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STUDIES AND ARTICLES

THE DOMINATION OF THE PTOLEMIES IN THE AEGEAN

*Florian Olteanu**

Abstract

The main purpose of article is represented by the description of the steps in which the Ptolemaic Dynasty (or Lagid Dynasty) imposed as one of the most powerful during the Hellenistic Age.

We proposed to present the activity of kings Ptolemy I Soter, Ptolemy II Philadelphus, Ptolemy III Euergethes, Ptolemy IV Philopator, Ptolemy V Ephifanes and Ptolemy VI Philometor. The main authors which studied the problem are Kostas Buraselis, Vincent Gabrielsen, Katja Mueller, Alexandru Avram, Paul McKechnie, Philippe Guillaume, Zofia Halina Archibald, Tomasz Grabowski.

Key words: *Ptolemies, Aegean Sea, Black Sea, domination, Hellenistic Age, Egypt*

Historical background

After the death of Alexander the Great, in 323 B.C., the absence of an official succession system opened a period of alliances, crisis and wars, having as main object the imperial heritage of Alexander the Great. Soon after the moment 323 B.C., we can observe that the "Successors" of the Alexander had to choose between trying to preserve the "imperial idea" and to have a most important part of the Macedonian Empire.

The Successors

At the first meeting, held in Babylon, the main "Successor" was Perdiccas, appointed in 324 B.C., as *chiliarchos* by Alexander the Great which was an equivalent of that of "prime-minister". He might exercise regency on the name of Philip Arrhidaios and the son of Alexander Alexander IV, who Was just born at that moment. It was accredited the idea that Crateros which led 10 000 veterans from Orient in Macedonia after their dismissal ordered by Alexander had the chance to replace Antipatros in Europe and to become regent, but because of is march to Macedonia, he had lost the position in the favor of Perdiccas (McKechnie, 2008).

Another "successor", Antigonos Monophtalmos received the Great Phrygia, Lycia, and Pamphylia. Ptolemy was proclaimed satrap of Egypt. Eumenes of Cardia (he was the only Greek from the successors), former secretary-in-chief of Alexander received Paphlagonia and Cappadocia. Leonnatos received Phrygia-Hellespont, Pheiton received Media. Lysimachos received the provinces of Thracia and Pont. In Europe, the authority of Antipatros, "strategos" of Europe was reconfirmed.

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Antipatros, Perdiccas, Eumenes, Antigonos were supporters of the "imperial idea". The others would to extend their positions by conquering territories from others successors. Antigonos fought for the idea that the "imperial heritage" might belong to him and to his successors.

The 321-317 period

In 321, Ptolemy refused the order of Perdiccas to send the body of Alexander from Alexandreia to Macedonia and executed Cleomenes, a treasurer named on position by Alexander the Great. Ptolemy was accused on insubordination by Perdiccas who led an expedition against him. Perdiccas failed to enter on the Nile, facing a case of revolt from the part of his soldiers. Peithon from Media and Seleucos, commander of the cavalry had killed Perdiccas in his tent, in July 321 B.C. Peithon will take the command of all troops of Perdiccas. Eumenes from Cardia, allied with Perdiccas succeeded to defeat Crateros soon after crossing the Hellespont Strait.

At the end of 321 B.C., the successors decided to have a new meeting in the Northern Syria, at Triparadeisos to decide how to manage the situation generated by the death of some successors (Grabowski, 2013).

The regency and the tutelage of the minors Philip and Alexander were entrusted to the strategos of Europe, Antipatros. Antigonos Monopthalmos became *strategos autocrator* of Asia. Seleucos entered in the "main category" obtaining Babylonia. Ptolemy was again recognized in Egypt. The allies decided to eliminate Eumenes, but Antigonos failed in the action to capture him at Nara after a one year siege.

In 319, after the death of Antipatros, this successor decided to entrust the power to Polyperchon because his son, Cassandros had no political and military experience. Cassandros made an alliance with Antigonos against Polyperchon. Polyperchon introduced a political practice used also by others successors, "the proclamation of freedom of Greek cities" starting from 318 B.C. Cassandros succeeded to occupy a lot of parts from Macedonia and Greece. In this conflict was involved also Olympiada, mother of Alexander the Great and former wife of Philip II, as an ally of Polyperchon. Cassandros had the victory and became the tutor of Roxana and to his son Alexander IV. He built a solid political basis by marrying Thessalonike, daughter of Philip II, who gave her name to the actual city of Thessaloniki, capital of Macedonia (McKechnie, 2008).

The 316-307 period

In 316 B.C., the map of the Hellenistic world knew the same position of Ptolemy in Egypt, that of Cassandros in Macedonia and Greece, the authority of Antigonos in Asia, the authority of Seleucos in Babylonia, Lysimachos in Thracia and Pont, that of Peithon in Media. Polyperchon had the symbolic quality of regency. He decided to impose Eumenes as autocrator of Asia, against Antigonos, condemned by his discretionary powers. Peithon was executed after trying to perform an independent attitude and Seleucos fled to Ptolemy in Egypt to save his life. Antigonos tried to eliminate Eumenes who was executed after he was left on the battlefield by its on army. The political relations started to be difficult after the assassination of Philip III (317) and Alexander IV (311).

During 315-311 B.C., Antigonos Monophtalmos had to resist against a coalition formed by all successors, who accused him by authoritarianism and by the attempt of reconstruction of the Empire of Alexander for him and his family. Antigonos used

"Greek states freedom" as an expression of his political domination. In 312 B.C., Seleucos succeeded to come back in Babylonia. In 311 B.C., after failing to defeat Antigonos, the other successors recognized his authority in Asia. At the peace from 311 B.C. Ptolemy had gained territories in Lybia and Arabia, Lysimachos extended his conquests in Thrace, Cassandros obtained the confirmation of his status in Europe. In 310/309 B.C. Cassandros succeeded to eliminate another son of Alexander, Herakles, helped by Polyperchon. The death of Alexander IV in 311 B.C. closes a firs period in the history of the Hellenistic world (Mueller, 2006).

The peace of 311 B.C. will not last for a long time. Ptolemy, using the concept of "Greek cities freedom" started a campaign by occupying Megara and Corinth. After that, he turned in Egypt. Between 307-304 B.C. a new war was started. Antigonos sent his son Demetrius in Greece in front of a great fleet. At Athens, Demetrius of Phalero, a ruler helped by Macedonian party (and also by a Macedonian garrison) fled in Thebes, Macedonia, and finally in Egypt.

The 306-280 period

The success of Antigonos and Demetrius enraged Ptolemy. Ptolemy had started the conflict with Antigonos for hegemony in the Aegeean area. The decisive battle took place in the spring of 306 B.C., near Salamina (in Cyprus island, under the authority of Ptolemy) and the Egyptian fleet was destroyed by the fleet of Demetrius.

In 306 B.C., Antigonos and Demetrius became "kings", understanding by this title that they claimed the imperial heritage of Alexander the Great. For enforcing this quality they started a war with Ptolemy. At Pelusion, in the delta of the Nile, the Ptolemaic fleet succeeded to stop the advance of Antigonos who decided to turn back in Syria in the autumn of 305 B.C. After this victory, Ptolemy proclaimed himself as a king, as Ptolemy I Soter, but only king of Egypt, having no interest for the "imperial idea". Until 304 B.C., Lysimachos, Kassandros, Seleucos became also kings. It was the moment of the appearance of Ptolemaic Kingdom, Macedonian Kingdom (Macedonia and some Greek cities), Thracian Kingdom (Thracia and Pontus), Antigonid Kingdom (Anatolia, Palestina), Seleucos Kingdom (Iran, Mesopotamia, parts of India).

The domination of Aegean Area by Antigonos was a reality after the victory of Salamina. Ptolemy had an alliance treaty with Rhodes the main island of the area. Demetrius tried to make a siege over Rhodes which resisted and the siege was stopped.

Demetrius decided to came back over Greece. In 303 B.C., he succeeded to force the retreat of Cassandros back the Thermopyle strait and the retreat of Polyperchon from Peloponessus. The old general will die at 90 years. Demetrius tried to rebuild the former League of Corinth in 302 B.C. on similar basis as "the league of Filip II". The main aim of this league was to maintain "the generally state of peace" and to ensure military force for Antigonos (Mueller, K., 2006).

The new successes of Antigonos and Demetrius ("surnamed Destroyer of Cities") created a state of fury for Ptolemy, Lysimachos, Seleucos, Cassandros. Seleucos had a success in ensuring peace in India, having treaties with local kings.

The reunited forces against Antigonos made the main junction in Phrygia. The battle of Ipsos, in 301 B.C. was the last for the old king Antigonos who died on the battlefield. Ptolemy had got a lot of territories in Syria, Palestine. Lysimachos extended in Asia Minor. Cassandros obtained territories in Cilicia and Caria. A part of Syria was given

to Seleucos. Between Seleucids and Ptolemies will be a lot of wars, named the "Syrian wars".

The new relations between the successors included also the "marriage politics". Lysimachos had the daughter of Ptolemy as wife. Demetrius had as wife the daughter of Seleucos. In 297 B.C. after the death of Cassandros, the Macedonian Kingdom was a good opportunity for the rest of successors.

Demetrius became king of Macedonia in 293 B.C., having an authority on the important part of Greece. Ptolemy, Seleucos and Lysimachos had a new alliance and they succeeded to defeat Demetrius who fled in exile at Seleucos, between 287 and 283 B.C., when he died at 54 years.

His son, Antigonos Gonatas will become king in an important part of Greece. In 283 B.C. Ptolemy I Soter had died, being followed at the Egyptian throne by his son Ptolemy II Philadelphos. Lysimachos will be a victim of the dynastic interests of his court. Lysandra had married Agathokles son of Lysimachos. They were defeated at Hellis by Dromichaites a Getian king. After they were released, in 293 B.C., Lysimach had to fight in his kingdom with the interests of Arsinoe, his wife who would ensure the throne to his major son against Agathokles, the major son of Lysimachos. Seleucos entered in conflict and Lysimachos was defeated at Kourupediond in 281 B.C. After the death of Lysimachus, Seleucos I Nicator had the way opened in Europe. The brother of Lysandra, Ptolemy Keraunos, upset that Ptolemy I preferred his brother Ptolemy II as successor decided to eliminate Seleucos, who was murdered in the Hellespont Area at Lysimacheia.

The Hellenistic state with a unitary rule and structure will be the Egypt conducted by the dynasty of Ptolemies (Mueller, 2006).

In 276, Ptolemy Keraunos died and Macedonia will become again an Antigonid kingdom, generally in the limits of the state during the rule of Philip II. From the Seleucid Kingdom, the Iranians will separate, creating the Parthic state, ruled by Arsacyde dynasty. The Southern Cappadocia will be an independent kingdom conducted by Ariarates (a descendant from the Achemenid family). The Pontic Cappadocia will form the basis of the Pontic Kingdom under Mithridates, after the death of Lysimachos. Ziboetes will form the Kingdom of Bythinia and Philetairos will form the Kingdom of Pergamon (Gabrielsen, 1997).

In conclusion, between 323 and 301 B.C., we can consider that the "imperial idea" subsisted until the death of Antigonos Monophtalmos who died in the battle of Ipsos in 301 B.C. until 280 B.C., all the "successors" which had participated at the meeting of Babylonia died.

After this important date, the "imperial idea" had lost its importance. The Hellenistic state of Egypt, under the authority of Ptolemy, son of Lagos was the most united and well-built Hellenistic state. The main explanation is that of the ethnic homogeneous conformation (the majority of population was Egyptian followed by Greeks and Macedonians) and to the stable internal organization.

The Ptolemaic Dynasty tried to expand its authority on territories situated in Syria, Greece, Asia Minor, even in Thrace Aegean and Black Sea regions.

The Ptolemaic domination over the Aegean Area represents the main key of the Ptolemaic external politics during all the Hellenistic Era.

The Aegean Area in the Hellenistic Age

The Aegean Sea, named after the father of the founder of Athens, Theseus, named Aigeos makes the separation between continental Greece and Asia Minor. It has a surface of 214000 square kilometres. In the Aegeean Sea are located more than 2000 islands divided in seven groups: North Eastern Aegean Islands, Euboea, Northern Sporades, Cyclades, Saronic Islands, Dodecansese, and Crete. Most important of them are: Delos, Naxos, Paros, Samos, Lesbos, Crete, Rhodes, Keos, Kos, Thera (Santorini) the Archipelago of Cyclades. Seen as a bridge between Asia and Europe, the Aegean represented a main interest for Greeks from the ancient times of colonization, classical period of Greek history until the Hellenistic and Roman ages (Cummings, 2014).

In the Hellenistic Age, all the successors of Alexander the Great tried to have an influence on the Aegean basin: Antigonides, Ptolemies, Seleucides. The Aegean Sea represented the main connection with the Hellespont and to the Black Sea.

The Aetolian League had encouraged the activity of piracy, the pirates making troubles for all the kingdoms which tried to control the area.

The evolution of the Ptolemaic domination in the Aegean Area

The Dynasty of Ptolemies ruled Egypt until 31 B.C., when Kleopatra VII Philopator committed suicide after being defeated by the Roman fleet at Actium. It is necessary to consider that in the Aegean area, the Ptolemies were active during the reigns of Ptolemy I, Ptolemy II, Ptolemy III and Ptolemy IV. After the last reign, we can consider that the decline of the Ptolemies forces was started. There is difficult to present a complete chronology and an image of the territories placed under the Ptolemaic domination on the Aegean Area, because of the discontinuity of sources.

The expression used to designate the power of Ptolemies in the regions outside the territory of Egypt is the "thalassocracy". The main representatives were Ptolemy I Soter and Ptolemy II Philadelphos (Buraselis, 1982).

In 313 and, especially after 295 Ptolemies succeeded to occupy Cyprus a very rich island which could ensure a basis for the next step, the advance to the Aegean region.

During the actions from 310-308 B.C. Ptolemy I performed actions in Caria, Cilicia, Lycia. Proclaiming the freedom of the Greek cities he attempted an expedition in Greece promoting an intensive propaganda in the archipelago of Cyclades, considered a liaison bridge between Greece and Minor Asia, and in the same time the "key" of the Aegean basin. For showing the interests of Ptolemies for the Aegean Area, the headquarters of Ptolemy in Aegean basin was established in the Island of Kos.

After the defeat and the death of Antigonos at Ipsos in 301 B.C., Ptolemy I decided to get involved in the conflict with Demetrios. After 287 B.C., he succeeded to ensure the command of the League of Islanders (founded initially by Antigonos to control the Aegean Sea), the most efficient political instrument in controlling the Aegean basin (Buraselis, 1982).

The successor of Ptolemy I, Ptolemy II Philadelphos had a major success in establishing a basis in the island of Samos. Between 267-261 B.C., and 260-253 B.C. Ptolemy II involved in the "Chremonidian War" and in the Second Syrian War. The battle of Kos was a moment in which the domination of Ptolemies was seriously threatened, but generally speaking, the Ptolemies succeeded to maintain the majority of their points of resistance in the Aegean basin. In this situation, for example, from Rhodes to Cyprus it

was a distance for more than 600 km by sea, in the condition of no island to stop. It is very clear why Ptolemies tried to control some coastal territories (especially in Lycia) on this way from Cyprus, by Aegean Sea to the continental Greece.

Practically, there were three major Ptolemaic bases on Aegean Area: Keos in Crete, Ithanos and Methana/Arsinoe in Argolida. An explanation concerning the small number of new settlements on Ptolemaic origin, is given by the fact that Ptolemies tried to ensure a cooperation with the cities already existent trying to avoid the new foundation because of the difficulties caused by the relief.

During the Third Syrian War (246-241 B.C.), Ptolemies (reign of Ptolemy III) succeeded to ensure a domination especially in Thrace and Hellespont.

The Ptolemaic control remained generally in these lines until the times of Ptolemy V. During the entire time of their domination the Ptolemies tried to ensure the domination by a dynastic unification by giving names from their family of the existent and new settlements as an expression of a dynastic unification (Cummings, 2014).

In the Aegean area, the expression of the thalassocracy was accomplished by two means: establishing new settlements and having the alliance of the existing settlements. For example, in Thracia the new settlements founded by Ptolemies are practically inexistent. The military force which ensured the "thalassocracy" was the Ptolemaic fleet.

The presence of the Ptolemies in the Aegean Area was a prestige problem. All the rulers of the Egypt tried to ensure a communication point in the south of Syria and also in the Minor Asia. Having the key control of the Aegean, the Lagid Dynasty could have an influence in the continental Greece, Thrace and even in the Black Sea region.

According to the first mean, that of establishing new settlements, the Ptolemies founded 2 colonies in Crete, 2 in the Greece (Methana in Argolida at the Saronic Gulf) and in the Aegean Islands (Keos, Thera). We can observe that the Ptolemies had a good relation with the Aetolian League. There in Aetolia were founded two colonies with Ptolemaic name. The historical explanation is that of the cooperation between Egypt of Ptolemies and the Aetolian League in the context of domination in the Aegean Area.

At the half of the III-rd century B.C., the Aetolian League an allied of Ptolemeies had established relations with a lot of settlements from the Aegean Sea and Minor Asia coasts: Delos, Chios, Miletus, Smyrna, Tenos and Abdera. The interests of Ptolemies in having the control over the islands or over the sea shores of the continental areas could be explained by the technique of sailing in the Antiquity (sailing in the neighbourhood of the coasts).

In 245 B.C. the Ptolemaic fleet was defeated in the battle of Andros and the main consequence was a diminution of the Ptolemies force in the Aegean area.

The end of the Ptolemaic influence in the Aegean Area

As a generally image, in the case of the first three Ptolemy kings, they preferred to delegate representatives in the dialogue with the city-states where they had political and military interests. On the other side they imposed another type of communication establishing some permanent diplomatic residences of second or third rank officials, helped usually by a military garrison.

We must consider that the Ptolemaic strategy in the Northern Aeagean region was rather different that in the rest of the region. In the monumental dedication from Samothrake, it is presented the "patronage" of Ptolemies as official policy, extended even

to the Black Sea Region. In the rest of the Aegean Sea, the inscriptions concerning Ptolemies government present a lot of information of military officials with great careers, as Patroklos (who supervised a lot of garrisons at Keos, Methana, Ithanos, Thera) and Hippomedon (Thrace, Hellespont).

In 246 B.C., after the battle of Andros, the Ptolemies los this military basis, moment which represents the end of monumental representativity of Ptolemies on the Great Sanctuary of Delphes.

Ptolemy III succeeded to maintain Ptolemaic garrisons in the basis situated in Maroneea, Ainos, Lesbos and Samothrake, Sestos, Lysimacheia.

The military basis of Keos was abandoned at the end of the III-rd century B.C. The military basis on Thera, Itanos and Methana resisted until 145 B.C., at the death of Ptolemy VI Philometor. The "imperial heritage of Ptolemies" was lost in the favor of Antiochos III, King Philip V of Macedonia and the Roman Republic. In this context we can see the disappearance of the first Hellenistic state, Macedonia in 148 B.C., under the Roman authority.

The economy, the society and the culture on the Aegean Area during the Ptolemaic Dynasty

The Ptolemies tried to have a political control on their basis on the Aegean Area on the name of a Dynastic politics. The Ptolemies had a good cooperation with the islands of the Aegean, having treaties with the Aetolian League, with the Islanders League. They put the name of their family members in some new settlements or in settlements already built. Also, there were imposed local festivals to honor members of the Ptolemaic families.

Ptolemies succeeded to put an end to the Antiochos II Theos interests in Black Sea (Olteanu, 2009). The conflict between Istros, Kallatis for the emporium of Tomis must be put in connection with the siege of Byzantion made by Antiochos II. Herakleea, mother city of Kallatis and the League of North had the help of Ptolemy Philadelphos. This is the expression that the Seleucids and Ptolemies fought for obtaining control and influence in this area. Later, Istros, Apollonia, Kallatis were in good relations with Antiochos II Theos. Against them Ptolemy Philadelphos tried to oppose the "Northern League".

The Ptolemies had economical connections with Black Sea region. From this region the inscriptions show a commercial activity with wheat, slaves, honey, fish, raisins. Instead of this, from the Aegean area was imported wine. The amphora from Rhodes were attested also in the Black Sea colonies (Avram, 2003).

A relief from Nymphaion, discovered in 1984, shows the presence of the admiral-vessel of Ptolemaic fleet, Isis in the Black Sea area. Also, in Istros was discovered a vase made by Egyptian faïence on Ptolemaic tradition (Avram, 2003).

As a conclusion the Ptolemaic influence in the Black Sea, as a consequence of the power in the Aegean Sea, we can consider that Ptolemies offered economic and religious influences. Egyptian deities are present in the Black Sea Region (as Sarapis at Istros, Sarapis, Isis at Mesambria). Also, a lot of young student from Pontic cities are attested in the main center of education which was Alexandreia in Egypt.

Conclusions

The kings from Lagid Dynasty did not make personal visits in the territories outside Egypt. They used the basis from the Aegean Sea for sending officials in these territories.

The politics of Ptolemies was different in the Northern Aegean, that in the rest of the Aegean basin.

The Ptolemies succeeded to preserve the most stable dynasty and state on the entire Hellenistic history. They involved in the major crisis on this period. They succeeded to take an important part from the Antigonid kingdom and to have the first position in the competition to keep the influence in the Aegean and the Black Sea region.

The government of Ptolemies was made by a complex system of means: political, diplomatic, military, economic, and religious patronage.

In the Thrace and Black Sea region we can see some rich religious and commercial activities, attested by archaeological discoveries.

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THE NATIONAL-LIBERAL PARTY (1875) AND THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY (1880): A NEW APPROACH SEEN THROUGH POLITICAL SCIENCE LENSES

Cosmin-Ştefan Dogaru[*]

Abstract

The two modern parties in Romania, the National Liberal Party (founded in 1875) and the Conservative Party (founded in 1880) ensured the consolidation of the political regime created in 1866. The present article proposes an analysis of the historical facts on the basis of methodology from the political science in order to offer a new perspective on the creation of the two caucus parties. The formation process of the two government parties went through a number of stages related to the Romanian political life, to the mentality of the politicians, to the power strife, to the governmental and parliamentary activity etc. My research question, which is still viable nowadays, refers to a new approach to the analysis of the two government parties, the National Liberal Party (NLP) and the Conservative Party (CP) within the Romanian political system.

Key words: *caucus parties, the National Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, Charles I, Romania*

The political party – a modern concept that was illustrated by the nineteenth-century developments

The political party is obviously a modern concept that has represented an important topic in the research of numerous historians, political scientists and cultural specialists from the very beginning of the twentieth century until the present. In this respect, authors like LaPalombara and Weiner analyse political parties while displaying four essential criteria of analysis: the durability of the organisation, its extension in the territory, its will to exercise political power and the search for popular support (LaPalombara, Weiner, 1966: 6). The political party becomes interesting also for the two authors who establish the fact that the modern political parties are constituted in the nineteenth century.

The political scientist Jean Blondel, while analysing the political parties, was offering it a general definition: "the political parties are groups, but a special type of groups /.../ they are indeed political groups in as much as they exist in order to influence the political process /.../ the parties are associations, not community groups. They have their own goals, but these are of a particular nature – they do not only cover all types of social problems, but they are also connected to all the sectors of the society" (Blondel, 2009: 141).

Pierre Bréchon, another political scientist interested in the study of political parties, offered an analysis in which he mentioned the facts that the parties represented "a concurrential offer on the political market and they propose political products to a clientele who would not support them unless they respond to its expectations /.../ the parties are like any other social actors that have to interfere competitively when a problem

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occurs: their actions have to take into account the actions of their competitors" (Bréchon, 2004: 51).

The Romanian political party from the perspective of the political science

After doing research on the Romanian parties, Dimitrie Gusti offered a general definition of a political party that could be taken as a milestone even nowadays: "the political party is a free association of citizens that are permanently united through general and common interests and ideas and who openly pursue the goal of acceding to government power in order to achieve an etical and social ideal" (Gusti, 1934: 124).

In the interwar period in Romania, another two authors, Constantin Gr. C. Zotta and N. Tulceanu, were interested in the study of the political parties in this country. The two authors help us better understand how the political parties were perceived during that period: "the association called a political party was supposed to pursue the goal of acceding to governmental power /.../ any political party tends to become a clique when its members pursue the exploitation of the state and the transformation of the government in a means of getting rich. A faction is a part of a political party which, at a certain moment, due to personal usatisfaction, creates a new party within the old party it belongs to. The "cotterie" is a faction of a faction" (Zotta, Tulceanu, 1934: 4). Moreover, for the two authors, "the political party also represents general ideas and interests" (Zotta, Tulceanu, 1934: 4). In their analysis, they also refer to the technical part related to the organisation of the political party and mention three important elements in this respect: the party leadership, the programme adopted and the means for political strife and propaganda. The most important role within the party is nevertheless that of the party leader, who represents the "supreme authority", which always "concentrates in the person and personality of the leader, who represents the symbol of the party unity; the prestige and the force of the party are directly related to the grandeur of the personality of the leader" (Zotta, Tulceanu, 1934: 5). The role of the political party is essential especially in the "political education of the nation and in the of the citizens' interest in the existence and the progress of the state" (Zotta, Tulceanu, 1934: 7).

The Romanian case – from political groups to modern political parties

In the Romanian case, like in any other, the political parties went through several stages until they became modern political institutions, according to the general interpretation given to the concept nowadays (Dogaru, 2015: 140-158).

Gradually, along the reign of Charles I, the two political parties, the National Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, would meet the criteria mentioned by the two political scientists, LaPalombara and Weiner. Both the NLP and the CP would become (1875 and, respectively, 1880) two modern parties, pursuing an organisational and hierarchic course that gained contour along many years: first, one can trace two political tendencies, the liberal and the conservative, at the beginning of the nineteenth century (the 1820s and the 1830s); later, these tendencies would coagulate into two political groups during the 1848 revolution, in Wallachia and Moldavia; that culminated with the development of liberal and conservative groups in the years 1857-1866 (the *Ad-hoc* Assemblies of 1857 and the reign of A.I. Cuza). Moreover, during the first stage of Charles I's reign, the liberal and conservative groups would go through moments in which

the political pluralism characterised a better structured political class, which was nevertheless still existing within a liberal regime based on the 1866 Constitution.

Regarding the words "conservative" and "liberal", "the term "conservative" appeared for the first time /.../ in a letter of Mihail Sturdza to a Russian agent, on 1 February 1823, but then it was especially the case that it characterised reactionary principles rather than defining a political group. Much later, in 1858, Teodor Balş, in a letter to Aali-Paşa, speaks of our conservative party /.../ "The Iaşi Tribune" is the first liberal newspaper that designates the adversary party as the "conservatives". In contrast, the liberals' adversaries were calling them "upstarts, bonjourists, carbonari and innovationists. It was only the 1848 revolution that started circulating the words liberty and liberal" (Herjeu, 1915: 254). During the 1848 revolution, both in Wallachia and in Moldova, liberal and conservative groups were articulated. Under these conditions, in 1848, there were: "the self-defined "progressive" or "revolutionary" group, which also inherited the old "national" calling and the ones who confronted it, the "party of the old boyars", the "Phanariotes", the "Moskals" or the "reactionary" (Vlad, 2006: 7).

Thus the liberal and conservative political currents were gradually defined in the Romanian realm in the nineteenth century, manifesting in a clearer manner around the year 1848: "since 1848 one can say that the creation of our political parties and the differentiation of ideas started" (*Istoricul Partidului Naţional-Liberal de la 1848 şi până astăzi* (*The History of the National Liberal Party from 1848 to the Present*), 1923: 24). The two political currents gradually appeared both in Wallachia and in Moldavia, with several groups being developed. In time, these would be noted especially within the *Ad-hoc* Assemblies (1857) and during Alexandru Ioan Cuza's reign (1859-1866), but "during the period 1859-1866, the liberal and conservative groups were not well organised" (Dan, 2008: 52). During the reign of Alexandru I. Cuza, a gradual transfer from the two political currents to the two political groups (the conservative and the liberal) could be noted. The best known case was that of the radical-liberal group around the political leaders "I.C. Bratianu and C.A. Rosetti, Dumitru Bratianu, the Golescu brothers etc., radical elements of revolution and exile, grouped, after having returned to the country, around the journal *The Romanian* and around some clubs in Wallachia" (Stan, 1995: 18). Moreover, the liberal current was also represented by a modern group, "which comprised of a series of personalities like Ion Ghica, Chr. Tell, G. Costaforu, V. Boerescu, C. Bosianu /…/ to whom the Moldavian M.C. Epureanu could be added" (Stan, 1995: 20); likewise, the Moldavian liberals were united around personalities such as M. Kogalniceanu, Anastasie Panu, V. Malinescu (Stan, 1995: 20-21).

On the other side of the political spectrum, one can note the Wallachian conservatives lead by Barbu Catargiu, around whom there were also D. Ghica, I.Em. Florescu, C.N. Brailoiu etc. However, in Moldavia, the influence of the conservatives was stronger and the conservative group was supported by Prince Gr.M. Sturdza and by A.C. Moruzi, Lascar Catargiu and Petre Mavrogheni (Stan, 1995: 21-22).

The two political groups would act also during the first years of the reign of Charles I (1866-1871), a moment in which the structuring of the political platform was visibly affected by the tensions that existed at the regional level between the liberal and conservative groups.

The constitutional framework of 1866 created a new perspective in the evolution of the modern Romanian political parties. C.I. Istrati asserted that such a moment – the

creation of the 1866 regime – permitted the formation of two political parties, but they were not yet formally constituted since the NLP was institutionally formed in 1875 and the CP in 1880. However, in 1866, he asserted that: "*through the style of our political life, with its constitutional background, we have to have at least two parties*"; he also admitted that: "*in fact, we find the conservative party and the liberal party in the front line*" (Istrati, 1904: 7).

It is true that, at the moment the fundamental law was created, the two political groups were very active: "The 1866 Constitution was created on the basis of the common work of the conservatives and the liberals" (Lupaş, 1937: 299). Likewise, Alexandru Papacostea considered that: "The Constitution itself was created due to a compromise between the two parties" (Papacostea, f.a.: 150).

Gradually, on the fragmentary political platform in the first years of Charles I's reign, one could observe the notion of a "political party" as defining the two political groups, the liberal and the conservative, in the political discourse of the prince and of the politicians before the actual creation of the parties. In the structure of the political platform of the year 1866, there were two denominations: "the liberal party" and "the conservative party", but, formally, they were not acting as modern political parties, according to the contemporary acception of this concept. Out of these reasons, "the creation of the Romanian political parties did not actually have a fixed date such as 24 May 1875 for the NLP and, respectively, 3 February 1880 for the CP, but it was a process that lasted for about two decades" (Scurtu, Bulei, 1990: 44).

From the perspective of the political science and not only, a political party is capable to govern and to resist the governmental succession throughout time if it is a strong, undivided party (Blondel, 2009: 140-141).

The political parties during the reign of Charles I

Following the viewpoint of the political science, the concept of a "political party" appeared in the Romanian political realm in the nineteenth century, but at that time it did not mean a political party that was similar to what most of the parties in the European states of the time were. Out of this reason, both organisationally and institutionally, the NLP and the CP, were later constituted within the Romanian political regime due to reasons that were connected to the political life in general.

At the beginning of Charles I's reign, one would not emphasise a well defined organisational structure regarding some aspects such as belonging to a party (party identity) and the existence of subdivisions also at a national level and not only at a regional level (in Wallachia and in Moldavia). In the Romanian realm, both in the press and in the parliamentary and political discourses, in other speeches or in the correspondence, "the liberal party" and "the conservative party" were two entities that structured two political groups: the liberals and the conservatives. Under these conditions, from the perspective of political science, one can admit that the process of constituting a party in Romania took a great number of years and that it was closely related to other aspects of the political life such as the electoral system, the government alternation of the liberals and the conservatives, the experience of the politicians in the process of formation and consolidation of the Romanian state etc.

The liberal Vintila I. Bratianu, while analysing the concept of a political party, a typical concept of the modern age, considered that: "*a political party has to be a control agent of the executive power even when it is in opposition; even then it has to be able to check the solutions proposed*

by the adversaries, to oppose them when they do not consider them good and to offer better ones" (Brătianu, 1906: 28-29). Within the political regime, the political parties are obviously part of the regime's foundation; Bratianu was thus convinced that: "*obviously, the political parties are not formally recognised as important factors of the political regime in our Constitution, but they are indeed the means of manifestation of an uncontested constitutional factor: the national will. This national will is manifested in the consultation of the electoral body*" (Brătianu, 1906: 12).

Pursuing his analysis further on, Vintila I. Bratianu mentioned that "*the organisation and the political programmes have to create that necessary continuous contact between the government party and the national will*" (Brătianu, 1906: 22). This presents the role of the political parties in the public realm while forcing the idea that one should impose "*a continuous research of the general needs, the study of the possible solutions, the unification of ideas within the party and, finally, their pursuit within the general trends of the public opinion*" (Brătianu, 1906: 28).

During that age, yet another analysis of the political parties was offered by the liberal leader I.I.C. Bratianu, who advanced a new approach regarding the party construction. He clearly delineated a series of aspects of the issue such as: "*the party needs a past that could establish its character in front of everybody and could show what it has already been able to do; it needs a leader /.../ who should be followed by friends and respected by everybody; it needs numerous and convinced adherents who could liaise the different elements of the party and ensure its future*" (Ion I.C. Brătianu, 1904: 55). Finally, he asserted that: "*any party that does not meet these essential conditions cannot be a complete party and, consequently, cannot perfectly respond to the mission it has within the state*" (Ion I.C. Brătianu, 1904: 55). In his vision, it is necessary to obtain a coagulation of these criteria in order to strengthen the party and eliminate all possible dangers that could weaken it. Although there was a substantial gap between the Romanian state and other European states, the Romanian political thought was a westernised one and the political elite had clearly defined milestones. The liberal leader was not an exception when he considered that "*the party is an instrument that should be used not by a person, but by the state itself*" (Ion I.C. Brătianu, 1904: 56).

The NLP and the CP – two government parties

Both the NLP and the CP were institutionally formed when they were in the opposition, the government determining them separately to change from political groups into modern political parties. The political leaders of the time understood that they could not continue to be in power otherwise than as united and strong parties, which coagulated around them the liberal and, respectively, the conservative groups as two modern political parties, in accordance to the European model. Under these conditions, the creation of the NLP has as its formal chronological milestone the date of 24 May 1875 (Damean, Oncescu, 2015: 212), an event that was known under the name of "the coalition at the Mazar-Paşa's". There was constituted a committee composed of 12 persons: Manolake Kostaki [Epureanu], Ion C. Bratianu, M. Kogalniceanu, Al.G. Golescu, G. Vernescu, [Take] Anastasiu, C.N. Fusea, Al. Candiano-Popescu, An. Stolojan, G. Chitu, C.G. Pesiacov and N.C. Furculescu, who created a programme known under the name of the programme of the 1875 coalition at the Mazar Paşa's" (*Istoricul Partidului Național-Liberal de la 1848 și până astăzi (The History of the National Liberal Party from Its Origins until the Present)*, 1923: 98). One should not forget that, at that time, the conservatives have been in power since 1871, under the leadership of Lascar Catargiu. The NLP had the support of the

industrial, financial and commercial bourgeoisie and of a great part of the great landowners (Damean, Oncescu, 2015: 212-213).

At the other end of the political spectrum, one can note the same proceeding of coagulation of the conservative groups in one single party with the Conservative Party. This happened formally when the NLP became a political party that was already constituted and consolidated (the liberals came to power in the year 1876). Out of rational reasons, the conservatives understood the political game and united with the purpose of ensuring the alternation to government between the NLP (1875) and the CP (1880).

Under these conditions, while being in opposition, the different conservative groups united in order to form a Conservative Party on 3/15 February 1880. On that date, several political personalities (88), among which Lascar Catargiu, Manolache Costache Epureanu, Ioan Emanoil Florescu, Alexandru Lahovari, Titu Maiorescu, Petre Mavrogheni and Theodor Rosetti, assumed the responsibility to constitute a second government party, something that was well received by Charles I, who wanted the functioning and the consolidation of the power alternation of the two political forces. At that time, both the NLP and the CP were caucus parties, which united around them a series of notable people – an aspect which was ensured by the electoral system, supported by the census vote and the two-party system. Within this context, the NLP was a left wing party and the CP was a right wing party. The CP was supported by the "great landowners, some elements of the rich bourgeoisie, the public officers and a great part of the intellectuals" (Damean, Oncescu, 2015: 217).

At that time, C.I. Istrati was presenting the following comparison between the two parties: "*the liberal party has the mission to continuously change the nation in accordance to the evolution of ideas and the meaning of humanity. The conservative party, this oak of the Romanian nation that is always awake, has the role of an able helmsman who would lead the boat with a sure hand and who would not let the sails unfold too abruptly and too widely and thus easily endanger the ship when the storms may hit*" (Istrati, 1904: 101). Both parties were supposed to offer a political balance within the liberal political regime in Romania.

The NLP and the CP – the two pillars of the operation of the two-party system

Due to their parliamentary and governmental activity, the two government parties, the NLP and the CP, managed to extend their influence within the country (especially the NLP, which was the only party with subdivisions all over the country).

During that age, with the aid of the political elite, Charles I managed to institute the two-party system in order to ensure political stability and generate the modernisation of the Romanian state. In this respect, Charles I gradually understood the political game and, while "pendulating between liberals and conservatives /.../ he made Romania go through an alternation of these two major political groups in the formation of the governments, a situation that was similar to the alternation of the Tory and Whig parties that was characteristic for England" (Drăganu, 1991: 259-260). Gradually, the proclamation of the Kingdom of Romania in 1881 and the operation of the government alternation during that age lead to the consolidation of the two government parties, the NLP and the CP, within the liberal political regime that was on its course to democratisation.

While analysing that age, the political scientist Mattei Dogan agreed that: "the essence of parliamentarism consisted in the existence of a parliamentary majority and

minority that would collaborate with each other" (Dogan, 1946: 108). Under these conditions, the two government parties ensured the operation of the Romanian two-party system and were supported by king Charkes I in that: "we encounter /…/ a government alternation of two parties that succeede each other in government during a regulated alternation" (Dogan, 1946: 109-110).

Gradually, the government alternation of the two parties came to be a custom, a deeply rooted political practice, which, after 1881, had king Charles I as its main protagonist, who understood very well the necessity of this political mechanism and had the ability to convince the majority of the politicians to support him in ensuring the functioning of the two-party system, a political project that maintained the political stability especially in 1895-1914.

Nevertheless, the application of the British model favoured the creation of a two-party system in Romania, with its own specific features and the partnership between Charles I and the two government parties lead, in time, to the consolidation of the political regime created in 1866. During the process of the Romanian state modernisation, a decisive part was played by Charles I, who, due to his personality, encouraged the constructive actions of the political leaders of whatever political allegiance.

Conclusion

In 1866, the conservative and liberal groups were not sufficiently mature to find a common denominator, as it happened in the case of the foreign prince that was to be invited to rule the country or in the case of the elaboration of the fundamental law – both these desiderata being accomplished in 1866. However, the process of formation of the two caucus parties, the NLP and the CP, which lasted for about twenty years, did have some common ground: the government. The government alternation of the two parties determined each of them to unite in two separate great government parties. Both these government parties represented true pillars of the foundation called Romania. Consequently, together with Charles I, the two parties managed to represent a positive factor in the foundation and the consolidation of the political regime created in 1866.

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THE CONTEXT OF THE ASSASSINATION IN BUCHAREST
OF MACEDONIAN ROMANIAN ŞTEFAN MIHĂILEANU (1859-1900)
– IN THE LIGHT OF SOME EPOCH TESTIMONIES

Stoica Lascu[*]

Abstract

The assassination in July 1900 (in Bucharest, where it was established), by a young Macedonian Bulgarian, of the Romanian teacher originally from Macedonia Ştefan Mihăileanu, a leader of the national movement of the Vlachs/Aromanians in the Balkans has received a wide echo both in Romania and among the Aromanians communities of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan area (known under the generic name of Macedonia). In Bucharest and other cities (Constanţa, Brăila) occurred actions blamed the assassination, were written plays and poems, were published numerous articles in newspapers and magazines and have held public demonstrations. In the second part of the paper are reproduced articles from "Le Matin" and "Le Temps", as well as two diplomatic comments showing the Romanian-Bulgarian relations, in international context. In a conference held in Bucharest in 1910, writer and teacher Leon Boga (nativ Aromanian) highlighted the personality of "the idealist apostle of Aromanians": "He spoke often about other nations and their role, and often wore polemics with Bulgarian and Greek newspapers, for how he wanted to resolve the Macedonian thing did not suit their aspirations. He foresaw the 1903 revolution and vehemently attacking those who, intentionally bringing misfortune on the head of poor Macedonia. His slogan was: Aromanians by themselves. Its newspapers were well received and were scattered through all the villages Macedonia and Epirus to Thessaly. He saw, so things from a higher perspective and found no other solution than developing national sentiment by schools and church interests without offending others".

Key words: *Ştefan Mihăileanu, Aromanians, Macedonian Romanians, the Macedonian Issue, Bulgaria*

At the intersection of the 19th and 20th centuries, the issue of sharing the Balkan area was indicative of the Ottoman Empire (Ciachir, 1987: 193-202; Castellan, 1991: 347-369, 370-397; Renouvin, Duroselle, 1991: 181-182; Hösch, 1995: 180-187; Jelavich, 1999: 249-264; Jelavich, 2000: 79-102; Pavlowitch, 2002: 172 sqq.); as one of the more dominant concerns Great Powers' chancelleries. In a geographical area strong amalgamated ethno-confessional, with equally obvious geostrategic impact of the balance regional – it was a time of national decisions fate multiple ethnicities that lived in a relatively small area; so-called "issue Macedonian" (Danforth, 1995, 28-77; Zieliński, ed.: *passim*; Buşă, 2000-2001: 99-113; Nistor, 2009: 41-66; Lascu, 2011: 201-234) – in fact, referring to the entire space Balkan Ottoman, not only at the area of Ancient Macedonia – engage both governments (especially those of Sofia, Athens and Belgrade), and peoples, public opinion and patriotic-national organizations.

They were revealed, on another occasion (Lascu, 2009: 16-18; Lascu, 2015: 281-300), some of the echoes among the Romanian public opinion the assassination in Bucharest on 22 July 1900 the Romanian teacher originally from Macedonia Ştefan

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Mihăileanu (1859-1900) (Minov, 2013: 207, 303-304), "the apostle most idealistic of Aromanians" ([Arginteanu], 1912: 1), who said bluntly: "I do not write that Macedonian (namely, Slavic Macedonia – our note), no. I am Romanian before being Macedonian" (Mihăileanu[1], 1890: 1); his sustained national-cultural action (Mihăileanu, 1889; Mihăileanu, 1901; Mihăileanu[2], 1890: 1), carried in the pages of his newspaper *Peninsula Balcanică* (January 1, 1893-November 27, 1894; January 23, 1900-March 4, 1901; also has appeared: April 1-September 30, 1912; January 20, 1913), concerted the defense of nationality for Romanian Macedonians and unmasking the Bulgarian Macedonians and sofiot policy in the sense to creating a Slave Macedonia – have to go through the effect of his assassination by an ardent young Bulgarian Macedonian to a tense situation between the chancelleries of Bucharest and Sofia, the radicalization of part of public opinion and the media in both countries. "The exchange of notes between the governments of the two neighboring countries is becoming tougher. Especially Alexandru Marghiloman (Minister for Foreign Affairs – our note) puts a lot of exaggeration in terms.

Eventually the conflict was bordered on legal ground. On October 30 everyone involved in the assassination plot, present or absent, they were sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court of Assizes" (Bulei, 1984: 210).

The assassination of the Romanian patriot prompted outcry of public opinion, recorded meetings of protest, articles solidarity with the Romanians Balkan (*Asasinarea…*, 1900: 1; Bacalbașa, 1900: 1; *Înmormântarea…*, 1900: 1, *Aniversarea…*, 1901: 1), by editing is even newspapers occasional – *Jos asasinii* [Down with the assassins], published under the control of the *Comitetului Național Studențesc* [National Committee Student] of Jassy (August 20, 1900), and another with the same title edited by *Studenții universitari* from the Bucharest (August 6, 1900). "On the occasion of his death Mihăileanu (Minov, 2013: 303), the Macedonian issue, which had disappeared for a while from the order of the day, comes again. Romanians are wondering today what became painfully made sacrifices for brothers from Pindus. It seems us – *wrote a newspaper in Bucharest* – that the present circumstances are favorable for the Romanian foundation of a new policy *with more chance of success than today followed by Macedonia* (our emphasis)" (Negru, 1900: 1); also, a newspaper expressing the views of the conservative plead for removing elements that could contribute to straining the Romanian-Bulgarian relations: "If the Bulgarian government wants to keep us good neighborly relations, he is obliged to take decisive action to end criminal actions of the revolutionary committees that operate throughout Bulgaria (Popov, 1902: 211-225; Popov, 1994: 109-154, 203-260, 355-415; 426-464: *Konfliktăt prez 1900*) and go bold, not to observe the hospitality of neighboring countries" (*Asasinatul…*, 1900: 1).

Also, the journalist and writer Petru Vulcan, from Constanța (native Romanian Macedonian), is the author of a play, which is on the cover statement *Se vinde în folosul ziarului "Peninsula Balcanică" fondat de Șt. Mihăileanu* [Is sold for the benefit of the newspaper "Peninsula Balcanică", founded by Șt. Mihăileanu] (Vulcan, 1900: *passim*). There have also been written on the death of Macedonian Romanian martyr, *poems* (Drăghicescu, 1900: 2; Moruzi: 1900: 1; *Lui Ștefan Măhăileanu*, 1900: 3), and the Aromanians in Macedonia have received letters and telegrams which condemned the assassination and emphasized the personality of the "dead martyr of Romanianism, but his memory glorified will remain immortal". A patriotic have also students; in an *Apel către românii macedoneni* [Appeal to the Macedonian Romanians], signed by *Un student* is a protesting the assassination of native Aromanian teacher from Bucharest, pleading the same time for more efficient

organization of the national movement: "Romania, Mother-Country [*Ţara-mumă*], where we found throughout the house and all love, sacrificed and sacrificed everything for us Romania helped us and helps us more than his powers would allow. Only we did not move, only we sit in that the numbness-killing lie down for so long? No time already called awakening, our enemies believed in their heart that cowardly killing one, everything will be dead. Our hearts are bleeding, he will entrust the ardor of battle, however, that instead of died, sprang thousand souls willing to sacrifice for victory glory for their nation. From there, from Macedonia, the Romanian breath has all eyes staring at us. They all expect to see us working, organizing, since the work of salvation" (Un student, 1900: 2). Also, in another appeal (*Către cetăţenii Capitalei*, 1900: 3), *studenţimea din Ţară* [The students of the Country] inspired "by animated by aspirations and thoughts of an entire people, will now do duty with unwavering love of the nation and will protest with the latter gaining momentum with indignation against the people of vile and savage in the middle of which stood the hands of an assassin ordinary in order to destroy a tree in mighty garden" (*Manifestul studenţimei…*, 1900: 2).

Over the years, in a conference, the personality of this "great nationalist Macedonian, killed dastardly of Bulgarian revolutionaries", would be raised by Aromanian intellectual Leon Boga (1886-1974; born in Ottoman Macedonia, establlished in 1913 in Romania, is a famous writer in maternal idiom and important Romanian historian and archivist), in the following terms: "Born in Beala de Sus next to the Ohrid was one of the first students who attended Romanian school. With all Grecomans' obstacles, school take root in Ohrid and young Mihăileanu comes into his mother-country [*patria-mumă*] brought by his uncle and attend High School St. Sava [in Bucharest]. Afterward, he attends University and reaching teacher, remain in the country. Since he was a student, with other colleagues of his, out newspaper *Macedonia* (January-March 1888, April-October 1889) (Lascu, 2013: 202-207) and, afterward, *Peninsula Balcanică* – he exposes his views on the political and cultural Macedonia. He claimed that to be faithful subjects of the sultan and not make alliance with any of the nationalities in Macedonia, because they pursue irredentist ideas, and are staring across the border; he asked only the amelioration of these peoples and removing corruption and robbery. He spoke often about other nations and their role, and often wore polemics with Bulgarian and Greek newspapers, for how he wanted to resolve the Macedonian thing did not suit their aspirations. He foresaw the 1903 revolution (Tomici, Godorodja & Popov, 2001: *passim*) and vehemently attacking those who, intentionally bringing misfortune on the head of poor Macedonia. His slogan was: *aromânii prin ei înşişi* [Aromanians by themselves] (our emphasis).

Its newspapers were well received and were scattered through all the villages Macedonia and Epirus to Thessaly.

He saw, so things from a higher perspective and found no other solution than developing national sentiment by schools and church interests without offending others.

He wrote a Aromanian-Romanian dictionary (Mihăileanu, 1901) whose value is low, because he sought to form many words and borrow from us words that could be understood by the people. It's this dictionary compared with that of Laurian and Masim.

As a man, he was very good, merciful and help from the poor fortune to his compatriots, supporting schools and churches. Man was steadfast, selfless and honest, *that his death was a great goal, which could not be filled even now* (our emphasis)" (Panduru, 1910: 173-174).

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Légation Royale
   de
Roumanie
Annexe n. 444/900

Bruxelles,
le 16/29 Août 1900

DANS LES BALKANS

Un incident diplomatique d'une haute gravite, mais qui a passé presque inaparcu, l'attention de l'Europe, distraite de la guerre des Boers, se concentrant presque exclusivement aujourd'hui sur les événements de l'Extrême [Orient], a surgi, ces jours derniers, entre la Roumanie et la Bulgarie.

Une note que «de Matin» a publié hier, laisse entrevoir quels fermets de discorde existent en ce moment dans la péninsule balcanique. L'incident qui s'est produit n'est qu'un simptôme de cet état de choses fâcheux: dont voici l'origine.

Malgré ses eforts, la Bulgarie, dont l'existence politique, en tant que participanté autonome, compte à peu prés un quart de siécle, este restée un pays pauvre. La population de la Bulgarie, dont le chiffre este de trois millions et demi d'habitants, se compose de soixante-dix pour cent d'agriculteurs. L'industrie, tres peu developee, ne suffit pas aux besoins locaux; les recettes de l'État, qui atteignent à peine cent millions, avec lesqueles il faut faire face aux dépenses du pays et au service d'une dette extérieure, qui est déjà de 125 millons de frances, proviennent done presque exclusivement de la classe agricole.

Or, par suite du manqué de capitaux, l'industrie agricole ele-même; la terre este cultivée par des moyens primitives et le rendement proportionnel est absolument inférieur à celui des autres pays producteurs de céréales. La Bulgarie produit annuellement 30 millions d'hectoliters de blé, il est vrai, alors que la Belgique par exemple, n'en donne que 25 millions; mais il faut remarquer que nous sommes un pays industriel; ce que n'est pas la cas pour Bulgarie: ce chiffre de 30 millions este tout ce qu'elle peut donner, le partie du sol non cultivée consistant en terrains impropres aux travaux agricoles. Aux céréales il convient d'ajouter l'élevage du bétail et, en raison de son importance, la production de l'essence de roses, qui consitiue la specialité de certains districts, tel que celui de Kassanlick.

Toute l'economie nationale repose donc sur l'agriculture; et, comme la situation de celle-ci n'est pas florissante, il en résulte un état de géne qui se répercute dans toutes les parties de l'organisme economique du pays. Ainsi les travaux publics sont négligés; les moyens de communicatons ne se developpent pas; rien n'est fait pour améliorer les ports de la Mer Noire, ni ceux du Danube. L'enseignement lui-meme ne répond pas à ce qu'il devrait être dans un pays jeune, désireux de suivre les progrès des autres peuples. À part des établissements d'instruction de quelques grandes villes, où les Bulgares envoyès à l'ètranger ont introduit les règles de l'instruction moderne, le reste ne s'élève pas au-dessus du niveau d'écoles de village. Un de nos compatriots, licencié en sciences commerciales de l'Institut d'Anvers, qui avait accepté d'organiser l'enseignement commercial dans une de ces écoles, dut renoncer à des véritables : «J'avais affaire, me dit-il, à de véritables sauvage, dont le caractére indomptable m'avait absolument découragé».

À ces causes de dépression économique, qui arrêtent le progrès de la Bulgarie, viennent s'en ajouter d'autres d'ordre politique. Les Bulgares, c'est une justice à leur rendre, aiment leur pays, sont trés patriots, et ce sentiment les a rendus jaloux de leur nationalité. Ils n'ont pas tarde à verser dans l'exaggeration et c'est ainsi: qu'ils ont fait leurs dans revendications panslavistes, ou pan-bulgares, pour le moins imprudentes, qui les placent dans une situation difficile vis-à-vis de leurs voisins. Mais, cette situation est compliquée encore par a façon, répondant assez peu à nos moeurs modernes, dont les Bulgares, étant donné leur nature de Slaves, entendent régler, semble-t-il, leurs différends avec ces dermers et resultant de cet état de choses. On n'a pas oublié la tragedie

sanglante qui se deroula à Sofia à l'époque, ou y dominair Stambouloff[1], le ministre-dictateur, qui merit lui-meme sous le fer des assassins; nombre de ses moyens d'action le mentre politique; il vient d'en donner une preuve en faisant assassiner à coups de revolver, dans les rues de Bucharest, un publiciste roumain des plus distingués, M. Michaleanu, adversaire fougueux des revendications des pan-bulgares. Voilà donc les Bulgares retournés aux beaux jours de Stambouloff, et en plein!...

Mais des réclamations immédiates et énergiques, se sont produites, de la part de la Roumanie, après cet attentat; le gouvernement roumain a demandé au governement bulgare de server contre les coupables et d'en finir avec les agissements du comité révolutionnaire macédonien.

La Bulgarie fait la sourde oreille; et, ce qui pis est, les journaux bulgares exaltent l'assassin, un slavophile militant appelé Dimitrow et le comité macédonien menace de faire d'autres victims. La police roumaine aurait même arrêté à Ploesti un personage mysterieux – que l'on affirme être une haute personnalité politique bulgare – qui par un télégrame adressé à une dame de Bucarest aurait montré qu'il etait parfaitement au courant du complot ayant pour but d'ainer le pauvre Michaleanu. On a également confisque des letters tres comprommettantes d'un ministre bulgare qu'avait en sa possession un certain Penciow; celui-ci a disparu immédiatement après l'assassinat du publiciste. Enfin parmi les personnes arrètées, figure une dame de la meilleure société de Bucarest laquelle aurait remis au nom du government de Sofia, une forte somme au journaliste bulgare Kozakoff, résident dans la capitale roumaine. Kozakoff fut arrètées lui-même au moment où il adressait à la Poste une letter recommandée au ministre de l'Interieur de Bulgarie, demandant d'autre fonds pour «de nouvelles enterprises patriotiques», et pour tâcher de délivrer Dimitrow. Dans les papiers de Koyakoff, on a trouvé la liste des personnes designées, par le comité macédonien, aux coups des assassins; en tête de cette liste figure de roi Charles de Roumanie!

Le président effectif du comité macédonien a Sofia est Boris Sarafow; mais le president d'honneur de cette association peu recommandable est, s'il faut en croire les journaux roumains, le… prince Ferdinand en personne! Et les plus hauts fonctionniares, ainsi que des officers de l'armée, d'un grade élevé en font partie.

L'affaire en est là. La Roumanie n'ayant obtinen aucune satisfaction à le spite de ses réclamations, qui n'ont eu por résultant que d'amener ne recrudescence dans la poiémique violente des journaux bulgares, ceux-ci renvoyant la balle aux Roumains qu'ils accusaient des pires méfaits, s'est adressée à l'Allemagne, à l'Autriche et à l'Italie pour obtenir leur appui diplomatique. À part les feuilles hongroises, qui naturellement, ont pris fait et cause pour les Bulgares, en raison de l'antagonisme existant entre Hongrois et Roumains pour la question des races et en particulier pour réglement de cette question en Transylvanie, le presse des pays à l'Orient de l'Europe donne tort à la Bulgarie et fait observer qu'elle joue là un jeu dangereux, sans qu'elle puisse en retirer aucun profit possible.

Tout le monde sera cet avis. Ce n'est pas en s'occupant d'intrigues ténébreuses et en ressuscitant des traditions sanglantes, remontant à une époque de son histoire qu'elle aurait intérêt à faire oublier, que la Bulgaire acquerra les sympathies des autres pays. Et elle en a beison comme ele a beison de la confiance de l'étranger pour asseoir son crédit et veiller, au peu mieux qu'elle ne l'a fait jusqu'ici, à son développement économique.

Le conflit bulgaro-roumain

Aprés la question anglo-boér et la question chinoise, en voici une troisiéme, qui parait moins grave, mais qui peut le devenir à cause de l'endroit ou elle est agitée. Il s'agit de la question d'Orient, cette éternelle question d'Orient que l'on s'efforce de résoudre depuis tant d'années et qui revient sans cesse sur le tapis sous une nouvelle forme.

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[1] Stefan Stambolov (1854-1895; assassinated); September 1887-May 31, 1894: president of Council of Ministers.

Cette fois c'est entre la Roumanie et la Bulgarie qu'a éclaté le conflit, et la cause ou plutôt le prétexte, est l'assassinat dans la principauté du professeur roumain Mikaileano. À Bucarest on veut rendre responsable de cet assassinat le trop célébre comité macédonien qui a établi à Sofia son quartier général.

De son coté, le gouvernment bulgare décline toute responsabilité et proteste contre les accusations dont il est l'objet. Il a même porté plainte devant la Russie, qui se dit la protectrice de la Bulgarie devant la Turquie, qui est la puissance suzeraine, et devant les nations qui font partie de la triple alliance et qui sont intéressées au maintien du bon ordre dans la région des Balkans.

Mais en Roumanie on n'a pas attendu l'intervention des puissances pour prendre certaines mesures de représailles. Ainsi, des sujets bulgares, résidant à Bucarest, ont été expulsés par la police sous prétexte qu'ils étaient affliés au comité macédonien. Par contre, les Bulgares ont refusé les indemnités et les satisfactions demandées pour l'assassinat du professeur Mikaileano. Et à Sofia les têtes sont tellement montées que l'on accuse nettement la Roumanie de chercher dans ce qu'on appelle un facheux accident l'occasion de troubler l'Orient au profit de la triple alliance. Cette façon d'envisager les choses est absurde, pour le dire en passant, car les puissances de la triplice qui aient des intérêts danubiens et balkaniques sont l'Autriche et l'Allemagne. Or, l'Autriche a déjà assez d'embarras chez elle pour provoquer des complications non loin de ses frontiéres. Quant à l'Allemagne, ele n'a aucun intérêt, surtout pour le moment, à soulever la question d'Orient.

Dans ces conditions, il est permis de croire que, n'algré toute cette agitation des deux parties en cause, la Bulgarie et la Roumanie n'arriveront pas à intéresser dans leur querelle des puissances qui ne se soucient certainement pas de favoriser le réveil du balkanisme au moment ou elles ont, dans un autre Orient plus lointain, de trés grosses affaires sur les bras. C'est ce que Guillaume II[1] aura fait comprendre au prince Ferdinand de Bulgarie; et c'est ce que fera comprendre l'empereur François-Joseph au roi Karol de Roumanie dans l'entrevue qui va avoir lieu à Vienne.

Nos lecteurs connaissent la réponse faite par le gouvernement bulgare à la derniére note diplomatique du cabinet de Bucarest. Ce commencement de satisfaction dunné aux Roumains a calmé quelque peu les esprits, mais tout danger de conflit ne paiaît pas encore être écarté. Une dépéche publiée par «Neue Freie Presse», de Vienne, annonce que la Bulgarie fortifie toutes ses villes de frontiére et d'autre part, nous appronons que de grandes quantités de matériel de guerre ont été transportées à Widdin, Nikopol et Sistova, les trois forteresses qui font face à la frontiére roumaine.

Voilà des préparatifs assez étranges pour des gens qui se déclarent prêts à donner satisfaction. À Bucarest, dans les milieux politiques qui ne sont pas directement à influencés par la Cour, on trouve que la réponse du gouvernement de Sofia, quand on l'examine de prés, est beaucoup moins satisfaisante qu'elle ne l'apparaissait tout d'abord. En effet, la Bulgarie promet d'ouvrir une instruction au sujet de la prétendue extorsion de la Sofia se serait rendu coupable, mais elle passe sous silence la question de la complicité du comité macédonien dans le meurtre de Mihaileano. Or, c'est ce crime qui a provoqué en Roumaine toute l'agitation antibulgare actuelle, c'est ce crime qui améne les autorités roumanies à accuser le comité macédonien d'organiser en Roumanie de véritables bandes d'assassins, ayant pour mission de faire disparaître tous les hommes politiques ferment décidés à combattre l'influence bulgare en Macédoine. Le gouvernment bulgare semble donc assez peu disposé à réagir contre l'action politique du comité macédonien et c'est cela qui inspire quelque méfiance à Bucarest au sujet de la sincérité des sentiments d'amitié exprimés dans la note diplomatique que le ministre des affaires étrangéres de Bulgarie a adressée au cabinet roumain.

L'organe officiel du comité macédonien a publié une note qui est bien faite pour accroître encore la méfiance des Roumains. Cette note indique que, si le gouvernement bulgare prenait contre les révoltés macédoniens les mesures que réclame la presse roumaine, les meurtres politiques deviendraient «une épidémie irrépressible». Cela constitue une véritable menace de sanglantes

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[1] Wilhelm II (1859-1941), Emperor of Germany (1888-1918).

représailles contrastant étrangement avec les bonnes dispositions du président du comité macédonien qui s'est spontanément mis à la disposition de la justice bulgare pour lui fournir tous les renseignements de nature à jeter la lumiére sur le véritable rôle politique du comité de Sofia.

La situation, en somme, quoique beaucoup meilleure, reste assez tendue entre les deux pays, mais il ne faudrait pas s'effrayer outre mesure des menaces et des préparatifs de querre qu'on fait de part et d'autre. Nous avons dejà indique ici que ni la Russie ni l'Autriche ne toléreraient, en ce moment, une guerre bulgaro-roumaine, mais il y a une autre raison qui doit faire écarter la possibilité d'un conflit entre ces deux petits États des Balkans: tous les deux, la Roumanie aussi bien que la Bulgarie, se trouvent dans une situation financiére qui ne leur permettrait pas de risquer actuellement l'aventure d'une campagne. À Sofia comme à Bucarest, le Trésor est vide, ou à peu prés, et comme la Roumanie, pour faire la guerre, ne trouverait pas plus d'appui financier auprés de l'Autriche que la Bulgarie n'en trouverait auprés de la Russie, il faudra qu'on s'arrange à l'amiable, au bout du compte.

Roumains et Bulgares

Il est évident que ai quelque grande puissance européene avait un intérêt immediat à ce qu'une guerre éclatât sur le Bas-Danube le conflit qui s'est derniérement élevé entre Bucarest et Sofia en aurait aisément fourni l'occasion.

Il y a entre les Roumains et les Bulgares d'autres causes de dissentiments, parfois même d'intimités, que celles ayant été provoqués par les derniers assassinats commis sur des Roumains à l'instigation des comité révolutionnaires macédo-bulgares. Il y a ce fait que la Roumanie, militairement organisée et ayant si grandement contribué dans la campagne de Plevna à l'indépendance de la Bulgarie, n'a pu voir sans une impression plutôt désagréable l'organisation rapide d'une armée bulgare capable, ele aussi, d'entreprendre une action militaire, et, par la jonction de la Roumélie-Orientale à la Bulgarie proprement dite, la constitution d'un État deveant, jusqu'à un certain point, rivaliser avec un royaume comme la Roumanie.

La Roumanie, qui a une population de cinq milions et demi d'habitants peut, en temps de guerre, en rappelant la réserve et la territoriale, former quatre corps d'armée de campagne et une division active, comprenant en tout 4.000 officiers, 160.000 hommes de troupes, 32.000 chevaux, 390 canons. La Bulgarie et la Roumélie-Orientale comptent trois milions et demi d'habitants et peuvent, en rapelant toutes les réserves, présenter des effectifs s'élevant à 3.000 officiers 208.000 hommes de troupes, 39.000 chevaux, 432 canons, et plus de 8.000 voitures de transports. Dans l'état théorique de paix, le total des effectifs bulgares est de 2.500 officiers, 40.500 sous-officiers et soldats, et 4.700 chevaux, tandis que les effectifs de paix roumains sont de 3.200 officiers, 60.000 hommes de troupes et 12.000 chevaux. Les Roumains sont de remarquables soldats; les Bulgares se battent comme des enragés.

La Roumanie traverse une crise économique et financiére des plus désagréables; en Bulgarie, une crise économique et financiére des plus dures sévit. L'état de siége a été proclamé dans un certain nombre de districts; les paysans se refusent à payer la dîme au gouvernement du prince Ferdinand. Il faut faire donner la troupe, absolument comme il fallut naguére recourir à la troupe en Roumanie pour réprimer des paysans matinés.

Le gouvernement roumain est plus vieux; plus assis; il se trouve, en Roumanie, un nombre plus grand de personnalités ayant vraiment une instruction supérieure et des vues générales. La Roumanie est définitivement constituée en royaume, et qui qu'on puisse penser de la politique extérieure du roi Charles, il serait injuste de ne pas reconnaître des qualités dont ce monarque a fait preuve. Enfin, la Roumanie, géographiquement, est séparée des provinces turques ou bouillonnent toujours des fermets de révolte. Elle ne subit donc point le contre-coup immédiat, direct, de toutes ces agitations.

Certes, le prince Ferdinand[1], qui, lui aussi a de qui tenir, ne manque ni de finesse, ni d'habuleté, ni d'énergie, mais sa tâche était autrement compliquée que celle du roi Charles. Aprés Stamboulof, qui fut, un temps, le véritable régnant, il se trouve tiraillé entre les partis, sollicité par des politiques et des intérêts divers. Ses États limitent les terres turques ou se mêlent, des Serbes, des Roumains, des Albanais. C'est une macédoine de races; chacune a la prétention de représentes l'intelligence, l'avenir et, par comités plus ou moins secrets qui s'appliquent à entretenir la foi et les espérances nationales.

Bulgarie
Les bruits pessimistes. - Le manque d'argent

Le corespondant du « Matin » de Paris à Vienne apprend de source authentique et impartiale que les autorités militaires bulgares viennent de faire transporter une grande quantité de matériel de guerre de l'intérieur de la principauté à Widin Nikopol et Sistova, trois places fortes sur le Danube, faisant face à la frontiére roumaine.

Cependant, il doit dire que ni cette nouvelle ni l'avertissement donné aux réserves bulgares d'avoir à se tenir prètes au premier signal, ni les préparatifs de mobilisation des forces roumaines, ne praraissaient affecter l'optimisme qui régne ici à l'égard des relations roumano-bulgares.

Ou considere que la guerre est hors de question, parce que les deux gouvernements manquent également et absolument d'argent, circonstance qui aurait du créer un lien de sympathie entre eux. Aucun des deux États n'a de fonds ni de crédit, et lours trésors sont à vide.

À Vienne, on a, d'ailleurs, la plus grande confiance dans le roi Charles de Roumanie et on est convençu qu'il parviendra à aplanir des difficultés actuelles. On pense qu'il ne tardera pas à rétablir des relations normales entre les deux pays en mentrant à son ministére la nécesité de se déclarer satisfait des concessions obtenues, quelque minimes qu'elles aient pu être.

Naturellement, on devra mettre fin aux extorsions et aux meurtros, et les fonctionnaires bulgares devrent cesse d'acorder leur appui ouvert au mouvement révolutionnaire qui agite la principauté.

À signaler qui la Serbie, suivant l'exemple de la Roumanie, vient à son tour de soumettre aux puissances une liste de crimes qui auraient été perpétrés sur des Serbes par le même comité révolutionnaire bulgare dont les Roumains viennent d'être victimes.

En Bulgarie

Depuis l'avénement du ministére au Gouvernment de la Bulgarie, une ére de prospérité s'est ouverte pour la principauté.

Malgré ses nombreux dafauts et les charges considerablés qu ils au pays, le contrat de la conversion de la dette a été voté. On a voulu montrer que la Bulgarie respecte tous les engargements qu'elle prend.

Les nombreux travaux publics, les chemins de fer construits par l'État et l'exploitation de la situation speciale de la principauté par la banque étrangére, avaient compromis la situation financiére du pays.

Le nouveau ministére a réduit les dépenses me cherché de nouvelles ressources dans la transformation de certains impôts. Autrefois, a existait une dîme que les agriculteurs ayaient directement à l'État en maniére impôt. On avait cru devoir la remplacer par la contribution fonciére, à cause de certains abus. La réception de la dîme se faisait ministére des finances, et l'on

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[1] Saxe Coburg Gotha Ferdinand I (1861; Vienna-1948; Coburg) was Prince (1887-1908) and King (1908-1918) of Bulgaria. According to the findings of a Romanian historian nowadays it, "Strong personality and complex, very ambitious, proud and confident, wearing mostly the responsibility to strain the political situation in the Balkans and in Europe on the eve of World War I" (Ionescu, 2005: 363 – Editor's note biographical: N.-Ş. Tanaşoca).

constatait réguliérement de soi-disant manquants de poids. Les fermiers se plaignaient, mais ils en firent autant sous le regime de l'impôt foncier.

Avec la dîme, le paysant cédait une quantité proportionnelle du rendement. Si celui-ci était bon, l'impôt était fort, mais si la récolte était mauvaise, la part à donner au gouvernement était petite.

Avec la contribution fonciére le cultivateur dut verser en espéces une somme déterminée et il fut obligé de recourir à l'usurier qui demandait par an 15, 20, 30 p.c., parfois même davantage.

Les usuriers en Bulgarie sont généralement des cabaretiers tzintzares et roumains, vivant dans les campagnes, contrairement à la loi et aux traités de commerce, qui défendent aux étrangers d'exercer la profession de cabatier dans les villages.

Le gouvernement bulgare, ému par les doléances des agriculteurs, a rétabli la dîme, mais avec la clause de la réception directe du produit et de la livraison aux acheteurs par ses soins. Ce faisant, il s'est aliéné les usuriers et l'opposition a exploité le mécontentement. De là les troubles de Trestemsk et de Doman-Koulak, dont nous avons parlé, il y a quelque temps et que la presse roumaine a fortement extragérés.

Les journaux de Bucarest semblent inspirés par les Tzintzares de Bulgarie. Ils s'acharnent sur la principauté, ne manquent aucune occasion d'attaquer le Gouvernement de Sofia, et c'est ainsi que d'une crime personner, l'assassinat du professeur Michaleano, ils font une question politique des plus graves, excitant les populations et poussant à la guerre.

Heureusement qu'a Sofia on reste calme. Dés le premier jour, le Gouvernement bulgare a déclaré que, depuis son avénement, il n'a eu aucune relation avec M. Kazakoft, qui n'a été à aucun titre agent du ministére des affaires étrangéres, ni de l'agence de Bucarest.

La général Nicolaieff, étant en retraite de service, ne peut faire partie d'aucun comité. Il y a quatre ans, il était à la réserve; il pouvait alor être membre ou même président du comité macédonien qui done des secours aux écoles bulgares et aux Bulgares malheureux en Macédoine.

Les Roumains ont aussi de ces comités de secours, non seulement pour la Macédoine, mais aussi pour la Transylvanie. Les membres de ces sociétés sont-ils responsables des actes repréhensibles, commis, par quelques exaltés? Evidemment, non.

Le «Pester Lloyd» rappelait la semaine passée que beaucoup d'attentats perpétrés en Bulgarie depuis vingt ans avaient été organisés en Roumanie et que pour d'autres ces crimes, les auteurs et leurs complices trouvérent asile dans ce pays.

La «Narodni Prava» de Sofia dit à propos de la campagne de la presse roumaine:

«Tout ce mouvement ne serait-il peut-étre qu'un essai de diversion de la part des Roumains pour tenter de détourner l'attention de l'Europe des mauvais traitements que la Roumanie fait subir aux juifs habitant le pays; on pourrait d'autant mieux le croire que la presse roumanie accuse le ministre Radoslavoff[1] de faire partie du comité macédonien, ce qui est faux, tandis que la presse europénne accuse M. Istrati[2] de continuer, tout en étant ministre, d'être le meneur des comités antisémitiques roumains ce qui paraît être vrai!

La coïncidence entre les accusations de la presse française au sujet du terrorisme (le mot est des journaux roumains) exercé sur les juifs de Bucarest et celles de la presse européenne au sujet de l'action suspecte de membres du gouvernement roumain dans les menées antisémitiques, avec les accusations lancées par les Roumains seulement contre la Bulgarie et son gouvenement, nous semble font caractéristique. Elle paraît de nature à expliquer la mauvaise humeur de nos voisins.

Il y a également quelque jalousie chez eux à cause des immenses progrés faits par la Bulgarie en 20 ans, ces progrés surtout ceux qui ont rapport au développement de l'instruction du peuple, gênent les Roumains qui ne manquent pouryant jamais une occasion de vanter leur haute civilisation, de se parer même du titre de sentinelle de la civilisation en Orient; or, tous ceux qui ont

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[1] Vasil Radoslavov (1854-1929); president of the Council of Ministers: 1886-1887, 1913-1918; minister: 1884-1886, 1894.

[2] Constantin I. Istrati (1850-1919), scientific and Romanian politician.

pu étudier les Roumains chez aux, savent, que cette haute civilisation n'existe qu'à fleur de peau; que si l'on gratte quelque peu le byzantin ne tarde pas à reparaître, et encore est-ce du byzantin de la décadnce que nous entendons parler. La persécution des juifs qui ne date pas d'hier en Roumanie, l'article 44 du Traité de Berlin en fait foi, n'est elle pas une preuve de ce que nous avançons? Et tout récemment le refus de recevoir les malheureux. Arméniens, n'est-il pas une autre preuvre du manque absolu le générosité dans le caractère roumain».

L.S.

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Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Bucharest].
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BULLETIN DE L'ÉTRANGER

BUCAREST ET SOFIA

On so souvient du meurtre recènt du profesour Mikaileano à Bucarest. La victime était depuis longtemps un objet secret de haine pour les rèvolutionnaires macédo-bulgares, don't le comitè central est à Sofia. Ceux-ci ont deux têtes de Turc: celle des Turcs, d'abord, ensuite les Roumains de Macédoine, qu'ils accusent d'être des faux frères, vendus à l'oppresseur, capables de retarder à jamais l'émancipation du peuple macédonien par le dèsir qu'ils ont d'en faire exclusivement profiter leur race et leur pays.

Le gouvernement roumain lui-même n'est pas ménagé par eux.

Bulgares de Macédoine et Macédoines de Bulgarie l'acusent ouvertment d'encurager les Roumains établis en Macédoine a observer une attitude pleine de soumission et de déférence envers les Turcs. On le représente volontiers, à Sofia, comme le champion du *statu-quo* et le seul baton dans les de l'émancipation macédonienne.

Les Roumains de Macédoine et le gouvernement roumain, voila done les deux ennemis principaux du comité révolutionnaire qui prepare en silence, à Sofia, l'avènement d'une nation nouvelle. Mais il ne saurait les attendre ni les supprimer. On ne se débarrasserait des premiers que par un massacre, du second que par une révolution à Bucarest. Les deux moyens sont hors de question. Il a fallu trouver autre chose.

À en juger par de récents événements, les révolutionnaires macédo-bulgares auraient inaugurés une politique consistant a en imposer au peuple une politique consistant à en imposer au people roumain, sinon à son gouvernement, par le meurtre et la terreur. Deux bulgares réfugiés en Roumanie ont été récemment mis à mort par des agents du comité de Sofia et, d'autre part, l'on sait le sort de M. Mikaileano. L'assasin du professeur, un jeune homme de vingt ans, nommé Stoyan Dimitrof, aurait declaré qu'il avait été armé par un agent révolutionnaire connu de la police roumaine, qui lui promit l'immortalité. «Mon nom, disait-il, sera ecrit dans l'histoire de la Bulgarie».

Mais il y a plus. À Sofia, sont établis un certain nombre de marchands enrichis, Macédoniens d'origine, mais devenus Roumains par naturalisation depuis de longues années. Ils souhaitent bien l'émancipation macédonienne, mais non par le fusil bulgare ni pour le profit de la Bulgarie, ce qui ne fait pas l'affaire du comité de Sofia. Les marchands roumains ont done été d'abord menaces de mort; plusieurs d'entre eux auraient ete assassins; les autres se sont rachetés par une très forte souscription.

Le gouvernement roumain s'est ému. Il a demande au gouvernement bulgare, après l'assassinat de M Mikaileano, s'il continuerait longtemps à couvrir de sa protection le comité qui

functionne à Sofia. M. Ivantchof, ministre des Affaires Étrangeres à Sofia, a repondu que le gouvernement bulgare n'agirait contre les Macédoniens habitant Sofia que si leur complicité dans l'assassinat lui était demontrée par les pièces mêmes du processus. C'était une réponse raisonnable. Sur quoi Bucarest a mis en avant son second grief et a policment mais fermement fait savoir à Sofia qu'en attendant le règlement de l'affaire Mikaileano, il lui semblait désirable de faire cesser les persécutions que subissent les Roumains de Bulgarie.

Le journal officieux de Sofia repudie toute entente entre le gouvernement bulgare et le comité revolutionnaire de Sofia et accuse les Roumains de profiter de l'occasion, de chercher des prétextes sinistres pour nuire à l'oeuvre de la Bulgarie dans les Balkans. Les journaux autrichiens approuvent avec vigueur l'attitude de la Roumanie. Chacun sait à quelles intéreses divers réspondent ces plaidoyers différents.

Cependant l'enquete continue à Bucarest. Des témoignages sont recueillis. Les piéces seront, dit-on, soumises, avec la correspondance entre les deux États, à toutes les grandes puissances d'Europe, aussitot que chacun des ministères aura complété son dossier. Les choses en sont là.

"Le Temps"

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Bucharest].
Fond 71/1900, Vol. 45, f. 148.

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MINISTERUL AFACERILOR STRAINE
SECRETARIATUL GENERAL
No 15924 *17 AUG. 1900

LEGATION DE ROUMANIE À BERLIN
No 713
9/22 August 1905

Legation Royale de Roumainie
Annexe 11 418/900

La querelle bulgaro-roumaine, provoquee par l'assassinat du professeur Mihaileano, prend des part et d'autre, à des menaces de guerre et le gouvernement roumain a renforcé tous postes militaires de frontière et rappele sous les drapeaux les hommes actuellement en conge. Pourtant, avant d'en venire aux violences, le gouvernement roumain a informé la Turquie, la Russie et les puissances de la Triplice de l'étant de choses provoqué par les menées du comité macédonien de Sofia, et la Russie, a en croire les oficieux roumains, aurait décidé d'intervenir auprès du gouvernement bulgare afin d'aplanir le différend, conformement a son accord de 1897, avec l'Autriche-Hongrie et d'empêcher tout mouvement qui pourrat tender à changer la situation actuelle dans les Balkans.

Le malheur est que la Roumanie n'ait pas eu recours tout de suite aux bons offices de la Russie et que le gouvernement de Bucarest se laisse aller à commettre certaines fautes, qui ont achevé d'embrouillier les choses. Cest ainsi que beaucoup de Bulgares résident à Bucarest ont été expulsés et que dans les localités riveraines du Danube on a arrêtés plusiers Bulgares sous prétexte que, étant affiliés au comité macédonien de Sofia, ils devaient être impliques dans l'assassinat de Mihaileano.

À Sofia, on a été exaspéré par ces expulsions et par ces arrestations. Les attaques de la presse roumaine contre le gouvernement du prince Ferdinand ont rendu impossible, pour l'instant, toute conciliation directe. S'il faut en croire M. Dontcheff, maire de Roustchouk et député bulgare

très influent, la situation actuelle aurait été créé voluntairement par la Roumanie s'efforçait de donner au meurtre de Mihaileano des proportions considérables parce qu'elle y voyait l'occasion de développer un mouvement politique qui n'était certainement pas spontane certaines puissances européennes ayant intérêt à maintenir les pays balkaniques en état de division. Ce serait a l'inspiration de ces puissances européennes qu'aurait obei le gouvernement roumain en adressant au cabinet de Sofia, au ledemain du meurtre de Mihaileano, la note diplomatique que connaissent nos lecteurs, et que le gouvernement bulgare jugea beaucoup trop violente de ton. M. Dontcheff a declaré, au reste, que le gouvernement bulgare n'avait rien de commun avec le comité macédonien dont la culpabilité devrait être formellement démontrée avant qu'on put agir contre lui. Or, jamais, jusqu'ici, acune plainte n'a été depose contre le comité macdonien. M. Dontcheff conclut que la Roumanie a tort grave de chercher à établir son influence en Macédoine, qui est absolument perdue pour elle et que les Bulgares considèrent comme leur appartenant de droit.

Voilà ce qu'on dit dans les milieux politiques de Sofia pour la defense de la Bulgarie. En réalité, l'incident, si violent qu'il paraisse à première vue, se ramènerait donc à de simples compétitions des deux peuples en Macédoine.

Eut-il, d'ailleurs, une portée plus considérable que les puissances ne toléraient certainement pas, en ce moment, une guerre bulgaro-roumaine. Trop d'intérêts de prudent du maintien du statu quo dans les Balkans pourque la Russie et l'Autriche-Hongrie permettent aux deux peuples ennemis de courir jusqu'au bout l'aventure d'une guerre. Avec un peu de bonne volonté de part et d'autre, on arrivera à un arrangement que la Russie, au besoin, saura leur imposer.

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Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Bucharest].
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Bruxelles 10/23 August 1900

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L'incident bulgaro-roumain ne parait decidement pas devoir entrer de sitôt dans la voie de l'amplasement. On s'exaspere de plus a Bucharest contre le government bulgare, et le bruit courait hier dans les milieux politiques que le ministre de Roumanie à Sofia avait telegrafie à son gouvernement que le cabinet bulgare se refusant à lui donner une réponse convenable aux notes diplomatiques qu'il lui avait remises, il demandait à être rapele immediatement de son poste.

À Bucarest même se produisent chaque jour des manifestations antibulgares. Les étudiants y tiennent des meetings où l'on desapprouve en termes d'une rare violence la conduite du gouvernement de Sofia, et où l'on demande au roi de Roumanie, actuellement à Sinaia, d'agir énergiquement et fixer l'attention de l'Europe sur des actes susceptible de troubler la paix dans les Balkans. Au sujet de différend, on attend beaucoup de résultats practique du voyage que le roi et la reine de Roumanie vont entreprendre la semaine prochaine. En se rendant à Ragatz pour y faire sa cure habituello, le roi Carol rendra visite à Ischi à l'empereur François-Joseph d'Autriche-Hongrie, qui a toujours été pour la Roumanie un protecteur sincère. Le prince de Bulgarie, d'autre part, étant ouvertement protégé par la Russie, c'est entre les cabinets de Saint-Petersburg et Vienne que le diférend se réglera très probablement.

En somme, c'est ce que l'on pourrait esperer de mieux. Étant donnée la violence des polémiques entre la presse officieuse roumaine et la presse officieuse bulgare, on peut difficilement croire au succès des négotiations enterprises directement entre les deux pays. C'est qu'il y a, en effet, derrière ce meurtre du professeur Mikaileanu par le bulgare Dimitroff, des années et des années de lutte pour la prédominance de l'influence bulgare en Macedoine. Les Serbes, les Grecs eux-mêmes soutiennent les Roumains dans le differend actuel, dans l'expoir que les puissances, par

crainte de la guerre, mettent elles-mêmes la Bulgarie dans l'imposibilité de poursuivre sa propagande nationaliste en Macédoine. Le fait est caractéristique de voir les journaux grecs, par exemple, aussi montes de ton que les journaux roumains et qualifiant les Bulgares de Boxers, de criminels pour lesquels tous les moyens de propaganda sont bons.

Il faut beaucoup se méfier de ces violences de langage qui ne reflètent peut-être pas exactement la situation parce qu'elles résultant d'un état d'esprit très spécial. L'influence russe en Bulgarie et l'influence autrichienne en Roumanie auront vite fait de calmer tout cet emoi; car ni la Russie ni l'Autriche ne se soucient de laisser provoquer dans les Balkans des complications qui pouraient entrainer des moditications a l'accord austro-russe de 1897. Le cabinet de Saint Petersbourg est trop occupé en Chine pour favoriser d'une manière définitive, en ce moment, l'expansion bulgare en Macédoine, et le cabinet de Vienne est aux prises avec trop de difficultés interieures pour songer à soutenir efficacement les colères roumaines contre le fameux comité macédonien de Sofia. L'entrevu du Roi Carol avec l'Empereur-Roi à Ischi calmera les esprits de part et d'autre.

    Domnului Alexandru Marghiloman Ministrul Afacerilor Străine,
     etc.   etc.   etc.   București

           Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Bucharest].
           Fond 71/1900, Vol. 45, f. 173.

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THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE CLERGY IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF THE ROMANIAN PRINCIPALITIES. NEOFIT SCRIBAN

Adrian Duțuc[*]

Abstract

The present article aims at bringing to light the contribution brought by Bishop Neofit Scriban to what was the fight for the Unification of the Romanian Principalities and the organization process of the new Romanian state formation. In order to elaborate our topic, this article is taking into consideration a series of guidelines such as: which is the state of the current research related to the unionist activity of Neofit Scriban? Which archive information sources can complement and help us to evaluate the issues raised by our topic more precisely? What are we trying to bring new in our scientific endeavour?

Neofit Scriban is a history page which writing is still in progress! He identified himself with the Unification of the Principalities and with the Romanians' will of living together and did it as a true patriot, with whom many of the personalities we think of as heroes of the Unification have collaborated with. He fought for the ideals that the Romanian nation so longed for and he used the weapons of the clergy: first and foremost, he repeatedly promoted and spread the unionist ideas from the church's desk (sermons which are, in their great majority, unrecorded by history), he used the weapon of writing, and when needed, the political weapon.

Key words: *Romanian Principalities Unification, Romanian Church, politics, clergy involvement*

Introduction

The present article aims at bringing to light the contribution brought by Bishop Neofit Scriban to what was the fight for the Unification of the Romanian Principalities and the organization process of the new Romanian state formation. In order to elaborate our topic, we are taking into consideration a series of guidelines: which is the state of the current research related to the unionist activity of Neofit Scriban? Which archive information sources can complement and help us to evaluate the issues raised by our topic more precisely? What are we trying to bring new in our scientific endeavour?

The life and activity of Bisho p Neofit Scriban is recorded by historians in only a few studies conducted mainly in the second half of the 19th Century (Erbiceanu Constantin the 1884 study: (Erbiceanu, C., 1884), the 1888 book: (Erbiceanu, C., 1888), the 1888-1890 study: (Erbiceanu, C., 1889-1890); F. Romanescu the 1866 study: (Romanescu, F., 1866); Lascăr Dumitru, the 1898 book: (Lasăr, D., 1898); Hrițcu Dumitru the 1982 study: (Hrițcu, D., 1982), studies which were rich in historical information, but to which we wish to add a series of details and aspects which will complete the profile of the historical character Neofit Scriban. Along with these studies, we find that a good guide for the classification in time and appreciation of the place and role of Neofit Scriban in the history of the Romanian Church and the Romanian Principalities, were the two review papers of Mircea Păcuraru (Păcuraru, 1981) and, more recently, that of Alexandru Moraru

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from 2006, namely *The Romanian Orthodox Church between 1885-2000*, vol. III, tom 1, *Church. Birth. Culture*. In this paper work, the priest university professor doctor analyses and makes the strict evaluation of the clergy representatives and analyses the place and the role of the Scriban family members, both from the Church history perspective, as well as from the national-state history and culture of the eras in question.

Alexandru Moraru's review offers us essential, valuable details of the place and the role of Neofit Scriban, who, along with his brother Filaret, was among the leaders of the clergy in the unionist fight. Neofit Scriban is known especially for the fact that he militated for a policy of refusing compromises, both in matters related to the Church, and political, too. His distinguishing, many times acid frankness, as well as his direct way of approaching the acute problem that he had to face, made him one of the picturesque characters within the historical landscape in which he lived and worked, but have also made him fall.

In elaborating our topic, we are mainly taking into consideration the Archive of the Holy Trinity Parish Church from Burdujeni, which consists of documents belonging to the Moldavian bishop, as well as his correspondence to various notable personalities of that time. Their analysis aims to complete the portrait which history reserves for Bishop Neofit Scriban.

Before treating the topic, we must mention the fact that, throughout his activity years, Neofit Scriban carried about a box chained with iron belts, in which he kept the important documents, whether personal or official. (Annex 1). Thanks to this, historical research enjoys inedited instruments for the discovery of Neofit Scriban's personality, as well as certain important historical events which he was a part of. The history of this document-keeping box is very interesting. With regard to this topic, the vicar of the "*Holy Trinity*" Chuch in Burdujeni, writes the following: "*In the chamber that acts as museum, there us this metallic box, fitted with a very innovative locking system*: **nine padlocks which can all be only opened with a single key**, *from a single position. It is said that this box had carried about important documents from the time it was used, some even go further and say that Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza himsef would've carried documents of our country in this very secure box. Up until a few years ago, in 1994, a well sinker of the Burdujeni village, who was always helping the church, knew how to open the nine locks out of just one move. He died at 84, without sharing the secretto other villagers, so, currently, although the box is empty, no one can open it*" (Pârlac, 2001: 29-32).

2. The historical context

At the end of the 18th Century and the beginning of the 19th Century, the Romanian nation was struggling with a special political situation. Being under Phanariot regime, they couldn't affirm themselves neither as nation, nor as force, whereas the countries around were looking to take away parts of the ancestral Romanian territory. The fate of the Romanian states was in hands foreign to our kin. The type of politics performed in the Romanian states was a counterbalance between Petersburg and Byzantium, and the Phanariot rulers were the ones keeping the balance between these powers. People with love for their nation didn't know where to go and what to do in order to finally put Romanians' fate on an upward trajectory. They were afraid to direct their steps towards North, and they no longer believed in the Turks' opportunistic policy to go back to Byzantium (Erbiceanu, 1889: 322).

The national education was functioning at a very low level and the national small schools could barely save their names. Commerce and industry were, in their great majority, in the hands of foreigners, the only option left for the lower class of the population, was to work from dusk 'til dawn without the possibility to enjoy the fruits of their work, ending up in a state similar to slavery.

Militarily speaking, the Romanian states were always somewhere in the middle of the Russian and Turk invasions, the armies of both countries crossing our borders under the pretext of certain military campaigns which were performed in our interest, a reason for which we had to pay by: ensuring food for the occupying armies, having to put up with the country's taking status, providing transportation services in the interest of the invaders, having to watch the suspension of our local government and much more (Erbiceanu, 1889: 322).

People with a love for their country had to mobilize and try to restore the Romanian nation's dignity and freedom which it deserved within the historical context of the end of the 18th century and beginning of the 19th.

Alongside the huge role of the great political people, the ancestral Church, following the voice of its conscience, understood that it was better not to remain uninvolved. In the two Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, the involvement in restoring the political and cultural dignity of the Romanian nation was also shown by Church people. The fact that the leaders of the Episcopal thrones were people who supported the gifted humans, who were motivated to fight for their own country's good, boded very well.

In Moldavia, in the first half of the 19th century, the metropolitan stool was occupied by Veniamin Costachi, who worked so much for the church and national culture, that all the libraries couldn't cover the writings about his personality (Udişteanu, 2005: 310). Through his policy, he encouraged those who wanted to work for the people and the faith. Not few are those whom Veniamin promoted, but, among all of them, the most brilliant one were the Scriban monk brothers: Neofit and Filaret (Udişteanu, 2005: 310). Their fruitful activity made Nicolae Iorga talk about what the great historian called "*the Scribans current*".

The historical context enclosing both Neofit Scriban's, as well as his brother Filaret's work is marked by two reference points: The Unification of the Principalities, as irrefutable patriotic act and the fight for restoring the rights of the Church, generically called "*The fight for canonicity*". In this article we will focus on his involvement in the fight for Unification, as well as in the Romania's new process of organization. By this we are trying to ponder over – as objectively as possible – the place which history should confer this churchman.

3. Neofit's involvement in the process of the Romanian Principalities Unification

The reason why Neofit was the man who had something to say (or write, for that matter) in the fight for the Unification was the fact that he had become an opinion maker for the generation which he was a part of. He gradually became a much respected clergyman by his contemporaries and he achieved all this through his vast culture, but also through the fruits of his educational work. Diligent bishop, he graduated the classes of the Vasilian Gymnasium and the Mihaileana Academy in 1838, enriching his knowledge of

literature, philosophy and foreign languages such as French, Latin and Greek (Erbiceanu, 1889: 325). In Iasi, he worked as catechumen for the foreigners in this city who converted to Orthodoxy and censor (press licenser) of the speeches held in the cathedral, according to the Appointing book no 1861 from December 31st, issued by the Moldavian Metropolitan (The *"Holy Trinity"* Parish of Burdujeni-Village, Documentary Fund, File IV, sheet 50). In 1838, he published a short catechism entitled: *"Catechesis or high teachings of the Oriental Church, part of them composed, other collected and written in ancestral letters in a new method"*. For a short while, he studied at the Saint Sava College in Bucharest. Returned to Iasi in 1841, he was castaway and sent to the Neamţ Monastery by Prince Mihail Grigore Sturza as a result of certain schemes, but later was appointed education manager at the Monastery of Neamţ, where he revised the translation of the church canon collection called Pidalion, a work which had been translated by Metropolitan Veniamin Costache (Păcuraru, 1959: 89-90).

Probably one of the reasons why Neofit is sent into exile was the fact that he was reading the French author Voltaire. This was in contradiction with the rejection program for the atheistic and revolutionary foreign writings, a program initiated by Ioan Caragea through the 1817 schools regulations. Thus, Neofit, *"was spiritually and academically checked and then sent in exile for repentance at the Neamt Monastery by the very Metropolitan Veniamin Costachi, whose liberalism didn't reach Voltaire"* (Camariano, 1942: 407).

Returned to Iasi, he is appointed Principal of the *"Trei Ierarhi"* (*t.n.* The three Hierarchs) National School. In the following fourteen years (1848-1862) he is the titular of the Greek, Rhetoric and Philosophy lecturing desks of the Socola Seminary, as well as Chancellor throughout 1860-1862 (Păcuraru, 2002: 178), positions from which he was able to bring an important contribution to the improvement of theological education.

His consistent, fruitful activity made Neofit advance in the churchly hierarchy. Thus, in 1852 he is appointed archimandrite by Metropolitan Sofronie Miclescu (Erbiceanu, 1885: 102).

This promotion coincides with his active involvement in his fight for the Romanian Principalities Unification, an involvement materialized by his election as *"member in the Ad-hoc Divan in 1857 as delegate of his city Iaşi chosen by the clergy"* (Păcuraru, 1958: 558-559). We fully render **Certificate no. 1313** (The *"Holy Trinity"* Parish of Burdujeni-Village, Documentary Fund, Volume I, sheet 54) of August 29th 1857, the document drafted in Romanian in transit with Cyrillic letters:

"Sofronie, through God's mercy, Archbishop of Suceava and Metropolitan of Moldavia and Knight. Today, on the twenty ninth of Month August 1857, at the Mitropoly residence gathered all the priests from this residence, according to the First Article of the imperial firman, under our Presidency, and they have chosen in their greater majority, according to the legal lists, as deputy of the Ad-hoc Divan, His Allpious Archimandrite Neofit Scriban: hereupon we and the writers of the meeting have issued this legal certificate. Sofronie, Metropolitan of Moldavia. Secretary Archimandrite Neofit Scriban. Manager of the Mitropoly, illegible signature No. 1313, 1857, August 20. Having checked the hereby mandate and finding that it complies with the imposed rules, the committees hereby declare it legal. Archimandrite Melchisedec. K. Negri. K. Hurmuzachi. G. Sturza logothete. D. Rallet. D. Cracti. Ion Roată (fingerprint) 1857, sevt. 24." (Annex 1)

The document, found in the Documentary Archive of the Church, the latter having been founded by the Scriban brothers is very relevant, as it emphasizes the fact that, among the Romanian clergy members, Neofit Scriban was the most active supporter of

the Romanian Principalities Unification. Dionisie Udişteanu describes him as *"the most determined man of all the monks for all the good deeds, ... to Father Archimandrite Scriban, who on every occasion spoke his mind."* (Udişteanu, 2005b: 27). These were not just words, they came from a deep appreciation for Neofit's deeds.

Thus, amid the unionist disquietude, Neofit writes out of his own will, supported by Metropolitan Sofronie Miclescu (1851-1860) the work entitled *"The Unification and Non-unification of the Principalities"*, in semi-Cyrillic alphabet, having a foreword of Teodor Codrescu. (Scriban, N., 1856) The work appeared in the *Zimbrul* newspaper in Iaşi (year IV, no. 117 of June 1856) and in the *Steaua Dunarii* (Iaşi, year II, no 29 of June 5th 1856). The writing is split into two chapters: **I.** The Non-Unification of Principalities, in which the anti-unionist representatives' arguments were being fought and **II.** The Unification of Principalities, in which one showed the political, economical and administrative advantages which would come as a result of unifying the two Romanian states Neofit was suggesting (Vitcu, 1979), among others, that only by uniting Romanians, could they prevent the Northern Slavic people to come towards those from the South, and for Austria this danger of Panslavism was far outweighing the danger of the Romanian Principalities Unification.

This book caused even more adversity among the members of the separatist group and the unionists. Court Marshall Nicolae Istrati, brother of the anti-unionist Bishop Meletie Istrati of Huşi, combated Neofit's work through a brochure entitled *"Upon the matter of the day in Moldavia"* published in 1856 in Iaşi. This brochure is combated in its turn, nu more unionists, among whom Neofit with his polemical replying work entitled *"The advantages of the Romanian Principalities Unificaiton"*, Printed by Buciumul Român, 1856, in 37 pages, with semi-Cyrillic alphabet.

These two brochures written by Neofit Scriban were printed in 10 000 copies and spread all over Moldavia by the Socola Seminary students, during their 1856 summer holidays (Lascăr, 1896: 36).

In this fight between the pro and anti-union groups, the most ardent supporters of the Unification from the Church's part were: Metropolitan Sofronie Miclescu, Archimandrite Melchisedec Ştefănescu, Archimandrite Neofit Scriban and his brother Filaret. Although their struggle was successful, within the process of crystallizing the Romanian State, they had to endure the bad consequences due to the fact that the relationship between the State and the Church had gone though much turbulence.

We must mention the fact that the above mentioned brochures belonging to Neofit have aroused the hate of the country rulers and of those around them, too. As a result, the Austrian agent in Iaşi asked kaimakan Teodor Balş (1856-1857) to take measures as to expel Archimandrite Neofit Scriban. Even the new kaimakan, Nicolae Vogoride (1857-1858) asked Metropolitan Sofronie that the Scriban brothers not be registered in the electoral clergy lists for the Ad-hoc Divan elections, stating that the Ottoman Empire had expressed this will (Păcuraru, 1959: 93).

In the same unionist purpose, Neofit prints in Paris *"Short history and chronology of the Moldavia Mitropoly"* (Paris, 1857, June 18th, in 28 pages, semi-Cyrillic alphabet) (Păcuraru, 1959: 93). This work had been written with the purpose of arguing, as best as possible, the fact that the Church of Moldavia didn't depend on Constantinople.

Along with the Seven Great Power commisaries' arrival to Moldavia, who were forming the so-called European Committee Neofit and Filaret Scriban are part of the

welcoming staff. What Victor Place writes about the Scriban brothers, in a letter sent to commissary Walewski, on June 4th 1857, shows the way in which these two clerics were perceived by their contemporaries: "*Both are being, without a doubt, the most notable, capable and energetic representatives of the Moldavian Clergy... The Austrians and the Turks have understood for a long time that the Scriban brothers are hindering their pressure and cheating policy and what influence would they have within the Divan where they are called by their general wish; this is why, they won't stop until having eliminated them*" (Păcuraru, 1959: 94).

On the first elections, which took place on August 29th 1857, despite having received the Ad-hoc Divan member mandate (The "Holy Trinity" Parish of Burdujeni-Village, Documentary Fund, File V, sheet 54, Certificate no 1313 of August 29th 1857), Neofit was excluded from the electoral lists of the clergy, the reason being that of him being a monk and not living in the city, but outside of it, in Socola. The domination policy of that time was of erasing as many unionists from the electoral lists, especially the "*famous unionists*" (Istoria Românilor, 2003, vol. VII: 452) on which list Neofit was surely a part of. These actions, managed by Moldavia's kaimakan ended up strengthening the unionist party's wish for unification even more.

Amid that 1857 summer crisis, on the initiative of Iasi's unionist committee, Neofit leaves to Bucharest and contacts the Wallachian unionists. He establishes correspondence connections with the bishops and the local Metropolitan, urging them to take actions related to support of the Unification (Păcurariu, 1959: 94). Furthermore, Neofit, recommended by Kogălniceanu as "*champione energique de notre cause*" (*t.n.* energetic champion of our cause. This is the term used by Kogălniceanu in a letter to I.I. Filipescu, dated Iaşi, June 28th 1857, its bearer being precisely Neofit Scriban, the latter being later brought into contact with the Bucharest unionist party and with British commisary Sir Bulwer. Later, in 1870, along with the flow of events and Neofit's fall into the disgrace of the ruling class, Kogălniceanu would call Neofit "*Jesuitic*" and a "*sinister character of his country*") (Aricescu, 1873: 38), had to also contact the European Committee's members, and ask for support in order to achieve the Unification and inform them upon the Moldavians' complaints against kaimakan Vogoride and his government.

This episode is evoked by his biographer, who describes this episode, giving details of great importance in outlining Neofit's unionist portrait: "*Neofit Scriban was the soul of the principles of his time. He was the one responsible, in the summer of 1857, with the acts and protests of the Unionist Committee in Moldavia, to take them secretly to Bucharest, since they were followed closely by the anti-unionist government; reaching Focşani, he crosses Milcovul by foot, at night, along with his nephew, Romulus Scriban, who carried the papers at his chest,…*". (Erbiceanu, 1884: 404)

No one took responsibility for this action, but Neofit, not caring about the danger of getting arrested, dared to, but he didn't prove to be successful in his endeavour, which made C. Erbiceanu conclude: "*there was no significant political fact during the Unification in which Neofet Scriban not be an active part of, even risking his own life, because the battles had hardened him and he was used to suffering! … Not only through writings and hidden actions was he a part of the inauguration of the New Romanian Era, but even through having directly participated, as representative of the clergy, in the Ad-hoc Divan, although the powers of that time were against him*" (Erbiceanu, 1884: 94).

After the cancelling of the first Ad-hoc Divan elections, won by the anti-unionists through a series of irregularities, Neofit is put back on the electoral lists thanks to his and Metropolitan Sofronie's protest sent to the European Committee in Bucharest (Păcurariu,

1959). His election was made with 136 out of 139 expressed votes, a percentage which again, shows the appreciation and consideration he was enjoying among his contemporaries.

In the opening of the second Divan on September 28th 1857, Neofit holds a speech dedicated to the historical importance of these elections. The speech takes place at the Saint Nicolae Domnesc Church within the Te-Deum service which marked the opening of the works (Scriban, 1868: 74-87).

The Ad-hoc meetings represent a very important moment in the process of establishing the Romanian National State. It was then that the cohesion force of the Unionist Party got stronger, such that, these meeting, and especially those in Moldavia were a *"laboratory in which the political social program for the establishment of modern Romania was elaborated"* (Istoria Românilor, 2003, vol. VII: 459).

In Moldavia, the committee appointed with preparing the project related to the future organization of the Romanian Principalities consisted of: Archim. Neofit Scriban, P. Mavrogheni, C. Rolla, M. Kostaki, M. Kogălniceanu, V. Mălinescu, C. Iacovachi, Lascăr Catargiu and V. Stan (Buzatu, Lemny & Saizu, 1988). This project, established in 1857, on October 15th stipulated the following:

" - *Rectification of the Principality's border by an European Committee.*
- *Submission by the foreigners living in the Principalities to the country's jurisdiction.*
- *The free establishment of commercial connections of the Principalities.*
- *The national army power organization with regard to the Principalities 'protection system.*
- *Freedom of cultures at the edge of capitulations.*
- *The establishment of a new central synod society for the Romanian Church problems.*
- *Equality before law; all Romanians should have access to all the functions of the state; the rightful and general sharing of contributions; everyone's submission to military conscription.*
- *Respect for residence and individual freedom.*
- *Political rights for any Christian human.*
- *Separation of executive power from the legislative one.*
- *The legal part should not depend on administration, especially.*
- *Responsibilities of the Ministers"* (Petrescu, & Sturza, 1889: 44).

Neofit is also a member of the nine-member committee chosen on October 10th 1857 to address the problems which would resolve within the Divan. As far as the freedom of cults was concerned, a problem treated within the tenth meeting of October 25th 1857, archimandrite Neofit spoke on the matter and asked that the cults be granted freedom, though in such a way that the Christian-Orthodox religion not be endangered. In the same meeting they also asked for the establishment of a synod authority which would be responsible with legislative and administrative prerogatives. Also, within the entire series of meetings initiated by the Ad-hoc Divan's works, both Neofit and his brother Filaret Scriban brought an important contribution. Thus, within the January 4th meeting, point 6 is debated, namely *"IV. Acknowledgment of The Romanian Oriental Orthodox Church of the Romanian Principalities autonomy to all types of hierarchies, yet keeping the unity of faith and good relations with the Eastern Ecumenical Church, as far as dogmas. V. Establishment of a central synod authority for all spiritual, canonic and disciplinary matters"*. To this point, along with other personalities of the time, such as Melchisedec Ştefănescu, D. Matcaş, Gr. Balş, A. Botez Forăscu, a.o., Neofit Scriban, who, throughout his life had always been interested by the problem of clerics' presence in civil society life and in knowing as precisely as possible the

religious and daily problems of the people, proposes to add these words to point 5: "*Where the priesthood of each eparchy shall be represented*" (Pocitan, 1936: 39).

The majority of the points written and debated within the Ad-hoc Divan later formed the fundament for the Romanian Church's future organization, serving as regulations in almost everything that has been made in the second half of the 19th century with regard to the Church (Dobrescu, 1905: 93).

Archimandrite Scriban also is a part of the clergy representatives committee (also part of the committee were bishops Ghenadie Șendrea and Filaret Scriban, archimandrite Melchisedec Ștefănescu and treasurer Dimitrie Matcaș) which presents a 12-points project with regard to the organization of the Moldavian Church, a project voted by the Meeting in 15 points, on December 21st 1857. Also, he voted along with other members of the Divan, a series of measures regarding the future organization of the country, such as: equality of everyone before law and elimination of privileges, respect for residence and individual freedom, organization of the army, separating executive power from the legal power, submission of foreigners to the laws of the country, conclusion of commercial relations with other states, compulsory, free education etc.

Once the Divan was dissolved in 1858, the elections for the Principalities legislative Meeting were being prepared, a meeting which purpose was that of appointing the Prince. Fervently involved in this process, on August 29th 1858, Neofit Scriban holds a speech before the electors of Iasi, advising them to choose competent representatives, who would fight for the unification of the two Principalities (Scriban, 1870: 85-89).

In his speech held within the Legislative Meeting opening, which took place on December 28th 1858, Neofit Scriban urges the ones present there to choose a worthful Prince, bringing back the memory of Ștefan cel Mare (*t.n.* Stephen the Great) (Scriban, 1870: 247-248). Within the same spirit, he writes the article "*A salute to Romania on January 24th 1859*" in which he describes this historical event in such eulogistic, fulgent words (Scriban, 1870: 58-65).

Neofit Scriban's efforts in these historical moments for the country haven't stopped there. Once the unification battle had been won, it would be followed by a fight at least as difficult as the last one: state organization. Seeing the future of the United Romanian Principalities from the perspective of the Orthodox clerics and being aware of the role in the edification of the Romanian countries that the Church members had throughout history, Neofit published three brochures, in which he talks about the clergy role within the society:

1. "*The necessity of having a clergy in the society and its need to be at the service of its fate... accompanied by the establishment of the Orthodox Clergy of Transylvania*" (Iași, The Buciumul roman Printing House, 1899);

2. "*Romanian clergy before article 46 of the Convention*" and

3. "*The illegality and faultiness of the project law for the election of Metropolitans and Bishops in the United Principalities*" (Iași, The Buciumul roman Printing House, 1861) (Păcurariu, 1959: 97).

Through these brochures, Neofit repeatedly emphasized that within the country's new organization system the presence of the Church is one of great importance. Also, he approached with great involvement themes related to the clerics' role in the Romanian society, their right of occupying public positions (invoking article 46 of the Paris

Convention), the way in which metropolitans and bishops were chosen and the problem of the great number of ordinations and people becoming monks.

Here, we need to remind of the next document which saw the light of the Church's archive, the same church where Neofit is buried in: "*Fundamental law project, worked on based on the Moldavia's Ad-hoc meeting votes, in the spirit of the Paris Convention, for the Church and the clergy of the United Principalities*" (The "*Holy Trinity*" Parish of Burdujeni-Village, Documentary Fund, Vol. I, sheet 98) The document, spread on 38 pages, was drafted by Neofit Scriban between 1862-1865 and submitted to the official forums' approval, in order to offer a strong basis of the in-progress functioning of the Romanian Church. The project consists of 12 chapters and 2 annexes. The most important chapters talk about the Autocephaly of the Romanian Church (chapter I), The Synod Administration of the Romanian Church (chapter II), the Diocese Church Organization (chapter III), and the county Church administration (chapter IV). Despite being of great importance, this document wasn't taken into consideration by Al.I. Cuza and, along with the crystallization of the new Romanian state formation, the "*secularization*" process took place, with all its evil effects upon the Church and the Romanian society.

In the case of the Romanian Principalities Unification, history records and eulogizes those who at that time, brought their contribution to the achievement of this ideal, yet, for certain reasons, some unionists remained in the shadow. Thus, as far as the personalities who signed these unionist documents, we can observe that Neofit is not mentioned. We can cite the work *Alexandru Ioan Cuza – Documents and letters* in which it is presented "*The act of electing, by the Elective Meeting of Moldavia, of Al.I. Cuza as Prince of Moldavia,*" who says: "*The United Principalities – Moldavia and Wallachia – Act of Prince's election – By the – Elective Meeting of Moldavia in the year of 1859, Month of January, day 5, in the sixth session of the Meeting, namely in the second day following their meeting, proceeding to electing the Prince according to articles 12 and 13 of the Paris Convention between the High Ottoman Empire and the guaranteeing powers for the rights of the United Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, Colonel Alecu I. Cuza has been elected, with a majority of forty-eight voices as Prince – ruler of Moldavia, upon whom this election document has been drafted, subscribed by the Meeting and handed, along with the ruling of the country, to His Highness Alexandru Ioan Cuza, ruler Prince of Moldavia. President of the Elective Meeting, Sofronie Metropolitan of Moldavia, Vasile Alecsandri, Lupu Botez, G. Balș, A. Balș, N. Conachi Vogoride, Gheorghiade, Major Iorgu Ghica, C.Gr. Ghica, I. Gane, I. Donici, N. Docan, Iacovachi, D. Iamandi,...M. Kogălniceanu, L. Catargiu, I.A. Cantacuzino, ... P. Carp, D.C. Miclescu, N. Mavrocordat, A. Moruzi, C. Miclescu* (future Metropolitan, n.n.),... *Al. Mavrocordat, ... C. Rolla* (Constantin Rallet, n.n.) *C. Roset Tețcanu, ... C. Hurmuzachi, Petru Mavrogheni...*" (Isac & Ivănescu, 1973: 384) and other less known names. The only one appointed according to his clerical function was Metropolitan Sofronie Miclescu, lawful president of the Elective Meeting, yet to the second cleric, future Metropolitan Calinic Miclescu, one doesn't state his clerical position. As far as the Scriban brothers, Melchisedec Ștefănescu, as well as other clerics are concerned, they do not appear on the signing list. Also, the document which renders the protocol of the national independent party's meeting, in which colonel Al.I. Cuza had been chosen as ruler of Moldavia, only nominally renders the participants, omitting Neofit Scriban.

Neofit's face appears, though, in central position in the inset portrait, lithographed by Salomon Trasihul (Istoria Românilor, 2003, vol. VII: 449), an image which presents the unionist committee. These people were: 1. Dimitrie Rallet, 2. Constantin Negri, 3.

Anastasie Panu, 4. Mihail Kogălniceanu, 5 Archimandrite Neofitu Scriban, 6. Manolchi Costache-Iepureanu, 7. Dimitrie Kracți, 8. Petru Mavrogheni, 9. Dimitrie Cozadini, 10. Constantin Hurmuzachi, 11. Dimitrie A. Sturdza. (Annex 2)

An evocation made by his biographer could be seen as a sort of conclusion regarding Neofit Scriban's patriotism: "*The pen of D. Ralet, Ant. Panu, C. Negrea, M. Kogălniceanu, Hurmuzachi, N. Ionescu, Iepureanu, … along the one of the Scriban brothers', shed light to the press, conquered the multiple-headed hydra and pushed Romanians to Unification*" (Erbicenu, 1884: 403).

Moreover, the appreciation enjoyed by his character and activity is emphasized by the "*The Romanian Star Order*, distinction, through which he was, conferred the title of Commander. We hereby render the contents of the document:

"*The Romanian Star Order Office No 105, date April 1st 1879. The Romanian Star Order Office No 105, Year 1878 Month April, day 1. According to art. 23 from the regulation for the application of the law, relative to the establishment of the ROMANIAN STAR order, His Holiness Bishop Neofit Scriban was perceived a fee of 80 lei for the Commander degree license. Head of Division A. Eustație. Stamp place.*" (The "*Holy Trinity*" Parish of Burdujeni-Village, Documentary Fund, Vol I, sheet 30) (Annex 3)

This is a typified form, issued and filled in by the Head of Division A. Eustație and stamped with the seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Considering the issuing date, that is, just a little before his earthly end, we may assume that this order is a confirmation from the State's part for both the political services – The Unification of Principalities – as well as the cultural services brought – his involvements in establishing a healthy education curriculum and preparing textbooks.

4. Conclusions

Thus, in light of the above mentioned historical facts and analysed documents, we can answer the question: What did Neofit Scriban mean for the history of Romania?

This cleric is a history page which writing is still in progress! He identified himself with the Unification of the Principalities and with the Romanians' will of living together and did it as a true patriot, with whom many of the personalities we think of as heroes of the Unification have collaborated with. Being bishop of the Romanian Church, he fought for the ideals that the Romanian nation so longed for, and he used the weapons of the clergy: first and foremost, he repeatedly promoted and spread the unionist ideas from the church's desk (sermons which are, in their great majority, unrecorded by history), he used the weapon of writing, and when needed, the political weapon.

Despite having consistently contributed to the flourishing of the Romanian nation and Church of which cleric he was, throughout his entire life, the end of his life found him with many shortcomings, as he himself shows in the letter addressed to the Minister president of the Public Pensions Committee (The "*Holy Trinity*" Parish of Burdujeni-Village, "*Inventory …*", no. 36), as well as in the welcoming made to the Pensions Committee in Bucharest. In both of them, he asks for a pension as support for surviving, although he knew even from the time when he fought for the Unification, that he probably wouldn't live to enjoy it.

Archimandrite Neofit Scriban remains in the history of the Romanian Orthodox Church, as well as of our country's, as one of the notable hierarchs, a personality who had important contributions in the development of the historical events of the times that he

lived. In his synthesis, Alexandru Moraru makes important notes about the place and the role of both Neofit Scriban and his brother Filaret. These are placed among the first (authors places them 3rd and 4th) clerics who had fought for the Unification of the Romanian Principalities.

Cleric of the "*Sfinții Trei Ierarhi*" (t.n. The Holy Three Hierarchs") Church, preacher of the Mitropoly, teacher at the national schools of Fălticeni and the Neamț Monastery, especially the Sfinții Trei Ierarhi School and the Socola Seminary, Bishop of Argeș, Neofit Scriban left us the contrasting mark of his personality, culture, patriotism and faith.

Just how important the most known member of the Scriban family was, one can see from the fact that in the *General history,* edited in Geneva in 1870, he is mentioned among the cultural people, member of the superior cleric and writer, remarkable words having been written about him in the press of that time.

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ANNEXES

Annex 1
Neofit Scriban's member certificate within the Ad-Hoc Meeting

Anexa 2

The Unification committee: 1. Dimitrie Ralletu, 2. Constantin Negri, 3. Anastasie Sanu,
4. Mihail Kogălniceanu, 5 **Archimandrite Neofitu Scriban**, 6. Manoluki Kostaki,
7. Dimitrie Kraci, 8. Petru Mavrojeni, 9. Dimitrie Cosandeni, 10. Constantin Hormosaki,
11. Dimitrie A. Sturdza – editor of the protocol

Annex 3
The *"Romanian Star"* decoration, conferred to Neofit Scriban

FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF DELEGATION
TO SEARCH FOR A UNIFORM ELECTORAL PROCEDURE:
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS
IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

*Jakub Charvat**

Abstract

This descriptive case study deals with an issue of the European Parliament electoral system in a historical perspective. It describes its genesis and reforms over time. The study therefore presents the evolution of apportionment procedures in the European Parliament from the principle of delegation in the 1950s to the late 1970s through the 1979 introduction of direct elections for Members of the European Parliament to the current debate on a uniform electoral procedure across all Member States.

Key words: *European Parliament, delegation, direct elections, electoral laws, election procedures*

Introduction

Contemporary history of Western Europe is largely shaped by the development of the European integration process. Political projects sought to avoid the repetition of undesirable political developments which could have been recorded during the interwar period. And therefore, all major democratic political players in Continental Europe, including Germany, had been included in the project. Later, the European integration process has spread further. For the purposes of implementation of mutual cooperation between individual governments of Member States, several institutions were set up in the 1950s within the European Community (EC) which primarily represented government institutions established at national level. Within the context of the institutional structure of the European integration process, one began to discuss the democratic deficit because the European political arrangement lacked an institution that would represent citizens of the Member States directly. And this even despite the fact the founding treaties anticipated the emergence of such an institution. This was achieved only in 1979 by the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament (EP), yet without managing to fully eliminate the democratic deficit (e.g., in consequence of gradually strengthening, yet relatively weak powers of the EP etc.).

Objectives, methods and the study structure

While relatively great emphasis is laid on the issue of the European integration history, the issue of the evolution of the EP apportionment procedures has seemed to be overshadowed. Even despite the fact that it is its integral part which allows us to understand the development of the integration project and attitudes of individual participants in a better way. The submitted study therefore focuses on the introduction to

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the development of EP electoral issues over time.[1] At the same time, the paper does not follow any deeper theoretical ambitions. It is neither based on any existing theory, nor takes into consideration the existing integration paradigms. Therefore, it does not strive for interpretative character. Its essence is the description method. Considering the foregoing, this paper is drafted in the form of a descriptive case study.

With respect to its development, the examined issue can be divided into two separate phases that essentially subdivide the first direct elections to the EP held in 1979. While in the first phase of discussion developments and debates on this topic attention is paid mostly to the way leading towards the introduction of direct elections to the EP, the main objective of the following period seems to be an effort to find a compromise on the issue of uniform election rules. For now, sort of a last milestone within the scope of discussion on the introduction of a uniform electoral system has been the Council Decision of 2002, according to which the EU establishes some basic principles that are common to the EP elections in all Member States.

In the spirit of the foregoing "development phases", the text of this paper is structured as follows. The first part deals with the introduction of direct elections of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the 1950s until first direct elections to the EP in 1979. The follow-up passage describes a debate on the introduction of uniform rules in elections to the EP in the 1980s and 1990s. The third part represents then the Council Decision of 2002 and the path to its adoption as well as the current status of discussions on the possibility of introducing uniform rules to MEPs elections across Member States of the EU.

On the way to direct elections to the European Parliament

The issue of establishing the EP and institutions that preceded the EP (see below) is at least as old as the process of post-war European integration, while the idea of introducing direct elections to the European Assembly is even older. It was expected to appear for the first time already in 1948, during congressional hearings in The Hague (Pavlovic, 2003). Although direct elections to the EP became a reality only in 1979, it was already the ECSC Treaty of 1952 which referred to the possibility of introducing direct and general elections to the Assembly by explicitly quoting, in Article 21, the possibility of holding direct elections of representatives of Member States in the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steal Community, always in accordance with the rules laid down by a relevant Member State. It was however a mere possibility that has not been implemented in practice yet.

Due to the lack of political will to introduce direct elections, the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steal Community has been established indirectly. Every year, parliaments of the Member States have delegated a predetermined number of national parliamentarians to the Common Assembly. Governments of each Member State could determine the method of selecting its Assembly delegates. If a Member State had,

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[1] The EP has been spoken about only since March 1962. It was preceded firstly by the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steal Community. Since March 1958, i.e. since the Treaties of Rome, which established the joint representative body for all three European Communities – European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Euratom and the European Economic Community (EEC), the former Common Assembly was transformed into the European Parliamentary Assembly.

for example, a bicameral parliament, national governments of the Member States were allowed to decide, whether the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steal Community would be composed of members representing both chambers of the National Parliament (e.g. Italy) or only one of the two chambers (e.g. Germany – represented by members of the *Bundestag*).

Eventually, the EEC Treaty, concluded six years later, dealt with the establishment of the Assembly. The existing Assembly was entrusted, by Article 138, paragraph 3 of the EEC Treaty, with the task to prepare a proposal for introducing direct and general elections to the Assembly. Except direct elections of MEPs, the Assembly should simultaneously focus on identifying a uniform procedure for electing deputies of the European Parliamentary Assembly which would have binding force in all Member States of the three European Communities. The European Parliamentary Assembly began immediately to deal with this issue in a serious way and this resulted in submitting the Dehousse Report in mid-May 1960. However, already this first proposal was aware of potential problems related to the requirement of uniform voting procedures in all Member States. This was clearly reflected for example in the formulation of Article 9, which did not refer to the uniform electoral system, but to a procedure that would be uniform to the greatest extent possible ("*as uniform as possible*"). Thus, this proposal assumed a sort of compromise solution between the text of the EEC Treaty and the current status by suggesting that 2/3 of the Assembly members would be elected directly, while the remaining 1/3 would be deputed by national parliaments, as has been the case till now. But as the adoption of the proposal required unanimous consent of the Council, the Dehousse Report has not been accepted, in particular because of the contrary position of France which rejected direct elections of the Assembly members because it was not willing to strengthen the supranational character of the European integration process (Reif, 1984). In the 1960s, moreover, a part of German deputies of the Assembly refused to introduce direct elections too. In fact, they were assuming that such a step would de facto confirm and legitimize the subdivision of Germany into two separate states.

After the failure of the Dehousse Report, discussions on introducing direct elections to the European Assembly have faded at that time (the European integration process was exposed to other more serious questions). The issue of introducing direct elections to the Assembly reappeared thus only in the 1970s, to a certain extent in relation to some conclusions of the Hague Summit of 1969, especially within the context of the statement that the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament would not lead to strengthening the powers of this institution. No immediate link was supposed to exist between the introduction of direct elections of MEPs and strengthening the powers of the Assembly. Finally, this position was confirmed at the Paris Summit of 1974.

With respect to difficulties emerging in the context of introducing direct elections of the MEPs, it was becoming increasingly clear that the task embodied in the text of Article 138 of the EEC Treaty, i.e. direct elections to the EP according to a uniform electoral system for all Member States, had necessarily to be solved successively in two steps. The issue of introducing a uniform electoral system has thus been overshadowed for a long time and during negotiations, one placed main emphasis on the introduction of direct elections to the EP. At the same time, the principle of a uniform electoral system has been changed into a minimalist form, i.e. common basic principles of election rules. These were to become the principles of equal, general, secret and direct elections (see, e.g.,

EP initiative of January 1975, known also as the Patijn Report). On the contrary, regulations of electoral systems in individual Member States of the EC should have allowed for divergent national specifics.

Subsequently, in September 1976, the Council adopted the *Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage* (the so-called Brussels Act; hereinafter the Act) which *de facto* introduced elections to the EP by direct suffrage, while the first elections by direct suffrage were held in 1979. The Act dealt only with the question of introducing elections of the MEPs by direct suffrage, while the question of a uniform electoral system remained absolutely unsolved. It was clearly proven that there was no political consensus on the possibility of introducing a uniform electoral system. That is why the 1976 Act amended only basic principles of elections to the EP, such as determination of election days, number of seats for each Member Country, way of establishing and terminating mandates, incompatibility of functions etc. The decision on setting the basic parameters of the electoral system for elections to the EP in every Member State was, on the contrary, left by the Brussels Act to national governments. But, the Act also anticipated that a uniform electoral system would be introduced in future. The Assembly was commissioned directly by Article 7, paragraph 1, with reference to the ECSC, EEC Treaties and Euratom to draw up a proposal for introducing a uniform electoral system. Indirectly, this fact follows then from several other articles that restrict the validity of these articles exactly at the moment when uniform election procedures enter into force (see, e.g., Article 7, paragraph 2, Article 11 and 12 of the Act etc.). However, the Act did not specify any schedule for adoption of such a decision.

Unsuccessful attempts to unify election rules of the 1980s and early 1990s

Introduction of direct elections to the EP has thus reopened the question of introducing a uniform electoral system for EP elections. Activities in this direction were developed especially by MEPs. Nevertheless, their activities did not appear to be very successful over a long time and one failed to enforce the pursued objectives. The main obstacle has been represented until the late 1990s mainly by interests of the political representation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK). Introduction of proportional representation for the EP elections was seen as a potential destabilizing element for domestic policy, particularly on the part of both British political parties (Reif, 1984; Millar, 1990).

Opponents of a uniform electoral system emphasized increasingly the need to respect the subsidiarity principle, which is one of the fundamental pillars of the decision-making process. According to this principle, only such standards can be accepted at the European level, which are necessary for functioning of EC policies. According to opponents of the unification of European election rules, the principle of subsidiarity should thus be related also to the establishment of voting rules for the EP elections in individual Member States. In fact, introduction of a uniform electoral system appeared to its opponents as interference in internal affairs of Member States, which are subject solely to the decision of a Member State. The strategy of the representatives opposing the unification of election rules was therefore ultimately successful. In principle, there is basically no reason why any of the basic EP functions should be restricted by the fact that deputies are chosen by citizens of individual countries according to different rules (Outly, 2007).

Despite the problems outlined above, MEPs have not given up and carried on with their work. Especially during the 1980s and later also in the 1990s, several initiatives were presented. Socialists (mainly Belgian Dehousse or the Dutch social democrat Patijn), Christian democrats (Frenchman Seitlinger, German Bocklet or Greek Anastassopoulos) or rather liberals (Belgian de Gucht) assumed control of activities in such initiatives. Probably the most significant initiatives of MEPs from this period include the Seitlinger Report of March 1982, Bocklet Report of February 1985, three reports by de Gucht dating back to the period 1991 till 1993 (the first version was presented in May 1991, the second modified version comes from June 1992 and the final third version was adopted in the EP in March 1993) and last but not least, the *Anastassopoulos* Report of July 1998.

The Seitlinger Report proposed to introduce the electoral system of proportional representation during elections to the EP for all Member States. Voters should have been allowed to cast preferential votes and mandates should have been divided among candidate subjects according to the method of d'Hondt divisor. For the needs of the EP elections, Member States territories should have been subdivided into several districts (each district with three up to fifteen seats). The EP elections should have taken place within two days. All the decision on other parameters, such as district magnitudes (within the specified range) or character of party lists, should have been left to the national governments. However, not even the proposal submitted in the Seitlinger Report was approved because the required unanimity of the Council was not reached. In addition to the foregoing resistance of the British political representatives, also representatives of some Member States with a nation-wide district for national elections were against subdividing electoral districts for the purposes of the EP elections (Pavlovic, 2003).

The Bocklet Report, submitted not long after the mid-June 1984 EP elections, was based on the previous Seitlinger Report, but it modified significantly some of its measures based on experiences from previous discussions. The most striking change was that the emphasis on uniform electoral system has weakened. Instead, the Bocklet Report sought to find minimalist common basic principles – proportional representation and the method of d'Hondt divisor. National governments would have been allowed to decide on all other parameters (number and magnitude of districts or character of party lists as well as other parameters of the electoral system). However, not even this minimalist proposal has been ultimately adopted.

The failure of these two proposals submitted within a short period of time stifled temporarily discussions on the possibility of introducing a uniform electoral system for the EP. Nevertheless, this idea has not disappeared completely and became the subject of several political and expert discussions once again in the 1980s. However, the EP failed to agree on any of the suggestions related to this matter during its second term of office (1984-1989). Another significant moment within the context of this debate would thus become only de Gucht Reports of the early 1990s.

On the one hand, De Gucht Reports took up significantly the text of the previous Bocklet draft, on the other hand, they reflected, as they stood, the progress of intergovernmental conferences related to the admission process of the Treaty on European Union within which great emphasis has been placed on the principle of subsidiarity. By its reasoning, De Gucht Reports tried therefore to find a balanced compromise between the original Article 138, paragraph 3 of the EEC Treaty on the one hand and the principle of subsidiarity on the other hand. But in fact it is exactly this

document (De Gucht Report) that digressed from the subject of a uniform electoral system probably the most.

The best way to find the desired compromise should have been again the identification of common electoral principles, but not a uniform electoral system. This has resulted in the proposal to introduce proportional representation for the EP elections in all Member States. However, this regulation should have not applied to countries using non-proportional voting system with single-member districts (SMDs) in national elections. In the case of such countries, proportional representation did not have to be strictly adhered to in all districts according to the De Gucht draft. On the contrary, up to 2/3 of the total number of EP mandates could have been distributed according to the plurality or majority electoral system with (SMDs). The remaining 1/3 of the seats should have been divided in these countries by using the electoral system of proportional representation so that proportional allocation of seats and therefore the principle of proportional representation would be ultimately still maintained. In this sense, this was a clear concession to the UK government following its reluctance to introduce the proportional system. National governments should have been allowed to decide on other parameters of the electoral system according to De Gucht Reports. The proposal even literally referred to leaving some space for own specific regulations of the electoral system to national governments, while the only restriction should have been the foregoing principle of proportional representation. Only in the question of electoral threshold, it may not have exceeded from three to five percents of the total number of valid votes cast.

Not even proposals from De Gucht Reports have been ultimately approved. To a certain extent, this has been caused by complications accompanying the ratification process of the EU Treaty that have also caused some delay in the vote on the third De Gucht Report. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Maastricht has been crucial to the further development of the discussion on introducing uniform election rules to the EP. The EU Treaty has namely established a Union citizenship for all citizens of Member States and based on this granted them a set of fundamental rights. Besides others, these rights have also allowed voters to participate in the EP elections in the country of the voters' residence without having to become its citizen. In order to vote for the EP, citizenship of one of the EU Member States would have been sufficient. Under these circumstances, the need to coordinate rules of the EP elections has arisen, so that the laws of individual countries would not only formally allow other EU citizens to exercise voting rights, but would also factually avoid complications. This includes e.g. avoidance of duplicate votes, required minimum length of stay in a country etc. (Outly, 2007). In addition, the Maastricht Treaty has also modified the position of the EP in the decision-making process regarding a uniform electoral system to the EP. While the EU was, until the EU Treaty came in force, "only" the submitter, beginning with the Maastricht Treaty, it has also become „subscriber", since, in addition to the unanimous approval of the Council, the consent of the EP was required too (Fiala & Pitrova, 2003, 281). Corresponding rules for the implementation of common electoral principles should have been submitted according to the Treaty to Member States by the EC Council. In early December 1993, this came up in the Directive 93/109/ES (hereinafter the Directive). Together with the Act, the Directive constituted basic sources on which consolidated texts of relevant electoral laws in individual Member States should have been based.

Pursuing the acceptance of universal election procedures has continued and in June 1998, the EP formulated a recommendation addressed to legislative bodies of all Member States. Among other, the document advised to apply the method of d'Hondt divisor or to accept a five percent electoral threshold. It is also recommended to enact mandatory participation in the EP elections (Baimbridge & Darcy, 2001).

Council Decision of 2002

In the late 1990s, the discussion continued. Following the recent developments, the Treaty of Amsterdam modified the original version of Article 138, paragraph 3 of the EEC Treaty to such an extent that the EP had to draw up a proposal for introducing a uniform electoral system in all Member States or for establishing principles that would have been common to all EU Member States. The *Anastassopoulos* Report put forward several basic electoral principles that should have been adopted by all Member States. Besides general, equal, direct and secret vote, it should have led to the introduction of the electoral system of proportional representation in all EU Member States. On the contrary, national governments should have determined the number and magnitude of districts. The EU Member States with a population higher than 20 million had to subdivide their territory into several districts during the EP elections. On the contrary, this regulation did not apply to the Member States with less than 20 million inhabitants.[1] Moreover, national governments also had to determine the way of converting votes into seats, the character of party lists or to which extent the electoral threshold will be introduced (national governments should have been limited by the provision that the threshold should not have exceeded five percent of the total amount of votes). Of some interest might also have been the proposal contained in Article 7 of the *Anastassopoulos* Report. Starting with the 2009 EP elections, the so-called European district, whose boundaries would match with those of the EU, was expected to be introduced. In this district, ten percent of the total number of MEPs should have been split and only one uniform list of candidates would have been submitted here.

As to the 1999 European elections, already fifteen EU Member States including the UK have adopted the principle of proportional representation.[2] However, individual Member States have responded to other recommendations of the EP differently. Though the majority of the fifteen countries have inclined for d'Hondt divisor, Hare-Niemeyer method, modified Sainte-Laguë divisor, as well as the method of a single transferable vote in Ireland could find application too. One third of the countries (Austria, France, Germany, Greece and Sweden) have included an electoral threshold into their electoral laws. At the same time, only four Member States (Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg and Italy) have required the citizens to show up for mandatory polls.

For the time being, the last key moment within the frame of the examined discussion became the Council Decision of September 2002 which amends the Act on direct elections of 1976. Among other things, due to the so-called forthcoming Eastern enlargement planned for 2004, there was a need to revise existing rules for elections of

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[1] Even the original version of the proposal, which led to the adoption of the European standard in 2002 (see below), counted with the obligation to establish districts in countries with more than 20 million inhabitants (Farrell & Scully, 2005).

[2] Labour Party won in the 1997 General Elections and subsequently changed the electoral system for the EP elections in the UK from plurality to proportional representation.

MEPs. For the needs of rule harmonisation of the EP elections across Member States, a number of common principles applicable to all EU Member States have been adopted. Farrell and Scully (2005) have noted that the agreement has been reached at the right time. Exactly at this time, countries, which had to join the EU within the frame of the Eastern enlargement and to elect the EP together with other EU Member States in 2004, were preparing drafts of their national legislations for the EP elections. Thus, they had no other choice than to derive their rules concerning EP elections from this European standard of 2002. On the contrary, potential postponement of the agreement until the accession of these ten countries has threatened to reduce the likelihood of reaching a compromise because the debate could have been penetrated by a number of participants who have used series of hybrid adaptations of electoral systems at national levels.

To a certain extent, the adoption of election rules in 2002 may thus be labelled as success, particularly with regard to the previous development. On other hand, the standard merely summarized the current status of the already existing European electoral legislation in the then individual Member States rather than obliging them to adopt new rules. This includes the UK which approached proportional system only in 1999. As a result, the adopted Act was rather tending to narrow the range of national variations of electoral laws. In fact, it did not determine strict rules, but allowed Member States a considerable amount of flexibility as to the determination of specific forms of the electoral system. The EP elections have thus been held, since the Council Decision of 2002, under the principles of proportional representation, either by using lists of candidates or a single transferable vote (as in Ireland, Northern Ireland and Malta). Member States have the freedom to decide, whether they include the possibility of preferential voting into their electoral legislation as well as to determine the number and magnitude of districts. The only restriction in this sense is the requirement to ensure proportional allocation of seats. If any of the Member States decides to introduce an electoral threshold, which is according to this Council Decision permissible, this threshold should not exceed five percent. Finally, the Council Decision has acknowledged that specific arrangements for elections to the EP might be adjusted to specific national conditions. However, also these specifics have had to respect, according to the Council Decision, the proportional nature of elections.

Not even the adoption of the Council Decision of 2002 has forced a possible conclusion in the matter of possible unification of rules during elections to the EP in all Member States. On the contrary, further gradual strengthening of EP powers has been and still is subject to further proposals to reform European election rules, most recently in connection with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. This fact may be demonstrated for example by the Duff Report of April 2011. According to the Duff Report, the EP elections should take place every year in May, when elections to the EP should be held, but not longer in June, as it is the case nowadays. All voters in all EU Member States have to vote for political parties through the medium of closed lists (they could not allot preferential votes). Parliamentary seats have to be divided by the method of d´Hondt divisor, while the electoral threshold must not be present. In the next section, the Duff Report builds then on the earlier proposal of the *Anastassopoulos* Report on the introduction of a single pan-European district, where totally 25 MEPs should be elected. Voters would have to choose here from transnational lists of candidates (transnational lists), which would have to include candidates from at least 1/3 of the EU Member States.

Each voter would basically have two votes, while one vote would elect at the national level from national or regional lists and the other vote would be cast at the pan-European level. The Duff Report was discussed in the EP plenum in July 2011 and subsequently returned to the Committee for further reconsideration. At the same time, it was emphasized that the reform process of European election rules presents a very sensitive and therefore potentially controversial topic.

Conclusion

The issue of establishing the EP and bodies preceding it (the Assembly of the ECSC, the European Parliamentary Assembly) is at least as old as the process of the post-war European integration. Nevertheless, a reference to a common European representative body can be found even earlier, at latest in 1948. Yet, this issue has undergone quite an interesting evolution during the second half of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century.

Although initially, the Assembly was rather an institution that was not elected directly, but was filled by delegates of individual ECSC Member States, the regulation on the possibility of introducing direct elections appeared already in 1952 in the text of the founding Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community (Article 21). For a long time, the necessary political will required to approve the introduction of direct elections of the Assembly deputies was missing. Not even the Treaty on the European Economic Community of 1957 could change anything despite the Article 138, paragraph 3 of the EEC Treaty entrusted the Assembly with the task to draw up a proposal for the introduction of direct elections of the Assembly deputies, moreover according to election rules uniform in all Member States.

If the question of direct elections was very problematic, the issue of a uniform electoral system has been – and is till nowadays – so controversial that uniform election rules have failed to be implemented till now, although several reports with a series of proposal on how to solve this issue have been drawn up. The development of this issue has given the impression as if despite constant submission of new proposals, the discussion and presented proposals have been increasingly diverging from the possibility of introducing a uniform electoral system. Instead, different minimalist solutions have meant to satisfy the initial demand for a uniform electoral system has been sought for without having to implement it. On the contrary, elections of the MEPs by direct suffrage are being held regularly at five-year intervals since 1979, when the first direct elections to the EP were held.

The Council Decision of 2002 has been the latest revolutionary moment within the frame of the discussion. It has established some basic principles that are common to the EP elections in all EU Member States. These common principles are measures requiring MEPs to be elected through the system of proportional representation – nevertheless, the decision on whether it would be a list system or a nominal system of a single transferable vote has been left upon national governments. The electoral threshold shall not exceed five percent – nevertheless, the decision on whether it would be introduced and in which extent was dependent once again "only" on the decision of national political elites.

Fully in line with the previous development, it represents a compromise and mainly a minimalist solution on a difficult way to a uniform electoral system. The decision on the vast majority of parameters of the electoral system is left to national governments.

Therefore, the result is that, in essence, the only real common element of voting rules in the EP elections in all Member States is the principle of proportional representation. However, the decision on its concrete form or rather settings of individual parameters is left to national legislations. Nowadays we come across to a total of twenty-eight specific variations of the electoral system of proportional representation during the EP elections (for more detail see e.g. Charvat & Outly, 2015).

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SHIFTS OF THE FOREIGN POLICIES IN THE COLD WAR ERA. FROM THE THREAT OF CONTAINMENT TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE POST-SOVIET DEMOCRACIES

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Abstract

Throughout the Cold War era, the two main international actors, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, led the international affairs, setting the course in the foreign political actions. After the end of this age, the global relationships faced the need to readapt to a new order. Once the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred, the Russian population started to show certain nostalgia towards the former state organization, the new state facing the dilemma of adopting a new and correct political course. The desire to regain "international respect" guided great part of the post-soviet Moscow's foreign policy. We will start by presenting the main focal points of Russia's communist foreign affairs policy, aiming to highlight the ways in which it has changed along with the occurrence of certain global events. The Russian Federation has always structured its foreign policy on five main courses of action: two of them regard the relationship with the Occident, namely the United States of America and the European Union- being also the easiest to notice in the last two decades. The other three target Eastern Asia/ the Far East, especially China, the Middle East, and the former soviet states, also known as the close proximity. The second part of our analysis focuses on the way in which these basic directions in Russia's security strategy are being integrated in its current foreign affairs policy.

Key words: *geopolitics, Cold War, Russia, foreign policy, strategy*

After the Second World War, which "had serious effects upon the entire social and economic structure" (Goga, 2015: 140), began a tense period of ideological confrontation between major global powers, known in history as the Cold War.

The Yalta Conference of the Three Allies (4th – 12thof February, 1945) and the one in Potsdam (17thof July – 2ndof August 1945) represented, for I. Stalin, a confirmation of the Soviet Union's status as a great power, as well as the fulfillment of its foreign policy goals, the insurance of USSR's security, by creating a safety borderline at its frontiers. As Winston Churchill stated, "*from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow*" (Churchill, 1946). But, despite the appearances, there was no consensus regarding the division of the spheres of influence. On the contrary, each of the super-powers tried to obtain leverage in different parts of the globe (Osiac, 2012: 138).

The new president of the United States, Harry Truman, as well as the state secretary James Byrnes, opposed the expansion of the soviets towards Central and Eastern Europe

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(The Truman doctrine), stopped the economic aid given to the USSR, thus ending the soviet-American partnership. In February 1946, George Kennan, deputy chief of the American diplomatic mission in Moscow, sent to Washington a detailed report regarding the Soviet Union's policy. The text that would remain in history as "The Long Telegram" (Kennan, G. to Marshall, G., February 22, 1946), represents one of the best analyses of the Russian policy and its vision on the world:

• The Soviet Union still lives in the "capitalist containment", with which it cannot coexist in peace on the long term. As Stalin stated back in 1927 in front of a delegation of American workers, "*throughout the future development of the industrial revolution, two main centers of world importance will appear: a socialist center, that will draw around it states leaning towards socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing countries leaning towards capitalism. The battle of the two centers for leading world economy will decide the faith of capitalism and of the communism across the globe*" (Eudin, Fisher, 1957: 358).

• The capitalist world is being assaulted by internal conflicts, which define the inner nature of the capitalist society. These conflicts cannot be solved by peaceful compromising. The biggest one of these conflicts is the one between England and the United States.

• The intervention against the soviet world, while catastrophic for the ones that would provoke it, will cause further delay in the progress of the soviet socialism, and, therefore, it should be avoided at any cost.

• Everything possible must be done in order to ensure the relative power of the Soviet Union as a factor in the international society.

• The "*progressive democratic*" elements must be fully used in order to create pressure upon the capitalist governments, such as to serve the soviet interests.

On the 5th of March 1946, Winston Churchill, in the presence of Harry Truman, gave a public speech, arguing for the commitment of the Anglo-American relations. The two countries were meant to face two threats, "the war and the tyranny", that came from the USSR. Churchill's speech states, in a hostile way, the beginning of the Cold War.

USSR's foreign actions during the Cold War

A new stage of the Soviet foreign policy was the signing, in 1948, of the treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with Romania (February 4th), Hungary (February 18th), and Bulgaria (March 18th) (Vasquez & Elman, 2012: 96). In Czechoslovakia, the Kremlin installed a new regime, thus drawing the state towards the USSR side.

George Wallace, the governor of Alabama, thought that the Soviet policy was animated rather by fear than by expansionism. In March 1946, when he was still a secretary of Commerce, Wallace wrote to Truman (Wallace, H. to Truman, H., July 23, 1946): "*We might not like what Russia is doing in Eastern Europe. Its type of agrarian reform, industrial expropriation and suppression of the fundamental freedoms upsets most of the people in the United States. But whether we like it or not, the Russians will try to socialize their sphere of influence just as we try to make ours more democratic…the Russian ideas about the social and economic justice will govern about one third of the world. Our ideas about the democracy of free enterprise will govern most of the rest of the world. The two ideas will attempt to prove which of them can offer the greatest satisfaction to the common person from his own area of political domination*".

The attack of the troops of North Korea (strongly influenced by the soviets), in June, 25th, 1950, on South Korea (influenced by the USA), marked a new step in the Russian foreign policy. The Korean obedience would have given Stalin a strong hold in the Far East. In the White House, the intervention in the Korean territory was being regarded as a democratic obligation.

"The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security" (the speech of USA president H. Truman).

On May, 14th, 1955, Nikita Hrusciov (General Secretary of the USSR) initiated and signed the "Treaty of Warsaw". The members of this treaty were the USSR, the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the People's Republic of Romania, The Democrat German Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The members of the Warsaw Pact committed to defend each other, in case one or more of them were being attacked. The Warsaw Treaty was a pact in which the member states aimed to create a system of mutual defense against the threat represented by NATO. Nikita Hrusciov was not going to allow the Americans thrive without fight. He would address challenges to the West in fields that Stalin had always thought of as not belonging to the Soviet sphere of interest, making the hot points of the Soviet-American competition move outside Europe (Kissinger, 2007: 372). The first of these hot issues would erupt in heat became known as the Suez Crisis, starting in 1956. In 1955 the Soviet Union had conducted a massive weapon sale in Egypt, trading weapons for cotton, which was being excessively produced-representing a bold initiative of expanding the Soviet influence in the Middle East. By expanding his influence in Egypt, Hrusciov has, in fact, avoided the string built by the United States around the Soviet Union, thus confronting Washington with the task of countering the Soviets in a region considered, up to that point, safe in the western sphere.

The most dangerous impact of the Suez Crisis was upon the Soviet Union. Within a year, the Soviets had managed to enter the Middle East, to resist a riot in Hungary, and threaten Western Europe with missile attack. What had started as an attempt to trade Czech weapons with Egypt had turned in a major Russian break-through that divided the Atlantic Alliance and determined the developing nations to turn towards Moscow as a way of increasing their negotiation power. In search of a field to prove a permanent change in the distribution of forces, Hrusciov decided to exploit Berlin's vulnerability (Frunzeti, 2006: 135). Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson reported back from Moscow that Hrusciov *"truly wants and is almost forced to accomplish a detent in the relations with the West"* (Kissinger, 2007: 390). However, his behavior did not argue for such optimism. When, in October 1957, the soviets launched the artificial satellite Sputnik, Hrusciov considered this success, even from the first try, as a proof that the Soviet Union was bettering the democracies both in the scientific and military fields. As a true communist, Hrusciov felt that he actually had to turn this alleged change in the balance of force, in a "diplomatic currency", and Berlin was his first target. After Stalin's attempts, prior to the beginning of the Second World War, to engage in diplomatic relations with Hitler (Cîrstea, 2009: 430), a Soviet win in Berlin felt to Hrusciov like a fair reward.

East German Communist elite was not long after the 1949 master of the situation in his country, in which decided Soviet generals and politicians. Creating of the GDR was not originally Stalin's intention; Soviet dictator favored maintaining of the unified

Germany, but with a strong influence of the Communists to the politics. But when the three Western allied governments agreed to merge their zones and the creation of the West German state, the Soviets had no choice but to respond to the situation similarly, if they did not want lose their influence in Germany completely. But East German Communist regime still quite long served the Soviets as an instrument for negotiations with the West (Bureš, 2015: 155).

On November, 27, 1958, Hrusciov sent an official notice to the United States, Great Britain and France, declaring the agreement of the four powers on Berlin null, and insisting that Western Berlin should be transformed in a "free city". If within six months an agreement would not have been reached, the Soviet Union would have signed a peace treaty with Eastern Germany, surrendering its rights as occupant and the control upon the ways to enter the German Democrat Republic (Kissinger, 2007: 485). What Hrusciov sent to the Western allies was the equivalent of an ultimatum.

At that time, the Soviet Union was already generating half of the world's industrial production, and, therefore, the international situation was about to change radically. Hrusciov's ultimatum on Berlin had not changed the views of the ambassador. On March, 9th, 1959, Thompson stated again his conviction that Hrusciov's main concerns were internal (Allison & Zelikow, 2010: 54). According to the ambassador's opinion, Hrusciov's edgy policy was his way of creating a model of coexistence that would be the forecast of economic reform and internal liberalization. In June 1961 Hrusciov met J.F. Kennedy for the Summit in Wien, to reclaim his position in the Berlin issue. He was telling Kennedy that an official end of the Second World War was needed, while the latter replied that Berlin was a matter of maximum importance to the United States, even a matter of national security. Berlin was to become a test of the balance of powers, a battle of wills between Kennedy and Hrusciov (Vasquez & Elman, 2012: 182).

In the spring-summer of 1962, Kremlin decided to transport Soviet missiles of medium action in Cuba. Hrusciov was not happy with the presence of the American nuclear military bases in Turkey. On October, 15, 1962, Kennedy was presented photographic evidences proving that the Russians were building military bases in Cuba. On October 26 Kennedy receives a letter from Hrusciov, proposing a deal that USSR would accept the retreat of the missiles in Cuba, in exchange for America's guarantee that they would not invade Cuba. On October 27, Hrusciov sends a second letter, suddenly raising the stake, stipulating that the withdrawal of Russian missiles in Cuba depended on the withdrawal of American missiles in Turkey.

Following the suggestion of his brother Robert Kennedy (Secretary of Justice), J.F. Kennedy ignored the second letter and, through the Russian ambassador in the United States, A. Dobrinin, replied the first letter. The answer followed the next day, as the Soviet Government orders the missiles to be disassembled and transported back in the USSR (Allison & Zelikow, 2010: 95-105).

At the beginning of the '80s, it was as if the communist inertial shock was about to wipe anything in its way, only to become self-destructive. Within a decade, the orbit of South-European satellites dissolved and the Soviet Empire crumbled, retrieving almost all the Russian conquests since Peter the Great. No world power has ever disintegrated so quick and that entirely without losing a way. Gorbachev accelerated the death of the system he was representing, asking for a reform that it proved incapable of. The USSR had managed to establish an orbit of satellites in Eastern Europe, and, in the period that

followed Stalin's rule, turn into a global power. At first, the Soviet armies only threatened the nearby areas, but later expanded their influence in the further continents. The power of the Soviet missiles was growing in such a rhythm that many American experts were led to fear that the Soviet strategic superiority was imminent. Like the British rulers Parlmerston and Disraeli in the XIXth century, the American leaders perceived USSR as advancing in all directions (Allison, Zelikow, 2010: 86-88). Michael Gorbachev was truly the artisan of one of the most significant revolutions of his time. He destroyed the communist party that had been organized precisely to gain and maintain power, and that had in fact, controlled each aspect of the Soviet life, leaving behind the traces of an empire that had been assembled with great difficulty, throughout centuries. He intended to bring modernization, not freedom, he attempted to make the communist party significant for the rest of the world, but, instead, opened the way for the collapse of the system that had created him.

During a press conference, held at the end of his first meeting with Reagan back in 1985, Gorbachev declared: *"The international situation nowadays is defined by a very important feature that both the United States and us should take into account when defining our foreign policy. What I mean is that, in the current situation, it is not just about the confrontation between two social systems, it is about a choice between survival and mutual annihilation"* (Mann, 2009: 74).

Within ten months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Gorbachev agreed with the unification of Germany as part of NATO. Until then, all the communist governments had collapsed, and the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. The agreements of Yalta had been reversed. At the G-7 meeting, Gorbachev addressed the chiefs of governments of the industrialized democracies: *"our Perestroika is inseparable from a policy regarding our complete participation in the world economy. The world has nothing to gain from opening a market as big as the one represented by the Soviet Union"* (Mankoff, 2009: 11).

Russia's current foreign policy

Once the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred, the Russian population was feeling nostalgic for the former state organization, while the new one faced the dilemma of taking a correct political course. A part of the society, more faithful to communism, regarded disintegration as a profound humiliation, and, under the impact of the new geopolitical realities, could not face NATO's expansion, regarded as a threat to the new Russian state. The will to regain "international respect" guided most of post-soviet Moscow's policy.

As Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation argues, "the end of the Cold War and the uncompromising ideological confrontation it engendered opened up unique opportunities for overhauling the European system on the basis of indivisible and equal security and broad cooperation without dividing lines" (Lavrov, 2016).

Given the Euro-Atlantic incoherencies, the Russian Federation came to associate not only the feature of credibility, but also the status of moral protector of at least the peripheral world, threatened by globalization. For the past twenty five years, the Russian Federation worked hard, and in part managed, to be an important voice again, and in the next ten ones it can even impose a veto. The apparently forgotten imperialism was reactivated in another platform of nowadays Russia. The Russian policy is, in its core, a traditional and authoritarian one, and still preserves many features common with those of the communist system. Besides, the former clerks of the Soviet state have a rich

experience regarding the centralism of state, and it would not be difficult for them to continue this policy.

The Russian Federation has always structured its foreign policy on five main courses of action: two of them regard the relationship with the Occident, namely the United States of America and the European Union- being also the easiest to notice in the last two decades. The other three target Eastern Asia/ the Far East, especially China, the Middle East, and the former soviet states, also known as the close proximity.

The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, as approved by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, on 12 February 2013, states as basic goals:

"*a) ensuring the security of the country, protecting and strengthening its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and securing its high standing in the international community as one of the influential and competitive poles of the modern world;*

b) creating favorable external conditions for a steady and dynamic growth of the Russian economy and its technological modernization with a view to putting it on the innovation-based development tracks, as well as for improving the quality of life, strengthening the rule of law and democratic institutions, and ensuring human rights and freedoms;

c) active promoting of international peace and universal security and stability for the purpose of establishing a just and democratic system of international relations based on collective decision-making in addressing global issues, on the primacy of international law, including, first of all, the UN Charter, as well as on equal, partnership relations among nations with the central coordinating role of the UN as the principal organization regulating international relations;

d) promoting good-neighborly relations with adjoining states and helping to overcome existing and prevent potential tensions and conflicts in regions adjacent to the Russian Federation;

e) developing mutually beneficial and equal bilateral and multilateral partnership relations with foreign states, interstate associations, international organizations and forums on the basis of respect for independence and sovereignty, pragmatism, transparency, multi-vector approach, predictability and non-confrontational protection of national interests; promoting broad international cooperation based on the principle of non-discrimination and facilitating the formation of flexible non-bloc network alliances with Russia's active involvement;

f) strengthening Russia's positions in the global trade and economic system, providing diplomatic support to national economic operators abroad, preventing discrimination against Russian goods, services or investments; making use of the potential of international and regional economic and financial institutions to that end;

g) ensuring comprehensive protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots residing abroad, and promoting, in various international formats, Russia's approach to human rights issues;

h) promoting the Russian language and strengthening its positions in the world, disseminating information on the achievements of the peoples of Russia and consolidating the Russian Diaspora abroad;

i) facilitating the development of a constructive dialogue and partnership relations between civilizations in the interests of enhancing accord among various cultures and confessions and ensuring their mutual enrichment."

By analyzing the provisions of the Foreign Policy, one can argue that the main focus remains on the post-Soviet space, while also arguing for further involvement with the Western democracies, via the United Nations, in pursuing the attempts to encourage and preserve world peace. Several international affairs analysts regard this document as a

rather formal one, reiterating previous provisions, and, in fact, not stating any new goals or instruments in Russia's foreign relations. 'Rethink' does not necessarily mean 'change substantially', of course, and there is a strong sense of continuity in the new Foreign Policy Concept (Monaghan, 2013: 3). However, at least by declarations, the Russian Federation keeps the multilateral line in adopting decisions, while not ignoring the instruments that offered it continuity and strength: the resources, the energetic policy, shaping two principles of action: unilateral and multilateral. Besides, according to the Recommendation of the European Parliament to the Council regarding the EU-Russia agreement, the main document that rules the international policy of Russia contains clear provisions in this matter. Officially, "*Russia will continue to insist on the multilateral beginnings in global affairs and on shaping such architecture of the international relations, based on the recognition by the international community of the principles of indivisibility of security in the modern world, thus reflecting its diversity*" (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013: 9).

If one is to notice the way the Russian Foreign Policy and National Security concepts define how the world works, significant details on how Russia's foreign policy is actually conducted can be discovered. Thus, Russian diplomacy seems to disregard the current international practice of taking part in multilateral agreements that involve or presume commitment to mutually shared values (Mankoff, 2009: 14), focusing rather on bilateral agreements with other states, especially the great powers of the world- U.S.A., China or India, and, more recently, the European Union. The Russian government prefers to work through those multilateral organizations that, like the UN Security Council or the G8, are essentially Great Power clubs that do not limit Russia's sovereignty over its domestic affairs and that impose limits on the United States' ability to act without the support of other major powers (Wallander, 2005).

However, Russian officials seem to commit rather to contributing for cooperation along with the other democratic countries in ensuring international security: "once again, we are not seeking confrontation with the United States, or the European Union, or NATO. On the contrary, Russia is open to the widest possible cooperation with its Western partners. We continue to believe that the best way to ensure the interests of peoples living in Europe is to form a common economic and humanitarian space stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific so that the just created Eurasian Economic Union could become a connecting link between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. We are trying to do our best to overcome obstacles on this way, including the implementation of the Minsk accords to settle the Ukraine crisis provoked by the coup in Kiev in February 2014" (Lavrov, 2016).

The Russian Federation's National Security Strategy
On December, 31st, 2015, Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, approved a new Russian National Security Strategy, as the basic strategic planning document defining the Russian Federation's national interests and strategic national priorities, objectives, tasks, and measures in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy aimed at strengthening the Russian Federation's national security and ensuring the country's sustainable development in the long term (Russian National Security Strategy, 2015: 2).

The document, stating more provisions than the previous one, clearly and explicitly describes the threats and the active and passive threats that may affect the Federation, the

objectives assumed for overcoming them, as well as the lagers of the national state of security that are to be addressed in the Security Council.

The first part of the strategy focuses on national defense, state and public security, economic growth, science, technology, and education, healthcare, culture, the ecology of living systems and the rational use of natural resources, also listed as strategic national priorities, while the final part regards "consolidating the Russian Federation's status as a leading world power, whose actions are aimed at maintaining strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnerships in a polycentric world" (Russian National Security Strategy, 2015: 6).

Among the most meaningful initiatives in the matters of international security, one can recall the consolidation of Russian position in the Far and Near East, the stimulation of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and RIC (Russia, India, China), as Russian offers for undermining the American position as superpower, building a world with more regional poles that the U.S. are assumed to plan, and thus contributing to increasing Russia's influence. Article 88 of the Strategy states that "The Russian Federation is increasing collaboration with its partners within BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), RIC (Russia, India, China), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the G-20, and other international institutions" (Russian National Security Strategy, 2015: 24).

Another article of much interest is Article 106 of the Strategy: "A determining factor in relations with NATO is still the unacceptability for the Russian Federation of the alliance's increased military activity and the approach of its military infrastructure toward Russia's borders, the building of a missile-defense system, and attempts to endow the bloc with global functions executed in violation of the provisions of international law" (Russian National Security Strategy, 2015: 27). Therefore, the "vital Russian space" needs to be preserved, and by arguing against increased military activity close to its areas of interest, Russia aims to protect and ensure its "rim land" against foreign-especially, though unnamed, American- intervention.

Conclusions

As some analysts assert, the new Russian documents in the matter of foreign policy mainly keep the same ideas as the ones previously stated (Monaghan, 2013; Mankoff, 2009), despite reinforcing the need to cooperate with the world's democracies, in order to achieve two main goals. First of all, the desire to take part in the global actions governs great part of Moscow's external behavior, and, second of all, but not less important, Moscow aims at remaining one of the main actors in the international landscape, and this can only be achieved by taking a strong position in regard to any international situation of potential interest.

However, it appears that Russia's intentions, publicly displayed by its rulers, are not to completely give up on nuclear arming, arguing that, in order to ensure a global state of security, certain balance in this regard is needed. It appears that since the end of the Second World War, the Russian interests in the international arena have not substantially changed, the focus remaining on the same type of actions and partners. What needs a deeper degree of analysis, and is probably to be set in a different frame as time will pass, are the recent changes in Russia's foreign actions, no matter if we refer to its close vicinity or the situation in more distant regions.

In the economic matter, by creating the Eurasian Union, following the EU model, and by controlling Europe in the energetic resources matter, Russia seems to attempt to rebuild its role as main regional stakeholder. Meanwhile, in the security matter, the Russian officials will continuously use UN instruments to undermine American military presence in their "close vicinity" and the NATO missions in the areas of risk, as well as to break from inside the cooperation between France and Germany within the North Atlantic Organization. What remains constant is a strong and rapid reaction from Russia, each time it feels that the Occident gets too close to its area of influence.

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REVISIONIST REGIONALISM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN POST-SOVIET SPACE

*Ekaterina Mikhaylenko**

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to analyze the problems of integration initiatives in the post-Soviet space. All projects suggested came under severe criticism from both Russian international relations experts and foreign observers. The paper presents the analytical framework of the regional trends in the post-Soviet space based on the modern theories of comparative regionalism. Comparative regionalism allows analyzing regional dynamics and problems in the post-Soviet space. Russia as one of the active region-makers in the post-Soviet space has its own vision about what type of regional integration there should be. New Russian regional policy has a new vector and ideology. Russia has chosen revisionist type of regionalism that demonstrates new trends in regionalism studies.

Key words: *regionalism, post-Soviet space, revisionism, foreign policy, Russia*

Introduction

Region-building-based approaches have become widespread due to the new vision of the structuring of regional space after the end of the Cold War, and were primarily related to the emergence of supranational regions as an answer to the globalizing world. Regionalism is essentially a project or politically motivated practice. This practice can be caused by different reasons (de-centralization of the world system, regional conflicts, weakness of the United Nations to keep regional order, economic security and challenges) and led by a concrete actor. "…All the three major dimensions of regional worlds, namely regional institutions, regionalization, and regional order, have been shaped by hegemonic powers, especially American hegemony" (Acharia, 2009). Regionalism becomes an active practice to structure the world led by a regional or global actor driven by economic, security or multi-purpose logics. Post-Soviet space[1] is not an exception from this region-building process. There are many regional projects that are being carried out in the post-Soviet space now: the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the unstable project of Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GU(U)AM), the most proficient project – Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the new forms of old ideas of Eurasian Union. Nevertheless, the majority of these organizations, according to many experts, cannot be regarded as examples of efficient integration (Kubicek, 2009).

Why is it important to study the post-Soviet regionalism? Studying the experience of European integration and its application to the post-Soviet case is not always justified. Post-Soviet regionalism has its own features. Russia plays an important role in the

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[1] Post-Soviet space here is considering only 12 post-Soviet countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Belorussia, Moldova, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia.

formation of regional area. In recent years, Russia's policy of restructuring regional order has taken more obvious forms. What will be the regional structure of the post-Soviet space and what role does Russia play in its formation? These questions will be addressed in this paper.

Features of regionalism in the post-Soviet space

The contemporary regionalism theory school possesses a vast range of tools for regional space consolidation based on the studies of various integration initiatives. The diversity of approaches demonstrates different ways of regional alliances formation and pluralism of participation forms for member states.

The term 'regionalism' has become widespread due to the new vision of the emerging regional space after the end of the Cold War, and was primarily related to the emergence of supranational regions as an answer to globalizing world. Theoretical approaches to regional processes are now divided into 'old' and 'new' regionalism; regionalisms in the 'first', 'second', 'third' generation; economic, monetary, cultural and security regionalisms; cross-, inter-, trans-, multi-regionalisms; 'pure' and 'hybrid' regionalisms; aggressive, extroverted, open, neo-liberal offensive, introverted, closed, defensive, regulated, developing regionalism; low-level and high-level regionalism; North, South, North-South regionalisms; informal and institutional regionalism (Börzel, 2011).

Regionalist approaches can be systematized differently. From the theoretical and methodological points of views, there are three classic logics of regions construction: strategic (realism), functional (liberal school) and normative (social constructivism). According to the strategic logic, regional integration processes intensify due to the need for strengthening collective defense and security. Functional logic forms the basis for the creation of institutions responsible for resolution of specific problems, disputes settlement and development of economic interdependence and integration. It also leads to the formation of a regional identity based on a common identity, culture and values, that is the case with the EU. It also leads to the formation of cohesion and the stronger representation in the world arena; the groupings of the developing countries are an example.

In the paper entitled as "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics", A. Hurrel also identifies three clusters of scientific schools within the framework of regional studies according to three levels of analyses (world/region/nation) (Hurrell, 1995). The first one is the system theories (neo-realism, the structural interdependence theory and the theory of globalization), the second cluster includes the theories of regionalism and interdependence (neo-functionalism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism), and the third one is the theory for studying the internal processes in the states (theory of regionalism and the formation of the nation-state, the theory of modes and democratization and the convergence theory).

Referring to history, three waves of theoretical approaches to regionalism can be defined: 'old regionalism' (re-construction of the regions during the Cold War period); 'New regionalism' (rethinking the role of regions and their actorness after the end of the Cold War); and 'Comparative regionalism' - the term which includes a great variety of options for regional integration, also known as 'non-European' type of regionalism (2000s.).

'Old' Regionalism is a symbol of scientific schools explaining the nature of the integration process during the Cold War (realism, functionalism and institutionalism). Functionalism and Institutionalism studied mainly the development of economic integration model. Other forms of integration (cultural and educational) and policy development were studied as a consequences or spillover effects of economic ties (Haas, 1970); (Vayrynen, 2003). Realistic concepts examined the formation of the military-political integration associations within the framework of existing anarchical system of international relations. The term 'region' as a 'subsystem' was used within the framework of the system analysis of Kaplan (Kaplan, 1957) and K. Waltz (Waltz, 1979). The subsystem had the same features as the global one, including polarity and balance of power allowing regions to have their own institutes and sub-regions (Waltz, 1979). The formation of integration blocks went under the dualistic confrontation of the East and the West.

The European integration processes and the development of transnational ties in the 1980s generated considerable interest in studies focusing on the nature of the integration process. According to A. Wiener and T. Diez, the authors of the book on the theories of European integration, a new analytical approach appears to be forming. The new approach raises the following questions: what the EU's political system is and what the EU regulatory policy is, etc. (Wiener & Diez, 2009). Thus, the new approach is beyond the traditional analysis of the anarchic system of international relations and focused on the study of supranational institutions, public- and market-based mechanisms, and the role of political elites in integration studies.

The 'new regionalism' theory of the 1990s was a response to the decentralization of the international system (Fawcett, 2004). On the one hand, there was the weakening role of the UN; on the other hand, there is the activation of regional integration in Europe, Asia and America. Such situation creates an impetus for more studies. In the paper entitled as "Theorizing the Rise of Regionness", B. Hettne and Fr. Söderbaum considered meta-theoretical approaches, such as global social theory, social constructivism and comparative area studies, to be a point of departure for the 'new regionalism' (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2000).

'New' regionalists make emphasis on the concept of 'region' as an actor of international relations. Thus, regions stopped being objects of international relations, and transformed to independent subjects, actors of international relations. A new niche in international relations studies, being different from both global and national levels, was formed as a result of the abovementioned. Regions thus transformed into a kind of 'powers' affecting both regional administration and regional solutions (Buzan & Wæver, 2010).

Thus, the 'new' regionalism is the process of region-building. It is mostly an open variant of integration, which involves different aspects, including economic, environmental, social, political ones, etc. This approach focuses on the processes taking place within regions, the causes and origins of regional consolidation. Regionalism is interpreted as the practice of construction in regions, including certain stages from the 'geographic space' to 'region-polity' (Hettne, 2005).

It was not until recently that the term 'comparative' regionalism emerged. The authors using this term represent a new stage in the evolution of region-based approaches, which is comprehensive study of regional processes. Nevertheless, scholars have yet to

generate a widely accepted definition of 'comparative' regionalism. From one point of view, the term 'comparative' regionalism means a comparative analysis of different regional theoretical schools, from another, it is a comparative analysis of different regions or regional projects types, etc.

The term 'comparative' regionalism was first used by F. Laursen in "Comparative Regional Integration" (Laursen, 2003). The study is aimed at examining the integration process from the realist, institutionalist and other perspectives. This concept was further developed by Fr. Söderbaum and his colleagues (Söderbaum & Sbragia, 2010); (De Lombaerde, Söderbaum, Van Langenhove, & Baert, 2009). The authors organize their research around the following questions: whether the European Union has become an example and a matrix for analysis of other regions, and whether this case to be the starting point for other studies? What indicators point to the formation of regional integration? Thus, the debates on region-construction or regionalism are going on.

A. Acharya studying primarily the integration processes in Asia calls into question the relevance of the EU's experience as an example of an evolutionary construction (Acharya, 2012). 'Comparative' regionalism, according to Acharya, is a theory of regionalism in the broadest sense, taking into account the historiography of research in this area, and going beyond the regional integration and comparative regional integration theories.

'Comparative Regionalism' is an approach offering to give up Europe-centricity, while studying integration processes. Regional integration can go different ways depending on historical, cultural and linguistic traditions. This sort of 'off-the-European' type of regionalism; the study which requires serious rethinking of the theoretical issues, such as the principles of forming the region, criteria of regionalism, the role of institutions in the process of region-building, the role of external and internal actors, etc. There is no any type of 'good' or 'effective' regionalism. The fact that every case is unique should be mentioned. Consequently, every region has its own way to construct the regional project.

Russia is choosing its own way of regional building. It looks very similar to European projects, but it has its own features. Post-Soviet regionalism can be analyzed through comparative regionalism approach. On the basis of comparative regionalism we can analyze the features of the post-Soviet regionalism led by Russia.

Regional institutions in the post-Soviet space look similar to the existing regional groupings in Europe. Nevertheless, regional integration in Eurasia is still marked by the processes of multiplication of the treaties without any demonstration of real effectiveness both in the field of economic and security cooperation. Here we have some new type of regionalism, which is a variant of the non-European regionalism. It has a lot in common with the regional projects of the newly independent states in Asia. In a certain way that regionalism can be called post-colonial regionalism, which is characterized by the fear of losing the sovereignty of the member countries, the fear of the creating of supranational institutions with automatic obligations, and not wanting to have the dominant force among the participants.

Despite the fact that the countries participating in the regional organizations in the post-Soviet space had a long history of joint co-existence within the same country, it is difficult to define this experience as an example of successful integration. Moreover, according to V. Mashitz (Chairman of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation with the countries - participants of the CIS (1991), former president of the Interstate Bank

(MB) CIS (1995-1999), in the last years of the Soviet Union "there was growing hatred [from the part of the Soviet republics] towards the center, which was generated by a sense of injustice that came from Moscow" (Aven & Kokh, 2013). It should be noted that the terms 'center' and 'Moscow' in this context were not associated with the Russian Federation, it was a separate entity of the USSR, which was represented by party leaders (the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee), the government, the bureaucracy that was responsible for state planning (allocation of resources), and the Supreme Council (pseudo-parliament). 'Centre' had the task of concentrating resources and then re-distributing them; it was responsible for security, for the formation of the ideology of the country. Everything was in the hands of the ruling party elite. At its core, the 'center' or the ruling bureaucracy of the USSR can be associated with the term 'metropolis'. However, in reality, the center was not a single country or territory that ran the other territories. And irritation against the center existed almost in all republics, including Russia. Thus, almost all Soviet republics wanted liberation from dependence on the Centre and Moscow.

Another feature of the post-Soviet regionalism is the unpreparedness of the countries to participate in new forms of regional integration due to the lack of experience of independent existence and to the lack of experience of organizing cooperation on the new independent basis. Newly independent countries, with the exception of the Baltic countries, gained independence, but did not get the experience of individual existence without maintaining links with their counterparts in the Soviet Union. Thus, the first regional integration in the framework of the CIS was the transit mechanism to support national systems and security of the member-countries on the one hand, and to seek and develop new forms of integration between newly independent countries on the new basis on the other hand. Other regional institutes appeared 10 years after the dissolution of the USSR.

The post-Soviet regionalism is marked by the dominance of the practical functions, but not normative, value characteristics. There was no clear understanding what identity core of the Commonwealth is, what shared values and principles of this Organization are. It is the crucial point. The post-Soviet regionalism was forming in the same space where successful types of regionalism existed (EU, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe), and participation in these organizations was attractive for many newly independent states in the post-Soviet space. If a great part of former Soviet republics was able and ready to share European values and was ready to fulfill the external conditionality demands of these organizations, why did they need to create independent structures and institutions?

If they did it, how to identify their shared values and norms, how to explain why these countries should be a part of the Commonwealth, what their regional identity is? There was and is a problem of choice for newly independent countries whether to be a part of EU-centered projects or to seek new basis for their own non-European, non-Soviet, non-imperial regionalism. This problem is very similar for all post-Soviet integration projects (the CIS, GU(U)AM, Central Asian Economic Community, the SCO).

Regional construction within the post-Soviet space can also be called 'parallel' or 'competing' regionalism, as it started at the same time as the reconstruction processes of the EU, integration of new members into the EU. The European Neighborhood Policy and the program of Eastern Partnership, which involved countries participating in the post-Soviet regional development, became a dangerous trend for the post-Soviet regional

sustainability. For many participants of the post-Soviet regional construction there was a choice – to support the post-Soviet ties, or to participate in European projects that have a certain appeal.

Thus, regionalism in the post-Soviet space is not the result of long-term economic integration and the formation of intra-regional relations, as it was in Europe. Relationships between former Soviet republics within the Soviet Union cannot be regarded as a positive experience of integration and firm basis for further integration. Thus, in 1990s the great part of integration projects didn't have a serious foundation apart from temporary need to solve urgent issues.

Evolution of the post-Soviet regionalism

Integration processes in the post-Soviet space can be divided into four stages. The first three stages were marked by the Russian attempts to find its place in a new regional order. The last period demonstrates new Russian policy towards post-Soviet regional space. A new stage of regional development in the post-Soviet space is characterized by the Russian policies aimed at restructuring territorial space fixed by the Belovezhskaya Agreement of 1991.

The first stage is the period of reorganization of the post-Soviet space (1991-1996). This stage was devoted to the process of seeking a mechanism and instruments to share the common heritage in a peaceful way. Many critical issues were discussed and solved during this period, such as status of Russia in the UN, the future of nuclear weapons, participation of new countries in nonproliferation regimes (NPT, START, etc.). It was the period of severe inner conflicts inside the countries, such as the constitutional conflict between Yeltsin and the main part of people's deputies and members of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation headed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, the beginning of the Chechen conflict. In the CIS there was the process of institution construction and strengthening ties within the CIS, and process of seeking new forms of integration such as multi-speed integration (CIS, 1994). In 1993, the CIS member states signed the Treaty establishing the Economic Union, which, in particular, involves the free movement of goods, services, labor and capital; the implementation of agreed policies in areas such as monetary relations, prices and taxation, currency regulation, customs duties. In 1994, an agreement was signed to establish a free trade zone, and in 1995 three CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan) signed an agreement of the Customs Union. However, the effectiveness of such contracts was low: not all states of CIS have signed such documents, and those who signed did not perform; some States made amendments to the signed documents. This has created difficulties for their implementation. Within the framework of the CIS there was no an effective mechanism for resolving problems of regional economic integration, such as not developed ways to resolve international disputes.

The second stage was the slowdown in the framework of the CIS, the emergence of alternative projects (1997-2002), such as GUUAM, Central Asian Economic Community. It was the period of the first serious crisis in the CIS and the period of seeking or reviving other forms of regional integration.

The third stage (2002-2008) can be associated with the new Russian activity in the post-Soviet space and the emergence of new institutions such as CSTO (2002) and SCO (2001). 'Color revolutions' in Ukraine and Georgia led to a cooling of relations within the CIS and to concentration of Russian activity in the new regional organizations (CSTO and

SCO). There was clear dissatisfactory by CIS among Russian political elite. In 2004 after Putin's speech the CIS was named "a suitcase without a handle, which is hard to bear, and it is a pity to throw it away" (Tretyakov, 2004). Russia continues to develop other integration projects and to maintain bilateral relations.

The last stage includes the years 2008-2015. This is a period of deepening crisis processes in the post-Soviet space: economic, political, territorial. Regional institutions such as the CSTO and the SCO continue to function but new projects appeared - the alternative projects of the Eurasian Union.

In spite of the undoubted geographical (implying the neighborhood and common boundaries), economic (implying the necessity to preserve the trade and technological ties) and cultural (implying the factor of common history, humanitarian cooperation and common values developed through 70 years of living in the framework of one state) integration premises, the influence of disintegration factors is undeniable as well. The internal disintegration factors for building regionalism in the post-Soviet Space include typological differences between the countries, economic disproportions, geopolitical strategy discrepancies, energy rivalry, migration problems, ethnic and territorial conflicts left after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fact that local political elites stay reluctant in terms of dealing with the problems.

Russia also faces the challenge of enduring competition with other regional political and economic actors, primarily with EU and China. China's active role in Central Asia and economic expansion that had already resulted in the transition to yuan payments and transactions poses a serious threat to Russian regionalism building. EU's neighborhood program has become the great challenge for Russian's integration attempts in the region.

During the period of 1991-2008 many projects were initiated by Russia, but in some way these regional structures don't coincide with Russian interests. Russian dissatisfaction with participation in regional organizations such as the CIS, CSTO, SCO, Customs Union, is associated with the lack of common understanding of the goals of these organizations (Putin, 2005); with differently oriented activity of members; with the lack of real effectiveness of the organizations (the case of Kyrgyzstan in 2010); with rivalry within organizations (China and Russia in SCO). In 2008 members of all these organizations formally supported the actions of Russia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Medvedev, 2008b), but didn't acknowledge the independence of these countries. Many experts now discuss a new wave of integration in the framework of Eurasian Union; meanwhile the crisis situation in Ukraine demonstrates new regional policy led by Russia.

Revisionist regionalism

New Russian policy towards restructuring the post-Soviet space may be associated with the new type of regionalism based on revisionism of the territories of the former USSR. Russian political elites consider all previous attempts to build a working integrating structure in the post-Soviet space as not successful. Russia considers the post-Soviet space as a natural area of its national interests. Russia also understands that integration in the region has objective nature. The involvement of external actors in the process of integration in post-Soviet space Russia sees as an intervention in the internal affairs of Russia and the region as a whole. The disappointment of the Russian elite with the ineffective regional projects in the former Soviet Union, the growth of color revolutions in the region (Putin, 2014a), the participation of countries of the region in the projects

with non-regional powers (Putin, 2014b) was demonstrated in August 2008 in the context of Russian-Georgian conflict, in terms of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia has begun to revise the boundaries of the former Soviet Union agreed under the co-agreements in the CIS. New Regionalism Russia is a revisionist; Russia has started to actively review the boundaries of the former Soviet Union. New regionalism of Russia is based on a new ideology - protection of Russian-speaking population in the territory of the former USSR (Putin, 2005).

A new type of regionalism involves the integration of not only independent states, but also the individual parts and territories of newly independent states in the post-Soviet space. According to its essence, revisionist regionalism implies revision of the Belavezhskaya Agreements signed in December 1991. Agreements of 1991 were aimed not only at dissolution of the Soviet Union and creation of the CIS, but also at frozen numerous territorial disputes that broke out in the late 1980s in the USSR. Moreover, many autonomous regions and regions that were part of the Soviet republics in 1990-1991 began to claim their own autonomy outside the USSR, but due to Belavezhskaya Agreements have become an integral part of the new independent states. In December 1991, during the negotiation process to establish the CIS, M. Gorbachev made a proposal to create a Commonwealth of the European and Asian countries. It should be noted that the proposals of a new union treaty had one very important feature. It was supposed to be a union of not just the 15 republics, but a union of 35 new federal subjects (Gorbachev, 1991). Thus, under the new Union treaty the autonomous territories were to be equal to the status of the union republics. Thus, the new Union was to have a completely new configuration, and perhaps could have undermined) the authority of the new elites in the Union republics.

Russia has begun to defrost conflicts and territorial disputes of the former USSR and revise the agreements of 1990s. The first step was the participation of Russia in the conflict between Georgia on the one hand, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other in 2008. As a result, two new states appeared on the map of the region, they have gradually been integrated into a variety of Russian projects. The second phase began in late 2013. The internal political crisis in Ukraine, which led to political and economic instability, allowed Russia to reach its strategic objective – to integrate the Crimea and Simferopol.

The Russian leadership is acting tactically, using different ideological options. The new intensified policy of Russia in the region is based on the following concerns: fears and worries about the 25 million Russian-speaking population remaining outside Russia (Putin, 2005); concerns about the ethnocentric position undertaken by the newly independent states which violates the rights of Russian and other ethnic groups (Medvedev, 2008a); the weakness of the governments of independent states that are influenced by the West. Fear of the color revolutions and NATO's eastward expansion has become an important occasion to strengthen Russia's policy in the region.

Modern Russia has chosen a policy of 'hard' regionalism as opposed to 'soft' or 'open' regionalism. Searching for external enemies becomes a central ideological line in Russian domestic policy, as well as in the regional projects in the former Soviet Union. In his book Bisenbaev A.K. "Not together. Russia and the countries of Central Asia" writes about the 'ritual character' of "integration efforts of Russia in the CIS space, which leads

to the fact that all global and regional events are evaluated from the point of confrontation" (Bisenbaev, 2011).

This regional strategy demonstrates the concrete message for the post-Soviet countries. It's a tough call to build a co-integration space with Russia and without the involvement of external actors. Russia demonstrates its determination in this regard.

Thus, today we are witnessing a new vector of regional development in Eurasia, which is initiated by Russia. Russia takes an active part in a new regional formation. What will be the form of regional development? Time will tell. However, new forms of regional integration impact the whole dynamics of regional development in the post-Soviet space.

Conclusion

A new phase of regional restructuring in the post-Soviet space has started. There are two parallel processes of constructing classical models of regional organizations in the post-Soviet space and new forms of regionalism driven by Russia.

Russia's position and understanding of its role in the region are clearly defined. Russia considers the post-Soviet space as its sphere of important and strategic interests. Undoubtedly, the concept of collecting land and helping the Russian-speaking population outside Russia became the driving force of modern integration processes. Russia acted as a guarantor of security for small nations in the conflict with Georgia in 2008. This role will determine the possible participation of Russia in the future situations of conflict in the post-Soviet space. Russia launched restructuring of the territory in the center of Eurasia, clearly demonstrating its neighbors and the West the new conditions and rules of interaction in the post-Soviet space. Such Russian policy could cause some resistance on the part of the post-Soviet countries, or vice versa, revive a policy of appeasement of Russia.

Russian case provides new basis for theoretical research in regionalism studies. Reconstruction of post-Soviet territories and creation of a new type of asymmetric integration including independent countries and unrecognized territories is a new example of regional projects. This case is a new variant of future world of regions that demands further examination.

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THE ROMANIAN POPULATION IN THE TURN OF THE CENTURY: AN APPROACH TO DEMOGRAPHIC BEHAVIOR IN ROMANIA DURING THE GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE TRANSITION FROM THE 20TH TO 21TH CENTURY

José Díaz-Diego*, José Manuel Jurado-Almonte**

Abstract

This article describes, analyses and discusses some of the main demographic indicators of Romania during the last two decades, which we have entitled 'Romania of the great transformations', since the data analysed corresponds with a historical period characterised by a profound social, political and economic transformation following the fall of the Ceaușescu socialist regime in 1989 and the rapid introduction of the Romanian society and State into the capitalist market and neoliberal logics, fostered eventually by its incorporation into the European Union in 2007. The analyses presented comprise statistical data from official Romanian institutions as well as excerpts from semi-structured interviews to specialised Romanian informants, and fieldwork notes taken by the authors in some of the main cities of the country. The data reveals an important decrease of the Romanian population in addition to a marked ageing, the feminization of the elderly and the masculinization of the young conditioned to a great extent by the excessive emigration during the last decade (which has not been rigorously estimated in the official statistics until recently), the fall of birth-rates, the rise of life expectancy, and the second transition of its family demographic structures.

Key words: *Romania*, *population*, *demographic behavior*, *Turn of Century*

The Romanian Demographic Indicators

Until very recently, the demographic data on population in Romania should be read with some caution because its National Statistical Institute (INS) had been calculating the population as of January 1st, for every census year, on the basis of the demographic data of the last census, to which it was applied the natural movements of population and the migratory balance (INS, 2012a). This methodology has been launching intercensal data with a high margin of error that, necessarily, increased in recent years as one of the variables of the demographic equation, the applied migratory balance, was only the one registered and not the real, far greater than this, a product of, among other circumstances, the economic crisis in Romania after the collapse of the socialist system and its transition to a market system, in addition to the occurred right of its citizens to free movement in the European Union after its accession in 2007. This situation facilitated the movements of population, especially the population interested finding a job abroad.

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The free movement of persons made even more difficult the record of the actual volume of the Romanian emigration, as indicated by Mercedes Gordo (2008) in the case of migratory flows toward Spain. However, the INS not warned about this, at least directly, in their methodological notes, even when in the latest progress on the Census of Population and Housing of 2011 published on 2 February 2012, before the final results appeared already in 2013, was estimated for the total of Romania a population of only 19,042,936 inhabitants (INS, 2012a), a great mismatch for almost 2,370,000 inhabitants with regard to the official figures published just a year before, on 1 January 2011 and revised on 20 June of the same year. Finally, the census estimated the stable population of Romania as of 20 October 2011 in 20,121,641 inhabitants (INS, 2013).

Still on the demographic indicators and focusing consciously until 2010, Romania is a country that, as it was said previously, slightly exceeds the 20 million inhabitants[1]. Of the almost 23 it had in 1992, experiencing a steady decline in its population from the political-economic transition of the early nineties of the twentieth century and accelerated in recent years, with a decline by over 12%. The new context took back the Romanian population to figures prior to the beginning of the sixties of the last century. Until then, the population had grown steadily at a mean intercensal rate above 10%, particularly sharply after World War II and during the economic boom experienced in the country in the decade of the sixties. With the crisis of the seventies and eighties, population growth moderated due mainly to a sharp fall in the birth rate, which rose from 19 to 11 per 1,000. This led the Romanian Government to implement measures to stimulate the birth rate and the reduction of mortality, which did not prevent the real growth of the population shifting from 12.86% to 5.80% in barely one and a half decade, the first decline in more than 100 years.

Table 1. *Evolution of the population in the censuses of Romania, 1910-2014*

Census	Inhabitants	⊿ between censuses
1910/1912	12,768,399	-
12-29-1930	14,280,729	1,512,330
01-25-1948	15,872,624	1,591,895
02-21-1956	17,489,450	1,616,826
03-15-1966	19,103,163	1,613,713
01-05-1977	21,559,910	2,456,747
01-07-1992	22,810,035	1,250,125
03-18-2002	21,680,974	-1,129,061
10-20-2011	20,121,641	-1,559,333
01-01-2014 (Annual Review)	19,942,642	-178,999

Source: Ghețău and Damian, 2006; INS, 2014.

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[1] The latest update of the population statistics as of 1 January 2014, a resident population (*populația rezidentă stabilă*) of 19,942,642 inhabitants was estimated for the total of Romania (INS, 2016).

As can be seen in Chart 1, the negative trend has continued throughout the last decade, being particularly intense during the past few years. Among its factors has obviously been present what Van de Kaa (1987, 1993 and 2002) and Lestheaghe (1991) christened "second demographic transition", characterized by a strong decline in fertility and therefore the birth rate below the threshold of replacement, in addition to an important influence of international migration that, according to the direction of the migration flows, has accelerated the loss or gain of the population of certain Western countries at a pace not well estimated in the demographic predictions.

This concept, already circulating in mid-70 expressed itself not only a demographic trend but a deeper change in the demographic and social structures, such as the family ones. Western families not only consolidated their new nuclear status but considerably reduced the number of children while the mothers gave birth increasingly late. The incorporation of women to the work market but also new patterns of consumption, the perception of a more extensive youth, the expansion of university education, the advance of moral secularism, the symbolic weakening of the family as an essential social institution, the growing importance of the individual's leisure and the couple projected as incompatible with the upbringing of children, the cost of living, etc., have played a crucial role in a reproductive revolution[1] that has disrupted both the profile and the number of members of the traditional Western family, sometimes very stereotypical, there is to say.

The second demographic transition, that in many of the countries of the Western Europe already took place in the 70's, and in other countries, especially in the South, took place in the mid 80, is not experienced intensively in Eastern Europe, and especially in Romania, until the collapse of the socialist regime, the adoption of abortion and, above all, the change of mentality of the hard transition to the capitalist market and its difficult economic context, which in no way facilitated the constitution of young families and its stability for the upbringing of children, especially when the emigration began to be not only a possibility but almost an obligation in the thinking of young people Romanians with prospects and ambition for a better life. All this drew, therefore, a downward trend in the demographic evolution of the Romanian population, incorrigible so far, both in the rural environment and in the urban environment (Chart 1).

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[1] On the concept of reproductive revolution we can read John MacInnes and Julio Pérez (2005, 2008), cited in the bibliography, who carry out an interesting analysis of some of the most representative demographic changes of postmodernity, from a demographic and sociological perspective, rescuing ideas already classic, such as those from June Davis (2006) about the social pressure on reproductive capacity. As for regional examples, there are those from Bertrand Hervieu and François Purseigle (2009).

Chart 1. *Evolution of the Romanian population, 1990-2011*


Source: INS, 2010, 2011, 2013.

Indeed, as highlighted by Monnier (1996) and Seys (1998), the socio-economic crisis of socialist collapse caused a true demographic shock among the former communist societies, as is the case in Romania[1], affecting basic indicators such as the number of marriages, the number of births and the volume of migration.

In Figure 2 one can see very clearly how the transition toward a free market impacted on the birth rate, which at the beginning of the 90s was 13.6 per thousand and that, in about a decade, fell to 9.8 per thousand[2]. Ghețău and Damian (2006) emphasize in this regard the importance of the liberalization of abortion and the widespread use of contraceptives. The birth rate is not stabilized until almost the middle of the 1990s, returning to fall among the rural population already in the twenty-first century and would recover, but only in urban environments, with better socioeconomic conditions and a population younger than that in the rural environment. This last fact is very significant because for the first time since we have Romanian data, in 2010 the urban rate of birth rate (10 per 1,000) stood above the rural rate of birth rate (9.8 per 1,000), which reflected a significant change in the reproductive and family pattern, and therefore the demographic and sociocultural profile, not so much from the urban environment as from the rural environment, which was historically more fruitful and of larger families, whose aging and economic difficulties have put in jeopardy its generational replacement.

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[1] In the specific case of Romania, it can be found in the work of the professor Ionel Muntele, summarized on: https://scholar.google.ro/citations?user=IC66g68AAAAJ&hl=ro.

[2] The birth rate was a 10 per thousand in 2012 and a 9.1 per thousand in 2013, according to Eurostat.

Map 1. *Aging index of the Romanian population by district*/judeţ, *2014*

Economic conditions very improvable, some health services deficit, especially in rural environments, very low pension levels, the harsh agricultural tasks uninterrupted almost until the last years of life among a large part of the rural population and in many cases, the loneliness of being away from their children in the emigration, have been drawing the context of difficult aging which undergoes a very considerable part of the population of Romania and especially of the rural population (Diaz-Diego and Márquez Domínguez, 2009 and 2011), which has resulted in increasing the rate of Romanian mortality, 10.6 per thousand in 1990 and 12.1 per thousand in 2010[1], with peaks up to 16.5 per thousand of rural mortality in 1996. In fact, it is particularly significant the permanent gap between the rural and urban mortalities that share the same temporal variations without reaching converge. Currently, the gap between the urban and the rural mortality is nearly 5 points, with urban areas in the 10 per thousand and rural areas in a considerably high 14.7 per thousand (Figure 2).

The difference between rates is observable even in the infant mortality, which registers an average of 7.7 children who died during their first year of life for every 1,000

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[1] 12.3 per thousand in 2013.

born during that year in the urban environments and 12.3 per thousand in rural environments, while it is a rate that in both rural and urban areas, in contrast to the adult mortality, has been reduced considerably in the past 20 years, from 26.9 per thousand in 1990 to 9.8 per thousand in 2010[1] (INS, 2011 and 2012b) (INS, 2011 and 2012b). As in the rest of western countries, such a decrease in the infant mortality rate has been linked undoubtedly to the medical advances and to the improvement of the basic health care, without forgetting the cultural change by which, reinforced since social policies, minors have come to occupy a central place in the nuclear family, doubling the attentions and care toward them. However, these rates of infant mortality, still remain low, doubling the existing ones, for example, in Spain at present.

Both factors, a decrease in the birth rate - with certain exceptions - and an increase in the mortality rate[2], have contributed, obviously, to the investment of vegetative growth that, with jumps, has not ceased to decrease since the fall of the socialist regime. Thus, without taking into account the emigration, i.e. relying solely on the negative balance that shed the fewest number of births and the highest number of deaths, Romania is losing since 1992 about 35,700 inhabitants per year, with peaks up to 46,700 in 1996 and 44,100 in 2002 (Chart 2).

Chart 2. *Vegetative growth of Romania, 1990-2010*


Source: INS, 2011, 2012b.

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[1] 9 per thousand in 2012.

[2] The latest statistics reflect a birth rate of 9.1 per thousand in 2013 and an overall mortality of 12.3 per 1,000, with a vegetative growth of -3.2 per thousand in 2013.

Chart 3. *Evolution of the birth rate in Romania, 1990-2010*

Source: INS, 2011, 2012b.

Chart 4. *Evolution of the mortality rate in Romania, 1990-2010*

Source: INS, 2011, 2012b.

To complete the main factors of the Romanian second demographic transition and therefore its loss of population, it would be necessary to analyze the reverse of its vegetative growth highlighting the fall in fertility motivated by the raising of the age of the betrothal, the incorporation of women to the labor market and the assumption of various responsibilities outside the home, the prolongation of the waiting time to conceive the first son, the decline in the number of marriages, the increase in the number of consensual partners and of the unmarried, the increase in the number of children born out of wedlock, the increasing number of divorces and separations, the increase in single-parent families generally aimed not to increase the offspring, the diversification of family models

and the generalized use of the contraceptive methods, without the high impact that in this demographic behavior has had the effect of migration.

In graphs 5 and 6 can be checked how it has experienced a steady decline in marriage among Romanian[1], with the exception of some peaks that do not blur the decreasing social trend. The most significant upturn occurred in 2007, a time in which Romania entered into the European Union. This upturn, led mainly by the increase in the number of marriages in rural areas, apart from the widespread optimism with which they lived the accession and what it might suppose as for their decisions about their life, it has few more explanations that the willingness on the part of couples to formalize their relationship in terms of marriage and, therefore, to strengthen their social and administrative ties facing a new horizon of migration, in other words, to decide to sat the "I want" before the migration project of one or both members of the couple. Surely, although this is hypothetical, here joined optimism in view of the new situation on the one hand, couples who, being outside already, returned to marry thanks to the greater security that the new European framework guaranteed them in regard to their mobility and their return and, finally, couples who decided to marry to undertake a new life abroad, all of this with the developed Europe in the background.

Similarly, the decline in the number of marriages has been accompanied by the increase in the number of divorces and separations, a growing trend that, as in the rest of Western countries, is defining matrimonial projects of less stability and duration[2]. In the Romanian case, it is particularly interesting to note how the divorce rate in rural environments has grown at a rate much higher than the corresponding urban rate and, although still considerably away, presented a converging trend, which implies a rapid modernization of rural family patterns, until now more conservative and traditional than their urban counterparts. In fact, the main urban districts of the country, as with Bucharest, Timiş, Constance, Iaşi or Braşov, the divorce rate has decreased considerably in the past 20 years. For example, Timiş, the most western of the Romanian districts, has changed froml 2.13 per thousand of divorces to 0.83 per thousand in two decades.

Certainly, all this should be understood in the context of a smaller number of couples who finally decided to get married and the relative weight of non-matrimonial unions is increasingly important, so that it would be logical to think that new marriages are constituted by couples more convinced of the next step to take and less tied to social pressure and its informal control, and therefore more stable over time. However, it is the rural population which really is finalising an accelerated process of breaking with the traditional conventions and the pressure of the informal control of their rural societies in matrimonial topics, as in the case of divorce, provinces (*judeţe*) as Vaslui, Botoşani, Maramureş, Neamţ, Tulcea or Calaraşi, among others, have increased their rates very quickly. In fact, Vaslui has doubled it in 20 years, from 1.01 per 1,000 in 1990 to 2.10 per 1,000 in 2010.

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[1] The marriage rate in 2012 was 5.4‰
[2] The divorce rate in Romania was 1.6 per thousand in 2012.

Chart 5. *Evolution of nuptiality in Romania, 1990-2010*

Source: INS, 2011, 2012b.

Chart 6. *Evolution of divorce in Romania, 1990-2010*

Source: INS, 2011, 2012b.

The Romanian emigration, a phenomenon of little statistical coverage

Without depleting them all, the last factor that has influenced heavily the evolution of the Romanian population has been emigration. As it has been stated previously, the National Statistics Institute of Romania, which is the official body of the Romanian State in the area of demographic information, has been providing data on international migration flows very distant to those which have actually been produced and today they continue to occur in the Carpathian country. With official data, it has been impossible to know the exact number of Romanians who had fled their country, mainly in the pursuit of better employment outlook, so it is very difficult to include with statistical accuracy the

migration variable in the evolution of the population beyond less empirical estimates and assessments, which does not influence the abundant information on the impact of migration that have unveiled the jobs of more qualitative nature in the Romanian society.

With regard to the Romanian emigration, there have been more reliable statistics that those made on their own from Romania and not by a small margin. As can be seen in the data table that accompanies the figure 7, the emigration volume recorded by the Romanian Institute was implausible. According to official figures, from the country it would have emerged toward emigration, since the fall of the communist regime, 414.607 Romanians, when only the National Institute of Statistics of Spain stood that the Romanian population resident to 1 January 2013 was 773.122 people, having reached the 865.707 in 2011 (INE, 2012 and 2013), already with the economic crisis, discouraging the arrival and encouraging the return. For the same period, the National Statistical Institute of Italy estimated the number of Romanians in the transalpine country to be 968.576 (INSTAT, 2011).

Somewhat less underestimated, the INS estimated more than 910,000 emigrant Romanians (*persoane plecate in periodă îndelugată*, i.e. people who have gone for a long period of time) for 2012, still distant from more than the estimated 2,000,000 that can reside only in Italy, France and Spain[1]. On the other hand, the INS published that immigrants present in the country (*persoane temporar prezente*, i.e., persons temporarily present) exceeded slightly the 301.600 and neither in the case of migrants nor for immigrants offered once more disaggregated data with a low degree of error on their destination, origin, age, sex, marital status, education, work experience, etc.

The alternative official source, the statistical yearbooks (*Anuarele Statistice al Romaniei*), nor have they been particularly lengthy in the detail of the emigrant profiles, while clarifying the overwhelming feminization of the Romanian emigration, with a 63.10% of emigrant women compared to a 39.90 per cent of men, and the median youth, already entering a certain maturity of the main age group of these immigrants, with a 57.70% of the same between 26 and 40 years. In regard to the destinations, they have traditionally been important Italy, Germany, United States, Canada and Hungary, among which, for a little more than half a five-year period, must be placed to Spain[2] Just after Italy, as the second destination of migration (INS, 2008, 2012a, 2012b).

J. Diaz: What sectors of the population are the most likely to migrate? Ionel: *Young people, although there are people of 40 or 50 years* [that also migrate] *because it is very difficult for them to find work* [here]. J. Diaz: And what about young students, of high academic level? Ionel: *No, in all categories. Emigration is general, they migrate with studies and no studies.* J. Diaz: And what about young people from 20 to 35? Ionel: *From 25 to 30, yes, that is the interval, although there are people who migrate for the first time at the age of 50 years, this is not something rare.* J. Diaz: What is the main destination of the Romanian migrants? If there is that destination. Ionel: *I think that is Italy. Most of these migrants are originating in Moldova and Transylvania. In Italy the emigrants* [Romanians] *are scattered all over the country, even in Sicily. They have an important presence*

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[1] The latest revisions from the INS offer a migrant population of 2.29 million Romanians in 2011 and 2.37 in 2014.

[2] On the history and geography of the Romanian emigration, primarily in and toward Spain, is particularly recommended the work of Professor Rafael Viruela, summarized on https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/autor?codigo=799089

in the region of Rome, in Lazio, in the region of Turin, in the north, in the region of Milan, in Venice and in Tuscany. J. Diaz: And from the beginning was always Italy the first destination or were there any changes? Ionel: *Could not affirm… Italy is now the first destination.* [can be checked in the number of *flights that there is for Italy, even from* [airports] *provinces, as Iaşi or Bacău.* J. Diaz: Can you fly to Rome? Ionel: *To Rome, to Verona, Treviso, to Rimini… are very good communications. Now an important destination is being Spain, because in Spain there is a great* [economic development]. *You can work in agriculture or in the tourism sector.* Excerpt from the interview to Ionel Muntele, 'Alexandru Ioan Cuza' University of Iaşi.

Finally, phenomena such as those described above formed in the Romania of the major socio-political transformations a population structure slightly feminized, whose representation pyramid shows a significant concentration of population between 20 and 44, with a prominent investment of the bases, weaker, as a result of the vegetative decline intensified by the significant emigration of the last decade. In a more detailed way, by sex, women have accounted for 51.32 per cent of the population compared to 48.68 per cent of men in 2011[1]. However, this feminization of society as a whole was not completely real, but a final balance sheet result of significant feminization of the population older than 45. From this step of age downturn, the population was slightly male, especially between 20 and 34, again as a result of the strong emigration of the past 10 years, where women accounted for a significant number of the bulk of migration. Thus, in the cut between the age of 30 and 34, the men accounted to 51.33% of the total number of this population, a percentage that is repeated, although slightly less in the entire young population of Romania. On the other hand, the most feminized group is the one that moves in a range of age between 70 and 74, with a 58.94% of women.

With regard to the rural population, which amounted to 9.635.620 inhabitants, i.e. the 44.99% of the Romanian population on 1 January 2011, was slightly feminized as a whole with a 50.12% women compared to a 49.88% of men. As was the case with the total set of the Romanian population, the feminization of the rural population was only partial as their assets were higher in percentage than the male aged from 55, with a marked inequality with advancing age. Thus, women above 84 represented a 63.68% of the total of its age. On the contrary, all age groups from 50 years down were slightly masculinized, especially the range between the 40 and 44, where men accounted for 54.43% of the total.

Why the set of the Romanian population was female from the age of 45, while the rural population started to be female from the age of 55? Again, it is necessary to make reference to the emigration to explain it. Obviously, the profile of the rural migrant and the profile of the national migrant, mostly urban, were dissimilar profiles and responded to different stimuli, in addition to having represented different migratory processes with dates and destinations also different.

The Romanian rural population participated in the inner emigration long before the urban, directed mainly toward the outside. During the implementation of policies for the intensification of the Rumanian industry, under the regime of Ceauşescu (1967-1989), an important part of the rural population left the field to focus on intermediate cities, around the main industrial poles, and thus being used in the industry. That migratory movement caused which until recently, in the pyramid of the rural population, has been observed by

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[1] The new figures of 2014 are the 51.14% of women compared to 48.86%, according to Eurostat data.

way of age groups significantly narrow. We refer to the shaped by those with more than 44 years. At the same time, that movement of rural population toward the cities was marked mainly by men, whose displacement feminized rural youth of its time, represented so far by that set of people over 55. On the contrary, the participation of the urban population in the inner emigration would expect until the 90s, with the privatization of the rural properties and the return of a significant volume of urbanites to the field, mainly thickening the rural ranges between the age of 30 and 44, among others.

Finally, emigration toward the outside has been dominated from the outset by a larger number of inhabitants from urban environments, who suffered the dismantling of the heavy industry after the economic restructuring of the country and the resulting massive destruction of employment. This has been an emigration involving a larger number of women compared to men, masculinizing a cohort of younger age in the country as a whole, than the masculinized in the rural population.

Chart 7. *Structure of the Romanian population by sex and age, 2011**

* Men at left, women at right. Source: INS, 2012c.

Chart 8. *Structure of the rural Romanian population by sex and age, 2011**

* Men at left, women at right. Source: INS, 2012c.

Final thoughts

After the fall of the regime of Ceauşescu (1989), not without certain episodes of violence, Romania was opened to the global world that in those years was in a huge political, economic and technological transformation. Its economic system, based on the duality of rural environments of farmers increasingly overshadowed, on the one hand, and urban environments of heavy state industry, on the other hand, suffered drastically and immediately. The loss of markets, technological backwardness and lower competitiveness of their agriculture and industry, coupled with the lack of political and social stability led to a huge crisis of their socio-economic structures. Since then, the dismantling of its industry, the agrarian reform and the increasing peasantry trait of agriculture, the territorial changes (Field-city) and the adoption of neoliberalism in their economic policies have been the highlights of its new historical cycle. The arrival of freedom to, among other things, migrate and move in the European territory. The Romania of the great transformations quickly opens to the West and, above all, to a European Union, to which with many hopes, finally, adheres in 2007, as the "magic formula" to achieve a desired development and welfare. All these factors are a cause and a consequence of the profound changes in the Romanian territorial distribution, its population and its demographic and social structures, markedly the family factor.

The sociodemographic events are appearing in other European countries in the 60s and 70s of the twentieth century, as well as the fall in fertility and natality and the increase in the aging, among others, are going to happen at a later date in Romania but at a more accelerated pace from the 80s and especially from the 90s. These changes have been

accentuated to such an extent that at present, the Carpathian country, as other ex-Soviet, has a natural negative dynamics, despite the decline of the general and infant mortality, which contributes to an increased aging of its population.

Furthermore, these changes in the natural dynamics are reinforced by the phenomenon of foreign emigration, on such a social scale and political implications that the Romanian official statistics have not recognized in its entirety. This output, especially to other European countries, and even more so since 2007, has become the exhaust valve of several million Romanians, especially of young and mostly female, affecting both the rural and urban spaces. Regardless of their figures, more real if we take the statistics of recipient countries such as Italy or Spain, the constant flow of Romanians toward the outside has meat a significant decline in the total population of Romania, in addition to the detailed consequences in the demographic and family structures. This pace of exit toward the exterior has decreased in recent years as a result of the economic crisis in European countries such as Spain, but still there was a phenomenon of flows of returns that entails a demographic recovery, apart from other consequences on the economy and the territory. If this will not occur, during decades, the demographic structure of Romania will reflect this phenomenon of emigration, as a result of the historical context of the country in the framework of the European Union and globalization.

And as a result of this social and historic becoming, demographic projections of Eurostat predict, beyond the numbers, a gradual decline of the Romanian population in absolute terms and an increase in the rates of dependence, motivated this by the increase in the aging[1]; a situation similar to that of other European countries, although in the case of Romania, this situation has come about in a more accelerated way by the lower temporary travel.

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[1] 16.5% of the population over the age of 64 in 2014, according to Eurostat.

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THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF LAND OWNERSHIP
OF THE NOMADIC KAZAKHS

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Abstract

The article discusses the theoretical aspect of land ownership in keeping nomads. This problem originates from the first half of the XX century, and researchers have not reached a consensus, it remains controversial in the science. That is why, we have tried to analyze this difficult problem, which originated in the Soviet Nomadology and was pressured by Marxist-Leninist ideology, which is the whole history of mankind is regarded as part of the formational theory. From this position, the Soviet historiography developed the question of ownership of the nomads and published the work. The authors attempted to address the issue of ownership of the pastures from nomadic Kazakhs XVIII-XX century and classified by periods of historiography. We do not stop at the historiography of the XX century, but also do the brief excursions as the previous file in the century, and the modern to disclose the matter of consideration.

Key words: *nomads, keeping nomads, nomadic Kazakhs, theoretical problems, historiography, landed property*

Introduction

In modern Nomadology, there are many theoretical and unresolved questions. One of them is a problem of landed property of nomads. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to reveal the theoretical and methodological foundations of land ownership among the nomads. To achieve this goal we have set the following tasks:

- Summarize the theoretical basis and features of the formation of land ownership among the nomads.

- To identify and classify the historiography of land ownership Kazakhs.

Subject of research is a land ownership among the nomadic Kazakhs.

Scientific substantiation of this study is to reveal the theoretical and conceptual issues of land ownership among the Kazakhs.

The theoretical problems of nomads in historiography refer to the end of XIX-XXI centuries. A large amount of data on the nomads give us the information gathered during the visit of Russian officials to the administration, the expeditions of researchers who have been particularly dynamic in the XVIII-XIX centuries due to the fact, in this period the colonization of land begins in Kazakhstan.

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We can divide studying the nomadic Kazakhs into the pre-revolutionary, Soviet and modern.

To the historiography of pre-revolutionary period there are official works of the royal administration and the works of researchers, as Levshin (1996), Georgi (1799), Pallas (1773) and others. The pre-revolutionary studies the peculiar descriptive, but they have an impressive value for the study of the Kazakhs as they are the source. Studies of Kazakhstan were not only research, but also a strategic character, which was aimed at its further colonization.

It is known that in the middle of the XIX century was founded the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, which initiated the study of the peoples of Asia and Kazakhstan.

A great contribution to their study in XIX-XX centuries were made an expeditions by Potanin (1875), Shcherbina (1905), Rychkov (1887), Radlov (1870) and other researchers. It was gathered an impressive amount of ethnographic and historical material about nomads.

Chronological scope of our study is covering XVIII-XX centuries. The reason for choosing these time frames, the most stable in terms of source.

By the beginning of XX century we have accumulated a sufficient number of historical and ethnographic materials about the nomadic people that are needed the analysis and conceptual understanding. The nomadic peoples were presented in opposition to the sedentary peoples. They are not traced the theoretical or conceptual problems of nomads, these studies were mostly descriptive, dominated by a statement of facts.

Thus, the Pre-revolutionary researcher Rumyantsev (1910) wrote about the land relations: "In the complete domination of the nomadic way of life, signs of land are absent. Kyrgyz peoples transferred their cattle and homes (yurts) from place to place every summer and winter. At that time, the land was so much that the ownership of it did not exist, and if between the individual genera occurred disputes over the right to nomads at a certain territory, the case did not go on the ground, but only on water sources that steppe is not rich and that, therefore, valued very highly. The first rights of using the land was "koun", the bestial manure at the camp. Koun gave the right of the tribal group becomes at the same place and for the next year. However, there were no boundaries around the Cone" (Rumyantsev, 1910: 51).

The author believed that the transformation in land use occurred of activation policy of the Russian Empire in the daily life of the Kazakh people. "As soon as one side Kirghiz people (*Kazakhs*) were surrounded by Russian people, the tribal groups began to feel the need to consolidate the right to use the land areas. And in XVIII-XIX centuries the settling labor came by. At that time Kirghiz people (*Kazakhs*) occupied the territory and began to spend the cold season in the wintering, constant grounds (kystau)" (Rumyantsev, 1910: 51).

At the end of XIX-XX centuries, the nomadic Kazakhs life was modified due to the reduction of pastures and nomadic routes, increasing agriculture, which led to the Settlement, the penetration of commodity money relations, which contributed to the Russian government. Rumyantsev (1910) writes that "in the future the separation of land is of selected villages. There are also redistributions mowing, completely unknown to the old Kirghiz (*Kazakh*) community, who knew only a free land grab. All these processes are

influenced by land acquisition by the government and an increase of population" (Rumyantsev, 1910: 58-59).

Based on information about the nomads Rumyantsev (1910) showed the impotence of the authorities of the khans in matters of land distribution and other socio-political issues.

Soviet historiography, research of the land problem of nomadic Kazakhs

In the Soviet period, starting in the 20's of the XX century, the Communist Party gives the setting for the implementation of a five-term model of Karl Marx. On such ideology the development of the nomadic peoples viewed in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. No scientist could conflict with the settings of the Communist Party. The new Marxist-Leninist ideology laid the stereotypes of the conception of history.

After the revolution and civil war in the mid -1920s, renewed the research survey on the nomadic peoples. Soviet scientists have studied the nomads guided methodological trends that focus on the ideological installations of Marxism and Leninism.

Thus, the 30-s of XX century there were a series of publications about the history of the nomads, in which nomadic society was interpreted on the basis of the new Marxist-Leninist systems. The logical conclusion of this conceptual and ideological policy was the adoption of "Short Course of the UCP (b)", which asserts the principle of the formation approach to the history of mankind.

One of the first studies on the Asian nomads had a monograph by Vladimirtsov "The social system of the Mongols: Mongolian nomadic feudalism" (1934), it has developed a theory of "nomadic feudalism", taking into account the feudal ownership of the pastures where the feudal system led and controlled land use. Dependent ordinary herdsmen have used the land as grazing land for cattle, at the same time performed various natural duties. Based on the features of the "nomadic feudalism" the nomads used to have the ownership of the land.

The XX century was of great importance for Soviet historiography. In 1954, there was a scientific session in Tashkent which also played an important role. This session dealt with the problem of patriarchal-feudal relations among the nomadic peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (Tolstov, Sidorov & Gafurov, 1955). Most of the conference participants supported the idea that the nomads dominated patriarchal-feudal relations. But there were also different opinions about the basic means of production in the nomadic way of life, which became the main issue and discussion, then reflected on the pages of monographs and the journal "Questions of History" (1954-1956).

In the historiographical review of the privately owned Kazakh nomads, Dahshleiger (1969) emphasized several forms of ownership of the Kazakhs in the period of XIX-XX centuries. He believed that "land was in communal ownership, and private ownership of land (as in the feudal and capitalist forms) appeared in Kazakhstan only after the transfer of nomads to settle down, and agriculture, after the occurrence of the Kazakh lands in the Russian Empire" (Dahshleiger, 1969: 116-117).

As a result, there were two points of view in scientific discussions: 1. The basis of feudal relations were feudal ownership of the land (Zimanov, 2009; Erenov, 1961; Zlatkin, 1955; Potapov, 1954); 2. The basis of feudal relations is the ownership of the cattle (Tolybekov, 1959; Shakhmatov, 1964).

One of the supporters of the first view was Potapov (1954), the developer of the theoretical concept. Relying on the opinion that it was a major pasture condition for conducting nomadic economy, does not detract the value of ownership on livestock. So he thought that pasture was fundamental, but it was not the main means of production.

According to his point of view, the private ownership of communal pastures were originated, which eventually went to the wealthy owners of livestock, thereby it was the total increasing of livestock. In the end, the author comes to the conclusion that in a nomadic society was a continuous process of monopolization of ownership of the pastures. In the same way there were the attachment to the land and the formation of ordinary herdsmen feudal relations (Potapov, 1954: 76). Transfer impoverished nomadic cattle was the main instrument of their attachment to the property feudal nomad, which is expressed in the form of patriarchal (Potapov, 1954: 79-80). In Potapov's (1954) opinion the territorial community maintained, which consolidated the nomads on the military principle.

Supporters of the second approach in theoretical questions of ownership Tolybekov (1959) and Shakhmatov (1964) considered that based on nomadic herding there were community forms of land ownership and private ownership of livestock, but pastures were in the position of production. Such patriarchal-feudal relations perceived by scientists as the initial stage of feudalism and the basis for its addition. According to researchers, the monopoly ownership of pasture owned by a wealthy nomad. Tolybekov (1959) had the opinion that in the nomadic economy cannot emerge fully developed feudal relations without going to settle down (Tolybekov, 1959: 17, 112, 75-76, 79-80).

However, Tolybekov's (1959) opinion was not supported at a conference in Tashkent. The main part of the session was on the side of Potapov (1954), however, people reacted negatively to his judgment that the nomads were the means of production as land and cattle.

As a result, the discussion in Tashkent adopted for many decades in the keeping nomads literature the feudal concept. Most scientists believed that private ownership of land was the basis of the relations among the nomadic peoples. Thus, it confirmed the same opinion about the relations of production, as the sedentary peoples as nomads.

Soviet historians have not been able to discover and solve the problem of private ownership of land. The applied methodological approaches in research scientists Nomadology failed to disclose a theoretical problem, and brought the discussion to a deadlock. In connection with the ideological pressure on scientists were given biased interpretation of historical facts and the pre-revolutionary period in the history of Kazakhstan was attributed to feudalism.

Historian Vyatkin (1998) in the monograph regards land problems in the Kazakh nomads. Describing the situation in the Kazakh society, the sultans, the author believed that "the main condition for the disposal of production was in their hands" (Vyatkin, 1998: 82). According to scientists, the private ownership of land in the Kazakh nomadic society could not emerge because of the peculiarities of nomadic economy. However, he stresses that the lack of land ownership is not a sign of homogeneity relations of all members of society to pastures. To confirm his thoughts, Vyatkin (1998) leads information from a source in 1514, authored by Muhammad Haidar: "Summer was coming to an end. Kazakhs moved to meet winter by order to Kasim Khan" (Vyatkin, 1998: 83).

Before the Mongol invasion in the southern regions' agricultural dominated culture, education feudal land ownership is widespread in the era Karakhanids (999-1141) (Vyatkin, 1998: 83). The right to dispose communal pastures in Kazakhstan formed before the formation of the Kazakh Khanate.

When comparing the land relations of farmers and nomads should be based on the specifics of farming sedentary. So the owner of the land has pasture or diploma, the title document which confirms the ownership of real property, and in a nomadic housekeeping, we see no legal proof of the right to pasture (land) almost to the XIX century.

The right of distribution pastures to conduct migrations do not prove the appropriation of land. Kazakh community used the pastures together, the concentration of livestock owned by the same family led to the actual use of pastures by nobility. However, complete capture of the pasture was not to use the bulk of the community. Scientific highlights village nomads, with the right to manage these nomadic pastures led to monopoly use of individual families of communal lands (Vyatkin, 1998: 84-86). When nomadic economy is impossible to survive a single family and for this reason, in the Kazakh nomadic society people lived a whole genus.

Vyatkin (1998) characterizes that the presence of ownership of cattle and the distribution of pastures by nobility is a form of usurpation of collective ownership of land especially in summer and winter. The right to dispose of public land is the economic form of appropriation of communal pastures by Kazakh nobility and tribal elders. Capture of land for private use could cause mutual collisions. The nomadic Kazakh society existed dependence on large cattle owners, which was natural, as the greater the number of livestock, so the greater was the coverage of land pastures.

A valuable contribution to Soviet historiography has made Zimanov (1958). The book "The social system of the Kazakhs of the first half of the XIX century" is written on the basis of a detailed study of the written sources, given an objective analysis of the production processes in a nomadic Kazakh economy, as well as the reasons that hindered their development. The role of the land also details in his work, land use, monopoly of feudal lords in the land, the nature of the private ownership of land, as well as the feudal and communal relations in ownership and conclusions. According to Zimanov (1958), "the real nomadic peoples did not exist. Cattle breeding and agriculture have a common material basis" (Zimanov, 1958: 130).

According to the author's point of view, nomadic herding emerged in the development of pastoral spaces for this reason that the land could not be based on nomadic husbandry. Livestock did not specify the area of pastures and grazing affect the degree of development of animal husbandry, but grazing influenced the degree of development of a husbandry. The less undeveloped space, suitable for grazing, the less it were any opportunities for its development (Zimanov, 1958: 130-131).

The main condition for the reproduction of the herd is pasture-land, as well as the basic condition of nomadic herding is a vast space. In this case we agree with the Zimanov (1958) that the development of grazing land is directly related to the number of livestock owned by a nomad, but we can not compare the economy of farmers and cattlemen-nomads.

The book argues that in the Kazakh law there is no indication of land ownership. In the sphere of land relations patriarchal survivals were the most tenacious. Everything

confirms the backward forms of land relations of the Kazakh people. However, the lack of legal institutions established in the land of the Kazakhs relationship does not prove the absence of various forms of economic land use (Zimanov, 1958: 134).

The customary law of the Kazakhs problem of communal land ownership are more or less represented. Based on this information, some researchers believe that Kazakhstan dominated the communal ownership of land, but Zimanov (1958) considers it is wrong. Researchers believe "that there was an individual Kazakh society and the feudal land ownership. Despite the fact that the latter forms of ownership dominated the public life of the Kazakhs, in the customary law of the Kazakhs is almost no mention of these forms ownership" (Zimanov, 1958: 135-136).

According to Zimanov (1958), landed property existed at the Kazakh nomads. "Monopoly right of the feudal lords in the pasture was right actual, not legal – the author writes (Zimanov, 1958: 148). Based on the customary law of the Kazakhs, Salyk Zimanovichu let out of sight the legislation of the Russian Empire of the second half of the XIX century, based on which Russia has announced Kazakh land as their own.

Monograph by Apollova (1960) shows the changes in the economy and socio-political system of Kazakhstan, following the accession of Russia. This work is a study of the socio-economic consequences of the accession of Kazakhstan to Russia.

Land relations transformed slowly in Kazakhstan in XVIII-XIX centuries. In our opinion, the nomadic herders had ownership of the land. Ownership of land (pasture) through customary law is assigned to the patriarchal extended family, native, tribal group. Relationship is the distribution of individual sections of the pens, kystau, zhailau had an internal communal character, the elders of the village deal with their redistribution, clan, tribal associations. Ownership of the land from nomadic herders had disguised.

With regard to the usurpation of land large livestock owners, then it was missing. Inside the community at various levels this issue was solved (at times), depending on the number of cattle.

The herd owner was not profitable to share pasture between individual farms, which hindered the development of land relations in Kazakhstan. But Apollova (1960) argues that the emergence of private ownership of land of the Kazakhs may accelerate due to the transition to a settled way of life.

In the southern regions monopoly feudal land ownership was based on land and water relations. In these regions, on such relationships "established the hereditary possession of the feudal nobility of the irrigation network. The system of distributing labels khans Khan confirms feudal right to the land of his khanate and indicates the vassal sultans and beys of Khan" (Apollova, 1960: 339-340). But this situation was observed not everywhere.

At the end of the section of land ownership Apollova (1960) notes the general line of development of land relations. The colonization of the region and the seizure of pasture lands Russian Kazakhs "reinforces the need to define more precisely the boundaries of their land" (Apollova, 1960: 344). Exploring the history of Kazakhstan, the scientist uses a large number of sources that confirm the existence of private ownership of land. From the study, we see that the actual owner of the pasture was a feudal lord. Given the peculiarity of farming nomads and their relation to the pastures (earth), the author remains a supporter of the prevalence of land ownership.

In scientific works of keeping nomads in 60-80 years of XX century continued controversy over the basic means of production. We would like to pay a particular attention to the monograph of Markov (1976), one of the first works, which considered agriculture and socio-political structure, especially of life of Kazakhs, Turkmens, Arabs and Mongols.

Markov (1976) particularly emphasizes that "the pastures were not privately owned, and they were used within the boundaries of the settlement Horde entrance. The place seasonal nomadic pastures were determined by custom, the right of the first seizure, personal understanding, of a strong right, as confirmed sources of personal messages of that time" (Markov, 1976: 141).

Based on historical and ethnographic data the author argues that the cattle from ancient times has been in private family ownership. According to the researcher, the private ownership of the cattle appeared already in the process of nomads. With the emergence of nomadic herding was the expansion of primitive communal relations and deepening income inequality (Markov, 1976: 290).

Private ownership of land from nomadic herders began to emerge as the transition to a settled way of life. The researcher acknowledges that prior to the accession of Kazakhstan to the Russian land was not privately owned, "when nomads found themselves under the authority of the settled state, to the last step and the right of the supreme sovereignty of the pasture. ... As the penetration and development of capitalist relations began to appear private ownership of land, mainly in the processed one. In nomadic Kazakh society the private property owned to the genus which is the main entity, the source of law commune cattleman. Markov (1976) does not focus on the colonization of the region and does not see it as the cause of the expansion of the nomadic economy" (Markov, 1976: 300).

According to the Soviet researcher Potapov (1954) the management of complex extensive farming was possible only if there is suitable for this large territories. The scientist believes that the main means of production was the land of nomads, where pastures were the decisive factor of production. In the presence of extensive land and grazing year-round throughout the year possible reproduction of the herd. It should take into account the fact that the traditional farming of the Kazakhs was natural, it was is targeted only at their needs.

Thus, in the Soviet historiography the main attention was paid to the development of formational nomads, not to the nomadic economy. Nomads was not considered as a separate civilization, which has its own characteristics requiring specific research. However, there were experts who took into account the characteristics of nomads and features of civilization, but they had to emphasize its indivisibility, in which the ownership of the land of the nomads were not the exception.

Basic approaches to land ownership in the modern study of the end of XX – beginning of XXI century

Khazanov (2002) argued in his monograph "Nomads and external world" paid to attention to the property in nomadic society. The author identifies two main reasons on which to build economic relations: a) private ownership of livestock and b) the corporate ownership of the pastures.

Here we will try to trace the views of scientists on the issue of ownership. According to Khazanov (2002), it was only just a trend "to the establishment of private ownership of certain types of pasture and then only in relation to specific nomadic societies are generally modern and contemporary integrated with sedentary societies in a system in which the nomads politically find themselves in a subordinate position" (Khazanov, 2002: 223). The author, like many researchers of this problem, sees the transition to a settled way of life and solving the land question has the effect of nomadic farming states.

Khazanov (2002) relied on the data from the beginning of the XIX century wrote that the Khan Jhangir of the Bukey Horde "seized and allocated land parcels to his confidants in private ownership". However, the author considers this fact to be an exception and emphasizes the importance of the Law of 1868, which finally stopped the former policy of the Russian government, aimed at supporting the khans and sultans (Khazanov, 2002: 223-224).

According to the scientist, the nomads of Eurasia supreme ownership of grazing in nomadic societies belongs to all the nomadic union, but in practice they are distributed on the rights of ownership or use of its various parts. There is played an important role especially the distribution of pastures and wells, delineation migrations routes, allowed to have complex shapes dissected ownership, possession and use (Khazanov, 2002: 224-225).

The presence of various forms of corporate ownership of key resources in nomadic societies explained the combined effect of several factors: 1) the environment (more or less regularity in the loss); 2) economic factors; 3) with a population of nomadic society and social organization.

We studied the problem in the monograph by Russian scientist Kurylev (1998) "livestock, land, community and semi-nomadic Kazakhs". According to the author, in the Kazakh nomadic society it was a large feudal property. He considers erroneous view of many scientists that the "extensive nomadic cattle the land cannot be the main means of production, as it is not attached to the labor of man, and therefore, there is a large feudal land ownership" (Kurylev, 1998: 46).

In XV-XIX centuries ownership of the land, "expressed in the right of a particular social group of feudal lords dispose pastures and nomads under their supervision Kazakh tribes. This will conclude one of the main features of feudal nomads herders in general and Kazakhs in particular" (Kurylev, 1998: 48).

Kurylev (1998) admits that in a nomadic society was a double operation of the basic means of production. On the one hand there were khans and sultans who ruled the pasture and on the other there was nobility used as an instrument of the exploitation of animals.

Through private ownership of livestock exploiters had a direct relationship to the land, taking the best and significant areas of pasture, which is shared in all kinds or units. The author keeps to the idea that the usurpation of feudal lords and pasture emerged during the "Kazakh khanate (XV-XVII centuries.) And it particularly intensified during the accession of Kazakhstan to Russia (XVIII-first half of XIX century)" (Kurylev, 1998: 64).

The researchers emphasize that the 60-ies of the XIX century, is a mixture of a large feudal land ownership, which was expressed in the right order "pastures and nomadic subservient labor, with communal land among ordinary Kazakhs" (Kurylev,

1998: 69). Despite the fact that early in the second half of the XIX century, was officially eliminated large feudal land ownership. Changes in the use of pastures did not happen.

Research of Artykbaev (2005) addresses the issue of land Kazakhs ownership. In the book, the author examines the historiography, the methodology and some of the theoretical issues of nomads. The study is interesting with its synergistic approach and the use of oral folklore to explain the features of nomadic culture and economic activity.

According to Artykbaev (2005), the nomads developed a special relationship to the land, which can be understood "only in connection with the principle of kinship, which plays a role in generalizing social system of the steppe peoples. Land nomads perceived as the substantial foundation of human life" (Artykbaev, 2005: 28-29).

At the same time, the author notes that the land was considered only "as an object of property, discussions are just about to elucidate the mechanism of its implementation. Not to mention the orthodox Marxist writings, even in the most current research area is considered in terms of the implementation of the ownership" (Artykbaev, 2005: 197-198).

According to Artykbaev (2005), the territorial organization arises from the fact of temporary ownership of land and is based on the historical identification of the person with possession of ancestors (Artykbaev, 2005: 200). Through clarifying taxonomic ranks of kinship specific territorial boundaries of the "jurt" of a single owner of the village, family are identified. "The land was originally considered as eternal intangible and unattainable the beginning of life. Earth nurtures all life" (Artykbaev, 2005: 204).

Turning to research scientist Masanov (1984) who has made a significant contribution to the development of the studied problem. He believed that private ownership of the animals objectively caused especially farming and social relations among the nomads, contributing in particular, the intensification of nomads, folding in the subsequent land ownership relations. Nomads of the scientist used the land not just as outside of it is real, objective conditions of labor, but also as a means of production, without which there could be no pastoral economy. Relationship to the land as a means of production is determined by their relation to grazing, the desire to effectively use the means at their disposal pastures, fodder and water environment (Masanov, 1984: 125).

The research by Masanov (2011) which covered the materials during his lifetime because of the censor was not included in the first edition under the title "Nomadic Kazakh civilization: the basics of life migratory habits of society" giving a comparative analysis of the Eurasian type of nomads and nomads with different regions of Kazakhstan.

Masanov (2011) explores the right of first seizure believes that the rights of the various communities in the warm season were governed by this law. However, the right of first seizure did not extend to the winter pastures and artificial water sources and was the privilege of only the members of associative groups. During the warmer months there was an assigning ownership of water sources, the result there was a ratio of communal ownership of grazing land around the water source.

Based on the environmental factor Massanov (2011) considers "involvement in environmental management of land occurred on the basis of seasonally productivity of vegetation. Because of this, the property relations only cover those pastures and only at that time of the year when they were able to provide cattle feed. As a result, the same pastures in the different periods of the year due to the seasonal performance of the

vegetation cover could graze cattle of different communities, so that the relations of land ownership could be worn seasonally character" (Masanov, 2011: 442).

Masanov (2011) extracted three major components, which we quoted: "The relationships of land ownership were, firstly, mediated as forage lands were appropriated in the warm season is mediated by the ownership of water sources. Second, every kind of cattle organization demanded a special regime of grazing, watering and nomads. Third, seasonally character, for practical utilization of rangeland dependent on the margin of seasonal character of the highest productivity of vegetation" (Masanov, 2011: 442-443).

In legal terms, usually the right of ownership as communities and rich cattle owners of land and water sources expressed in the "right of first seizure" that the mass of direct producers turned to the production of a legal fiction. However, the final conclusion of the universality of the monopolization of land ownership relations rich class of cattle owners needs analysis of the actual relations of the property on livestock and other means of production in the course of employment (Masanov, 2011: 444).

In our opinion, "the right of first seizure" in the nomadic community worked only in intra-land relations. For example, the best grazing areas or the upper part of a water source at a flow could take the commune, who had settled. It played a role, and social and property status of a member or relative of village communities, such as the prestigious pasture land could not take the poor relatives. Besides the "right of first seizure" practiced at development of new territories and new pastures.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we wish to note that the pre-revolutionary studies peculiar descriptive, but despite this, they have an impressive value for the study of the Kazakhs. Studies were not only scientific, but also a strategic character aimed at its further colonization. We are not focused on the pre-revolutionary studies because in them is not traced any theoretical or any conceptual problems of nomads, they are mostly descriptive. The most part of the work in XIX-XX centuries was dedicated to the resettlement of peasants and to a lesser problem of land ownership, due to the fact that the researchers focused on the legislative consolidation of land of Russian crown.

In the historiography of the Soviet period, much attention was paid to the development of formational nomads and to a lesser extent, economic development. The historiography of the Soviet period did not consider the nomads as a separate and unique features distinguish economic activities having unique statehood. It underestimated the socio-political system and socio-economic relations of the nomads, therefore, the findings led to the fact that in comparison with agricultural peoples nomads were unable to develop independently and to create a separate special state to the development of relations. At the same time, there were the studies that recognized the uniqueness of their state, but for ideological reasons the unity was recognized, indivisibility nomadic society as it concerned the relationship to the land owned by the nomads. The main idea of the study of private property is the evidence of exploitative forms of ownership of the nomads. In the Soviet keeping nomads the institution of property was not disclosed.

Researchers at the end of XX – beginning of XXI centuries isolated three components, which are based on nomadic herding, water sources, grazing (land); livestock have caused controversy in the debate among social scientists. The majority of scholars are of the opinion that the cattle is in a private family, property, pastures in communal

ownership, where the principle of acting of first seizure. The third kind is the water resources which available throughout the race and had close grazing. They conclude that prior to the accession of Kazakhstan to the Russian Empire land ownership was not legally secured.

Thus, the problem of land ownership of the Kazakhs until the middle of the XIX century is still studied in historiography and the debate remains to be open.

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HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND FORMS OF ARTISTIC EXPRESSION IN ROMANIAN RELIGIOUS ART

Alexandrina Bădescu*, Veronica Gheorghiță**

Abstract

The historical period and technological aspects so varied led to different and distinct forms of artistic expression, the religious art being born out of the need to illustrate the man's faith as well as his desire, to represent graphically and architecturally the symbols for personal experiences.

The penetration of Christianity in the Romanian countries resulted in the accumulation of everything that is the religious art in the country, building churches by stone, wall or wood, which were adorned with religious artwork. These works were the most different and were intended to help conduct liturgical service, their variety extending from the religious furniture to the specific icons and cult objects.

From an artistic standpoint, some religious works are characterized by a typical Byzantine manner, the iconography stays classic, while still retaining the traditional line both in terms of characters and scenery, while others have oriental and western influences.

Key words: *religious art, historical and social context, iconography, Christianity, symbolism*

The art plays an important role in society, significantly contributing to the transmission of ideas, values and attitudes over time. As a carrier of culture, it shapes the fundamental beliefs and innovative outlook, reflected in various fields such as history, art, science or politics.

Generally, the art emphasizes both cultural continuity and cultural changes, being noted more of its many functions (Jirousek, 1995):

• *to evoke the memory of a significant event*, given the historical facts of great significance and representative events of a person's life (wedding, baptise);

• *social propaganda,* by the use of images aimed to promote the ideas that support a concept or theory in order to convince and win partisans. The power of visual images was used to outline the actions of institutions, but also to persuade the people to accept the faith or to take initiatives;

• *visual recording means of social reality*, the artist being interested in capturing social facts by using linear perspective and the technique of oil painting;

• *highlighting the idea of beauty* in all aspects of social life. Thus, the beauty is defined and depending on social context and the evolution of society;

• *a mean to "tell stories" by pictures*, to relate either episodes from the Bible or the ability to highlight the important events;

• *transmission of emotions by capturing the individual's nonverbal language* (facial expression and posture);

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• *the interpretation of the subject* inspired by the historical, social and cultural period. Thus, with the evolution of the society has changed the way to interpret events, human condition or nature;

• *capturing the religious ritual,* art is always closely connected to the church, currently its main purpose is religious or ceremonial.

The religious or sacred art is the human activity that uses artwork with religious motifs, in order to produce aesthetic values that provide a framework of moral and spiritual effervescence. The religious art uses means of expression with more specific character as ritualistic practices and aspects of the faith system that unites its members of religious worship in a spiritual community.

Christian art uses the tenets of the Christian religion, in an attempt to emphasize the teachings and the basic themes of religion: life and miracles of Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mary and the saint's life. Unlike other religions, particularly Islam and Judaism, Christianity uses pictorial representations that illustrate subjects and representative scenes of the religious cult. However, there have been historical periods in which the religious graphic representations borrowed profane elements and was trying to dispossess any religious significance. Thus, the iconoclasm shook the foundation of the Christian faith.

Most of the first centuries of sacred art monuments were destroyed by iconoclasts, later by Crusaders or simply by the time. There are kept especially the frescoes in catacombs, especially in Rome.

To express its teaching, the early church used both pagan symbols and specific topics from Romanian and Greek mythology. Also, it used ancient and Greek and Roman art forms, giving them a Christian content, so that this new content would modify itself the forms to express. Art of catacombs is an art that preaches faith, most of themes correspond to sacred texts, such as the Old Testament, liturgical and patristic texts (Uspensky, 1994).

All the paintings of catacombs from I and II centuries represent symbols such as fish, lamb, Noah's ark, etc. "Illusory, three-dimensional space is replaced with the reality plan; the connection between images and objects becomes conventionally symbolic, the image is reduced to a minimum of detail to a maximum of expressiveness. Most faces are represented facing the congregation, as the importance does not only stay in the action and interaction of the represented characters, but also in their condition, which it is a state of prayer as usual" (Lossky & Uspensky, 2006: 33-34).

Besides the rare explicit images of Christ, we find a multitude of symbolic representations either painted in catacombs or carved in bas-reliefs or high-relief of the sarcophagi. Among those using the human form, we primarily meet the good pastor type since the late I[st] century. We have several such representations in Domitilia catacomb, this image is closely linked to the lamb image-inspired by biblical texts.

Another symbolic image of Christ is taken from the ancient mythology, the representation, rather rare in the image of Orpheus, with the lyre in hand, surrounded by animals. This symbol is widely used in the writings of ancient authors, starting with Clement Alexandrinul. Like Orpheus, he tamed the wild beasts with his lyre and spelled the mountains and trees, as well as Christ draws men by His Divine words and appeased the forces of nature (Pădureţu, 2012).

The topics that, at first glance, appear to be decorative, often have a hidden meaning, such as vines, often seen in the art of the first centuries. "The grape vine refers

to the Holy Eucharist and the New Testament, it symbolizes the Covenant Land, as shown by the clusters brought from the land of Canaan in the Moses period" (Uspensky, 1994: 39). Thus, this symbol will represent in the New Testament the paradise motif, the covenant earth motif of those who commune with the body and Blood of the Lord. Currently the decorative grape vine motif exists in the sacred art of the Orthodox Church, keeping its symbolic meaning.

One of the most common symbols in the first centuries of Christianity was the fish motif. Its image was everywhere in wall paintings, sarcophagi, funerary inscriptions on various objects and even worn on the neck by the Christians, the fish being made of materials like metal, stone or nacre. They were incised with the inscription "Let it be Your salvation" or "Save". Christ Himself represents the paramount essential significance of fish, some ancient writers sometimes calling Him our Lord Jesus Christ "the heavenly fish".

Another Christian symbol highly spread in the catacombs is the lamb one, while it represents Christ, the Apostles and Christians at the same time. As a main symbol of Christ, the lamb has replaced a long time the direct image of Jesus, and the biblical scenes such as the Transfiguration or Theophany, not only Christ Himself, but even the Apostles and St. John the Baptist were represented as lambs in catacombs.

Holy Virgin Mary is also represented as often as Christ, but while Christ was mainly represented by symbols, the Virgin was represented directly. She still appears in the second century in various iconographic themes like Annunciation, in Priscilla's catacomb or Nativity in the catacomb of St. Sebastian, from the IV century. Following the "direct or symbolic images of Christ and the Virgin appeared then the ones of the Apostles, prophets, martyrs and angels, summarily, the whole variety of Christian iconography" (Uspensky, 1994: 40-43).

In Romania, with the secularization of the monasteries assets and the development of national consciousness, one began to show interest in conservation and restoration of works of art and monuments in order to preserve these works of art, by highlighting the various historical periods and cultural aspects of our country. Thus, the varied artistic and technological aspects led to different and distinct forms of artistic expression, being influenced over time by two great European cultures, of the Eastern and Western segments.

The oldest evidence of artistic and technical activities, performed on Romanian territory, consists of cave paintings, small sculpture and the decorative ceramics, ornaments, weapons and tools. They brought us the most remote indications concerning the technical and artistic tradition used in their realization (Mihalcu, 1984). Currently there are kept ancient manuscripts of painting, developed by the Romanian painters, testimonials of Romanian medieval painting, dating from a time where Romanian communities rennet the first state forms. These testimonials were kept fragmented, because they have crossed centuries of turbulent and changing periods.

Romanian art was especially influenced by the Romanian nation belonging to Orthodox Church rite, although in the vast majority of works created over the centuries, we have also meet elements of Western civilization, which painters have adapted them to the local specific.

Romanian medieval art has experienced three different stages in its evolution. The first stage is framed between X-XIV centuries and coincides with "barbarian migrations

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end and the establishment of centralized states, Romanian country and Moldova. Transylvania, gradually conquered until the early thirteenth century, by the Hungarian kings, was organized in an autonomous principality under the Hungarian authority" (National Museum of Art of Romania, 2008: 12).

During this period were appearing new fields, strongly influenced by Byzantine culture areas, such as decorative arts. Various architectural monuments, especially religious, were outlining, embracing such an iconographic program in painting. They begin to shape their artistic features of each historical province, resulting from the different ways of assimilating the influences perceived in contact with large areas of culture. "Thus, unlike Moldova and the Romanian Country, in Transylvania, the Hungarian conquerors and then the Saxons, the Catholic religion, will promote a Western art, printing distinct features to the local creation" (National Museum of Art of Romania, 2008: 12).

The second stage of the Romanian art is the development period of the economic life of the Romanian states, between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in the fight against the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, and the trends of domination of Poland and Hungary. This period represents the time of evolution of the art and the culture, when the traditional elements of painting, the Byzantine tradition, make contact with new currents of Western art, with Gothic and Renaissance style.

The last stage of Romanian medieval art is the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of all three provinces subjected to the Ottoman Empire. "At the end of the seventeenth century, Transylvania passes under the control of the Habsburg Empire, and the art of Moldova and the Romanian Country will assimilate Islamic artistic influences, coming on the Ottoman channel and Western elements specific to the late Renaissance and Baroque circulated by masters in Italy, Transylvania, Poland and Ukraine" (National Museum of Art of Romania, 2008: 13).

By joining the artistic styles coming from inside the country with local tradition of artists, was born the first Romanian style, Brâncoveanu style, which marked the art of the three Romanian provinces especially in religious painting, murals and icons, in sculpture, embroidery, miniatures and silverware.

Brâncoveanu era is characterized, in terms of architecture, a renewal of the forms, namely the introduction of new, rich and varied decorative elements that will decorate and adorn an artistic ensemble (Postolache, 2014: 308).

"Brâncoveanu style is defined as such by potentiation of structural elements and decorated in much the artistic tradition of the Romanian Country and cohesive in a unified vision in a time of Matei Basarab (1632-1654), which can be added innovations promoted by the masters who worked on the command of Cantacuzino family, as an important formal-decorative afflux of late renascentist origin and baroque, come on different channels, often mediated (Transylvania, Dalmatia), rarely directly" (Sinigalia, 1995: 74).

An important feature derived from the Brâncoveanu style is the wood sculpture that enriches religious or secular interiors of the era. The richly decorated sculpted forms are found in the space of Orthodox Church and decorate the iconostasis of the Romanian Country as well as the Church wooden objects, such as candlesticks, pews, tetrapods. "The iconostasis tends to store a more decorative nature, acting related functions to its destination, but at the same time aiming to become an integrated whole interior architectural work" (Panoiu, 1975: 24).

In the era of Brâncoveanu, wood sculpture is a decorative sculpture, intended to decorate an object, but an object specifically designed to be decorated with a wood sculpture adequate to its forms, function and role. Brâncoveanu ornamentation of the wood sculptured iconostases, doors and furniture that does not fit neatly to the Western Baroque decoration, it is characterized by a greater abundance of figurative elements, both vegetable, zoo and anthropomorphic.

The sculpture in wood of Brâncoveanu uses various techniques, including Meplat site and bass-relief, occupying a primary place, followed by the fretted and high relief. It is expressed mainly by techniques where the relief is slightly loose from the surface of the material; it is therefore a background sculpture. This is not true, not only for the era of Brâncoveanu, but for all other eras, in all of them we rarely encounter high relief. (Dumitrescu, 1974: 156).

The ornamentation, even though mainly vegetal is non-stylized and the spindle of grape vine with its undulations, is led by a visibly directed trail forming hearts or eights suggesting the nature and reality, the same characteristic is true for zoomorphic palm-leaf. All the elements, rhythm, composition, place and connection, working together to achieve the palm-leaf in a decoration sits in a natural order and a normal connection after an own conception of logic from which it started (Dumitrescu, 1972: 259).

The decoration of sculpture in wood of Brâncoveanu is presented as an exuberant aspect the elements, the palm-leaf used seem of endless variety. However this is misleading, because the repertoire is exuberant not by variety of ornamentations that it contains, but by the image in which these ornaments are presented, arranged and treated. The ornaments are used in a large majority as vegetal-floral, followed by geometrical palm-leaf, zoo and anthropomorphic.

Floral plant palm-leaf, are actually various representations of a small number of themes, of which the acanthus family abound, forming the very basic element of this ornamentation. Besides, we meet the grape vine palm-leaf, the poppy flower, corn cob, Granada fruits, fig and pineapple, but all of them appearing in arbitrary combinations. Not only they are located on the same spindle of acanthus, poppies, Granada fruits or fig or grapes, but the combination of these different plants, creates conventional palm-leaf whose forms may vary to infinity.

Geometrical palm-leaf also comes down to a few such as twisted pair wire, pearl ribbon, scales motifs, denticlulates, circles, but the form they appear in compositions are varied. The geometric motifs usually given as independent, organic unmerged with the other, but only in the overall layout. In some cases they merge with vegetable element (spindles describing circles, pearl strings forming the ribs of the leaves) or compose forms that do not belong to the abstract-geometrical category (the vessel from which rise the branches) (Dumitrescu, 1974: 173).

Subordinates, as the geometrical ones of the vegetable floral, zoo and anthropomorphic ornaments are two types: real or fantasy. The zoomorphic motifs number is slightly higher than the anthropomorphic and the proportion of the fantasy motifs to the real ones is also increased. As zoomorphic motifs we have the bird, dolphin, lion, deer, snake, winged dragon, lion or wolf ending in vegetable, leaves that imitate the shape of a rich plumage and the continued snake by a spindle vine. Here is included the shell motif too.

The anthropomorphic ones are the representation of Jesse, the angels fully presented, bust or as simple heads, between two or eight wings and the angel motif whose body from the bust down continues in vegetable. So it can be seen that, due to the repeated fantasy representations of some of the zoo and anthropomorphic reasons, they not only come in the context of the vegetable composition, but they completely change their character, integrating rather in the vegetal motifs category.

Consequently, the appearance of exuberance of the decoration of Brâncoveanu is due not to the numerous ornamental themes, but to the close cooperation between the different categories of ornaments and use in a wide extent of variations on the same theme (Dumitrescu, 1974: 204).

In the case of icons painted on wood, in terms of art, some of them are characterized by a typical byzantine manner, the iconography being classical and retaining the traditional line both in terms of characters and scenery. So as the saints and martyrs physiognomy are made in a realistic style, in an idealizing manner with severe expressions, the figures being sometimes ascetic and keeping the specific typology of the byzantine style. The outfits are rich but stylized, abound with details of great conceit, with small ornaments, carefully elaborate, and respecting the tradition of a certain type of decorativism, and the chromatic imposed by the Byzantines rules.

Some of the icons of the eighteenth century with influences from the style of Brâncoveanu, have many special decorations of the period. "The decorative repertory of the painting was inspired by elements of the Renaissance and Baroque as Mascheroni, heads of winged angels, birds, fantastic animals, human figures of men and flowerpots, coming directly from the West or from the East by Constantinople branch. The vegetable, figurative and geometric floral ornaments intertwined with the meandric spindle of acanthus leaves in unitary compositions, sometimes making place for heraldic motifs and these new forms are interpreted in an obvious sense of order and balance" (National Museum of Art of Romania, 2008: 123).

Including the folk icons, where the military saints are represented, is generally seen that they have painted on the left shoulder a breastplate decorated with figures of Mascaron. Another example of works that shows the influences of the style of Brâncoveanu are represented by molenia and icons of the XVIII century, showing carved decorations on the edges with double-headed eagle and numerous specific floral and plant elements.

In many icons of Messiah, the Virgin Mary and St. Nicholas are represented on the throne chair. The stall is decorated with rich vegetable elements in the lower or upper area presenting fantastic animals, like snakes.

"The typology of icons characters influenced by Brâncoveanu style have certain specific characteristics as the face oval slightly elongated, the rounded chin, big eyes, highlighted by the dark circles, arched and more elongated to temples eyebrows and the lower lip is marked by a specific shade. Besides the mastery of modelling faces, the icon painting is characterized by perfect execution of draping the robes by a vivid chromatic, with dominant red and green, pleasant harmonized on the golden and shiny background, sometimes decorated with incised vegetal motifs"(National Museum of Art of Romania, 2008: 126).

Such icons whose background is entirely decorated with floral and vegetable elements made by incising and marking of the gold leaf, are those who have Russian influences, especially the Lipovan ones.

"Starting in the phanariote period, the art no longer owned by the lord, it will lose its auditorium character. The place of the vaivodes and great boyars, as founders and donors, is taken by modest social categories as Gent, merchants or even village communities. Material supported and promoted by these middle classes, the art expresses the taste of representatives, which imparts a stronger popular note. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the style created during the reign of Constantin Brâncoveanu survives in the provincial formula, being practiced in many local centres in the country by painters less trained who copy the models established at the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the following one. The painting evolves toward a more pronounced and simplification of compositional schemes. The golden background will gradually be replaced by a fully painted background and some ornaments will be made with the template" (National Museum of Art of Romania, 2008: 146).

From the early nineteenth century, "the icon painting will survive as folk art in the village environments, more conservative. The anonymous craftsman/master usually peasant, more or less talented or trained will sometimes create original works, full of picturesque by combining the traditional elements with his living fantasy, fuelled by the hagiographic writings, legends or stories" (National Museum of Art of Romania, 2008: 153).

In the case of icons, the painting is characterized by a great ability to summarize and pragmatic stylization of the reality, leading often to abstraction. Thus, the physiognomy and characters are made not anatomical, but disproportionate. This is the case of the folk icons, in this category also entering the local icons that may represent the Lord Jesus Christ, the Virgin or the saints protectors of the house, the drawing is done by incising the wood, over which they apply two to three colour shades directly on the countertop no longer applying the layer of acid preparation.

Other icons from the artistic point of view, seek to imitate religious pieces, observing as possible the rules which require submission. Thus, the physiognomy gets out of control, by the lack of teaching school or from the centre of the iconographic tradition, that awkward disproportion appear in representation of the figure and anatomy. The painting simplifies the robes, sometimes even the colour tone is easily transferred to not traditional, the ornamentation becoming more superficial.

"Looking for some creative solutions, the painters of urban environments will focus on the painting easel, gradually abandoning the rules and traditions of Byzantine painting. The rupture between form and content gradually changes the representations essence, transforming them from icons in simple paintings of religious subjects" (National Museum of Art of Romania, 2008: 153).

Technologically, the icons painted in wood have been made on a support consisting of one or more tables, fabric or paper, layer of preparation, bolus, metal foil, colour film and verni.

In different eras, this structure has remained generally the same, but suffered little simplifications. Thus, the canvas that exist on the entire surface of the icon was replaced in the late eighteenth with strips at the joints and edges, then in the nineteenth century with paper, and the late nineteenth century with paper strips at the edges and joints.

The gold was gradually decreased as surface and replaced with other materials like silver, tin, which were covered with a gold coloured verni to give the impression of gold, leading then to remain on the surface only the red, orange or ocher bolus.

The layers of soil were simplified and, from 6-7 stay only 2-3 layers maximum, being applied in successive layers, polished and ready to be painted with or without interim protective elements of fabric, or could have poor concentration, applied in a single layer, usually uneven, with minimum and crude intermediate protective elements.

Also, the wooden support may have various elements of reinforcing with or without adjacent carved elements, they may be prepared for the painting respecting the technological rules or may be prepared coarse, negligent.

The icons painted in tempera on wood are made of technologically wood structure and a layer of paint. The cellular structure of wood support and the placement of the fibres varies depending on the wood species. This change will have an impact on their appearance and properties. Thus, the structure, appearance and physical-mechanical properties of the wood vary depending on the trunk section. The predominant wood structure, which is the icons' support, is the linden wood essence and most common being the fir, followed by the oak and beech.

Most supports were mechanically and manually cut in case of folk icons, noticing on the back and the surface of the paint layer, numerous traces of manual processing. If on the support level are seen few deformations of tables, it means that the wood cutting was transversely performed related to annual circles, radial and in some tangential cuts. In particular, the support made of fir wood has numerous fibre anomalies that tend for an expulsion.

As building systems, the most common were sleepers, applied on the back of icons, frames applied to the surface of the paint layer and in some cases the consolidation was achieved by a built-in edge thickness in languette.

The pictorial layer was formed from textile layer, a preparation layer, colour film and verni. Over the wood structure, the first layer was applied containing an adhesive material, for these icons the most used is the bone glue. This was used over the panel before applying the primer or the cloth/paper and the primer composition, as binder. As a binder of colour, the bone glue was very little used because the glue solution gelatinizes quickly and because of the high pressure created in the colour layer and the tendency for it to peel.

The textile or paper layer was applied on the wood support before the primer, in order to enhance and protect the paint layer of vibration and contraction of the wood, suffered by it over time. Most times the cloth or the paper may be observed in cracks or deep gaps of the colour film.

The primer has appeared as a necessity to have a very fine support and he is like a buffer between the wooden support and colour film, as well as protective role against shocks, being placed over a fabric layer or directly on the wooden supports. The folk icons, the primer are applied in a very thin layer, with the brush, while the icons painted in oil and the others made in tempera have several layers. In priming the panels, it is followed a basic rule - the application of skinny coats on fat coats, this being achieved by lowering the proportion of glue, the fat item from one layer to another. Doing so, the concentration of each layer of glue will decrease with the introduction of inert matter,

chalk dust, white pigments or gypsum. This rule allows overlaying multiple layers, without the danger of further deterioration.

In some religious art works, the preparation layer was modelled by incising, pastiglia and marking. Thus for the icons of influences of Brâncoveanu, the primer has floral and vegetable motifs made by incising and marking and for the nineteenth and twentieth century icons appear decorations on the edges of the robes and the icons made by scratching and modelling the primer with sinuous lines. There is a pre-coat painting, which is called imprimatur for oil painting and bolus for polychrome, which is then applied over different types of metal foil.

The bolus is a very fine layer of clay, which is applied over the entire surface to be gilded, giving the area a very fine texture over which is then applied the metal foil. The purpose of this layer is that by the transparency effect to give a warm appearance to the applied foil, creating an optical effect.

The most common metal foil is the gold one, followed by the silver and tin which were applied with different adhesive, such as glue, or on a layer of bolus. On some icons, there is the foil on some large areas, in the background, on royal thrones, the aureole and robes. In case of silver and tin foil, there are applied coloured tint drawings, in order to give the impression of a gold foil. Most of the icons, especially those folk present as background no metal foil, but a layer of colour, predominantly being the blue one in different shades, red and green.

The colour film is represented by weak tempera or fat tempera, oil colours and pigments, used with different types of binders. The pigment is bound with a binding protein, such as the egg yolk emulsion, animal glues or vegetable at different concentrations. In the case of oil icons painted on wood were used as a binder the flax oil.

Over the colour film is applied a protective coat, verni, that is "a liquid more or less dense, colourless, composed of natural or synthetic resins dissolved in a volatile solvent. The liquid spread on the surface of an object is converted by evaporation of the solvent, by oxidation or polymerization in an adherent, hard, flexible and waterproof film" (Săndulescu-Verna, 2000: 198).

"The use of wines was expanded with the practice of the oil painting, and have broadened since the eighteenth century, since we have the most and varied guidance for their preparation, with the today materials appointments" (Săndulescu-Verna, 2000: 199). Because these coatings are subject to an aging process, on their surface are observed some cracks in some icons, changes in colour, browning or splice, which reacted chemically with the layers below or the above adherent deposits.

There are icons in the collection presenting the metallic ouches, silver over the entire surface revealing only the saints faces or icons showing ouches on the hands, halo and various sets of garments and background. The embossed decoration was carried out by various techniques such as incising, marking, cutting and shaping the surface on a negative.

Therefore, the Church attaches a great importance to the image, which constitutes a true confession of Christian faith. This kind of approach, a dogmatic one, represents an essential dimension of all Orthodox sacred art.

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RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE GLOBALIZED WORLD

*Mihai Valentin Vladimirescu**

Abstract

Religious fundamentalism is one of the central topics of the debate concerning the role and influence of religion in contemporary society. In the light of the tragic events that shook the Western world in the last decades and of the unprecedented expansion of terrorism and religious extremism, the task of defining fundamentalism and its boundaries, roots and facets is an essential task for researchers.

Key words: *religion, fundamentalism, extremism, globalization*

1. The major features of modern fundamentalism

Providing a rigorous and complete definition of fundamentalism is a quite difficult task, mainly because of the major differences in its understanding among both followers and critics. On the one hand, it is asserted that fundamentalism must be understood as an attitude through which people seek to maintain their cultural and religious identity by resorting to the dogmatic and historical sources of this identity. On the other hand, the critics of the phenomenon talk about an attitude that opposes progress and that is essentially immobile. Judging by the data of the contemporary world, we could say that the truth is somewhere in the middle.

Peter Herriot identified five major features of modern fundamentalism, the kind of fundamentalism that we see today on the global stage. Firstly, fundamentalism is defined as a reactive attitude, because it is always appearing as a reply to a threat on the traditional religion from the part of secularization and/or globalization. There are various types of resistance to this threat, but it is in the essence of fundamentalism to take the shape of opposition against a theoretical or material enemy. Secondly, fundamentalism appears as a dualist phenomenon, because operates with radical binary distinctions, such as God-devil, good-evil, truth-falsehood. Thirdly, the fundamentalist currents place in the center of their doctrine the revealed and exhaustive character of the Holy Book, be it the Hebrew or the Christian Bible or the Qur'an. But in the same time – and this counts as a fourth feature – the fundamentalist interpretation of the Holy Book is very selective, because tends to extract passages from their context and to ignore those passages that alleviate the radical nature of other texts. Sometimes, this interpretation is clearly exaggerated, as it brings situations from totally different socio-cultural environments into the contemporary framework. Consequently, some of the solutions proposed by the fundamentalist interpretation to nowadays problems are impossible to apply in society. Finally, the fundamentalist view of history is very often dominated by millenarianism; this view is, in its turn, a basis for the spiritual or physical resistance against the threats of contemporary history. According to this interpretation, history will have a happy end for fundamentalists, who will have a special status compared to ordinary believers who were

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not as radical in their opposition to secularization. Therefore, fundamentalism excludes not only non-believers or atheists, but also moderate believers (Herriot, 2009).

2. The evolution of fundamentalist currents

Although fundamentalism was a constant presence in the entire history and evolution of humanity, it reached its peaks in the 19th and 20th centuries, mainly after the Second World War. In this era, fundamentalism was linked to ethnic and nationalist aspects, while religion became the main challenge to the hegemony of the capitalist and liberal West, substituting the defunct political ideologies of the 19th century and of the first half of the 20th century. It is worth noting that the first offshoots of religious fundamentalism, in the contemporary world, appeared at the very heart of the capitalist West – in the United States of America (Ruthven, 2004). This is not surprising if we take into account the large diversity in the American religious life, a diversity that allowed even the creation of both small and large radical groups. Such an attitude was more difficult to appear in the European Roman-Catholicism, the scene of numerous transformations in the centuries that followed the French Revolution.

In the United States, though, the heterogeneous Protestant community experienced, in the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the following century, an internal conflict on the Christian approach to the evolutionist biology or to the textual analysis and criticism of the Bible. This conflict, known as the modernist controversy, was actually a continuation on a modern level of the old controversy from the period when the Protestant rationalism emerged in Catholic Europe. The divine authority and inspiration of the Bible were once again questioned but, in the same time, the common creationist framework of all Christian denominations was seriously threatened by the new results in scientific research. The American Protestant community divided between modernists or liberals, who plead for the harmonization of the Biblical doctrine and scientific research, on the one hand, and traditionalists or conservatives, who plead for keeping without any modification the doctrine of Revelation and Biblical infallibility. In the '20s, the followers of traditionalism named themselves fundamentalists, but they had already lost control over the American religious scene, where modernists were in foreground (Marranci, 2009). In course of time, this separation was exported to the broad Christian world, although it was less visible in the Catholic community and even less in the Orthodox communion. But there was a real tension within the two major Christian Churches, a proof in this respect being the public controversies between modernism and traditionalism, where religious arguments are often used in the debate.

As far as the American Protestantism is concerned, we should emphasize a phenomenon that took place after modernism became the leading current in the social and religious life. The reaction of fundamentalists was one of isolation, of retreat from the larger community of believers. This led to the creation of their own, fundamentalist, religious institutions. The split between the two sides caused a pronounced marginalization of traditionalists and became more and more obvious as the public policy turned to secularization, accepted by the vast majority of the representatives of the Protestant community. Until the '70s fundamentalists displayed an attitude of civic and political passivity and refused to collaborate with the secular system supported by modernists (Weeramantry, 2005). After the '70s, following a theoretical repositioning and the apparition of new outer threats, the fundamentalists started to be more and more

involved in politics and to protest against decisions of the authorities, such as legalization of abortion, by the decision of the US Supreme Court, in case *Roe vs. Wade*, from 1973. The nationalist and ethical fundamentalism was extended to the religious sphere and now represents one of the main opposition currents to the globalization and its harmful effects, even among American citizens. In the non-religious sphere, fundamentalism lends its meanings to other currents, such as nationalism, pacifism or anti-expansionism. Often, though, these types of fundamentalism resort to certain cultural and religious traditions and heritages. For example, the American pacifism from the times of the Vietnam or Iraq wars resorted to the American Christian tradition, using arguments from the non-violent doctrine of the Bible to stand against the war policy of the White House.

Although the focus of fundamentalists is on what they call the rejection of the false values of modernity, it is not uncommon for cultural products of the Christian tradition to be blamed by fundamentalist groups. For example, Soares de Azevedo asserts that certain branches of Christian fundamentalism disregard works such as Dante's *Divina commedia* and display no particular admiration for the sacred architecture or for works of religious metaphysics, being only interested in the literal and moralist meaning of the Scripture (Azevedo, 2010). This point of view is slightly exaggerated, because *Divina commedia*, for example, was a controversial work even in its own time and was not even compared to the traditional Biblical or patristic writings. Therefore, the reserved attitude of contemporary traditional Christians towards such literary works should not be considered a paradoxical hostility to the very values of their civilization, but a continuation of the traditional attitude of Scripture-based Christianity towards those cultural-religious products created outside the official Church framework. Of course, this attitude was not always legitimate; we can observe even nowadays in the Orthodox communion violent and unexplainable reactions to cultural elements that belong to different Christian traditions, reactions that have their grounds in the rigid understanding of the doctrinal differences between Eastern and Western Christianity.

Along with the rejection of certain elements of the cultural and even religious tradition, fundamentalism also promotes the so called myth of the Golden Era. This era is either in the distant past or in a bright future, where the problems of the modern society no longer exist. For Muslims, for example, the Rashidun Caliphate represents a Golden Era (Ruthven, 2004). In Eastern Christianity, the faithful often think, with nostalgia, of the Byzantine era, with its Golden Century of patristic. This tendency of constructing an idealized past – sometimes future – is a feature not only characteristic to religious fundamentalism, but to most types of fundamentalist thought. These Golden Eras truly were times when most of the problems that caused modern fundamentalism to appear did not exist. In the same time, though, we have to note that in those times religious dogma and political authority were closely relate and it was quite difficult – if not impossible – to promote a real diversity. In modern era, secular policies allowed a higher degree of diversity, under the auspices of tolerance. Therefore, various problems and controversies were brought to light, generating debates that were prohibited in the idealized past of the fundamentalists.

3. Isolationism and aggresivity
The genesis of important fundamentalist movements in traditional religions, always ready to react aggressively to any kind of exterior intervention and to any revolutionary internal idea, is only one of the defensive attitudes adopted by traditionalists dealing with the threats of globalization. In many parts on the Globe, fundamentalism is still in an

incipient form, as an anti-modernist attitude. Therefore, in these societies the main reaction of traditionalists is not an aggressive one, but an attitude of isolation, of retreat from public life. In this respect, they are similar to the early American fundamentalists. Although they accept, in principle, the idea of religious tolerance and freedom of conscience, these isolationist movements are extremely reticent to interreligious dialogue. Collective isolationism is a problem for State too, because although it has to respect religious freedom, State also has the responsibility of protecting the rights of the individual. It can be quite difficult for an individual to leave such an isolated and isolationist community and this is where State has to interfere and ensure the protection of the basic rights of the person.

It is paradoxical that, by encouraging diversity, States force fundamentalist communities to adopt isolationist attitudes. For example, within the European Union, every citizen is called to bring his or her own contribution to the definition of his own community, but also to the promotion of the pan-European unity. This means that a traditionalist can influence the political, social and economic life of the community – understood in the broad sense –, but also that he can be forced to accept decisions made by people who are not part of his community – here understood in a narrow sense (Banchoff, 2008). Therefore, the aggressive and insistent promotion of pluralism and multiculturalism, ignoring the specificities of groups and micro communities, can lead to results contrary to the principles of democracy. Those rigid and closed cultural and religious communities start to feel that they are unimportant in the general framework of the European Union. Consequently, they might resort to isolationist attitudes, limiting or even eliminating their participation to the socio-economic life and to dialogue.

On the other hand, States are forced to take a position concerning religious isolationism, because – as I emphasized –they have the obligation of creating a favorable framework for the exertion of individual rights. Isolationist attitudes of communities can lead to a limitation of the exercise of individual economic, political or social rights of their members. In principle, State is required to respect the decisions made by communities, in respect to their involvement or non-involvement in the social life, but the authorities also have the obligation to promote civic involvement, to the detriment of passivity and isolation. In the 19th century, the United States Supreme Court draw a clear line between faith and religious behavior, stating that although State has no right to limit freedom of faith, the religious behavior must be governed by a precise set of rules, intended to ensure public order and to guarantee the premises of individual rights and freedoms (Trig, 2007). From theoretical guarantees to practical enforcement of these regulations is, though, a long way. In the European and American jurisprudence we can find numerous cases in which the stake is to define which religious behaviors are directly connected to the respective doctrines and which are not. Often this task is very difficult for courts and their decisions can easily be interpreted as an illegitimate interference into the "forbidden area" (US Commission, 2010).

These considerations on the isolationist attitude of fundamentalist groups are not valid as a whole outside the Christian civilization. In traditionally Islamic countries, such as Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia or Iraq, fundamentalism does not generate isolationism. On the contrary, in this type of societies, the fundamentalist groups are more expansive and their members are not the passive, but the active subjects of discrimination and intolerance. Even in the moderate circles it is accepted that non-Muslims living in Islamic

countries enjoy very few rights in point of religious identity. When interpreted as rigidly as fundamentalists do, Sharia is very restrictive and discriminatory towards non-Muslim or women. In the category of non-Muslim we can find additional classification, because the so called Peoples of the Book enjoy a slightly better status than Hindu or Buddhists. According to contemporary analyses, the main fault for the fundamentalist and discriminatory interpretations of the Islamic teachings and of the Sharia belongs to the Muslim religious authorities and political leaders, who hesitate in using their influence over masses in order to ensure that the universal value of human civilization are understood and respected (Haar, 2003). After September 11, 2001, the general discussion on religious fundamentalism in Western public opinion was reduced to Huntington's famous theory (1996) on the clash of civilizations. There were formed two groups with different goals and visions: one that seeks to promote the idea that terrorism is a product with religious overtones of religion and Islamic civilization and another that opposes this idea. Before the terrorist attacks in USA, Islamic religious fundamentalism side was not particularly studied, except perhaps Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict, but in each of those cases were obvious political implications of debate. After September 11, however, Islamic fundamentalism became religious fundamentalism par excellence, and, with very few exceptions, represents the primary reference material for studying this phenomenon and extremism derived from it. This trend is visible not only among researchers in the field of anthropology or, more generally, of social sciences, but especially among the general public. For this reason, taking advantage of the high demand for information and interpretations of fundamentalism behind the terrorist attacks, many authors having questionable academic value poisoned public opinion with anti-Islamic theories, seeking to demonstrate the direct link between the Muslim doctrine and the terrorist phenomenon. Without a correct knowledge of the Muslim holy texts and of the history of religion and Islamic civilization, this vision is in fact the successor of dangerous Eurocentric ignorance, like the one that led to the escalation of antisemitism in interwar Europe. And when reporting on Islam, "the emphasis on the role that main Islamic texts play in the formation of extreme political views, particularly in the form of a strict structuralism, it is certainly not an innovation of the literature of populist right, which seeks to profit from the tragedy of September 11" (Marranci, 2009). Ernest Gellner (1981) pioneered the idea that Islam presents in its very structure, all elements that allow transformation into a fundamentalist ideology. These elements taken, in particular from historical evolution of Islam, would be the basis on which any time, depending on the circumstances of the time, Islam can quickly and decisively become radicalized. First, Gellner argues, Islam is a religion of the book, with, from the beginning, supposes an essential immobility. The Quran is complete, perfect and unchanging, and therefore, it cannot adapt to different contexts and Muslims should adapt these frameworks to Qur'anic teaching. Then centrality of Muhammad, as seal of all prophets, prevents development of religious thought, because nobody has at least an equal authority to amend the Islamic prophet or nuance the opinions. Thirdly, the lack of clergy and differentiations between state and religion leads to a confusion of ideas and political, religious, social and economic ideals (Gellner 1981). This last point, in Gellner's view, makes impossible a democratic and secular state in the Muslim world. On the one hand, the existence of democracy opens Sharia establishment, Islamic religious law, as civil disposition, so eliminate the secular character of the state. On the other hand, maintaining

secularism as state policy is possible only to the extent that it is required by dictatorship. The past century is likely to support this Gellner's account. Historic democratic States from Islamic world or at least not being totalitarian such as Iran, ended up losing completely secular character, while secular states like Egypt's Mubarak, Libya's Gaddafi or Turkey adopted totalitarian regimes.

Across the border between civilizations in collision, Islamic fundamentalism is not seen in moderate circles as a direct consequence of the Muslim religion. It would represent, according to the non-radical Muslim, a spontaneous response to social, political and economic punctual problems. Therefore, Islamic fundamentalism should not be removed from the general context of fundamentalism as human response to crises. Like other religious and cultural frameworks, in Islam there are people and communities who proclaim themselves guardians and keepers of the fundamental values of the society they live in, rejecting immorality, social decadence or illegitimate outside interference. Of course, the meanings of these ethical and political threats differ from civilization to civilization. What can however be stated with certainty beyond the moderate wing of Islam trying to deny the peculiarities of modern Islamic fundamentalism, is that the reaction of radicals Muslims opposite the threats already mentioned took the most violent form, if we refer only to religious fundamentalism excluding ideologies such as Nazism or communism.

At the basis of this aggression of the Muslim reaction stands the concept of jihad or Islamic holy war, as it is commonly, perceived by the Western world. Jihad is one of the most visible aspects of Muslim fundamentalism and therefore received the most attention from researchers and the public. Although the idea of sacrificing their lives for religious faith is not specific to Islam and, moreover, is found in almost all religions of the world, the importance of jihad in the life and history of the Islamic world makes this idea to be deeply ingrained in the consciousness of Muslims. In light of the latest developments on international political arena, the end of militant Islamic fundamentalism, turned into extremism and religious terrorism, hardly seems close one. Tensions between Iran and the Western world, impossibility of reaching an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians or the civil war in Mali are highly neuralgic points on the world map of this fundamentalism. Although primarily religious fundamentalism is a reaction against globalization and secularization, its existence is facilitated even by these global processes. Right wing Islamic regime in Saudi Arabia, very sharp and not leaned toward cultural and religious dialogue, has control over the most important oil reserves in the world. In these circumstances, the economic interests of major Western powers make impossible to adopt an attitude of outright condemnation of this type of fundamentalism. But beyond international treaties, in particular with the United States and beyond the obligations assumed, Saudi Arabia remains the home of the holy places of Islam, Mecca and Medina, and therefore a centre of ideological fundamentalism. From here, by the way, left Osama bin Laden, using material resources gathered by his family, especially from the economic relations with the same Western world that fought against bin Laden. Also, the "Arab spring" has led to important changes in the politico-religious scene of North Africa, events testify to Gellner's idea that Islamic regimes cannot be at the same time, democratic and secular. Libya and Egypt have, in this respect, signs of concern for the Western world, because the overthrow of dictatorships has not led, as in Eastern Europe, the establishment of secular democracy, but the rise to power in democratic ways, of fundamentalist organizations and parties.

In its meaning of appeal to the sources and to the foundations of faith, fundamentalism is a feature ever present in the lives of all the Christian confessions. For example, the Orthodox communities who define themselves as fundamentalist do not, always, give outspoken opposition against modernity, but rather, wanting to indicate that doctrine and way of life that it embraces and promotes it is based directly on scriptural and patristic teachings and not on an adaptation to the contemporary world. Likewise, paradoxically, Protestant revolution of the early modern period can be considered fundamentalism, because demanded reconsideration of the doctrines of the Roman Church in the light of the source, the supreme foundation of Christianity, namely Scripture. But what is envisaged in contemporary society when dealing with the Christian fundamentalism, is its opposition to modernity, including against globalization, the secularization of the public sphere, sometimes against Westernization (the case of Orthodox communities) or to the legislative measures, such as the legalization of abortion and the teaching of evolution in public schools. Although this fundamentalism consists, first, in adopting isolationist attitudes, in recent history of Christianity have not missed any radical or violent manifestations, much less of course than in Islam. The peaceful feature and loving one's neighbour are the main characteristics Christianity, which prevented generally develop a violent extremism fundamentalism' foundations.

Although, apparently, the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church could be the main Christian denominations susceptible to develop fundamentalist trend and attitudes, neo-Protestant world, with its numerous religious groups, is the environment in which Christian fundamentalism accumulate most specific features of fundamentalism. Although these fundamentalist believers represent only a small part of Christian civilization, they exert a strong influence globally and this is due largely to the fact that they have the leading centres in the United States. Beyond these social and cultural aspects, within evangelical communities, the most important issue was represented by evolutionary philosophy, both in biology and theology. Protestant fundamentalists believed that morality was declining overseas, particularly in Germany, due to promoting of this philosophy of evolution. Therefore, they fought on all levels to ban the teaching of evolution in American public schools. For the American fundamentalist Christianity, the only solution to overcome cultural and spiritual crisis was a return to the Bible as the infallible and the only source of divine revelation, but also of all social and moral norms. In Catholicism and Orthodoxy, traditionalist movements have not primarily focused on Bible, but on patristic and neo-patristic views on the Christian life. The fundamental difference, in terms of community cohesion, between Protestantism deeply divided on the one hand, the centralized Catholicism and conservative Orthodoxy par excellence on the other hand, made possible the development of a much larger variety of traditionalist fundamentalist attitudes inside neo-Protestant world.

Although, as we said, it is not specific to Christianity the concept of holy war, this does not mean that in different historical eras, Christian Churches and communities of believers have not called for such an idea to justify their actions. Historical examples that come quickly to anyone's mind are the Crusades and the Inquisition. But the call to a holy duty of physical combat characterized some Christian fundamentalist movements in the modern contemporary world too. Reinhold Niebuhr was one of the theorists of "Just War", an adaptation of liberation theology to social issues on a global scale. So Christians have a duty, in Niebuhr's view, to take action, even violent, to eliminate injustices, even if this

cannot be founded on the Gospel message. There are, however, only few cases in modern time when this happened, if we refer only to the Western Christian world. Guerrilla movements such as Lord's Resistance Army led by Ugandan Joseph Kony, although it claims to be essentially Christian, cannot be classified as Christian fundamentalism, because, at least in the case of Kony, are animated by syncretic ideologies and even where they are actually present, Christian elements are interpreted in a manner radically different even from the one used by the most innovative neo-Protestant movements (Niebuhr, 1940). If Islamic fundamentalism has come to be equated with terrorism and thus became known outside the Muslim world, while fundamentalist Christian, usually identified as ignorant, intolerant and racist, is in the forefront of public attention, following its massive presence in the United States, Jewish fundamentalism is an issue debated very little outside Jewish world, moreover, outside Israel. Although it presents all the features of fundamentalism as phenomenon, which we have previously cited, and manifests itself strongly, particularly in modern Israeli society, Jewish fundamentalism is often out of the question, motivating that is no more than a more rigorous set of religious practices, overlapping a specific lifestyle, and therefore poses no concrete danger. In Israel, religious fundamentalism is perpetuated, in particular, by the Haredim, an ultra-orthodox and ultra-conservative group whose growing influence on political scene has led in the past two decades to different mutations for a democratic state like Israel. For Haredim, zealous observance of the Halakha, Jewish law, is the primary concern, and this may be easy seen even from their mode of dress. Besides these, there are nationalist-religious groups who, without fully embracing the immobility of Haredim, share some of their concerns and objectives. Thus, there is a fear among these religious Jews, maintained by some political supporters, concerning West and Western public opinion. In the view of religious nationalists, Israel should not be a country among others, as aim seculars longing for a socio-political normality of Euro-Atlantic origin. (Marranci, 2009).

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TURKIC-ARABIC CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC RELATIONS

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Abstract

The article considers the peculiarities of cultural and linguistic relations between the Arabs and the Turks, starting with the pre-Islamic period and finishing with the present. Continuous coexistence of these peoples has led to the fact that the vocabulary of both languages is significantly enriched with loanwords. However, if the problems of Arabic loanwords in Turkic languages, their phonetic and morphological adaptation are widely covered both in domestic and foreign linguistics, the linguists actually ignore the potential of the Turkic languages as the language of the source of borrowing. This problem has led to the choice of research topic and its relevance to the Turkic studies, Arabic studies and the science of language in general.

A comparative analysis of grammar, phonetics and lexical structure of Turkic and Arabic languages, the mechanisms of their mutual influence on the lexical structure of vocabulary act as the research objects. Comparative method, contextual analyses, the method of semantic and diachronic analysis was used to solve these problems.

The article also discusses the problem of the classification of the Turkic languages, deals with the stages of the Arabic literary language development, the impact of the adoption of Islam on the development of the Arabic script, the establishment of norms of the literary language, lexical enrichment system.

Key words: *Turkic languages, Arabic language, language contacts, lexical borrowings, Islam*

Lexical and grammatical system of any language over a period of its history of development and formation because of political, economic and cultural contacts in various forms is affected by foreign language, as a result of which they are exposed to certain change.

In modern linguistics stratum is used, the term that is associated with the manifestation of the contacting languages. "Stratum – is the result of cultural, mediated interaction of script languages in the upper areas of communication: the religious, public, scientific, literary, etc. While stratum borrowing process takes place in the languages which are geographically distant from each other, i.e., which are mediated at their relationship" (Akhunzyanov, 1968). An example of stratum is the interaction between Arabic and Turkic. It should be noted that of all the Middle Eastern languages, which are affected by the Arab, Turkic languages take the first place on the number of Arabic loan words.

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There are a significant number of works that are devoted to the problem of lexical borrowings. Some of them have generalized character. In particular, the works of D. Winford (2003), R. Appel and P. Muysken (2005), T. Kaufman and S. G. Thomason (1989), U. Weinreich (1963), M. Haspelmath and W. Tadmor (2009) are devoted to language intercontact as a whole. The authors point out that the result of language contact is such phenomena as the convergence of languages, tracing, creolization, and others. However, the influence of languages on each other often shows itself in the form of loan words, which for a time rooted in the language and because of the frequency of use, loss of association with the source language, phonetic or morphological deformation begin to be taken as primordial. Besides, the authors reveal the role of political, cultural, religious and the other factors in the process of borrowing.

A number of works reveals the features of Arabic borrowing in the particular Turkic language. Thus, K. Zimmer (1985) examines in his article the influence of the Arabic language on the Turkish language phonological system. However, nowadays more and more supporters of the idea of the continuation of "linguistic revolution" that was carried out by Kemal Ataturk appear in Turkey and it is still aimed at purification of the Turkish language from Arabic and Persian borrowings. This idea can be seen in I. Aytyurka's (2004) studies, B. Bredemoen's (1998) studies, Charles Gallagher's (1971) studies, J. Lewis's (1999) studies.

It is noteworthy that there was no less difficult and persistent struggle for the displacement of the Arabic and Persian languages from writing after the victory over the Seljuk tribes over the Danishmend group and the Crusaders. Significant literature in Arabic and, mainly, in the Persian language that was understood by only a very limited range within the ruling elite has developed in the new Seljuk State. The switch of power to another Oguz tribal group in 1271 under the leadership of Karaman-oglu was marked by energetic measures against the domination of foreign languages: Karaman-oglu prohibited to use in the official correspondence any language but Turkish; the prohibition was supported by a very perceptible measure: scribes – the bearers of the old tradition were beat.

Monographs and defended theses that are published in the post Soviet Union countries are dedicated to the Arabic borrowings in languages of Turkic peoples living in Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and others. Among these works, we should mention A.N. Bakhtiyarova (2009), L.Z. Rustemov (2002), F.A. Abdullayev (1995), J. Jafarov (2001), A.G. Yarullin (2005) and others who put forward the lexical-semantic classification of Arabic borrowings in the analyzed languages, deal with the mechanisms of phonetic and morphological development of the Arabic borrowings.

There are not so many works that reveal features of borrowing of Turkic words in Arabic (Khrisat & Mohamad, 2014; Al-Qinai, 2000).

In this regard, the choice of research topic and its relevance is due to the fact that the issue of Turkic-Arab cultural and linguistic relations in both domestic and foreign linguistics is not studied quite enough.

First of all, it is due to the small number of works that are devoted to the Turkic loanwords in the Arabic language, despite the fact that the language contacts of these language families have taken place over thirteen centuries, which could affect the replenishment of the lexical vocabulary in both languages. Secondly, all the analyzed

works have the linguistic nature, so the authors practically omitted cultural component of the interaction of the Arabic and Turkic worlds.

A consideration of the problem of Turkic-Arabic cultural and linguistic relations determines the formation of the following research tasks: to give a brief description of the Turkic and Arabic languages, to deal with the features of the cultural development of the Turks and Arabs, to conduct a comparative analysis of these cultures and languages, to reveal the mechanisms of their mutual influence on the lexical composition of the vocabulary of the Arabic and Turkic languages.

In order to achieve the research tasks there should be used such methods as comparative method of determining the similarities and differences between the Turkic and Arabic languages; contextual analysis which allows to identify the specifics of the functioning of language means in the text; a method of semantic analysis of linguistic material; a diachronic analysis method which traces the specifics of the linguistic and cultural contacts of the Arabs and Turks for a long time.

Turkic languages are a family of related languages of Altaic language family that are widespread in Asia and Eastern Europe. The area of distribution of the Turkic languages extends from the Basin of Kolyma River in Siberia to the east coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Nowadays the total number of Turkic languages speakers is more than 167 million people.

As for specific languages which belong to the Turkic language family, there are a number of classification schemes in Turkic studies that are proposed by various linguists, which are based on different feature nowadays. One of the earliest classifications of Turkic languages is the classification of the outstanding medieval philologist and lexicographer Mahmud al-Kashgar (X-XI centuries.): «*Kırgız, Oğuz, Tuhsi, Yağma, Çiğil, Oğrak ve Çaruklarla birlikte saf Türkçe, tek bir dil konuştuklarını düşündüğü, Kıpçaklarla, onlara yakın olarak gördüğü Yemek ve Başkırtların konuşmaları arasında biraz mesafe koyar. Yemek yurdu o zamanlar, Yemek bozkırlarında olan İrtiş nehrinin yol yakasında gözüküyor*» (Dankoff, 2008).

This statement can be translated as: *Kyrgyz, Uighurs, yagmy, chigily, Oguz, tuhsi, ugraki and zharuki speak a common Turkic language, Kimak and Bashkirs dialects are very close to it. The easiest dialect is the Oguz dialect, the most correct ones are the dialects of Yagma, tuhsi residents and residents from river valleys Or, Irtysh, Atil. The most beautiful dialect is the dialect of khanate rulers and their entourage.*

Among the domestic classifications it should be noted N.I. Ilminsky's classification, A.N. Samoilovych's classification, G.H. Ahatov's classification, N A. Baskakov's classification, O.A. Mudrak' classification, A.V. Dybo's classification etc. Among the foreign ones – the classification that was proposed by M. Swadesh, Rahmeti Arat, J. Benzig, K. Menges, N. Popp, G. Doerfer, T. Tekin etc.

I – Chuvash (literary language), II – Khalaj people's language, III – Yakut (literary language) and Dolgan languages, IV – Tuvinian and the Karagas languages, V – Khakassia (literary language), Mrassu, verhnetomsky dialects, jolty-Uigur, VI – the northern dialects of Altai (Tomsk, Kumandsky, Chalkan) Nizhnekolymsky, Kondoma, verhnetomsky dialects, VII – Altai (literary language), VIII – Kirghiz (literary language), IX – Uzbek, Novouighur (literary language), X – Tatar, Bashkir, Kazakh, Karakalpak, Nogai, Kumyk, Karachay-Balkar, Karaite, Crimean Tatar (the literary language), Baraba dialect of the Tatar language and Khorezm, Kipchak dialects of Uzbek language, XI – Salar Language, XII – Turkmen (literary language), Trukhmen, Horasan, Khorezm-ozugsky dialects of

Uzbek, Azeri (literary language), kashkaysky, aynalsky, Kirkuk and Erbil dialects Turkish (literary language), Gagauz (literary language).

A phonological system of Turkic languages is characterized by a number of common features. At first, it is a limitation of the compatibility of phonemes. So, originally Turkic words do not begin with the letters *l, n, r, š,* and *z*. Secondly, the Turkic languages peculiar vowel harmony, i.e., assimilation of vowels in one word or more phonetic signs. It is assimilation in the backness and labial in the analyzed languages. Synharmonism disappeared only in Karluk languages, and there is so-called "Uighur umlaut" in Novouigur consisting in making vowels front before the next *i*. Third, long and short vowels which existed in the pre-Turkic language survived only in the Yakut and Turkmen languages, in other Turkic languages opposition in length / brevity disappeared. However, in the words of the Tuvan language vowels can be long after the loss of intervocalic sonorous.

The accent in all Turkic languages is fixed morphologically.

Morphologically Turkic languages are agglutinative languages, of a suffix type. Signification of a number, possessiveness and case are attributed to the category of a noun. Adjective does not possess inflectional categories; therefore fulfilling the sentence syntactic function subject or adjective is becoming a noun inflectional paradigm. There are active voice, passive voice, reflexive voice, reciprocal voice and causative in Turkic verbs.

From the point of view of syntactic typology, Turkic languages are nominative languages with the dominant word order "subject – object – predicate" preposition of adjective, preference postpositions to prepositions.

The main part of the lexical structure of Turkic languages is primordial. Comparative analysis of the Turkic language gives an idea of how Turkic peoples lived and what they did during disintegration of community in Turkic epoch.

The primordial vocabulary includes words for body parts, verbs that name simple movements, sensory perception; lexemes that indicate the landscape, flora and fauna; specificity of economic structure of that period: agisted stock cattle relying on horse and sheep breeding, farming and hunting as an ancillary economic activities; metallurgy terms of the Early Iron Age.

Analysis of the primordial Turkic language also shows the social stratification of society into tribal basis; about a certain extent codified system of legal relations, the development of trade with the neighboring peoples, the developed system of myths and legends, on the rule of a religious form like shamanism.

Along with the primordial Turkic vocabulary, modern Turkic lexicographical sources record a significant amount of loanwords from the languages which Turks had ever had contacts with its informants.

In particular, the Old Uyghur language is characterized by loanwords from Tibetan and Sanskrit, there are a lot of Tungus-Manchu loanwords in the Yakut language, there are a lot of Finno-Ugric languages of the Volga region words in the Tatar and Chuvash languages, and there are a lot of loanwords from Arabic in the Turkic language of Muslims.

The Arabic language belongs to the Semitic branch of the Afro-Asiatic language family. Nowadays over 240 million people speak this language and about 50 million people consider that it is their second mother tongue. In addition, the classic Arabic language, so-called language of the Koran, is used by Muslims all over the world during

prayers and other religious purposes. The first use of the name "Arabic" in the Arabic sources refers to the middle of the VII century. In XVI sura of the Koran, it is written in 103/105 verse: *lisānum 'arabiyyun mubīnun*, i.e. the Arabic language is clear.

There are five groups of dialects from a linguistic point of view, which are separate languages in the spoken Arabic language. This is Arabian, Maghreb and Central Asian group of dialects, as well as the Egyptian-Sudanese and Syro-Mesopotamian Arabic.

The Literary Arabic language is common for all Arabic-speaking countries, but it is rarely used by informants in the conversational speech.

The most important milestone in the history of the Arabic language is the adoption of Islam and the development of their own writing (VII century). The first epigraphic monuments of the Arabic language are the information about the movements of the shepherds with their flocks, tombstones and dedicatory inscriptions. In these inscriptions in the pre-Islamic period Sabaean or Nabataean script was used, which was a base for the final formation of the Arabic graphics letter in the period of the Qur'an records (mid VII in.) and the subsequent development of the Arab culture.

The Arabic writing is a system of signs of the 28 consonants. For indicating three long vowels consonants *alif, waw*, and *ua* are used. For identifying short vowels, doubled consonants or absence of vowels special superscript and subscript are used. They write from right to left in the Arabic language. Unlike languages with Latin or Cyrillic writing, there are not any capital letters that is why proper names in Arabic and the first word in a sentence are started with a lowercase letter.

The phonetic system of the Arabic language consists of 34 phonemes: 28 consonants and 6 vowels. The consonants are characterized by voicelessness opposition / sonority and velarization vowels – the quality of $a : i : u$ and the number $\bar{a} : \bar{i} : \bar{u}$.

Arab noun has such morphological categories as gender, number, case and condition, the category of certainty / uncertainty. The verb is characterized by a large development of verbal forms: a system of conjugation; developed system of tenses, including the three simple and three compound tenses; active and passive voice; indicative, subjunctive, conditional, imperative and enhanced mood.

Synonymy, polysemy and homonymy are widely developed in Arabic. The main ways of word formation: morphology – it is by word-formation models and formulas, syntactic and semantic ways.

The vocabulary of the modern Arabic literary language is characterized by its major part of the primordial Arabic. The total amount of loanwords is rather small and it is about one percent of the Arabic language.

The development of the Arabic literary language is traditionally divided into four major epoch of formation of its vocabulary. The end of the VII century – beginning of the VIII century is characterized by the use of pre-Islamic language of the community-tribal system. In the VIII-XII centuries there is a significant expansion of the lexical structure of the Arabic language, mediated by the rapid development of the medieval Arabic civilization. In the period of stagnation (XIII-XVIII centuries) the field of the Arabic language application is decreasing. From the middle of the XIX century the modern period started, which was characterized by a great inclusion in the vocabulary of neologisms that were related to the development of science and technology, with extensive contacts with other countries in the fields of politics, trade, art, and others.

I.M. Oransky (1979) correctly noted that after the Arabic conquest of the territories of Khorasan and Maverannahr, Karluk khanate, the collapse of the Western Turkic and Turgesh not only the geopolitical situation of these regions had changed, but linguistic map of the regions also had had some significant changes.

Recognizing some of the negative aspects of the influence of Arabic on other languages of Central Asia, an academician V.V. Vinogradov (1976) writes that: "Long since the Arabic language was the bearer of its culture among other Iranian, Turkic, and partly among the Afghan peoples. That is why nowadays a huge number of native Arabic words are "common" for the Turkish, Persian, Afghan, Uighur, Tajik, Uzbek, Kazakh, in a less degree for Urdu, Hindi, in Africa – for Talich languages".

It is known that the lexical system is most exposed to changes among the linguistic levels. Other language levels are constant and are more resistant to change. External factors almost do not have influence on the morphological and syntactic system. In connection with this, it is no coincidence that German philosopher Karl Vossler in his research "Positivism and idealism" (1904) connects a syntactic system of the language with the spirit of the people and the language: *Die syntaktisrhe Regel hat ihren Grund in der vorherrsch enden geistigen Eigenart eines Volkes. Sie will aus dem Sprach geist heraus verstanden werden.*

As the linguistic facts shows, in Turkic languages Arabic loanwords adapted to the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic system of language, so in the Turkic languages word order, the phrase structure and morphological laws are remained. For example,

Turkish. Tanrı dek Tanrıdan olmuş Türk Bilge kağan. Bödge [Kağan] oturdum. savımı tüketene [dek] işit – Turk Bilge Kagan who had lived in a divine sat on the throne. Heed my words. (here and elsewhere – our translation);

Kazakh. Оғузның алты оғлы бар ерді, алты оғлының һар бірісінің төрт оғлы бар ерді уа тақы Оғузның алты оғлы оң білән сол қолны башлар ерді. – Oguz Kagan had six sons, each of the six sons had four sons, six Oguz's sons headed right and left wing forces.

Tuva. Дүрген аът ырак чед-ер – Fast horse reaches far (proverb).

Khakassia. Чайан салианнау чазынмассыу, худай салианнау худулбассыу – There is no escaping fate (the traditional formula of the Altai epos).

Thus, the above mentioned examples demonstrate that in the Turkic languages the arrangement of words in a sentence system is not changed, i.e., predicate is at the end and subject is at the beginning of sentences. The specific order of the parts of the sentence is the result of the stability of the language system and it reflects the outlook of the people.

There is always a predicate at the end of the sentence in the Turkic languages, and if we recognize that it is a direct reflection of thought processes, this circumstance has a significant logical explanation. As a rule, according to the grammatical tradition the predicate is used as a basis for a sentence. The predicate in a sentence shows the basic idea, the time and the result of the action. Therefore, the use of predicates in the end of the sentence in the Turkic languages is closely related to the traditional mentality of the Turkic peoples, i.e., results and consequences of any action received considerable attention. Therefore the predicate was not pronounced at the beginning or the middle, but at the end of sentences with a special intonation.

However, despite the influence of the Arabic language on the grammatical system of Turkic languages, it was not able to "absorb" Turkic languages like Coptic, Nabataean, Romeysky and Syrian.

However, the Turkic peoples for a relatively short period of time had global changes associated with two alternately acting socio-legal systems of relations based on different religions, cultures and worldviews. After the adoption of Islam the traditional norms (ancient Turkic) of social and legal relations of the Turkic peoples give a way to relations that are based on the Islamic law – sharia that regulates almost all aspects of the life of a Muslim. And a change of Tengrianism with a long history in the original Islam, which has Arabic roots, implied a change, a transformation of the whole complex of social and legal relations, ideology, which also had an impact on the lexical language system.

For example, if we examine the Turkish language, in the era of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish language was under the unrestrained influence of Arabic. Arabic was the language of religion, served as a court language, the language of the state bureaucracy. Loanwords from the Arabic language exist in different layers of the lexical structure of the modern Turkish language. A considerable part of them is included into the lexical core of the Turkish language and is no longer perceived by informants as the Turkish language loanwords.

This is, first of all, the word everyday use. For example: *aile (family), akraba (relative), arıza (breaking), bahar (spring), Bakkal (grocery, grocer), bedel (price, fee), bekar (bachelor), belediye (municipality), beyaz (white), bina (building), cadde (avenue), cami (mosque), cumhuriyet (republic), daire (apartment), dakika (minute), davet (invitation), etc.*

The second place is taken by loanwords that are related to the 'religion' field.

As we have already noted, the Arabic language is the language of the Koran, and more than 90% of the Turkey population are Muslims: *mesh* (stroking a head with a wet hand during the ritual ablution), *hatim* (reading the Koran from the beginning to the end), *çile* (interval time of 40 days when entering one of the Islamic religious sects would be alone, having a small amount of food, refusing from all loaves and fishes).

Nowadays according to the Turkish Linguistic Society in the number of loanwords from Arabic are 6,500 (Khrisat & Mohamad, 2014).

The presence of loanwords creates Turkish synonymous fields: *deplasman –tonaj – grostonluk (displacement), sarfiyat – sarf – masraflar – giderler – harcamalar (expenses, spending), efor – çaba – gayret (force).*

Along with the problems of lexical variation in the Turkish language, related to the wide functioning of the Arabic loanwords, orthoepic variability is urgent. Here we are not talking about the occasional orthoepic features, but about the preservation of the Arabic phonetic scheme "length – brevity."

In Arabic vowel's length has a distinctive significance. In most cases in the Turkish language the vowel length in Arabic loanwords is identifying the character as in the case of violation of this orthoepic rules interlocutor may arise a need to ask again, and it will be not based on a misunderstanding, but on making sure that he could hear correctly what has been said (Tietze & Tekin, 1994). For example: *tatil* [ta:til], *taze* [ta:ze], *mavi* [ma:vi] etc.

However, in some cases, particularly in functioning conditions homographs, the length may acquire a distinctive value. For example, *adet (number, number) - adet [a:] (custom), ademiyet (no) - ademiyet [a:] (humanity); alem (flag) - alem [a:] (world society); alim (knowledgeable) - alim [a:] (a scientist); dahil (intervention) - dahil [a:] (internal).*

Despite the fact that the literary language of Turkic peoples has been considered the classical Arabic language for a long time, it should be noted that in the course of linguistic and cultural contacts of the peoples who speak Arabic and Turkic languages,

there have been loanwords of Turkisms in Arabic. Especially a lot of Turkic words were borrowed from the Arabic language in the era of the formation of the literary Arabic language (VII -VIII centuries.).

During this period Aramaic, Persian, Greek, Latin and Hebrew made a significant impact on Arabic.

All words that were borrowed from Turkic languages can be divided into several thematic groups:

a) household items: *қазанун – қазан (cooking pot), уүджақун – ошақ (hearth), манну-рун – тандыр (brazier), буджақун – пышақ (knife), хашуқ – қасық (spoon), билазйқун-білезік (bracelet);*

b) food: *йабрақун – жүзім жапырағына орап пісірілген күріш пен ет (grape leaves, which are used for wrapping steamed rice and meat); бузатун – боза (beer), қаймақун – қаймақ (sour cream), қаймақли буз – қаймақты мұз (балмұздақ) (ice cream); айран буз – мұздай айран (ayran - cultured milk food), қауунун - қауын (melon), қандун – қанттан жасалған қатты кәмпит (caramel);*

c) names of instruments and tools: *балтатуын - балта (axe), күрәйкун – күрек (spade), бұранда, қазматун – кетпен (қазушы құралы) (mattock), шакуш – шақшыш (балға)(hammer for nuts);*

d) names of metal: *дамир – темір (iron).*

It should be noted that it is difficult to overestimate Arabic cultural and religious influence on Turkic speaking population of Asia Minor and Central Asia.

In the beginning of the VII century in the Arabian Peninsula a new religion appeared – Islam, under the banner of which significant gains have been made in both the East and the West. Calling Arabic tribes to monotheism, the founder of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad laid the idea of uniting disparate warring Arabic tribes. At first Medinan Muslim community that was led by Mohammed, won the main Arab tribes, and after the death of the Prophet, his successors continued the conquest of the Arabian Peninsula.

Before expansion to Central Asia the Arabs defeated the Byzantine and the Sassanid state which were two powerful empires of that period. In the decisive battle of Qadisiya in 636, they defeated the Sassanid army, in 638 Jerusalem was conquered, and in 640-642 years Egypt was conquered.

However, in Khorasan and Maurya initial stage of the Arab conquest had lasted about 60 years. A number of circumstances prevented unconditional submission of the occupied territories. In particular, there were the stubborn resistance of the local Turkic population of the Arabs, the invaders; lack of maturity of the Arab state apparatus; third, the unstable situation of the Arab states (fight for power between the elite, folk riots and other military leaders riots.).

However, as a result of the victory of the Arabs, Central Asia became one of the Muslim provinces in which there was an active imposition of Islam and Arabic culture.

However, the first years of Arab domination the results of Islamization were very poor. The Arabs founded several towns on the Syrdarya as a springboard for further hikes for Irtysh and for Western Siberia. Islam has made The first significant success in the Turkic world far from the center of Islam – from the Kama and Volga Bulgars, on the threshold of the "country of the darkness."

Despite the fact that the Islamization has led to a slight change in the way and the level of Bulgars life, it gave impetus to progress. Islam gave Bulgars writing.

Some excavations show that there were 50 thousand of people, 2 mosques, baths, mint that minted silver coins in Bulgar. Bulgars gained industry: tanning, shoemaking, agriculture that developed actively.

Step-by-step other Turkic nomadic peoples shifted to a sedentary lifestyle and became farmers or moved to the city. One of the largest trade Turkic cities of that era was Khorezm that was situated at the crossroads of the west and north-west. Historical chronicles show that the merchants who headed for the Volga River region, preferred way through Khorezm to more direct route through the Caucasus.

At first, the adoption of Islam by Turks made a positive impact on the state ideology. The Turks who lived in cities and villages were rather satisfied with Islam. However, later the negative aspects of the Islamization process began to appear. Along with the oblivion of Tengrianism that was a primordial religion of the Turks, Turkic national customs and traditions began to disappear. Religious ideology totally substituted the national one. Turkic customs, traditions, laws, ideology, laws have been substituted with Arabic ones. Turkic-speaking peoples rejected the Turkic alphabet with the adoption of Islam and began to use Arabic. New generations of Turks lost their historical and national roots, forgot their ancient culture.

Thus, the transition to the Arabic alphabet and the change of religion shook the system of life values, led to fundamental changes in outlook of all the Turkic world.

Increasing the range of sources and expansion of methodical and methodological framework of historical research in recent years allows making a fresh look at the various aspects of the history, language and culture of Arabs and Turkic-speaking peoples. Despite the fact that the Arabic and Turkic languages belong to the different language families (Afro-Asiatic and Altaic language family, respectively), cultural and linguistic contacts of these peoples, which began in the early Middle Ages, do not stop to this day.

It is generally accepted the fact that after the adoption of Islam by the Turkic speaking peoples, the Turkic languages were under the direct influence of the Arabic language even in their most separated dialects.

On the other hand, a number of Turkic-speaking countries because of its political and cultural power for a long time before Islam served its neighbors as the source language for Arabic.

The analysis of lexical borrowing showed that there were Arabic words for common colloquial and religious vocabulary, which is due to active trade relations and the spread of Islam in areas inhabited by Turks. Arabic also borrowed the names of household items, food, tools and some metal from Turkic languages.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Балканите – Език, История, Култура. The Balkans – Languages, History, Culture (Великотърновски Университет "Св. Св. Кирил и Методий". "St Cyril and St Methodius" University of Veliko Tarnovo). Четвърта Международна Научна Конфернция 18-20 октомври 2013 г. Fourth International Conference 18-20 October 2013, Издателство "ИВИС", Велико Търноъо. "IVIS" Press, Veliko Tarnovo, vol. IV, 2015, 632 pp. ISSN 1314-4065

For several years, scientists from the "St Cyril and St Methodius" University of Veliko Tarnovo organizes scientific congresses under the title *The Balkans – Languages, History, Culture*: a first volume (504 pp.) has already appeared in 2008 and it contains the Congress held 12-15 April 2007 (from Romania are included since the first event, several researchers – Florin Anghel and Nicolae Paul, Ilona Bădescu, Daniel Citirigă, Adriana Cîteia and Cătălin Dumitrașcu, Mariana Cojoc and Magdalena Tiță, Stoica Lascu, Răzvan Mitu, Constantin-Ioan Mladin, Florentina Nicolae, and the late Aida Todi).

Last year came the fourth volume (632 pp.), containing the papers presented at the Conference on 18-20 October 2015, under the patronage of "St Cyril and St Methodius" University of Veliko Tarnovo. The vast majority of the perpetrators (in total: 68 authors) have, of course, from Bulgaria (52) – ie, most (29) from the well-known University of Veliko Tarnovo, that organizes the manifestation once two years; gradually, the Conference from Veliko Tarnovo has imposed in the eyes of specialists in Balkanologie as a quality scientific manifestation.

The authors from Bulgaria – Emiliya Avginova-Nikolova, Atanas Dermendzhiev and Polya Yordanova, Stela Dermendzhieva and Boyanka Dimitrova, Slavi Dimitrov, Boyanka Dimitrova, Lora Doncheva and Anka Ignatova, Milena Dzherekarova, Boryana Emiliyanova, Nevena Gavazova, Gergana Georgieva, Ivalena Georgieva, Nadezhda Hristova, Ivelin Ivanov, Neli Ivanova, Trenka Ivanova, Dimitar Kenanov, Rozica Lazareva and Dimitar Vladev, Rosen Malchev and Nihail Hristov, Ivelina Masheva, Momchil Mladenov, Marilena Mladenova, Krassimira Moutafova, Plamen Parashkevov, Milen Penerliev, Violeta Periklieva, Kristina Popova and Nuriye Muratova, Konstantin Rangochev, Dimitrios Rumpos, Petya Sabeva, Dimitar Simeonov, Atanaska Stambliyska, Atanaska Stancheva, Petar Stoyanov, Elisaveta Stoicheva, Elena Tacheva, Yovka Tisheva, Veselka Toncheva, Georgi Tsachev, Tsanko Tsankov and Svetla Stankova, Mladen Vasilev, Marina Vladeva, Rumen Yankov, Polya Yordanova, Mariana Yoveska, Zhivko Zhekov.

Also, there are 16 authors from other countries – Republic of Macedonia (Ivaylo Markov), Poland (Kiril Marinow), Serbia (Stana Smiljković, Buba Stojanović, Dragan Žunić) Turkey (Sema Gündüz Küskü, Nergis Imamoğlu, Elvan Topalli), United Kingdom (Andrew Anderson). Most foreign authors are from Romania (7, respectively 4 from "Ovidius" University Constanța) – Florin Anghel (*The Forgotten Romanian-Croatian Alliance: New Axis Borderlands in the Balkans, 1941-1944*, pp. 143-152), Daniel Citirigă (*Romanian Cultural Perceptions pf Central Europe*, pp. 131-136), Ionuț Holubeanu (*Some Remarks on the Real Author/Authors pf the Passio Sancti Andreae Apostoli (Latin Epistle), the 6ᵗʰ Century A.D.*, pp. 486-493), Mihaela Ivănescu (*Electoral Behaviour and Political Participation in Constanța, Romania (2008-2012)*, pp. 352-369), Ruxandra Lambru and Silvia Mihăilescu (*Expressing Approximate Quantity in the Romanian and Bulgaria Languages*, pp. 609-613), Cătălina Puiu (*Two Pieces of Intransigence in the Romanian and Bulgarian Literature between the Two World Wars*, pp. 545-550).

The thematic sections of the volume are: I.1. *Time, Space, People* (pp. 73-188), I.2. *Places in the Balkans* (pp. 189-230), I.3. *Towns and Urban Space in the Balkans* (pp. 231-319), II. *Geospace and Borders* (pp. 323-474): II.1. *Socio-economic and Demographic Issues* (pp. 323-407), II.2. *Natural-geographic and Methodological Aspects* (pp. 408-474), III. *Languages, Space, Time* (pp. 477-619): III.1. *Balkan Literatures in the Dynamics of Time* (pp. 477-558), III.2. *Languages, Space and Time in the Balkans* (pp. 559-619).

"We hope that the fourth volume of the series «The Balkans – Languages, History, Culture» under the general heading «Shared in the Balkans» will be the next step in the investigation of the complicated problems of the «multicoloured» Balkan world. Very likely part of theses defended in some of the papers will provoke debates because of their disputable character. In spite of the differences in the particular thematic fields – *shows the main editors (Krassimira Mitafova, Stela Dermendzhieva, and Tsenka Ivanava) –*, which reflect the wide variety of knowledge of the Balkans, in the present publication of the series as well the editorial board continues to keep to the conviction that the discussion engendered by the mentioned differences, actually is a way to dialog, to adequate self-knowledge and acquaintance with the bearers of other languages and cultures" (p. 35).

Among other studies, all very interesting and serious documented, we draw attention to the following. Ivaylo Markov, *Religion, Ethnicity and Symbolic Boundaries in the Republic of Macedonia* (pp. 167-173) – the author places a special emphasis upon "the actual ethnic conflict between Albanians and Macedonians and the use of religious symbols in this collision, which is reflected both in the political discourse and in the everyday social life and relationships, influencing perceptions and collective notions of peoples about religion and ethnicity" (p. 167). Plamen Parashkevov, *Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania's National Identity* (pp. 346-351) – the author shows that despite the specific of the political-geographical issues in the East European region, "a unifying element can be found in them. They are driven by the desire to promote identity – ethnical, cultural, national"; he considers that "without analyzing the projection og the Albanian national identity on the contemporary political map of the Balkans" (p. 346). Gergana Georgieva, *Saray of Provincial Ottoman Governors: Place for Living, Place for Governing* (pp. 256-267) – the article "tries to examine the sarays of the Ottoman provincial governors from different perspectives by revealing their importance as cores of local provincial governing, but also as personal space of higher Ottoman officials" (p. 256); in his approach, the author uses various sources, travelogues and diplomatic documents about Vidin, Salonica and some other Balkan town. Ivelina Masheva, *Justice in the Provinces. Vidin Commercial Court in the Late 1860s-the Early 1870s* (pp. 284-293) – the paper uses numerous testimonies (various kind of documents issued by the court itself, the official Ottoman statistics, regional journals): „More specifically, it clarifies the profile of commercial and judicial cases that the court dealt (debt collection, bankruptcy, contract registration, surety and/or guarantee registration etc.), the court's relationships with the provincial and central government authorities, the relationships with the other commercial courts, as well as the personnel's turnover" (p. 284). Krassimira Moutafova, *Topoi of Urban Space in Ottoman Documents from the 16ᵗʰ-17ᵗʰ C.* (pp. 39-62) – the article "makes an attempt, on the examples mostly of the towns of Tarnovo, Vratsa and Nikopol, to present the major changes in urban space in the Balkans during the so-called Ottoman period, reflected directly or indirectly in the Ottoman documentation" (p. 39). Mladen Vasilev, *Topoi of Urban Space in Pleven. Historical Parallels and Contemporary Aspects* (pp. 268-283) – "The city plan of the town of Pleven from the time of its fall under Ottoman rule until the end of the 18ᵗʰ century is poorly studied and there still are many controversial issues about it. Not many historians have worked on this topic and each one has focused on specific parts of the urban area but nobody has expended his research to achieve an overall look of the Ottoman town of Pleven. My expose is not exhausting the problem but along with the publications made so far I have tried to represent the topoi of that time imposed on the contemporary map of the town. (…) When and how Pleven fell under Ottoman rule is still a subject of scientific debates but all who have studied the subject are in agreement with the fact that the conqueror of Pleven was a descendent of Mihaloglu family. Due to this fact, the descendants of this mighty and powerful Ottoman family ruled the town and some of the nearby villages until the Liberation in 1877. (…) The first provided information on the recovery of the settlement life in Pleven is received from the oldest preserved Ottoman *tahrir* of Nikopol district – an *idjmal* of 884 on Hijra (1479/80) consisting of ten Christian and nine Muslim households. It has been proved that in the early years of the Ottoman rule there were two settlements with identical names – the town of Pleven (Dolni Pleven or Down Pleven) and the

village of Gorni Pleven (Upper Pleven) that later on grew and were united as one settlement" (pp. 268, 269).

We attract attention also, especially for Romanian reader, to the clarifications, in the opinion of Bulgarian historiography, on the concept Dobrogea de Nord; Milen Penerliev (PhD, Lecturer at the Department of Geography and Methods of Teaching Geography, "Bishop Konstantin Preslavsky" University of Shumen), in *North Dobruja as Part of the Bulgarian Cultural and Geographical Area* (pp. 389-395) shows that "The concept of North Dobruja is largely artificial. It defines the boundaries of the field in today's Dobruja borders of Romania. Historically this area is closely connected with Bulgarian history"; also, "This report is intended to mark the major sites and cultural spaces that make this part of Dobruja part of Bulgarian history, sites for current researches and opportunities for future research. Objects of research are the Romanian part of Dobruja Black Sea coast at the mouth of the Danube, as well as its Bulgarian part. This area is related to our past ever since the establishments of the Bulgarian state, the Danube Bulgaria Nikulitsel end. It is associated with the National Revival history of Tulcea, Enikyoy, Babadag and others. It is associated with military history of Machin, Isackha etc. All of these areas are part of the Bulgarian cultural and geographic areas outside the current Bulgarian borders should be studied, preserved and promoted among the population" (p. 389).

We note, also, other works, such as – Momchil Mladenov, *Silva Bulgarorum: Remarks on Space and People in the Times of the Second Bulgarian Kingdom (late 12ᵗʰ -14ᵗʰ Century)*, pp. 82-94; Ivelin Ivanov, *A Slayer of Byzantines or a Slayer of Latins? The Image of Tsar Kaloyan in the Historical Works of Nicetas Choniates and Geoffroi de Villehardouin*, pp. 95-104; Kiril Marinow, *The Haimos Mountains and the Bulgarian Political Border during the Early Medieval Period*, pp. 105-120; Andrew Anderson, *The Map of the Vilayet of the Danube, 1869* (pp. 430-437); Mariana Yoveska, *The Septinsular Republic – territory and Constitutionalization (1798-1807)*, pp. 121-130); Marina Vladeva, *The Reminiscences and the City. Findings on the Urban Spaces in Two Novels by Orhan Pamuk*, pp. 312-319; Petar Stoyanov, *Istanbul – From Transcontinental to World City*, pp. 323-336, Georgi Tsachev, *The Dialogue between the Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Daxton (1995) and High Representatives*, pp. 180-188; Slavi Dimitrov, *The "European Capital of Culture" Project and the Bulgarian Candidature for 2019*, pp. 370-377; etc.

These and other titles of volumes are important contributions to the development of these themes and the interest of scientists from Bulgaria, especially, demonstrates, including this volume, the connection of the Bulgarian historiography to the mainstream of world Balkanistic.

Stoica Lascu

Ionel Cândea, *Cetatea Brăilei. Istoric. Reconstituire. Valorificare.* **Prefaţă: Mihai Maxim. Coordonarea versiunii engleze: Constantin Ardeleanu.** *The Citadel of Brăila. History. Remodelling. Valorisation.* **Foreword: Mihai Maxim. Coordination of the English version: Constantin Ardeleanu, Editura Istros a Muzeului Brăilei „Carol I". Museum of Brăila "Carol I" Istros Publishing, Brăila, 2015, 212 pp.+CD, ill. colour, maps, plans. ISBN 978-606-654-164-0**

The new volume of Professor Ionel Cândea was conceived within in a cultural project which received funding from the Union of Architects of Romania, and it constitutes an outstanding contribution to knowledge of the documentary history of the Ottoman city of Braila, to the valorisation of its vestiges. Issued bilingual (in Romanian: pp. 7-55, and in English: pp. 57-105), the work includes: *Foreword* (pp. 57-58, by Mihai Maxim), *Introduction* (p. 59); three chapters: I. *The Erection of the Citadel of Brăila and the Phases of Its Construction (Sixteenth-Nineteenth Centuries)* (pp. 61-78), II. *The Reconstruction of the Citadel of Brăila According to Cartographic, Iconographic and Documentary Sources* (pp. 79-98), III. *The Valorisation of the Vestiges of the Citadel of Brăila* (pp. 99-103), respectively

Conclusions (p. 105), and very rich *Illustrations* (pp. 107-212). "The merit of Professor Cândea lies in the fact that, with an eye always turned to such researches, he goes further and deeper and adds new aspects to this documentation, comparing it with his archaeological excavations, extremely important as he has done over the decades exceptional discoveries in the historic city of Brăila, which he exposes, though briefly, in the book that is published now. Finally – *shows Professor Maxim* –, he uses narrative sources, maps etc. Regarding the citadel of Brăila, making, we might say, an interdisciplinary research, with a critical and integrative view, which often lacks in the similar approaches mentioned above" (p. 58)

In *Introduction*, the author circumstantiates for reader the stages in the history of Ottoman Brăila: "Built by the Turks with Wallachian workers after the annexation of Brăila to the Ottoman Empire, as it is stated in the letter that Suleiman the Magnificent sent in October 1546 to Mircea Ciobanul, the Wallachian hospodar, the Citadel of Brăila, «great» or not along its three centuries long existence (1538-1828), was demolished by Russian order in 1829-1830, also with the labour of Wallachian workers. The history of the Citadel of Brăila represents an illustrative example of Nicolae Iorga's sentence on the Romanians' history: Brăila two was «a place of tempting richness and suitable for the passage of armies». As for the inhabitants of Brăila, they were «apt to the highest of culture, but compelled to live from one refuge to the next one»" (p. 59).

In the first chapter of this volume, with a cover polychrome specific, attractive, are set into question by a professional author – documented, honest and uninhibited –, editable documents and historiographical studies on medieval Brăila (belonging N. Iorga, Constantin C. Giurescu, Petre P. Panaitescu to Gheorghe I. Cantacuzino, Maria Holban, Silvia Baraschi, Petre S. Năsturel or, more recently, the Professor Mihai Maxim); these, in conjunction with its own research of medieval archeology and archive provide clarifications and corrections about the Brăila citadel's dating and stages; the author showing, also: "Another source from the fourteenth or fifteenth century, disregarded so far, is the map annexed to the famous *Codex Latinus Parisinus* (Paulus Sanctinus Ducensis' treatise on military art and war machines). Here is the description made by the Romanian editor [I. Dumitriu-Snagov – our note] to the map that accompanies the treatise: «A plain represented by the author [of the map, annotation mine, I.C.]» as such stretches north of the Danube to the delta, then to the Black Sea. In this area, the author mentions on the left side of the Danube: *Giurgiu – a desert place*, and, when indicating Baradigo near the Delta, he adds: a desert place only inhabited by fishermen ("Baradigo – locho dexerto it(n) del qual abita solame(n)te peschadori ")". It is easily noticeable that I the case of Giurgiu, the toponym and the parenthetical information *desert place* are mutually excluding notions: Giurgiu (fortification, hence inhabited area) and the idea of a desert place. In the next instance, *that Baradigo, also a* locho dexerto, *could be identified with Brăila. In this case, the* desert place *mentioned on the map not only has a name, but it is inhabited by fishermen.*

Therefore, we seem to have a second mention of Brăila dating from the fifteenth century rather than from the previous one. We believe that our hypothesis (Baradigo = Brăila) is also supported by the fact that, without being a fortified settlement at that time. Brăila was too important to remain unmentioned, even in the way we have accounted for above. If it is proven that map annexed to Codex 7239 from the National Library in Paris was indeed drawn in the fifteenth century, and not at the end of the previous century, this all more proves the absence of any fortifications before the coming of the Turks. Also in regard to the name of the town and especially to the chronology of this name, recently [1994] there has been reiterated the opinion according to which Brăila would have been mentioned for the first time around 1350, in the form *Drinago*, in *Libro del conoscimiento*, a Spanish description book for sailors" (pp. 68-70).

In chapter two are presented and commented plans of the city and the city (from 1790 until 1830), are thoroughly reconstituted, also, by the appeal to narrative and iconographic sources, of Brăila's topography: "The relevance of these accounts appears to be even more important for aspects of local history when they add to other types of sources, as we have mentioned earlier, a fact further strengthened if approaching the question of the plans of the town and of the citadel of

Brăila" (p. 88). Very interesting is the last chapter in which the author – archaeologist researcher also – make some valuable proposals concerning the valorisation of the vestiges of the Brăila's citadel. As it is known, the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 led to the occupation of Brăila by the Russians and then the demolition the citadel (more than a year, about three thousand Wallachian people, from Gorj and Mehedinţi districts, worked at demolition): "At this point of our analysis, we have – *writes the author* – to answer to two questions: 1. *What vestiges from the citadel of Brăila still exist?* but mainly 2. *How can they be valorised?*

The most spectacular objective, which remains under the current ground level, is on 43 Cetăţii Street. It is the *new gunpowder magazine* built two centuries ago (1812-1814) by the Turks when they returned to the citadel, according to the provisions of the peace of Bucharest (May 1812)". The opinion of the well-known specialist, who performed thorough archaeological excavations, is "that the segment from the *new gunpowder magazine*, deserted at this moment, should become the headquarters of an *Institute of the Fortifications of the Danube along its entire length*. It should be at first a database and host, after its establishment as a museum section, exhibitions with aspects from the life of Brăila under the Turks – 1538-1828" (p. 100).

Further, the author-researcher detailing the areas where were carried out archaeological excavations, including numerous catacombs that crosses the Public Garden: "In 2011 we started, at the suggestion and with the financial support of the County Council of Brăila, and at the request of the Municipality, systematic archaeological excavations in the Public Garden of Brăila in order to reveal a segment of a catacomb that was marked on the 1834 plan. Some of these catacombs can be visited today and we consider – *shows Professor Ionel Cândea* – that at least some of them can be valorized by a public-private partnership, to the advantage of the city and its tourists" (p. 102).

The second part of this imposing book-album (pp. 109-212) is reserved for the rich and precious testimonies – plans of Brăila (1790, 1810?,1819, 1828, 1830, 1834, 1836, 1856), stamps (1788), lithographs (1824-1826, 1828), photographs of archaeological excavations (from the Public Garden: the traces of the fortification from 1772; etc.), plans (of new gunpowder magazine/*Pulberăria nouă*; etc.), various testimonies of the Ottoman culture and civilization in the Citadel of Brăila (gunpowder case, kettles, vessel, tombstone, Ottoman silver coins; etc.); also, the model of the Citadel of Brăila. A historical reality from the first half of the sixteenth century until 1829, the citadel of Brăila was many times in the Christian hands and "Its demolition was decided by the Russians – *shows, in* Conclusions *the author* – from the period of the battle, than its fate was sealed, leaving today only trails – often difficult to be discovered and explained – but which deserve to be better known and to be valorized" (p. 105).

Stoica Lascu

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