not all of these were accepted by the Austro-Hungarians. The Austro-Hungarian military authorities ordered that every Albanian fit for military service must serve in the army. They also began a search, condemning and fining people found possessing weapons.[2] Other similar measures included forcible confiscation of residents' domestic animals and farm products to feed soldiers and forcing the population to construct military facilities. This situation led to an increased difficulty in relations between the Albanians and the Austro-Hungarians resulting in the organizing of armed groups of patriots and local uprisings. This situation that arose in Albania troubled Austro-Hungary, and particularly government circles who saw, during World War I, the development of a lack of favor toward the Central Block, the declaration of autonomy of Korca by the French, as well as the reduction of the Austro-Hungarian influence on Albanian people. It became clear that it was necessary to take immediate measures to improve the situation. Representatives of the political and Austro-Hungarian military staged an emergency meeting in December 1916 in Teschen, Czech Republic. Arriving at the General Command headquarters on December 9, they came up with a common agreement stipulating the political future of Albania.[3] This agreement was preceded by the preparation of Albania's declaration of autonomy under the Austro-Hungarian protectorate on January 23, 1917 in Shkodra, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the entry of the Austro-Hungarian troops in Shkodra.[4] In this proclamation, it was stated that the Austro-Hungarians did not come as conquerors but in pursuit of their enemies. They proclaimed that the Albanian people needed to be educated to avoid mistakes of the past and try to exercise, as soon as possible, the right of self-governance. In addition, they declared that, when the conditions for the country's autonomy would be realized, Austro-Hungary without hesitation would take steps to establish Albanian self-administration. In this proclamation it was understood that the Albanian people would experiment with self-administration and the result in the end would be an internal autonomy. From the international perspective, Albania would remain under the protection of Austro-Hungary.[5]

After this act was taken by Austro-Hungary, the Austro-Hungarian military authorities in Shkodra created an administrative council consisting of local residents, but led by the Austro-Hungarian representatives.[6] Vienna diplomats said that this would expand the territory of the Albanian state under the map decided at the Conference of

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[1] AIH, HHStA, PA, Vj-26-7-729 *Letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austro-Hungary sent to Count Turn*, 4 April 1916, Vienna.

[2] AIH, HHStA, PA, Vj-26-20-2022, *Secret note of the Chief of General Headquarters at Army Forces Command in Albania sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna*, 28 May 1916, Teschen.

[3] AIH, HHStA, PA, Vj-26-20-2022, *Secret note of the Chief of General Headquarters at Army Forces Command in Albania sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna*, 28 May 1916, Teschen.

[4] Pietro Pastoreli, *L'Albania nella politica estera italiana 1914-1920*, Bari, Facolta Giuridica Dell'Universita di Bari, 1970, p. 42.

[5] *Ibidem*, p. 43.

[6] AIH, HHStA, Vj-27-1-114, *The speech of the Albanian delegation at the ceremony in Vienna*, 1 January 1917, Shkodra.

Ambassadors in London. This decision of the Austro-Hungarian administration in Albania allowed for the display of the Albanian national flag and the opening of schools in the Albanian language. But, learning German was mandatory, allowing for the development of different activities with cultural character.[1]

2. Albanians in the end of World War I

Despite all these actions taken by the Austro-Hungarians, the Albanian people felt great disappointment. They expected Austro-Hungary to improve its future destiny and meet the expectations of the Albanian people by supporting them in this difficult and critical moment. They wanted to be protected and to be enabled in uniting all Albanians in a single homeland under its own independence and ethnic territory. However, Vienna diplomats realized that the war had come to an end and acknowledged that the forms of protectorate over Albania that had been applied for years would depend upon the war and the negotiations for the establishment of peace in Europe and the World.

The Austro-Hungarian's presence in Kosovo and the Albanian territories would begin to end on September 29, 1918 when the French division entered in Skopje. On 1st October, the Austro-Hungarian and German forces were ordered to withdraw by 6 October and leave the territory of Kosovo, going northward and northwest.[2]

Besides the withdrawal of the Austro-Hungarian and German troops from Albanian territories, the Serb forces entered into Kosovo and surrounding areas, along with French and Italian forces. This helped in the occupation of Kosovo and preset the future of Kosovo under the Serbian Kingdom.

Conclusion

Foreign policy of Austro-Hungary prompted Albania's status as independent and neutral, preserved and not altered since the First World War, even despite the influence of invasions of the Balkan states and supported by the Great Powers.

Even though they were separated into several occupation zones, Albanian territories distinguished political and military personalities at this time and did not stop making strong resistance to achieve their liberation and unification. Perhaps, this was enabled by the presence of Austro-Hungary which naturally led to this idea of independence for the Albanian people.

The last years of the First World War marked a change in the political course of the Albanians which, until now, was oriented to the Central Block. The new focus was towards the Entente which had managed to win almost all fronts of the war. This was a new step and very important, especially for the future of the Albanian state.

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[1] Fiçorri, *op. cit.,* p. 285.

[2] Viron Koka et. Al., *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar*, vol. III, Tiranë, TOENA, 2007, pp. 442-443.

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GRANTING CITIZENSHIP TO JEWS IN ROMANIA
AFTER THE GREAT UNIFICATION OF 1918

*Adi Schwarz**

Abstract

After the Union of 1918, the issue of granting citizenship to Jews from Romania enters its final phase. Under the influence of including Jews from the former historical provinces of Romania in 1918, it was necessary to take quick action to resolve the problem of the Jews from the Old Kingdom, who had been able to obtain citizenship only by individual naturalization. The ratification documents of union of Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania, Banat, Crişana, Maramureş with Romania imposed the adoption of a transitional decree on granting citizenship to Jews from the Old Kingdom. This culminated in the decree law of 28 May 1919. In Europe, Romania will sign also the minority Treaty on 10 December 1919, after some disputes, which however were not related to the granting of political rights of national minorities.

The main measures that led to granting citizenship to Jews from Romania in 1919 are presented in this article.

Key words: *Israelites*, *Great Union*, *citizenship*, *Old Kingdom*, *Decree-Law*

The Great Union of 1918, historic act accomplished following public meetings and carried out in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transylvania during the period March to December 1918, whose plebiscitary nature is undeniable, was the culmination of the efforts of several generations of Romanian political and intellectual elite. This union was acknowledged, with enough effort and incompletely at the peace conferences in Paris (Protocol Bessarabia had not fully resolved the situation of the province; its finalization being left to regulation in the future between Romania and Soviet Russia, state which had not participated in the Conference).

"The minorities' question" in Romania represented, throughout the interwar period, a contradictory and complex issue.

Ioan Scurtu[1], Lya Beniamin[2], Dumitru Hîncu[3], Dinu C. Giurescu[4], Alexandru Radu[5] are the main authors who have approached this perspective of contemporary historiography.

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[1] Ioan Scurtu, Liviu Boar, *Minorităţile naţionale din România. 1918-1925. Documente*, Bucureşti, Arhivele Statului din România, 1995.

[2] Dumitru Hîncu, Lya Benjamin, *Evreii din România în Războiul de Reîntregire a Ţării 1916-1919*, Bucureşti, Editura Hasefer, 1996.

[3] *Ibidem.*

[4] Dinu C. Giurescu, *Evreii din România (1939-1944)*, în vol. *Romania în al doilea război mondial, 1939-1947*, Bucureşti, Editura All, 1997.

[5] Alexandru Radu, *Reforma sistemului electoral din România. O istorie analitică* (I), in "Sfera Politicii", nr. 167, ianuarie 2012, http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/167/art01-RaduA.php, accessed at 31 October 2015.

The main point that emerges from analysis of the period 1918-1920 is that the Jews were a separate affair in minorities' issue. First of all, in this case, discrimination was made indirectly in the sense that the Jews of the United Provinces were integrated as citizens, while Jews from the Old Kingdom continued to be under the influence of the laws of naturalization imposed by Article 7 of the Constitution form 1866.

Thus, decision makers in Bucharest had to find a formula aimed at closing off these discrepancies.

As it concerned the Israelites, they were integrated into the culture of the majority society they lived in. Jews from Bessarabia experienced influence of Russian culture and society, in Bukovina predominated Austrian influence, while in Transylvania and Banat there was a Hungarian and German influence. Jews from the Old Kingdom were framed culturally, socially and politically within the Romanian society.

Romania after the Great Union became a medium-sized country in Europe regarding its area and population.[1]

Beyond the enthusiasm that Romanians in provinces under foreign rule came together under a single political authority and under the same system of laws, before the reunited Romania opened prospects of legislative uniformity, harmonization of situation of minorities in the United Provinces and also agreement upon certain existing issues in the Old Kingdom.

"The Jewish Question" in the Old Kingdom had been solved insufficiently amending Article 7 of the Constitution in 1879 and also by granting citizenship to 883 Jews who had participated in the War of Independence. Very few of the Israelites, relative to their numbers in society[2], managed to become citizens until 1918 because of cumbersome procedure of individual naturalization. In addition, there had been lively discussions around some discriminatory provisions of the "Missir" law.[3]

Jews distinguished themselves in the Second Balkan War and in the war of national reunification.[4] Before the war for national reunification, at the census of 1912, there were 241,088 Jews in Romania. 194,815 inhabited urban areas and 46,273 rural areas. Only 4668 of them were Romanian citizens, while 7987 were foreign citizens. Thus, there were 228,430 local stateless Jews.[5]

Granting citizenship to Jews in Romania will find a full solution after 1918. This statement is based on course of events in 1918, as a result of which it will come to that.[6]

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[1] *Istoria Românilor*, vol. VIII, *România Întregită (1918-1940)*, coord. Ioan Scurtu, Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, p. 68.

[2] Adi Horaţiu Schwarz, *The beginning of the jews' integration in the Romanian society in the middle of the XIXth century*, in "Revista Universitară de Sociologie, Anul V, nr. 1/2008, Craiova, Editura Universitaria, Editura Beladi, pp. 189-192.

[3] Idem, *Reacţii ale presei occidentale privind articolul 4 din legea Missir (1902)*, in "Analele Universităţii din Craiova. Seria Istorie", An XIV, nr. 1(15)/2009, Craiova, Editura Universitaria, pp. 177-187.

[4] http://inliniedreapta.net/dereferinta/evreii-din-romania-in-razboiul-de-reintregire-a-tarii-1, accessed at 1 November 2015.

[5] Dumitru Hîncu, Lya Benjamin, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-17.

[6] Adi Horaţiu Schwarz, *Participarea evreilor din România la războiul de reîntregire naţională şi situaţia lor în perioada interbelică*, in "Analele Universităţii din Craiova. Seria Istorie", anul IX, nr. 9/2004, pp. 189-200.

The issue of citizenship acquiring of Romania's Jewry will carry out its last phase in the period March 1918 to May 1919. Primarily, the provisions of the National Assembly's decision that guaranteed the union are revealing.

Country's Council gathered on March 27 / April 8, 1918 in Bessarabia adopted a "Declaration" that contained in paragraph 8 the following provision: "*Bessarabia will send in the Romanian Parliament a number of representatives proportional to its population, chosen on the basis of universal suffrage which is equal, direct and secret*".

The Grand National Assembly of Alba Iulia, of 1 December 1918 passed a "Resolution". In its final form, it was mentioned in section 3: "*Perfect implementation of a democratic system in all domains of public life. The universal vote will be direct, equal and secret, in each commune, proportionally, for both sexes, aged 21 years*".[1]

We note that Bessarabia, Transylvania, Banat, Crisana, Bukovina pleaded for democracy and the right to vote contained no restrictions based on religion.

These decisions were ratified by Romania through three royal decrees: April 9, 1918, December 11, 1918 December 18, 1918. This meant a de-facto recognition of the situation that all the inhabitants of the Romanian historical provinces (including Jews) by the union became Romanian citizens. They ceased to be under the jurisdiction of the former states that had ruled those provinces.[2]

In July 1917, when the Romanian Constitution suffered a change to allow the implementation of agrarian and election reform, in Article 57, was introduced the following wording: "*House of Representatives shall be composed of deputies elected by Romanian citizens by universal, equal and direct vote and by secret ballot based on proportional representation*". Therefore, there is absence of any constraint on religion.[3]

The situation was somewhat incompatible with Article 7 of the Constitution, which contained some restrictions concerning Jews in the Old Kingdom. After 1918, Jews from the Old Kingdom continued to remain tributary to the old provisions, while Jews from the former Romanian provinces became de-jure Romanian citizens, all together, based on recognition of union acts of the National Assembly.[4]

A solution was found by the Romanian authorities, namely the adoption of a Decree-Law of 30 December 1918 which contained the following provision: "*The inhabitants of the Kingdom, who reached the age of majority, irrespective of their religion and who have not had full rights of citizenship, may acquire such rights when they prove by the present law, that they were born in the country and have not been subjected to a foreign state*".[5]

Hence, the Jews from the Old Kingdom continued to be discriminated against because they had to prove that they were born in Romania and that they had not received the status of foreign "subject". The final decision belonged to a court.

Therefore, the local Jews were forced to seek further to Romanian bureaucracy in state institutions, which impede the success of their efforts, especially because the decree maintained known difficulties in the process of citizenship granting.

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[1] Text disponibil la http://www.cimec.ro/Istorie/Unire/index2.htm, accesed at 1 November 2015.
[2] http://www.ioanscurtu.ro/statutul-politico-juridic-al-evreilor-din-romania-1858-2004, accesed at 1 November 2015.
[3] Alexandru Radu, *op. cit.*, accessed at 31 October 2015.
[4] Dinu C. Giurescu, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
[5] Claudia Gilia, *Sisteme şi proceduri electorale*, Bucureşti, Editura C.H. Beck, 2007, p. 104.

On May 28, 1919, a new Decree Law was adopted that eliminated mandatory appeal to court, presentation of evidence and the existence of a final court decision: "*Jewish residents of the Old Kingdom, who reached the age of majority, born in the country, who have not been subjected to a foreign state, are Romanian citizens and have full citizenship rights, whether they manifest this desire, by making the statement that they were born in Romania and have not enjoyed foreign protection (...) the mere statement that they wish to acquire citizenship rights is sufficient*".[1]

It brought to a rather ambiguous situation in the sense that Jews integrated into the minority cultures (being majority before 1918) became citizens, while Jews integrated into Romanian culture of the Old Kingdom were subjected to the action of a law whose discriminatory provisions increased in intensity.

The Jews of Romania demonstrated throughout history that they are an economic force. In the second half of the period 1920-1930 appeared right-wing currents advocating for "nationalization" of the economy. This idea that will generate serious abuses after 1930 could not be sustained in practice because Romanian ethnics had no preparation and no financial statement required to be an alternative to the economic power of minorities.[2]

Following the 1943 official statistics, we note that the Jews had in proportion to the Romanians, the share of private companies in the historical united provinces in 1918 also in Moldova, while in Muntenia, Oltenia and Dobrogea, Romanians prevailed.[3]

An explanation might be of a more efficient communication between those provinces and the neighboring countries, while in areas where Romanians constituted the dominant economic force this was of less intensity.

Basically, all Jews in Romania in 1919 became Romanian citizens according to the law. But this was not the last problem to be solved. Romania had to fight for international recognition of the Great Union and the issue of minorities would bring back a state of conflict, during discussions on the Treaty of Peace with Austria. The succession states of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, along with Romania and Greece had to sign a treaty that would regulate the issue of national minorities.

Ion I.C. Brătianu considered that the provisions of the Treaty would affect the Romania's sovereignty. So, this determined him to leave the Conference and to resign from the lead of the government. On 12 September 1919, Arthur Văitoianu was appointed to run the government in his place.[4]

The attitude of Prime Minister Brătianu was to protest against the treatment given to Romania, being considered as a state with "limited interests" not because of the refusal to grant rights of minorities and implicitly, to Jews.

Finally, on 10 December 1919 Romania, the government led by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod[5] signed both the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty. Two provisions are important to be mentioned here, the first of the preamble of the treaty, and the second of Article 7 of the Treaty.

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[1] Ioan Scurtu, Liviu Boar, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

[2] *Istoria Românilor...*, p. 63.

[3] *Enciclopedia României*, 4, *Economia Naţională*, Bucureşti, Imprimeria Naţională, 1943, p. 360.

[4] Nicolae C. Nicolescu, *Şefii de stat şi de guvern ai României (1859-2003)*, Bucureşti, Editura Meronia, 2003, pp. 243-245.

[5] Stelian Neagoe, *Oameni politici români*, Bucureşti, Editura Machiavelli, 2007, pp. 181-183.

In the preamble was stated: "*Romania, of its own volition, wants to give reliable guarantees of freedom and justice, both to residents of the old Kingdom of Romania and also to residents of the territories recently transferred, irrespective of race, language or religion*".[1]

In Article 7 it was provided: "*Romania undertakes to recognize as Romanian subjects, with full rights and without any formality, Jews living in the country on the Romanian territory and who do not belong to any other nationality*".[2]

Romanian Parliament ratified the treaty on 26 September 1920. Therefore, pending the adoption of the Constitution in 1923, the Jewish Question finally found its settlement. In the same year, 1923, "Native Jewish Union" changed its name to "Union of Romanian Jews".

In 1930, the census results showed that in Romania there were 728,115 Jews, or 4% of the entire population of the country.[3] Seven years later, in 1937, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce revealed that individual commercial firms were owned as to 48,4% by Romanian ethnics and 51,6% by ethnics of national minorities (Jews had 32,7% of the firms in property of minority representatives).

Thus, the Jews of Romania become full citizens in 1919, bringing to an end the political struggle began in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The political class that contributed to the Greater Union understood the right moment when the Jewish Question was to find a solution. Jews from the Old Kingdom, after a political struggle, became citizens by force of events. They demonstrated that they had appropriated the fundamental elements belonging to Romanian culture.

The Great Union of 1918, in addition to its importance for the Romanian state, represents the moment of settlement of one of the burning issues during the modern period of Romanian history, namely the Jewish Question.

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[1] Ioan Scurtu, Theodora Stănescu-Stanciu, Georgiana Margareta Scurtu, *Istoria românilor între anii 1918-140. Minorităţile naţionale din România. 1918-1925. Documente*, pp. 174-178, http://ebooks. unibuc.ro/istorie/istorie1918-1940/10-3.htm, accessed at 1 November 2015.
[2] *Ibidem.*
[3] http://www.ioanscurtu.ro/statutul-politico-juridic-al-evreilor-din-romania-1858-2004.

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STORIOGRAFIA DELLE RELAZIONI DIPLOMATICHE
TRA ROMANIA E ITALIA (1914-1947)

Ionuț Șerban*

Abstract

The period in question was one of the most turbulent for the two Latin countries, which in the past had always supported in their struggles having as ultimate goal the unity and independence, a European alliance and territorial interests.

The beginning of the twentieth century was, as natural, for Romania and Italy a period of major transformations. For Romania it was a period of accumulation and statement on the European level and on the Balkanic one. In this period that Romania was perfected as a nation-state, the legitimate desire of the Romanian people, which marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of Romania. For Italy, this period is very important because its influence on the European scene will grow, it will complete the unity of the state taking back the inhabited territories by Italians but under the control of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and manages to establish itself as a great power in the Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Key words: *Diplomatic relations, historiography, Romania, Italy, international relations*

Il periodo preso in considerazione è stato uno tra i più turbolenti per i due paesi latini che in passato si erano sempre sostenuti nelle loro battaglie avendo come fine ultimo l'unità e l'indipendenza, un'alleanza europea e gli interessi territoriali.

Studiando il periodo precedente riguardante le relazioni politiche e diplomatiche romeno-italiane (1859-1900) mi ha affascinato il fatto che i documenti diplomatici possono portare in superficie davvero fatti interessanti che erano sconosciuti al grande pubblico, sono sicuro che questo periodo, a seguito dell'inizio della prima guerra mondiale, la neutralità della Romania e l'Italia fino al 1915 e, rispettivamente, 1916, anche se entrambi parte della Triplice Alleanza, e le loro relazioni diplomatiche, porterà a nuove e originali informazioni al pubblico che permetteranno una migliore prospettiva sulle loro politiche interne ed esterne, entrambi i paesi latini che stavano insieme nella lotta per i loro territori che erano sotto l' Impero Austriaco.

Questo periodo, particolarmente importante per le questioni delle relazioni internazionali, è il campo in cui sono apparsi sulla carta d'Europa due paesi latini, Romania e Italia, entrambi con simili interessi, anche se negli eventi storici saranno coinvolti in modo diverso nell'ambito internazionale.

Per la Romania, quel periodo è stato importante per l'unità nazionale e l'indipendenza, i vecchi obiettivi dello popolo rumeno, che hanno segnato l'inizio di una nuova era nella storia della Romania. Per l'Italia, in quel periodo si raggiunge l'unità tra Stato ed i recuperati territori occupati d'Austria e Roma, il centro dello Stato Papale, dove le guarnigioni francesi erano acquartierate per proteggere il Papa. Con perfetta unità dello stato, L'Italia ha cercato di affermarsi come una grande potenza Europea e coloniale.

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Nel caso di dialogo diplomatico tra i due paesi, un'attività degna di notare in questo periodo fu il ruolo della Sardegna nei Principati Uniti, il Cavaliere Annibale Strambio, che ha rappresentato gli interessi italiani nel Principato dal 20 Marzo 1859 fino al 23 ottobre 1865, quando è stato sostituito da un altro grande diplomatico italiano, Francesco di Teccio Bayo.

Nel caso dell'Italia, nei tempi moderni, si trattava di un conglomerato di stati che hanno combattuto tra loro, mentre l'impero romano-tedesco (in seguito l'Austria e l'Impero Asburgico), l'Impero Bizantino, l'Impero Russo si batteranno per la gloria di Roma antica. Anche se il diplomatico "Rinascimentista" Niccolò Machiavelli, nel suo "Principe", ha esposto la necessità dell'unità d'Italia con qualsiasi mezzo, le rivalità tra gli Stati, le interferenze dello Stato Pontificio e degli Stati Europei rende impossibile ogni tentativo di fare così. L'Unità d'Italia, è un processo che ha avuto inizio con l'avvento al trono, il 23 marzo 1848, di Re Vittorio Emanuele II. Questo, aiutato dal primo ministro Camillo Benso di Cavour e Giuseppe Garibaldi, ha portato lo Stato nella politica europea.

L'Italia ha sostenuto i diplomatici romeni al Congresso di Pace di Berlino del 1878 contribuendo all'indipendenza della Romania e nello stesso tempo è stato uno dei primi Stati europei a riconoscere questo status quo.

I due Stati hanno preso parte alla stessa alleanza europea, la Triplice Alleanza, anche se l'Italia ha aderito al trattato tra Romania ed impero Austro-Ungarico nel Maggio 1888.

La fine del 19 secolo ha trovato i due Stati con interessi diversi, l'Italia cercando di diventare una Potenza coloniale e la Romania cercando di affermarsi in Europa come un paese stabile, con una identità propria e come un fattore di stabilità nella zona.

Per il periodo da noi preso in considerazione, l'anno 1914 rappresenta un anno molto importante dal punto di vista politico e diplomatico per i due paesi. Trovandosi in un'alleanza difensiva Italia e Romania decidono di restare neutrali fino a quando i propri interessi le spingerà fare altro.

La storia delle relazioni diplomatiche tra i due paesi (come già mostrato sopra), parlando poi dello stato attuale della ricerca nel confronto del soggetto per il periodo da noi preso in considerazione (libri, articoli pubblicati sulla faccenda, memorialistica, documenti diplomatici trovati nel Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri di Roma e Bucarest e anche dell' Archivio dello Stato di Roma e Bucarest, documenti che in parte sono già da noi stati fotocopiati).

Il ventesimo secolo è stato un periodo che ha affascinato sempre e ha attirato l'interesse degli storici e della gente di cultura. E' stato il periodo che porrà fine a un mondo che sparirà una volta iniziata la Prima Guerra Mondiale, per fare posto ad un altro nuovo.

L'inizio del ventesimo secolo ha rappresentato, come naturale, anche per la Romania e l'Italia un periodo di importanti trasformazioni. Per la Romania è stato un periodo di accumulazione e affermazione sul piano Europeo e più tosto sul piano Balcanico. E' in questo periodo che la Romania si perfezionò come stato nazionale, desiderio legittimo del popolo rumeno, che marcò l'inizio di una nuova fase nella storia di Romania. Per l'Italia, questo periodo è stato molto importante perché la sua influenza sul piano Europeo crescerà, si perfezionerà l'unità statale prendendosi i territori inabitati da italiani ma sotto il controllo dell'impero Austro-Ungarico e riuscirà ad affermarsi come una grande potenza nell'Adriatico e nel Mediterraneo Orientale.

Per la Romania e L'Italia i primi vent'anni del secolo passato rappresentarono tuttavia un periodo nel quale le relazioni tra i due paesi latini sarebbero divenuti molto stretti. L'Italia, culla della romanità, da dove gli eserciti di Traiano iniziarono la conquista della Dacia, ha sempre rappresentato una permanente attrazione per i romeni. Nei secoli, dal Medio Evo fino ad oggi, L'Italia è stata sempre fonte di attenzione per i "cronicari" e la gente di cultura romena interessata a dimostrare e consolidare la nostra romanità. Gli italiani hanno scoperto in Romania una seconda lingua, apprezzata dagli umanisti, che hanno visto in questa un miracolo e una prova della loro parentela con questo popolo latino situato nell'estremità dell'Europa circondato dagli slavi.

I contatti tra i rappresentanti della generazione del quarantotto, che ha effettuato l'unione del 1859 e ha contribuito all'unificazione d'Italia, hanno favorito la riscoperta reciproca d'Italia e Romania come due paesi fratelli sul fronte della latinità, ispirato da ideali simili. Questa è la loro appartenenza allo stesso blocco politico-militare, la Triplice Alleanza, ha portato ad intensificare la loro cooperazione in politica, dopo decenni di legami culturali che erano stati tra i primi posti dei rapporti romeno-italiani.

In un momento in cui la Francia, un altro stato latino vicino ai romeni, era alleata con la Russia e ha fatto parte del blocco di opposizione, la Romania, lo stato latino in una grande "mare slavo", ha visto l'Italia come un paese fratello che l'avrebbe potuta sostenere. Come la Romania, anche se per ragioni diverse, l'Italia non voleva una crescente influenza nei Balcani degli stati slavi ma rafforzare l'elemento romano in questo settore. Inoltre, considerati come alleati di seconda mano nel blocco dominato dalla Germania e l'Austria-Ungheria, si trovavano di fronte agli stessi problemi in questa alleanza: la questione dei loro cittadini nell'Impero Austro-Ungarico, impero multinazionale, la sua politica Balcanica, in contrasto con i loro interessi.

Questi e altri problemi sono stati i motivi principali per cui i due paesi hanno rinunciato alla Triplice Alleanza. Man mano che diventano sempre più consapevoli della somiglianza della loro situazione in questa alleanza e ai loro interessi simili nei Balcani, Italia e Romania si sono impegnati ai primi anni del Novecento in sempre più stretta collaborazione. Questo visto difendere i loro interessi contro l'Austria-Ungheria e prevenire la crescita eccessiva dell' influenza slava nei Balcani. Raggiungendo il suo picco negli anni che seguirono la crisi bosniaca e durante la neutralità durante la prima guerra mondiale, questa collaborazione diminuirà più avanti questo conflitto, quando il crollo di Austria-Ungheria, una volta ridisegnata la mappa d'Europa e del mondo e le differenze di un piccolo stato e la volontà di una grande potenza, in campi diversi.

L'evoluzione delle relazioni Rumeno-italiane in un periodo ricco di significato per entrambi i paesi ha richiamato l'attenzione evidenti contemporanei e storici. Un'attenta analisi di documenti sul tema delle relazioni Rumeno-Italiani mostra che viene trattato in modo diverso come l'esposizione e l'analisi dei fenomeni storici. Sia per quanto riguarda le relazioni della Romania con la Triplice Alleanza, o che indirizzi i rapporti con le grandi potenze, queste opere insistono meno sui rapporti con l'Italia.

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Inoltre, per quanto riguarda la storiografia romena, il tema delle relazioni culturali goduto di maggiore attenzione. Spiega con il fatto che quest'ultimo ha mostrato un alto grado di sviluppo, a prescindere dal politico-diplomatico e reciproche relazioni economiche, grazie spirituali e affinità linguistiche tra i due popoli, la questione è stata affrontata dai più numerosi ricercatori rumeni.

Per quanto riguarda la storiografia straniera, quasi tutti gli articoli su questo argomento non spesso indiretta e piuttosto sommariamente, se funziona che fare con la politica estera d'Italia, i problemi dei Balcani e a rumeno o prima guerra mondiale e Conferenza Pace. Sembrano così troppo stretto un problema di contribuire a una visione d'insieme sull'evoluzione dei rapporti romeno-italiani del primo Novecento.

Naturalmente non mancano le opere di valore riguardando le relazioni romeno-italiane però queste presentano un altro periodo. Per quanto riguarda la storiografia romena, le poche opere che trattano le relazioni romeno-italiane parlano più di cultura e economia e meno di politica e diplomazia. L'esplicazione risulta dal fatto che le relazioni culturali hanno conosciuto un grado di sviluppo più alto delle altre nonostante il livello delle relazioni politiche e diplomatiche grazie alle affinità spirituali e di lingua.

Poiché riguardando la storiografia straniera, quasi tutte le opere trattano questo tema in un modo indiretto e più tosto sommario, sia se parlano della politica estera dell'Italia, gli problemi balcanici e dei romeni, o riguardando una problema molto particolare per potere contribuire all'immagine globale dell'evoluzione delle razioni tra Romania e Italia nel ventesimo secolo.

Per fare un'analisi quanto più esaustiva abbiamo cercato di utilizzare più fonti possibili. In queste sorse le più importanti sono quelle inedite. Studiate con attenzione e corroborate con altri materiali queste possono offrire al ricercatore la possibilità di sorprendere un'immagine molto più completa sul soggetto trattato.

Le più interessanti sono state scoperte negli Archivi dei Ministeri degli Affari Esteri di Romania e d'Italia, a Roma e Bucarest.

Tra le fonti più importanti in questa categoria sono gli archivi storici e diplomatici dell'Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri a Roma. Negli archivi sono stati studiati più fondi e documenti molto importanti per la nostra tesi. Di questi fondi specifici presentiamo: Ministero Affari Regno di Sardegna estere (Ministero degli Affari Esteri) – R. 24-35 – Registri Dodici copia Lettere della Corrispondenza politica "Riserva è Confidenziale" dal Ministero di Partenza (Gabinetto) (Dodici registri telegrammi rispondenti co copiare sul riservato e confidenziale "inviato dal ministro" (gabinetto) – R.32; R. 33; R.34; R.35; R. 36-42 – Sette Registri; Copia Lettere della Corrispondenza politica "Riserva è Confidenziale" dal Ministero di Partenza (Gabinetto) – R. 5 (2.01.1914-30.09.1914); R. 6 (1.10.1914-21.05.1915); R. 7 (22.05.1915-22.02.1916). Un altro fondo di particolare importanza: Le scritture del Ministero degli Affari Esteri del Regno d'Italia dal 1916 del 1917 – Serie casa – "Gabinetto e Segretariato Generale" (Gabinetto e Segretario Generale) – Quattro B. 18-21- Missioni Buste contenenti Istruzioni per l'Estero (quattro buste contenenti le istruzioni per le Missioni Estere) – Busta 19 – Fascicolo 7 – Romania; F. Carteggio Confidenziale e Riservato – 198-200 – contenenti tre buste; 215-216- relativo Alle Due Buste (l'Ungheria, Relazione Segreti, Romania è Polonia), GM1 (1923-1943), Fascicoli dell' Archivio della Conferenza della Pace (pacchi 11-70), Serie Affari Politici (buste 1507-1516) ecc.

Molto importanti sono anche i registri Copia Lettere in Partenza in cui sono trascritti, grazie a Ruggero Moscati, tutti i documenti inviati dal Ministero degli Esteri per vari Legazione e Consolati italiani all'estero.

Sempre a Roma, ho avuto il privilegio di consultare L'Archivio Centrale dello Stato, dove abbiamo trovato molti documenti inediti sui nostri problemi. Tra questi presentiamo:

i Fondi Casa Reale, Gabinetto Particolare di Vittorio Emanuele III, Visconti Venosta, Giovanni Giolitti, Antonio Salandra ecc.

Particolarmente importante per la comprensione delle relazioni romeno-italiane sono i documenti negli archivi diplomatici del Ministero degli Affari Esteri – Bucarest. Tra i più importanti sono: fondo 71, Problema 21 (volumi 83-85); fondo – Roma (1912-1922); Archivio Storico (1910-1945), Telegrammi (volumi 10-30).

Per quanto riguarda gli archivi nazionali, particolarmente utile per il nostro approccio si è rivelata la Collezione dei microfilm Italia – Fondo Casa Reale (1914-1930), fondi personali e della famiglia: Ion Gigurtu, Gheorghe Tătărescu, Constantin Argetoianu, Gheorghe Argeşeanu, Miron Cristea, Duiliu Zamfirescu, Kretulescu-Lahovary, Bălăceanu, Brătianu, Butculescu, Filipescu, Rosetti, Constantin Diamandy, Nicolae Titulescu ecc.

Alcune fonti molto note sono i Documenti Diplomatici pubblicati dal Ministero degli Esteri a Roma, serie V-X, contenente la corrispondenza del Ministero degli Esteri italiano con la rappresentanze diplomatiche in diverse capitali del mondo e con le altre istituzioni statali e verbali delle varie riunioni internazionali. Devo citare anche la nota collezione di documenti pubblicati dagli storici rumeni Ion Bulei e Rudolf Dinu, *35 anni di relazioni italo-romene, 1879-1914. Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, contenente documenti diplomatici dagli archivi del Ministero degli Affari Esteri a Roma sulla Romania e le sue relazioni con l'Italia e le altre grandi potenze.

Un primo approccio storiografia romena quanto riguarda i contatti diplomatici tra Italia e Romania da parte del grande storico Nicolae Iorga che pubblicano nel 1911 *Breve storia dei Rumeni con speciale considerazione delle relazioni con l'Italia*. Nel 1923, sempre Nicolae Iorga pubblicava a Roma: *Rapporti politici tra l'Italia e la Romania e nel 1938: Un pensatore politico italiano all'epoca di Risorgimento: Marco Antonio Canini*. Nel 1930 pubblicava nella "Revue historique du Sud-Est européene, 7, nr. 10-12: *Cavour et les Roumains*. In tali opere sono evidenziati stretti legami tra romeni e italiani nel corso della storia, sorprendendo quelle influenze visibili soprattutto durante la rinascita nazionale e la creazione dello stato romeno moderno e l'Unità d'Italia, per la quale è stato sostenuto lo sviluppo delle relazioni e della cooperazione romeno-italiane tra le due nazioni. Dato l'anno di pubblicazione, le opere di N. Iorga rappresentano soltanto un inizio. Più tardi, Alexandru Marcu, uno dei più importanti italianisti dalla Romania interbellico, presenta in gran parte le relazioni romeno-italiane nelle sue opere: *L'Italia in cerca della latinità dei romeni*, Bucureşti, 1927; *Il Rinascimento romeno e l'Italia in cerca della latinità dei rumeni*, Bucureşti, 1940; *Un prieten uitat: G.V. Ruscalla*, Bucureşti, 1927; *O legiune italiană în Transilvania*, in "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Naţională Cluj", nr. 6, 1931-1935; *Conspiratori şi conspiraţii în epoca renaşterii politice, 1848-1877*, Bucureşti, Cartea Românească, 2000.

Sulla base del lavoro dello storico Dan Berindei, i rapporti romeno-italiani hanno iniziato a farsi conoscere a livello profondo e dettagliato. Tra le opere dell'accademico Dan Berindei includiamo: *L'ecco nella stampa liberal-radicale di Bucarest degli avvenimenti italiani dell'estate 1866*, Trieste, 1967; *Garibaldi e I Romeni*, in *Garibaldi generale della liberta*, Roma, 1984; *Epoca Unirii*, Bucureşti, Editura Corint, 2000; *Istoriografia italiană în ultimii ani şi problemele etapei finale a Risorgimentului*, in "Studii. Revista de Istorie", XVI, nr. 4, 1963; *La liberation de Rome reflétée dans la presse progressiste de Bucarest(1870)*, in "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", 11, nr. 3/1972; *Les Roumains et Giuseppe Mazzini*, in "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", 24, nr. 4/1985.

Lo storico Ştefan Delureanu presenta, in generale, la questione dell'unificazione d'Italia, ma anche la questione della Triplice Alleanza: *L'Italia e l'opinione romena nei primi anni della Triplice Alleanza*, in "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", XXVIII, nr. 4/1980.

Anche se è difficile adattarsi esattamente alla storiografia romena o italiana, interessanti contributi allo studio delle relazioni romeno-italiane durante il periodo di rinascita nazionale e l'indipendenza che hanno portato i loro paesi pubblicati dal lavoratore in Romania, e ricercatori di casa italiano: Bianca Valota-Cavallotti: *Risorgimento. L'Italia è la Romania. 1859-1879*, Bucureşti, Anima, 1992; Paolo Gianfelici, *L'unione dei Principati e l'opinione pubblica italiana*, in "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie şi Arheologie (A.D. Xenopol)", Iaşi, XVI, 1979; Vito Grasso, *L'attegiamento diplomatico italiano sulla questione romena al Congresso di Berlino*, in "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", XVII, nr. 1/1978.

Per quanto riguarda il periodo 1859-1939 è certamente uno dei più prolifici in termini di sforzi diplomatici allo scopo di contribuire alla realizzazione delle aspirazioni nazionali, dovrebbe essere considerata la vastità di materiale documentario, mentre il trattamento che il periodo ha beneficiato da parte della storiografia romena contributi eccezionali come del resto, e quello estero. Occorre ricordare qui R.V. Bossy, *Agenția diplomatică a României în Paris şi legăturile politice franco-române sub Cuza-Vodă*, Bucureşti, "Cartea Românească", 1931; *Agenția diplomatică a României în Belgrad şi legăturile politice româno-sârbe sub Cuza-Vodă*, Bucureşti, 1934; *L'Autriche et les Principautes-Unies*, Bucarest, 1938; Leonid Boicu, *Diplomația europeană şi triumful cauzei române*, Iaşi, Editura Junimea, 1978.

Dopo la reciproca riscoperta, seguirà nella storia delle relazioni romeno-italiane una nuova fase, quella della loro adesione alla Triplice Alleanza. Alcuni dei lavori importanti sull'evoluzione dei rapporti romeno-italiani durante questo periodo sono: Nicolae Ciachir, *Marile Puteri şi România. 1856-1947*, Bucureşti, Editura Albatros, 1996; L. Boicu, V. Cristian, Gh. Platon, (coordinatori), *România în relațiile internaționale, 1699-1939*, Iaşi, 1980; Gh. N. Căzan, Şerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *România şi Tripla Alianță. 1878-1914*, Bucureşti, Editura Ştiințifică şi Enciclopedică, 1979; Emil Diaconescu, *România şi Marile Puteri după Congresul de la Berlin până la 1914*, Iaşi, Institutul grafic "Presa Bună", 1937.

Ion Bulei e Rudolf Dinu parlano delle relazioni tra la Romania e L'Italia riguardando anche gli avvenimenti che accadevano prima dell'inizio della prima guerra mondiale. Loro parlano nel libro *Italia, România şi chestiunea albaneză, 1913-1914* delle relazioni tra la Romania e l'Italia nell'ambiente creato delle guerre balcaniche sorprendendo degli interessi comuni dei due paesi nella zona balcanica. Un interessante approccio riguardando le relazioni romeno-italiani e dei romeni che vivono all'estero basato sui fonti degli archivi italiani e stato offerto dal professor Gheorghe Caragiani nel suo libro *Studii aromâne* nel 1999.

Tuttavia, lo storico Şerban Rădulescu-Zoner, in uno dei suoi lavori *Convergences des relations diplomatique roumano-italiennes à la veille de la première guerre mondiale*, in "Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento", anno LXI, fascicola III, Roma, 1974, analizza la situazione de la Romania e Italia nella Triplice Alleanza, nella vigilia della prima guerra mondiale, parlando della situazione simile dei due paesi in quanto riguarda l'impossibilità di unirsi alla Germania e all'Austria-Ungheria in una guerra europea.

Per quanto riguarda la prima guerra mondiale, molto utili sono i contributi di Mihail Ionescu che sorprende nel suo lavoro *Luptele de pe frontul italian în primul război mondial reflectate în publicistica românească a epocii*", in Revista de Istorie, tom XXXII, nr. 4/ 1979, l'eco favorevole nell' editoria romena degli sforzi dell'esercito italiano contro il nemico

comune e quelli di Constantin Iordan-Sima che nel suo lavoro basato sulle fonti di archivio, *L'entrèe en guerre de l'Italie et la position des ètats neutres du sud est europèene (avril-mai 1915)*, in "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", tome XV, no. 2, 1976, in quale Sima parla delle azioni d'Italia per attirare la Romania nella prima guerra mondiale dopo il suo intervento nella stessa guerra.

Anche se nella storiografia rumena mancano i lavori che dovessero parlare delle relazioni rumeno-italiane durante la Conferenza di Pace di Parigi (1919-1920), i lavori sintetici sulla partecipazione della Romania al foro di Parigi riuscirono a coprire questo problema in parte, evidenziando una possibile collaborazione tra le due delegazioni nelle questioni in quale i loro interessi erano simili ma anche gli elementi furono contrari a una tale collaborazione.[1]

Dopo il 1920, anche se sono esistiti momenti in quali la Romania e l'Italia si situarono sulle posizioni relativamente simili, anche di collaborazione, per quanto riguarda il periodo interbellico e quello durante la seconda guerra mondiale, i due paesi si trovarono generalmente su posizioni diversi poiché la politica della Romania fu una anti-revisionista mentre l'Italia fu una delle potenze revisioniste. In questo senso possiamo ricordare i lavori di Vasile Stoica, *Între Italia şi noi, de la tratatele de pace din 1919 la arbritajul de la Viena din 1940*, Bucureşti, 1944 e Gheorghe Brătianu, *L'Italia e la Romania nella realizzazione della loro unità nazionale*, Bucureşti, 1940. I due storici sonno riusciti a superare i loro sentimenti riguardando l'attitudine d'Italia in questo periodo, accentuando sulla simpatia che l'Italia mostrò ai romeni nel tempo della prima guerra mondiale.

Più vicino ai nostri tempi, dobbiamo ricordare i lavori di Adelei Herban, *Aspecte ale relaţiilor diplomatice româno-italiene în deceniul III al secolului XX*, in "Sargeţia", Arad, 1994 e Ion Bulei, *Roma, 1924-1927. O ofensivă diplomatică întârziată şi dificilă*, in "Magazin istoric", XXXII, no. 3 (372), 1998. L'ultimo, ha studiato molto in Italia, riuscendo a prendere dei documenti importati per quanto riguarda le relazioni tra la Romania e l'Italia.

Anche se al livello diplomatico o politico in questo periodo le relazioni non sono state molto strette, al livello culturale, le relazioni sono state sempre strette anche grazie alla Scuola Romena di Roma. Un eccellente lavoro sulla creazione e sull'attività di questa prestigiosa istituzione e quello dell'italianista George Lăzărescu intitolato *Şcoala Română din Roma*, Bucureşti, 1996.

In conclusione, la storiografia romena, a parte le sue realizzazioni, alcune molto importanti, in quanto riguarda le relazioni tra la Romania e l'Italia, emergono alcune lacune. La mancanza della ricerca diretta negli archivi stranieri, in modo speciale quelle italiane, e anche il "subiettivismo" visibile di più ai rappresentanti della storiografia della fine del diciannovesimo secolo e l'inizio del ventesimo secolo.

Le grandi sintesi straniere che riguardano le relazioni internazionali del diciannovesimo secolo e del ventesimo secolo contengono anche informazioni relative alle relazioni romeno-italiane.[2]

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[1] Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, *România şi sistemul Tratatelor de la Paris (1919-1923)*, Iaşi, Institutul European, 1993; Constantin Botoran, Ion Calafeteanu, Eliza Campus, Viorica Moisuc, *România şi Conferinţa de Pace de la Paris (1918-1920). Triumful principiului naţionalităţilor*, Cluj-Napoca, 1983.

[2] Sherman David Spector, *România şi Conferinţa de Pace de la Paris: Diplomaţia lui Ion I. C. Brătianu*, Iaşi, Institutul European, 1995; Glen E. Torrey, *The rumanian-italian agreement of 23 september 1914*, in "The Slavonic & East European Review", XLIV, nr. 103, London, 1966.

Poiché la storiografia italiana[1] e straniera, iniziando dall'alleanza con le Potenze Centrali, nel 1887, Francesco Crispi il premier italiano ha ritenuto necessario per il suo paese di raggiungere un grade potere, gioendo nel raggiungimento di questo obiettivo del sostegno di Re Umberto I. Per Francesco Crispi era importante la formula di Visconti Venosta: "Sempre indipendenti, isolare mai", ma anche la pressione dell'opinione pubblica italiana.

I lavori di Giulliano Caroli presentano in principale l'evoluzione delle relazioni tra la Romania e L'Italia nel periodo interbellico e in quello della seconda guerra mondiale.

Per quanto riguarda i libri di Amedeo Giannini e Leo Valiani, questi parlano più della prospettiva della disintegrazione dell'Austria-Ungheria e dell'interesse della Romania e dell'Italia per quanto riguarda la liberazione dei loro connazionali e della collaborazione tra i due paesi per approfittarsene della disintegrazione dell'Austria-Ungheria per realizzare i loro obiettivi nazionali e dei contatti realizzati con l'occasione del Congresso delle nazionalità dell'Impero Austriaco-Ungaro organizzato a Roma nella primavera del 1918. Un altro libro che parla del problema della nazionalità durante la prima guerra mondiale è quello di Angela Tamborra, *L'idea de nazionalità a la guerra, 1914-1918*, Congresso di Storia di Risorgimento italiano, Trento, ottobre, 1963.

Gli interessi comuni della Romania e dell'Italia nella Penisola Balcanica sono riflessi nei lavori italiani riguardanti le guerre balcaniche, la questione albanese e quella dei romeni che vivevano fuori dal loro territorio nazionale.[2]

Presentiamo le più importati opere da noi consultati per questo progetto: Francesco Crispi*, Politica estera. Memorie e documenti*, Milano, Fratelli Trevis Editori, 1912; Jacques Droz, *Histoire diplomatique de 1648 à 1919*, Paris, Dalloz, 1959; A. de Stiegliz*, L' Italie et la Triple Alliance*, Paris, Dujarrie et Cie, 1906; Giovanni Giolitti, *Mémoires de ma vie*, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1923; Pierre Albin, *Les grandes traités politiques de 1815 à 1914*, Paris, Felix Alcan, 1923; René Girault, *Diplomatie européenne et imperialismes. 1871-1914,* Paris, Masson, 1979; Henri Hauser, *Histoire diplomatique de l' Europe. 1871-1914*, 2 vol., Paris, 1929; Arthur Singer, *Histoire de la Triple Alliance*, Paris, M. Giard & E. Brière, 1915; Luigi Bissolati, *La*

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[1] Giuliano Caroli, *L'Italia ed il problema nazionale romeno alla Conferenza della Pace de Parigi, 1919-1920*, in "Storia e politica", anno XXII, fasc. III, settembre 1983; Gianni Amedeo, *L'unita nazionale della Romania alla Conferenza della Pace*, Roma, Istituti per l'Europa Orientale, 1922; Leo Valiani, *La dissoluzione dell' Austria-Ungheria*, Milano, Casa editrice "Il Saggiatore", 1966; Lilio Cialdea, *L'intervento romeno nella guerra mondiale*, I-II, Roma, 1940-1941; Idem, *La politica estera della Romania nel quarantennio prebellico*, Bologna, L. Cappelli Editore, 1933; Idem, *Italia e Romania nella neutralità*, in "Studi Italiane", Bucarest, 1934; Tommaso Tritoni, *La Bessarabia, La Romania e l'Italia*, Roma, 1927.

[2] Luigi Albertini, *Le origini della guerra del 1914*, 3 vol., Milano, 1942-1943; Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *Italy at the Peace Conference*, New York, 1938; Giovanni Amadori-Virgilj, *La questione rumeliotta e la politica italiana*, vol. I, editore N. Garofalo, 1908; Jacques Ancel, *Les Balkans face à l'Italie*, Paris, Delagrave, 1928; A. Bernardi, V. Falorsi, *La questione adriatica vista d'oltre Atlantico, 1917-1919*, Bologna, 1923; Antonello Biagini, *Momenti di storia balcanica (1978-1914). Aspetti militari*, Roma, 1981; Luigi Bissolati, *La politica estera dell'Italia. 1897-1920*, Milano, Fratelli Trevis Editore, 1923; Giorgio Candelero, *Storia dell'Italia moderna*, vol. VII, *La crisi de fini secolo e l'età giolittiana*, vol. VIII, *La prima guerra mondiale, il dopoguerra, l'avvento de Fascismo, 1914-1922*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1979; Federico Chabod, *L'Italia contemporanea (1918-1948)*, Torino, Giulio Einaudi editore, 1961; Benedetto de Luca, *Gli albanesi I Macedo-romeni e gli interessi d'Italia nei Balcani*, Roma, Unione Editrice, 1913; Idem, *Politica italiană față de Grecia și România*, București, Socec, 1910.

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Poiché sono tante le opere da noi prese in considerazione per questo progetto, una gran parte di questa sarà esplicitata nella bibliografia finale.

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ROMANIA AND THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION CONFERENCES OF THE SECOND INTERWAR DECADE (THE 1930s)

Gheorghe Sbârnă*

Abstract

During the second interwar decade, the Inter-Parliamentary Union kept on holding its annual Conferences – organized in different European capital cities – in order to debate the hottest issues of the international relations. The most debated issues were: issues concerning the decrease of the number of weapons, disarmament and protection of State security; international codification of law; evolution of the representative regime; economic, social and financial problems etc. The Romanian Delegates hosted the 27th Inter-Parliamentary Conference in 1931, and, during the following years, they kept on bringing their outstanding contributions to the Union Conferences, by elaborating reports, by an active participation to the debate of the issues on the agenda and by adopting resolutions.

Key words: *Inter-Parliamentary Union, Inter-Parliamentary Conference, disarmament, peace-related law, parliamentary group*

The Inter-Parliamentary Union was founded in Paris, in 1889, and became the first international non-governmental political institution whose programme aimed to realize an intensive propaganda in favour of an international arbitration or of other pacific means of settling international disputes.

The results of this propaganda became increasingly popular, and other parliamentary groups from a number of countries joined the organization, as well. In 1896, the 6th Inter-Parliamentary Conference of Brussels voted a convention draft for the creation of an International Arbitration Court, and based on that draft the First Hague Peace Conference adopted the Great Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

Eleven years later, during the 14th Conference of London, a draft of an arbitration-type treaty was adopted, whose principles were adopted by thirty-two out of the forty-four countries attending the Second Hague Peace Conference, in 1907.

As the Inter-Parliamentary Union has permanently worked on reaching its goal, which all mankind has dreamt of – namely the real and long-lasting protection of peace – it became one of the most important international institutions in this sense during the first decades of the 20th century. This institution has the great honour of having contributed to laying the foundation stone of the League of Nations Offices.

After the end of war, and, then, after the conclusion of peace treaties, it was natural for the Union agenda not to be restricted to the international arbitration problem, but to also deal with the war prevention issue, in all its extent and complexity.

The consolidation of the international solidarity concept, as a means of war prevention – in the three great human activity domains – economic, political and intellectual – became the main concern of the Union, as one can see from the first

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interwar decade Conference works. Throughout its activity, the Union became known to the world not only as an association for debate and collaboration among political individuals of the legislative forums, but also as a federation of the national groups representing the Parliaments from different countries.

These parliamentary groups had the responsibility to determine, by means of a mutual action, the respective countries to collaborate for the democratic consolidation and development of the international effort of peace and cooperation among peoples.

As the Union was a creation of the modern countries' Parliaments, they had the responsibility of studying all international problems – whose settlement required the intervention or support of the Legislative Assemblies in the actions carried out by the representatives of different governments. From that point of view, it was different from the League of Nations, as the latter was a creation of the governments of different countries.

Unlike the representatives of the States in the Council or in the Assembly of the League of Nations, who usually had opinions based on and within the limits of the instructions received from their governments, the Inter-Parliamentary Union members – considered to be the representatives of the opinion trends dominating the parliamentary environment – enjoyed more freedom in their actions, so that they could have opinions even in some fields where solid reasons of diplomatic appropriateness sometimes determined the Governments to display a legitimate and wise discretion.

As an instrument of propaganda for the peace and international collaboration ideas, an instrument endowed with a great force of action through the direct relations that it had with all Parliaments, the Inter-Parliamentary Union was regarded – by all those who believed in the necessity of reorganizing the League of Nations through the separation of the powers assigned to its different organisms – as the most reliable promise for the establishment of an International Parliament in the future.

When, after the First World War, the Union restarted its activity, it expanded and diversified the issues of its concerns and debates. The Union's published papers, especially the considerable volumes containing the proceedings and debates of each Conference – published regularly and exactly by the organization leadership, just as before WW1 – represent a trustworthy mirror of its entire activity during the interval in-between the annual Conferences and especially during its works. During the 22nd Conference, held in Bern, in 1924, a resolution was adopted and written down in the Union's Regulations, according to which each Conference would be opened by a debate based on the Report presented by the Secretary General on behalf of the Inter-Parliamentary Council. A significant part of that Report concerned the analysis of the general international political situation and the most imperious issues in the world relations of the respective period. Naturally, many of them were on the agenda of the Union Conferences. Some of them, of the greatest importance, constituted the topic of a series of Conferences, as follows: The issue concerning the decrease of the number of weapons and the protection of security; Codification of the international law; Evolution of the representative regime; Economic, social and financial issues; Minority population issue etc. Other issues drew attention for a short while, as follows: Fight against narcotic drugs; Mother and child's protection; Colonial issues; Migration issues etc.

The Romanian Parliament joined the Inter-Parliamentary Union on the occasion of its third Conference, organized at Rome, in November 1891. Then, the Romanian

delegates participated to almost all the Union Conferences (held until 1913) with outstanding contributions.

The series of Inter-Parliamentary Conferences restarted after WW1 – in 1921, being held every year until 1939, except for the years 1926 and 1929. The Romanian Parliamentary Group of the reunited Romania (the Union having taken place in 1918) – first contacted the Inter-Parliamentary Council in April 1921 but did not participate to its Conferences until 1923[1], for different reasons. Starting with the following Conference, the 22nd, held in August 1924, the participation of the Romanian Inter-Parliamentary group, naturally reshaped during each legislature, in accordance with the elections result, was distinguished and prestigious. Delegates and former delegates, such as: Vespasian V. Pella – elected as a result of his outstanding activity, in 1925, the appointed-for-life member of the Inter-Parliamentary Council, Mircea Djuvara, Stefan Cicio Pop, Nicolae N. Săveanu, Aurel Cosma, Constantin Dimitriu, Leonte Moldoveanu etc. stood out through their contributions to the elaboration of reports in the specialized Commissions of the Union, through their intervention during the debates in the plenary sessions of the Conferences, concerning different issues on the agenda.

During the Inter-Parliamentary Conferences of Paris, Berlin and London, between 1927 and 1930, the Romanian parliamentary group enjoyed a good appreciation, which led to the idea of organizing the 27th Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Bucharest, despite the great hardships Romania was going through during the harsh economic crises. Thus, on July 15, 1930, Stefan Cicio Pop – chairman of the Romanian parliamentary group at that time, announced, during the 26th Conference, that the Romanian group invited the Union to agree that the next Conference be held in the Romanian capital, mentioning that the invitation was made with the consent of the Romanian Government.

The organization of the works for this high international parliamentary organism in Bucharest, on October 1-7, 1931, had a great significance for Romania. "It is for the first time in history that we host a reunion of so many distinguished political people from all around the world" – the chairman of the Delegates Assembly, Dimitrie Pompeiu, declared. The agenda contained numerous and diverse topics, starting with disarmament issues, so controversial in the international relations, and continuing with economic issues, mainly related to the agrarian crisis. It was for the first time that the focus of the inter-parliamentary conferences was constituted by ideas and perspectives of a European Federal Regime and also by humanitarian issues such as: mother and child's protection and the situation and the protection of illegitimate and abandoned children in different countries.

The reports presented and the debates that took place highlighted the role of the representatives of that "huge army of consciences" – as the great jurist, Istrate Micescu, chairman of the Romanian parliamentary group, noted – "dedicating their efforts to the

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[1] See Gheorghe Sbârnă, *Conferinţele interparlamentare. Elemente de participare la construcţia ideilor europene în primul deceniu interbelic* (*The Inter-Parliamentary Conferences. Elements of Participation to the Construction of the European Ideas during the First Interwar Decade*), in *Europe as viewed from the Margins*, Târgovişte, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2007.

success of justice and of peace, during these times of deep crisis, when pains get deeper, and worries and impatience grow".[1]

The disarmament issues were a priority not just by virtue of the fact that the Inter-Parliamentary Union had drawn the attention of the public and especially of the political world on this extremely important issue even since 1906 (and this issue then insistently came back almost during each Conference) but also by virtue of the preparation of the Disarmament Conference that was to inaugurate its works, within a few months, namely on February 2, 1932, in Geneva, under the patronage of the League of Nations.

The debate of such an issue, having great implications in the internal life of the world's countries, just as in international relations, as well, brought to light, once more, the fact that the Members of Parliament, guided by the desire to find the best ways and methods for bringing to life the extremely old and vital disarmament dreams – which goal could find the solutions to save the peoples' peace and wealth –, have created, according to the tradition of this organization, an atmosphere of polite, convergent cooperation, meant to elegantly solve all the divergences, where arguments, good fellowship and respect were a main concern. The analysis of the speeches and interventions of the parliamentary group representatives highlighted the basic ideas, which, many of them, were very close or even similar, but differently formulated, and had in view, among others: the observance of the international laws and treaties, as a prime requisite of the peoples' security; the complete settlement of the disarmament issue; the ceasing of war, through peoples' solidarity and peaceful collaboration.

The opinion of the Romanian parliamentary group was asserted by Professor Vespasian V. Pella, well-known as a famous specialist in the disarmament issues. He showed that during the Union's Conference of Washington in 1925, the Romanian Members of Parliament had asserted that "the arming of a nation may find an excuse either in its aggressive intentions or in the exceptional situation positioning the respective nation in a state of legitimate defence".[2]

Concerning the first theory, namely the arming with the purpose of a territorial conquest, it is clear – the Romanian representative highlighted – that Romania could not admit such a hypothesis, as she had been and was "animated by a single and supreme dream: to assure her development amidst the community of peoples, through peace and international cooperation". The fact that the Romanian people had suffered – for a long time – the consequences of numerous wars, which were fought on the territory of their country, triggered, as a consequence of this unhappy experience, the appearance of strong traditions, "coming from the past and going towards the future, as aspirations rooted in an almost innate pacifism" – the great jurist argued. Referring to the approaching Disarmament Conference of Geneva, he considered that, in order to obtain good results, it was desirable that the issue of reducing the number of weapons should not be regarded only from a military perspective. To make this desire come true, it was necessary to conclude international agreements "meant to counterbalance such a reduction, providing international assistance to the countries that could be victims of possible aggressions and

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[1] *Union Interparlementaire. Compte rendu de la XXVII-e Conferance tenue a Bucarest du 1-er au 7 octobre 1931*, Libraire Payot, 1932, p. 315.

[2] *Vespasian V. Pella în slujba ştiinţei dreptului şi a cauzei păcii (Vespasian V. Pella in the Service of Law and Peace)*, publication and introductory study elaborated by Univ. Prof. Dr. D. Gheorghe Sbârnă, Ploieşti, Editura Karta-Grafic, 2011, p. 360.

organizing an effective action system against the societies responsible for the international crime of war".[1]

A series of ideas presented by Professor Pella was taken over and emphasized by other Romanian and foreign delegates, as well, in the debates of the Conference of Bucharest, which conference held the forefront position of the world politics for five days, by going deeper into the issues concerning the peace of the world and justice among nations".[2]

Important contributions were recorded as well while debating the other issues submitted to the attention of the Parliamentary Delegations, which were included in the resolutions approved during the Conference.

The year 1932 started under the sign of a great interest – present in all the political and public environments – in the coming event of the Conference on disarmament. Soon after the inauguration of these works, the political Commission of the Conference entrusted to Prof. V.V. Pella the mission to make a report on the adaptation of the national legislations to the "current stage of development of the international organizations". Accepting the request, the outstanding Romanian jurist elaborated a large Memorandum, which was to bear his name, under the title: "The Protection of Peace by means of the Domestic Law. Adaptation of the Constitutions and Criminal Legislations to the Current Development Stage of the International Life". At that time, also, the Security Commission of the Inter-Parliamentary Union requested Prof. V.V. Pella to elaborate a resolution on the "Harmonization of the Internal Law of the States with the New Principles of the Law of Peace", which resolution was to be presented by Prof. Pella, in his quality of *rapporteur*, during the 28th Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference of Geneva, in July 1932, as he was the only Romanian representative, in his quality of full member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The Romanian parliamentary group was not able to attend the conference, as the elections for the new Parliament were going on at that time.

In his speech and in the resolution draft adopted during the Conference, Pella stressed that the elaboration of the law of peace – harmonized with the domestic law of the States and with the principles included in the international treaties for the prevention and repression of war – was in progress in certain States, while in others it was proposed to be accomplished. Pella reminded that the Inter-Parliamentary Union, in 1924, through the resolution adopted at the Berne Conference, had focused on a few aspects of that issue, and suggested to the national parliamentary groups to notify their Parliaments on the drafts of modification of the internal law, in order to apply the possible agreements concluded during the disarmament Conference in this respect. To that end, Pella considered that a step forward was first the inclusion into the State Constitutions, especially into those that considered war still a legitimate institution, of some clauses to foresee: on the one hand, the interdiction to conclude offensive treaties and, on the other hand, the obligation to use nothing but peaceful means to settle international disputes, except for the cases of legitimate defence or of participation to a common action foreseen by a treaty.

In the end of his report, Pella expressed his confidence that "This harmonization will possibly revolutionize domestic law. Still, it will not be a revolution to impose to the

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 361.

[2] *Ibidem*.

nations as a call to arms, with new suffering and new human sacrifice. It shall only express itself through the permanently renewed flame of the glorious ideas that will "melt" the secular armour of prejudices that still tend to convince some people in the fatality of war".[1]

Considering the importance and actuality of the issues laid down in that resolution – unanimously adopted – the Conference of Geneva "entrusted the Commission studying the juridical issues with the mission of presenting a report at the next Inter-Parliamentary Conference, concerning the results of the works of the Disarmament Conference, in relation to the harmonization of the domestic law with the new principles of the law of peace and concerning the progress achieved in the field.

In order to meet this demand, the Commission for juridical issues decided – during the subsequent reunions from Geneva – that once again it would be Prof. Pella who should present, during the following Conference, a report on the new acts and their effects, which had taken place in the meantime.

Held in Madrid, on October 4-10, 1933, the 29th Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, "undoubtedly marked a new age in our institution's history"[2] – as they further appreciated. Indeed, in spite of the political trouble in Central Europe, and of the failure of the great international Conferences that had generated so much hope, the debates from Madrid were considered a proof that the Union had maintained all its vitality, its specific mission being to pursue the reunion and the free mutual dialogue of the peoples' chosen representatives.

On the Conference agenda, an important subject was the debate on the Security and Disarmament issue, during which the report elaborated by Pella was subjected to the attention of the audience. He mentioned that the resolution that had been adopted the previous year had set out – as a great important issue, which had to be settled as soon as possible – the adaptation of the national laws to the current stage of development of the international life, and expressed his surprise at the fact that "we can still find constitutional paragraphs considering war as an instrument of national politics, as a legal institution, still admitting the constitutional possibility of a war declaration, although that was in complete contradiction with the Kellogg-Briand Pact". That is why recently – he continued – "we have noticed a strong trend tending to harmonize the Constitutions with the new law of peace. Along the same line of reasoning, we can notice in other Constitutions, if not an equally clear tendency in the same sense as above, at least a trend aiming to promote peaceful means for the settlement of the international disputes".[3]

Like others participants to that debate, the Romanian diplomat noted that the resolution adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1932 was resumed by other international organizations, and theses of the same document seem to have been considered by certain law makers or official codification Commissions. It is worth mentioning that the juridical Committee of the disarmament Conference – reunited in June 1933, at Geneva – used the *Memorandum* elaborated by V.V. Pella, as a basis for its works.

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 384.

[2] *Compte rendu de la XXX-e Conference tenue a Istanbul du 24 au 29 septembre 1934*, Librairie Payot, 1934, p. 126.

[3] *Vespasian V. Pella în slujba ştiinţei dreptului şi a cauzei păcii* (*Vespasian V. Pella in the Service of Law and Peace*), p. 431.

Actually, out of this work, as the author mentioned, a part of the paragraphs were taken over and included in his large report, presented under the above-mentioned title (namely *Memorandum*) in the series of the preliminary documents of the Conference of Madrid.

A great deal of interest went to the viewpoints expressed by delegate Mihail Ralea during the debate concerning the analysis of the evolution of the parliamentary regime in the domain of the responsibilities it had in the voting of the budget and in the ratification of the international conventions.

An important page in the activity of the Inter-Parliamentary Union was its 30th Conference, held on September 24-29, 1934, in Istanbul, which brought together a great number of Members of Parliament from 45 countries. Romania was represented by a delegation of 44 senators and MPs, led by the chairmen of the two Chambers of the Romanian Parliament. Nicolae N. Săveanu, chairman of the Delegates Assembly, in his quality of delegate chairman of the Inter-Parliamentary Council, had the honour of opening the Conference works. On top of the agenda was the Security and Disarmament issue, followed by the debate on the social issues and the representative regime evolution.

The participation of the Romanian parliamentary group was marked from the very beginning of the event, by the speech of Professor Pella – in his quality of *rapporteur* – for the complex Security issues. By resuming ideas from the speeches presented during the previous Conferences, he emphasized that "security cannot be obtained except through international or continental agreements or other agreements answering the special needs of certain countries, so with a regional character. The latter can be either bilateral or multilateral and rely on the guarantee of the territorial status-quo. Professor Pella's opinion was that "this system could be usefully developed to fight against all the actions of force or violence undertaken out of personal initiative".[1] Concerning this text, the Hungarian representative stated that security did not rely on the observance of the territorial status-quo and announced that he would close any means of revision of the peace treaty and Hungary would never give up its claims on the territories it had been robbed of by the Treaty of Trianon.[2] In addition, he presented an amendment, by which it was claimed that the indented line concerning the territorial status-quo from the resolution should be suppressed.

A new intervention of V.V. Pella was generated by the amendment proposed by the representative of the Hungarian group, and also by some observations presented by the representatives of the American, Italian and Hungarian parliamentary groups, concerning the security issues. The comments and arguments produced in defence of the ideas laid down in the respective report were extremely appreciated by the participants at the debate. When subjecting to vote the amendment drafted by the leader of the Hungarian Inter-Parliamentary group, it got just 12 votes, namely only those of the Hungarian delegates out of the total of 164. "We were – the leader of the Romanian Inter-Parliamentary group related – in front of an impressive demonstration; it was for the first time that an institution of such a great importance as the Inter-Parliamentary Union was voting an

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 452.
[2] Biblioteca Academiei Române (The Library of the Romanian Academy, from here on B.A.R.), fond V.V. Pella, Ach. 22/2001, mapa 8 (brief 8).

absolute resolution for the observance of the territorial status-quo, consequently condemning the revisionist movement".[1]

As for the disarmament issue, the Romanian delegate, General Petala, a senator, made an interesting presentation (as Pella, the emissary of the Foreign Affair Minister, remarked, in a report on the Conference works sent to the Foreign Affairs Minister Nicolae Titulescu) in absolute agreement with the official viewpoint expressed by the Romanian delegation during the disarmament Conference. Professor Mircea Djuvara expressed important considerations on other aspects of those issues.

The debates on the evolution of the representative regime took into consideration the technical aspects of the parliamentary government, especially the concerns for the removal of the imperfections of the parliamentary procedures. The interventions of the Romanian representatives, made by Senator Jean Th. Florescu and MPs I. Pilat and S. Serbescu were unanimously appreciated. The adopted resolution highlighted several suggestions on the voting of the budget, on the remediation of the imperfections of the parliamentary procedures, on the governmental stability, the separation of the political and juridical powers, and on Parliament independence.

In the end of his report, Prof. Pella considered that it was good to mention that, two great powers from the outside the League of Nations participated at the Union's activity, namely the U.S.A. and Japan, which sent some of the most distinguished delegates to all the Union Conferences. "As for Romania – he emphasized – she enjoys one of the best situations and a particular prestige. This prestige is the result of the perfect training of the delegates who have interventions in the debates, but also of the actual participation of the chairmen of our Legislative Bodies to the Inter-Parliamentary Conference".[2]

As in 1934, during the 31st Conference of the Union, held at Brussels in July 26-31, 1935, the Romanian Parliament sent a distinguished delegation made of senators and MPs, led by the two chairmen of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, which was – as the newspapers of the time noted – brilliantly represented by its members in each of the commissions especially made up to discuss the issues under analysis.[3] The debates regarded: Juridical Issues: a) international law codification, b) neutrality and assistance, Arms Manufacture and Trade; Economic and Currency Issues: a) international economic solidarity, b) currency stability and evolution of the representative regime.

Elected vice-chairman of the Conference, N.N. Săveanu – chairman of the Delegates Assembly – held a much appreciated speech on the very first day of the general debates, a speech based on the Report of the Secretary General of the Union and "brightly" reflecting Romania's policy and her tendencies in the international relations. He also brought up the contribution of a "distinguished member of the Romanian parliamentary group, Professor Pella, who, in 1925, had proposed to the Inter-Parliamentary Conference of Washington, the draft of a code for the repression of the states' collective criminality. Săveanu noted that, ten years later, the ideas promoted during that Conference had become topical once more, as a result of the attack from Marseilles. The League of Nations was asked to find solutions for the prevention and repression of terrorism. A

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[1] *Dezbaterile Adunării Deputaţilor*, şedinţa din 16 noiembrie 1934 (*Debates of the Delegates Assembly*, the meeting of November 16, 1934), p. 6.
[2] B.A.R., fond V.V. Pella, ach. 22/2001, mapa 8 (brief 8).
[3] "Viitorul" ("The Future"), August 8, 1935.

Committee of jurists, having the responsibility to elaborate a Convention draft for the international repression of terrorism, reunited at Geneva, on April 30, 1935, under the presidency of "he who leads the activity of our Union authoritatively and brightly", namely earl Carton de Wiart. The Committee substantiated its activity based on a "scholarly draft elaborated by Prof. V.V. Pella". Moreover, the representatives of certain states, of which Romania was part as well, entirely approved Pella's project, which "tended to create and to assure the operation of an International Criminal Court".[1] In the same train of thoughts, it was reminded that the Inter-Parliamentary Union had carried out an avant-garde work in this field, as well, when, during the Conference of 1925, it had noticed "the possibility of collective crimes of several states and had established a commission whose mission was to elaborate the draft of a Repressive Code". In the draft elaborated by Pella at that time, and submitted to the attention of the specialized commission, there is a whole section dealing with crimes committed by individuals, among which there are also the cases of terrorism, as well.[2]

During the Conference of Brussels, Pella spoke on the topic of the "Neutrality and Assistance" report, which he presented on behalf of the permanent Commission for the study of juridical issues, whose vice-chairman he was. He showed that the signatory states of the League of Nations Pact and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact are obliged to help all the victims subjected to any aggression and not to give, by no means whatsoever, assistance to the aggressor.[3] And the neutrality concept can no longer exist under its traditional form anymore, it would be an illusion to think that keeping the neutrality institution, some countries could be spared the horrors of war. The great jurist considered that "All for one, one for all" was the basic principle, which had to be imposed by the solidarity of the members of the international community in front of the attacker.[4]

Referring to the same problems, delegate Mircea Djuvara showed that the idea of justice was at the basis of mankind's progress and the need for international communities to exist and to assert themselves imposed respect for the countries' sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In that context, the Hungarian representative brought into discussion the issue of the revision of the treaties again. On behalf of the Romanian delegation, of the Little Entente and of the Balkan Pact, Mircea Djuvara replied that there was no reason leading to the modification of the current situation based on the idea of justice. History – he asserted – cannot go back to the old injustices, which must not be resurrected. The current regional alliances are not aggressive and a piece of evidence in this sense is Hungary, which was loyally asked to join these Pacts.[5]

The representative regime continued to be a part of the focus of the Union's Conference. Delegate Aurel Cosma made a review of the tendencies of the representative system under the circumstances of the needs of adjustment to the demands of the modern states and he suggested a number of amendments, which were welcomed by the audience.

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[1] *Compte rendu de la XXXIᵉ Conference tenue a Bruxelles du 26 au 31 juillet 1935*, Librairie Payot, 1935, p. 58.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 365.

[3] *V.V.Pella în slujba ştiinţei deptului şi a cauzei păcii (V.V. Pella in the Service of the Science of Law and of the Peace Cause)*, p. 477.

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 484.

[5] *Compte rendu de la XXXI-e Conference tenue a Bruxelles...*, pp. 395-396.

As for the currency stabilization issue, delegate C.C. Zamfirescu had a notable intervention, reviewing the inconveniences of the "wandering currencies" and then insisting on the importance of stabilization based on gold; he insisted that this should not remain optional for each country. The Assembly actually voted for this amendment, unanimously consenting to it.

The 32ⁿᵈ Conference of the Union, whose papers were debated at the beginning of July 1936 at Budapest, took into account: juridical issues – internal trade arbitration and international mixed Courts for the settlement of trade litigations; unemployment and development of the possibilities of using labour force: a) public labour, b) decrease of work hours, c) collective migration; parliamentary control of public finance.

Romania was represented by a delegation of parliamentary delegates led by Mircea Djuvara, vice-chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, and by MP Aurel Cosma.

The Chairman of the Inter-Parliamentary Council mentioned in his speech for the Conference opening, that financial problems were especially considered, as currency instability and deterioration of the international trade circumstances were issues the Inter-Parliamentary organization should insist on. As for the political issues, he insisted that the events of that year were far from consolidating the prestige of the League of Nations, and the institution of the collective security was a superstructure whose foundation was not solid. But the Union – by its role and mission – had to contribute to strengthening the peace and close relations between peoples. In his speech, MP Mircea Djuvara – stressing the reliability of the Union – requested that "the danger appearing in international relations should be neutralized through a single efficient means: re-establishment of order, law and justice". The Romanian people subscribes to that ideal and "it must be organized not through disorder, but through the progressive improvement of the existing institutions".[1]

The intervention of MP C.C. Zamfirescu was also received with high interest, since he analyzed the way the unemployment issue might be regarded, indicating that no state can remain indifferent in front of this scourge for mankind. He suggested that it was during the Conference that the real causes of unemployment should be discussed, as the Conference brought together – under the same roof – the official representatives of all nations and this might provide an adequate opportunity of bringing closer together the divergent viewpoints, by means of international agreements.[2]

On the last point of the agenda, MP Aurel Cosma presented a point of view on the intellectual collaboration. The main aim – he asserted – is the spiritual preparation for an intellectual and spiritual closeness between peoples, in order to strengthen world peace. From that perspective, "the experience gained from the collaboration of the Balkan peoples and of the peoples participating to the Little Entente is relevant, and may be extremely useful for our future works".[3]

As a permanent and prestigious member of the Inter-Parliamentary Council, V.V. Pella was not able to attend that Conference, as he had been recently appointed minister plenipotentiary at The Hague. In spite of the numerous political and diplomatic

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[1] *Compte rendu de la XXXII-e Conference tenue a Budapest du 3 au 8 juillet 1936*, Librairie Payot, 1936, p. 361.
[2] *Ibidem*, p. 409.
[3] *Ibidem*, p. 546.

responsibilities, he continued to have an intense activity in the permanent Commission for the study of juridical issues, where he had been re-elected as vice-chairman. In that quality, he chaired two important meetings of the sub-commission, held in Rome, in April 1937, where there was also a text on equal rights for all the members of the international community, which text was subjected to the attention of the plenary commission.[1]

Given the deepening of the crisis of Parliamentarism, as part and parcel of the general crisis of the political system which dominated the decennium that preceded World War II, the 33rd Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union was held in front of more than 300 senators and MPs from 23 countries, in Paris, at the beginning of September 1937. Romania was represented by 29 Members of Parliament, who, again, were led by the chairmen of the two Legislative Chambers, N.N. Săveanu and Al. Lapedatu.

As the newspapers appreciated at that time, the Conference imposed itself to the attention of the public opinion as a genuine tribune for the defence of peace and democratic liberty. All the speeches strongly emphasized the deep attachment of the representatives of the parliamentary groups for the harmony between peoples and their aversion for the theories of armed violence.

N.N. Săveanu – Chairman of the Delegates Assembly – held a speech on the first day of the debates, based on the Report of the Secretary General, where he paid a tribute to France; he expressed his faith in the values of the parliamentary democracy and an honest desire for peace and good relations among peoples. "Our historical age – he highlighted – is unfortunately characterized by the arms race. The budgets are burdened by huge amounts that could be destined to public care, health and education. For this reason, our Conference, which reunites the great majority of the world Parliaments, must strongly declare the peoples' unanimous desire to get rid of war and to incriminate this international crime generating poverty and disasters, both for winners and for losers".[2] A member of the delegation was V. V. Pella, minister plenipotentiary at The Hague, as well, who had the mission of *rapporteur,* the same as during the previous Conferences, yet this time on another issue of great interest: "Collective Security and Reform of the League of Nations Pact".

At the beginning of his speech, he paid tribute to the Union, which "had played such an important role in the evolution of the juridical norms for the pacific settlement of the international disputes" and insisted on the need to find solutions meant to protect the juridical work aimed at organizing peace, in front of "one of the most complicated crossroads ever".[3] Emphasizing the great juridical and political divergences concerning the organization of peace, he also highlighted the opposition between the universality system of the League of Nations and the system of bilateral agreements, fragmenting the security and consequently restricting it to certain frontiers. "As far as I am concerned – the brilliant jurist affirmed – there can be no contradiction between universalism and regionalism", since the regional movement – as it is consecrated by certain agreements, and here he had in mind the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente – "can only strengthen

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[1] *Compte rendu de la XXXIII-e Conference tenue a Paris du 1-er au 6 septembre 1937*, Librairie Payot, 1937, p. 128.
[2] *Ibidem*, p. 350.
[3] *Vespasian V. Pella în slujba ştiinţei dreptului şi a cauzei păcii* (*Vespasian V. Pella in the Service of Law and Peace*), p. 492.

the work of the League of Nations. Such regional pacts are meant to assure first of all the efficiency of the settlements of the League of Nations Pact".[1]

A particular attention was paid to the fragmentation of the League of Nations Pact by the peace treaties, as well, an issue brought up more and more often by certain political circles. "We cannot make such a separation – the rapporteur asserted – as the League of Nations does not have the necessary competence to do that. The separation is the sole competence of the contracting parts – the signatories of the Peace Treaties". Therefore, the League of Nations did not have "the competence that would be necessary to adopt amendments that could somehow influence the moral force and juridical value of the Peace Treaties".[2]

In addition, the Conference had on its agenda the issue of the regional economic agreements, rather the ones concerning the Danubian countries, and the rapporteur on that issue was the Hungarian representative, I. Szterenyi. The Romanian representative, Mihail Ghelmegeanu presented some remarks, both regarding the report and concerning the resolution suggested by the rapporteur, and subjected to vote in the Assembly. Using solid arguments, he supported necessity of rectifying some of the report remarks, referring to the frontiers created through the Peace Treaties and to their influence – pretended to be detrimental to the economic relations between countries. "The present state of the international economic relations cannot be blamed on the frontiers generated by treaties, as it was triggered by the effects of the economic crisis that began in the autumn of 1929, which joined the far-off consequences, still experienced in the economic field, resulting from the Great War. There is no correlation – he continued – between the territorial frontiers generated by the peace treaties and the state of the economic relations between the present countries. The undeniable proof is that the economic depression occurred in all countries, even in those where there have been no or less intense territorial modification following the war".[3]

The Conference accepted the modification of the resolution requested by the Romanian representative, having the consent of the delegations from Italy, Poland and from the other countries within the Danubian zone.

As during the previous Conferences, MP Aurel Cosma approached different issues related to the reform of the representative regime and to parliamentary incompetence. The resolution draft, on the latter issue – he noted – brings to discussion an issue which must be studied from several perspectives, since it goes up to the examination of the diversity of systems and traditions existing in different countries, concerning the ways of recruitment of the Members of Parliament.

The application of a number of incompatibilities could become dangerous for Parliamentarism, unless carefully examined to suit the public needs and morals of each country. In his opinion, two things had to lead to the determination of the incompatibilities: first, the respect for the power separation principle, and second, the protection of the prestige of the Legislative Bodies. The analysis undertaken led him to the idea that the greatest inconveniency of all incompatibilities would be that they tended to prevent the access into the Parliament of many people who would be useful to the

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 494.
[2] *Ibidem*, p. 496.
[3] *Compte rendu de la XXXIII-e Conference tenue a Paris…*, p. 457.

legislative work but exert professions considered incompatible with the parliamentary mandate. But, he reckoned, as this issue is so "complex and diverse, each country had better set and delineate its own incompatibilities, on its own, according to its needs".[1] The Romanian MP's speech was well-appreciated and he was congratulated by the French senator Mario Roustan, former minister and chairman of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference.

Out of the Romanian delegation, other Members of Parliament who took the floor on other issues on the agenda were: Constantin Dimitriu, D. R. Ioanițescu, Nicolae Bănescu, Nicolae Penescu, and Nicolae Miclescu. That Conference recorded the Romanian delegates' most numerous participation in the debates. The Romanian written press appreciated that they had brought "honour to the country and to the Parliament they represented".[2]

At the end of the Conference there was a great moment of solidarity and friendship between the Members of Parliament of the countries of the Little Entente – with the participation of the Turkish Members of Parliament as well – organized by the Romanian delegation, at the Romanian Pavilion of the Universal Exhibition of Paris. It marked – as the participants appreciated – "a closer connection between the ranks of the MPs of the countries that were parts of the regional Ententes, in which Romania represents a useful and intimate connection point".[3]

The basic modifications, introduced at the same time as the installation of the new royalty regime, in February 1938, could not be forbidden by the Parliament institution which, obviously, declined up to the condition of "appendix" of executive power. The introduction of the new Constitution, on February 27, 1938, was succeeded by a year and a half of inexistence of the Parliament. The first and only parliamentary elections of the system dominated by King Carol II were held at the beginning of June 1939. The members of the political parties were no longer on the Parliament election lists anymore – actually the parties had been dissolved – but instead, on these lists there were representatives of certain professions, all belonging to the sole organization called the Front of National Rebirth.

Although in Romania the political regime had been changed and the Parliament had been dissolved, a delegation made of nine former senators and MPs, among which N. N. Săveanu – former chairman of the Chamber of Deputies and chairman of the Inter-Parliamentary Group – and Alexandru Lapedatu – former chairman of Senate –, attended the sessions of the 34th Conference of the Union, held on August 22-27, 1938, at The Hague. Professor V.V. Pella was part of the group of Romanian Members of Parliament as well, as a full member of the Inter-Parliamentary Council, being also minister plenipotentiary of Romania at The Hague. He did not take the floor during the debates of the Conference, but continued an intense activity in the permanent Commission for the study of the juridical issues, as he still had the vice-chairman position.

On the agenda, the Conference had the following issues: participation to the exploitation of the colonial resources; the "most favoured nation" clause; international unification of the legislation on the copyright and law initiative and elaboration. Within

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 643.

[2] "Timpul" ("Times"), September 11, 1937.

[3] *Ibidem*.

the general debates, based on the Report of the Secretary General, N.N. Săveanu took the floor on the very first day of the Conference, noting that, throughout its 50 years of existence, the Union had entirely done its duty, and it would keep on working on the accomplishment of social and international peace.

Referring to the events in Romania, he showed that the necessity for peace and social harmony had determined the decree of the new Constitution, adopted by the Romanian people and meant to lay the Romanian state on solid bases. In the same train of thoughts, he mentioned that, from her own initiative, Romania had given minorities a statute which consecrated the freedom and cooperation policy, always practised by the Romanian governments in their relation to minorities.[1] Constantin Dimitriu – former minister and former Senate chairman[2] – approached the issue of the initiative and elaboration of the law, relating it to the Romanian experience.

During the last Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union of the inter-war period – namely the 35th, held on August 15-19, 1939, at Oslo – the Romanian Parliament, under its new structure and with responsibilities established in accordance to the provisions of the new Constitution, was represented by 18 senators and MPs, who were led, on that occasion, by the Senate vice-chairman, Prof. Anibal Teodorescu. The Inter-Parliamentary Reunion was opened by a ceremony dedicated to the anniversary of half a century since the foundation of this organization, where the chairman of the Inter-Parliamentary Council presented a large anniversary speech. The general debates on the Activity Report of the Council equally occasioned the highlighting of important moments and great achievements of the Inter-Parliamentary organization throughout the five decennia but also of the concerns appeared in international life since the previous reunion.

Like other representatives of the Romanian parliamentary group who held speeches, Prof. Teodorescu insisted on the merits of the Inter-Parliamentary Union throughout the years, due to the maintenance and development of contacts, and to the fruitful debates of the Conferences and Commissions of the Union, translated into a number of practical realizations in different fields. As for Romania – he noted – the new political organization, based on the Constitution of 1938, had brought significant changes in the system of institutions, particularly in the structure and operation of the Legislative Bodies, which, beside other measures taken, may further enhance the efforts of the Romanian people on its way to progress and civilization.[3]

A great interest was aroused by the interventions of MPs Ion Petrovici and Victor Vâlcovici, on the agenda issues regarding the maintenance and development of small and medium family propriety, and the pacific settlement of international conflict.[4] In fact, this worrying evolution of the international situation dominated the works of the Conference. The representative of the Belgian parliamentary group declared that "at present, the world is in a situation similar to that of the last weeks that preceded the world war, and the peoples expect important events but nobody knows whether these events will be fortunate

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[1] *Compte rendu de la XXXIV-e Conference tenue a la Haye du 22 au 27 aout 1938*, Librairie Payot, 1938, pp. 343-345.
[2] *Ibidem*, p. 575-578.
[3] *Comte rendu de la XXXV-e Conference tenue a Oslo du 15 au 19 aout 1939*, Librairie Payot, 1939, pp. 360-366.
[4] *Ibidem*, pp. 485-487, 505-510.

or not, as it is not democrats but dictators who make the final decision".[1] The representative of the Polish group considered that it was absolutely necessary that – even beginning with those very days – they should make sure to "prevent the Reich from making irreparable mistakes".[2] And on the third day of the Conference, the American MP Hamilton Fish submitted a motion, where he suggested that an intervention should be made to the English, French, German and Italian governments, in order to determine them to conclude a truce of 30 days or more in order to settle international conflicts, by arbitration, mediation or other peaceful means.[3] At the end of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Conference unanimously adopted a motion by which the Union declared that it was "its responsibility to intensify the efforts for the respect of the peaceful means of settlement of all conflicts".[4]

The beginning of World War II, just a few days after the Conference, restricted and finally interrupted the activity of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, during the war years. At the beginning of March 1940, the Inter-Parliamentary Council announced the reunion of the permanent Councils of the Union at Lugano, at the end of the same month. As its representatives to that reunion, the Romanian parliamentary group nominated Anibal Teodorescu, Senate vice-chairman, and Prof. V.V. Pella.[5] It was the last reunion of the representatives of the Inter-Parliamentary Council during the war period. Its activity was resumed after the war, in 1945.

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[1] "Timpul" ("Times"), August 18, 1939.

[2] *Ibidem.*

[3] *Ibidem*, August 19, 1939.

[4] Idem, August 20, 1939.

[5] Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (Archives of the Foreign Affairs Ministry), file 2255/vol. V, f. 1343.

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ROMANIAN DIPLOMATIC ATTACHÉS IN LONDON
ON POLITICAL CRISIS IN EUROPE (1936-1939)

Marusia Cîrstea*

Abstract

The article refers to the way Romanian diplomats and politicians generally, but especially attachés in London, reacted during the political crisis in Europe. The 1936-1939 events – the invasion of the demilitarised area of the Rhineland (7 March 1936), the introduction of compulsory military service in Austria (1 April 1936), the beginning of the Spanish Civil War (17 July 1936), the establishment of the Berlin-Rome Axis (25 October 1936), the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia (1938-1939), the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (23 August 1929) et alii – led to a dangerous turn, especially for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. To cope with the looming threats, Romanian diplomats championed for the conclusion of agreements on political and military strategy, to ensure real and effective support for Romania, under all circumstances.

Key words: *the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the Spanish Civil War, the Anschluss, the Munich agreement, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact*

1. Introduction. Romania within the framework of international agreements

During the interwar period, the efforts of Romanian diplomacy focused on a wide range and variety of targets: a sustained activity within the League of Nations in favour of international peace and security; the creation of bodies and mechanisms of regional security; the strengthening of Romania's traditional alliances with the two Western powers, France and England.[1] It should be noted, however, that Romania's geopolitical and strategic standing was very complicated; three of its neighbours – Hungary, the USSR and Bulgaria – manifested themselves, implicitly or explicitly, as enemies.[2] In order to deal with the threat, interwar Romanian governments set off a chain of diplomatic agreements, political and military alliances meant to ensure, under all circumstances, complex and effective external support in preserving the *status quo* established by the treaties of Paris-Versailles.[3]

Referring to these arrangements, diplomat Alexandru Cretzianu emphasised in a report entitled *"Romania's security within the framework of international agreements"* that in the interwar period were concluded: "I – *Non-aggression treaties*: 1 – *General* (the Briand-Kellogg Pact, 27 August 1928, amended, in the matter of our relations with the Soviet Union, Poland, Turkey, Yugoslavia, by the Convention for the definition of aggression of 3 July 1933); 2. *Bilateral* (with Greece – 12 March 1928; Turkey – 17 October 1933); II *Treaties of*

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[1] Andrei Alexandru Căpuşan, *Diplomaţi români de elită*, vol. II, Universitatea din Bucureşti, 2009, pp. 71-79.

[2] *Istoria Românilor*, vol. VIII, *România Întregită (1918-1940)*, coord. Ioan Scurtu, Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, p. 431.

[3] Marusia Cîrstea, Gheorghe Buzatu, *Europa în balanţa forţelor*, vol. I, *1919-1939*, Bucureşti, Editura Mica Valahie, 2007, pp. 13-16.

friendship (with France – 10 June 1926; Turkey – 17 October 1933); III *Treaties of mutual assistance*; 1 *General* (the Covenant of the League of Nations – 28 June 1919); 2 – *Special* (with Yugoslavia – 17 June 1921, directed against Hungary and Bulgaria; with Poland – 15 January 1931, theoretically <<*erga omnes*>>, practically against the Soviet Union; with Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia (The Balkan Entente) – 9 February 1934, directed against any Balkan state committing aggression on a Balkan border;) IV – *Unilateral guarantees* (with France and England – 13 April 1939, against any state that would threaten Romania's independence and against whom Romania would deem it is in its vital interest to stand with its national forces)".[1] At the same time, the inimitable diplomat Nicolae Titulescu considered that "the European status quo can be maintained through a series of security treaties, each meant to cope with certain definite threats: the Little Entente, to conserve the territorial gains of the successor states at the expense of Hungary; and the Balkan Entente, the entente with France – never more than a simple agreement, – Great Britain's benevolence and the Polish alliance to oppose a possible Russian aggression".[2]

During the fourth decade of the last century, the entire body of agreements, pacts and treaties will crumble under the pressure of a revanchist and aggressive policy, which will lead to war. The Stresa Front, through which Great Britain, France and Italy condemn "the unilateral repudiation of Treaties" and guarantee Austria's independence and integrity (14 April 1935) represents, basically, a final attempt to set up an anti-German front.[3] Events in 1936 – the continuation of military operations in Ethiopia (October 1935 – May 1936); the invasion of the demilitarised area of the Rhineland (7 March); the introduction of compulsory military service in Austria (1 April); the signing of the Austrian-German agreement (11 July); the beginning of the Spanish civil war (17 July); the signing of the Montreux Treaty (20 July); the establishment of the Berlin-Rome Axis (25 October) and others – led to a dangerous turn for countries in Central and South-eastern Europe in particular.[4]

Romania detected early, in 1936-1937, the new course of international relations; the crucial change proved to be the decision of Nazi Reich to choose war as a solution to satisfying its own imperialist plans. Between 1936/1937 – March 1939, Germany engineered a *concealment* of its objectives and this orientation was met with *indulgence* in London and Paris, and the general result translated into the annexation of Austria, then of the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia and, in the end, the abolishment of free state of Czechoslovakia and enslavement of Albania.

2. Romanian diplomat Dimitrie N. Ciotori on Germany's intentions following the occupation of the demilitarised area of the Rhineland

On 7 March 1936 German troops entered the demilitarised are of the Rhineland. By doing so, Germany infringed upon Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles referring to the establishment of the demilitarised area of the Rhineland, as well as Article 1 of the

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[1] Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al României, Bucureşti (The Archives of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, Bucharest, hereinafter: A.M.A.E.), fond 71 România, vol. 7, ff. 130-154.
[2] Idem, fond 71 Anglia, vol. 39, ff. 287-288.
[3] F.-G. Dreyfus, A. Jourcin, P. Thibault, P. Milza, *Istoria universală*, vol. 3, *Evoluţia lumii contemporane*, Bucureşti, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 2006, p. 427.
[4] Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Istoria relaţiilor internaţionale. 1919-1947*, vol. I, Bucureşti, Editura Ştiinţelor Sociale şi Politice, 2006, pp. 147-153.

Treaty of Locarno, sanctioning the demilitarisation of the same area. After German troops occupied the cities of Aachen, Trier and Saarbrücken[1], general Gamelin recommended general mobilization and the French army's urgent come into action, but Albert Sarraut, the French Prime Minister, was opposed. The French government's monumental mistake at that time was chiefly determined by the influence of the British Prime Minister, Baldwin, who, at 2 p.m., had sent a telegram to Paris saying: "The English cabinet requires France to abstain from taking any measure that would compromise the future, before the meeting of the Locarnos in Paris, on Tuesday, 10 March".[2] The act of 7 March marked a turning point in the history of the interwar period. The reoccupation of the Rhineland area by Germany made it difficult – even impossible – for France to help her Eastern allies, Poland and Czechoslovakia. In Geneva, within the League of Nations, growing ever more powerless, time is lost with sterile and ineffectual talks. The League of Nations' failure to contain conflicts, even among its members, had badly discredited it. It was the beginning of a period when the infringement of the main provisions of the Paris peace system, the revanchist states' territorial policy, the aggressiveness of European totalitarian states were tolerated by the great democratic powers through their reconciliatory attitude when faced with aggression, preoccupied to avoid their involvement in a potential new war.[3]

From this point on, Germany's policy focuses on the occupation and domination – political, economic, military – of East European states. In a 21 July 1936 address, Romanian diplomat Ciotori emphasised that: "Germany's military action against Russia and the securement of German domination in the Black Sea basin and Ukraine can only be done, according to the German General Staff after Romania has been finally conquered as a safe area for Germany's future action. Wealth resources and especially oil represent an essential element in the planning of the German General Staff. [...] According to German estimations, Czechoslovakia will be conquered by means of the intensification of the campaigning among Bohemian Germans on the one hand and, on the other, through Hungary's action in Slovenia, forcing it to accept a pact with Germany, following the pattern of Austria and Poland. In fact, Hanlein, the Germans' head (in Czechoslovakia), is in London and pro-German circles working to bring Czechoslovakia under German influence are trying to use him. Knell, a professor at the University of Vienna and renowned supporter of Hitler's policy, militating for German policy, is also here. [...] The German General Staff seem certain of the success of the German action in Romania, where the Reich's direct and indirect policy intensifies".[4]

In order to counteract Germany's aggressive policy towards the East, the three countries of the Little Entente decided that Romania's, Yugoslavia's and Czechoslovakia's heads of state have "routine meetings" to establish economic and military relations and measures be taken with a view to maintaining "cohesion and solidarity between the three allied states".[5] The Balkan Entente, highlighted Victor Antonescu in 1936, must also constitute one of the "essential elements of our foreign policy, rounding up felicitously the

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[1] A.I. Poltorak, *De la München la Nürnberg*, Bucureşti, Editura Politică, 1965, p. 38.
[2] Geneviève Tabouis, *20 de ani de tensiune diplomatică*, Bucureşti, Editura Politică, 1965, p. 274.
[3] Em. Bold, I. Ciupercă, *Europa în derivă (1918-1940). Din istoria relaţiilor internaţionale*, Iaşi, Casa Editorială Demiurg Plus, 2010, p. 137.
[4] A.M.A.E., fond 71 Anglia, vol. 9, ff. 118-119.
[5] Idem, fond 71 România, vol. 3, ff. 278-281.

organization of security in this part of Europe".[1]

3. The Civil war in Spain – reflected and analysed in the reports of certain Romanian diplomats

Another chief event – with large implications at European level – was the outbreak of civil war in Spain. 18 July 1936 was the start of Franco's rebellion against the lawful government of republican Spain. Franco declared state of war: the officers in Morocco, devoted to the rebellion, supported by the falangists, took over the control of strategic points without delay; the easily predictable success of the Morocco Movement was crowned by the seize of control in Seville, Cadiz, Algeciras and Jerez de la Frontera, which provided the insurgents with ports and airfields on the territory of Spain.[2] The League of Nations and the great powers were again being called upon to test their efficiency. However, despite the fact that the aggression was obvious, the adopted measure materialised again in an "international agreement" between the 27 European states, which stipulated non-intervention in Spain's internal affairs. Thus, pursuing the chimera of an agreement with Italy and Germany, Leon Blum, the head of the Popular Front government in France, and Delbos, the foreign minister, held consultations with British officials on 23 and 24 July 1936, on the possibility of forging a "new Locarno". On this occasion, Eden warned the French that a potential intervention in support of the Spanish lawful government "could have great consequences"[3] and – he stated – "We have not lost hope that we will one day be able to assemble at the same table the representatives of the interested nations in order to arrive at the conclusion of a new Western agreement".[4] With regard to Romania's position, it is worth emphasising that during the conflict (1936-1939) relations between the two countries were conducted under special circumstances, determined by the concurrent existence, on the territory of Spain, of two antipodal states and governments locked in a tragic and bloody dispute: the republican state and government, on the one hand and the nationalist state and government on the other.[5]

Examining the new international circumstances, in September 1936, in London, the Great Powers established a Non-intervention Committee, whose task was to facilitate the exchange of intelligence regarding the measures taken by the signatory states. At the same time, a protocol was signed, according to which the 27 European states – who agreed not to intervene in the civil war in any form – would monitor Spanish borders both from the sea and from land, in the following way: the Spanish-Portuguese border would be monitored by 130 English observers; the Franco-Spanish one by an international corps (also made up of 130 observers), while from the sea "the observers who will board in certain ports [...] should make sure ships do not transport materiel or volunteers to Spain".[6] It should be mentioned that Romania's representatives in the Non-intervention

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[1] *Ibidem*, f. 286.
[2] Bartolomé Bennassar, *Războiul civil din Spania*, Bucureşti, Editura ALL, 2009, pp. 56, 57.
[3] Geneviève Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 308.
[4] A.M.A.E., fond Anglia, vol. 7, f. 36.
[5] Apud Gheorghe Paşcalău, *România şi războiul civil spaniol*, Bucureşti, Editura Adevărul Holding, 2011, p. 15; see Doru Liciu, coord., *Relaţiile româno-spaniole. Documente. 1936-1939*, Bucureşti, Institutul Cultural Român, 2006.
[6] Arhivele Militare Române, Piteşti (The Romanian Military Archives, hereinafter: A.M.R.), fond 5487, dosar nr. 974, f. 246.

Committee – C.M. Laptew, Vasile Grigorcea and V.V. Tilea – permanently informed the Romanian government about the proposals, the discussions, the requests and the decisions adopted in the Committee's meetings, brought to the attention of the Committee the measures taken by the Romanian government to execute the Non-intervention agreement and establish a control system at Spanish borders. Unfortunately, the Non-intervention Committee in London got tangled up in sterile, endless talks, while Germany and Italy, both members of the Committee, took advantage and continued their aggressive policy. A report of the Romanian Legation in London highlighted that the first meeting of the Committee for the coordination of intervention measures in the Spanish situation took place on 9 September 1936 and that in time, during ample debates, were established "measures to be taken to ensure greater efficiency"[1] regarding "*Maritime control* – for the surveillance of ships in landing ports [...] *Terrestrial control* – as far as the border between Spain and Portugal is concerned, will be done by a number of 150 English observers. The Franco-Spanish border will be monitored by an International Committee made up of 130 people".[2] As regarded the execution of this plan, on 2 March 1937 the Romanian government informed the Legation in London that "The Ministry of the Navy felt Romania should adhere to and implement the plan of Spanish coast control".[3]

The Spanish civil war became international through the involvement of Germany, Italy and volunteers in aid of Franco's government, on the one hand, and through the establishment of the "Red Brigades" by the Communist International under the control of the Kremlin, who supported the Popular Front government. Tens of thousands of volunteers will stand on one side or the other of the barricades: democrats, supporters of left-wing movements, will fight alongside the republicans; others, regimented in extremist, fascist organisations, will strengthen the lines of nationalist forces. Finally, the latter will prevail because republican Spain "did not receive the correct treatment to which it was entitled according to international law: foreign weapons for the lawful government, not for the rebels".[4] In this international context, Romania was permanently in agreement with the measures and actions taken both by the League of Nations and the lawful government in Madrid. Thus, on 2 September 1936, the Romanian government issued a decree which banned the export and shipment of armaments to Spain, its text being communicated on 11 September by Hiott, member of the Romanian Legation in London, president of the Non-intervention Committee, established in London, on the initiative of the English government to monitor the implementation of the agreement by Lord Plymouth, who was also deputy foreign minister of Great Britain.[5] Romania was also well-disposed towards the Spanish government's Appeal to the League of Nations sent, on 27 November 1936, on the strength of Article 11 of the Pact. The Appeal denounced the armed intervention of Germany and Italy, who had acknowledged Franco's government "de jure" on 19 November 1936, showing that it represented the most blatant violation of international law. The appeal was discussed during the 95th Session of the Council of the League of Nations. The debates resulted in a haphazard resolution marked by the conciliatory

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[1] Doru Liciu, coord., *op. cit.*, pp. 54-57.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 99.

[3] *Ibidem*.

[4] Constantin Vlad, *Diplomaţia secolului XX*, Bucureşti, Fundaţia Europeană Titulescu, 2006, p. 119.

[5] Apud Gheorghe Paşcalău, *România şi Marea Britanie. Relaţii politico-diplomatice. 1933-1939*, Bucureşti, Editura Albatros, 2001, p. 82.

imprint of the Great Powers, which invoked each country's duty to respect the territorial integrity and the independence of a member state of the League of Nations, stating that "any state is compelled to refrain from intervening in the foreign and domestic matters of any other state".[1] Great Britain's activity within the Non-intervention Committee continued to target the preservation of the non-intervention policy – therefore giving a free hand to Germany and Italy, who supported Franco massively. A short time after the beginning of the hostilities, Hitler sent Franco a number of transportation squadrons, and later formed "The Condor Legion" out of the so-called German volunteers, and put it at the disposal of Franco's men. The material support dispatched to the rebels exceeded a hundred million marks. The "Duke", Mussolini, acted even more publicly: on 28 November 1936 he signed an agreement with General Franco's representatives in Rome and Burgos. The Spanish matter continued to be discussed at length within various international bodies in the following years. In the autumn of 1937, within the Assembly of the League of Nations – when, for the last time in the history of the League, almost all foreign ministers of the European member states participated – the delegates of republican Spain requested the Assembly declare their country was the victim of foreign aggression. During the same period, Vespasian V. Pella, Romanian representative within the Council of the League of Nations, speaking about the conflict in Spain, emphasised (in October 1937) it was necessary, legally speaking, to reach a form of conciliation: "The Council determined the occurrence of attacks opposing the most elementary humanitarian principles, incriminated by the 1930 Treaty of London and that such attacks directed against any merchantman are condemned by the conscience of civilised nations whose interpret is now the Council".[2] In the same international context – when countries defeated in the first World War were secretly preparing and openly demanded the revision of the territorial status sanctified by treaties – the great Romanian jurist Vespasian V. Pella wondered "concerning the Pact of the League of Nations [...] if it possesses the requisite flexibility to ensure peace" or, on the contrary, "if a revision of the Pact is necessary to give it more flexibility so as to be able to adapt to the requirements of a permanently evolving international community".[3] Regarding the Spanish matter, the Romanian foreign minister, Victor Antonescu, also expressed an opinion on behalf of the Romanian government and the Little Entente, on 21 September 1937, highlighting that "The Little Entente Considers each people has the unalienable right to choose their own form of national life".[4]

An interesting naval event, in the context of the Spanish civil war, is analysed and reported by the Romanian attaché in England, Gheorghe Dumitrescu, who showed that "The German ambassador to London, Mr. Von Ribbentrop, visited Mr. Anthony Eden, English Foreign Affairs minister and informed him that the German Leipzig cruiser (6000 tons) had been attacked by a submarine belonging to the Spanish governmentalists on 15

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[1] Eliza Campus, *State mici şi mijlocii din centrul şi sud-estul Europei în relaţiile internaţionale*, Bucureşti, Editura Politică, 1988, p. 251.

[2] Doru Liciu, coord., *op. cit.*, p. 143.

[3] Apud *Vespasian V. Pella – în slujba ştiinţei dreptului şi a cauzei păcii*, ediţie îngrijită şi studiu introductiv de Gheorghe Sbârnă, Ploieşti, Editura Karta-Graphic, 2011, p. 38.

[4] Apud Petre Bărbulescu, *România la Societatea Naţiunilor (1929-1939)*, Bucureşti, Editura Politică, 1975, p. 381.

June (1937), while the German ship was in front of the Oran".[1] By declaring victim of Spanish aggression, Germany was in reality pursuing an older goal of its foreign policy, which was to enter the Mediterranean, to obtain a sector of Moroccan coast or a few strategically important islands. Therefore, during the 21 June 1937 meeting with the ambassadors of France, Germany and Italy – to discuss the maritime incident of 15 June – the German delegation demanded the following: the sequestration of Spanish trading vessels; the blockade of Spanish ports; naval demonstration with forces representing all the powers that control the seas.[2] The reply of England – an advocate of "non-intervention" in Spain – was given by A. Eden who declared in the House of Commons: "I can resolutely say that the British Government has no intention of taking part in naval operations".[3] However, during the war, both totalitarian and democratic powers became involved in supporting the two warring sides massively and openly. Germany and Italy for General Franco's forces; France and the USSR for the republicans. Referring to this involvement, Gh. Dumitrescu emphasised that "Italian patrol vessels found themselves in the situation of not being able to do anything" about the French supplies to the province of Catalonia; at the same time, "British control ships ended up protecting vessels carrying provisions and ammunition to the port of Bilbao"[4] (under siege from Franco's troops). On 23 December 1938 Franco initiated the final offensive in Catalonia, occupying Barcelona on 26 January 1939. Following these attacks, a large part of the republican army found refuge in France. The republican government, led by Juan Negrin, only had the central and south-eastern part of the country under its authority. Franco's troops concentrated their military operations against Madrid, which will capitulate without any fight on 28 March 1939. After 986 days of heavy warfare, on 1 April 1939, Franco will declare the end of the hostilities.[5]

4. The *Anschluss* and its impact on Central and South-eastern European countries

The Peace Treaties of Paris outlawed the *Anschluss*. On this ground, Austria's National Assembly adopted the Law concerning the renaming of "German Austria" as the Republic of Austria. However, Germany never gave up on the plan to annex Austria. To this effect, in 1931, a project of Austrian-German customs union had been devised. In July 1934, with the apparent help of Nazi Germany, the Austrian national-socialists organised a coup d'etat whose victim was Federal Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, an advocate of the pro-Italian policy. The *Anschluss* failed and the English-French declaration of 1935 reminded Berlin of its prohibition after 1919. In the same year the Austrian Chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg and minister von Berger-Waldenegg visited London "with the purpose of removing Austria from under the current Italian tutelage – as C.M. Laptew reported. In case the independence and the integrity of the Republic were threatened, the Government in Vienna would like the signatories of the Consultative Plan to be unable to intervene directly in Austria, by dispatching armies, until they received a

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[1] A.M.R., fond 3832, dosar nr. 198, f. 438.

[2] *Ibidem.*

[3] *Ibidem.*

[4] *Ibidem.*

[5] Valentin Ciorbea, *Din istoria secolului XX*, vol. 1 *(1919-1939)*, Constanţa, Editura Ex Ponto, 2006, p. 246.

mandate to do so from the League of Nations".[1] In July 1936, Germany enforced upon Austria an agreement by which it declared "a second German state" and undertook, in fact, to submit its entire policy to Nazi Germany's interests. In November 1937, on the occasion of the signing of the Anti-Komintern Pact, the German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop discussed the Austrian matter with Mussolini, emphasising the time had come for "the Austrian matter to stop being considered a merely Italian-German problem".[2] Thus, through the *Duke*'s silence, Italy acknowledged the *Anschluss* tacitly but practically. Taking advantage of the hesitations of the Great Powers, Hitler will move to act decisively. Romanian diplomat Grigorcea reported in 1937 – following a Halifax-Hitler meeting – about "the Great Powers' hesitations and interests": "Today we know for certain that Hitler placed the whole burden of the discussions on secondary matters. He requested the retrocession of the (German) colonies [...]. The Chancellor acknowledged the special strategic arguments which preclude the retrocession of the German colonies in South-eastern and South-western Africa and was agreeable to accepting compensation instead [...]. On the Austrian matter, Hitler was very vague, only showing that the German-Austrian agreement of July 1935 formed a sufficient foundation for the settlement of all problems. As regards Czechoslovakia, the Chancellor denied any martial intention, but demanded equal treatment for the German minority".[3] The results of the Halifax-Hitler meeting were welcomed both by Great Britain and France. "Both parties were satisfied in the end [...]. It was decided that Lord Halifax's talks may form a starting point for a general relaxation".[4] During this period, Anglo-French diplomats were attempting: "1 – to maintain contact with Germany; 2 – to gain time for the British re-armament programme; 3 – to create an atmosphere of relaxation, avoiding any irritation to the Germans and thus giving them grounds for complaint on the issue of the treatment received by the German minorities".[5]

On 12 March 1938, Hitler signed directive no.1 for *Operation "Otto"* – the invasion of Austria by midnight. And indeed, on 13 March 1938 German troops invaded Austria, president Miklas resigned and the cabinet issued the law regarding the annexation of Austria to the Great Reich.[6] The *Anschluss* had been achieved, first through the Führer's will and under the Wehrmacht's threat, and in the following weeks, more precisely on 10 April 1938, proclaimed officially, as a result of the plebiscite which resulted in almost unanimity of the votes cast.[7]

5. The position of Romanian diplomats regarding "The Munich Arrangement"

During the reunion of 5 November 1937, the union to the Reich of the Germans in Czechoslovakia had been brought in the foreground by Hitler. These Germans, numbering approximately 3200000 people, lived in the Sudetes region (Sudetenland). The fifth Nazi column in Czechoslovakia, led by Konrad Henlein on instructions from Berlin,

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[1] A.M.A.E., fond 71 Anglia, vol. 4, f. 184.
[2] Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 160.
[3] A.M.A.E., fond 71 Anglia, vol. 39, f. 297.
[4] *Ibidem*.
[5] *Ibidem*, f. 300.
[6] Erich Zöllner, *Istoria Austriei de la începuturi până în prezent*, vol. II, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1997, p. 646.
[7] *Ibidem*, p. 648.

came into action, organising at the beginning of May 1938 a series of incidents and manifestations hostile to the government in Prague. Referring to the actions of the Germans, Vasile Grigorcea, Romania's minister in London, highlighted (on 26 September 1938) that "Hitler demands the retrocession by 1 October of an area comprising not only the territories inhabited by a German majority of over 50%, but also important territories with a Czech majority, including communication nodes of the greatest importance. Apart from these, he also demands the establishment of a region where plebiscite could be held under international control, but under special circumstances, which would allow the Sudetes in the ceded area to take part in the plebiscite without any conditioning, so a definite German majority could be obtained".[1] In the context of this political crisis in Central Europe, the stance of the two great allies of Czechoslovakia, France and Great Britain, can be defined/ observed clearly. Thus, while the Foreign Office's lack of interests in the political evolutions east of the Rhine had been asserted since 1925 (the Locarno agreements), France was involved in a series of treaties as well as bi- and multilateral agreements stipulating clear obligations for its involvement in supporting Czechoslovakia in case of unprovoked German aggression.[2] To that end, French diplomacy was faced with a tough test because of the duplicitous position adopted by Great Britain in its relations with the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The British and French ambassadors in Prague advised the Czechoslovakian government to look for an understanding with Henlein. On 17 May 1938 negotiations began between Henlein and the government in Prague. At the same time, the English and the French media, in its great majority, released harsh criticism against Czechoslovakia. Thus, the "Daily Mail" published an article entitled *The Czechs do not interest us*, which stated, among other things, that "Czechoslovakia does not carry any interest for us. If France wants to fry her fingers there, it is her own business".[3] To prevent armed conflict – as Hitler had threatened during a speech given on 12 September 1938, in Nurnberg – the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, "glorious strategist" of the policy of appeasement towards fascist states, made three humiliating pilgrimages to Germany, first to Berchtesgaden, on 15 September 1938, then to Godesberg on 22 September 1938 and, finally, to Munich on 29/30 September 1938... This was how, from one capitulation to another, he eventually ceded to all of Hitler's claims during the night of 29 to 30 September 1938, together with the French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier.[4] *The Munich Agreement* occurred at a moment when actions against the *policy of appeasement* towards Berlin were increasing, mainly in Great Britain; at their head were established politicians, such as Winston Churchill, who in the following period would assert himself in the Allies' war against Nazi Germany and its satellites. Romanian diplomat Radu Florescu made a brilliant analysis of Great Britain's foreign policy in a confidential report entitled *On the English policy following the Munich Agreement*[5], emphasising that it differed from other European states in that "The British Empire, being a community of interests so widely scattered on the surface of the globe,

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[1] Apud Prof.univ.dr. Viorica Moisuc, *România şi criza cehoslovacă. Documente. Septembrie 1938*, Bucureşti, Editura Adevărul Holding, 2010, p. 630.

[2] *Ibidem*, pp. 20, 630-632.

[3] Zorin Zamfir, *Istoria universală contemporană*, Bucureşti, Editura Oscar Print, 2003, p. 155; Valentin Ciorbea, *op. cit.*, pp. 420-424.

[4] F.-G. Dreyfus, A. Jourcin, P. Thibault, P. Milza, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 430.

[5] A.M.A.E., fond 71 România, vol. 262, ff. 196-219.

her actions and reactions are naturally different from those of a country with limited and compact geographical interests".[1] That is the reason why "No British head of Government and no Parliament would ever be able to engage the entire Empire in defending local interests, knowing that by doing so they would endanger much bigger interests".[2] However, continued Radu Florescu, "a vital interest for the Empire is the geographic and military connection between England and a continental power. England's gendarme for Europe is France, so whoever attacked France would weaken England's military bridgehead on the Continent".[3] Taking these interests into consideration, England and together with it, France, unwilling to engage in a war that was detrimental to them, will sacrifice the integrity of Czechoslovakia on the altar of what the supporters of the "appeasement policy" called "the cause of peace".[4] "The impression of an unfavourable moment prevails in the explanations given by the Government-inspired media. Added to this, the belief that the revision of the borders of Czechoslovakia avoided the immediate invasion of German armies in the European South-east, which was impossible to defend in due time by the Bohemian fortifications left isolated following Austria's annexation and Poland's defection. Chamberlain's invitation to Mussolini to come to Munich in order to stave German pressure confirms Italy's role in Central Europe, as well as the difficulty of reaching a solution in the absence of its agreement".[5] Hence, Munich marked the beginning of a change in the course of British foreign policy so that any conflict "that may arise outside England's vital areas could be contained to prevent war".[6]

Romania's attitude on the "Munich arrangement" can also be inferred from a document in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs referring to the meeting – of 15 November 1938 – between Minister N.P. Comnen and Lord Halifax. On this occasion, the Romanian minister specified: "Romania did not want to take any advantage of the break-up of the Czechoslovakian state. Although the Romanian government was requested by a part of the Slovakian political parties to claim a mandate over Slovakia, the Romanians never entertained the thought of acting on these requests. The same happened with Rhutenia, where we do have a considerable Romanian minority. It would have been deeply immoral and unpolitical to take part in the division of the body of a good and loyal ally. The catastrophe that hit Czechoslovakia created intense confusion among the country's intelligence and, at the same time, a serious economic imbalance. In order to provide reassurance and suppress the interested propaganda of various outside factors, Czechoslovakia's international status should have been *final* and settled as soon as possible in the spirit of the Munich Agreement. At the same time, Czechoslovakia should have been provided with financial assistance to enable it to maintain its independence. This *independence* was a *vital necessity* for Romania and simultaneously, it posed great interest for the western Great Powers. The Great Powers, if I may be honest, have assumed a threefold responsibility to Czechoslovakia: political, juridical and moral. Through the

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[1] *Ibidem.*

[2] *Ibidem.*

[3] *Ibidem.*

[4] M.P. Renouvin, *Les relations franco-anglaises, 1935-1939. Esquisse provisoire*, in vol. *Les relations franco-britanniques de 1935 à 1939*, Paris, Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1975, pp. 39-45.

[5] A.M.A.E., fond 71 România, vol. 262, ff. 199-200.

[6] *Ibidem.*

assurances given on 19 September last year, England and France were issuing a categorical proclamation to Czechoslovakia that if she accepts the suggestions made in Prague and decides in favour of the requested sacrifice, they are ready to assure Czechoslovakia of its future borders. On account of these assurances, Czechoslovakia accepted the principle of the sacrifices it was requested to make. Once reunited in Munich, the Great Powers were not satisfied with regulating the German-Czech dispute, but also made decisions concerning the Hungarian and Polish demands. These decisions were followed by the well-known protocols, by which the four states pledged their guarantee, as soon as Czechoslovakia would accept the adopted decisions regarding the three disputed borders. Given the above-mentioned facts, Czechoslovakia may rightfully claim it would never have accepted the massive amputations that were enforced on Czechoslovakia if it hadn't twice received the solemn assurance that its future territorial status would be guaranteed by the four Great Powers".[1] In Munich it was accepted that Czechoslovakia should be broken up. All Czechoslovakian regions with over 50% German population were to be ceded to Germany. The signed Quadripartide Agreement envisaged the transfer to Germany of 28291 km² with 3683082 inhabitants. After Munich, the German government pursued the federalisation of the Czechoslovakian state in order to achieve its subsequent dissolution and full occupation.[2]

Munich certainly closed a stage in the international political life and opened another – in which political reasoning was gradually being replaced by brutal force. According to Henry Kissinger, Munich represented "the climax" of the appeasement policy promoted by London and Paris and, moreover, it put an end to the balance of forces in Europe as it had been established through the Treaties of Peace in 1919-1920.[3] The Munich Agreement compelled all states to re-examine the results of their previous politics and re-evaluate the resulting ratio of forces, in order to decipher the perspectives of the evolution in the international situation as far as it was possible to do so.

Analysing the new international relations, Romanian diplomat Alexandru Cretzianu concluded: "Czechoslovakia's experience – though the country profited from a well-compound network of mutual assistance pacts – shows us that today no country can rely absolutely on Pacts, Treaties and Guarantees – however perfect they may be – and international agreements – however solemn".[4]

6. The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact – "the division of Eastern European territories"

In 1939, Soviet diplomatic activity, dynamic and aggressive, adjusted itself to the importance of each state they maintained economic and political relations with or else when a special strategic or territorial interest was being pursued by choice. An important sign of the change in Soviet foreign policy was Maxim Litvinov's replacement with Viaceslav Molotov on 3 May 1939. Once Litvinov was removed, a "Bolshevik order"[5] was

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[1] Idem, fond 71 Anglia, vol. 40, ff. 117-121.
[2] Alexandru Oşca, *România în sistemul relaţiilor internaţionale contemporane*, partea I, *1917-1939*, Bucureşti, Editura C.T.E.A., 2006, p. 207.
[3] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomaţia*, Bucureşti, Editura ALL, 2007, pp. 274-275.
[4] A.M.A.E., fond 71 România, vol. 7, f. 153.
[5] Emilian Bold, Răzvan Ovidiu Locovei, *Relaţii româno-sovietice (1918-1941)*, Iaşi, Casa Editorială Demiurg, 2008, p. 260.

instituted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the summer of 1939, the U.S.S.R. initiated talks with the French and British government regarding a concerted action against Hitler's Germany. However, the western allies did not pay attention to this matter, "sending missions of lower rank, in a spiritless manner".[1] The publication of an article entitled *The English and French governments do not want an agreement based on equality of rights with the U.S.S.R.* by A. Jdanov in the "Pravda" newspaper on 29 June 1939 was an important alarm signal regarding the core of Soviet mentality. The author launched a genuine indictment against the deliberate hindrance, as he claimed, of tripartite negotiations, concluding that "The British and the French do not pursue a real agreement, acceptable for the U.S.S.R., but mere discussions about an agreement, in order to be able to speculate about the so-called inflexibility of the U.S.S.R. towards public opinion in their countries and prepare the path towards an accord with the aggressor".[2] In reality, as it will become obvious in less than a month, the one to enter a pact with the Reich was the government in Moscow. And, to everyone's surprise, the moment when the sealing of the U.S.S.R.'s military convention with Great Britain and France had become imminent, Germany and the U.S.S.R. announced – on 21 August 1939 – the forthcoming signing of a non-aggression Pact on 23 August 1939.[3] The Pact, entered into for a period of ten years, was accompanied by a *Secret Protocol* (to be disclosed in 1946) which acknowledged U.S.S.R.'s "interest" in Poland, Finland, Latvia, Estonia and Bessarabia, under the circumstances of German "disinterest" in the area.[4] The preamble to the additional protocol stipulated that Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia delimited "their spheres of interest in Eastern Europe" and the final part of the secret protocol recorded the Soviet Union's interest in Bessarabia and Germany's complete political disinterest in south-eastern Europe.[5] By signing a pact with Hitler – a perfect expression of hypocrisy, but also of the "realpolitik" – Stalin hoped to postpone the outbreak of the conflict by a year and a half or even two. The Soviet Union was indeed less prepared to enter war in 1939 than it would be in 1941. Stalin was informed that Hitler wanted to ensure "vital living space" and planned to attack Ukraine. Through this Pact – and also through the Treaty of 28 September 1939 – Stalin hoped to stay Hitler's ambitions of attacking the U.S.S.R.[6]

The non-aggression treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union concluded on 23 August 1939 was not a "duplication" of Munich, but it shocked everybody, and especially the ones who had excluded from their estimations any agreement or alliance between Nazism and communism.[7] The two Powers declared they wanted to defend the cause of peace. They committed to not support a third power which would declare war to either of them, to not join an alliance hostile to one of the partners and to settle differences only amiably or through partition. The treaty, coming into power immediately, was entered into

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[1] Paul Dukes, *Istoria Rusiei. 882-1996*, București, Editura ALL, 2009, p. 260.

[2] Georgiana-Margareta Scurtu, *Relațiile internaționale în contextul celui de-al doilea război mondial. Studiu de caz: Relațiile României cu Franța (octombrie 1938 – iunie 1940)*, București, Institutul Cultural Român, 2006, p. 214.

[3] Gh. Buzatu, *România și Marile Puteri (1939-1947)*, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, pp. 41-52.

[4] Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 188.

[5] Ion M. Oprea, *România și Imperiul Rus. 1924-1947*, vol. II, București, Editura Albatros, 2003, p. 169.

[6] Lilly Marcou, *Stalin – viața privată*, București, Editura ANTET, 1996, p. 184.

[7] See Emilian Bold, Ilie Seftiuc, *Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov și implicațiile internaționale*, Iași, Casa Editorială Demiurg Plus, 2010.

for a period of ten years and extended automatically for five more years unless either of the parties denounced it one year before its expiration.[1] The pact comprised seven articles and a secret additional protocol, which had three main articles. According to the provisions contained in the additional protocol, Germany and the Soviet Union divided among themselves spheres of interest in Eastern Europe, namely[2]: in case of territorial and political transformations on the territories belonging to the Baltic States – Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania – Lithuania's northern border would become the convergence line of both Germany's and the U.S.S.R.'s "spheres of interest". In relations to this, Lithuania's interest in the Vilna territory was acknowledged by both parties; in case of territorial and political transformations on the territories belonging to Poland, both Germany's and the U.S.S.R.'s spheres of interest were going to be delimited roughly by the line formed by the Narev, Vistula and San rivers. The matter of whether it was in both Parties' interest to maintain an independent Polish state and of the manner in which its borders were going to be charted remained to be settled conclusively during subsequent political events. In any case, both governments were going to settle this matter through amiable agreement; regarding south-eastern Europe, the Soviet party highlighted their interest *in Bessarabia*, while the German party declared their complete disinterest in the territory between the Prut and the Dnestr Rivers.

In Paris, London and elsewhere, the Soviet-German Pact caused consternation. Ever since the beginning of 1939, N. Chamberlain had received a number of unsettling reports (some incorrect) from the British secret services predicting German actions against Poland, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine and even the Netherlands and Switzerland. After Germany occupied the whole of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939, Chamberlain accused Berlin of becoming alienated from the spirit of Munich. In late March, Chamberlain's government relinquishes the policy of appeasement that had been pursued so far and seeks to organise, together with the French government, a common resistance against Hitler's threat.[3] Poland, Romania and Greece were given guarantees[4]. Under these circumstances, Great Britain became even closer to France. Both countries had engaged on the road of democracy and were equally afraid for their security. Politicians in Bucharest were also shocked, according to King Carol II's *Journal* entry: "I believe they divided the Eastern European territories among themselves, especially Poland's and ours. In any case, we are in the foreground of threat [...] Romania's interest is that the Anglo-French prevail and, at the same time, that Romania will be safe from war for as long as possible. In a nutshell, extended neutrality, in order to be able to preserve its forces and, maybe, if circumstances designate it, to intervene when action are useful".[5] Armand Călinescu also wrote in his memoirs: "I consider the situation is very serious.

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[1] Gh. Buzatu, *România sub Imperiul Haosului (1939-1945)*, Bucureşti, Editura RAO, 2007, pp. 118-120.

[2] Gheorghe Onişoru, *Istoria lumii contemporane. De la revoluţia bolşevică până în zilele noastre (1917-2015)*, Târgovişte, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2015, pp. 50-52; Ioan Scurtu, *România şi Marile Puteri (1933-1940). Documente*, Bucureşti, Editura Fundaţiei România de Mâine, 2000, pp. 148-150; Emilian Bold, Ilie Seftiuc, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-102.

[3] Alexandru Cretzianu, *Ocazia pierdută*, ediţia a doua, prefaţă de V.Fl. Dobrinescu, postfaţă de Sherman David Spector, Iaşi, Institutul European, 1998, p. 49.

[4] M.F.W. Deakin, *Anglo-French Policy in relation to South-East Europe, 1936-1939*, in vol. *Les relations franco-anglaises, 1935-1939…*, pp. 63-87.

[5] *Istoria Românilor*, vol. VIII, p. 537.

Have they made an agreement for the partition of Poland and Romania?"[1] The answer came sooner than expected, when, after 23 August 1939, Romania's international isolation became a reality, neighbouring states expressing revisionist and imperialist intentions. The invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 scattered the last illusions of European stability: when the ultimatum to Hitler expires, on 3 September 1939, the British find themselves engaged in war.

In this international context, King Carol II will call a meeting of the Royal Counsellors and some of Romania's ministers on 6 September 1939, which will be attended by "General Văitoianu, Dr. Vaida Voevod, G.G. Mironescu, Professor Iorga, Dr. Anghelescu, Gh. Tătărescu, Constantin Argetoianu and Generalul Baliff […] as well as Armand Călinescu, Prime Minister, Grigore Gafencu, Minister al Foreign Affairs and Ernest Urdăreanu, Minister of the Palace".[2] On this occasion, "The King made a presentation of our foreign policy during the recent months and our attitude towards the conflict that arose between Poland, Germany, France and England".[3] Several participants expressed their opinions regarding the new international situation, emphasising the need for Romania to declare "for absolute neutrality"[4] and voting unanimously for the preservation and "strict observance of the rules of neutrality established through international conventions towards the belligerents in the ongoing conflict".[5] In his speech, Dr. Vaida-Voevod emphasised the following: "A statement should be issued, regarding Romania's neutrality. Mr. Vaida knows that Germany is expecting such an announcement. He is however wondering what Germany will give us in exchange. And he is also wondering if the other belligerent states will make similar declarations to guarantee our neutrality".[6] Moreover, N. Iorga emphasised that "We should never pursue a policy of fear. Nobody should believe that we bow to power because it is a power. Such a bow would be a shameful act and it would be a pity for all our past and present sacrifices in the name of the country. I am firm in stating the following: we are pursuing a different policy from the one we would like to. We would have liked a different policy – we cannot execute it. Therefore, we will maintain neutrality. But it must be dignified and honest neutrality. The ceaseless interventions on the part of Mr. Fabricius, who is lacking in both spirit and a sense for reality, must end once and for all. The public don't want war – at the same time, they don't want Germany's victory. We all wish for the end of a reign of terror in Europe. Neutrality equals honesty – we should therefore maintain sincere neutrality. We should not accept more, like other neutral states. It is the only attitude we can have. Although we may not like all our commitments to the Balkan states, they must be respected. I am relieved to find, from the Foreign Minister's declarations, that we are not bound by a commitment to Poland to provide help in a conflict with Germany and so we have the right to remain neutral. Then Colonel Beck, who represents an inconsistent smugness, did not manage to push us into all adventures. Neutrality is a fashion. It requires honesty and fineness. Think about Italy's attitude, where the Monarchy saved peace and represented a rein that Germany, unfortunately, did not have. It wouldn't hurt

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[1] Apud Emilian Bold, Ilie Seftiuc, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
[2] A.M.A.E., fond 71 România, vol. 7, f. 172.
[3] *Ibidem*.
[4] *Ibidem*, f. 173.
[5] *Ibidem*, f. 180.
[6] *Ibidem*, f. 173.

us to close ties with Italy. We should think ahead, to the end of this conflict. There will be a Peace Congress. We cannot assist France and England the way we would have wanted to. Our neutrality, must, however, be maintained – by the ruling circles, by the public, by the media (it is with disgust that I remember the articles published in "Porunca Vremii" and "Curentul") – so that we do not offend our friends. Our attitude must be so that at the Congress we do not find that those who helped our rights triumph are against us".[1]

The complexity of the international situation, the change in the ratio of forces between the Great Powers determined Romania to adopt a neutral position, in the hope of maintaining its forces intact and waiting for favourable external circumstances to fulfil its objectives – in accordance with national interests and international law.

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[1] *Ibidem*, ff. 174-176.

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THE ROMANIAN CABINET UNDER THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME OF KING CHARLES II (1938-1940) *PROLEGOMENA*: THE LONG WAY TOWARDS AUTHORITARIANISM

Mihai Ghițulescu[*]

Abstract

The institutional change brought by the authoritarian regime of Charles II (1938-1940) is often described but very little analyzed. In this study, we focus on the executive power and we try to show that the new arrangement was broadly a formalization of some old practices. This is why, in the first part bellow we will shortly present the Romanian tradition of government, the first eight years of Charles's reign, the normative consecration of the Cabinet as a political institution and the constitutional framework of the new regime.

Key words: *Romania*, *Charles II*, *Government*, *Cabinet*, *authoritarianism*

The establishment of the so-called monarchic authority regime (after February 10, 1938) meant an institutional change or, rather, a set of changes in the Romanian political system. They are always presented by the historians, but the approach remains descriptive and simplifying. The only interpretative attempt is limited to marking their authoritarian character and possibly highlighting/postulating their contrast to the earlier situation, despite the idea that Charles II prepared his authoritarian regime gradually since his accession to the throne, in 1930. We intend to make some first steps towards an analysis of the institutional arrangements, focusing on the executive power and advancing the hypothesis that most of the changes were not really qualitative/essential, but rather quantitative. In some cases, it was only a formalization of some existing practices, much before the reign of Charles II. Therefore, we find necessary an overview of the organization and functioning of the Executive during the interwar years and especially their second decade.

The Romanian tradition

"The authoritarian monarch" and "the playboy authoritarian king" are Charles II's historic most frequent labels. Attempting to mitigate the negative image, several authors remember his role in the cultural and economic growth. This raises the impression of the king with "the largest qualities and the highest deficits".[1] That does not concern us here. We just try a quick look at the first nearly eight-year reign, through the Romanian written constitution and the principles of the parliamentary monarchy.

Based on most writings, one can think that, in 1930, "suddenly not the parliament, but the King became the most important character of Romania, and the only deciding

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[1] Lucian Boia, *Suveranii României. Monarhia o soluție?*, București, Editura Humanitas, 2014, p. 55.

factor".[1] This is obviously an exaggeration. The King, with all its constitutional superiority and all his political skills, could not possibly be "the only deciding factor". And the change was not so radical; It did not happen overnight, nor was a shift from representative democracy to autocracy. The essence of the Romanian political regime remained the same. The transformation was one of gradualism.

The 1866 Constitution provided that "the executive power is entrusted to the Prince King, who regularly exert it by the Constitution" (art. 35) and that "the Prince/King appoint and dismiss his ministers (art. 93). The additional provisions that "he makes the regulations necessary for the enforcement of the laws" and that he "appointed or confirmed in all public powers" show that, formally, the monarch had "full administrative authority". Adolph Thiers's words ("The King reigns, but he does not govern") were quite popular in Europe, but they were also disputed in doctrine and ignored in practice. Swiss author J.K. Bluntschli considered that for a system to be considered truly monarchy, the King must govern, but without confusing the governance and the administration: "the King is not in charge of business details; it is even not desirable for him to deal with them normally".[2] In Romania, Constantin G. Dissescu wrote that "the antithesis between the reign and the government is a pure play on words" and that "the formula is not true and cannot be".[3] Two decades later, trying to score Charles' authoritarian regime in a local tradition, other scholars wrote that Romania "was permanently and practically reigned".[4] The first finding was based on law, the second on practice. Let's say that in almost all monarchies, sovereigns have the same powers (the right to appoint senior officials).[5] But not all sovereigns used their powers. Carol I did it; he chose the cabinet and he involved in the governance.

Things were different with Ferdinand, but not essentially different and more complicated than one can understand from the history handbook. He was, like his predecessor, "constitutional" in relation to the Romanian Constitution. "All limitations to the royal powers were observed by a constitutional monarch as Ferdinand", noted the American historian Keith Hitchins.[6] For the "limitations" we need to return to the constitutional texts. During the first nine years of his reign, Ferdinand ruled under the text of 1866. If we are not attentive to detail, we tend to say that "regarding King's powers, the Constitution of 1923 repeated the text of the fundamental law of 1866".[7] It mostly did, but additionally it provided a mark of shy evolution toward "the parliamentary government", although it was too general and enter somewhat at odds with some of the

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[1] Oana Ilie, Cornel Constantin Ilie, *Istoria Parlamentului, a Camerei Deputaților și a președinților săi*, București, Historia, 2007, p. 93.

[2] J.K. Bluntschli, *Théorie générale de l'état*, traduit de l'allemand et precede d'une preface par. M. Armand de Riedmatten, Paris, Librairie Guillaumin & Cie, 1877, p. 369.

[3] C.G. Dissescu, *Dreptul constituțional*, third edition, București, Editura librăriei Socec & Co., Societate anonimă, 1915, p. 843.

[4] I.C. Filitti, I.V. Gruia, *Administrația centrală a României*, in *Enciclopedia României*, vol. I, *Statul*, București, 1938, p. 282.

[5] A. Bard, P. Robiquet, *Droit constitutionnel comparé. La Constitution Française de 1875 étudiées dans ses rapports avec les constitutions étrangères*, Paris, Ernest Thorin, Editeur, 1876, p. 322.

[6] Keith Hitchins, *România 1866-1947*, translated by George G. Potra and Delia Răzdolescu, București, Editura Humanitas, 1996, p. 405.

[7] Ioan Scurtu, Ioan Bulei, *Democrația la români*, București, Editura Humanitas, 1990, pp. 168-169.

old provisions: "The government exercises executive power in the King's name, as established by the Constitution" (art. 92). Later, when the Constitution of 1923 has been already history and many lawyers tried to legitimize the authoritarian regime, Paul Negulescu wrote the text of 1923 "seeks to reduce the role of King, making it a passive organ, of representation forbidding him any interference in the public affairs".[1] The assessment is correct. But... The Constitution just "sought"; it did not succeed. The constitutional statement represents a fundamental principle of the parliamentary monarchy; but it remains simple word, unless specific mechanisms are fixed. And they were never fixed, in Romania. A Western researcher was right to conclude that the new Constitution "left most of the 1866 institutional architecture unchanged, including the virtually unrestrained power of the executive in general and of the monarch in particular".[2] Virtually, but not practically unrestrained, because the principle matched somehow with Ferdinand's way of being and reigning. He did not involve in governance. But, whatever his beliefs were, he formally acted just like his uncle in the cabinet appointments. It is always said that he was influenced by Ionel Brătianu. With one single exception (1919), cabinets were not issued from the Parliament, but the Parliament was issued from new elections, organized by the "King's Council of Ministers".

A parliamentary start

Paradoxical as it may seem, Charles II's coming to the throne (1930) was, in form, a triumph for parliamentarianism. Historians always speak about "Restoration", and they perpetuate Charles' idea, who saw continuity as a source of legitimacy. It is, however a fair question: "Restoration or establishment?". Beyond the back arrangements, the act of 8 June 1930 did not result from the Constitution, but from the will of the "representatives of the nation". We can now see working in Romania the British principle of *parliamentary sovereignty.* "A parenthesis of four years is erased from history by the enthusiastic applauses of a parliament". The representatives changed, three times (1926, 1927, 1928) but "the institution was the same".[3] Parliament adopted a law in 1926 and Parliament repealed in 1930.

"The Legislative Bodies, gathered in one Assembly and established as national representatives declare void the bills promulgated by the royal decrees no. 13 and 14 of January 4 and 5, 1926, and, accordingly, under the art. 77 of the Constitution notes that the Romanian throne succession rightfully returns to HRH Prince Charles..."[4], the official report said. Going on the assumption that the four years represented a deviation from the natural evolution of the Romanian state, Charles had to accept, however, that the deviation produced many effects which cannot be erased. He announced that "all the acts of exercise of royal prerogatives, adopted by the High Regency or by the Council of Ministers since King Ferdinand's death and until Our oath, are ratified by Us".[5]

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[1] Paul Negulescu, *Constituţia României*, in *Enciclopedia României*, p. 192.
[2] Wim van Meurs, *The Burden of Universal Suffrage and ParliamentaryDemocracy in (Southeastern) Europe*, in Sabine Rutar (ed.), *Beyond the Balkans. Towards an Inclusive History of Southeastern Europe*, Wien, LIT Verlag, 2014, p. 169.
[3] *Ibidem*, p. 98.
[4] "Monitorul Oficial", Part I, Issue 127, June 12, 1930, p. 4390.
[5] Idem, Issue 125, June 9, 1930, p. 4366.

The old practice of their peak

After the first moment, parliamentarianism had only suffered under Charles II. Two trends are easily seen: the increasing ascendancy of the executive and the increasing role of the King within the executive.

First, the role of the Crown in the cabinet formation! Like its predecessors, Charles II appointed the president of the Council and he dissolved parliament. But how he did it? His wish to form cabinets of "concentration", "national unity", "above the parties" or "outside the parties" was obvious from the very beginning. We know several attempts: General Constantin Prezan (June 1930), Nicolae Titulescu (April 1931, June 1932), Marshal Alexandru Averescu (1934). It was, after all, his right to appoint anyone with any conditions, but that meant the infringement of one of the few Romanian customs in the Romanian politics. The government "above the parties" could not exist without overthrowing the whole system gradually established after 1866. Time had not yet come for it. The system was fragile, but not yet compromised.

The apparent success of 1931, Nicolae Iorga's cabinet, was considered "a lesson for the parties", "showing them that country can be ruled, if needed, by a government outside parties".[1] But this cabinet was supported by several parties, including the National Liberal Party, and it lasted only a year. It is very important to notice that, this time, the King provided to the president the full list of ministers. What would have been perfectly constitutional under the text of 1866, which stipulated only that "the King appoints and dismisses his ministers" was now questionable, as the Constitution of 1923 introduced the reference to "the one who has been charged by the King to form government". In 1930, G.G. Mironescu, withdrew the "Restoration cabinet" (appointed by the Regency) claiming that the new king must exercise his constitutional right "to appoint his ministers".[2] Right after that, Iuliu Maniu decline the mandate, saying that "it would be unconstitutional for the King to recommend as ministers, people who are not part of his party".[3] In 1931, the newly appointed Prime Minister, Iorga, demanded to the Parliament "the restitution of those rights of the Crown, which, to the detriment of all of us and it have been kidnapped".[4] It was not the only time Charles II decided the appointments in the cabinet. He did it frequently during Gheorghe Tătărescu's government (1934-1937), when he did not hesitate to demand the president's resignation and then reappoint him, just to get rid of certain people; the best known case is that of Nicolae Titulescu in 1936.

But Charles went on. Violating the custom, he involved in appointments and dismissals at a lower level. Let's take for example an often mentioned episode. In October 1932 Maniu accepted to form the cabinet, after the resignation of Vaida-Voevod, but asking for freedom of action. In January 1933, the Interior Minister, Ion Mihalache, proposed the dismissal of two public: Gabriel Marinescu (prefect of the Capital Police) and Constantin Dumitrescu (commander of the Gendarmerie). The King refused and a new conflict has emerged between President Maniu and Carol II on the "Crown prerogatives".

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[1] M.I. Costian, *Regele Carol II şi partidele politice*, Bucureşti, Tipografia "Lupta" N. Stroilă, 1933, p. 83.
[2] Ion Mamina, Ioan Scurtu, *Guverne şi guvernanţi 1916-1938*, Bucureşti, Editura Silex, 1996, p. 78.
[3] M.I. Costian, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
[4] Apud Ion Mamina, Ioan Scurtu, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

The Prime Minister resigned, saying: "The real cause of my resignation was the inadequacy of my point of view to that of the sovereign to assume government's responsibility". A new cabinet (Vaida-Voevod) was appointed, based same parliamentary majority. Octavian Goga outlined the contradiction of the majority, being simultaneously alongside Maniu and Goga, who had different views on royal prerogatives.[1] But the majority did not matter too much. Grigore Iunian clearly described the new system: "The King or head of state also has some rights. It has a first right: he appoints the prime minister. But his right ends here? No! The head of state in all constitutional regimes similar to that of ours can express some wishes on the composition of the government".[2]

A huge debate on the royal prerogative erupted after the assassination of I.G. Duca (on December 29, 1933). After a short interim of Angelescu, on January 3, 1934, the King appointed Gheorghe Tătărescu, who presented an almost identical new cabinet, two days later. It was said then – and historians have broadly taken this statement – that the King had "worked" contrary to the political custom, appointing someone other than the majority leader. That was usual, but it was not imposed as a constitutional custom. There had some exceptions (1896-1897, 1930-1931, 1932-1933). Even before 1930, Paul Negulescu admitted that the King may "invest a person, who can be the head of the party that has the majority in parliament, or other person who has the confidence of the majority, to form the cabinet".[3]

The last performance of the old system of appointment took place in the autumn-winter 1937 (the Ion Mihalache's failed attempt, the reappointment Tătărescu, who lost the majority and finally the 40 days government led Octavian Goga).

Obviously, the label of "personal government" suits better to Charles II than to Charles I. The King not only decided whom to call, but he also imposed certain persons and engaged in ongoing activities. It is already legendary the obedience of Tătărescu, with its formulas "We did it, Your Majesty!" and "We'll do it, Your Majesty!" Facts lead to the conclusion that indeed the Prime Minister gave "literal sense to the protocol formula «too submissive and faithful servant of Your Majesty»" and "he satisfied the desire of the king who wanted to govern, not only to reign".[4] Beyond this, the ascendancy of the executive over the legislature reached its peak. It was not the usual ascendancy from all parliamentary systems, where the cabinet is made up of leaders of the majority party and it works as a management office of parliament. No! In Romania, during the '30s, the cabinet, strictly controlled by the King, attempted to replace the legislature, making large use of decrees approved *en bloc* by the Chambers.

We can see that Charles perpetuated and accentuated old royal practices, he "forced the spirit of the Constitution, trying to play an increasingly active role on the stage of national politics"[5], but he did not abandon the Constitution, until February 1938. It can be said, however, that quantitative accumulation led to qualitative transformation. It would be unfair to formulate a categorical judgement. Ultimately, we think that Lucian Boia's conclusion is very appropriate: "The reign of Charles II is may have a double

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[1] "Monitorul Oficial", Part I, issue 30, February 7, 1933, p. 899.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 914.

[3] Paul Negulescu, *Curs de drept constituțional român*, editat de Alex. Th. Doicescu, București, 1927, p. 430

[4] Aurelian Chistol, *România în anii guvernării liberale Gheorghe Tătărescu (1934-1937)*, Târgoviște, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2007, p. 359.

[5] *Ibidem*, p. 353.

interpretation. On the one hand, it remains undisputed that King contributed to the deregulation of the political scene; on the other hand, conversely, his action was aimed to end a growing disorder".[1]

The birth of the cabinet

The 1923 Constitution brought the first consecration of the "government"/"Council of Ministers" and its President. The text was general and obviously insufficient and ambiguous. Art. 92 stated that "the Government exercises executive power in the name of the King", and the next one that "the Ministers gather in the Council of Ministers, chaired by the one who has been charged by the King to form the government, with the title of President of the Council of Ministers". "Ministerial departments and undersecretariates of state may be established and abolished only by law", it said in the same article. 93. We have no other detail about the organization, the functioning and the powers of the Council.

In 1929, Petre Andrei, the rapporteur of the draft law on the organization of the ministries, appreciated that this "is the first law harmonizing the activities of various public services. Until now, each ministry had its law to the organization, their duties were not defined well enough, and there were many confusions and frequently even conflicts between ministries".[2]

The law expressly stated for the first time first some fundamental rules, namely that King appointed by decree a "person responsible for forming the government," namely the President of the Council who countersigned the decree appointing the other ministers (Art. 2). State services were grouped in ministries, representing "the general interests of the State". Their number was set at 10: Interior; Foreign Affairs; Finance; Justice; Religious and Public Instruction; Army; Agriculture and Fields; Industry and Trade; Public Works and Communications; Labour, Health and Social Welfare (art. 37).[3]

This law has not had the desired effect. The stability and the uniformity of the ministerial departments have not been achieved. Frequent government changes associated with the old informal practices. The structures of ministries required by the law of 1929 were amended either by law (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defense – 1933, Ministry of Interior – 1935), or by decree (Ministry of Justice -1935, Ministry of Agriculture and Estates – 1936).[4] The King even formed new ministries by decree (Ministry of the Air and Navy – 1936).[5]

The framework of the authoritarian regime

What happened on February 1938? First, on 10-11, the King dismissed the cabinet of Octavian Goga (appointed by him, without any parliamentary basis, 40 days ago) and replaced it by one headed by Patriarch Miron Cristea. He also introduced by decree the state of siege throughout the country. There was nothing new, so far! Next, he conceded a new Constitution (approved by referendum, on February 24), which "enshrined the

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[1] Lucian Boia, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

[2] Petre Andrei, *Discursuri parlamentare 1929-1933*, Iași, Editura Ankarom, 1996, p. 248.

[3] *The bill for the organization of the ministries*, in Paul Negulescu, Romul Boilă, Gh. Alexianu, *Codul administrativ adnotat*, București, Institutul de Arte Grafice "Vremea", 1930, pp. 1-180.

[4] I.C. Filitti, I.V. Gruia, *op. cit.*, pp. 288-295.

[5] *Ibidem*, p. 118.

principle of the supremacy of the King", following the idea that "the King reigns but he does not govern".[1] That is correct, but again, things were more complicated. Art. 31 provided that "The King is the Head of State". It was the proclamation – powerfully symbolic – of an old general principle available in all monarchical regimes. Art. 33 brought something new 1866: "The executive power is entrusted to the King, who exercises it through his Government [new provision], as determined by the Constitution". Art. 65 defined the Government: "The government is composed of Ministers and Undersecretaries of state", but "Ministers [not the Government, as in 1923] exercise executive power in the name of the King" and they are "gathered in the Council of Ministers, which is chaired by the one who was charged by the King to form a government and bearing the title of President of the Council of Ministers [art. 44 used the name of Prime Minister]" (art. 66). Two other issues deserve our attention. The claim that "Ministers have political responsibility only to the King" was, without any doubt, a denial of the parliamentary government; but, in fact, it wasn't new; it was only the constitutional strengthening of an old-time existing situation. Then, the exclusion of the provision that the King has no other powers than those granted by the Constitution was an obvious way to infringe the anyway weak limits of the royal prerogatives.

Commenting on the situation of "The executive power in the new Constitution", the well known scholar Andrei Rădulescu concluded that "The Government is not the second factor of the executive, as in other Constitutions, but the body which exercises the executive power in the King's name, as his representative". "Constitutions" could not mean, as we have shown, old Romanian constitutions. But anyway, first or second factor, it was clear that "It must however take into account the will of the King who has the right to decide"[2]. Therefore, remain as it was. Altogether we find fair assessment that "to us, when we had no separated powers, it is understood that the execution attributes belonged to the Prince. Since we introduced this principle, the executive, fulfilling power belonged to the Prince, also [...]. The new constitution has kept most of the previous rules, so it's not fair the observation that it would have given the entire power or too much power to the executive".[3]

As usual, in the Romanian political regime, the practice was not strictly governed by the Constitution. For a year and a half, there was no Parliament and the legislative power was exercised exclusively by the King. For two and a half years they have worked no less than nine cabinets, with many more ministerial changes and a permanent instability at the lower administrative levels. It was surprising for a regime that aimed to ensure order and stability. In the next part of this study, we will analyze in detail the organization and functioning of the cabinet, highlighting both the continuity and the innovation.

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[1] Manuel Guțan, *Istoria administrației publice românești*, second edition, București, Editura Hamangiu, 2006, p. 266.

[2] Andrei Rădulescu, *Puterea executivă în noua Constituție*, in "Revista Fundațiilor Regale", Year VII, Issue 6, June 1, 1940, p. 596.

[3] *Ibidem*, p. 589.

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THE POLITICIZATION OF THE GERMAN LIBRARIES
BETWEEN 1933-1945

*Septimiu Lucian Jurca**

Abstract

The aim of this article is to analyze the German libraries' relations with the National Socialist Regime between 1933 and 1945. The research will approach the activity and the attitude of university and regional libraries directors, such as the Prussian State Library, the Bavarian State Library and the German National Library, mentioning, in the same time, the share in which these directors were members of the National Socialist German Workers' Party. Additionally, we will emphasize the changes introduced since 1933 in the education for librarianship, the discrimination of the librarians based on political and racial grounds, the forced retirements, the disciplinary measures and the criteria of staff promotion in order to identify the consequences of the personnel policy and the reactions of the librarians to the abusive measures.

Key words: *libraries, Germany, National Socialism, antisemitism, political discrimination*

Between 1933 and 1945, many German librarians had a positive attitude towards the regime, even those who were not party members. The libraries yearbooks adopted an objective tone, but in certain cases they also published eulogistic texts of the libraries' directors for the German political leadership: "geniality, energy and perseverance of the leader have substantially contributed to obtaining of major successes in Germany and abroad".[1]

The Newsletter of the Prussian State Library, entitled "Our State Library", published articles with a strong ideological emphasis. This publication was created in December 1st, 1938 and had gradually become a mouthpiece of the national socialist propaganda. The editors came from the library's employees, approaching both professional and political themes. After the outbreak of the Second World War, there has been created a new column, named "Stories of our soldiers", within which were published heroic notes of former employees, who were on the front line.[2] On the other hand, the journal was offering information related to the library staff and other various changes, the events' schedule, the distinctions granted, the most recent acquisitions or donations, etc. Numerous materials contained quotations from Hitler or from other Party preeminent members' discourses. However, we should note that the general director of the Prussian State Library, Hugo Andres Krüß, did not publish any article in this journal.

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[1] Richard Dertsch, *Jahresbericht*, Mainz, Universitätsbibliothek, 1939, p. 9.
[2] Werner Kratsch, *Alltag an der Front*, in "Unsere Staatsbibliothek", nr. 20, 1940, p. 11.

Members of the National Socialist German Workers' Party as Library Directors

Among the library directors in Germany, there was a significant number of members or sympathizers of the National Socialist German Workers' Party. Being a party member did not involve the support of all its measures or ideology.

The access to positions in the public sector was often conditioned, between 1933 and 1945, by the membership to NSGWP[1], while a resignation from this party was synonymous with the dismissal from work.[2] Since 1937, many people were enrolled in the party without being consulted beforehand. Also, the adherence to the paramilitary organization "The Assault Division"[3] took place without the consent of the functionaries, within the training courses in the National Socialist spirit, which employees were required to attend.[4]

However, many librarians showed courage refusing to become members of the NSGWP and assuming possible negative repercussions. So, simple party membership did not automatically mean that the person was an ardent supporter of the totalitarian state. There were some librarians who, despite the allegiance to the Nazi political organization, did not follow the instructions hierarchically received or found a less intrusive way to apply them[5], which do not absolve these employees of the guilt of spreading National Socialist ideas.

The number of the NSGWP members among librarians before 1933 was small. According to the archive documents[6], there were only 13 librarians enrolled in Hitler's political party during the Weimar Republic.[7] From these 13 functionaries, only Rudolf Kummer, Rudolf Buttmann, Hans Peter des Condres and Heinrich Clarius subsequently occupied senior positions, so we can conclude that achieving a director position was not conditioned by the early NSGWP membership.[8] Therefore, the librarians' situation was not different from that of other high ranking officials.[9] Of the 34 directors of university libraries in Germany between 1933 and 1945, 12 were members of the party. Excepting Joachim Kirchner, Richard Oehler and Gustav Abb, the heads of these institutions had a discreet presence within the political organization, with little laudatory statements to the National Socialist Regime, directors such as Hermann Corsten, Karl Preisendanz and Josef Kindervater had only a formal adhesion to the party.[10]

The vacancies were filled, in most of cases, by people who shared the national socialist ideology. There were a number of university libraries' directors who were dismissed and thus being affected institutions in Berlin, Göttingen, Münster, Würzburg,

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[1] National Socialist German Workers' Party.

[2] Hans Hattenhauer, *Geschichte des Beamtentums*, Köln, Heymann, 1980, pp. 296-297.

[3] Sturmabteilung.

[4] Leo Haupts, *Aspekte der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft in Köln und im Rheinland. Beiträge und Quellen*, Köln, dme-Verlag, 1983, pp. 104-105.

[5] Manfred Heinemann, *Erziehung und Schulung im Dritten Reich*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1980, p. 16.

[6] Bundesarchiv Berlin, RWEV R21/10599.

[7] Bundesarchiv Berlin, BP R21/10671, PA Arthur Fink.

[8] Engelbrecht Boese, *Die Bestandspolitik der Öffentlichen Büchereien im Dritten Reich*, in "Bibliotheksdienst", nr. 17, 1983, p. 281.

[9] Friedbert Schenck, *Die Einstellung der deutschen Beamten zur Weimarer Republik*, Darmstadt, Eigenverlag, 1984, p. 222.

[10] We have reached this conclusion on the basis of the archives mentioned at the 6 and 7 footnotes.

Kiel, Gießen, Leipzig, München, Heidelberg and Halle. Excepting the new library director from Würzburg, all the other persons named were party members.

Changes were also made in the management of state libraries, Georg Reismüller being removed as general director of the Bavarian State Library and replaced with Rudolf Buttmann, which was one of the first members of NSGWP.[1] Hugo Andres Krüß remained the head of the Prussian State Library and joined the party in 1940.[2] Additionally, the German National Library was managed, except for a brief interruption, by the same person, Heinrich Uhlendahl, who never became a party member.[3]

Therefore, in terms of leading positions within the state, university or national libraries, there was a significant politicisation, but not all the institutions were affected.

The education for librarianship

The librarians' formation became uniform throughout Germany since 1938, with the adoption of new examination regulations. On this occasion, they renounced the old curricula that were previously managed by every land. The candidates who aimed a position within the university libraries had to fulfill some conditions, which included a faculty graduation and the possession of a doctorate in science. Also, in the competition were admitted only candidates who were members of the NSGWP. If the competitors were married, they had to prove that their spouses belonged to the Aryan race. The candidates had to declare whether they were members of a Masonic Lodge or a similar organization. The registration dossier was usually submitted to the head of the library, which drew up an assessment report of the candidate and sent the documents to the Ministry of Education in Germany.

The decision regarding the admission or the non-admission of a competitor was taken at this level. The candidates, who have been accepted, were attending a training course of two years, first doing an internship either in a university library or in the regional libraries from Stuttgart and Dresden, or at the German National Library. During the first year, the trainee had to attend also political training courses. The activity of the second year was held at the Prussian State Library or at the Bavarian State Library. At the end of the two years, an examination has taken place, and, after its promotion, the candidate was assigned to a library.[4]

The trainee was subject, during its preparation, of political indoctrination attempts, which he could not refuse. The marks obtained in the political training courses, which lasted between three and six weeks, were important because they decided whether the person had the required qualities of a future civil servant[5]. The goal of these courses was

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[1] Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, M41371, Removal Decision taken in October 8, 1935.
[2] Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, I HA 76/566, Letter of Krüß adressed to the Ministry of Education, resulting that he had become member of the NSGWP, April 1, 1940.
[3] Hildegard Riedel, *Faschistische Kultur und Wissenschaftspolitik*, Leipzig, Hochschulschrift, 1969, p. 195.
[4] Bundesarchiv Berlin, RWEV 2544 Z II a (b)/38, *Ausbildung und Prüfungsordnung für den wissenschaftlichen Bibliotheksdienst*, in "Amtblatt des Reichsministeriums für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung", nr. 4, 1938, pp. 423-426.
[5] Mainz University Library, Nachlaß Hermann Fuchs, Manuskript, p. 50.

to determine the librarian to do first its "duty to the people", and secondly to perform his professional obligations.[1]

The mandatory reading list of the intern included National Socialist Papers.[2] Wolf von Both, member of the Board of Directors of the Prussian State Library, frequently organized seminars in which were approached specific issues of the National Socialist thinking.[3] Along with the specialty subjects from the graduation examinations of the library and information studies, were also present questions related to the National Socialist thinking, such as: the Army of the Third Reich, governors of regions, German Labour Front or the Jewish question.[4] The share of policy issues versus the library science ones was of ten percent. From the 90 minutes provided for the specialty exam, 9 minutes were allocated to political issues.[5] The subjects chosen by trainees for their graduation papers were non-political. A list of dissertations submitted at the Prussian State Library between 1930 and 1936 shows that there is not a single paper that addresses political issues.[6]

Unlike other countries, in Germany women played a minor role in the university libraries. In 1934, only five women were active within the university libraries[7], and, since 1938, theoretically, females were not allowed anymore into this field. It was recommended that if there were candidates of different gender, but with similar skills and qualifications, to be favored men.[8] In addition, married women whose husbands had a satisfactory income were dismissed.[9] This measure was criticized by professionals because it prevented access and promotion of the women librarians holding a high qualification.[10] After the outbreak of World War II, the mentioned regulation was no longer followed and women were employed due to the lack of male staff who was on the front line.[11]

In conclusion, we can say that the education for librarianship was subject of a growing politicization. On the other hand, the small number of women employed in university libraries and the lack of promotion opportunities were signs of a policy of discrimination.

Dismissals, forced retirements and staff promotion policy

Librarians of Jewish origin or those, who had been members of other party than NSGWP, were dismissed. On April 7th, 1933, there was created the legal framework

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[1] Hermann Sauter, *Bücherei und Buchhandel*, in "Bücherei und Bildungspflege", nr. 100, 1933, pp. 706-707.

[2] Bundesarchiv Berlin, RWEV 2544 Z II a (b)/38, *Ausbildung und Prüfungsordnung für den wissenschaftlichen Bibliotheksdienst*, in "Amtblatt des Reichsministeriums für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung", nr. 4, 1938, pp. 423-426.

[3] ***, *Jahrbuch der Preußischen Staatsbibliothek*, Berlin, 1937, p. 7.

[4] Bundesarchiv Berlin, BP R 21/10680, PA Julius Gross.

[5] Bundesarchiv Berlin, BP R21/10749, PA Herbert Wegener, The examination took place in March 24, 1941.

[6] Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Fond Acta I 2, List of the graduation papers.

[7] Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, I HA 76/567.

[8] Bundesarchiv Berlin, RWEV 24088, Disposition of the Ministry of Education, December 2, 1933.

[9] Mainz University Library, Nachlaß Hermann Fuchs, Manuskript, p. 49.

[10] Bundesarchiv Berlin, BP R21/10703, PA Elisabeth Kreyenborg.

[11] Bundesarchiv Berlin, BP R21/10711, PA Maria Möller.

necessary to implement the above mentioned abusing measures by adopting a new law[1], which regulated the public service.[2] According to this law's provisions, most civil servants of Jewish origin were dismissed. The only exception was represented by the employees who had demonstrated that they had fought on the front line in World War I, or they were the son or father of a killed soldier, or they were civil servants before 1914. After the National Socialist Regime came into power, the officials were obliged to fill in a form in order to apply the civil service law entered into force on April 7th, 1933.[3] This legislation did not take into account only the employees of Jewish origin, but all civil servants who were unreliable due to their past political affiliation.[4] The rate of dismissals gained momentum with the adoption of the Citizenship Law on September 15, 1935, which removed the clause regarding the persons who had fought in World War I, meaning the provision which exempted the dismissal of many Jewish employees.

These measures were followed by the adoption of the German Civil Servant Law on January 26, 1937, which prohibited the exercise of this profession for the citizens who did not belong to the Aryan race. A research from 1937 on staff policy in the public administration of the Third Reich revealed that there were not Jewish employees anymore serving the German State.[5]

Being obliged to comply with the mentioned law, the libraries fired a large number of people. The exact figure is unknown due to a lack of the archive material, but the data provided by Eduard Yarnall Hartshorne, on 15 librarians, are questionable.[6] Alexandra Habermann indicates nominally a number of librarians who were expelled from their work place for political or racial reasons.[7]

Frankfurt am Main Public Library fired the following employees: Aron Freimann, Otto Schiff, Ulrich Leo, Edgar Breitenbach, Ernst Vatter, Wilhelm Weinreich, Walter Schürmayer and Adolf Waas.[8] The Prussian State Library was forced, in 1933, to dismiss Max Husung, Hans Lindau, Ernst Honigmann, Robert Lachmann, Gerhard Alexander, and Hermann Pick. The General Director of the Prussian State Library said on this situation that: "the dismissal of the six librarians of Jewish origin facilitated the access of a new generation of librarians".[9] Two years later, other two librarians had to leave the library, Arthur Spanier and Walter Gottschalk.[10] Most of these people were highly qualified, therefore their dismissal was a loss for the institution. The management of

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[1] Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums.

[2] Hans Seel, *Erneuerung des Berufsbeamtentums*, Berlin, Heymann, 1933, p. 6.

[3] Mainz University Library, PA Charlotte Schneider. In this dossier is such a file.

[4] Hans Seel, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[5] Erwin Schütze, *Beamtenpolitik im Dritten Reich*, in Hans Pfundtner, *Dr. Wilhelm Frick und sein Ministerium*, München, Eher, 1937, p. 49.

[6] Eduard Yarnall Hartshorne, *The German Universities and National Socialism*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1937, p. 93.

[7] Alexandra Habermann, *Lexikon deutscher wissenschaftlicher Bibliothekare 1925-1980*, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1985, p. 7.

[8] *Ibidem*, p. 377.

[9] Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, I HA 76/567, Letter of Hugo Andres Krüß adressed to the German Ministry of Education, November 23, 1935.

[10] Eduard Yarnall Hartshorne, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

certain libraries disapproved the implementation of these arbitrary directives, and for the individuals concerned such measures were incomprehensible.

Arnold Singer was an employee of Freiburg University Library, and, because of its Jewish origin, he was early retired under the law of public service. Despite the support received from the library director, the application of this law could not be avoided. Arnold Singer expressed his consternation in a letter: "I am German. I have always felt and thought like a German. My parental home was a place where German traditions and language were highly appreciated. My family's loyalty to Germany was demonstrated through my brother, who was serving officer and killed in 1916, in the heavy battle at Verdun".[1]

Initially, he received a pension, but later it was withdrawn because he did not have a contribution of at least 10 years, putting him in a difficult financial situation:

"It is impossible for me to find a job at a magazine, a newspaper or radio since the provisions of the same law prohibit the access to it. I hope, however, that there will be a solution to this desperate situation".[2]

Arnold Singer was able to emigrate, but he always hoped that he could return to Germany, managing to repatriate only after the end of World War II.

His tragic destiny emerges from his letter of 1940. He regretted that libraries were deprived of some of their highly qualified staff, which was a loss for the German libraries. He wrote: "My family has repeatedly shown its loyalty to the homeland, many relatives losing their lives on the front line. My wife and I are deeply attached to Germany and we hope to come back as soon as possible".[3]

Jewish librarians, who were living abroad, and, according to the law, they were entitled to a pension, lacked confidence that their financial rights would be respected. Regular payments were conditioned by the political attitude of immigrants, who were overseen by the German consulates staff. The same institution also reviewed the activities of the librarian Arthur Spanier, who was living in exile, holding that: "Dr. Arthur Spanier, former employee of the Prussian State Library, is working at Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati. Dr. Spanier did not express any political opinion in the public sphere".[4]

After coming to power the National Socialist Regime carried out a cleansing of the civil service through legislative measures, which affected librarians too. Primarily, it was the Jewish employees who lost their jobs but civil servants who were politically unreliable were either dismissed or forced into retirement as well.

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Bundesarchiv Berlin [The German Federal Archives, Berlin], fond Bibliothek Personalia, R21/10671, PA Arthur Fink.

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[1] Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Acta XII 2, Complaint.

[2] *Ibidem.*

[3] *Ibidem.*

[4] Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, I HA 76/567, Information of the German Consulate in Cleveland, USA, December 28, 1939.

Dertsch, Richard, *Jahresbericht*, Mainz, Universitätsbibliothek, 1939.

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ROMANIA AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
(1965-1990)

*Daniela Osiac**

Abstract

The article entitled *Romania and the peace process in the Middle East (1965-1990)* presents Romania's position in the problem of the Near East conflict, emphasising that: "Romania never targeted for one moment a unilaterally advantageous solution and neither a provisional or circumstantial one, but an enduring, definitive, main solution to enable the peoples in the region to lead a normal, peaceful life". The article also presents – succinctly but relevantly – the involvement of Romanian diplomacy in the negotiations between the conflicting parties, meant to achieve a climate for peace in the Middle East.

Key words: *the Middle East, Romania, Israel, Palestine, Nicolae Ceauşescu*

1. Interests and motivations

In the second half of the 20th century, Romania's international decisions were influenced/ governed by the fact that the world was divided in two blocs confronting each other in all areas: *in politics*, the East-West confrontation targeted continental and world domination – one system being based on democracy and political pluralism, the other on the single party rule; *in economy*, the competition was between two social-economic systems – in the West, market economy, in the East, centralised economy; *in ideology*, it was a competition between the two types of society: capitalism and socialism.[1] In this context – of the "cold war" and a world divided into blocs – one must not forget that Romanian politics and successes depended essentially, but simultaneously, on firstly the government in Bucharest succeeding in following its own policy and making use of a favourable international setting; secondly, it depended on the accelerating decline of the power in Moscow and the rapid ascension of Beijing; on the "*opportunities*" Bucharest was offered as a result of China's cooperation; the attitudes or actual support of France, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the USA, and others; in these circumstances it became possible for Romania to express its own attitudes or demand its national sovereignty and independence be respected.[2] At the same time, Romania became involved in solving the Middle East crisis, especially after 1965, in a versatile and diplomatic way. Each Romanian intervention was made in accordance with the U.N. principles and the interests of the peoples in the area. Romanian diplomacy always appealed to history in analysing the geopolitical phenomenon in the Middle East, as the history of the Arab and

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[1] See *Manual de analiză a politicii externe*, coord. Motoc, Şerban Filip Cioculescu, Iaşi, Editura Polirom, 2010; Daniela Osiac, *România şi conflictul din Orientul Mijlociu. 1948-1989*, Craiova, Editura Aius, 2011.
[2] Gh. Buzatu, Marusia Cîrstea, *Europa în balanţa forţelor*, vol. III, Iaşi, Editura Tipo Moldova, 2010, pp. 394-395.

Jewish peoples had over time suffered multiple "adjustments" and "interpretations" at the hands of the great powers.

Romania's interest in solving the problems in the Middle East area found justification in: our country's geopolitical importance, being situated between Europe, the Soviet Union, the Balkans and the Middle East; active involvement in all international organisations; President Nicolae Ceaușescu's desire that Romania pursue a "foreign policy aimed at defending peace, easing international tension and promoting cooperation between the different peoples"[1]; Romanian-Israeli relations, which, from various points of view, represented an exception in the two blocs' diplomacy. During "the six-day war" (1967) Romania was the only country in the socialist bloc to maintain relations with Israel[2]; old consular relations: in 1921, I.G. Duca, Minister of Foreign Affairs, establishes the first Romanian consulate in Jerusalem; in 1948 Romania recognises Israel[3], and on 19th August 1969 the Romanian representation in Tel Aviv becomes an embassy; the migration wave of Romanian Jews to Israel. Relations between Bucharest and Tel Aviv had traditionally been good ever since the establishment of the state of Israel, Romania being unopposed to Jews migrating to Israel; in the '70s it was estimated that approximately 400000 Jews in the population of Israel came from Romania; Romania's ambition to solve the "Palestinian problem", which was considered truly decisive in ensuring an enduring peace in the Middle East. Thus, after the Yom Kippur War (1973) the envoys of the two sides – Arab and Israeli – carried out a series of negotiations (until 1977) on Romanian territory.[4]

Maintaining and intensifying open dialogue with both Israel and the Arab states, Romania managed to help make important steps in the détente and peace process in a neighbouring region – that of the Middle East – to which it is connected through old spiritual traditions, at the same time displaying interest and respect for all peoples in the area.

2. Diplomatic and economic relations between Romania and Israel

Romanian-Israeli relations in the second half of the 20th century developed both on the basis of traditions retained through the Romanian principalities' connections with the Holy Lands, and also the fact that Romania recognised the newly formed state from the beginning and never interrupted diplomatic relations, not even during the Arab-Israeli armed confrontations: 1948-1949, 1956, 1967, 1973.[5] Romania granted de-jure recognition

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[1] Ion Calafeteanu, coord., *Istoria politicii externe românești în date*, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, p. 391.

[2] Mircea Malița, *Tablouri din Războiul Rece. Memorii ale unui diplomat român*, București, Editura C.H. Beck, 2007, p. 162.

[3] Alfred Hârlăoanu, *Istoria universală a poporului evreu*, București, Editura Zarkony Ltd., 1992, pp. 14-21.

[4] Cristina Păiușan-Nuică, *Istoria relațiilor internaționale și a diplomației (1945-2008)*, București, Editura Fundației România de Mâine, 2008, p. 114.

[5] See for more: Cristina Păiușan-Nuică, *Istoria relațiilor internaționale și a diplomației (1945-2008)*, București, Editura Fundației România de Mâine, 2008; Ion Calafeteanu, Alexandru Cornescu-Coren, *România și criza din Orientul Mijlociu (1965-1971)*, București, Editura SEMPRE, 2002; Yosef Govrin, *Israeli-Romanian Relations at the End of the Ceausescu Era*, London, Portland, Frank Cass Edition, 2002; Dumitru Preda, Victor Boștinaru, *Romania-Israel. Diplomatic documents*, vol. I *(1948-1969)*, Bucharest, Bruxelles, 2013 (hereinafter: *Romania-Israel. Diplomatic documents*); Raluca Rus,

to the state of Israel on 11th June 1948, when "the Romanian government took note of the notification (the proclamation of the State of Israel) and decided to recognise the State of Israel and its provisional government", while de-facto recognition was granted in January 1949, when Reuben Rubin presented his credentials in Bucharest and 21st September 1949, when diplomat Nicolae Cioroiu became Romania's representative in Tel Aviv.[1] Gradually, diplomatic relations between the two states advanced, up to February 1966, when Israeli authorities raised the issue of promoting the representation to the level of embassy. Discussions resumed in December 1968, when Gideon Rafael, General Director of the Israeli Foreign affairs, visited Romania and met with George Macovescu, second-in-command to the minister of Foreign Affairs. On this occasion, the Foreign Affairs Minister George Macovescu informed the representative of Israel that the Romanian government had decided to promote Romania's diplomatic representation to the level of embassy; at the same time, he proposed a calendar for the road ahead: on 10th January 1969 a declaration on this topic was to be issued and the actual promotion of the diplomatic representation level was to be made "by 10th February".[2] (The proceedings were completed in August 1969.) On this occasion – that of promoting the Romanian representation in Tel Aviv to embassy level, – Israel appointed Rafael Benshalom ambassador in Bucharest, who held this position between 19th August 1969 and 9th February 1973.

Diplomatic relations between Romania and Israel experienced tensed moments – but (*nota bene*) – they didn't lead to a break in diplomatic relations due to the fact that there was mutual interest in maintaining them. Romania changed its attitude towards Israel, particularly after 1964. Yosef Govrin, Israel's ambassador to Bucharest between 1985 and 1989, recounted that Ceauşescu played "the card of Jewish and Israeli interests in order to promote Romania's objectives in the West"[3] and that there were at least two reasons why he permitted *alyah* in Israel: firstly, "apart from the sums Israel paid for each emigrant, depending on age and level of education, the Jewish problem was also solved in Romania [...]; secondly, this decision proved consideration for Israel and the West's request that Jews were permitted to leave Romania as a humanitarian gesture".[4] During the '50s, Israel's strategy was to exploit any opportunity to mention the problem of Jewish emigration, while the Romanians will continuously deny there is any desire among the Jews to emigrate from Romania. Thus, in 1950 the Israeli delegation to the U.N. supported the Western states' proposal to blame Romania "because of anti-Zionist reprisals, obstruction of immigration to Israel and the arrest of Zionist leaders".[5] Nevertheless, the Israelis' connections with the Americans will prove beneficial for Romania, especially after President Nixon's spectacular visit to Bucharest in August 1969,

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Conflictul din Orientul Apropiat în perioada 1948-2000, Iaşi, Editura Lumen, 2006; Daniela Osiac, *Conflictul israeliano-palestinian. Proiecte de pace. 1947-2003*, Craiova, Editura Universitaria, 2013.

[1] Cristina Păiuşan-Nuică, *Relaţiile româno-israeliene. 1948-1978*, Bucureşti, Editura Universitară, 2008, pp. 24, 25.

[2] *Romania-Israel. Diplomatic documents*, pp. 293-296.

[3] Apud Radu Ioanid, *Răscumpărarea evreilor. Istoria acordurilor secrete dintre România şi Israel*, Iaşi, Editura Polirom, 2005, p. 120; Yosef Govrin, *Israeli-Romanian Relations at the End of the Ceausescu Era*, London, Portland, Frank Cass Edition, 2002.

[4] Radu Ioanid, *Răscumpărarea evreilor*, p. 120.

[5] *Romania-Israel. Diplomatic documents*, p. 56.

the first visit of an American chief of state in a communist country after the Yalta Conference. After this visit, one of the main points of Nicolae Ceauşescu's foreign policy was to obtain the *Most Favoured Nation Clause*. With this purpose in view, Ceauşescu appealed to the support of Rabi Rosen and the Israeli government. Rosen describes his own efforts in promoting Romania's image: "Starting with 1975 [...] I ceaselessly strove to obtain this American governmental clause for Romania. On the other hand, the clause would have brought my country many million dollars; at the same time, it would have facilitated the *alyah*, that is the possibility for every Jew to leave for Israel if they wanted to".[1] This is why at the end of the '80s the Jewish community comprised 25000 members who "enjoyed more autonomy than any other religious community".[2]

In conclusion, we can appreciate that Romanian-Israeli relations were permanently based upon the Jews emigrating from Romania to Israel. As a synthesis of this process we mention Ambassador Yosef Govrin's statistics, dividing the Jews' migration from Romania in three stages: the first, 1948-1964 – when 208.426 people emigrated; the second, 1965-1989 – when 58.896 people emigrated; and the third 1990-1991 – being the lowest in the number of departures, only 4616 people.[3]

On 25th May 1952, during a meeting with Mrs. Weizmann (the Israeli president's wife) and Rubin (former minister in Bucharest), Romanian diplomat Stănescu was asked "almost without preliminaries if the Popular Republic of Romania could sell Israel raw oil, as, following England's refusal to grant credits, competent circles consider they have to turn to the Popular Republic of Romania".[4] Economic rapports increased after the *Trade and Payment Agreement* between Israel and Romania was signed in September 1954.[5] The agreement was effectual until 31st December 1955, with a clause of a tacit extension for one-year periods, the amount of commercial exchanges being $2550000 in each direction.[6] These commercial exchanges enhanced almost constantly, reaching the value of $4.3 million in 1958 and a total of $30.4 million in 1966.[7] Nevertheless, Israeli diplomats were not satisfied with the economic cooperation; ever since April 1966, Aiezer Chelouche, director of the economic department within the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, communicated to Valeriu Georgescu, Romania's minister in Tel Aviv that "The state of Israel made concrete steps towards an improvement of trade relations [...], but didn't always encounter the same attitude on the Romanian side".[8] As a result, a Romanian economic delegation led by V. Răuţă, vice-minister of Foreign Trade, went to Israel in March 1967 to participate in commercial negotiations; only two weeks after the visit of the Romanian delegation in Israel an important Israeli economic delegation arrived in Bucharest, led by Pinhas Sapir, minister of Finance – the first time a member of the Israeli government had made an official visit to a socialist country.[9] In December 1967, after bilateral Israeli-Romanian negotiations, a new *Cooperation Agreement between Israel and*

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[1] Apud Radu Ioanid, *Răscumpărarea evreilor*, p. 178.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 185.

[3] Apud Cristina Păiuşan-Nuică, *Relaţiile româno-israeliene: 1948-1978*, p. 264; Yosef Govrin, *op. cit.*

[4] *Romania-Israel. Diplomatic documents*, p. 68.

[5] *Ibidem*, pp. 79-83.

[6] *Ibidem*.

[7] Cristina Păiuşan-Nuică, *Relaţiile româno-israeliene: 1948-1978*, pp. 208-210.

[8] Ion Calafeteanu, Alexandru Cornescu-Coren, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

[9] *Ibidem*, p. 88.

Romania[1] was signed, stipulating that in 1968 the compulsory Israeli imports from Romania will reach the value of at least 65 million lei in foreign currency.[2] The signing of the Agreement coincided with the Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Countries in Eastern Europe, held in Warsaw and centred upon the problem of the Middle East, Romania's presence being regarded by Israel as a mediator of the intransigent position held by the socialist states. Thus, most reviews in newspapers such as "Yerusalem Post", "Maariv", "Information" and "Viaţa noastră" appreciated that Romania's presence in Israel and the development of future relations between the two countries reflect its position on the Near East conflict, as Romania never allowed itself to be dragged in "the flood of blackwash" poured over Israel by the other states in the soviet bloc.[3]

Within bilateral relations, the economic policy was doubled by a permanent dialogue and the need for mutual concessions: the Romanians' concessions regarding the liberalisation of emigration and the concessions made by the Jews, in ignoring the rules of a popular democracy, which was far from being a democratic system. With reference to Israel's attitude towards international problems, Golda Meir declared as far back as 1960 that "Israel is not tied to any of the U.N. blocs" and that its policy was one of "*non-identification*", which, however, did not mean "*neutrality*".[4] Hence Israel's interest in preserving political relations with Romania as cordial as possible.

3. Relations on the highest level between Romania and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (P.L.O.)

It is worth noting that after the First World War Romania amplified and developed its economic and diplomatic relations with Maghreb, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine (the last three under French and English mandate). Therefore, the acts promoting Romania's foreign policy also included the 1935 initiative to appoint Elian Hassan honorary general consul to Tangier. The consular patent, signed by Nicolae Titulescu, specified: "He is appointed in order to protect and defend Romania's interests, especially in relation to trade and navigation, to oversee the execution of treaties, to lend aid to Romanian and third country nationals and accomplish everything he is asked through the instructions and ordinances he will be remitted".[5] Romania established diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1960, Syria in 1955, Sudan in 1956, Yemen in 1957 and Iraq in 1958.[6] Romanian-Arabian political dialogue on the highest level continued after 1964, when – as a result of the *April Declaration* – Romania promoted among other principles, the one of "*solidarity and determined support in favour of the movement for peoples' liberation*".[7]

The Palestinian liberation movement was an example of such a movement – supported by Romania. In the context of a strengthened cohesion and unity of the Arab countries for which the Palestinian issue played a significant role, as well as the appearance

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[1] Ion Calafeteanu, coord., *Istoria politicii externe româneşti în date*, p. 399.

[2] *Romania-Israel. Diplomatic documents*, pp. 235, 236.

[3] *Ibidem*, pp. 236, 237.

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 128.

[5] Apud Aurel Turbăceanu, *Arabii şi relaţiile româno-arabe*, Bucureşti, Editura Niculescu, 2010, pp. 65, 66.

[6] *Ibidem*, p. 70.

[7] Ştefan Lache, *România în relaţiile internaţionale. 1939-2006*, Bucureşti, Editura Fundaţiei România de Mâine, 2007, p. 278.

of Palestinian resistance centres, the first Arabian summit reunion held in Alexandria in 1964 lay the foundations of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (P.L.O.).[1] Romania was one of the first countries to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation as sole representative of this people, the P.L.O. having a permanent representation in Bucharest since 1974.[2] The meetings and conferences between President Nicolae Ceauşescu and Yasser Arafat, chairman of the P.L.O.'s Executive Committee, were numerous (April 1972 in Cairo; February 1974 in Beirut; August 1979 in Damascus; October 1974, October 1975, December 1976, December 1981, October 1982, June 1983, January and August 1984, February 1985, February 1986, June 1986, November 1987, June and September 1988, December 1989 in Bucharest and August 1986, August 1987, March 1988 in Snagov – Romania) and focused on bilateral relations, certain international problems – especially concerning the situation in the Middle East – and the means of achieving a just and enduring peace, which would ensure a solution to the Palestinian people's problem.[3]

Romania always maintained that the difficult complicated problems in the Middle East could not be solved by force of arms, but only through peaceful means in accordance with the fundamental interests of the nations in the area, of world peace and security. In Cairo, in April 1972, the Romanian President met with Yasser Arafat for the first time, on the occasion of Ceauşescu's first tour of several Arab countries; Arafat received him (6th April) in Kubeh Palace in Cairo.[4] On this first meeting, Arafat told Nicolae Ceauşescu "with tears in his eyes": "Dear brother, I represent a people who has no country, no passport, is not free but is either under occupation or a refugee in other Arab countries, often in camps or tents".[5] Ceauşescu listened patiently and showed that there was but one way to ensure a conclusion of the current state of tension: the way of reason and wisdom on the part of those involved, which could only be reached through reciprocal compromise. Ceauşescu tried to persuade his interlocutor that they needed to start from realities: that it was necessary to act for peace, for the creation of the state of Palestine on the territory partitioned by the U.N., for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, for the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes and, last but not least, for the state of Israel being recognised by Arab countries, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Romania also supported the Palestinian people's cause within certain international organisms. Thus, during the 30th June 1976 U.N. Security Council debates on the problem of exercising the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, which was based on a report by the Committee of the 20, to which Romania contributed actively, the Romanian representative restated the position of the government in Bucharest "according to which, the Palestinian issue is an essential component of the situation in the Middle East".[6] At the same time, during the proceedings of the U.N. Committee, made up of 23 states which included Romania, on the problem of exercising

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[1] See Rodica Georgescu, Mioara Georgescu, *Dosarul problemei palestiniene*, Bucureşti, Editura Politică, 1977.

[2] See Daniela Osiac, *Legături la nivel înalt între România şi Organizaţia pentru Eliberarea Palestinei (1965-1989)*, in "Revista de Ştiinţe Politice / Revue des Sciences Politiques, nr. 30-31/2011, Craiova, Editura Universitaria, pp. 45-51.

[3] Ion Calafeteanu, coord., *Istoria politicii externe româneşti în date*, pp. 449-600.

[4] Aurel Turbăceanu, *op. cit.*, p. 467.

[5] Ştefan Andrei, *Memorii* (nr. 372), in "Flacăra lui Andrei Păunescu", 21-27 mai 2010.

[6] Aurel Turbăceanu, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, the representative of our country "formulated a number of suggestions with a view to activating the committee and leading its proceedings towards concrete, realistic acts meant to help stimulate positive processes in the evolution of the Middle East crisis".[1]

During this entire period (1967-1989) the close rapports that Romanian diplomacy maintained with the Palestinians and the Arab countries in the Middle East were reflected in the advocacy of the "*Palestinians' right to self-determination*" and the support expressed in favour of "*creating an independent Palestinian State*".[2] After 1990, relations between Romania and the P.L.O. did not comprise consistently organised actions, but they were rather sporadic, our diplomacy ceased to offer its good services and was not invited to contribute to the peace process in the Middle East any longer.

4. Romanian initiatives for stability and peace in the Middle East

Throughout this whole period, Romania, upholding unswerving principles in its foreign policy, supported the cessation of military operations in the Middle East, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, guarantees for the right to exist for all the states in the region, finding a solution to the Palestinian people's problems in accordance with their legitimate interests and the peaceful settlement of the conflict in the spirit of the 22nd November 1967 Security Council resolution.[3] On the basis of these principles, Romania managed to create a distinctive image in the political-diplomatic game of the two blocs (an evaluation which includes the Israeli-Arabian mediums) in the absence of any immediate or major interest in the area. Romania benefited from extremely precious and realistic information thanks to Romanian diplomat Valeriu Georgescu. He predicted the course of events accurately, appreciating the Israeli government's position, who, shortly after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, expressed their willingness to "waste no time in adopting a favourable attitude" towards the cease-fire proposal put forward by the Security Council.[4]

In fact Romania – through the voice of President Nicolae Ceauşescu – always supported the solution of the "litigious issues" in the Middle East through the parties' consent and the conclusion of "judicious and equitable" agreements that take into account "the legitimate rights of the peoples concerned" – therefore, including Israel's legitimate right to existence.[5] Romania's position on the problem of the Middle East conflict was also presented in New York (U.N.) by the president of the Council of Ministers, Ion Gheorghe Maurer – in "the most thorough official presentation of the Romanian point of view on the situation in the region, in which the adopted position is supported with a variety of legal, political, moral and historic arguments".[6] "It is time – Ion Gheorghe Maurer appreciated – tension in the Middle East stopped and a tempering process commenced, in order to create a proper climate for <<*equitable and constructive solutions*>>,

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 335.

[2] Apud Raluca Rus, *Conflictul din Orientul Apropiat în perioada 1948-2000*, Editura Lumen, Iaşi, 2006, p. 164.

[3] Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al României, Bucureşti (The Archives of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, Bucharest, hereinafter: A.M.A.E.), fond Israel/1970, problema 224, vol. III, f. 173.

[4] Raluca Rus, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[5] Apud Ion Calafeteanu, Alexandru Cornescu-Coren, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

[6] *Ibidem*, p. 64.

that would respect the rights to safe existence of all states in the region.[1] In essence, the Romanian Prime Minister proposed a four-point plan to solve the conflict: the exclusive use of peaceful means for solving disputations; the exclusion of foreign interferences in the affairs of countries in the region; respect for the fundamental interests of each state in the region, based on its independent and sovereign existence; the provision of absolute equality between interlocutors and the exclusion of any tendency to impose solutions or "exploit advantageous military situations with this purpose in view".[2]

Romania's involvement on the stage of Middle Eastern politics was also done through meetings and exchange visits between Romania's leaders and those of the states in the Middle East. The freedom to act enjoyed by Romanian diplomacy and Nicolae Ceauşescu's direct involvement in the secret diplomacy of the Middle East, given the fact that Romania had good relations both with the state of Israel, and the Arab states, increased our country's prestige. In the aftermath of the "Six-day War" Romania preferred to maintain a balanced attitude towards both sides, militating for urgent and definitive cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories and the protection of Palestinian refugees.[3] In this context we can explain Romanian diplomacy's endeavour to prepare summit meetings with both the representatives of Israel and the Arab states. During these meetings, the main components of Romania's position on the situation in the Middle East, as stipulated in documents, were the following: the cessation of military operations in the area; the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories; guaranteeing the right to exist for all the states in the region and the respect of their territorial integrity; finding a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the spirit of the 22nd November 1967 Security Council resolution; the solution of the Palestinian people's problem in accordance with their legitimate interests, including the establishment of an independent national state, if they should want it.[4]

The visits calendar of the Romanian chief of state to the Middle East countries, as well as the visits that Israeli, Egyptian and Iraqi political leaders made to Romania prove the extent of Romania's diplomatic involvement in the problems of Israeli-Arab relations. In March-April, Nicolae Ceauşescu made an Afro-Asian tour, the last stop being Egypt, where he attended talks with President Anwar el-Sadat, at the end of which a Common Declaration was issued[5]; discussions focused on the development of bilateral relations in the economic, educational and cultural areas, as well as on the role of the Romanian mediation channel in the Middle East. In Cairo, Nicolae Ceauşescu met with Yasser Arafat and assured him that Romania would permanently act in favour of the international recognition of P.L.O., its leader and the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.[6]

An important event of Romania's involvement in the peace process in the Middle East was the visit of the Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, to Bucharest (4th-7th May 1972), when she had talks with President Nicolae Ceauşescu and Prime Minister Ion

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 65.

[2] *Ibidem*, pp. 67-71.

[3] Cristina Nedelcu, *Conflictul din iunie 1967 şi reacţiile diplomatice faţă de modificările teritoriale*, in "Studii şi materiale de istorie contemporană", Serie nouă, vol. V, 2006, p. 204.

[4] A.M.A.E., fond Israel/1970, problema 224, vol. III, ff. 26-29.

[5] Ion Calafeteanu, coord., *Istoria politicii externe româneşti în date*, p. 423.

[6] Ştefan Andrei, *art. cit.*

Gheorghe Maurer.[1] Golda Meir would later write in her memoirs that she had arrived in Bucharest to meet Arab leaders, who, for various reasons, had not come, frustrating the Romanians' efforts.[2] Upon returning home, Golda Meir wrote to Ceauşescu: "I appreciate your endeavour in helping to bring peace to our turbulent area [...] I am certain our meeting will constitute a new step forward in strengthening the bonds that unite our nations".

International mediums shared the general opinion that Bucharest will host a series of exploratory meetings, if not outright negotiations. "The Yerusalem Post", for example, appreciated it wasn't at all impossible that the Romanians mediate between Israel and the Arab countries, given that in the same period Bucharest was likely to be visited by both representatives of Arab countries and the Soviets.[3] Towards the end of 1973, Mircea Maliţa, in his capacity as Nicolae Ceauşescu's representative, visited 14 Arab countries – among which Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan – followed by Corneliu Mănescu in Egypt and Maghreb and Vasile Pungan in Israel.[4]

Romania also expressed its official standpoint regarding the belligerent parties at the 28th U.N. Session; on this occasion, George Macovescu, the chief of Romanian diplomacy, had talks with L. De Guiringaud, permanent French representative for the U.N., and Donald Maitland, Great Britain's representative, during which he pleaded in favour of concentrating international diplomatic efforts "to prevent military hostilities form escalating and expanding" and also identifying a solution which would guarantee the right to "free and sovereign existence" for the states in the Middle East.[5]

After the end of the fourth Israeli-Arab war, the president of Egypt, Sadat, opted for peace and a closer alignment to the United States, which allowed him to recover Egyptian territories that had been lost through military actions. It all started with an intervention of the American state secretary Henry Kissinger, who, in the autumn of 1974 tried to obtain a provisional agreement from the Israeli and the Egyptians, but negotiations were suspended in May 1975, because of Israel's pressures; they were continued in secret and on 4th 1975 a new Egyptian-Israeli agreement was signed, which was called "The Sinai Agreement".[6] During these secret negotiations, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, visited Bucharest, which impacted Israel emotionally and also sent echoes throughout the diplomatic world. The Soviet ambassador to Bucharest, Abramov, declared that in his opinion the Romanian initiative was good and "it isn't easy for a state to enjoy the complete confidence of both conflicting parties", implying soviet agreement for this gesture from the beginning.[7]

In the 1970s, Romanian diplomacy maintained a permanent dialogue with diplomats from Israel, Arab countries and the Great Powers with a view to identifying the means to

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[1] Ion Calafeteanu, coord., *Istoria politicii externe româneşti în date*, p. 424.

[2] Serviciul Arhivelor Naţionale Istorice Centrale, Bucureşti (National Historical Central Archives Service, Bucharest, hereinafter: S.A.N.I.C), fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secţia Relaţii Externe (Foreign Relations), vol. 81/1967-1989, ff. 55, 56.

[3] A.M.A.E., fond Israel, problema 220/1973, ff. 303-304.

[4] Ion Calafeteanu, coord., *Istoria politicii externe româneşti în date*, pp. 437-438.

[5] Raluca Rus, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

[6] Bernard Lugan, *Istoria Egiptului de la origini până în zilele noastre*, Bucureşti, Editura Lucman, 2005, p. 282; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomaţia*, Bucureşti, Editura ALL, 2001.

[7] Cristina Păiuşan-Nuică, *Relaţiile româno-israeliene: 1948-1978*, p. 192.

solving the conflict in the Middle East. Therefore, in 1977 there were several visits to Bucharest made by Arabian chiefs of state: the Syrian Arab Republic's President Hafez Al Assad's visit (15th-16th February); Muhammad Hosni Mubarak, vice-president of the Arab Republic of Egypt, President Sadat's special emissary (27th-28th April); Anwar al Sadat, president of the Arab Republic of Egypt (29th-31st October), who were received by President Nicolae Ceauşescu, when issues of international importance were discussed, especially the evolution of the situation in the Middle East.[1] Nevertheless, the most important visit – for the subsequent evolution of relations in the Middle East – was that of the Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin (25th-29th August 1977). Recently elected Prime Minister, Menahem Begin reserved his first visit abroad for the U.S.A., then he came to Romania. Given his excellent rapports with the president of Egypt, the Israeli Prime Minister asked Nicolae Ceauşescu to arrange a meeting with Sadat, either public or secret.[2] During the talks, Begin told Ceauşescu trenchantly: "The Egyptians count on the Americans' capability to put pressure on us. I would like them to put an end to this policy that leads nowhere. Israel is not a banana republic, and the U.S.A. cannot dictate our conduct. Tell President Sadat to treat directly with us".[3] Prime Minister Begin's message was transmitted to Sadat during his visit to Romania.[4] At the same time, Begin used another diplomatic channel: the one opened by the king of Morocco, Hussan II (in the autumn of 1977, in Rabat were held "exploratory negotiations" attended by Begin's emissary, General Moshe Dayan and Sadat's emissary, vice-president Hassan El-Touhami).[5]

In the following years, Romanian diplomacy made numerous appeals for the organisation of an international conference that would give a joint interest to all parties involved in the Middle East. The creation of a Palestinian state – N. Ceauşescu claimed – would end the tension and allow the safe development of all states in the region.[6] To that end, Romania supported at the U.N. (1974) the two resolutions concerning the "Palestinian Problem": the first – regarding the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people; the second – which granted the P.L.O. observer status within the U.N. Explaining the vote of the Romanian delegation in favour of the two resolutions, our country's representative emphasised that – through this stand – Romania insisted on highlighting the need for a political solution in the Middle East, solving the entire conflict, and therefore the Palestinian problem as well.[7] It is worth emphasising that Romania opted permanently in favour of identifying an "equitable solution in the Near East" during an international conference held under the patronage of the U.N.

Maintaining and intensifying open dialogue with both Israel and the Arab states, Romania managed to help make important steps in the détente and peace process in a neighbouring region – that of the Middle East – to which it is connected through old

[1] Ion Calafeteanu, coord., *Istoria politicii externe româneşti în date*, pp. 476-782.

[2] Robert Assaraf, *Ariel Sharon şi bătăliile lui politice*, Bucureşti, Editura Minerva, 2008, p. 113.

[3] Apud Viorel Cruceanu, *Sadat şi Egiptul: de la confruntare la pace cu Israelul*, in "Istorie şi civilizaţie", Anul II, nr. 13, octombrie 2010, pp. 60, 61.

[4] Peter Calvocoressi, *Politica mondială după 1945*, Bucureşti, Editura ALLFA, 2000, p. 387.

[5] Viorel Cruceanu, *art. cit.*, p. 61.

[6] Constantin Moraru, *Discuţia dintre Nicolae Ceauşescu şi delegaţia organizaţiilor evreieşti din S.U.A.*, in "Istorie şi civilizaţie", Anul II, nr. 13, octombrie 2010, p. 36.

[7] Rodica Georgescu, Mioara Georgescu, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

spiritual traditions, at the same time displaying interest and respect for all peoples in the area.

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In the end we can ascertain that until the end of the '80s, the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict seemed impossible to solve – as two peoples, *the Jews and the Palestinians* – fought for the same land and refused to recognise each other's existence. After 1990, with the end of the *Cold War*, the disappearance of the East-West antagonism (the Middle East ceasing to be one of the areas under either American or Soviet "protection"), the outbreak of the *intifadas* (the Palestinians' rebellion in the territories occupied by Israel), the intervention of various international organism – all helping unblock negotiations and solve an impossible problem – came "the mutual recognition, on 13th September 1993, in Washington, of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation".[1] Following that moment, the peace process between the two peoples will develop under "*a negotiation calendar*" through which it was attempted to reduce the number of disagreements, making it smaller than that of agreements.

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[1] Jimmy Carter, *Palestine Peace not Apartheid*, New York, 2006.

THE ROMANIAN DETENTION SYSTEM DURING THE COMMUNIST REGIME: BETWEEN THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SOCIAL REALITIES

*Cristina Ilie Goga**

Abstract

This article, based on a thorough analysis of social documents (books, articles, legislative acts, archives), aims to emphasize the characteristics of detention during the communist period (1945-1989) in Romania. However, the first part of the research highlights the changes of the repressive system prior to the communist regime; by presenting the legislative acts which regulated the system during that period and by analyzing the events of the Second World War which affected the organization of Romanian penitentiaries. The second part of the research, consisting of an analysis of the communist period, presents the defining elements of communist detention and moves on to analyze the main laws and events which characterized the detention system between 1945 and 1989.

Key words: *detention, the Romanian communist regime, political detention, legislation, Romanian penitentiaries and labour camps*

Changes of the detention system before communism

The years before the installation of the communist regime in Romania represented a troubled time for the entire Romanian society, including for the detention system, because of the strong influence of the events of the Second World War.

When the second world conflict burst, the detention system in our country was regulated by the Law for the organization of penitentiaries and prevention institutions, issued in July 1929, which came into force on the 1st of January 1930 (it stayed in force for 20 years). It managed to turn the purpose of the punishment from isolation to reformation by means of intellectual, moral and physical education, thus providing an essentially pedagogical nature to the penitentiary institution. Another related part of legislation was the Criminal Code in 1936, which classified punishments into "main", "complementary" and "accessory" and emphasized the difference between the freedom-depriving punishments due to common law and those due to political reasons.

Penitentiaries were organized on account of Decision no. 673/1936 for the reorganization of the prison system, as an effect of which all penitentiaries were transferred in the subordination the Ministry of Justice, and the activities therein were controlled by four structures called "Inspectorates", organized according to the territorial criterion.[1]

Since 1938, the execution of punishments, of other freedom-depriving security measures and preventive detention was regulated by the Regulation issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and implemented by the Directorate of Penitentiaries and Prevention Institutions, promulgated by the Royal Decree no. 1439 of the 2nd of April 1938 and published in the Official Monitor of Romania in its 93rd issue of the 21st of April 1938. It was one of the most advanced European regulations in the penitentiary field at that time.

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[1] Ioan Băla, *Evoluția sistemului de executare a pedepselor privative de libertate în dreptul românesc*, București, Universul Juridic, 2011, p. 99.

It emphasized the idea of the social reintegration of the detainees, and it even featured a specific chapter.[1] In the first title, the Regulation set the status of the institutions for the execution of freedom-depriving punishments, by dividing them as follows:

1. Penitentiaries for the execution of common law punishments: forced labour penitentiaries, correctional jails and police prison.

2. Penitentiaries for the execution of political punishments: strict, rigorous and simple detention penitentiaries.

3. Transitional institutions for the execution of freedom-depriving punishments (agricultural and industrial penitentiaries colonies for men and women).

4. Workhouses for homeless people and beggars.

5. Establishments for the execution of freedom-depriving punishments by under aged boys and girls – correctional institutes (which had special quarters for correctional prison and simple detention).[2]

In Romania, the Second World War had serious effects upon the entire social and economical structure and upon the Romanian penitentiary system. After the neutral year, during which Romania lost a significant amount of territories (Northern Bucovina, Bessarabia and the Hertza county), upon the ascension of Ion Antonescu, our country joined the Axis in 1940 and entered the war in June 1941. The main purpose of the three years' military campaign against Russia was to recover the lost territories.

Between 1939 and 1942, the situation in the Romanian penitentiaries became critical, as indicated by the Minister of Justice of the time, Constantin Stoicescu, in a report submitted to Ion Antonescu in March 1942. This document was found in the National Archives of Romania, in the Prison Administration fund (Vornicia Temniţelor). Thus, on account of the events which led to the loss of the Romanian territories it became necessary to evacuate 27 penitentiaries, resulting in over-crowded prisons in the rest of the country. Further on, the earthquake in 1940 nearly completely destroyed 5 penitentiaries, thus leading to a new eviction and to more over-crowded prisons, considering the fact that three of the five detention places were among the largest ones: Doftana, Mărgineni and Mislea. Moreover, following the troubled events between the 21st and the 23rd of January (the legionaries' rebellion), penitentiaries were further over-crowded by the incarceration of 4000 people. This time, the situation became extremely dangerous, given the fact that the prisons' military guards were mobilized, leaving the prisons to the hands of their guards. In the spring of 1941, the number of detainees in the Romanian penitentiaries went greatly beyond their accommodation capacity. Thus, the Aiud penitentiary, the capacity of which was 700 detainees was hosting 1500-1700 people, whereas in Văcăreşti, the 600 places available were used to accommodate 1400 people. The situation became so serious that it was necessary to improvise accommodation for detainees in places such as the schools in Slatina and Vaslui and the manor in Işalniţa. In the summer of 1941, Marshal Antonescu appointed Colonel Petrescu head of the penitentiary system and things became dramatic. The new director issued orders related to the organization of the detention system which imposed very strict rules and violated the legislation in force. Orders such as: prohibition of family and lawyers' visits, prohibition of

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[1] Ioan Durnescu, *Asistenţa socială în penitenciar*, Iaşi, Polirom, 2009, p. 44.
[2] Radu Ciuceanu, *Regimul penitenciar din România 1940-1962*, Bucureşti, Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2001, p. 61.

winter clothing for the inmates or the denial of food provision from the family for legionary detainees, led to a great number of protests.[1] Another report sent to Marshal Antonescu by the Minister of Justice, Colonel Petrescu, on the 21st of April 1942 clearly emphasizes the actions of the delegate director of penitentiaries, characterized by legal dispositions implemented in an inhuman fashion; circulars issued to enable the director to have the power of arresting employees who do not obey rules imposed prison administration, or which gave the Directorate of Penitentiaries the right to decline sending the detainees to hearings; unjust, aggressive and threatening attitude towards their own and other employees of the Ministry of Justice, constant activity reports sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whereas the respective reports were supposed to be sent to the Ministry of Justice. All of these actions of the delegate director of penitentiaries created chaos within the structures of the Ministry of Justice, making Stoicescu to require Antonescu, the transfer the Directorate of Penitentiaries under the direction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, if Colonel Petrescu should still be head of the Directorate of Penitentiaries, a fact that, as the Minister of Justice mentioned in his report, went against the country's best interest.[2] In May 1942, the Minister of Justice was still mentioning irregularities in the penitentiary centers of Aiud, Sibiu and Arad, related to article 33 of the Criminal Code. The article ruled that isolation last for no more than 6 months, which was not the case in the above-mentioned penitentiaries, wherein most detainees, especially legionnaires were kept in isolation cells for a period of time longer than that provisioned by law. This was possible because of an Order issued by the General Directorate of Penitentiaries, ruling that legionnaires could be kept in cells for a longer period of time than that provisioned by law".[3]

Although there were still irregularities in the national penitentiaries, the transfer of the detention centers under the direction of the Ministry of Justice was postponed.

On the 23rd of August 1944, Marshal Antonescu's refusal to sign the armistice with the United Nations made King Mihai agree to have him removed by force, and he was dismissed and arrested on the same day. A new prime-minister, General Constantin Sănătescu, was immediately appointed head of a government consisting of people in the military and representatives of the National Democratic Bloc.

The following day, on the 24th of August 1944, General Constantin Sănătescu issued the Royal Decree regarding general amnesty, ruling the amnesty of all crimes "provisioned for in the Criminal Code, the Military Justice Code and other special laws, committed or attempted after the 1st of January 1918, the nature and means of which are political, whether or not they have remained undiscovered, or if they are under investigation, under instruction, under trial or if they have been definitively judged and whether the competent authorities are civil or military courts".[4]

In the years after the 23rd of August 1944, in Romania there have been in force special legislative acts issued in order to sentence those who had been found guilty of war crimes and for the crumbling national economy. Romania had to implement the terms of

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[1] Serviciul Arhivelor Naţionale Istorice Centrale (National Historical Central Archives Service), fond Vornicia Temniţelor, nr. inv. 370, dosar 1/1942, Memoriul ministrului justiţiei Stoicescu C. Constantin către mareşalul Ion Antonescu (11 martie 1942), ff. 1-9.
[2] *Ibidem* (21 aprilie 1942), ff. 10-11.
[3] *Ibidem* (11 mai 1942), ff. 12-14.
[4] Decretul Regal de amnistie generală, 1944, Articolul 1.

the Moscow Armistice, aiming at the defascistization of the country, and leading to the promulgation of a series of laws, such as: "The law on the status of the people imprisoned in November 1944, regarding politically imprisoned people, Law no. 312 in 1945 issued in order to condemn the political regime during Antonescu's rule, Law no. 291 in 1947 issued in order to condemn war criminals and Law no. 10 in 1948".[1]

The Regulation regarding the foundation and functioning of imprisonment centers, approved on the 1st of September 1944 by the Ministers Council, included provisions related to the foundation and functioning of imprisonment centers, which were used for detaining the persons for whom a fixed residence was decided, and the detainees were not allowed to make contact with the outside world or engage in activities which might have facilitated the exchange of social and political ideas.

The imprisoned persons were separated according to their sex, and then according to their training. The detainees were used for labor according to the actual necessities of the centre, and women were given easier tasks. Ioan Băla saw these imprisonment centers as "genuine concentration camps".[2]

According to Decision no. 52993 published in the Official Journal, in the 243rd issue of the 20th of October 1944, penitentiary colonies were classified as follows:

• *Agricultural and horticultural penitentiary colonies*: Mislea (main, cl. I), Vaslui (main, cl. II), Arad (main, cl. II), Işalniţa (main, cl. II).

• *Main industrial colonies*: Aiud (main, cl. I), Văcăreşti (main, cl. I), Mărgineni (main, cl. II), Ocnele-Mari, forest colony (main, cl. II), Deva (main, cl. II), Cluj, women's colony (main, cl. II) (Decision no. 52994: 1944).

In the spring of 1945, there was a total number of 35 concentration camps, and by the end of the year 1945, the large concentration camps in Târgu Jiu, Slobozia Veche and Ciurel Bucharest had already been set up.[3]

Characteristics of the communist detention

Communism was officially installed in Romania on the 6th of March 1945, upon the appointment of the Petru Groza government, under Russian pressure. However, we could only speak of the supremacy of communism in our country after King Mihai abdicated on the 30th of December 1947, leading to the Republic being established as a form of government and to the socialist party taking over political power[4] (by merging the communist party with the social-democratic one).

Communism, as a social, moral and cultural doctrine, aimed a radically transformation of the entire society.[5] It is very important to analyze what happened in our country during the communist regime, with his features, results, programs and consequences.[6] In

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[1] Radu Ciuceanu, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[2] Ioan Băla, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-107.

[3] Radu Ciuceanu, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[4] Ionuţ Virgil Şerban, *International context and Romanian causes in the initiation and affirmation of the Revolution of 1989*, in "Revista de Ştiinţe Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques", no. 35/2012, p. 394.

[5] Veronica Gheorghiţă (Ion), *The relationship between the State and the Romanian Orthodox Church during the communist period*, in "Revista de Ştiinţe Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques", no. 43/2014, p. 44.

[6] Andreea Mihaela Niţă, Maria Stoica, Irina Petria Truşcă, *Screening romanian medical and social security system: self-ratings and healthcare feedback at local level*, in "Revista de Ştiinţe Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques", no. 45/2015, p. 261.

Romania, communism "led to the establishment of a political, economic and social regime that replicated the Soviet model in all aspects", characterized by a "totalitarian and authoritarian government".[1] During communism, the penitentiary system has undergone numerous negative changes, such as a higher number of detainees, or new colonies and work units for large numbers of people, which were actually improvised barracks, surrounded by barbed wire. Also, penitentiaries have increased their accommodation places between 4 and 6 times their original size.[2] The communist regime is characterized by a high rate of political detentions, thus continuing the political repression initiated on the 23rd of August 1944. Until 1964 it is possible to identify direct political repression, followed by a period of more subtle political detentions. According to the *Report of the Presidential Committee for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship*, the category of political detainees encompasses all those who were deprived of their freedom for political reasons and incarcerated in penitentiaries, Security arrest, safe houses, work camps, deportation areas or psychiatric hospitals.

In many cases, these incarcerations and even assassinations affected all categories of people, of all ages and all social and professional backgrounds.[3]

According to the same report, the beginning of the political terror regime was on the 14th of May 1948, with massive political detentions of the members of the Legionnaire Movement and of the Liberal, National Peasant and Social Democrat parties who supported C.T. Petrescu, as well as the members of spontaneous anticommunist organizations.[4] A number of 600,000 political detainees were estimated to have been imprisoned between 1948 and 1964, and 81,000 between 1945-1948 and 1965-1989. The deported people added to these figures[5] lead to a total number of 1,131,000 persons deprived of their liberty between 1945 and 1989, and to 2,000,000 people when adding those who were imprisoned for up to 3 months.[6] An important feature of communist repression was the Security, founded in 1948. Along with the special troops and the Militia it exercised terror by organizing vast networks of informers, investigations, threats, blackmail, arrests and torture.[7] During the communist period the term "Romanian gulag" is used to describe the network of colonies and forced labor camps, which represented the most important means of repression. Although the gulag was used mainly during the communist period, its starting point was in 1944, when Antonescu was arrested. In 1998, a map of the Romanian gulag was drawn for the Addendum "The black book of communism", which mentions an estimate number of 230 detention places existing between 1944 and 1989.

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[1] Marusia Cîrstea, *Explaining the European Communist Bloc Formation and Implosion: Capitalizing Ideology and Societal Inputs*, in "Revista de Ştiinţe Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques", no. 46/2015, p. 18.

[2] Ştefan Bruno, *Istoria şi reforma închisorilor româneşti*, in "Revista Română de Sociologie", No. 5-6/2006, pp. 485-512.

[3] Comisia prezidenţială pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste, *Raport final*, Bucureşti, f.e., 2006, p. 160. Available at: http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 159.

[5] Alexandra Porumbescu, *Historical Landmarks of the Romanian's Migration to Germany*, in "Journal of of Humanities, Culture and Social Sciences", no. 1/2015, p. 29.

[6] Comisia prezidenţială pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-161.

[7] *Ibidem*, p. 159.

Legislation and detention in communism: 1945-1989

The civil penitentiaries and the prevention institutions of any kind, as well as the military prisons were transferred from the control of the Ministry of Justice to that of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1945, by the Decree-Law no. 417 issued on the 30th of May.[1] Control of how punishments were executed was conducted by the military and civil section of the Public Ministry.[2]

In 1950, Decree no. 66 of the 18th of March issued by the Chair of the Grand National Assembly abrogated Law issued on the 30th of July 1929 regarding the organization of penitentiaries and prevention institutions, as well as other 1052 laws and decrees issued between the 27th of March 1864 and the 5th of April 1948.

The year 1950 marked the beginning of the great constructions of the socialist economy. Many detainees were used for works at the Danube-Black Sea canal, the irrigation systems in Dobrogea, the hydro power plant in Bicaz, the mines in Oltenia etc. The rough physical labour led to thousands of deaths among the detainees who worked there.[3]

In 1951, the Decision of the Ministers Council no. 729 of the 19th of June, provisioned that the Directorate of Work Units within the MIA merge with the General Directorate of Penitentiaries, thus creating a new structure: the General Directorate of Penitentiaries, Colonies and Work Units, belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[4] This Directorate consisted of Central and Exterior Organs. The Central Organs were: the Secretariat; the Directorate of Staff; the Archive and Evidence Service; the Administrative Directorate; the Central Accountancy Service; the Directorate of Guard and Detention Places; the Inspection Service; the Political Directorate; the Education Service; the Directorate of Work Units; the Production Directorate; the Sanitary Service; the Supervisory Board; the Planning Service. The exterior organs were: *the Penitentiaries*; *the Work Units*; *the Work Colonies* and *the Productive Units*.[5] In the Decision of the Ministers Council no. 729/1951 it is emphasized that the purpose of punishments and of the freedom-depriving measures is that of "isolating and re-educating the socially dangerous elements in order to make them useful to the society".[6] This Decision provides the organization of *corrective labor colonies* in places where the prisoners' work was needed, in order to use the work force in a productive, rational way. *Work units* were organized in the same way. In view of using the workforce of the detained persons, the General Directorate of Penitentiaries, Colonies and Work Units, "was entitled to conclude and terminate contracts with state and cooperative firms; to found and dissolve their own firms; to regroup detainees according to their profession and special training".[7]

During the formation of the Ministry of State Security, between September 1952 and September 1953, the General Directorate of Penitentiaries, Colonies and Work Units was

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[1] Administraţia Naţională a Penitenciarelor, *Penitenciarul Vaslui. Repere istorice*. 2015, Available at: http://anp.gov.ro/web/penitenciarul-vaslui/despre-noi .

[2] Ioan Băla, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

[3] *Ibidem*, p. 109.

[4] Octavian Roske, *România 1945-1989. Enciclopedia regimului comunist. Represiunea (A-E)*, Bucureşti, Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2011, p. 527.

[5] Nicoleta Ionescu-Gură, *Internările administrative din timpul regimului Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. I. Internarea în unităţile de muncă (1950-1952)*, in "Caietele CNSAS", no. 2/2014, p. 17.

[6] Hotărârea 729/ 1951, Articolul 1, Apud. Nicoleta Ionescu-Gură, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[7] Nicoleta Ionescu-Gură, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

divided into two sections belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs: the Penitentiary Service and the Directorate of Concentration Camps and Work Colonies. In 1953, when the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs merged, the Penitentiary Service turned into the Directorate of Prisons and Penitentiaries, which was different from the Directorate of Concentration Camps and Work Colonies. On the 1st of September 1954, the Directorate of Concentration Camps and Work Colonies, the Directorate of Prisons and Penitentiaries and the Under aged Colonies Service merged, generating the Directorate of Penitentiaries, Concentration Camps and Colonies.[1]

In 1952 it was issued the Regulation regarding the implementation of the penitentiary regime and in 1955 another Regulation was issued regarding the imprisonment, detention, status and supervision in camps and colonies. They provided that the purpose of a freedom-depriving punishment was to "isolate and guard the detainees, so as to make it impossible for them to commit any kind of actions that may prejudice the popular democratic state, reeducate them through work, to accustom them to the order and to qualify them for various jobs, so that, at the end of their sentence, they may become useful to society.[2] Thousands of detainees were sent to work in colonies, which were divided into mines, canals, dams and agricultural lands. The peak of this period was in 1953, when 11,913 detainees worked in such colonies.[3]

The period between 1952 and 1962 was characterized by cruelty inflicted upon the detainees in penitentiaries, such as violence, starvation, poor hygiene, hard labor, brain wash, and in the 1955's Regulation it was even stated that the death of the detainees was notified to their family, but their burial place was not.[4]

In terms of political detention, there is a downward trend beginning in the years 1957-1958, when the Soviet troops left Romania, and the most obvious change has been between 1959 and 1964, when Decrees were issued to amnesty political detainees. Decrees no. 176 and 411 in 1961 granted amnesty to 10,014 political detainees, who were however still under surveillance after their release.[5]

In 1962 a Regulation was adopted regarding *the implementation of the regime in the detention places* and *the functioning of the General Directorate of penitentiaries, colonies and work units*, which further emphasized the fact that the aim of a freedom-depriving punishment was to use the detainees for work purposes, in different branches of the social economy in order to educate them. However, these regulations also included part of the cultural and educational activities promoted in 1938.

In 1968 it is published a new Criminal Code, which, unlike the previous one, eliminates political and common punishments.

The Code provided sanctions such as punishments, safety measures, special status for under aged delinquents and the replacement of criminal responsibility with other means of

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[1] Mihai Burcea, Marius Stan, Mihail Bumbeș, *Dicționarul ofițerilor și angajaților civili ai Direcției Generale a Penitenciarelor. Aparatul central (1948-1989)*, Iași, Polirom, 2009, pp. 43-44.

[2] Regulamentul privind primirea, deținerea, regimul și supravegherea în lagăre și colonii, 1955, Articolul 3.

[3] Radu Ciuceanu, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

[4] Cristina Ilie Goga, *Toward a Social and Judicial Analysis on the Social Reintegration of Persons Deprived of Liberty: Evidence from the Romanian Detention System*, in "Revista de Științe Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques", no. 47/2015, p. 169.

[5] Ioan Băla, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

community constraint or administrative responsibility.[1] The 1968 Criminal Code was republished two times, in 1973 and in 1997. The punishments mentioned in this Code are divided into "main", "complementary" and "accessory".

Between 1950 and 1970, the execution of the freedom-depriving punishment was ruled by the Criminal Code, by the Criminal Procedure Code and by the provisions of numerous legislative acts. As of 1970, the provisions of Law no. 23/1969 were applied.[2]

On the 1st of January 1970 it came into force Law no. 23 of the 18th of November 1969 regarding the execution of punishments. The legislative act details the status of the execution of freedom-depriving punishments, by describing the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the detainees, disciplinary measures and rewards, and release on parole in view of the provisions of article 59 and on. There are also provisions for the execution of the death penalty, criminal penalty fines, complementary punishments and preventive detention. According the provisions mentioned above, "women and men were detained in separate places, and the under aged were detained separately or in special detention places".[3] Detainees whose sentences were definite were also separated from those who were under preventive detention. Detainees were also separated according to the nature of their crime, the duration of their punishment, how many offences they had committed and how receptive they were to reeducation activities.

In terms of penitentiary systems, there were: the closed (severe) system, the semi-free system and the special system (for certain categories, such as the under aged, the elderly, women, first-time detainees, recidivists, short-term and long-term detainees etc.).[4]

A new regulation of the Law was: "work conducted outside the detention place with no guard or the use of detainees to guard fellow detainees". In order to benefit from these work systems, the detainees were supposed to have displayed clear signs of improvement and to have served at least one third of a 5-year long punishment or at least two thirds of a 10-year long punishment.[5]

The reeducation of the detainees was provided to be conducted by work (which was paid, except for the household activities), by qualification, requalification, "cultural and educational activities, as well as by stimulating and rewarding those who work diligently and show significant improvement".[6] A special emphasis was placed on education, instruction, family relations, as important elements of resocialization.[7] The under aged were able to "continue their compulsory general studies and they were given the opportunity to be trained according to their literacy and their skills" or take professional training courses.[8] Except for the pregnant women and sick people, all detainees were used for work, in different activities, whether in fields of the local economy which required work force, in the prison agro-zoo-technical facilities, or in prison firms or workshops.

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[1] Ioan Chiş, *Drept execuţional penal*, Bucureşti, Universul Juridic, 2013, p. 149.

[2] Ioan Băla, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

[3] Legea privind executarea pedepselor, 1969, Articolul 3.

[4] Ioan Băla, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

[5] Teodor Sâmbrian, *Istoricul instituţiei închisorii în România*, in "Revista de ştiinţă penitenciară", no. 1-2/1993, pp. 126-127.

[6] Legea privind executarea pedepselor, 1969, Articolul 5.

[7] Mirela Anghel, *Elements of Personal Development in the University Milieu*, in "Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences", no. 142/2014, p. 22.

[8] Legea privind executarea pedepselor, 1969, Articolul 6.

However, the detainees' options were not taken into account and all those who refused to work were subjected to disciplinary punishments. Also, working detainees had the right to eat better food, receive packages and family visits more frequently, and their activities translated into served time, which enabled them to get released sooner.[1] Professional training courses were held annually by the Cultural and Educational Service and they were attended by between 2000 and 7000 full-aged and all under aged detainees. They became qualified in fields wherein their work was required (furniture, metallurgy, textiles, shoe-making, stone workers, painters etc.). The under aged were trained in the workshops of special reeducation schools.[2]

Special focus was placed by Law no. 23/1969 on post-detention assistance, by describing the mechanisms which could be used in order to improve the detainees' chances of reintegration, so that, upon release, they should be given a job by any of the organs of the Ministry of Labor or by any of the county directorates of work and social security.[3]

Law no. 23/1969 had a rather human nature, by acknowledging a series of rights for the detainees during the time served. Thus, they were allowed to use part of the money they received for their work during the execution of their punishment for personal purposes, they received free medical assistance, monthly allowance for work incapacity due to the execution of their punishment, and the authorities were obligated to give detainees a job after their release. Special care was also given to under aged detainees, who benefitted from special detention conditions, professional, cultural and educational training.[4]

The time when the norms of Law no. 23/1969 were implemented, the execution of the freedom-depriving punishment was characterized by the correlation of elements belonging to common detention with those of the progressive system, with stages which led to an increasingly higher degree of freedom for the detainee. This type of penitentiary system also ruled out cell isolation and silence.[5]

The Law in 1969 providing for the execution of punishments was subsequently amended by the Law Decree no. 6/1990, which abrogated the provisions related to the execution of the death penalty, by Decision no. 20/1992, Decision no. 587/1993, Decision no. 183/1995, Decision no. 543/1996, Decision no. 471/1997, Emergency Ordinance no. 56/2003. It was abrogated by Law no. 275/2006, regarding the execution of punishments and of the measures imposed by the judicial organs during the criminal trial.

Between 1970 and 2004, the penitentiary system was organized according to Law no. 23/1969 and to the Regulation providing for the implementation of this law approved by the Decision of the Ministers Council no. 2282 of the 15th of December 1969, subsequently amended. The functioning of the penitentiary system changed when Decision no. 1849 was issued on the 28th of October 2004. The coordinating institution was the General Directorate of Penitentiaries, controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The General Directorate of Penitentiaries encompassed the Directorate of Economy, the Directorate of Guard, the Technical and Material Provision Services, the Staff and Education Service, the Under aged Service, the Sanitary Service, the Financial

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[1] Ioan Băla, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 122.

[3] Ioan Durnescu, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[4] Aurelian Popa, *Legea privind executarea pedepselor*, in "Revista română de drept", no. (1) XXVI/1970, p. 60.

[5] Ioan Băla, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-113.

Control Service and the Secretariat. Between 1967 and 1977 there were 45 county penitentiaries and 25 autonomous detention and work centers. The centre in Târgu-Ocna housed medical facilities for tuberculosis patients, and the Sighet centre housed a medical facility for patients with mental illnesses. There were four other penitentiary hospitals in Aiud, Dej, Poarta Albă and Văcăreşti. In some penitentiaries factories were founded, for extremely dangerous detainees to work there, as it was not safe to be sent to work outside the penitentiary, or for other detainees to be qualified in different professions. There are also five reeducation centers for under aged detainees, one for girls (the Roşu Centre in Bucharest) and four for boys (in Alexandria, Găeşti, Păltiniş and Târgu-Ocna). These centers housed special professional schools and schools for illiterate detainees who had to complete their elementary and secondary studies. In 1973 a Centre was founded in Bucharest to receive, test and send under aged detainees to the most appropriate location in order to reeducate them.[1]

There has been a fluctuating number of detainees between 1969 and 1989, because, at irregular times, when there were too many detainees (up to 60,000 people, which was more than the penitentiaries could accommodate) amnesty decrees were issued, which led to a large number of detainees to be released. After having analyzed the data of the National Directorate of Penitentiaries for the time between 1969 and 1988, Ioan Chiş presents the yearly distribution of incarcerated people.

Year	Number of detainees	Year	Number of detainees
1969	28,000	**1979**	28,000
1970	38,000	**1980**	28,000
1971	45,000	**1981**	33,000
1972	52,000	**1982**	42,000
1973	38,000	**1983**	48,000
1974	38,000	**1984**	53,000
1975	39,000	**1985**	52,000
1976	48,000	**1986**	58,000
1977	18,000	**1987**	60,000
1978	18,000	**1988**	18,000

Source: Ioan Chiş, *Reforma penitenciară în România*, Timişoara, Ando Tours, 1997.

As mentioned above, the amnesty decrees issued between 1969 and 1988 significantly altered the number of incarcerated people. There have been:
- three decrees in 1969, leading to the release of 4000 detainees;
- eight decrees in 1970, leading to the release of 12,000 detainees;
- five decrees in 1972, leading to the release of 9000 detainees;
- four decrees in 1974, leading to the release of 11,000 detainees;
- two decrees in 1976, leading to the release of 16,500 detainees;
- three decrees in 1977, leading to the release of 22,061 detainees;
- one decree in 1988, leading to the release of 41,184 detainees.[2]

It is worth mentioning that Decree no. 115 of the 7th of May 1977 which released 70% of the imprisoned people and decreased the punishments of the rest of the detainees

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[1] *Ibidem*, pp. 123-125.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 127.

had a disastrous impact upon the Romanian penitentiary system, because, as a result of the drastic drop in the number of detainees it was decided to close 27 penitentiaries, 25 detention places, the six reeducation centers for under aged detainees and the School for penitentiary officers in Hârşova. This decision came into force as soon as Decree no. 225/1977 has been issued.[1] After its implementation only 16 penitentiaries were still working, with 15,000 accommodation places, which led to massive unemployment among the former employees of the closed detention places. However, in spite of the Militia being ordered to only arrest as many criminals as there were accommodation places inside the penitentiaries, it proved impossible to control the implementation of the decision and the number of detainees increased. This is the reason behind the restoration of the Special Schools for Work and Reeducation in Găeşti and Târgu-Ocna on the 15th of March 1978, and in 1980, more penitentiaries became functional again: Baia Mare, Bârcea-Mare, Colibaşi, Iaşi and Slobozia. In 1983, the following penitentiatries were also reopened: Arad, Brăila, Chilia Veche, Drobeta Turnu-Severin, Focşani, Miercurea Ciuc, Oradea, Tulcea and Vaslui, as well as the Special School for Work and Reeducation and the independent detention unit in Târgu-Jiu. In the 80's the Chilia Veche penitentiary also reopened, after having been closed in 1975.[2] Two other events were important in the evolution of the penitentiary system prior to the 1989 Revolution, namely: the consequences of Decree no. 11 of the 26th of January 1988, which allowed the release of 41,182 detainees and the closure of ten detention units and also, the closure and demolition of the Văcăreşti-Bucharest Penitentiary, as ordered by Nicolae Ceauşescu, although the penitentiary was the most modern Romanian unit in the entire imprisonment system, being able to accommodate 2500 people.[3] At the end of 1989, a number of 32 penitentiaries were in place and working in Romania.[4]

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 128.

[2] *Ibidem*, pp. 129-131.

[3] *Ibidem*, p. 132.

[4] Cristina Ilie, *O analiză socio-istorică a sistemului de detenţie din România. Între prevenţie, pedepsire şi reintegrare socială*, Bucureşti, Pro Universitaria, 2015, p. 111.

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HISTORICAL CONDITIONS OF THE RISE OF COMMUNISM IN THE CENTRAL EUROPE

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Abstract

The article deals with the process of formation of communist regimes in Central Europe after the Second World War. The author traces the causes of the rise of these regimes in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and East Germany. This process analyzes with the comparative method, and trying to show the similarities and differences between developments in these countries. The analysis is based on a comparison of conditions in frame of three keys factors: experience / inexperience with parliamentary democracy, social and economic conditions after WW2, and the way of establishment of a communist regime in the relevant country.

Key words: *rise of communism, Central Europe, Second World War, social transformation, democratic experience*

The communist regimes in Central Europe were a historical phenomenon and, secondly, the phenomenon of the political science. Theory of totalitarianism, emerging from the 50s of the 20th century as the Western concept of Political Science, tried to show above all common features of these regimes.

The key problem which, however, these concepts of totalitarianism in professional debates crashed, were either of these modes changes that occurred since the 50's almost until 1989, and the differences in the characteristics of these regimes in each country of Central Europe. They were not only given by the current socio-economic conditions or situation of communist elite, but also by profound differences in historical traditions of each country. These differences are already fully reflected in the way the communist regimes in the countries of Central Europe after WW2 raised.

Differences between these regimes consisted mainly in the way the Communist takeover and the public's attitude, in dependency of the power elite on the Soviet leadership, and the ability to promote the national interests of the state, the extent and way of applying repression, the position and perception of opposition groups, including the Church, in their ability to respond demands for reform and the changing situation on the international scene.

In the following article we will show the similarities and differences of the key factors that influenced the creation of Communist regimes in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and East Germany. In particular, we should analyze:

1. Actual geopolitical situation in CE as a consequence of the WW2

2. Differences in previous development of each country (national, political, economic, cultural, religious)

3. Different perceptions of radical changes in recent history (results of WW1, experience with the interwar regimes of 1918-1938, WW2 – resistance vs. collaboration)

4. Different position of communist parties in each national society in CE

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5. Different level of un/modernity of each national society in CE

In order to outline these differences, we must research (at least) the following three factors:

1. In/experience with Parliamentary Democracy
2. Social and economic conditions in the relevant country after WW2
3. The way of establishment of a communist regime in the relevant country

In/experience with Parliamentary Democracy

Czechoslovakia and East Germany certainly had, from reporting countries, the richest experience with the regime of Parliamentary Democracy.

In both countries, since the last third of the 19th Century and especially during the interwar period was richly developed party and social life; after 1918, both countries developed in the frame of liberal democratic constitutional system and the rule of law. However, in both countries observed in this period also strongly opposing tendencies, notably on the restriction of Parliamentary Democracy.

In Czechoslovakia, these tendencies were manifested in the form of too strong role of party elites and rather passive membership of political parties. Constitutional and political practice, this corresponds to the conception of tied candidates lists and tied parliamentary mandate.

Although in Czechoslovakia did not exist a strong republican tradition, has managed to build up quite quickly, among other things. And because this idea had a strong support especially in the Czech elites and public. To support the building of the republican form of state were political and cultural elite also used the historical traditions (the references to the Hussite Revolution, social reforms, the struggle for cultural autonomy in the 19th Century).

In Germany, after 1918, there were too many obstacles to building a strong republican and democratic traditions. Formally existing Weimar Republic was being swayed by political extremists, whether it represented a nationalist, radical left-wing (Communists) or right-wing populist parties eventually in the form of NSDAP. How much exactly once wrote historian Golo Mann, it was "a republic without republicans and democracy without democrats".[1] The prestige and authority of the republican authorities in Germany after 1918, decreased steadily depending on the deteriorating economic, social and international political situation. Significant support of Stresemann's centrist governments in the second half of the 20's proved to be a very short episode.

In both countries also existed uncontrolled domination of political parties and economic elites, and strong tradition of party-controlled press, which kept the public support to the political system. Both countries have been characteristic by strong social stratification of society, different social class closely perceived their collective identity, and it basically corresponded strong linkage of voters to "their" political party, which built its policy strictly on defending of particular interests of the social class. This also corresponds to the political practice in the Parliament: we can observe "militant" approach of political parties to the solution of key problems and their weak willingness to reach a compromise.

Parties were living in the environment of a sort of permanent cold civil war, able to always go to the hot phase, as seen from the street battles of the Communists and the

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[1] Golo Man, *Dějiny Německa 1919-1945*, Praha, Český spisovatel, 1993, pp. 24-25.

Nazis since the late 20's. Even in the face of the Nazi threat in January 1933 other political parties with a majority in the Reichstag were not able to agree on such a joint approach by the Nazis came to power prevented.

In Czechoslovakia, the situation was apparently different (strong tendency of parties to a mutual agreement, the governments of broad coalitions, which, however, strongly qualified the importance of the elections), and the result was quite different from Germany. Majority of citizens criticised, questioned, and finally refused (by massive support for the Nazi Party, other nationalists, and communists) this form of ("Weimar") party democracy in Germany. The citizens in Czechoslovakia also criticised the actual form of democracy and the ruling political system, but majority of them supported democratic political parties until 1938 (with the exception of the majority of ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia).

However, in Czechoslovakia after the Munich agreement (1938), and after the experience of the occupation and creation of Nazi Protectorate (1939) and WW2 prevailed among the public and politicians in 1945, convinced of the impossibility of returning to discredited "party state" from the time of the interwar republic.[1] It also greatly facilitated the success of the Communists to power.

In the case of Poland and Hungary, the situation was more complicated. Poland wants its statehood began in 1918 to build an entirely new and largely not political traditions something to build on. Poland started building its statehood and its system of Parliamentary Democracy "from square one" after 1918 and had no older democratic traditions (excepting the First Republic in 16th – 18th century). Thus, when opting for the most commonly used form of republican and Parliamentary Democracy. In the face of external threats Bolshevik Revolution, however, found themselves facing the need to fight for the survival of their national independence – and it is too early to have enough to build a little stable foundations of the democratic system.[2]

General social and economic catastrophe, even inherited from WW1, and the weakness of the newly established democratic institutions meant that after the defeat of the Red Army Tukhachevsky gained on the Polish political scene, the dominant position of the architects of victory, headed by Marshal Pilsudski. This resulted in the establishment of an authoritarian regime, seeking inspiration in Mussolini's Italy, that in Nazi Germany, but always ready to find common ground with anyone in a negative relation to the USSR. Maintenance of national and state independency, Anti-Russian and anti-Soviet tendencies were pivotal axis of Polish politics since the twenties until the period just after WW2.[3] The Pilsudski's Army becomes the main guarantee of Polish political independency; this led to the preference of authoritarian regime. Safety of state had priority over preservation of democracy. It was also typical the economic decline, strong role of traditional elites and absence of political liberalism for Polish society.

Hungary was (in the time after 1918) characterized by both tremendous frustration with the results of the war, and in particular the results of the Paris Peace Conference, and the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. The political situation in Hungary determined the postwar chaos caused by the reluctance of local elites to come to terms with the new

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[1] Tony Judt, *Postwar Europe*, London, William Heinemann, 2005, p. 64.
[2] Norman Davies, *Polsko: dějiny národa ve středu Evropy*, Praha, Prostor, 2003, p. 13.
[3] Jacques Rupnik, *Jiná Evropa*, Praha, Prostor, 1992, pp. 46-47.

situation in Europe, as well as frequent violent upheavals and political adventures, culminating in the form of so-called "Hungarian Soviet Republic". Establishing Horthy's regime in this context appeared to be a stabilizing factor that has enabled Hungary gradually absorb too radical changes in its national, political, social and economic organization, which in 1918 was clearly not ready. This was done at the cost of restriction of Parliamentary Democracy and the establishment of an authoritarian regime. Thanks to this in interwar Hungary was not much place for a moderate liberal policy; their positions rather renew old traditional conservative social class with its defeatist approach to politics and with Anticommunism.

Generally, we can thus summarize this aspect so that in 1945, while – in the case of Germany and Czechoslovakia – there was some experience with parliamentary democracy, but they were both very short, and because of its many systemic weaknesses not enough and did not strongly rooted in society, nor in the social and political institutions. Moreover, it was not accompanied by economic democracy, which was the citizens in both countries perceived as one of its key weaknesses. The German society, of course, entered the post-war period, both after twelve years of experience with brutal tyrannical regime, and secondly, the situation of economic, social, moral and general human catastrophe in the form of defeat in war and the almost total destruction of the entire country. Of course, it played its role well as the fact absence of state independence, which was a logical consequence of the occupation of Germany by the Allied armies.[1]

Poland was in 1945 the country liberated by the Soviet army and became a battleground on which he had yet to decide the struggle between the forces of anti-Russians more than the pro-democratic (Mikolajczyk's People's Party) and the Polish Communists, who had some very scant public support, but strong support for the Soviets. Sharp anti-Russian mood of the public, even complemented the WW2 experience with the pact Molotov-Ribbentropp, murders in Katyn, not help of the Soviets to Warsaw Uprising and the mysterious death of General Sikorski, it could be assumed that in Poland after the war pulls a sharp political struggle for power.

Very similar situation was in Hungary, which was like Germany the country in the war militarily defeated and occupied. The position of the Communists in Hungarian society was also rather weak, which resulted mainly from the social structure of society and also from the fact that during the inter-war period the communists were illegal (as in Poland), and could not therefore broadly develop political activities. Most citizens of Hungary after the war supported the Peasant Party ("Smallholders"), which represented a large part of the countryside, but also had considerable support in the cities. On the left dominated the rather moderate social democrats with a traditionally strong position in Budapest and larger cities. All this gave a sense that here the way of the Communists came to power will be very difficult – they had only one powerful helper – Allied Control Commission, controlled by the Soviets and headed by Marshal K. Voroshilov.

Social and economic conditions in the relevant country after WW2

Generally, of course, it was possible in 1945 noted the extensive devastation of post-war economies of the four surveyed countries. Prewar Czechoslovakia and Germany were definitely the industrial countries, Germany was in the 30's even the most dynamically

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[1] Hermann Weber, *Dějiny NDR*, Praha, NLN, 2003, p. 10.

developing industrial powers of Europe. It had large stocks of raw materials and consumables developed heavy industry, extensive research and development, and also excelled in a developed transport infrastructure. A large part of the industry was concentrated in the east of the country, which was occupied by the Soviets at the end of the war. Wartime destruction, of course, led to a significant weakening of the industrial potential of the country, which was further reduced by post-war expropriation, the Soviets realized within the wound healing for the victims, which the Soviet Union brought the defeat of Nazism in the war.

Czechoslovakia was also developed industrial country, but with significant regional differences in the level of industrialization; almost entirely agrarian Slovakia strongly contrasted with the industrial areas of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. Wartime devastation, although significantly damaged the country, but not so much as in the case of Germany.

Poland and Hungary were more agrarian countries, with a relatively small share of the industry.

Wartime occupation of Poland greatly damaged the country economically, moreover Poland in the war lost almost all the intelligence, the social elite as well as extensive eastern territories which were only partly offset by earnings former German Silesia.[1] Hungary is particularly towards the end of the war became a vassal of Nazi Germany rather, which of course it also cost significantly damage. The country has however retained a considerable part of the intellectual elite.

In all the above mentioned countries took place after the war nationalization of key industries, mineral resources, banks and insurance companies, which expressed the faith of local (often non-communist) elites in the possibility of realization of socially just society.

The way of establishment of the communist regime

As we have already indicated above, the conditions for the emergence of communist regimes in our surveyed countries varied. In Germany, the division of a unitary state and the establishment of the Communist regime in one of them was the result of the post-war power structure. East German Communist elite was not long after the 1949 master of the situation in his country, in which decided Soviet generals and politicians. Creating of the GDR was not originally Stalin's intention; Soviet dictator favored maintaining of the unified Germany, but with a strong influence of the Communists to the politics.

But when the three Western allied governments agreed to merge their zones and the creation of the West German state, the Soviets had no choice but to respond to the situation similarly, if they did not want lose their influence in Germany completely. But East German Communist regime still quite long served the Soviets as an instrument for negotiations with the West.

Stalin and yet also Khrushchev were ready to accept the sacrifice of the GDR in a few specific historical situations, and to accept also its reintegration into a unified German state in exchange for a strong Communist influence in such Germany.[2] West German leaders never accepted such offers, even if that they undoubtedly met the expectations of

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[1] Marceli Kosman, *Dějiny Polska*, Karolinum, Praha, 2011, p. 38.
[2] Jiří Vykoukal, Bohuslav Litera, Miroslav Tejchman, *Východ. Vznik, vývoj a rozpad sovětského bloku 1944-1989*, Praha, Libri, 2000, p. 418.

many East German citizens.[1] Until the entry of West Germany into NATO in 1955 put an end to these Soviet affair with the existence of the GDR – indeed, it was no coincidence that only after that act gained the GDR full sovereignty from the Soviets, as demonstrated also agree to set up its own army of the GDR.

Czechoslovak case is perhaps known well enough, but we note the basic factors of its development. The establishment of the Communist monopoly on power have contributed to our mind these basic factors:

• Significant influence of the war exile (in Moscow) leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party for talks on postwar arrangements of the political system of liberated Czechoslovak republic, held in Moscow in March of 1945. At these meetings the Communists enforced whole their version of the new government program (ie. The Košice's government program), which meant a fundamental changes in the political system, economy, social affairs, security and foreign policy of the state. Other political actors (non-Communist parties, the President Beneš) more or less respected dominant influence of the Communists, or they faced it rather ineffectively; in addition they have agreed with many measures proposed by the Communists, especially in foreign and retributive politics, as well as the vast majority of the measures in the economy, and – in the case of the Social Democrats – the have proposed an even more radical steps.[2]

• Disappointment of the population from the political and economic system of the pre-war Republic, which was perceived in the context of the Munich agreement as a politically corrupt and socio-economically unjust.

• The election in 1946 – it was the only election in Central European countries in which the Communists won (40% of votes) in relatively democratic conditions.

• The Communist Party seized control of key ministries (interior, army, justice, Secret police).

The communist takeover in February of 1948 was certainly perceived by the public less fatal than we perceive it today. From the former perspective it was mainly the solution of the government crisis, caused by the demise of leaders of non-Communist parties. The Communists used the advantage of the crisis for the powerful reversal in their favor. Within a few days, they activated the public support on their side, activated thousands of its officers in the village and towns who took power in "national committees" (town halls), and they neutralized the President. Through its allies in other political parties they made an upheaval of these parties that added to the "revived" National Front in a few days after 25th of February of 1948.[3]

Although we can certainly speculate on the constitutionality of this process, it is obvious that the basic building block of success of the Communists was both surprise (non-communist parties were not sufficient to recognize the intentions of the Communist Party, and when it is observed, they were already in principle unable to prevent their implementation) and, secondly, passivity of majority of the public, which in principle also was unable to see the consequences of the ongoing changes. All this gave the communist leaders reason to believe that the silent majority of the public actually supports their

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[1] Mary Fulbrook, *Dějiny moderního Německa*, Praha, Grada, 2010, p. 115.
[2] Karel Kaplan, *Nekrvavá revoluce*, Praha, Mladá fronta, 1993, pp. 19-20.
[3] Jan Rataj, Přemysl Houda, *Československo v proměnách komunistického režimu*, Praha, Oeconomica, 2010, p. 55.

progress. This proposition was defeated also by President Beneš, who accepted all of communist's proposals for solving the crisis.[1] The real power reaching breakeven however, it was up agreement (March-April of 1948) of the other political parties to form a so-called "Unified list of candidates" for the upcoming parliamentary elections, which practically meant the resignation of the parties in the electoral fight against the communists.[2]

The takeover of Communists in Poland and Hungary was much more complicated, it is because we limit ourselves only to its main features. Communism was in both countries restored clearly against the will of the majority of inhabitants. Post-war Poland was tossing about violent political struggle between the communists (who had strong support from the Soviets, but the minimum support among the public), and popular politicians, who organized domestic and exiled resistance against the Nazis, and who were in 1945 leaded by war exile Prime Minister and Chairman of the People's Party Mikolajczyk. He thought, moreover, that he will be able to create a political alternative to the pro-Soviet government (ie. Committee in Lublin). But the Soviets forced (through rough coercion and terror against the leaders of Polish wartime resistance movement) the formation of a government in which the Communists and their Allies occupied the overwhelming majority of seats. This new government was finally also recognized by the Western Allies. This is why the exile democratic leaders (with their pro-Western policy) were eliminated and lost the influence on events in postwar Poland.

The Communists with Soviet support postponed democratic elections, required especially by the party of Mikolajczyk, to obtaining an advantage in terms of realization of irreversible personal, economic and social changes in Polish society. The Christian Democrats refused to join the joint list of candidates with the Communists in 1946. It followed by a referendum on the government's economic policy, organized by the pro-Soviet government. The Polish government lost this referendum at the end of June 1946 when it voted against 75% of voters. However, the results were falsified and the government announced that it had, on the contrary, 68% support. The Communists started a discrediting campaign against the opposition Christian Democrats.

The government's candidate list (communists and socialists) won the elections, held in January 1947, with 80.1% of the votes; the opposition Christian Democrats were defeated. It followed the adoption of the new constitution that undermined the principle of separation of powers and concentrated most of the political power in the hands of the executive (in the form of the newly established Council of State).[3]

Subsequently, the Communists carried out the discrediting campaign against its previous allies, the Socialist Party. The enforcement of the next wave of nationalization (services, trade and commerce), liquidation of the autonomy of universities, arrests and show trials of the leaders of the Socialists was the result of it. People's Party was officially disbanded in autumn 1947 and Mikolajczyk emigrated from Poland. In March 1948, the Socialists (under press agreed of the Communists) agreed with unification of their party with the Communist Party. The monopoly of the Communists was completed.

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[1] Jan Bureš, *Národní neštěstí nebo osobní tragédie?*, in "Na pozvání Masarykova ústavu 1. Sborník z konference MÚ AV ČR", Praha, 2004, pp. 118-120.
[2] Karel Kaplan, *Pět kapitol o Únoru*, Brno, Doplněk, 1997, p. 498.
[3] Andrzej Packowski, *Půlstoletí dějin Polska 1939-1989*, Academia, Praha, 2000, pp. 120-121.

In Hungary, the situation was different practically only in the official position of the country at the end of the war: while Poland was allied countries, liberated by the Red Army, Hungary was a hostile, defeated and occupied country. This situation, of course, considerably eased the communists their path to power, because the country was effectively ruled by the Allied Control Commission headed by Soviet Marshal Voroshilov. At the end of the war, all Hungarian political parties including the Communists agreed to form a National Front of Independence that should manage the country to the holding of elections.[1] The government, formed on the basis of this agreement, however, conducted a major political and economic changes: the confiscation of the property of traitors, nationalization of industries, agrarian reform, introduced the principles of planned economy and system of controlled democracy.[2]

The Communist Party, originally tiny, illegal and without significant public support, was quickly picking up new members and with the support of the Soviets occupied key power ministries.[3] Conservatively Agrarian Peasant Party ("Smallholders") had the strongest public support, but this party was now led by the young and inexperienced politicians. The political atmosphere in the country was very sultry, both major political camps was bored against themselves with the threat of disaster in case of victory of the enemy. The Smallholders convincingly won the elections in November of 1945 to gain 57% of votes, Communists ended up with nearly 17% to third place behind the Social Democrats.

However, the real power position of the Communists has not changed. The Soviets after the election gave a strong indication if their interest in the continuation of the coalition of National Front. Communists "had to" remain in the government, and although Smallholders occupy the highest constitutional positions of the prime minister and president, communists retained power ministries, including control of the secret police AVO. In the following months they tried to decomposition of Smallholders Party, which they did in cooperation with the Soviets in the Allied Control Commission, and finally they met this goal with help of the unions and the secret police and manipulated justice.

The Government of Smallholders in Hungary ended up with a touch bizarre thriller: after Prime Minister F. Nagy went on holiday in Switzerland in May of 1947, he was accused of preparing the conspiracy in Hungary, and was warned not to return. Communists blackmailed him for his son, who remained in Hungary. Ferenc Nagy thus remotely from Switzerland resigned as Prime Minister, the Communists sent him a son and he remained in exile. Meanwhile, Hungary rejected the Marshall Plan and carried out massive nationalization.

The Communists won 22% of votes in the manipulated parliamentary elections held in August of 1947, disorganized Smallholders party ended up in third place with 15.4% of votes. Subsequently, the parliament headed by a communist Imre Nagy, gave most of its powers in favor of the government. The Communists immediately completed the process of nationalization of property. In June of 1948, virtually the same time as in

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[1] László Kontler, *Dějiny Maďarska*, Praha, Lidové noviny, 2001, p. 360.

[2] Eva Irmanová, *Maďarsko v éře sovětizace. Mezinárodní a politické aspekty*, Ústí nad Labem, Albis International, 2008, p. 247.

[3] Anne Applebaum, *Iron Courtain: the Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944-1956*, New York, Doubleday, 2012, p. 70.

Czechoslovakia, the Hungarian Communists united with the Social Democrats and became party of power monopoly.

Conclusions

The way the communist regimes emerged in the surveyed countries remained firmly imprinted on the way they were perceived by the citizens as well as the local communist elites.

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OUTLOOK ON THE HISTORY OF MIGRATION
IN THE XXᵀᴴ CENTURY'S EUROPE

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Abstract

For a long time in history, human migration has been a global phenomenon, linking remote geographical areas. But, until the recent events involving large population movements, there is no other period in history so rich in evoking international migration like the XXth century. And the most targeted region of the world in those ages was Europe, especially the western developed countries. The aim of this article is to review the major events regarding migration, and to set them in the specific contexts in which they occurred. In order to do so, we divided the paper in five distinct parts. The first two of them focus on the presentation of migration as a historical phenomenon, also introducing previous attempts to divide the history of these processes. The last three parts approach the evolution of the size or migratory flows related to the evolution of the European destination countries.

Key words: *migration, Europe, history, countries, migration flows*

1. Migration – a historical phenomenon

The conceptual approaches on the term "migration" offer various dimensions of this phenomenon. For instance, Romanian sociologist Dumitru Sandu defines migration as *a life strategy*, representing "*a perspective of the durable report between assumed purposes and means (...). They are rational action structures, relatively durable for the level of the agent who adopts them*"[1], while Jan Szczepanski defines social mobility as "*the series of phenomenon that reside in moving of individuals or groups from place to place in the social space*".[2]

Regardless of the terms used, human geographical movement is one of the social phenomenons known from ancient times. One can even claim that migration has sometimes, in history, been used as a method of surviving by some nations, who either retreated from conquerors, or travelled in search of better living conditions. During the XVIIIth-XXth centuries, due to significant evolutions in the field of industry and transport infrastructure, geographical distances are no longer regarded as a real impediment for human migration. Western European countries' process of economic development favored the occurrence of a vast territorial movement of people from and in different countries. This movement occurred, on the one hand, from poor societies towards those

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[1] Dumitru Sandu, *Migraţia transnaţională a românilor din perpectiva unui recensământ comunitar*, in "Sociologie Românească", 3-4:5-52.
[2] Jan Szczepanski, *Noţiuni elementare de sociologie*, trad. N. Mareş, Bucureşti, Editura Ştiinţifică, 1972, p. 126.

with blooming economies, and, one the other hand, from wealthy European states towards other areas and continents of the world.[1]

When they migrated to other continents, the Europeans brought along patterns of behavior and thinking systems from the societies they abandoned. Therefore, after the colonization process of isolated or remote lands, often inhabited by population with a lower level of civilization, the Europeans were granted an educational role. As it often happened in history, the indigenous populations adopted from the conquerors the language they spoke, the habits, dressing stile, and, most important of all, rules and moral and educational standards.

Among the main factors that resulted in the movement of population on the globe, we can also recall major shifts produced by the evolution of natural, political, military or economic factors. For instance, the periods of a great power`s regional domination, such as, for instance, the case of the Roman empire, also represented massive population movements. Another historical moment that brought along substantial migration of population was the discovery of America (at the end of the XVth century), the largest amount of people coming from Europe. In the early ages of movement towards the North- American continent, there was an important need of work force to exploit the vast plantations from the south. Thus, slave commerce was encouraged, about 12 million people being brought from Africa. Later on, the XIXth and XXth centuries brought along a revival of the migration towards the American continent, this time the immigrants coming mostly from Western Europe. They were representatives of the poor class, travelling to "the New World" in seek of a better life. Therefore, around 20 million Europeans moved to the United States of America, 2 million moved to Canada, and about 12 million to Latin America.[2]

The growth in the number of European population, and consequently, the European economic expansion all over the world, whose promoters were the industrialization and the urbanization, along with the growth in the standard of living in the cities (through economic prosperity, diversification of services), represented an attractive element for the citizens from the states with poorer living conditions, turning Western Europe into a perfect destination for international migration. The dominance and influence of the European states all over the world took various shapes: conquests of colonial territories, acquisition of lands and economic activities, applying models of education or government), and represent a major factor of modern and contemporary history, resulting, among others, in creating European-like societies in different areas of the globe. Some researchers consider that these societies were "*created by the wave of immigrants who, along the XIXth century, fled Europe. It is estimated that, between 1841 and 1914, there were about 30 or 35 million of them*"[3] (departing especially from the Anglo-Saxon, Irish, German or Scandinavian space).

Other historians argue that "*XIXth century's Europeans were champions in demographic invasion*".[4] Referring to the 1821-1924 interval, approximately 55 million Europeans are

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[1] Alexandru D. Albu, Ion Roşu-Hamzescu, *Migraţia internaţională a forţei de muncă*, Bucureşti, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1987, pp. 25-29.
[2] Massimo Livi Bacci*, A Short History of Migration,* Cambridge, Polity Press, 2012, pp. 82-85.
[3] Francesca Fauri (ed.), *The history of migration in Europe. Perspectives from economics, politics and sociology*, New York, Routledge Publishing, 2015, p. 125.
[4] Vasile S. Cucu, Elena Toma, *Populaţia Terrei*, Bucureşti, Editura Transversal, 2003, p. 95.

estimated to have *"migrated over the seas, among them 34 million to the United States. The Western people have conquered and sometimes erased other peoples, explored and colonized less populated territories. The human export was probably the single most important dimension of Western progress in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries"*.[1]

Of course, this substantial growth in large distance migration flows was also fueled by the technological innovations and unprecedented diversification in the field of means of transportation (regarding accessibility to remote geographical areas, distances travelled, and, at the same time, decrease of the time invested in travelling them, as well as the number of travelers). Constant improvement and the increasing variety of the means of transportation from the end of the XIXth century and beginning of the XXth century favored continuous growth of the frequency of contacts between different human communities, and implicitly, the continental and intercontinental migration phenomena. Therefore, we can argue that the period of time between the end of the First World War and present arouses the greatest amount of interest, the different stages during decades calling for a differentiated historical examination.

2. Modern history migration stages

Douglas S. Massey divides the modern history of migration in four periods.[2] In the first one, identified as *the mercantile period*, international migration was dominated by the colonization and economic development phenomenon, under the influence of capitalism. Within 300 years, the Europeans came to occupy vast regions in both South and North America, Africa, Asia and even Oceania. The emigrants in this period can be divided in four categories: a rather large amount of workers in the agriculture, a smaller amount of administrators and artisans, even fewer entrepreneurs, who started plantations to produce materials exported in Europe, and, in some cases, former convicts sent to execute their criminal punishments.

The second one, referred to as *the industrial period*, started at the middle of the XIXth century, and was caused by the industrial development of Europe and by the spread of capitalism towards the former colonies in the New World. In this time of the beginning of industrialization about 48 million emigrants fled Europe, this amount representing about 12% of the total population of Europe at that time.[3]

During the last three decades of the XIXth century there were notice, often with amazing rapidity, new and complex structures of international migration. Although their amount was modest compared to the mass movements of Europe towards the New World, that characterized the end of the XIXth century and the beginning of the XXth century, the effects of these migration were not less profound.

The beginning of the First World War generated a drastic decrease in the number of European emigrants, the first four decades of the XXth century representing *the period of limited migration*, in Massey's view.[4] Although the global economy gradually recovered during the 1920s, the debut of the Great Depression in 1929 practically stopped all

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[1] *Ibidem*, pp. 96-97.

[2] Douglas S. Massey, *Patterns and Processes of International Migration in the 21st Century*, lucrare prezentată la Conference on African Migration in Comparative Perspective, Johannesburg, South Africa, 2003, p. 2.

[3] Massimo Livi Bacci, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

[4] Douglas S. Massey, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7.

transnational movements, except for a small amount of migrants who returned to their countries of origins. Along the 1940s, international migration was strongly restricted, due to the Second World War.

The legal frameworks through which the postwar migration occurred were varied, but they can be grouped in two: colonial migration regimes and "temporary" guest-worker policies. Migrants passed through these two streams for one reason: to satisfy labor shortages created by a booming European economy. The story of migration up to the early 1970s in one of economic shortages interacting with prewar colonial migration and citizenship laws in the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Belgium, and with postwar guest-worker policies in Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Denmark and Sweden.[1]

The fourth period identified by Massey is *the post-industrial migration period*, which started in the middle of the 1960s and was characterized by the globalization of the migratory movements, as the number and diversity of both sending and receiving countries grew constantly. After the 1960s, Europeans represented a smaller and smaller share in the total amounts of international migration flows.

In Western Europe, the phenomenon developed, at first, as intraregional migration from Southern Europe towards Northern and Western Europe. However, these movements were shortly outnumbered by the migration from the former colonial possessions and from the states from outside Europe. Significant migratory flows headed towards Western Europe in the Caribbean area, the Middle East, Northern Africa, Latin America and south Asia. In a similar pattern, these migration flows started later in North America and Australia. The flows that were already becoming global from the XIXth century and the beginning of the XXth century from Europe towards the New World, were accompanied, and later on replaced, by flows coming from Latin America, the Caribbean's and the Asia-Pacific Area towards North America and from the Asia-Pacific area towards Australia. Furthermore, almost all the nations in the O.C.D.E.[2] continued to face migration inside the O.C.D.E. of the highly skilled personnel that fueled the nods to a more and more globalized economy. For the past Twenty years, these flows were accompanied, on a global scale, by human movements from Southern Asia towards the Gulf region and the Middle East. Another size of the extension of the contemporary migratory flows is the large number of regional migration systems that appeared along with the global flows.[3]

3. Europe's reconstruction after the Second World War and labor migration

After the Second World War, the basic conditions of transnational migration have undergone significant change. The period of European migration history from the early nineteenth century to the eve of the First World War was dominated by "proletarian mass

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[1] Randall Hansen, *Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and its Lessons*, in "The Political Quarterly", Volume 74, Issue Supplement s1, 2003, p. 25.

[2] Klaus J. Bade, *Migration in European History*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2003, p. 166.

[3] David Held, Anthony Mc Grew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton, *Transformări globale. Politică, economie și cultură*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2004, pp. 348-349.

migrations".[1] It was determined to an unprecedented and never repeated extent by the freedom to migrate across borders. The subsequent "century of refugees"[2] or of the "homeless man"[3] was an era – continuing into the twenty-first century in this respect – in which migration movements in the European and Atlantic realms were triggered or forced, and at the same time regulated and limited, as never before by political developments and state-determined conditions. This epochal change in political and state conditions must be brought to bear in any account of twentieth-century European migration.[4]

The peace treaties at the end of the Second World War lay the foundation for the new geopolitical landscape of after-war Europe, and created large population movements within Europe and into Europe.[5] There were certain countries, and we include here Germany and Austria, had their geographic dimensions substantially reduced, in their national boundaries, while other countries incorporated new areas into their national geography.

After the end of the Second World War, approximately 30 million refugees arrived in Europe, fleeing from the areas that had been devastated by the conflict. The reconstruction of the European countries after the war imposed the need to increase the workforce, thus producing exchanges of workers between the countries that had unemployed workers (Italy, Holland or Western Germany) and their neighboring countries, deficient in workforce (France, Belgium). As a consequence, French patrons looked towards Spain, Portugal and Algeria. After the stop of Eastern immigration, Germany expanded its recruitment zone towards Greece and Spain, and afterwards Yugoslavia and Turkey. England continued to request workforce from the Commonwealth countries and Ireland. For the colonial European states that had empires across the ocean the decolonization age also meant the massive return of European colonists. In this time, most of the industrialized states recruited immigrant workers in order to sustain their economic expansion, to stimulate their development and to stop the conjectural fluctuations in working places.

After the 1948 currency reform the German economy began to recover, and it recovered quickly. By the middle of the 1950s, Germany and the rest of the continental Europe had a level of demand for labor that could no longer be satisfied domestically (or, in Germany, by expellees from Eastern Europe). In a pattern common to most continental European countries, Germany looked first towards the Southern Europe (believing that such migrants could be assimilated more readily into the labor market), later to Turkey and finally to North Africa.[6] The German government negotiated guest-

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[1] Dirk Hoerder and Amarjit Kaur (editors), *Proletarian and Gendered Mass Migrations. A Global Perspective on Continuities and Discontinuities from the 19th to the 21st Centuries*, Leiden, Brill Publishing, 2013, p. 29.

[2] Michael Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees From 1St World War (Politics History & Social Chan)*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2002, p. 58.

[3] *Ibidem*, p. 93.

[4] Klaus J. Bade, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[5] Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini, *Immigration: The European Experience*, London, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, Department of Economics, 2011, p. 4.

[6] Randall Hansen, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

worker schemes with Italy (1955), Greece and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968).[1]

From the legislative point of view, the states in Western Europe treated the issue of migrants differently. Germany, for instance, adopted a rigorous legislation, but it turned out to encourage temporary immigration. A work permit was granted for one year and could be renewed two times for a period of two years each time. In 1965, work permits for limited periods of time became the exception, and family reunions become hard to tolerate. England was also one of the states that opted for such a temporary migration. The legislation in the field of citizenship had the purpose to encourage the establishment of its own citizens from the Commonwealth, as well as the settling of those who came from India, Pakistan, or the Antilles. France, on the other hand, opted for a mixed system that included, first of all, the use of labor force from the Southern areas of Europe, with poorer populations, such as the Portuguese.

Due to the extremely favorable economic context, demographic migration flows were mostly intercontinental, fact that can be considered to be an important characteristic of this period of time.

During the 1950s and the 1960s most legal migrants moving into Europe from the South were young adults aged between 20 and 35. Those seeking illegal entry in the 1990s were even younger and some of them were pregnant women with children. The economic migrants from North Africa used the word "*Lahrig*" to describe themselves. "*Lahrig*" is a Moroccan-Arabic word meaning 'burning'. This word is used in two senses. First, the migrant "burns" with desire to reach Europe. Second they use the word in a literal sense to refer to burning their identity documents. These so called 'burners' come into four categories[2]:

• Illegal entrance without any documents entitling them to reside in a European country.

• Those who entered legally but stayed on beyond their legally-ratified period.

• Those who either entered legally or illegally or found work in unauthorized jobs.

• The family members of legal and illegal migrants who themselves did not have a visa.

4. The economic crisis and restricted migration

In the 1970s, an economic recession hit Europe and left many migrant laborers unemployed. From 1973 to 1975, many Western European governments implemented restrictive immigration policies. These policies varied from country to country but were generally referred to as "immigration stop" policies, which intended to stop foreign labor recruitment and prevent immigrants from coming to Europe. However, these policies were not effective in encouraging return migrations. Many migrants stayed in Europe and brought their families to join them through family reunification policies and continued labor migration. Since the 1970s, the number of immigrants in Europe has increased rather than decreased.[3]

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[1] Alexandra Porumbescu, *Work migration in Germany after the second world war*, in "Revista Universitara de Sociologie", 2(16)/2011, p. 83.

[2] See more at: http://historiana.eu/case-study

[3] Randall Hansen, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

Along with the overall increase of immigrants in Europe, Muslim populations have also grown throughout Europe over the past few decades. Some Muslim migrants who were already living in European countries during the 1970s and 1980s had opportunities to gain citizenship during this time, which helps explain the increase of Muslim populations. This period saw many European governments trying to enforce restrictive immigration policies while also providing amnesty for migrants living in their countries.[1] For example, by 1974, Belgium had instituted strict policies for work permits in an effort to reduce immigration. Belgium had also granted amnesty to many labor migrants living in the country who did not have work permits.[2] Many governments supported family reunification policies for migrants already living in Europe as a means to encourage integration with the larger society and a stable lifestyle for labor migrants.

The outburst of the economic crisis, as well as the apparition of the new industrial production technologies, imposed the need for a highly qualified workforce, but less numerous, the 1970s representing, from this point of view, o period of great changes in regard to the volume and direction of migratory flows. Moreover, in November 1973, Federal Germany suddenly interrupted any type of recruitment of foreign workers, followed by France in 1974, and then by most of the European states. Starting with 1975-1976, border controls were becoming stricter, and various financial measures were adopted, in order to encourage foreigners to return to their countries of origin. These years are characterized by the evolution from a work migration to a new type of settlement migration. The new "foreigners" were, in most situations, children born on European land. The recruitment of foreign workforce was then completely stopped. Thus, most of the immigrants chose to stay in the countries in which they had come for work or for family reunion, despite the fact that special aid politics meant to encourage them to return to their home lands were being promoted. Those who did however choose to return to their original lands were the workers who came from other European states, such as the Greeks, the Italians or the Spanish.

The oil crisis that started in 1973 put an end to the open-doors policy regarding migrant workers, who were welcomed when the economy needed them but were expected to leave when times were hard. To the surprise of the host nations, however, most of the guest workers had come to stay.[3] Moreover, many of these migrants had invited their families to join them in the destination countries, making family ties a more prominent cause for legal migration into Europe than active labor recruitment. This dilemma was neatly summarized by Swiss author Max Frisch: "*We asked for workers, but human beings came*".[4]

As a consequence of this option of most of the migrant workers, as well as their desire to reunite with their families, the European countries were facing a very difficult position in the eight decade of the XXth century. In order to fully understand their situation, we must acknowledge the fact that, in light of the international relations, the human kind was in full Cold War at that time. The ideas promoted by the Western states regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms did not always match the needs of the

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 30.
[2] Valeriu Rusu, *Migrația forţei de muncă în Europa*, Bucureşti, Editura Arvin Press, 2003, p. 95.
[3] Saara Koikkalainen, *Free Movement in Europe: Past and Present*, Migration Policy Institute, 2011, available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/disply.cfm?ID=83
[4] *Ibidem.*

economy. In 1980, the amount of migrant workers was estimated at about twenty billion, and, if their family members are to be considered as well, they reached a total amount or thirty five to forty billion migrants. Therefore, the member states of the European Communities and those from Northern Europe progressively became importers of labor force coming from all the continents. The areas from which workers were being recruited became more differentiated, the neighborhood, historic relations and the language spoken becoming the main factors that directed the international migration flows.

After 1945, the year 1985 was the year with the largest population movements in Europe. Important population shifts occurred inside the continents as well, the reasons being represented, on the one hand, by the nationality of the migrants, who wished to return to their countries of origins, but also, on the other hand, by the attempts of some people to avoid areas were conflicts were taking place, such as, for instance, the Gulf War (approximately 3.4 billion people migrated due to this event).[1]

5. The new millennium migration: from asylum seeking to economic migration

The collapse of Soviet rule in the early 1990s led to a wave of civil conflict and separations, with large displacements of civil populations. The Balkan wars led to large asylum and refugee migrations.[2] This time however migrations were not only targeting Northern Europe, but also Southern European countries, which had, partly as a result of their incorporation into the European Union, experienced rapid economic development and convergence to Northern Europe during the 1980's. Immigration was not only limited to former Western European countries, however. The fall of the iron curtain and the transition of former Soviet Bloc countries to free market economies led to differential economic developments in these countries, triggering migration flows from the poorer countries to the richer countries. During the Balkan wars, those countries who either had already large populations from ex-Yugoslavia, like Germany or Austria, and countries who were immediate neighbors, like Greece, experienced large in-migrations. This wave of immigration ebbed down towards the end of the 1990's, when the conflicts ended.[3]

As mentioned, the end of the Cold War lifted the lid on a number of small wars and ethnic conflicts around the world. In this type of warfare, the combatants – regular troops complimented by paramilitaries – often target civilian populations. Many people applying for asylum are ostensibly fleeing such "ethnic cleansing", most notably in Bosnia in the early 1990s and Kosovo in the late 1990s. Also, with the end of communist rule many eastern Europeans believe that their aspirations for a better life can only be served in the west. With freer movement and cheaper travel, it is not surprising that many have tried to emigrate westward. The problem is that tens of thousands have tried to use the asylum process to do so, leading to a backlash, in some countries, against all types of migrants.[4]

The beginning of the new millennium brought along the internationalization and globalization of population movements, due to the altering of a certain state of equilibrium that existed in the world up to that time. The diminishment of the economic

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[1] David Held, Anthony Mc Grew, David Goldblatt și Jonathan Perraton, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
[2] Christian Dustmann, Albrecht Christian, *Immigration, Jobs and Wages: Theory, Evidence and Opinion*, London, Centre for economic policy research, 2005, p. 29.
[3] Klaus J. Bade, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
[4] Ben Hall, *Immigration in the European Union: problem or solution?*, OECD Observer No 221-222, 2000, available at http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php

resources in the under-developed states caused an increase in the level of social exclusion[1] and, thereby, the occurrence of a real exodus from these areas. On the other hand, new regulations in the field of the International Law made the circulation of persons, services and capitals easier. The growth in nativity in the poor areas of the planet and its decrease on the ones more economically developed causes a new type of social pressure that reflects on the situation of international migration.

There are, of course, nuances in the tone of the debate and the policy framework in different states. But the stress everywhere has been on reducing the flow, while trying to distinguish genuine asylum-seekers from purely "economic" migrants. The Bonn government responded to the Balkan influx in the early 1990s – and to some attacks on refugees – by tightening its previously liberal asylum law. This introduced a "safe third country" rule: if a person has passed through a country which Germany deems safe, he or she cannot apply for asylum in Germany. Since Germany considers all neighbouring countries as safe, asylum-seekers who do not arrive by plane are likely to be rejected.

After these restrictions were introduced in 1993, the number of applications fell sharply, prompting other EU states to follow. In Holland, the numbers of asylum-seekers rose considerably after 1996. The Dutch authorities (like the British, see below) are experiencing difficulties in dealing quickly with applications. As in Britain, Dutch politicians talk of the "flood" of "bogus" refugees, although Dutch newspapers use more temperate language than the British tabloids.[2]

According to estimates of the Migration Policy Institute, there are some seven to eight million irregular African immigrants living in the EU, mostly in its Southern parts. The actual number fluctuates in accordance with the regularization programs of member states, notably of France, and more recently of Italy and Spain. However, many of the officially recognized migrants fall back into illegality when their limited visas expire or if they fail to meet other conditions for recognizing their legal status. West Africans constitute by far the largest share of SSA-migrants in Europe. They came mostly from Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. In general, Francophone Africans are more likely to migrate to France because of its special socio-cultural post-colonial relations with its former colonies and due to the language problem, whereas Anglophone Africans, notably Ghanaians and Nigerians showed more flexibility in selecting their destination.

Migration within the Mediterranean basin is a long-established phenomenon with deep historical and socio-political implications. For some time now, the Mediterranean has been characterized as Europe's "*Rio Grande. Like the famous river that many poor Mexicans cross to reach the wealthy United States, the Mediterranean Sea divides prosperous aging Europe from a highly populated, youthful, and economically underdeveloped North Africa*".[3]

Space mobility does not represent a new characteristic of the individuals. The news is being represented by the current context, whose influences led to the appearance of distinct forms of mobility. In the age of globalization and expanded means of communication, people's migratory movements are no longer intended to be forever, but

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[1] Cristina Ilie, *Criminality among Romanian emigrants in Spain*, in "International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences", no. 4(3)/2014, p. 509.

[2] Ben Hall, *op. cit.*

[3] Martin Baldwin-Edwards, *The Changing Mosaic of Mediterranean Migrations*, Athens, 2004, available at http://historiana.eu/case-study/

we are rather witnessing a new dominant type of movement, far more flexible: temporary migration, circulatory migration, or seasonally migration.

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UNEVEN INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND MAKING OF DEMOCRACY CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION FOR THE 2000s

*Anca Parmena Olimid**

Abstract

The present article aims to present the historical and political patterns of the state-building theories that accompanied the international relations and political literature recently. The analysis presents the contemporary debate and contextualisation of the institutional capacity building and making of the democracy culture. The article contributes to the explanation of the institutional capacity building in the international community at the beginning of the 2000s through an analysis of the ongoing research theories and studies. The main findings of the article will help to better integrate the capacity-building-development-governance-administration and jurisdiction relations. Furthermore, it also appears significantly to analyse the transformative findings of the liberal theory of democracy culture and the state governance as topics to uneven interpretative approaches.

Key words: *state-building, theory, international relations, state governance, democracy*

Introduction

Theories and historical or political studies recently focused on the status of the institutional capacity building, state-building and security governance primarily analysing and explaining: the legitimacy and the democracy approaches; the authority of state and the relationship to the economic development; the phases of transition and the arguments of the democracies. The present article develops a two-part analysis that takes into consideration the state-building level and the key tasks of the security governance.[1] But what role state-building theories play in the international law and how the nation-building approaches individualize the transition systems? The question of state-building and making of the security culture is the same as the question of the state development and nation-building? Is the state-building theory new and innovative in the context of localism and regionalism? Under these conditions, we can argue that the article addresses a number of conceptual approaches focusing on the development of a historical and political approach to security governance and practice: 1. as to the structural dimension of the research, the analysis converges towards the acceptance of a wide range of prospective components[2]; 2. as to the institutional dimension of the international system, most of the

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[1] For a comparative approach on the systems-building and state-building see: Peter Haldén, *Systems-building before state-building: On the systemic prec of state-building*, in "Conflict, Security & Development", 10(4), 2010, pp. 519-545.
[2] Duncan Barley, *Rebuilding Afghanistan's Security Forces: Security Sector Reform in Contested State-Building*, in "RUSI Journal", 153(3), 2008, pp. 52-57; Peter Albrecht, Paul Jackson, *State-building through security sector reform: The UK intervention in Sierra Leone*, in "Peacebuilding", 2(1), 2014, pp. 83-99; Paul Jackson, *Security sector reform and state building*, in "Third World Quarterly", 32(10), 2011, pp. 1803-1822.

analyses converge towards the state-building and democracy approach.[1] Therefore, the "linkage" between the state-building approach and the renewed emphasis of the ideological framework encourage the birth of localism and state legitimacy.

There is no doubt that during the last twenty years the most influent topics developed in the institutional capacity building discussion distinguished two approaches: the first that requires a large scale theoretical discussion and the second that requires the reinterpretation of the trajectories and institutional changes in local government.[2] A decisive literature on the available institutional capacity building has also developed by examining and restructuring the open-endedness discussion enabled in the context of the democracy culture challenges and transition institutionalism.

Traditional approaches of state, governance and democracy are no match for the actual context of the world community. The present essay argues for mandating institutional capacity building and the making of the democracy culture in response to the recent ideological and security challenges. Considered a recent prescription for the literature of the 2000s, the provisions of the institutional capacity building are analysed under the exercise of the state governance and societal inputs. We will also specify the extent to which the making of the democracy culture enhances the state capacity at international and local scale. We argue that five factors determine the institutionalization including the provisions and policies: the conceptualizations of the institutional capacity building, the state-building and development, the state authority, the security and governance approaches and the importance of the governance capacity.[3] Under these conditions, networked relations are often considered as democracy tasks in the 2000s.

Methodological state-building and beyond: state authority, state development and legitimacy of state

The paper is also grounded on the modern understandings of the role of state-building and the methodological assumptions in the task of the institutional capacity building and democracy developments capitalizing both ideology and societal inputs.[4] Noting the role of the political actors within the state-building system, a part of the literature argues that there is a "culture of state-building theory" drawing the capacity-building-development-governance-administration and jurisdiction relations since the modern times.[5]

The orientation of the work towards a complex context of scientific analysis allows the possibility of the involvement of the historical determinism. These arguments are

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[1] Silvia von Steinsdorff, *Incomplete state building – incomplete democracy? How to interpret internal political development in the post-soviet de facto states. Conclusion*, in "Communist and Post-Communist Studies", 45(1-2), 2012, pp. 201-206.

[2] Cătălina Maria Georgescu, *Peace-building, Europeanization and Local Self-Government Empowerment. A Cross-Country Constitutional and Democratization Indices Analysis in the Balkans*, in "Revista de Ştiinţe Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques", no. 47/ 2015, pp. 21-40.

[3] Jen Nelles, *Cooperation and Capacity? Exploring the Sources and Limits of City-Region Governance Partnerships*, in "International Journal of Urban and Regional Research", 37(4), pp. 1349-1367.

[4] Marusia Cîrstea, *Explaining the European Communist Bloc Formation and Implosion: Capitalizing Ideology and Societal Inputs*, in "Revista de Ştiinţe Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques", no. 46/ 2015, pp. 15-27.

[5] Anca Parmena Olimid, *Broadening Administrative Jurisdiction and Ecclesiastic Self-Government: Evidence from the Romanian Modern Institutional Settlements in the XIXth century*, in "Analele Universităţii din Craiova. Istorie", year XX, no. 1(27)/2015, pp. 53-60.

comprehensive and the recent conceptualizations of the state- building and security culture are driven by the need of reassessing historical and political critical discussion.[1] An initial focus sets out the state-building theory limits and underlines the connection to the legitimacy of state.[2] From literature data, the state-building discussion highlights four main domains of the research: 1. to underline the main understandings of "state-building", "state authority", "state development" and "security governance" developed as strategic directions and basis of the system; 2. to argue that the state-building develops and connects the legitimacy of the state to the democratic choice in the context of a notable institution building and support; 3. to indicate the main patterns of the democratic capacity and equitable access to the democratic governance.

State-building theory is nevertheless related to the "the legitimacy of the state's monopoly" that "can, of course, be built on the legitimation of the state's authority through a democratic vote".[3] Specifically, Fukuyama identifies the alternative instruments that particularize the "legitimacy of the state": a. "state authority" and b. "democratic vote". Under these provisions, we analyse the state-building theories by explaining and exploring the development of the state-building capacities, but also the capacities of the international community based on territory and population approach and institution-building.[4] In other cases, the state-building theory involves the liberal doctrine, the democratic capacity of the state and the "patronage politics".[5] In this situation, the minimal conceptions of democracy allow for a detailed exposition of the minimal theoretical and practical elements of the developmental paradigm and social democracy. In the light of the recent theoretical formulations that recently encompassed not only the socio-economic developments, but also the actual measures of the democracy, the state-building conceptions of the security system reform have expanded the gap between social democracy and the legitimacy of the state.

Mandating the "new development paradigm"

Focusing upon these concrete understandings of the state-building theory, it is important to determine the increasing concentration on the security elements in the particular analysis of the paper topics such as: 1. state-building "as a new development

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[1] For a comparative analysis see Sorin Liviu Damean, *Instituţiile politice în perioada 1859-1918*, in Sorin Liviu Damean (coord.), *Evoluţia instituţiilor politice ale statului român modern din 1859 până astăzi*, Târgovişte, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2014; Ionuţ Şerban, *Politică şi diplomaţie europeană. România şi Italia în relaţiile internaţionale în epoca modernă*, Târgovişte, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2013.

[2] See also Derek G. Evans, *Editor's Choice: Human Rights and State Fragility: Conceptual Fundations and Strategic Directions for State-Building*, in "Journal of Human Rights Practice", 1(2), 2009, pp. 181-207.

[3] For a particular overview, see Francis Fukuyama, *Liberalism versus State-Building*, in "Journal of Democracy", 18(3), July 2007, pp. 10-13.

[4] For more details, see Yelena Biberman, *Bureaucratic Partisanship and State Building*, in "Problems of Post-Communism", 58(2), 2011, pp. 17-27.

[5] For a comparative perspective, see Paul D. Kenny, *The origins of patronage politics: State Building, Centrifugalism, and Decolonization*, in "British Journal of Political Science", 45(1), 2015, pp. 141-171; Robert Egnell, *The organised hypocrisy of international state-building*, in "Conflict, Security & Development", 10(4), 2010, pp. 465-491; Jan Selby, *The myth of liberal peace-building*, in "Conflict, Security & Development", 13(1), 2013, pp. 57-86; Jonathan Goodhand, Mark Sedra, *Rethinking liberal peacebuilding, statebuilding and transition in Afghanistan: an introduction*, in "Central Asian Survey", 32(3), 2013, pp. 239-254.

paradigm"[1]; 2. the post-conflict reconstruction and the security sector reform. In these cases, the theoretical approaches move towards a similar pattern: the considerations making reference to a common focus and a common provision: the comparative and "developmental approach" in a comparative perspective and "social democracy in the developing world".[2]

From this perspective, White argues that most Eastern European countries would appear to have experienced "various arguments about the influence of democracy on socio-economic development in the developing world". A noteworthy approach is also taken with the analysis of the "form of democracy" and the "infrastructural, regulative and distributive capacities" of "an effective democratic state".[3] On the other hand, the state-building concepts have social and political implications and it is appropriate for the international system to express these through various arguments such as democracy and socio-economic development. Furthermore, these studies focus on the different views of democracy and the developmental perspective that challenge the topics of the state capacity, political interest, international organizations, localism and governance. More generally, in this situation, Carbone argues that the normative perspectives of the state building are simply incorporated into the norms, approaches and topics of democratization and the culture of democracies.[4]

The imperative to democracy and state capacity

There is in fact a common focus of the security governance: a growing sense of state-building and the democracy functional dimension. In such a developing atmosphere, considerations and reference regarding the "developmental approach" advance the idea of the "form of democracy" and system legitimacy. A notable approach of this work is the hypothesis concerning the political participation and the exploration of the social norms "as a group-level phenomenon". In order to answer these questions, Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas explore the level of participation in the international organisations and the linkage to political interest and state capacity.[5] An important aspect of this approach concerns the transformations of the "effects of democracy and state capacity" within the institutional system. In order to find an answer to these transformations, it is necessary to examine the characteristics of the transitory societies in the respective context.[6] This explanatory assumption of this analysis concerns the evolution of the process of society, the security system and the regional challenges by invoking both the historical background and the security updates. On the other hand, however, we need to look closer at what the state-

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[1] Heather Marquette, Danielle Beswick, *State building, Security and Development: State building as a new development paradigm?* in "Third World Quarterly", 32(10), 2011, pp. 1703-1714.

[2] Gordon White, *Building a democratic developmental state: Social democracy in the developing world*, in "Democratization", 5(3), 1998, pp. 1-32.

[3] *Ibidem.*

[4] For a comparative approach, see Giovanni Carbone, *Democratisation as a State-Building Mechanism: A Preliminary Discussion of an Understudied Relationship*, in "Political Studies Review", vol. 13, 2015, pp. 11-21.

[5] Benno Torgler, Maria A. Garcia-Valiñas, *Participation in Environmental Organisations: Political Interest and State Capacity*, in "CSERGE Working Paper ECM 06-02", 2006, pp. 1-18.

[6] Stephen Blackwell, *Between Tradition and Transition: State Building, Society and Security in the Old and New Iraq*, in "Middle Eastern Studies", 41(3), 2005, pp. 445-452.

building actors have to address in the conditional perspective of the recent conceptualizations of localism and social legitimacy. Without ignoring the analytical focus of the social realities of the recent theories, Lambach and Debiel argue, in the context, that the state building literature advances "miss local realities"[1] due both to the capitalization of the ideological framework during the 1990s. Moreover, the same authors claim that the different actors and political conditions undertake the system legitimacy. Furthermore, Andersen focuses on various arguments of localism and system legitimacy considering state institutions and society.[2]

Conclusions

The current research provides particular insights into the recent conceptualizations of institutional capacity building wishing to contribute to the understanding of the facts and factors developing the understanding of the concepts and their impact on the international system.[3] Furthermore, the study offered the rethinking of the state-building and security sector considering: a reinterpretation of the complete democracy culture and a working hypothesis of the new approach by configuring the relationship between state and politics. In conclusion, the democracy culture approaches and assumes the hypothesis that undertakes the state-building theory and the theoretical appeal to the security system reform, the developmental state, state-building strategies, local social and political realities. In conclusion, the situation in which the international system finds itself mobilizes the research and practice of the socioeconomic development and the rebuilding of the legitimacy. In so doing, the well-institutionalized processes of state building discusses the effects of the institutional capacity building.

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[1] Tobias Debiel, Daniel Lambach, *How State-Building Strategies Miss Local Realities*, in "Peace Review", 21(1), 2009, pp. 22-28.

[2] Morten Skumsrud Andersen, *Legitimacy in State-Building: A Review of the IR Literature*, in "International Political Sociology", 6, 2012, pp. 205-219.

[3] L.V. Astakhova, *The concept of the information-security culture*, in "Scientific and Technical Information Processing", 41(1), 2014, pp. 22-28; Areej Alhogail, Abdulrahman Mirza, *A framework of information security culture change*, in "Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology", 64(2), 2014, pp. 540-549.

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A SHORT HISTORY OF "DISENCHANTMENT": THE GIFT AND THE SOCIAL RELATIONS

*Eugenia Udangiu**

Abstract

The paradigm of "social exchange" and the paradigm of "the gift" apparently describe the same form of human interaction whether it is about goods, ideas or feelings exchanges. Only that, throughout history, ritual exchange gifts described by Marcel Mauss in his famous essay, lost part of its symbolic load and altered his essence. Although archaic forms of distribution and redistribution of the "gifts" can still be easily identified in our modern or post-modern societies, they have lost their spiritual dimension and kept only the pragmatic one. Is Mauss's essay a "history of secularization, a history of disenchantment of the world through the disenchantment of the gift" as Camille Tarot wrote? Is this the reason why we feel so often lonely and uprooted? This study aims to answer these questions using the history of "gift – giving" from a sociological point of view.

Key words: *gift, social exchange, externalization of control, types of solidarity, disenchantment*

Introduction

Emile Durkheim suggested in his famous book *Les regles de la methode sociologique*[1] that the social fact should become the cornerstone of sociology, the ultimate ontological given of man as social being. The syntagm refers to modes of action generally valid within a particular society. They have an existence of their ones, are external to individuals and exert a constraining action on them. This coercion can come from inside (moral restraints) or from outside (legal restraints). Almost thirty years later, in the multitude of social facts, Marcel Mauss (1923/1997) identified *the* total social fact: evergreen, trans-historical, trans-cultural, universal. This was the gift.

After another 30 years, George Homans[2] lay the foundations of social exchange theory, a micro-sociological approach of inter-human exchanges, rooted in the fertile soil of Durkheim's writings. The circle will be closed somehow, methodologically speaking, by the further researches that – especially those of Peter Blau – aim at finding the exchange macrostructures, i.e. different types of social markets.

1. The gift as the paradigmatic "total social fact"

In his *Essay on* the Gift, Marcel Mauss[3] emphasizes the idea that any negotiation of benefits and any economic exchange is based on a system of exchange ritual designed to

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[1] Emile Durkheim, *Regulile metodei sociologice* [Les regles de la method sociologique], Iași, Editura Polirom, 1895/2002.

[2] George Homans, *Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms*, New York, Harcourt, 1961.

[3] Marcel Mauss, *Eseu despre dar* [Essey on the Gift], Iași, Polirom, 1923/1997 apud Randall Collins, *Four Sociological Traditions*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 228-230.

create first of all a social relationship between the future partners. He identifies the following types of gift giving:

1. Kula Ring, the horizontal exchange among equals: on the Trobriand Islands, the inhabitants of one island offer local products for other products they need from a neighboring island. But this "barter" is preceded by a symbolic form of commerce: the head of a tribe offers the head of the other tribe "symbolic money" or gifts as bracelets, necklaces, ornamental shells etc., and get others in return. Ritual gifts, says Mauss are a form of diplomacy so that until not offered and accepted, the two tribes are at war. Products and gifts move from one island to another in a circle (ring). That is why "Kula ring" became a paradigm for relatively egalitarian economic structures in which exchanges occur horizontally. Many diplomatic and business contacts nowadays comply generally with this ritual.

2. Hierarchical redistribution: in other tribal societies (New Guinea), the gifts take the form of a hierarchical "redistribution". The head of the tribe receives from the community all kinds of products and then, in sumptuous ceremonies, redistribute them. Thus "the big man" becomes the ritual center of social and political concerns. Hierarchical redistribution is now part of the social policies of all civilized states, but in a rationalized form. It still appears in its ceremonial form, during certain holidays.

3. Potlatch or exchange competition: on the Canadian Pacific coast the gift exchange of "potlatch" type is a form of symbolic struggle in which the heads of the various tribes try to defeat one another by offering more and more valuable gifts until one of them cannot respond appropriately. If the rival can no longer respond in the same way, he loses the competition and suffers a diminution of his prestige and power. In this case, although initially the exchange occurs horizontally among peers, it has a "vertical impact", causing a decrease in the status of the defeated and a power increase for the winner. At the micro-social level, "potlath" is easy to be observed but also it can be often identified in the case of aggregate actors.

The three aspects of the gift illustrate its functions: as a precursor to broader relations (kula – ring), as a marker of status (hierarchical redistribution) and as a tool to enhance power (potlath). In all these forms, the gift has a strong symbolic component – friendship, subordination or war – being accompanied by specific rituals. Alain Caille[1] notes that in fact, it is gift only what "exceeds through its symbolic dimension the material dimension of goods and services". This observation refers to the fact that before of any type of economic exchange, it has to be established first a social relationship capable to sustain it. In other words, we have an example of dual compliance: an external one, that is the gift exchanging ritual and an internal one, that is the assimilation of social interaction rules in the depth of subjective structure (internalization). In brief: any material exchange of gift – counter-gift type, has a symbolic dimension and many times, an aesthetic one. The symbolic dimension is the one that creates social relationships as a basis for the exchange relations. The interaction ritual involves both external and internal compliance to the social norms.

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[1] Alain Caille, *Anthropologie du don. Le tiers paradigm*, Paris, Desclee de Brouwer, 2000 apud Pascal Lardellier, *Teoria legaturii ritualice* [Theorie du lien ritual], Bucureşti, Editura Tritonic, 2003, p. 30.

The *gift paradigm* inspired a lot of studies such as: institutions as gifts and trust investments[1], information as gift in science[2] and inheritances[3] as inter-generations gifts.

2. The theory of social exchange

This theory was formulated around the 60's and attempted to describe the fundamental nature of social life as interactive process that involves mutual "exchange" relations. The initiator of the new theory was George C. Homans and his follower was Peter Blau. Homans considered action, interaction and emotions to be the main sociability items and, in a good behaviorist tradition he defined social behavior as "the exchange of rewards and costs between two people". These exchanges sometimes occur vertically, with superiors and sometimes horizontally, with our peers. The types of rewards that are exchanged in the course of interaction varies from society to society and from group to group within a society, according to the cultural specificities of each.

The principle governing these relations, the golden law, is the reciprocity one, so that a person who can not return certain services, suffer a diminution of the status. Moreover, to avoid social sanction (marginalization, exclusion, labeling, etc.) that person must offer an explicit recognition of the authority of the other. The power to offer rewards and make services to others will draw the lines between social positions.[4] This is the "penultimate source of power". The last, the absolute source of power, although limited and uncertain, is coercion. We can see here of course, the two sources of power which behaviorists metaphorically called "stick and carrot". The restoring of the balance required by the principle of reciprocity, produces an imbalance on a symbolic level first: the recognition of inferiority. The concrete consequences of subordination and recognition of the superiority of the other appear after.

The differences arising between the macro and micro- level are highlighted by Peter Blau[5]: for the social exchange processes that occur between complex, aggregated structures, consensus on social values has a crucial meaning as commonly accepted standards that serve as "mediating link" between individuals and groups without direct contact. The feeling of personal attraction that binds people in small groups, finds its "functional equivalent" in the sharing of the basic values of society. This sharing creates integrative links and solidarity feelings between millions of people who maybe never will meet. Only this way man can transcend personal relationships and engage in indirect, complex exchange networks.

In short, action, interaction and emotions are those that give rise to human sociability as far as they are oriented to the other. Social actors have a need of balance, of fairness in the social exchange process. This need regulates social exchanges phenomena and

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[1] Marilena Pana, *Instituţiile: "daruri" şi "investiţii" de încredere* [Institutions as gifts and trust investment] in *Feţele schimbării. Românii şi provocările tranziţiei* [Faces of the Change. Romanians and the Tranzition's challenges], D. Sandu (ed.), Bucureşti, Editura Nemira, 1999, pp. 166-174.

[2] Warren Hagstrom, *Social Control in Science*, in *Four Sociological Traditions – Selected Readings*, R. Collins (ed.), New York, Oxford University Press, 1965/1994, pp. 262-270.

[3] Merlin Schaeffer, *The Social Meaning of Inherited Financial Assets. Moral Ambivalences of Intergenerational Transfers*, in "Forum: Qualitative Social Research", 15, 2014, no. 1, p. 120.

[4] Homans apud Randall Collins, *Four Sociological Traditions*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 126-128.

[5] Blau apud Randall Collins, *Four Sociological Traditions*, pp. 137-139.

produces consequences in terms of personal power. At the macro level, for that exchange can work between people who have not ever met, only the shared social values function as mediators. They create reliable integrative links and thus, social solidarity.

The exchange theory inspired scientific researches that identified "exchange markets" within societies: political markets[1], sexual and marriage markets[2], even crime markets, or markets within organizations.[3]

Conclusions

1. The dyad gift – counter-gift is a "total social fact" because it is perennial, trans-cultural, universal. It carries with, in intimate fusion "the personal" and "the communitarian" being therefore paradoxical: free and compulsory, interested and disinterested.

2. Circles of "kula" type create *the community* and *the society* through the movement of gifts and counter gifts because, unlike modern rationalist paradigm, the exchange is not considered primarily and essentially an economic and a utilitarian purpose but rather "social, from the start (…)".[4]

3. Alain Caille[5] notes that it is a gift only what has a symbolic dimension that exceeds the utilitarian one. Therefore the gift function is to build a social egalitarian or hierarchical relationship, a relationship that introduce order into the real world. And order means safety. Only after such a relationship has been established, people can proceed to the economic and commercial exchanges. First need is to establish reliable relationships between partners, to diminish suspicion, to create trust and predictability.

4. Thirty years later, the theory of "social exchange", more abstract, but also more complete, introduce an explanatory link between micro and macro level: face-to-face exchange interaction that creates and maintains community, turns more and more into a mediated exchange that becomes increasingly abstract, rational and calculated, as in today's society.

5. So, what was lost from "the gift" to "do ut des" along a history of "disenchantment"?

It was lost a lot of inner compliance to norms and values. It appeared, in other words, a deficit of socialization resulted in the necessity of mostly external conformity to legal standards and moral values. Social control was exercised mainly by internalized social instances and this fact created a greater confidence both in Ego and Alter, directly affecting the perceived quality of life. When the exercise of control became mostly exterior, people began to feel it as a limitation of their freedom and even as an aggression. That's why, although the living conditions were improved over time, the perceived quality of life decreased. This seems to be paradoxically but when the living conditions improve,

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[1] James Coleman, *Foundation of Social Theory*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1990.
[2] Hugh Carter, Paul Glick, *Marriage and Divorce: A Social and Economic Study*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976.
[3] Linda Molm, Monica Whitham, David Melamed, *Forms of Exchange and Integrative Bonds: Effects of History and Embeddedness*, in "American Sociological Review", 77, 2012, no. 1, pp. 141-165.
[4] Camille Tarot, *De la Durkheim la Mauss, inventarea simbolicului* [De Durkheim a Mauss, l'invention du symbolique. Sociologie et sciences des religions], Timişoara, Editura Amarcord, 1999/2001, p. 532.
[5] Alain Caille, *op. cit.*

life satisfaction also increases, but less and for a short time. (In fact, Durkheim[1]) mentioned the real paradox when he discovered that the number of suicides may increase, under certain conditions, in times of economic boom). How can we explain these empirical facts?

- The close and direct interaction within tribal societies gave rise to a "mechanical" solidarity or, in other words, a solidarity based on similarities (precontractual solidarity). Direct and constant supervision of individuals in the small groups determined the internalization of norms, given that the social changes were very slow.

- With the increasing number of individuals and of "dynamic density"[2], a new form of solidarity arouse: the organic solidarity or a solidarity based on differentiation. The communities became weaker and weaker and the supervision was taken over by specialized agents. Human face-to-face interaction decreased and the mediated interaction became predominant. At the same time, the dynamic of social life has increased and people have no longer the necessary time to internalize the changes. Consequently, these changes remain more or less external to our own subjectivity.

- Along with the weakening of communities, the most important social functions as the religious one, the juridical, social, economic and aesthetic one, separated as people were separated in professional bodies. People have lost their control over "the whole that controlled them" and, with it, the global meaning of life. They got massified.

- The civilization itself and its benefits have determined the increase of the number of the population and the change of the way in which people built up their solidarity. The bad news is that we cannot return to the "golden age" as we cannot return to childhood or adolescence. The good news is that in a free society, who cannot bear the anxieties of modern life can form his own protective community or join an existing one. These "voluntary communities" are like an antibody which any healthy society produces.

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[1] Emile Durkheim, *Despre sinucidere* [Le Suicide, etude de sociologie], Iaşi, Institutul European, 1897/1993.
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BOOK REVIEWS

Sorin Liviu Damean, Iulian Oncescu, *O istorie a românilor de la Tudor Vladimirescu la Marea Unire (1821-1918)* **[***A History of the Romanians from Tudor Vladimirescu to the Great Union (1821-1918)***], Târgovişte, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2015, 280 p.**

History is still being written. It is written by good specialists, as well. Evidence is provided by the recently published volume penned by historians Sorin Liviu Damean, a native from Iaşi and an academic in Craiova, and Iulian Oncescu, an academic in Târgovişte.

Known as *belle époque*, the history comprised between 1821 and 1918 is the history of the great national accomplishments. From Tudor Vladimirescu to Ferdinand I, Romania underwent various stages in the creation of the modern national state: the Little Union, the Independence, the Kingdom and Greater Romania.

The *Foreword*, signed by Sorin Liviu Damean, introduces us into the fascinating world of our history, where we encounter exceptional political personalities and events of great national importance and commitment. In fact, the Foreword delineates the entire content of the book, thus becoming a preamble and an invitation to discovery. Declaring their human and technical limitations, the authors achieved a synthesis of Romania's modern history and not an exhaustive treatise. It is, however, true, that this is not either of the two authors' first contribution to historiography, as, over time, they have enriched libraries with valuable studies in modern history and not only.

The study is structured into two parts, each being written by one of the authors. The first part, authored by Iulian Oncescu, covers the chronological period from Tudor Vladimirescu to Alexandru Ioan Cuza. Between the two coryphaei of Romanian history, true symbols of patriotism and national ideal, there is an ample series of unfolding events: revolutions (1821, 1848), wars (Crimea), congresses (Paris) et al. The most significant political event during this period is the union of the Principalities of Moldova and Wallachia under the leadership of Colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza. Known as the Little Union, it opened the path to Romania's development and modernisation through reforms, as well as its positioning on a particular place in European geo-politics.

Part II, authored by Sorin Liviu Damean, covers the epoch of King Carol I. Providential personality in Romania's history, the sovereign with the longest reign in our country, Carol I is the one who brought this geographic area to bright avenues of national triumph. Under him, Romania conquered its independence, became a Kingdom, entered important treaties with powerful nations in Europe and modernised (for instance, the first railway). Under his nephew, Ferdinand, the Great Union was achieved. And professor Damean points, in his personal style, all these chronologic landmarks in Romania's modern history. As a matter of fact, Sorin Liviu Damean is one of the (if not the most) important expert in Carol's reign in Romanian historiography. A redoubtable specialist, thorough and serious about historical research. The evidence is this, as well as his previous studies.

The authors understood that times are changing and today's generations are no longer attracted to rigid, sober and scientific historical studies written in a language that is

difficult to understand for the uninformed reader. That is why the present volume, embodying the role of a university course book, is not overloaded with a critical apparatus, but is written in a standard language and thus accessible to both the informed historian and the history enthusiast. But at the same time, the final bibliography numbers ten pages with tens of titles. The updated bibliography is one more proof of the authors' precision and constancy. Congratulations to them!

A few words written by professor Damean put the finishing touches on the image of the book: *Undoubtedly, the present study bears the personal and interpretative imprint of the two authors, both academics, the information structured by them being the fruit of an ongoing reading of countless specialised volumes, in continuous expansion and ceaseless revision, of the experience gained in the years spent exercising their profession, and of the regular contact with students and their requests.* (p. 17)

I am expressing my gratitude to the authors for writing a book that is so easy to use and understand, as well as the desire that they continue their work. A few words are due for the publishing house, Cetatea de Scaun. In a society which is apparently uninterested in culture and history, running a publishing company which specialises in academic literature with a definite target is more than an act of courage. It is, undeniably, proof of passion and goes beyond the mercantile and consumerist spirit of the times. And they continue to do it, despite the numerous existing obstacles.

I congratulate the authors and confess I am looking forward to new exceptional achievements in historiography. This book constitutes further proof that in the age of modern technology, the printing press still retains its role and reason, and history is still attractive for those who take account of it.

Bogdan Emanuel Răduţ

Roland Clark, *Sfîntă tinereţe legionară. Activismul fascist în România interbelică* [*Holy Legionary Youth. Fascist Activism in Interwar Romania*], traducere de Marius-Adrian Hazaparu, Iaşi, Editura Polirom, Colecţia "Studii româneşti", 2015, 286 p.

The Legionary Movement is not only an important part of the Romanian past, but also one of the most powerful fascist organizations in interwar Europe. Let us remember only that, in 1940, the Legion was larger, compared to the total population, than the Italian NFP, in 1922, and the German NSDAP, in 1933 (p. 18). It is therefore natural that it should draw the attention of some western researchers.

The book authored by Roland Clark (Assistant Professor of History at Eastern Connecticut State University) and published in 2015 by Cornell University Press, sees "fascism 'from below', as a social category that had practical consequences for those who embraced it". It is therefore rather about the Legionnaires than about the Legion and about *legionarism* rather as activism and lifestyle rather than ideology. I noticed that some historians do not like the word "fascism". They find it exaggerated. It should be said however that, beyond the obvious similarities with the other movements, Romanian Legionnaires openly assumed the label.

The American researcher pursued other issues than those that usually attract the Romanian researchers. While talking about ideology, intellectuals' adhesion, famous

assassinations, and the 1937 elections, he does not insist on them. It is not the legionary establishment (except the inevitable Corneliu Zelea Codreanu) who fill the pages, but the common people (students, workers, peasants, priests and others), whose number has steadily increased, from only 20, in 1927) (p. 79), to over 270,000, ten years later (p. 167). They were organized in "nests" ("cuiburi"), "small cities" ("cetăţui") (for women), "brotherhoods of the Cross" ("frăţii de cruce" and "bundles of friends" ("mănunchiuri de prieteni") (youth groups).

First, during the '20s, there were the ultranationalist chaotic student movements, under the patronage of A.C. Cuza's National Christian Defense League. In 1927, the Legion of the Archangel Michael broke away from the League. It had a hard beginning, but it became increasingly stronger, during the following decade. It can be seen some ideological coagulation and especially an intensification of the propaganda. The organization became very rigorous, the resembling a "state within a state"; an authoritarian state, in which "the Captain" dictated everybody's behavior.

The author presented the demonstrations of all kinds, with their scenery and atmosphere (uniforms, flags, songs, etc.), the frequent conflicts (with the authorities, the political enemies, but also with the suspected traitors), the recruitment campaigns in towns and villages, the electoral campaigns, the sports (the cult of the"muscular masculinity", p. 188), the labor camps for public or just legionary works (Casa Verde/Green House etc.), the fundraising, the "Christian / Legionary trade", persecution of 1938-1940 and finally, the huge lawlessness of the "National Legionary State" (1940-1941). Many things have nothing to do with mystical and emphatic speech. They are quite mundane, often petty and hilarious. Here, for example: "In 1938, a legionnaire was arrested after he went throughout his village searching for people willing to paint his shirt in green. Police seized the shirt in question and it was able to prove man's guilt, because the shirt was still white under the label "(p. 184).

Codreanu wanted to look like a divine leader. In fact, he acted like a cynical politician and a businessman able to draw money from dry stone. He tempered or intensified the revolutionary impulses of his subjects, according to the interests of the moment. It was not insensitive to electoral success. Despite the anticommunist rhetoric, he frequently had a communistic attitude. He mixed actually communism, nationalism and orthodoxism. The hammer remained, but the sickle was replaced with... the cross. He even created Legionary trade unions. It is humorous that is that, before Codreanu, Cuza created an "union of the fascist waiters" (p. 100). He blamed the Jews for all the evil things in the world, but he did not hesitate to receive money from Kaufmann, Auschnit and Shapiro (p. 180). He organized takings to buy himself a car and he forced his followers to buy propaganda materials; men were asked to collect scrap (pp. 178-179) and women to manufacture and sell trinkets (p. 185). All for the movement!

The picture is astonishingly eclectic. Clarck achieved it by extracting the numerous and various cases from the Romanian and American archives, but also from the press, memoirs and testimonies. He carefully avoided any abusive generalization. On the contrary, he emphasized the diversity: "The Legion brought together unique individuals, just as a person with schizophrenia incorporating more voices and identities in one body" (p. 257). The remarkable organization failed to homogenize people. However, it defined the movement far more than its ideas. "The practical activity" overshadowed the poor "abstract ideology": "They made more effort to print and share than to write the legionary

literature; the road constructions and the clashes with the gendarmes say more about the legionary values than the words of most propagandists" (p. 257).

It would be a shame that this book provokes traditional reactions like: "What knows this young American about our history?". He really came to know! Sometimes, his discourse is a little naive, with small factual errors. But that happens all the time and Romania when talking about other histories. Maybe we are not used to accept a comparative perspective or a new grid of interpretation. However, a non-partisan look from the outside is always welcome. Things do not always as we think or as we want.

Mihai Ghițulescu

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