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STUDIES AND ARTICLES

GENEALOGICAL MYTHS AND PROBLEMS ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF ANCIENT TURKIC PEOPLES

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Abstract

In the article the main problem of origin of ancient Turkic peoples which is actual and disputable at present day is investigated. This research is carried out on the basis of genealogical myths from ancient sources. The history of origin of the certain ethnos is always connected with myths and legends. Based on similar texts, researchers reveal information, necessary for the research, which is not recorded in historical treatises. The first Turkic folklore monument recorded by Chinese historiographic tradition (in writing) in the 6th century and reflected an early stage of Turkic ethnogenesis are genealogical legends of the tribe Ashina origin and its appeal to the dominating group of the Turkic tribal union appearance.

Key words: *Ashina, ethnic processes, empire, "Turkic", myth*

According to Klyashtorny S.G. to the middle of the 6th century there is a stage of ethnic history based on the conclusion of the political union of relative ancient Turkic tribes, the head of which was the family created by Turkic-Ashiny. Then the ethnic term Turkic turns into the general politonym, designating all steppe population subjected to creators of the First Turkic khaganate (551-630).

Also as Klyashtorny S.G. (2006) notes, formation of the territorial political unions into khaganates (Turkic, Uigur); the karluk, tyurgeshy, oguz, Kyrgyz, kimak and kipchak states, predetermined the main territorial location displaced to the West side and weakening of ethnic processes in the Middle Asia where consolidation of the Mongolian tribes results in superiority at this territory followed.

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In the developed “empire” it should be noted that the material and spiritual culture carries on the traditions (relative language, writing, customs, the uniform socio-political nomenclature, etc.) as well as the processes connected with political and territorial claims and trade cultural ties introduces the changes in ethnocultural processes.

In researches of Gumilev L.N. (1967) reasoning is given, that not all tribal families entering the conglomerate of Turkic community were Turkic peoples by origin.

After a number of the events connected with disintegration of the Turkic khaganate, the name “Turkic” does not disappear. The etymological “Turkic” value extended to considerable territories of the Asian continent further is modified in the name of a language family. So many people never entering a great khaganate of the 6-7th centuries (for example, the Turkmen, the Osmans, the Azerbaijanians, the Balkars and the Chuvashs, etc.) became “Turkic peoples” (Tulebayev, 2011). But even that widespread linguistic interpretation which is nowadays given to the term “Turkic” has a certain basis under itself: ancient Turkic peoples most brightly realized those beginnings of steppe culture which ripened in hunnes time and were in the condition of anabiosis in hard times of the III-Vth centuries. Complex forms of social being and social institutes of the Turkic: ale, specific ladder system, hierarchy of ranks, military discipline, diplomacy, and also existence of accurately fulfilled outlook opposed to ideological systems of neighboring countries (Gumilev, 1967).

Klyashtorny, S.G. (2006) in his judgements expresses quite different opinion, having characterized the unity of “The Turkic language type”; it reveals ethnopsychological imperatives which at the subconscious level appear in everyday life of most of the Turkic people. Speaking about the unity of Turkic language type Trubetskoy N.S. does not support the hypothesis, that on the basis of similarity of language, ethnogenetic culturological system there is a formation of uniform “Turkic” outlook. So formation of national consciousness developed on the basis of the ethnic stereotypes which led to the mythologized and epizirized ideology.

Coming back to the described above book by Gumilev L.N. (1967), where the historical moments connected with the family of Ashins are given. Gumilev L.N. ranks this family to related at that time syanbiy and hunns principalities which talked in the ancient Mongol language. The word “Ashina” meant “wolf”. In Turkic a wolf is ‘bury’ or ‘kaskyr’, and in Mongolian ‘shonochino’. “A” is a prefix of respect in Chinese. Therefore, “Ashina” means “a noble wolf”. The word which did not undergo chinification remained in the Arab record of this name Shane” (Gumilev, 1967).

In the book of Bichurin N.Ya. (1950), there is an interesting fact, that the western orientalist without having apprehended beliefs of the Chinese history at all, compared the house (family) of Tyugu, in the Mongolian name of Dulga, in a conformable combination tyugu with Turkic peoples. That led to acceptance of the family of Dugle which came from the Hunns’ house, to the Turkic origin.

Bichurin N.Ya. (1950) specifies: “ancestors of the tukyu House inhabited from the western sea to the west and one made the ‘aimak’. It is separate branch of the House to Hunn, by the pro-name Ashina. Subsequently this family was broken by one of the next possessors and absolutely exterminated. There was one ten-year-old boy. The warriors, seeing his early childhood, regreted to kill him: so, having cut off his hands and legs, they threw him into the grassy lake. The wolf began to feed him with meat. The possessor, having heard that the boy is still living, sent people again to kill him. The sent, having seen

the boy beside the wolf, wanted to kill it too. At this time, according to the Chinese legends, this wolf appeared in the country to the east from the western sea, in the mountains lying from Gaochan on the northwest. In mountains there is a cave, and in the cave there is a plain, overgrown with dense grass. From all four parts of the cave the mountains lie. Here the wolf hid and gave birth to ten sons who married and all had children. Subsequently each family made the isolated family of them. Among them there was Ashina, the person with great abilities, and he was recognized as the sovereign: that is why over gate of the residence a banner with the wolf head was exposed – in reminiscence of the origin” (Bichurin, 1950).

Proceeding from the legend, it is possible to assume that the family Ashina because of conflicts of intertribal families, was forced to go to other lands.

In reflections of Gumilev L.N. (1967), the next lines are given: “The foothills of the Mongolian Altai where fugitives got, were inhabited by the tribes coming from hunns and speaking Turkic languages. The combatants of the prince Ashina merged with these natives and gave them the name “Turkic”, or “Tyurkyut”.

However, again there is a question who were hunns actually?

And further reasonings are given, that: “whatever origin there were those “five hundred families” which united under the subname Ashina, between themselves they spoke Mongolian until peripetias of military success did not throw out them from China to the Altai... It must be assumed that to the middle of the 6th century members of the family Ashina and their satellites were absolutely made Turkic and kept traces of Mongol speaking only in titulature which was brought by them. The population turned out so full that in hundred years, by 546, they represented that integrity which it is accepted to call as ancient Turkic nationality or tyurkyuts. And the Turkic environment at that time had already managed to extend far to the west from the Altai, to the countries where the Guses, the Kangles or the Pechenegs, the ancient Bulgarians and the Hunns lived (Gumilev, 1967).

Bartold V.V. reports that there are not enough data to understand the main point what people during the period of early VI century were called Turks and how this name extended to other people. Radlov V.V. shows that Turks of the 6-8th centuries belonged to the people Oguz. The Oguz, or Turks were divided into several nationalities (tyoles, tardush in the East, tyurgesh in the West), some unions who began to be called further as Karluks, Uyghurs and Kyrgyz are also mentioned, but there are no proofs that these people had already called themselves as Turks. Bartold V.V. assumes that the word Turk was acquired by the Arabs to those people who had similar language as those Turks with whom they dealt in the 7th and 8th centuries. In the West Turks were called neither Pechenegs, nor Cumans, and such word was used to designate only the seldzhuk people, and then the Osman Empire, originated from the people of oguz (Bartold, 1968).

Bichurin N.Ya. (1950) points that data on existence of ancient tribes are very doubtful. There is a mixture of historic facts with national legends. In one of multiple legends, data from where there could be a Turkic and Mongolian family provided:

“Tafetov’s son Türk is believed to be the forefather of the tribes inhabiting the Middle Asia from the Caspian Sea to the Korean Bay: but this legend is apparently accepted for the purpose to stretch a family tree of the Houses reigning till Noy. In the seventh generation from Türk two twins were born: Tatar and Mongol for whom their father them Illi-khan divided Tyurkistan: the first got the East half, and the second – the Western half.

And it, apparently, is fiction to name the beginning of two Houses ruling in the East and the Western Mongolia. In the third generation from the Mongol Oguz-khan, that is the son of Kara-khan, the son of Mongol, the first of grand ancient conquerors in the Central Asia" was born (Bichurin, 1950).

Here, the source from "the history of the Mongols" of the Persian historian Khondemir is given. Where it is told that Kara-khan began the war against his son Oguz-khan because he accepted another religion. Oguz-khan won and within 73 years subdued all the Tyurkistan, and designated the most part of names for the Mongolian tribes. The second source on "The History about Tatars", Abyul-Kazi-khan writes that Kara-khan began the war against his son Oguz-khan who was hunting at the time, because of disagreement in religious beliefs. After the victory Oguz-khan declares himself the khan and begins war against Tatar-khan who was near the Chinese border. Having won Oguz-khan expanded the borders of his possession lying from Mongolia to the south to India, in the West to the Chinese sea.

Comparing legends with historical data Bichurin points that Oguz-khan that is Mode or Modo-khan who came from the house of the Hunn.

The unclear question is who Tatar-khan was: "Khan of the East Mongols or Yuechzhyy khan? Both of them wandered in contiguity with China; the first one owned the lands lying abroad provinces Chzhi-li; the second one wandered on the lands composing nowadays the northwest corner of the Chinese Empire. But this misunderstanding is explained by the partition of Mongolia into east and western half from which the first is given to Tatar, and the second to Mongol from which the people also received names" (Bichurin, 1950).

Following further, in 92 the Hunns were struck by the Chinese and there was only one generation from the house of Hunns under the patrimonial name Ashina (Dulga) who went to the lands of the Altai and were subordinated by syanbiys, and then zhuzhans. And only in 552 the Dulgan possessor Tumyn, who was released from under the power of the Zhuzhan House declared himself as Ili-khan (Bichurin, 1950).

However, if we refer to the work of Inostrantsev K.A. (1926) "The Hunns and the Guns" where he also gives opinion of the professor Sorbonne Degin who stated Abul-Ghazi's legends that from the general ancestor Turk originated two twin brothers, khans Tatar and Mongol. Here Degin does not specify the assumption who actually "twin brothers" are, and in the statement of history of East Turks who apparently originated from the northern Hunns he calls these Turkic both Turks, and Mongols.

Providing stories of "the Roman historians", Degin designates that about the Western Tatars (Hunns) many fables were told who they were and where they came from. "In Tataria they were called Hunns and founded the large state which was destroyed by Chinese. Then they dissipated. They went to the west and subsequently entered the Roman Empire. Others stayed on borders of China and were broken only by Zhu-zhen Tatars ... when one leader by the name Tu-myn became at the head of many hordes and formed the new state. These people were called then Turks. They took control of all Tataria".

Inostrantsev K.A. (1926) notices that Degin indicates to one certain thing quite right: "The Turkish horde, having received the power, gave the name to all other people, or rather other people knew the Hunns only under the name of Turk as subsequently Chinghiz-khan from the horde of Mongols was the reason that the name Mongol became

the name of almost all Tatars” that means that the winner calling the subordinated people by his name, thereby lets know about his possession.

It is also necessary to note that Inostrantsev K.A. (1926) emphasizes that Degin did not distinguish the people of the Central Asia into races and tribes, but stated only the political facts of history. Also here we will not give opinion of other researchers which are carefully described in the works by Inostrantsev K.A. It is worth noting, as well as a number of the other researchers writing history of the people, their opinions differ concerning belonging to the Hunns (Guns) to the Mongolian or Turkic family. And unfortunately judgements of researchers have subjective character, a number of wrong views and guesses on the matter take place.

According to the second legend given by Bichurin N.Ya. (1950): “ancestors of the tyukyu House come from the sovereign House So living to the north from the Hunns. The elder of the aimak was called Apanbu. There were 70 brothers. The first was called Ichzhini-nishydu, and was born from the wolf. Apanbu with other brothers was silly by nature that’s why his all House was destroyed. Nishydu had supernatural power: he could cause winds and rains. He married two wives one of which as it was told, was the daughter of summer, another – the daughter of winter spirit. The first gave birth to four sons from whom the first turned into Ivis; another reigned between the rivers – Afu and Gyan, under the name Tsigu; the third reigned at the river Chusi; and the last lived at Basychu-sishi mountains. It was the eldest son. On the mountains the family Ananbuy lived. There mostly cold dews were. The eldest son made warmth, and through that rescued all others: that is why by common consent he was appointed as the senior sovereign over themselves under the name Tukyue. It was Nadulu-she. Nadulu had ten wives. All his sons were called according to the house of mothers. Ashina was the son of younger wife. After Nadulu’s death the sons of ten mothers wanted to elect one instead of the father. They came to a big tree and set such a condition among themselves: who jumps up in the tree higher than others, so he will be appointed as the head. Though Ashina was too young, but jumped up very high: that is why brothers recognized him as the sovereign, under the name Akhyan-she” (Bichurin, 1950).

This legend was stated from “The History of the Northern dynasty Wei” (from 386 to 558). Aristov N.A. (2003) also gives the arguments, explaining his ideas of this legend: “... the fourth, eldest son, by the name Nadulushe (No-tou-lou-che), lived in the mountains Basy-chu-si-shi (Tsien-sse-tchou-tche-chi); the horde occurring from the mentioned general Turkic forefather lived in the same mountains; this horde strongly suffered from the cold caused by dews; Nadulushe taught them to extract fire, warmed and impregnated so kept life; the mentioned horde obeyed him being grateful for it, recognized as the head and nominated tou-kioe. His descendant Tumyn was the first sovereign of Turks (tou-kioe) who entered the intercourses with China in the first half of the 6th century (Aristov, 2003).

At last, Basy-chu in translation from Turkic can mean “upper courses of the Chu river”; as shi in Chinese – “stone”, the place where the eldest son settled is a pasture essence lodged at “stone (or rocky) mountains in river courses of the Chu river”. Generally, according to geographical and ethnic data of the legend that Turks-tukyu (more precisely on Iakinfu, “the Dulga house”, i.e. actually khan family) occur from the tribe So living in the north of the Altai and that, after their resettlement to the Altai and reproduction, they were divided into four branches: one was approved on the northern

slope of the Altai, with the name ku ('Ban' or 'Man' meant, apparently, "earth", "country", that subsequently was turned into prefix of collective meaning, as e.g. and in the name the Turkman or the Turkmen), the second branch was based on the Yenisey and the Abakan with the name the Kyrgyz, the third remained to wander in the Altai on the river Chu, and the fourth formed the tribe which accepted the name Turk. This the last, turned known to the Chinese in the second quarter of the 6th century who began the political relations with it and in 536 subjected gaogyuyets in number of 50 t. tilt carts, then put an end to dominion zhuzhany and by 556 owned all Mongolia and the Middle Asia to Hindu Kush and the Black Sea (Aristov, 2003).

Though Aristov N.A. (2003) points that this legend does not give considerable data on Turkic tribes (hunns, kangles, gaogyuyets), and possibly, it is only mentioning of all Turkic peoples in the north of the Altai and it means only ruling of khan family, the dominating generation which united the separate Turkic families living on the southern slopes of the Altai and gave the name Turkic to their union and tribe that was accepted or received by it.

In compositions by Bartold V.V. (1968) the review of the article provided by Aristov N.A. (2003) is given, where the considerable moments underwent a critical remark about incorrect interpretation of the question "about the initial origin of Turkic peoples and their ancestral homeland". It is specified that it is impossible to define locations of Turkic family coming only from the called rivers and the districts located in the Altai. And also that the empire of hunns formed the Turkic family, being based only on language similarity and many other analogies.

That again leads us up a blind alley. If referring to works by Klyashtorny S.G. (1994), from the Chinese historical chronicle of Zhou-shu, he says about Tutszyue (Turkic peoples) there is a special tribe syunna (hunna). Localization of tribes is located in mountains to the north of Gaochang that means on the East Tien Shan, to the north of the Tarim basin and the Turfan oasis. And as according to the legend Ashina accepts names on mother, i.e. there is a mixture of tribes of syunnu-ashina to local population of the East Turkistan, here terms 'huo' denoted the settled population speaking in the Iranian and Tokhar languages.

It turns out that the family hunna did not go to the lands of the Altai, and settled down in the East Turkistan, doesn't it?

Let's consider further, Klyashtorny S.G. (1965) gives political events from which follows that: "After disintegration of the Tsin empire in Khesi and Gaochan the dynasty the Early Liang was established. In 376 the Northern China was united by the dynasty Early Tsin for several years, but already in 385 the commander of this dynasty Luy Guang created an independent kingdom in Khesi. Later Liang (385-403) whose protectorate extended to Gaochang and some other oases of the Tarim basin. By the beginning of the 5th century Hunns of Ordos headed by the tribe Helyan took the northern part of Shansi and Pinlyan. Their leader, Helyanbobo, created here the kingdom Sya (407-431) which last sovereign died in fight against the syanbiy tribe tuguhun, and lands were occupied by the vey emperor Tay U-di. The tribe Helyan and the Hunn tribes adjoining it were partially subjected to syanbiy-tabgach, partially ran to the west, to Khesi where in 397-401 the hunn prince Tsyuitsyui Mensyun based a dynasty of the Northern Liang (the territory of Khesi and Gaochang). In 439 Tye U-di took Khesi, but two sons of Mensyun – Ukhoy and Anchzhou – from 10 000 families ran to Shanshan (the region of

Lobnor), and then to Gaochang where, relying on the union with zhuan-zhuany, held on by 460. In 460 this union was broken; according to Tszychzhi Tuntszyan, “zhuan-zhuany attacked Gaochang, killed Tsyuitsyui Anchzhou and destroyed the family Tsyuitsyui”.

Thus, some moments concerning movement and settlement of hunn tribes based on legends clear up.

As Klyashtorny S.G. (1994) notes, after defeat of the state Tsyuitsyui in Khesi, Ashina together with Ukhoi and Anzhou ran to Gaochang where soon (after 460) got under the power of zhuan-zhuany and were moved to the southern spurs of the Altai. According to both legends, only after resettlement to the Altai the tribe accepted the name Turkic and the old name of the tribe became the dynasty name of the ruling family.

During the first period of the history – gansuy-gaochan (3rd century AD – 460) – ancestors Ashina lived in the territory where Saks and “Tokhar” languages prevailed. Exactly here there is the tribe Ashina whose ethnic mixture with the autochthonic population of the area is noted by both the Chinese historiography and Turkic genealogical legends.

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NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE HISTORY OF THE KAZAKH KHANATE FORMATION

*Leskaly Bazargalievich Berdyguzhin**

Abstract

One of the largest and the most influential countries of Central and Middle Asia in the Middle Ages was the Kazakh Khanate. In modern times, the Kazakh Khanate no longer exists as a separate independent entity on the political map of the world, but its accumulated achievements in the field of management, legislation, regulation of public relations, foreign policy and diplomacy have a tremendous impact on modern Kazakhstan. This article also focuses on the personality of outstanding Kazakh Khanate khans, who played a pivotal role in the long life of the Kazakh people.

Key words: *Desht-i Qipchaq, the Kazakh Khanate, Horde, bey, statehood*

Introduction

Occupying a unique geopolitical location between Europe and Asia, Kazakhstan is seeking to ensure strategic interests with a deep analysis of the global and regional processes, as well as the internal development. However, all this would not be possible without the support on the political culture of the Kazakh people, the ability to conduct complex diplomatic negotiations, the desire for stability in the political life, and the respect for human rights. The roots of all this go deep into the Middle Ages, and are reflected in the domestic and foreign policy of the Kazakh Khanate khans. Therefore, the understanding of the Kazakh Khanate history and the activities of its outstanding leaders is very relevant.

The purpose of this research is to analyze the history of the formation and development of the Kazakh Khanate and its impact on contemporary political processes taking place in the Republic of Kazakhstan. The achievement of this purpose contributes to the realization of a number of tasks, namely to consider the basic prerequisites for the formation of the Kazakh Khanate; to analyze the domestic and foreign policy of the state during its rise; to investigate the factors that led to the loss of independence; to trace the influence of the Khanate on the modern political institutions.

The novelty of this study lies in the fact that for the first time an attempt was made to present a comprehensive study of the history of the Kazakh Khanate from the period of its formation to the time of its entry into the Russian Empire.

A considerable amount of factual material is contained in generalizing works on the history of the Kazakh Khanate. In particular, these are the works by S.G. Klyashtorniy and T.I. Sultanov (2004), V.Ya. Basin (1971), M.Kh. Abuseitova (2012), G. Curtis (1996) and others. A valuable source for studying the history of the early Kazakh Khanate is the works of medieval historians and travelers, for example, Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat (2008), Muhammed Vefa Kerminégî (2009) and *Zainuddin Mahmood Wasifi* (1986).

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The methodological basis for exploring the analyzed topic was formed by a system approach, involving a holistic consideration of the object, revealing its structural elements and principles of its organization. This paper also used such scientific methods as chronological, comparative, historical and descriptive methods, a content analysis of documents and research works. Along with traditional methods of the complex analysis of historical events there was used a modern methodology of studying the domestic and foreign policy, which requires attention to the personal aspects of the activity of power holders. The historicist principle helped not only examine the conditions of the Kazakh Khanate formation, but also follow the dynamics of its development in each particular historical situation. When studying the organizational structure of the Kazakh Khanate, the activities of the khan and beys, the methods of the institutional and functional analysis were used.

New insights into the history of the Kazakh Khanate formation: basic prerequisites

As early as in 1227, the proto-Kazakh state as part of the Golden Horde was formed in the territory of Desht-i Qipchaq and called Ulus Ezhen Horde (the White Horde). After separation from the Golden Horde, the White Horde in 1361 became an independent state. However, in 1428 the White Horde split into the Khanate of Abul Khair Khan and the Nogai Horde.

Analyzing the newly created states, it should be emphasized that in the XV century, the Abul Khair Khanate, possessing the steppes of Desht-i Qipchaq, modern central Kazakhstan (Ulytau) and part of Western Kazakhstan, was one of the most powerful communities in Central Asia.

At the same time, the opposition, created by the descendants of the Ezhen Horde – Zhanibek (1428-1480) and Kerey (year of birth unknown – 1521) – could not offer a serious resistance to Abul Khair until the 60's of the XV century. Subsequently, Zhanibek and Kerey managed to take advantage of the unstable situation within the Abul Khair Khanate, the short-sighted policy of which was ultimately marked by incessant wars, social differences, economic decline, constant strife and extreme power despotism of the Khan.

By the mid-50s, Kerey and Zhanibek already controlled a number of major cities, trade centers and the rich water and pasture land in Western Kazakhstan. Backing out of the military forces, brought against them by Abul Khair Khan, the sultans retracted southward to Zhetysu.

According to Kazakh legends, the direct reason for the sultans' decampment was the assassination of Akzhol-bey, a representative of the powerful Argyn clan, by Kara Kypchak Kobylandy (Kudaiberdiyev, 2007). It is believed that the leaders of the injured party demanded that Kobylandy be punished. But Abul Khair Khan, trying to keep the relationship with Kypchak beys, evaded a fair verdict of litigation, which caused outrage among the relatives and supporters of the slain. Then Abul Khair offered compensation – *кын* (cost) for the death of Akzhol-bey in the amount of charge for three soldiers, which also caused indignation among the injured party (Kudaiberdiyev, 2007: 46). In this situation, the sultans Zhanibek and Kerey left Abul Khair and went into Moghulistan. Thus, 870 AH (1465 AD) is considered the official date of the founding of the Kazakh Khanate.

The definition of the state that represents the political power system, which is established in a certain territory, is generally accepted. In addition, the state is

characterized by the availability of the object and the subject of political management (the ruler and the people). It should be noted that Zhanibek and Kerey had no independent territory and a large population in the days of Abul Khair Khan. They lived as political refugees in the territory of another state (Moghulistan).

In the territory of Moghulistan, Zhanibek and Kerey were not khans, they were only contenders for the throne. Declaring themselves khans in the territory of Moghulistan would lead to an open conflict with Moghulistan khans, who, naturally, did not seek to give a part of their territory to political refugees from another region. Therefore, in our opinion, Zhanibek and Kerey were announced khans only after the death of Abul Khair Khan, when they were able to return to their homeland. This happened in the period between 1468 and 1472. Most likely, Klyashtorny and Sultanov (2004) are right, according to whom the year of the Kazakh Khanate formation was 1470.

It should be noted that none of the Shaybanid sources fixed Zhanibek and Kerey as khans during the life of Abul Khair Khan. Even assuming that they were proclaimed khans in Moghulistan, such concepts as “the proclamation of khans” and “the emergence of an independent state” should be separated. Thus, even if Zhanibek and Kerey became khans before 1470, it is not contrary to the idea that the independent Kazakh Khanate appeared only after the death of Abul Khair Khan. And the first mention of “Kazakhstan”, localized in the land of Zhetysu, refers to 1537, according to Zainuddin Mahmood Wasifi (1986).

In summary, it may be noted that by the formal parameters, the period of 1465-1466 cannot be considered the time of the Kazakh Khanate formation, as far as during this time Zhanibek and Kerey had no sovereign territory with a large population that would recognize them as khans. Whereas the opinion that the Kazakh Khanate arose after the death of Abul Khair Khan (1470) is more than justified.

In general, the formation of the Kazakh Khanate was the result of complex ethno-political, socio-economic and ethno-cultural processes taking place in the territory of modern Kazakhstan and adjacent regions in the XIV-XV centuries. The main result of these processes was the completion of formation within the post-Mongol States (Ak Horde, Moghulistan, the Nogai Horde, the Siberian Khanate) of the Kazakh nation, which faced an urgent need to unite into a single political entity.

Kazakh Khanate: the period of prosperity

From the very beginning of its formation, the Kazakh Khanate was fighting for the unification of all the tribes of Desht-i Qipchaq and the incorporation of the towns near the Syr Darya. Back in the early 1470s the Kazakh Khanate, stretching from the Irtysh to the Zhaik (the Ural), was divided into two wings. The left (east) wing was headed by Kerey himself, while the right (west) wing passed to Zhanibek. Here one can talk about the institution of coregency, widespread among the nomadic peoples since ancient times (Kradin, 2011).

During this period the Manghit beys made repeated attempts to get free from the duumvirate and declare more obedient sultans khans. For example, in 1472 Musa Mirza entered into an alliance with Abul Khair's grandson Muhammad Shaybani, promising to proclaim him the Khan of the entire Desht-i Qipchaq. Musa Mirza would receive the post of beklyarbek, managing the state administration, in return. Upon learning of the arrival of Mohammad in Saray-Jük, Kerey Khan's son Burunduk Khan moved the 50 – thousand

army against them, but it suffered a defeat from the troops of Mohammad. At the same time the Manghit leaders and the allied tribes of the Nogai Horde were opposed to the intentions of Musa Mirza to proclaim Muhammad the Khan. The protracted negotiations stimulated Burunduk Khan to attack the possession of Muhammad on the Syr Darya. Further wins of Burunduk Khan at the heights of Sagunlyk in the Karatau Mountains, at Otrar, Turkestan and Arquq forced Shaybani to leave the territory of Musa Mirza.

Thus, by the end of the XV century, the Syr Darya valley was divided between the three states – Uzbek, Kazakh and Moghul. Based on the towns near the Syr Darya, Burunduk Khan managed to unite the nomadic generations of Zhetysu, Central and Western Kazakhstan, and after the death of Musa Mirza most of the Manghit nomadic tribes came under the rule of Burunduk Khan.

However, the rise of the Kazakh Khanate is associated with the name of another khan – Zhanybek Khan's son Kasym who came to power in 1511. Under Kasym the number of subjects of the Kazakh Khanate, according to Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat (2008), was one million people.

Moreover, under the Kasym Khanate the towns near the Syr Darya were eventually attached to the Kazakhs. In 1519 Kasim consolidated his power in Western Kazakhstan, as a result of a victorious crusade against the Manghits. In June 1519, the main forces of the Manghits were routed near Haji-Tarkhan, and the Edil River (Volga) became the western border of the state. Zhetysu and Prityanshane also became part of the Kazakh Khanate.

These territorial gains were the beginning of Kasym Khan's "collecting" the adjacent lands of the neighboring states inhabited by kindred tribes and clans, which due to ethno-political factors were attracted by the growing Kazakh ethnos. It was also affected by the need of the nomads to compensate through such measures for the costs of attenuation of the Silk Road, as far as the southern, south-eastern and western regions of Kazakhstan, where agriculture, trade and crafts were developed, acquired a special significance for the Kazakhs.

The motive of territorial increments was also the need to establish natural boundaries with neighbors, which would coincide with mountain ranges and large rivers, without which any other line of land demarcation would always remain conditional, when nomadic cattle breeding was dominated in the public sector (Kirimli, 1999: 38).

The period of Kasym Khan's rule was remarkable for the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Moghulistan, the Kashgar Khanate, the Nogai Horde, the Muscovite state and other countries, as well as the fact that the Kazakhs as a separate ethnic group became known in Western Europe.

However, the death of Kasym Khan (in 1518, according to Dughlat (2008); in 1521, according to Preston (2001) and (Trepavlov, 2016), in 1523, according to Curtis (1996) and Olcott (2002)) and the strife that killed the khan's successor Mamash Khan significantly weakened the Kazakh Khanate.

When Takhir Khan was in power (20's of the XVI century), there was a loss of a number of territories in the south and west. The friendly relations with the Nogais, provided by personal and family ties of the former Khan, fell apart. Then the Nogai Horde began to lay claim to the land which was previously moved to the Kazakhs. An outburst of separatism and strife among the Kazakh sultans stimulated the Mirzas to carry out a sudden invasion, leaving no chances of military preparations to Takhir Khan. The retreat of the Kazakhs to Semirechye in 1523-1524 turned out to be inevitable. However,

having arrived there, Takhir Khan activated negotiations with the governor of Moghulistan Said Sultan. Almost simultaneously, he was able to win over the Kyrgyz people, which was the beginning of their entry into the Kazakh state. Tipping the balance of power in Semirechye soon forced the Moghuls to leave this place forever, which meant the completion of its transforming into the Kazakh region (Rahul, 2000: 89).

The Kazakh Khanate could stabilize the relations with the Nogais only by the middle of the XVI century with the advent of Khak-Nazar Khan, whose name is associated with the restoration of the former power of the Kazakh state after a series of feuds: the area from Emba to the Aral Sea and the Syr Darya again came under the control of the Kazakhs.

The earliest information about Khak-Nazar is dated 1549, when he fought off the Turkmens at the coast of the Amu Darya. In 1556 the Khan tried to capture Tashkent, and in 1560 started the war with the ruler of Moghulistan Abd ar-Rashid Khan. In 1568 Khak-Nazar Khan attacked the Nogai Horde, weakened by strife, and about the same time began the war with the Siberian Kuchum Khan. In order to narrow down the front of opponents, Khak-Nazar made an "oath" with the ruler of Mawarannahr Abdallah, which meant that the Khan was under his protectorate. It undermined the anti-Kazakh Union of the Moghul and Uzbek rulers and gave an opportunity, using differences in the camp of the Uzbeks, to resume the Kazakh influence in the towns on the Syr Darya and to the south.

Khak-Nazar Khan was a skilled diplomat and achieved a significant improvement in the international situation of the Khanate, unlike his successor Shigay Khan (1580-1582), who, however, attached the land of Khujand to the Khanate during his short rule.

His successor Tauekel Khan ended the Bukhara protectorate over the Kazakhs and started fighting for the return of Tashkent. In the foreign policy of Tauekel Khan the Uzbek vector was major, but not exclusive. In the east, he captured part of the Kalmyk land, then gained the recognition of forty Karakalpak clans for his son as their ruler and thus long provided support and loyalty on their part.

Tauekel Khan carefully watched as the Russian state was growing in strength, and was aware of the need to have stable political and economic ties with it. In 1594 the Khan sent an official mission headed by Sultan Kul-Muhammad to Moscow for establishing allied military relations and ensuring the supply of firearms, which the Kazakhs badly needed (Baidildina, 2013: 119).

Then the coalition with the Shaybanid and Nogai rulers was formed. One of the most important treaties of peace and cooperation in the repulse of external aggression and the resolution of political conflicts was a treaty made in 1598-1599 after the war, in which each side tried to expand its influence in the towns near the Syr Darya. The document said that after lengthy negotiations between the Kazakhs and the Ashtarkhanids a peace treaty was concluded. It is noteworthy that the winner – the Kazakh Khanate – received Tashkent in its possession. However, as stressed by M.Kh. Abuseitova (2012: 15), the Tashkent vilayet was considered a constituent part of the Ashtarkhanid state. It should be noted that the foreign policy of Tauekel Khan towards the end of the XVI century significantly strengthened the international position of the Kazakh Khanate.

The task of preserving the territory from the attacks by its neighbors, especially the Ashtarkhanids and the Kalmyks, became a top priority in the foreign policy of the Kazakh Khanate in the XVII century, as far as the Ashtarkhanids stubbornly wanted to return Tashkent and the area near the Syr Darya.

After the death of Tauekel Khan, the khan was Yesim (1598-1628). His rule was the time of another amplification of the Kazakh Khanate. Yesim Khan conducted an active domestic and foreign policy, aimed at the transformation of the Kazakh Khanate into a powerful centralized state. For example, Yesim Khan maintained diplomatic relations with China and the Khotoygot Khanate. At the beginning of his rule, he also concluded a peace treaty with Bukhara, according to which Tashkent, Kanka and part of Fergana moved to the Kazakh Khanate. However, the fifteen-year period of calm in the Kazakh-Bukhara relationship ended in 1603. The war between the Kazakh Khanate and Bukhara lasted until 1624, when the Bukhara Khan Imamkuli conceded defeat.

Yesim Khan also had strained relations with Moghulistan, the khan of which Abd al-Latif Abak supported the ruler of Tashkent Tursun Khan in the rebellion against Yesim. The rulers of the Katagan tribe also supported the rebellious Khan. It is noteworthy that when Yesim was being proclaimed khan in 1598, Tursun did not claim this title. However, having become popular after the winning wars against Bukhara, Sultan Tursun soon proclaimed himself khan, began to mint coins in his own name and to collect badge and kharaj from the population, i.e. duty and land tax.

The desire of Tursun Khan for an individual rule, his non-recognition of the power of Yesim Khan led to the duality of power. This weakened the khan's power and exacerbated the internal conflicts. However, Yesim Khan regarded this dual power wisely and calmly. In order not to give rise to bloodshed among the common people, Yesim Khan announced that the self-proclaimed Tursun Khan was an equal ruler.

The situation changed dramatically when in 1627, taking advantage of the fact that Yesim Khan was at war with the Dzungars, who increased raids on the Kazakh land, Tursun Khan attacked Turkestan, killing a lot of civilians, destroying homes and capturing the family of Yesim Khan. In the same year in the vicinity of Tashkent there was a decisive battle between Tursun and Yesim, in which the latter won.

The domestic political situation clearly showed the inherent weakness of the Kazakh Khanate. Under these conditions, Yesim Khan implemented a reform of the political system of the Khanate, which was called "Bey Revolution". As a result of this reform, beys and elders began to play an increasingly important role in the life of the traditional Kazakh society (Tokhtarbayev, 2001: 9).

Instead of the *ulus* system, the system of *zhuzes* was introduced. The land of the Kazakh Khanate was divided into three economic and territorial associations: Senior (*Ulı*), Medium (*Orta*) and Junior (*Kishi*) *zhuzes*, headed by the Council beys. The supreme legislative power was still vested in Maslikhat, which included the representatives of all Kazakh communities and the most powerful sultans.

The khan's weakened role in the political system led to a change in the principle of his electing. Although officially the principle of meritocracy remained in force, in fact the Kazakhs proceeded to inherit the title of khan until the beginning of the XVIII century. Khan had the right to declare war and make peace and to negotiate with other states. However, khan was still not the only bearer of power, because he shared it with beys.

The final consolidation of the legal system of the Kazakh society is connected with the name of the last khan of the single independent Kazakh Khanate – Tauke Khan (1680-1715).

In this period, the legal relationship in the Kazakh society was regulated by the customary (torah, adat) and Islamic (Sharia) laws. Yesim Khan and Kasym Khan made

attempts to develop a uniform legal basis. However, it was Tauke Khan who systematized the basic principles of patriarchal-feudal society, included in the code of laws “*Zheti Zhargy*”. He strongly tried to strengthen the centralized power in the steppe. For this purpose Tauke Khan set a permanent venue and time for the convening of Qurultay and beys.

Summarizing the outcomes of Tauke Khan Khanate, it should be noted that he was a visionary politician and a clever diplomat. In order to regulate the inner life and to eliminate the willfulness of sultans, he raised the role of beys and made efforts to strengthen the Council of beys. In addition, during the period of his rule the boundaries of the Kazakh Khanate were finally established both by conducting the diplomatic policy and by strengthening the armed forces.

Decline: main causes and legacy

With an increasing danger of the Dzungar invasion, the eastern direction of the foreign policy of the Kazakh state gradually became the top priority. The Kalmyk factor drew attention to itself at the beginning of the century: the Kalmyk raids were significantly increased. In 1635 the Kalmyk tribes of Southern and Western Siberia were united in the Dzungar state with a very aggressive policy. For a century the steppe was plunged into a series of wars, occasionally interrupted by truces. The military action came with varying degrees of success. For example, in 1708 the Dzungars committed a crusade against the Kazakhs of Southern Kazakhstan, as a result of which all three *zhuzes* suffered enormous damage. In 1718 the Kazakhs suffered a new defeat near the river Ayagoz, entailing disputes between the Karakalpak Khan Kaip and the khan of the Junior *zhuz* Abulkhair. In 1723-1727, the Dzungars captured Southern Kazakhstan and Zhetysu. In addition, the Dzungars captured Fergana and established a protectorate over the Syr Darya towns, Senior, Middle and Junior *zhuzes*. This period was included in the history of the Kazakh Khanate as “the years of the great tribulation” (Kalan, 2011: 143).

In 1726 the khan of the Junior *zhuz* Abul Khair asked the government of the Russian Empire to take the Kazakhs in the Russian citizenship. It should be noted that Russia was also interested in strengthening the relations with Kazakhstan. In the XVI-XVII centuries the Russian state considered Kazakhstan as a transit base in the exclusive silk trade with Western Europe. At the beginning of the XVIII century the Russian monarch Peter I set a task for Russia to achieve the mediation in trade between the eastern and western countries, particularly between India and Western Europe (Donelly, 1975: 205). Thus, there was a mutually beneficial rapprochement. Without doubt, the relations between Russia and Kazakhstan cannot be considered as equal. Kazakh rulers understood that this accession would limit their independence, but was compensated by the military and economic support.

On October 10, 1731 at the Congress of the representatives of the Middle and Junior *zhuzes*, Abul Khair and 29 elders swore allegiance to the Russian Empress Anna Ioannovna. This act marked the beginning of the accession of the Kazakh land to Russia. The Junior *zhuz* was the first to join the Russian Empire in 1735, and a little later the Middle *zhuz* – in 1740. The Senior *zhuz* became an integral part of the Russian Empire in 1847 after the suppression of the rebellion of Kenesary, the last khan of the three Kazakh *zhuzes*, which lasted from 1837 to 1847.

In the historical science, there is no consensus about the Russian citizenship of the Junior, Middle and Senior *zhuzes*. Some researchers give evidence that the process of the

accession of Kazakhstan to Russia abounds in various forms of international legal relations, combined with the signs of vassalage and protectorate (Basin, 1971: 250). The term of the Kazakh citizenship is more applicable at the final stage of the accession of Kazakhstan to Russia, namely when on the basis of the "Provisional regulations on administration in the steppe areas" in 1869 there was introduced a new management system, according to which Kazakhstan was divided into Governorate-General and *oblasts* (regions) (Basin, 1971: 269). Protectorate sometimes insufficiently protected from the Dzungar and Chinese threats, but quickly turned into the military colonization of regions (Hayit, 1984: 61-77).

A successful attempt to resist these trends was associated with the name of Ablai Khan, who played a prominent role in the implementation of the balanced foreign policy of the Kazakh Khanate. Many sources testify to the flexible and far-sighted policy of Ablai Khan. First he improved the Kazakh-Dzungar relations, which caused the anxiety of China and Russia that were not interested in such outcomes (Mazhidenova, 2003: 179). Then Ablai provided a real growth of the Kazakh state sovereignty and returned a great part of the land, skillfully balancing on the contradictions between the powers. Due to his outstanding qualities, this talented commander and diplomat managed to conclude peace treaties with Russia and China in the long run, eliminating the threat of attack from the outside and ensuring the territorial integrity of the Kazakh *zhuzes* (Mukatayeva & Sultangazy, 2015: 19-23).

At the end of the first quarter of the XIX century there were favorable conditions for the elimination of the khan's power both in the Middle and Junior *zhuzes*. By this time the institution of khanate lost the character of the highest authority that could manage the internal affairs of *zhuzes*. The activation of the tsarist government in Russia for subjugating Kazakh steppes started in 1811, since the inclusion of the territory between Ural and Ilel in the Orenburg province. In fact, the beginning of this process dates back to the elimination of the khan's power in the Junior and Middle *zhuzes*. As a result of a number of administrative reforms in 1822, 1824 and 1868, in Kazakhstan such ancient structures of governance as the khan's power, the national assembly and the khan's council were eliminated.

It should also be stressed that although it is legally considered that the Junior and Middle *zhuzes* were included into Russia in 1731 and 1740, respectively, in fact, until 1782, all the relations with them were carried out by the Board of Foreign Affairs along with other countries. Thus, the Russian government recognized that Kazakhstan was not yet a part of the Russian Empire. Only in 1782, all the cases concerning the Kazakh khanates were transferred to the general-prosecutor. As regards the Senior *zhuz*, the political relations with it were conducted up to 1847 before its legal accession to Russia after the suppression of the Kenesary rebellion.

By its scope, duration, persistence and impact on the policy of Russia, neighboring countries and the internal life of Kazakhstan, the Kenesary war is most significant in the history of the Kazakh people's struggle for independence and sovereignty. The Kenesary actions against the Russian Empire were based on the aspiration to stop its advancement into the steppe, to ruin the Russian fortresses built on the Kazakh land and to stop the construction of new ones, but the main reason was to restore the Kazakh statehood as it was in the times of Ablai Khan.

In September 1841, Kenesary was elected as the Khan of all Kazakhs. However, he

never managed to unite all the clans at the same time, and this was the main weakness of the rebellion. The rebellion peak refers to 1844, and then after the superior forces of the Russian army made Kenesary withdraw to Semirechye (Zhetysu) in 1846, he invaded the land of the Tian Shan Kyrgyz people in 1847, where he was assassinated in the same year.

The mistake of Kenesary was that his progressive aspirations, focus on the unification of the Kazakh people and desire to create a centralized state came across the insurmountable obstacles: the fragmentation of Kazakhstan and the inter-clan struggle, fomented both by the feudal lords and the official Russian authorities. Therefore, he could neither free the Kazakh people from the colonial rule nor create a self-centralized state, because Russia, China and Central Asian Khanates, the military force of which was much greater than the forces of Kenesary, would not allow it to happen.

Kazakhstan regained its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan is recognized by many authoritative international organizations, institutions and foreign states. The Republic of Kazakhstan has been adopted in the UN as an equal member and entered into a lot of multilateral and bilateral agreements. Currently, Kazakhstan is an independent subject of the international community.

However, the system of power relations of modern Kazakhstan is characterized by the fundamental categories of the political culture of the Kazakh Khanate. For example, human rights were regulated by the laws of Tauke Khan. According to the current terminology, the code reflects the right to life, marriage, land and property rights, i.e. civil and economic rights.

Conclusions

The Kazakh Khanate, formed by sultans Kerey and Zhanibek, had evolved naturally for two and a half centuries, varying according to the requirements of time, but maintaining a continuous succession. However, the weakness of the internal development of the Kazakh society and its inability to ensure the unity of the various segments of the population, a series of continuous wars with its neighbors (the Nogai Horde, Bukhara, Dzungaria, etc.) and the colonial policy of the tsarist government led to the loss of sovereignty and statehood for a long time at the beginning of the second half of the XIX century. Only in the 90s of the XX century, the conditions for continuing an interrupted history of the nation emerged with the proclamation of independence.

Therefore, the analysis of life events in the Kazakh state in the dynamics of its changes in the XV-XIX centuries testifies to the presence of the rich political practice, which covered the tasks of providing the legitimacy of Kazakh rulers in the territory of Desht-i Qipchaq, gathering the lands of the state created by them, protecting their territory from external attacks, partial or complete transition to the protectorate of other countries under the threat of forcible dismemberment and complete destruction of the Kazakh Khanate.

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INTERPRETATION OF SACRIFICE IN THE CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

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Abstract

In the methodological framework of cultural studies, this paper analyzes the most important aspect of the ancient religion – the phenomenon of human and animal ritual sacrifices. The author presents the cultural and historical characteristics of sacrifice types and reveals the dependence of the ritual of sacrifice on practical purposes and the time of the sacrifice made.

Key words: *sacrifice, ritual, gift, archetype, cultural and historical phenomenon*

Introduction

The importance of sacrifice as a fundamental religious ceremony and an integral part of life in ancient times, antiquity and the Middle Ages is evidenced by the fact that this cultural phenomenon can be traced in the history of almost all ethnic groups. The purpose of this study is to analyze sacrifice in the cultural and historical context in various nations in the past and present.

The consideration of the features of sacrificial rituals determines the following research objectives: to review the concept of “sacrifice” in humanities; to illuminate the origins of sacrificial traditions in different cultures; to reveal the specifics of various sacrificial rituals; to explore the current practice of sacrifice, including the so-called symbolic sacrifice.

The relevance and novelty of this research lies in the fact that the consideration of sacrifice through the prism of the cultural approach contributes to the penetration into the problem at the depth of human experiences, the scientific understanding of the phenomena, which are related to sacrifice, and their role for maintaining the cultural immunity of various nations of the world.

Sacrifice as a ritual event has been the subject of studies since the XVIII century. In the XIX century, the research of sacrifice started to be religious in nature. The analysis of sacrificial traditions, the peculiarities of their procedures, their connection with everyday life, calendar and ritual celebrations, social events is primarily associated with the name of an English ethnographer, culture expert and researcher of religious rites and ceremonies, Edward Tylor, who described the offering as a gift for the gods to ensure their favor (Tylor, 2010: 480-481).

However, the function of the gift is not substantial for sacrifice. For example, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown (1952) drew attention to the social function of this phenomenon – the maintenance of social ties. N. Jay (1988: 52-70) in her work explored the gender aspect of sacrifice, defining sacrifice as an important mechanism for the establishment of a relationship between men of different generations.

According to Georges Bataille (1936), a French philosopher, a person finds the true

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meaning of things and the clarity of thinking only at the time of his/her death, and sacrifice serving as a “comedy” indirectly conveys this meaning. When seeing the death of “others”, people constitute a single entity and feel the joy of their being. Consequently, sacrifice affirms the value of the life of its participants. R. Girard (1972) wrote that those actions which are forbidden in everyday life (e.g., murder) receive public approval in sacrifice rituals, as far as they are related to the otherworldly sphere.

Turning to the history of the Aztecs, one can note that these people brought numerous animal and human sacrifices to their gods in each of the 18 events of their sacred calendar. Self-sacrifice was also widely practiced: during special ceremonies people applied to self-injury, committing ritual bloodletting. Moreover, the Aztecs wore special spikes, permanently injuring their body. At the same time, as pointed out by Juan Bautista de Pomar (2010), every god needed a certain type of offerings: young girls were drowned for Xilonen, boys were sacrificed for Tlaloc, prisoners – for Huitzilopochtli, Aztec volunteers – for Tezcatlipoca. The cult of Quetzalcoatl demanded the sacrifice of butterflies and hummingbirds.

The Aztecs were extremely warlike and oriented to capture new territories. The residents of the occupied lands often became the victims for receiving the divine grace and maintaining the harmony in the world (Frazer, 1990). According to the Aztec chronicles, about 20,000 prisoners were sacrificed in four days for the construction of the Great Temple (Pomar, 2010: 54). And since the Aztec society had militarized consciousness, it is hardly worth talking about sacrifice as a means of resistance to the collective violence. In this case, sacrifice only becomes the indicator of people’s aggressiveness.

It should be noted that sometimes the Aztecs did not have real enemies. In these cases, the so-called “flower wars” were practiced, in which the armies of allied cities fought among themselves. The sole purpose of these ritual wars was to ensure the necessary number of prisoners for sacrifice at the altar.

This example shows that despite the diversity of approaches, modern science cannot provide a comprehensive, exhaustive definition of sacrifice. This cultural phenomenon is extremely complex in structural terms, and may not be definitely understood as a gift.

The main thing that should be stressed in the characteristic of sacrifice is its procedurality and eventfulness. It presents the action that is associated with a particular event. Thus, sacrifice is a peculiar model of death “experience”, a way of its symbolic approaching with a view to realize the totality of human being.

Sacrifice: the history of origination in different cultures

Sacrifices have an ethnic specificity, which can be systematized by types: permanent and occasional; bloody and bloodless; sacrifice-gift, sacrifice-request, and sacrifice-redemption; sacrifice-meal and sacrifice-instrument; a symbolic sacrifice. The basis for this typology is practicality and the time of the sacrifice made.

O.N. Tikhonova suggests the following classification of offering types based on their objectives:

- 1) within the cosmogonic ritual: a) the renewal of the world; b) a “reminder” of the divine act underlying the modern form of human existence;
- 2) within the framework of the totemic meal (communion): a) the preservation of a kinship of the social community with the god; b) the granting of the god’s life force to

people, social institutions (laws, contracts) and the entire state as a whole; c) an increase in fertility through the liberation of the god's spirit;

3) redemption and cleansing: a) the elimination of the internal tension of society, the satisfaction of the "will to destruction", the restoration of the harmony in the team; b) the elimination of the external "evil" by focusing it in the victim; c) the redemption of a particular guilt, the returning of the person to the framework defined by tradition; g) the removal of "filth"; d) the recovery of the world order imbalance due to the inclusion of any innovation in it;

4) gift: a) the obsecration and worship of gods and ancestral spirits; b) the offering of gratitude to the deity; c) the conclusion of the "contract" binding the god to fulfill a giver's request (Tikhonova, 2010: 143-147).

In prehistoric times, the main ritual victim, according to the animism of the cave and rock art, was such a fertility symbol as the aurochs. J. Hawkes and L. Woolley (2003: 87-88) indicate their sacrificial aspect, as far as a reflexive message of the ritual sacrifice among the ancient Indo-Iranians and a number of other nations was the dismemberment of the victim into conceptual parts.

This dismemberment was manifested in the myth about the creation of the world from the body of the primal essence, for example, Purusha – in the ancient Indians, Ormazd – in the Iranians, Ymir – in the Scandinavians, Zeus – in the ancient Greeks. In the ancient Indo-Aryans, the eye of Purusha became the sun, the navel – the airspace, the head – the sky, feet – the ground, the ears – cardinal directions, etc. (Griffith, 1996: 302).

At the same time, primitive philosophy could not do without the ritual practice based on a human sacrifice. It is possible that this is caused by an ancestral memory of the primary cannibalism, which was based, according to Yu.M. Boroday, on the following idea: "if we kill any of our own kind, we will transgress the most terrible commandments and in the torments of remorse will find out that we are killing the god (goddess)" (Boroday, 2006: 131).

Along with animistic reflections, primitive man had the idea of turning the body of a woman-mother, foremother into the bodies of her living descendants through the ritual of sacrifice. The American Indians have a whole series of myths, in which the philosophy of sacrifice was based precisely on this logic. In these myths, foremother, sometimes in the form of a girl, was kidnapped, raped by men, and then cut into pieces. These pieces formed new women – wives for men.

Ancient authors also wrote about the sacrifice of women, sometimes girls and boys, to various deities. For example, Pausanias wrote that the most beautiful young man and the most beautiful young woman were annually sacrificed to the Ionian Artemis due to the transgression of one of the Vestals named Comaetho, who slept with Melanippus in the temple (Pausanias. Description of Greece, 1983: 193). Plutarch indicates that the Hyperboreans annually sent two girls as a sacrifice to the Temple of Artemis on the island of Delos (Plutarch. Table-talk, 1990: 239).

In a certain historical period, the philosophy of the transformed body, pervading the rituals of sacrifice in the ancient primitive state, became replaced by the philosophy of gift, honoring and renunciation.

The motives of gift in sacrifice, called "potlatch" in ethnography and ethnology, are seen in the ancient Chinese culture. Every year, they gave one girl "as wife" for the river spirit Hebo (Bingyi), causing devastating floods. On the eve of the mystery, a shaman

chose the prettiest girl, who was bathed, dressed in new silk and placed in the “palace of abstinence”. She was then laid on the patterned bed and tied with ropes. Several men took the bed to the river shore and threw it into the water (Yuan, 1993: 149). At the time of flooding of the Nile, the Egyptians also threw the most beautiful girl dressed as a bride into the water (Tylor, 2010: 497).

Renunciation is the highest category of sacrifice, as far as it implies the victim's consent to his/her murder or suicide. Most often, it is a matrimonial offering, i.e. a voluntary death of the widow at the grave or funeral pyre of her husband.

In the Indo-Aryan cultures, the suicide of widows at their husbands' funeral, called “sahamarana” (dying with), was observed in Eneolithic times, according to the archaeological data. In India itself, a sacrificial custom of wives was called sati (derived from the name of the first wife of the god Shiva, who burned herself in the sacred fire when her father insulted her husband) and first mentioned in the “Mahabharata” in the second half of the 1st millennium BC.

Archaeological excavations of Scythian royal burial mounds, particularly that of King Ateas, who died in 339 BC, show that the Scythians also had a tradition of the ritual sacrifice of wives after husbands' death. Similar rites were practiced by both the ancient Germans and ancient Slavs.

Peculiarities of ritual sacrifices in different cultures

As noted, a particular role in the ritual aspect of most ethnic groups of the past was played by sacrifice. The peculiarities of ritual sacrifices in ancient cultures reflect a special religious pragmatism of antiquity. An interaction with divine powers was used to solve the problems of purely practical work, family life, everyday life and others. At the same time, sacrifices in different cultures are characterized only by their inherent characteristics.

In particular, in ancient Greece, sacrifice along with the prayers and the offerings of votive gifts, was an important form of worship. The structure of sacrifice also included processions, dancing, music and sporting events (Bremmer, 1996: 44).

Traditionally, Greek sacrifices are divided into private and public. Private sacrifices could take place both by the head of the family at home, and the priest in a public place. In contrast to private sacrifices committed by individuals for private purposes, public sacrifices were made by the representatives of policies, demes, districts, clans and phratries (Rosivach, 1994: 11). Accordingly, the number of sacrificial animals brought to the gods in public sacrifices was incomparably greater than in private. Some of the calendars of sacrifices have been preserved, such as Attic, which, among other things, contained the number of sacrificial animals brought to the deity in a particular month.

Ancient Greek sacrifice can be divided into bloodless and bloody. The first group of offerings includes that of dairy products, the first harvest, scones, cereals, flour, ritual pastry, which were often produced in the form of sacrificial animals, burning of incense, etc. An important element in the bloodless sacrifice was the offering of a gift of the first fruit harvest. This kind of sacrifice was more typical for daily household rituals (Zaidman & Pantel, 1994: 38).

It should be emphasized that in some sanctuaries it was allowed to perform only the bloodless sacrifice. Thus, according to Pausanias, it was forbidden to sacrifice living beings or wine at the altar of Zeus, situated in front of the Erechtheum; it was only allowed to sacrifice the pastry. Athenaeus wrote that the priestess of Athena could not sacrifice the

sheep, only the pastry in the form of the sheep.

The information on human sacrifices in ancient Greek sources is extremely rare. B. Steuernagel (1998: 28) indicates that this kind of sacrifice was more common in the mythological context than applied in practice.

On the basis of the archaeological finds of human bones and written sources, it is known that in some sanctuaries there was a tradition to sacrifice a part of the human body. For example, in the sanctuary of Artemis in Ephesus, once a year during Thargelia – one of the chief Athenian festivals in honor of the Delian Apollo and Artemis – there was a custom to bring the genitals of an offender or a prisoner as a sacrifice to the goddess (Bammer, 1998: 40).

The victims were often pets, and the process of sacrifice was in the form of burning. When selecting an animal for sacrifice, the following conditions were often met: it should not have been previously used as a labor force, the gender of the animal often corresponded to that of the deity to whom it was sacrificed, dark-colored animals were often sacrificed to the chthonic deities, light-colored – Olympic, etc. (Blümner, 2006: 337).

The main sacrifice was often preceded by a preliminary sacrifice: hand washing, putting garlands and other decorations on the victim. After that the process of sacrifice began. First, the head of the sacrificial animal and the altar were sprinkled with barley, roasted and mixed with salt, the victim's hair was cut off and thrown into the fire, and then the victim was cut, and the victim's blood was collected in a vessel for the sacrificial blood. Part of the meat was burned for the deity at the altar, with the rest divided between the sacrifice participants. The ash remaining after the sacrifice was considered sacred by the Hellenes that is why it was not allowed to be taken from the sacred territory as well as everything that was dedicated and belonged to the deity. Therefore, the ash often remained lying at the altar, or was dumped into special vessels near the altar.

In China, the emperor combined state and religious authorities, for which reason the religious activity of the emperor held a very important place in the government. Therefore, every month the emperor devoted much time to sacrifice.

The attitude of the emperor to sacrifices in China is clearly reflected in the Confucian canon *The Book of Rites* or *Liji*. Chapter 6 sets out the procedure of the emperor's religious activities for the whole year. For example, in January, after three days of fasting, the emperor along with his dignitaries goes to the eastern suburb of the capital, where he makes a sacrifice in the honor of spring. On the first xīn day, the emperor brings sacrifices to Shangdi, praying for an abundant harvest of grain.

On the first February chā day, the emperor instructs that sacrifice be made to the earth god across the country. On the day when "the first swallows" arrive, the emperor personally worships Mǎo (the deity bestowing an heir on the emperor), praying for an heir, sacrificing three kinds of sacrificial animals – a bull, a ram and a boar.

In March, the emperor sacrifices yellow ceremonial dresses for ancient emperors. During the first voyage, he makes a sacrifice in the ancestral temple, bringing a sturgeon to the ancestors. In the same month, the officials and the population of the capital make the ritual expulsion of the epidemic spirit and other evil spirits, tearing a sacrificial animal apart alive outside the gates of the capital.

In April, after three days of fasting, the emperor along with the dignitaries goes to the southern suburbs of the capital, where he makes the ritual of sacrifice in the honor of summer. In May, the emperor and officials offer sacrifices to the spirits of famous

mountains, rivers and the sources of famous rivers with a supplication for the rain to fall in the capital. In the same month, the emperor performs the rite of sampling of the new harvest in the ancestral temple, sacrificing millet sprays and cherries.

The bloodless sacrifices are also made during the summer months. In September, the emperor immolates the best sacrificial animals for five ancient emperors in the ancestral temple, as well as listens to the report on the preparation of sacrificial objects and confirms the tax for the following year for making public sacrifices. In this month, the emperor, dressed in a military uniform, goes hunting and brings the kill to the deities of the four cardinal points. In December, he makes a solemn ritual of the expulsion of epidemic demons, tearing a sacrificial animal at the entrance to the capital. To exorcise the frost spirit, a ritual clay image of the bull is made. During this period, the head of the metropolitan area, according to the established order, collects the sacrificial fuel used during public offerings. Taishi (the head of the court chroniclers and astronomers) draws the plan for the following year, which determines the number of sacrificial animals brought from each chzhuhou for Shangdi, the gods of the earth and grain, the ancestors of the emperor.

With regard to the peculiarities of the sacrifice that is characteristic for several cultures, the sacrifice of virgins should be mentioned. For example, a sacrifice to the goddess of the Earth in the medieval state of Pegu (today's Myanmar) consisted in the fact that the priest, having undressed a virgin, strangled her, then tore the heart out of her chest and threw it in the face of the idol. The Sudanese Bari buried the most beautiful girl in the tribe alive (Kobischanov, 1986: 169). The Toltecs and Mayans, living on the Yucatan, dropped the most beautiful virgins in the "Well of Death", offering their prayers. The same custom can be traced in the Khonds – one of the Dravidian tribes of India. Only when the territory was conquered by the British in 1853, the bloody sacrifices stopped (Macpherson, 2001: 69).

In ancient times, it was also believed that the orderly ritual spilling of blood of a virgin prevented the indiscriminate and uncontrolled spilling of blood of the fighting men. To this end, defending from Minos, the Athenians sacrificed Antheis, Aegleis, Orthaea, and Lytaea – the daughters of Hyacinthus; King Agamemnon of Mycenae stabbed his own daughter Iphigenia at the altar for the victory in the Trojan War.

The tradition of sacrifice in the modern era

In the XX and XXI centuries, the ritual of sacrifice continues to be somehow retained in almost all modern societies of the world. Thus, in late 2011, the press reported that in the state of Chhattisgarh, in order to secure a good harvest, the priests first killed a 7-year-old girl, and then cut off her liver, which was sacrificed to the gods (Daily mail, 2012). In Bangladesh, in March of 2010, a 26-year-old worker was killed by his colleagues on the orders of the owners, who were told by a fortune teller that a human sacrifice would yield highly-prized red bricks (Daily mail, 2010).

In some parts of Africa, there is no central authority, and the real power is concentrated in the hands of tribal leaders, combining the functions of shamans and high priests. In these places, human sacrifices are still widely practiced. The first "risk group" includes the African albinos. According to statistics, most African albinos are born in Tanzania, where there was a legend that the magical rituals, which used the severed parts of the body of these people, bring good luck in business and politics. For example, it is

believed that the hands of an albino can bring financial success, the tongue – good luck, and the genitals can cure impotence. The second “risk group” includes children. The price for a child’s life is 150 US dollars on average, and a child is often sold for immolation to his/her own parents or other close relatives. According to the researchers, this is due to the belief in magic and in the fact that an individual’s life is nothing compared with the interests of the clan, the tribe or the family to which this person belongs (de Heusch, 2013: 36).

In 1931, the Bashkirs of Chishminsky District in Bashkiria burnt the body of a man who died of cholera first in order to eliminate the epidemic of the disease. The fire, in which he was burnt, was spread with the help of chips, pans and bowls throughout the entire village. It was believed that this fire was “alive” and could prevent the misfortune. In the 1990s, the Bashkirs of Meleuzovsky District made a sacrifice of blood on the ground when there was a drought. To do this, a hand of the person who agreed to be the victim was put on the ground, and the little finger was cut off. Human blood was to awaken the land to life and to give a new crop.

Of particular interest are sacrifices in the Middle Volga region of Russia, which are performed to this day, as far as they accompany the transitional stages in human life: birth, initiation, marriage and death. In the XVIII-XIX centuries, they were “bloody” in nature, but in the XX century, the secularization of the public conscience gave them a symbolic meaning. For example, in the funeral and memorial rites of the region’s peoples there are sacrifices for all the dead relatives on the Sunday before Lent, Pentecost, Easter, Eid al-Adha (“Feast of the Sacrifice”), Eid al-Fitr (“Feast of Breaking the Fast”) and so on. In these days, sacrifices are made in the honor of dead ancestors by eating beef, mutton, chicken or the meat of other sacrificial animals. For example, in autumn, after the Feast of the Intercession of the Holy Virgin, the Meadow Mari sacrifice a horse or a sheep to protect themselves from the bad influence of the dead.

Currently, animal sacrifice is practiced by the majority of Hindu castes in the southern state Tamil Nadu, some eastern states of India and in Nepal. Typically, the ritual slaughter forms a part of the festival in the honor of the Hindu god. For example, in Nepal, in the honor of the Hindu goddess Gadhimai a festival is held every five years with the ritual slaughter of 250,000 animals.

The Meadow Mari, for the redemption of their sins and help, sacrifice bulls and sheep to the god Osh Poro Kugu Jumo (in translation from the meadow east Mari language – “the Great White Good God”). The meat of these animals is eaten, and the skin and bones are burnt. According to T.A. Kryukova (2012: 56), the fire needed for a sacrifice “is the intermediary between the gods and men. It takes offerings and transmits them to the gods in the form of smoke with the prayers of the people”.

Spanish-style bullfighting is also a variation of animal sacrifice, despite a harsh and systematic criticism from animal welfare organizations. This is a modern adaptation of the ancient ritual slaughter of bulls, the so-called *La Tauromaquia*, which was allegedly imported to Iberia by the Roman legionaries who worshiped the Indo-Iranian god Mithras.

In many cultures of Africa and Polynesia, such types of sacrifice as a sacrifice-meal and a sacrifice-instrument continue to prevail. They represent the supply “whatever is required” to the deceased in the afterlife and contain the idea to provide him/her with “a share”.

In the culture of these peoples “a share” is an essential element, which acts at the level of an archetype and “helps” the deceased to settle down in the afterlife. To give the deceased person “a share” as a tribute means to deprive him/her of the desire to come back for something in the real world. As a rule, “a share” of the deceased is considered to be a piece of bread, tools, amulets for protection from the evil forces, an animal slaughtered for the memorial meal, etc.

The symbolic type of sacrifice, the meaning of which is to establish a mediated connection between the real and the sacred worlds continues to be widely practiced by the Orthodox Christians in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. An example is a glass of the vodka, stored in the house for forty days for the dead. When the vodka evaporates, it is considered to be drunk by the deceased (Buzin, 1997: 136). It is a tradition to leave food for the deceased on the grave on the day after the funeral, Easter, Saturday of Remembrance of the Departed Parents. Similar customs are observed in the Chuvash and Mari culture.

It should be noted that the study of the ritual of sacrifice in modern times is of a particular interest. There appear new research works that discuss the new aspects of this cultural and historical phenomenon. For example, S.N. Borisov and A.V. Artyukh (2013: 12-21) called terrorism as one of the archetypes of the modern sacrifice.

In the criminal history of the modern society, the following events can be viewed as the ritual sacrifice: the murders of pathological serial killers such as Zodiac, the mass suicide against the background of the doomsday cult (the incidents in the Peoples' Temple, the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God, the Order of the Solar Temple or Heaven's Gate), and the killings in Matamoros attributed to the Mexican cult leader Adolfo Costanzo (Penncock, 2012: 276-302).

O.N. Tikhonova (2010: 143), examining the effect of sacrifice on the current socio-political acts, concluded that many social phenomena are a continuation of the ancient cult of sacrifice. The reason for this, in her opinion, is the multifunctionality of the sacrificial ritual.

G.P. Mikhaylov (2014) considers sacrifice an essential attribute of the modern pop culture. He writes that the subject in pop culture is deliberately focused on a certain idol and has a strong desire to take place of the “Superstar-God”. Over time, this idol turns into a barrier to the desired pedestal, then there appears an aggression issue, developing into a desire to sacrifice the idol to one's own ambitions. A striking example of this “sacrifice” is the killing of John Lennon by Mark Chapman. When explaining the main motive for the murder of John Lennon, Chapman said that he wanted to steal the glory of the musician and become famous, it was hard for him to feel “a big nobody”.

Thus, in our lives the ritual sacrifice in the hidden form is present all the time, but not always perceived by us. It can be found not only in religion but also in other spheres of human relationships: social, political, cultural and others.

Conclusions

Such a historically deterministic phenomenon as sacrifice existed or exists in the culture of almost every ethnic group. The role of this ritual cannot be overestimated due to the fact that it played a significant role in religious practices, family life, social relations, foreign policy etc.

Self-sacrifice as a ritual event became the subject of the intense research of

ethnographers and culture experts in the XVIII century. However, there is still no universal definition of sacrifice. Nevertheless, scholars agree that sacrifice is a complex phenomenon in structural terms, and identify several types of sacrifice: permanent and occasional; bloody and bloodless; sacrifice-gift, sacrifice-request, and sacrifice-redemption; sacrifice-meal and sacrifice-instrument; a symbolic sacrifice.

In prehistoric times, the main offering of the ritual was a bull, which was the symbol of fertility. Over time, a human sacrifice began to appear in the ritual practice, which was typical for the South American Indians, African tribes, ancient India, China, Japan, the countries of classical antiquity, the barbarian tribes of Europe and others. Most often the most beautiful girls of the tribe, mostly virgins and prisoners of war, were sacrificed. Some peoples, including the eastern Slavs, are characterized by a sacrificial suicide. In ancient Greece, China and a number of peoples of the Volga region a bloodless sacrifice was widespread – animal, fish, pieces of wheat, fruits or vegetables.

In today's world, sacrifice is not a relic of the past but the reality of our society. Currently, a symbolic type of sacrifice is practiced, such as funeral rites, which are widespread in Europe and many other countries. The essence of the funeral rite is that all the food and drinks, prepared for the memorial, are devoted – sacrificed – to the deceased.

However, in some countries of Asia and Africa, it is still possible to find a human sacrifice. In these countries, people, especially children, are still killed to propitiate the gods, who sent crop failures, natural disasters or pestilence on the city, village or the country in general. Amulets made from the body parts of the sacrificed people are also popular.

Some scholars believe that sacrifice as a cultural and historical phenomenon has undergone a major transformation in the XX-XXI century, while keeping the impact on the social, cultural and political life of ethnic groups.

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**EMERGENCE AND SPREAD OF CHRISTIANITY
WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF OLTENIA
DURING THE 4TH-6TH CENTURIES**

Alexandra Deaconu, Veronica Gheorghiu***

Abstract

On the territory of ancient Dacia, the Christian doctrine brought into the world by Jesus Christ, has been known since the time of the apostles. With the establishment of the first Christian community in Jerusalem, the Holy Apostles and their disciples began to preach the new Christian teaching to the world.

During the 4th-6th centuries, the spread of Christianity encountered some obstacles and hardships, so the spread of the new Christian teaching had to face more bloody persecutions unleashed by the Roman authorities, also putting the church in the balance.

In Oltenia, Christian religion, according to the written documents, was spread especially during the reign of Constantin the Great and his successors. Also, here were discovered numerous objects and worship buildings dating from the early spread period of Christianity. Therefore, Paleo-Christian church in Slăveni remains the oldest Christian place of worship north of the Danube, dated in the 4th-6th century after Christ, followed by the Christian basilica in the 4th century built in the Sucidava fortress. These archaeological findings in Sucidava prove that this citadel was an important Christian center where many missionaries came from the south of the Danube.

Key words: *history, worship monuments, Christianity, Oltenia, 4th-6th centuries*

Romanians descend from the mixture of natives, meaning the Illyrian and Thracian natives, the ancient inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula, the heirs, or its inheritors, with elements of the Roman Empire, that “from outstanding tribes learned to speak the Latin of the lower people” (Iorga, 1929: 9). To better understand the issue of spreading the new Christian teachings within the country, one must first know the situation of this territory, and of the neighboring ones, at that time (Păcurariu, 2004).

The political and social context of Oltenia territory during the first centuries

The fate of the Romans within the former Dacia Inferior province at the time and especially after the Aurelian retreat to the south of the Danube, was a special issue of Romanian historiography, that raised many different opinions (Dănilă, 1984). Some historians have argued that Aurelian had yielded the Roman territory of Dacia to some migrating nations, while others are going closer to the historical truth argued that, although abandoned, Dacia maintained continuous ties with the Empire, both during Aurelian and the other Roman emperors.

Constantin the Great's activity at the Danube and, especially, its north, contributed not only to the territory return of a part of the Roman Dacia within the borders of the

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Empire, but also to strengthen Romans and spread Christianity in mass. Also, the build of a bridge over the Danube by Constantin the Great between the localities Oescus and Sucidava was meant to bind the Empire to the Carpathian-Danubian territory; both because of the Goth danger that threatened the northern borders and for facilitating the connections between the South Danube and the North Danube oriental Romans. The bridge was inaugurated in the year 328, the same year Constantin restored the old Roman road on the Olt Valley, the road being restored on the earth wave known by the name of “Brazda lui Novac”.

Therefore, Constantin restored the forts from: Sucidava by building a new citadel; Drobeta, Putineu, a castle built from the ground up; most likely the fort at Hinova on the Banului Island; Slăveni in the Olt County, etc. The appearance of several Constantinian coins in other Roman forts, also, on the Oltenia territory shows that, although not all were restored by Constantin, these were nevertheless used by him within his offensive policy on the Lower Danube.

Constantin's descendants will continue to rule the Oltenia territory using the forts built or restored by their predecessor (Dănilă, 1984). A weakening of the Roman rule happened between the years 364-378, caused by the crisis of the monetary circulation in this period and attributed to the attacks of the Goths at the south of the Danube. A similar situation also characterizes the period during the years 378-383 when it was also observed a monetary crisis caused by the Huno-Germanic collisions.

During the period Theodosius the 2nd reigned there were frequent attacks of the Huns, who destroyed the fortifications of Oltenia. With the destruction by the Huns of Sucidava and Drobeta, approximately 447, the Roman-Byzantine military control weakens at the north of the Danube between the end of the reign of Theodosius the 2nd and the beginning of the reign of Justinian the First (527-567). With the enthronement of Emperor Justinian, a revival of the Roman-Byzantine rule at the Danube took place.

Between the years 530-533, following numerous expeditions against the Slavs by the General Chilbudios, the strategic points in Oltenia and Muntenia will be reunited. Thus, we remember the Constantinian citadel restoration of Sucidava, to which an interesting building was added, namely the “secret fountain”, moment in which the Christian life bloomed.

In a similar situation was also to be found Drobeta, restored now, that will appear in documents under the name of the Empress Theodora. “The great scholar Vasile Parvan brought to attention the missionary activity that would take place north of the Danube, in Oltenia too, of course, the current Saint Niceta of Remesiana (366-418) which he even named the apostle of the Dacian-Romans” (Pîrvan, 1911: 76).

A particularly important role in spreading and organizing Christianity north of the Danube must have also been played by the many bishops established in the 4th century near the Danube, among which: Aquae, Bononia, Rotiaria, Oescus, Naissus, Remesiana and Sardica. “In the 4th century it seems that the Roman territory of Oltenia was legally subject to the Justinian Prima Archdiocese, established by the novella 11 of April 16th, 535 by the Emperor Justinian” (Dănilă, 1984: 329). The jurisdiction of this Archdiocese stretched over about 25 metropolises and bishops in the lyrical prefecture. It is important that its dominion stretched over some regions or citadels in northern Danube.

After the Romans conquered Dacia, the Christian teaching could be spread north of the Danube in several ways: by settlers, by soldiers in the Roman army, by slaves, by merchants and captives brought to Dacia by the Goths.

The first religious monuments and worship buildings from Oltenia

During the archeological excavations in the Roman fort praetorium at Slăveni, Olt County, in 1963, were discovered the traces of a building belonging to the Christian worship, from the 4th century. "The building was erected over the Roman ruins between the praetorian court, over the center of the "sacred hall", to the edge of the chapel located in the center of the west side"(Dumitru, 1979: 102). The building has a length of 16 m and a width of 7 m and had the same orientation as the praetorium, meaning NE-SW. At its construction were used fragments of stone, brick and tile pieces linked with sticky clay, its masonry having no foundations.

In the building were found many Roman pottery fragments dated from the 2nd-4th century, such as:

- silver detached from a limestone plaque framed by a profile on the left, in the center of this plaque is preserved the biggest part of a crux monogrammatica, in a shape characteristic to the 4th-6th century. "Also on the upper arm of the cross appears, at the top, the celery letter "P", and the left one ends with a width in the shape of a trapezoid. It reads "XP" (Tudor, 1979: 103);

- in the former praetorium underground treasure was found a ransacked tomb. The corpse was deposited at the bottom of the former pagan treasure room in a makeshift coffin made from Roman tiles. "There is no inventory, and the skeleton was that of a grown man. Thus, we have a special burial of a late era from which a martyr or a chief clerk of the church could benefit" (Tudor, 1979: 103).

The form of the Roman fort in Slăveni, built first from dirt during the reign of Trajan, was equipped with brickwork in the year 205. In this current shape, the praetorium dates from the Septimius Severus era (Tudor, 1979: 103). In the year 202 after Christ, returning from the east to Rome, Septimius Severus inspected part of the Lower Danube Valley and, most likely, also passed through Slăveni (Ionescu, 1980: 822).

The Paleo-Christian church in Slăveni is possible to be built during the reigns of Constantin the 2nd (337-361) and Valens (364-378). Since the plan of the church had to have a semicircular altar, it was chosen for this the former pagan chapel in the fort praetorium. The most significant fact is that, where there was a castrens basilica in the 3rd century, a century later we find a Christian basilica (Ionescu, 1980).

In the 4th century Athanalic persecutes the Christians because they were considered Romans, followers of the Roman politics. In the praetorian ruins were found numerous fragments of pagan reliefs that were probably broken and scattered with the construction of the church. The pavement was kept in the period of the Christian church as altar flooring. The great hall of the church (the nave) was extended by the altar until the western wall, from the former atrium, was large enough to accommodate many faithful.

As shape and size, the two column bases located on either side of the altar entry are identical to those lining the corridor between the atrium and the armamentarium, thus belonging to the year 205. With the church building, the monumental entry which was based on two massive columns whose ends "rested an arch or an architrave under which you could enter to the aerarium and the sacellum, the entry being suppressed. The hall

designed as the nave was paved with bricks. At its eastern corners were discovered, adjacent, two slabs of limestone of which the largest measure 0.95x1.25 m” (Tudor, 1979: 104). The slabs were fixed there in the 4th century as a link of the walls to the corners of the building.

It is argued that the altar of the church in Slăveni had to be located eastward, as found in most Paleo-Christian basilicas. In the Constantin era, however, such an orientation was not mandatory. Therefore for our history, shows Dumitru Tudor, the Paleo-Christian church in Slăveni presents an important archaeological finding (Ionescu, 1980). The church documents the strong cementing of Christianity north of the Danube, in the 4th-6th century after Christ. Also, the building size (7x21 m), it is a sign that indicates the size of Christian community in Slăveni Olt.

Saint Sava the Goth in 373-374, with particular importance for the history of the Orthodox Church, signals the existence of cities in the Buzau area, in the 4th century, and of villages, with churches, with houses, with ceilings and beams. “The churches were served by priests, church singers, such as the Saint Sava, called the Goth because he was from the “Roman Goth” (Ionescu, 1980: 826). The informative data provided by the Saint Sava the Goth on the Orthodox Church situation in the east of the country, ruled by Visigoths in the 4th century, as the recent discovery data of the church in Slăveni, built a picture about the old Christianity situation north of the Danube.

Thus, it can be said that the Romanian nation was born Latin and Christian, being the only Orthodox Christian neo-Latin nation bearing the name, language and consciousness of the entire Romanism. “The process happened on both sides of the Danube, on the Geto-Dacian site of Burebista, under the Oriental Romanism, bearing uninterrupted connections with the eastern empire, as proves the important archaeological find of the Paleo-Christian church in Slăveni” (Ionescu, 1980: 832).

Another conclusive evidence of the cult buildings appearance is the Sucidava citadel, today named Celei, on the Danube. Sucidava, important trade and military center, remained under the Roman dominion even after Aurelian left Dacia (Păcurariu, 2004). In the year 447, Sucidava was destroyed by the Huns led by Attila. During the archaeological excavations led by Dumitru Tudor between the years 1946-1947, near the Roman citadel walls, the remains of a basilica dated in the 5th-6th century were discovered. The building had a length of 20.9 m and a width of 10.2 m, consisting of a large entrance hall, a nave and a semicircular apse eastward. At the entrance was discovered a quadrilateral masonry pedestal. Several graves were discovered inside and outside, as well as various Christian objects: lamps with cruciform handle, bronze crosses, including a matrix for pouring crosses, dozens of amphorae scraps bearing Christian symbols and inscriptions: “Mother of God”, “Mary births Christ”, “Son of God”, “God too brilliant”.

Another valuable discovery was made near the altar, namely a yellowish clay amphora fragment on which a Greek inscription was written: “Mary gave birth to Christ, the Son of God”, as well as the name of the priest Lukonochos, son of Lykatios.

The fact that the inscriptions are in Greek shows that the amphorae could have been brought from a Greek environment, maybe even from the empire capital, or that these served to some soldiers who spoke Greek. It is assumed that the Greek national priest came from Constantinople, perhaps for the Sucidava citadel soldiers speaking Greek.

Evidence of existence and spread of Christian practices within the territory of Oltenia (4th-6th centuries)

“In Oltenia, some Paleo-Christian pieces were discovered pagan in Romula (today named Reșca, county Olt), thriving city in the southern parts of Dacia” (Păcurariu, 2004: 90). Here, following some archaeological excavations, there were also discovered two lamps decorated with crosses, a bronze cross and a piece of brick imprinted with fish and crosses. Also from the 3rd-4th century come some gems: one engraved with two dolphins, another with two symmetrically placed fish on both sides of a cross.

In Răcari, county Dolj, was discovered a fragmented bronze chandelier with the base decorated with tiny fish, perhaps used in a place of worship (5th-6th century); in Bumbești-Gorj a lamp decorated with a cross; in Drobeta-Turnu Severin a lamp with cruciform handle (5th-6th century). “The Paleo-Christian archaeological materials bring more light on the issues of the early Oltenia Roman Christianity being undeniable, as opposed to the literal documents” (Dănilă, 1984: 330).

Another important discovery in Oltenia, which proves the existence and spread of the new Christian teachings since the dawn of Christianity, are the 96 inscriptions, belonging chronologically to the centuries 3rd-6th and have their origin in the citadels: Sucidava, Romula, Slăveni and Praetorium I-II. These inscriptions were scratched on stone or painted on amphorae. Among all these inscriptions the earliest are the Gnostic Gems dating from the 3rd-4th century, their discovery being made in the citadels: Orlea, Romula and a third, probably still Romula.

At the Praetorium in Racovița, county Vâlcea, was discovered a sandstone plaque with the inscription “χιλια”, inscription that made its finders assert that they were faced with certain representatives of the chiliasm cults. Not least, the word “χιλια” could also be considered the plaque number and, thus, not be the proof of presence of some chiliasm cults in Praetorium.

For the 4th-6th century period we have three inscriptions containing the abbreviated name of Jesus Christ the Savior, in various forms characteristic to the post-Constantine era” (Dănilă, 1984). As mentioned above, in Sucidava it is found on a limestone fragment the abbreviation “XC”, the chismon we find on a tile and, not least “crux decussate” on a brick. Crux decussate means the Greek letter X, meaning the short name of Christ, often found in the Christian epigraphy.

“A special place is occupied by the 83 Christian inscriptions drawn with red paint on the amphorae fragments, also discovered in Sucidava” (Dănilă, 1984: 333). These inscriptions have a special importance by the simple fact that most local inscriptions could have been written locally, thus trying to reconstruct based on these the theological culture degree the Christians in Sucidava have reached, mostly the soldiers. The sign of the holy cross is the one that appears frequently on these ceramic fragments.

The Paleo-Christian architectural pieces from Oltenia and dating from the 3rd -6th century are: two Cancelli pieces, one from Slăveni and another from Sucidava. Also, in Sucidava and Drobeta, were discovered four blocks of stone decorated with Byzantine crosses and dated in the 6th century.

These are assumed to belong to the Paleo-Christian art even if there was no other physical evidence needed to confirm this theory, just the testimony of Procopius, who mentioned that in the time of Justinian were built such buildings throughout the area (Popescu, 2008).

The objects belonging to the minor arts were 17, made of metal or made of clay, a special place being occupied by the Christian lamps (11 in number), discovered throughout Oltenia and originating from six cities: Romula, Sucidava, Orlea, Drobeta, Banului Island and Bumbești.

The spread of religious teaching on the territory of ancient Dacia

The Christian doctrine which was founded with the existence of Jesus Christ has been known since the time of the apostles. With the establishment of the first Christian community in Jerusalem, the Holy Apostles and their disciples began to preach the new Christian teaching to the world.

“Starting with the 7th century, with the migration of the Slavs, the lives of the residents in the old Roman province of Dacia will undergo a series of transformations” (Popescu, 2008: 61). The Slavs settled on the territory of the country and for centuries have lived together with the natives. Also, the church of the Vodița monastery was built by Saint Nicodim of Tismana on the ruins of an old one. In this city, of Severin, a mononave church was also found. All these findings give reason to many historians saying that, in these parts, Christianity continued to grow unhindered even after the Slavs came, “who isolated the region from the rest of the Byzantine Empire but also laid the foundation of a local organization of the present Christian community” (Popescu, 2008: 62).

Another more recent discovery is that, namely around the year 1930, the inhabitant Iorgu Giuca from the village Crusov, county Olt, after having dug a hole at the border of the village, of about 1.2 meters in depth, found a church bronze object. After being considered Engolpion, the safest view is that it can be considered a small Christian medallion from the assumed 18th century that the priests or devout Christians wore in the past. Either way is tagged, the object itself is of particular interest, both in form, origin, text, and treated religious theme (Spiru, 1984: 393).

The medallion is round in shape and consists of two parts tied in the middle and a small handle surrounds it above, on which the necklace was tied to be worn, around the neck, chest. The outer face forming the medallion was painted with the Crucified Savior, surrounded left and right of the cross. The upper arm of the cross is near the head of the Savior, surrounded by a halo, and above in a small cartridge, are the initials: “NC XP”. The back of this medallion is slightly concave compared to the face which is domed. To the left of the cross is the spear that pierced the body of Jesus Christ and the sponge that watered him. Above the cross there are four letters of which the last two can be distinguished easier.

The clergy contribution in Oltenia was integrated into the unanimous effort of the entire nation for waging a just war ended by defeating the Ottoman Empire and consecrating Romania’s state independence by force of arms.

Aspects regarding national liberation struggle and education

“The state independence of Romania solemnly proclaimed in May 9/21, 1877 and enshrined on the battlefield by a religious war waged by the Romanian army, supported by the whole nation, constituted the culmination of some secular fighting aspirations of the Romanian people (Ștefănescu, 1977: 376). Oltenia, one of the Romanian provinces who participated actively in the major uprising documents to the social and national liberation

struggle, “its contribution was made apparent for the support of the Independence War” (Ștefănescu, 1977: 376).

In Craiova, like many other cities in the country, the independence proclamation was celebrated with all the required solemnity. Oltenia supported by all its means and strength the actions meant to help equip and maintain the military. In September 8/20, 1877, at the church of the commune Filiași, in the presence of the commune authorities and by the participation of hundreds of people of all ages, the priest held a religious service.

The most important city of Oltenia, in the days of November 29, 1877 and December 11 and 12, 1877, lived three days of grand demonstrations. “The material support for the military population materialized by requisitioning and offerings of grain, cattle for slaughter, food, clothing, wagons and transport animals, cloth, bandages and other materials for bandaging wounds, furniture for equipping the hospitals for the wounded” (Ștefănescu, 1977: 377).

In the county Gorj the archpriest Ștefan Nicolaescu was presiding over the clerical committee. To purchase rifles the amount of 436 lei was raised, amount that did not include buying other offerings. The clerical committee, with the help of the priests in Targu Jiu, managed to gather no less than 455 lei, 120 drachmas of lint and 11 cubits of cloth. Some churches offered, from their income, money to the administrative authorities to be made available to the Romanian military. After the war ended, the Oltenia clergy paid the expenses necessary for rebuilding the church buildings in the cities, Danube ports that suffered from the Ottoman artillery bombardments. The greatest damage was caused to Calafat, where even the churches suffered, being ultimately damaged. The greatest damage was caused to Calafat, where even the churches suffered, being ultimately damaged.

With the proper sense of school, the clerical education was established along with the foundation of the Romanian villages. “In Cozia of the year 1415, the first monastic school within the Râmnic diocese territory starts operating. The first teacher of the monastic school in Cozia was Sofronie himself, the abbot of the monastery (Piteșteanul, 1979: 106). Such schools have emerged, in time, at the monasteries Bistrita, Tismana and Govora.

At the Synod of Horezu, held in November 29, 1719, the bishop Damaschin the diocese of his abbot demanded the establishment of a school in Romanian language. All the national monasteries taught Romanian and religious books, because all along the settlements were considered similar religious schools. A new Romanian language education was conducted by priests on the church porch, with religious books as teaching materials. The priests’ training would have been conducted by learning the church ordinances, meaning the religious practice, knowing the time, reading ritual books and learning church songs by ear.

In the Phanariot era, the Romanian and Greek language schools have continued to exist in the church, convents and monasteries (Piteșteanul, 1979: 107). The teaching of grammar, geography, history and other sciences was only done in Greek language by Greek teachers, in private schools and in those schools that were called royal schools.

Constantin Obedeianu, in the year 1748, founded the church that bears his name to this day, and left it his immense wealth. Constantin Ionița, son of the founder, dedicates the church to the bishop Partenie and the Râmnic diocese, expressing the wish that, along with the hospital for the sick, to also appoint teachers for children.

Conclusion

Considering the registration of the cult buildings, the architectural parts and the minor art objects discovered in Oltenia, it can be said that this territory experienced a Christianity organized in parishes, whose center is the basilicas investigated or those whose existence must be assumed based on the architectural elements.

Also, the use of objects of Christian character (buckles, mirrors, lamps) or wearing them as jewelry (crosses, gemstones) by the Oltenia Roman representatives, remind of the mass spread of Christianity in the post Aurelian era, life in the new religion being able to be captured in all its important phases. The Paleo-Christian materials, in conjunction with the little news literary-historical news, constitute the most convincing proof of continuity and Romanity of the remaining nation after the Aurelian retreat. These materials explain how people kept the Romanian character of the national language and being, at a time when other branches of the oriental Romanity were displaced or assimilated by the migratory nations.

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**HISTORICAL AND IDENTITY LANDMARKS IN TRANSYLVANIA
(A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN SIGHIȘOARA,
MUREȘ COUNTY AND RUPEA, BRAȘOV COUNTY)**

*Mariana Borcoman**

Abstract

Transylvania has always been under historiographers' scrutiny from a historic, economic and political perspective. The focus of this article is the historical landmark underlying the social and economic changes in two neighboring areas of the Transylvanian space lying between Târnava Mare and Cohalm Valley. Their fortified structures are testimonies of the past to these days. The cohesion of their communities was forged through people's willingness to help one another and work together for their present and future. Neighborhoods were a means for community mobilization and an important role in outlining moral and behavioral guidelines was assigned to schools and churches. The identity of the Saxons and Romanians inhabiting the two areas of interest, Sighișoara and Rupea, was also shaped by two diverging trends: increasing territorial separation coupled with cohabitation. The changes in these areas are also analyzed based on the demographic data. Thus, all of the above become landmarks for the multiculturalism of these territories.

Key works: *Saxons, borough, town, citadel, neighborhoods*

Introduction

Documents record the inner part of Carpathians as *Terra ultransilva* or *The Country beyond the woods*, a land rich in mineral sources and salt. All this, along with its strategic positioning: bordering the South and East of Carpathians, have made it a coveted area and, hence, subject to colonization and inclusion into the territories of two neighboring states: The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Empire.

The settlement of the population from Western Europe in Transylvania is part of a complex process that is to be presented in this article. Political and economic disputes made some Germans leave from the left bank of Rhine, Luxembourg, Saxony, Flanders and Bavaria: "...the princes and the bishops felt threatened by the lower classes and were afraid of losing their positions" (Nägler, 1981: 54). Three social categories came to Eastern Europe: "...poor peasants, middle and lower rank nobles and urban dwellers who had no rights or liberties" (Nägler, 1981: 53). This displacement was encouraged by the Hungarian king, Geza II, through his "renters", namely clerks assigned to offer advantages on behalf of the king both within Hungary and in Transylvania since "Hungary had a small number of dwellers ...and the new settlers were granted border territories that could not be kept under the direct control of the Hungarians" (Nägler, 1981: 56) In Transylvania these settlers were called Saxons. In parallel with this colonization that lasts between XI and XIII centuries, military religious orders like the Teutonic Knights and the Sword Brethren also settled in Bârsa Country and in the lower part of the Vistula River.

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Before the settlement of the German population in the Inner Carpathian territory, Hungarian kings had colonized the Szekely (a people of Turanian origin that accompanied the Hungarians onto the Pannonian Basin) in order to defend their kingdom's borders.

The German colonization of Transylvania unfolded in several stages (even though rental documents testifying to that miss) in the West and South East of Transylvania as follows:

- a) 1186 – Sibiu and Sebeș (the most numerous settlement);
- b) 1230 in Satu Mare area (a smaller number);
- c) after 1200 in the Hârtibaci and Olt area (South Eastern Transylvania);
- d) after 1200, the Târnave area and Homoroadelor Valley;
- e) 1240, Mediaș and Șeica;
- f) Bistrița and Rodna “when the Saxons are recorded as border defenders during the battles of Ladislau I with the Cuman tribes” (Nägler, 1981: 160).

The Szekely leave these areas and withdraw in the South East corner of Transylvania (Odorhei, Sfântul Gheorghe), an area that was later to be known as “secuime” (Romanian for *the Szekely's place*).

Apparently the Saxons' colonization in the Bârsa Country is related to the presence of the Teutonic Knights in the South in the first half of XIV century. The Teutonic knights controlled the Bârsa Country and owned five fortresses that, according to the Hungarian royal prerogatives, were supposed to be earthen made. However, they break the royal orders and build their fortresses of stone. These were as follows: the Back fortress near Codlea, the Rucăr fortress, the Cross fortress near Brașov-Teliu, and their residence fortress from Feldioara. The number of the Saxons in Bârsa Country increases once the Teutonic knights are chased away by the orders of the Hungarian royalty in 1224.

According to the promises they were made, the Saxons benefitted from autonomy and free administration as a result of the “*libertas cibinensis*” privileges granted by Andrew II of Hungary in 1224 for the Sibiu administrative area. These freedoms delineated geographically the territory inhabited by the Saxons: between Orăștie, to the West, and Drăușeni, to the East. These rights would then extend over the other territories inhabited by the German population. As a result of the damages these communities suffer from the Tatar-Mongolian invasion, “...king Bela IV of Hungary continues the colonization and forms enclaves” (Nägler, 1973: 103).

The Sighișoara administrative unit was colonized by Germans after 1300 “...Saxos that might have come from the Rupea, Cincu and Sibiu administrative units” (Nägler, 1973: 105). The first record of the Saxons' presence in the area dates back to 1210, thus previously to 1224, and, as Th. Nægler reports refers to “...the participation of Saxons, Romanians, Szekelies and Pechenegs in the Vidin battle under the command of Joachim, head of Sibiu county” (Nägler, 1973: 46).

The privilege gained by the Sibiu province in 1224 extended to the entire territory inhabited by the Saxons in South East Transylvania that was to be protected by the Hungarian kings and hence called *King's Land*. The Saxons in this area were considered free people and they had the right to self-administration and to appoint their own clerks (according to the privileges granted by King Carol and King Ludovic in 1353 for Brașov County, and by Quessn Elisabeth and King Ludovic for Bistrița County).

The Saxons had their own spiritual forms of organization. Financially and militarily they had to pay their dues to the Hungarian kings: the tax collected on St. Martin and the

obligation to participate in military campaigns. The Saxon population inhabiting the village “enclaves” on the territory of the administrative units had to also pay taxes to the head of the administrative unit to which they belonged. There were also villages owned by monasteries (such as Meșendorf, Cloașterf and Criț owned by the Cistercian monastery of Cârța, to be subordinated to the administration of Sighișoara later on). In the areas inhabited by the Saxons “...Romanians communities also lived, and, exceptionally, the Szekely and Saxon enclaves coexisted with the former” (Nägler, 1997: 106).

Legally, Romanians were free to live on king’s land.

The direct consequences of colonization consisted of an increased number of people and economic development as a result of emerging cities (and of the crafts organized by guilds) and commerce intensification.

The colonists were brought to these areas by those nominated to manage these territories. The latter filled public positions until the XIV and XV centuries when, especially in the cities, the rich class of craftsmen and merchants emerges and shows willingness to participate in the management of public affairs.

In the XIV century smaller administrative units, called seats, were formed from the four initial provinces (most likely the criterion for their establishment was the judicial activity). These were as follows:

- 1302 Sibiu Seat
- 1329 Cincu Seat
- 1337 Sighișoara Seat
- 1337 Rupea Seat
- 1349 Miercurea Seat
- 1349 Sebeș Seat
- 1349 Orăștie Seat
- 1349 Nochrich Seat

Sibiu was considered the main seat and as a result the others were called *The Seven Seats*. The Mediaș province is established later by merging Șeica and as of 1553-1555 when the city is fortified is known as the *Two Seats*. Along with these two seats there were also two districts: Brașov and Bistrița.

In 1486 king Matei Corvin endorses the establishment of the political and administrative structure of the Saxons called Universitas Saxonum (and also reinforces the privilege granted in 1224). Universitas Saxonum was functional until 1876 when “...by Act no. XII, King’s land is disbanded and included in the newly created administrative units” (Nussbächer, 1965: 7) and becomes only a cultural forum. Universitas Saxonum was a complex organization. Its members were representatives of the Saxon administrative units and met twice a year: on St. George’s Day (23 April) and on St. Catherine’s Day (25 November). Their meetings were presided by the head of the Sibiu administrative unit and its scope covered all fields: “administrative, religious, judicial, military, taxes, price quotas and measurement units” (Nussbächer, 1965: 8).

The responsibilities of Universitas Saxonum were respected. Thus, the clerks from king’s land would swear their allegiance and as Ioan Fruma noted: “...the jurisdictional responsibilities also covered areas that were not part of king’s land (Ocna Sibiului, Reghin, Cluj)” (Fruma, 1935: 12), but were inhabited by some German people. With the establishment of this organization, the community of Saxons in Transylvania becomes similar to a nation since the institution took over the commerce of guilds and their

associated rights (the Saxon localities gained their right to the status of guild and to hold fairs on a weekly basis), as well as the economic and cultural dynamics. Each seat had to contribute financially to this institution and its fortune at the end of XVIII century consisted of "...the school of Agriculture from Mediaș that owned 5,775 hectares of land, and the seven judicial representatives of the seats owned the forested mountainous areas on the South border of Sibiu, Turnu Roșu castle and an income of 45 million lei" (Ionescu, 1934: 10). After the establishment of the self administration regime of the Saxons in Transylvania in 1876 the University functioned as a cultural forum.

As of 1937, "...the goods of the Saxon Nation were divided between the cultural foundation *Mihai Viteazul* and the Evangelical Church, both of which were considered representatives of the two main populations from the former king's land" (Nussbächer, 1965: 7).

Some snapshots of local history

Sighișoara

The city is mentioned as: *Castrum Sex* (Latin), *Schässburg* (German), *Segesvar* (Hungarian) and *Sighișoara* in Romanian language. It is situated between *Târnavelor* plateau and *Târnavă Mare* river "at an altitude between 350 and 425". Some of it lies between the meadows of *Târnavă Mare* and *Șaeș*, while another part is located on *Dealul Cetății*-*Dealul Livada Poștei* and *Dealul Țiganilor* (Atlas istoric, 2000: 4). As of X and XI centuries the area falls under the rule of the Hungarian Kingdom and that contributes first to *Szekely's* establishment in the region. In the XIII century the Saxons also settle here, while the *Szekely* withdraw to the South Eastern corner of Transylvania, on the border with *Moldova*. The Saxons established their own administrative structure called the *Seat of Sighișoara*, consolidated and fortified the fortress, built defense walls. This administrative unit lasts until 1876 when the *Habsburg* authorities disband the autonomous units from Transylvania.

The *Schässburg* fortress included two dwelling areas: the upper part and the lower part, a fortified wall with 15 cannons, earthworks, three entrance gates, three churches and two monasteries, a school and a hospital. There were also numerous private dwellings, workshops and storage houses of craftsmen and merchants separated by small squares. The Saxons lived inside and at the bottom of the fortress. The Romanians were on the other bank of *Târnavă Mare* in a separate neighborhood.

The oldest archaeological relics like traces of settlements and tools date back to the *Bronze Age* and were discovered outside the city perimeter. On *Dealul Cetății* traces of a *Dacian* settlement and of a *Roman castrum* were also discovered. In the Xth century the political interests of the neighboring *Hungarian Empire* include Transylvania as one of the territories to control and two centuries later the *Szekely* and the Saxons are brought to the area. As of 1350 there are numerous references of the *Sighișoara Seat* and its administrative organization in the documents.

To this day, *Sighișoara* has been permanently inhabited and as such was included in the *UNESCO* heritage and thus acknowledged as the only area inside a fortress that is still inhabited in South East Europe.

The *Sighișoara citadel* and the neighboring areas witnessed many political and military events as follows.

In 1419 the king of Hungary (Transylvania was a part of the kingdom at the time) grants Sighișoara the role of judicial court, and hence acknowledges it as a judicial authority, for the settlements around it. Vlad Țepeș (1431-1435) lives in Sighișoara for a short while and the house where he stayed is a historical monument. The craftsmen (locksmiths, coopers, carpenters) that were part of guilds along with the merchants from the area are also mentioned.

In the following years the fortress is under the Austrian occupation of General Castaldo (1551-1552). A part of Hungary had become pashalic and Transylvania a principality under the subordination of the Ottoman Empire and as such a tax payer. The Seat of Sighișoara underwent difficult times with the coming of General Basta's troops after the assassination of Mihai Viteazul and the establishment of a garrison between 1603-1604. All these events followed the destruction of the uphill church and the looting of the city by the soldiers of General Bathory in 1599. The troops' presence was financed by the city and 28,000 guilders were paid for that (a document dated July 1600 orders all authorities and German, Walloon, Cossack, Romanian and Serbian troops to return the looted goods to the dwellers of Sighișoara).



Fig. 1: Sighișoara citadel – postcard, beginning of XIX century

These events led to a high impact plague epidemics that caused the death of 2,000 people in the city. The fights for throne between Ștefan Barcksay (supported by the Turks) and Gabriel Bathory (supported by the Wallachian ruler, Radu Șerban) increase in intensity after 1600. The Habsburg Empire led by Emperor Rudolf II also took an active part in these conflicts. In 1605 the troops of the noble Ștefan Bocskay, a candidate to the throne, destroy the upper part of surrounding entrenchment and a part of the fortress wall. The chronicle and notary of the city, Georg Kraus (*Georg Kraus was born in Sibiu and was the son of a rich merchant. He studies in Sibiu and in 1622 in Cluj with the main notary, Gabriel Bethlen. He travels to Italy where he takes courses in the legal framework and then returns to*

Transylvania to mediate the conflict between Gb. Rakoczy I and Bishop Nicolae Esterhazy. Between 1632 and 1646 he settles down in Sibiu as a merchant. As a result of some disagreements leaves for Sighișoara and becomes notary of the city. He authors three main works: Stundturmchronik (a short history of the city based on the chronicle of Ursinus), a paper on the events unfolded until the death of Mihai Viteazul and the Chronicle of Transylvania), offers a lot of information concerning the century under discussion.

The rule of Prince Gabriel Bethlen (1613-1629) brought some peace to the Principality.

The Saxons were accused of treason by the emperor and "Pavel Roth, the mayor of Sighișoara and David Weyrach, the royal judge from Rupea, go to Vienna to appeal to the Emperor's good will" (Kraus, 1965: 14). The notary Kraus is a subtle observer of details and as such he combines information on the political and daily events telling stories of natural catastrophes, plagues, daily life from the courts of Transylvanian princes. Thus, the features of the religious Reform from the Principality are analyzed, along with the military campaigns of Bethlen in Hungary between 1621 and 1622 against Ferdinand II, supported by the Turks, that come to an end with the nomination of Ferdinand of Hapsburg as King of Hungary in Sopron in 1626.

In 1658 when the rule of Prince Rakozy II is threatened by Prince Rhedey, the Saxon cities take a political side and, as a result, Sighișoara supports Rakozy while the Turks invade the country "...devastating Bârsa country ...in the Seat of Rupea: Ungra is burnt to ground and people are enslaved...in Sighișoara Seat, Brădeni și Daneș are also destroyed by fire" (Kraus, 1965: 53). In October 1658 the Saxons' University meets in the citadel of Sighișoara and acknowledges Acațiu Barckay as Prince of Transylvania (in the XVIIth century the privileged classes had an important role and were often consulted on arious decisions, mostly political).

In 1659 the people from Sighișoara take sides in the fight for the leadership of the Transylvanian Principality: supporters of Rakozy II and allies of Barckay. This makes the magistrate and the judges of the city meet. As a result of the Saxons' cities' opposition against Prince Rakozy II, the latter retaliates.

Kraus also records a somewhat special event: the Turks not only remain in the city, but they also organize a carnival in May 1663 "...when women began to congregate around the Turks" (Kraus, 1965: 523) so that the authorities have to take measures and publicly punish depraved women.

The neighboring Târnava Mare River caused incessant flooding problems for Sighișoara such as the ones in 1771 and 1851. In 1977 is fully confined by dykes.

After 1805, as a result of the interventions on behalf of the Habsburgs, other dwellers apart from the Saxons are also acknowledged as entitled to own properties within the city and recognized as citizens. In 1876 the old Saxon administration organized by seats is disbanded and the territory is organized by counties and regions. As of this year, Sighișoara is the administrative center of Târnava Mare County. As of 1918, after World War I, Transylvania, Banat and Bucovina are returned to Romania and ever since then Sighișoara has been a Romanian administrative unit. Between 1920 and 1944 the area is industrialized, the railway is extended, a Romanian school is built, along with a weaving plant and several hospitals.

The Communist period between 1945 and 1989 leads to the systematization of the city, to the emergence of new neighborhoods with blocks of flats, the demolishing of parts from the citadel's walls to allow cars to enter within its perimeter, new small

factories manufacturing mechanical parts, textiles, felt and silk. As a result of private property nationalization and land confiscation, the people from the villages around Sighișoara migrated into the city to make a living. It was only after 1990 that Sighișoara began to reverse such a trend and heighten its cultural and touristic potential. Nowadays, it has become a landmark in this respect, both for Romania and for Europe.

Rupea

Until its first mentioning in the XIV century documents, the exact date when the fortress of Rupea was built remains unknown. Initially it must have been erected before that century and then fortified similar to a royal citadel for the castle dwellers of Kosd. The citadel was erected on a whinstone that stands erected above the locality and survived the Tatar invasion in the mid of the XIIIth century. Immediately after that, upon the initiative of the Hungarian crown, Saxon colonists were brought to the area and they will fortify the citadel. The name of the latter along with that of the place beneath is mentioned under various forms: *Rupes* (Latin for “rock”), *Kosd* (meaning the same thing in Hungarian), *Kubalomin* 1324, *Ruppes* in 1572 and *Reps* in 1670 (the German name for the citadel and the locality beneath) and Rupea in Romanian.

The colonization of the German population in this area took place towards the end of the XIIth century and the beginning of the XIIIth century. The citadel is divided in three parts in a snail like shape: the lower citadel, the middle part and the upper citadel. There are two gates that provide passage from one part to the other. The upper part is the oldest, is situated right on the whinstone and initially hosted the house of the administrators of the Sear of Rupea – the royal and the local judges). It was only later that the other two houses were built. A massive wall with eight towers surrounded the citadel. In the middle of it there were several private houses, cereal storage holes, a school and a chapel. The lower part of the citadel had a 76 m deep well, an armory (also accommodating the military garrison), the guard's living place and two entry gates:

- a wide one for supplies and carts situated in the North of the citadel and accessible from the fields. Initially it had a mobile bridge and a ditch filled with water that are no longer present nowadays, as well as a narrow oak made gate coated with iron bands and on which the year of construction is inscribed: 1621; the gate was built by the guild of the blacksmiths from the area.

- The second gate faces the East and the city and also has a smaller gate allowing people's access. The path towards it passes by the Roman Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic and the Evangelical cemeteries.

The fortress was inhabited only in case of necessity. The people of Rupea took refuge in situations like the Tatar invasion of 1285, the opposition of the Saxons against the nobles' control of their territories in 1324 under the lead of Henning from Petrești, and the siege of Toma of Transylvania. All along the XVIIth century during the numerous incursions of the Turks, the princes of Transylvania or of the Habsburg armies, the inhabitant of Rupea used the fortress as a refuge.



Fig. 2: Rupea Fortress – photo of the XVIIIth century

Of all the political events that unfolded in the area and that are worth mentioning are the following: in 1289 Rupea, along with the Kods-Rupea religious unit, is first mentioned in the documents; between 1350-1375 a small group of Franciscan monks find shelter in the Catholic monastery at the bottom of the fortress; in 1480 the first school for the Saxons' children from Rupea is attested; in 1509 Rupea is granted the right to organize annual and weekly fairs; in 1611 the Prince of Transylvania, Gabriel Bathory is hosted in the fortress of Rupea for a few days. Between 693-1709 the fortress is under the control of the imperial armed forces. Between 1864-1866 the imperial road between Sighișoara and Brașov and that crossed Rupea is built: thus Rupea becomes part of the strategic plans of the House of Austria.

The XIX century brought a lot of changes to Rupea and the surrounding areas. In 1870, the House of Economies and Credit (Casa de Economie și Credit) from Rupea is disbanded and a year later the telegraph opens its services. After 1876 Rupea is no longer part of kink's land and hence the town along with the villages nearby become part of Târnava Mare County.

After 1918 the Romanian administration is established, several factories are open: Lomas – a company in the field of wood manufacturing and exploitation, Textila SA – a factory for scarves; Mars – a plant focused on weaving baskets; the brushes workshop, and several small entrepreneurs are recorded: Carol Falk, Victor and Hugo Gross, Mihael Roth selling cologne and managing storehouses; Ioniță Spornic owning a gas storage; Victor Teutsch making commerce with leather, Nicolae Apolzan owning a small cheese factory. Rupea is declared a town and as such gets higher financing which allows it to expand the existing hospital.

After 1945, under the Communist regime, there was a population migration towards Rupea from the neighboring areas as a result of the vacant positions created through the

setup of several companies like: the Mechanic Company, Unirea Co-operative and the Hoghiz binding agents factory.



Fig. 3: Neighborhood landmark from Rupea

Demographic evolution

Sighișoara

The oldest data come from the census conducted by the Saxon authorities in 1488 in Sighișoara and recording 2900 people (609 families with properties and 29 families of peasants with little to no land working nobles' lands).

Between 1488-1765

Year	1488	1532	1567	1589	1602	1631	1671	1720	1765
Total no of people	2900	2200	3250	3800	3700	2115	4400	2000	3700
No of people by categories	609 fam. with properties 29 peasants with little to no land working nobles' lands	483 fam.		848 fam.	811		706 fam. 103 peasants with little to no land working nobles' lands 154 widows	481	967 fam.

Between 1800-1910

Year	1850	1880	1890	1893	1910
Total no of people	7962	8788	8618	9629	11570
Romanians			2313	2446	4366
Germans			5202	5243	5236
Hungarians			1630	1577	2896
Others			180	363	356 gypsies 146 Jews 33 others

Between 1940-2012 (Date statistice preluate de la Oficiul de Statistică Mureș)

Year	1940	1948	1956	1966	1977	1980	1992	2002	2011
Total no of people	14961	18284	20363	24196	33072	42210	35939	32304	28102
Romanians	7315	9363	-	-	-	27630	26939	25429	19632
Germans	5037	3933	-	-	-	6320	1416	568	403
Hungarians	2018	2136	-	-	-	7540	7057	6002	4643
Others	571	2852	-	-	-	720	128	24	27
							1048 gypsies	278	1471

Rupea

The first census on king's land in 1488 recorded in Rupea: 152 households, 1 school principle, 7 poor people and two shepherds (out of which 808 people were Saxons)

Seat of Rupea between 1488-1800

Year	1488	1552	1640	1698	1700	1713	1787
Total no of Saxons	808 Saxons	604 Saxons	1823 Saxons	4000	830 Saxons	1952	17044 total dwellers
peasants with little to no land working nobles' lands	7+2 shepherds				432	223	
Widows	-		118		231		
Clerks	1						
Other categories						41	

Seat of Rupea, later on called the district of Rupea, between 1800-1966

Year	1850	1880	1910	1930
Total no of population	20670	20172	2285	22127
Romanians	-	-	-	-
Germans	-	-	-	-
Hungarians	-	-	-	-
Gypsies/ roma people	-	-	-	-
Others	-	-	-	-

Between 1956-2011 (Date Statistice preluate de la Oficiul de Statistică Brașov)

Year	1956	1966	1977	2002	2011
Total no of population	4691	6273	6640	5759	5011
Romanians	2532	3414	3617	4063	3589
Germans	1385	1327	1269	110	87
Hungarians	602	1455	1502	1245	977
Gypsies/ roma people	162	69	242	338	357
Others	9	8	10	3	2

Comparatively, the two towns do not have the same demographic data: Sighișoara used to be a royal town of a higher status since the Middle Ages, while Rupea was just a borough like small town. They both were the residence of the Seats of Sighișoara and Rupea and that is illustrated by the data in the tables above. Between XV century and 1800 the censuses recorded a majority of Saxon population, while the Romania population is scarcely if none at all mentioned. The Romanian were called “jeleri” (Romanian for

peasants with little to no land working nobles' lands) or shepherds and their number is very small.

That was explained by the fact that, even though Romanians were the majority in Transylvania, they did not have civil or political rights (until 1800 their status was maintained at an inferior level on purpose) and those conducting the censuses, namely the Saxons, were not interested in recording their real number so that their arguments for colonizing Transylvania would remain solid. Thus, the demographic data are not always complete and this article aims at comparing them. The data are enough and representative for Sighișoara, whereas the demographic data for Rupea are far smaller and comprise a diverse population from all the localities of the Seat.

The conduct of censuses this early and in these areas is worth noting, and the demographic evolution fluctuates under the influence of several factors like:

- Diseases such as cholera and plague leading to a high mortality rate.
- Infant mortality rate.
- Frequent wars and incursions leading to population displacement.
- An increase in the number of population in both towns after 1945.

The demographic situation changes radically after 1940 when an increase in the number of the Romanian and Hungarian population is recorded. Moreover, another important landmark is the recording of other ethnic groups such as the Rroma. As a result of land and property confiscation by the Communist regime people come to towns in an increasing number to make a living. After 1990 the number of the Saxons decreases dramatically since they immigrate to Germany. Thus the ethnic formula changes and the majority of the population is represented by the Romanians closely followed by the Hungarians.

Social and community structures

The coming of the Saxons to Transylvania caused a number of social changes manifest through the associations of boys and girls, the brotherhoods of the young men or adults formed by various criteria, or other type of associations. These types of groupings have existed since the Middle Ages until nowadays. Initially their organization was by the German model but gradually they adapted to the customs and practices of the colonized area. The starting point for the establishment of these associations was the civic spirit, mutual support and the need for community order and organization that was to be found both in large urban areas and in the small communities from Transylvania.

In the medieval cities, the vicinities were setup by neighborhoods and their number varied by the number of the entrance gates. The neighborhood was a quasi- military organization that had responsibilities both in peace and war time. The first information on these dates back to 1498 in the documents from Prejmer, nearby Brașov, and to 1533, Brașov. They were not state organizations or institutions, but associations of a civic and moral nature organized by streets and imposing a code based on moral principles. The first information on their existence dates back to: 1526 in Sighișoara; Brașov in 1533, Sibiu in 1563, Rupea Seat in 1640, and Orăștie in 1723. The number of associations in cities and towns was pretty large. Thus, there were "32-26 neighborhoods in Sibiu, 10 in Bistrița, 9 in Brașov and as of XVIII centuries Romanians also organize themselves in associations as it is recorded in Sighișoara in 1768" (Nussbächer, 1965: 119). Every neighborhood is led by a grandfather from among the neighbors, that is by the wisest person in the

community, as well as by a council of the elderly. A secretary would keep track of the neighborhood's financial situation (every member had to pay 16 to 32 guldens annually). Mutual support was granted when building a house, on weddings and for funerals.

Community administrative duties were related to maintaining cleanliness and hygiene on streets, repairing fences, maintaining wells (the neighborhood appointed a specialist for this job) and organizing local firemen units. The review of neighborhood activity was performed annually and on that particular day there was also a celebration for the entire neighborhood.

The neighborhoods in Sighișoara had tight relationships with the church "...they (after the Reform) took children for confirmation and neighborhood members took care of its sick people" (Linert, 1998: 326) organized choirs for Christmas and celebrated Easter together. Upon the analysis of the neighborhoods in Cincu Seat, G.A. Schuller stated the following: "...in 1720 is started a record of the neighborhoods in this area" (Schuller, 1907: 116-118).

In Rupea there were six neighborhoods and in "1640 the judge and the council of the elderly elaborate articles recording the establishment of the neighborhoods in Rupea borough" (Muller, H., 1910-1911: 13) and the provisions related to mutual help concerned house building and events like weddings, christening and funerals. Some of these articles also provision that at night people were to use flashlights and were not allowed to lit the light in their yards or sheds after sunset. These regulations are renewed in 1704, 1774 and 1902. An elderly leader was selected to keep track of the finances and important decisions in the neighborhood. A younger leader joined him and the latter took care of the administrative issues. There were a number of prerequisites to be met to join the neighborhood: the person had to be a local, to own a house and a yard and to produce in 14 days evidence from neighbors testifying to irreproachable moral behavior.

The neighborhoods of Rupea met once a year on the 24th of January. Moreover, birthdays were celebrated together and the priest from the parish was invited to these.

Initially started as simple forms of organization of those who lived nearby, neighborhoods become heavily involved in the community's religious and household activities. Their work principles are valid to this day and this form of organization still exists nowadays and is to be found in communities of Saxons that now also host Romanians. Members of neighborhoods witnessed family events and contributed to raising and consolidating community church and school.

Boys' associations called *Bruderschaft* in German, along with those of the girls *Schwesterschaft* grouped the youth before their marriage by age levels. In each of the two towns under the focus of this article they were affiliated to schools and once the youth graduated the associations were then controlled by the church. Their goal was to guide the youth towards taking up various sport and artistic activities, to supervise their life and thus morally guide them, and to also support them in building their own family. Their origin is as old as the neighborhoods (XII-XIII centuries). Boys' associations met two or three times a year and they were headed by one of the youth called *fecior=jude*, a "crașmar mare" (senior grog shop responsible) and a secretary recording all decisions made. Both boys and girls had duties to perform like cleaning and taking care of the church, the parish house, helping the priest and bringing the Christmas tree from the forest.

The groups of youth would walk around people's house caroling. All of the above are examples of the lively social and community life that included in its practices the smallest aspects of the two towns.

Living in the neighborhood

The two geographic areas under the focus of this article have been inhabited by Romanians, Saxons and Hungarians. However, social differences were a landmark until the 20th century. The area where people lived were differentiated by fortune and the position in the administrative hierarchy.

The citadel of Sighișoara was inhabited only by Saxons who were grouped by categories: the richest lived in the upper part of the citadel, the less rich in the lower part, and the craftsmen and merchants at the bottom. Romanians lived beyond Târnava Mare River and they were seldom allowed to enter the citadel, except for the days when the fair was organized. The closed ethnic group was also supported by the existence of the guilds where only the Saxon masters and apprentices were accepted. The situation was similar for the neighboring areas of Sighișoara and Rupea. No house in the citadel could be sold except to the Saxons. The exclusivist spirit was also preserved with the help of the German school and church.

Marriages were interracial, arranged by parents and depended on the social position of the family. The rich married only within their own group, and the craftsmen and merchants within their own guild. Marrying to a Romanian or a Hungarian was a disgrace to the Saxon community. Those who dared to do that were excluded from the community and considered pariahs. The Romanians inhabiting the neighborhood beyond Târnava Mare did not have much land and were into animal breeding. They were called *măiereni* and lived in the flood prone area of the river and they often had problems with the flooding of Târnava Mare.

In Rupea, the Saxons drained the swamps from the very moment of their arrival and built an inhabitable area along a main street and along the street that led to the citadel. In the central area they built a large area bordered by the Evangelical church that hosted the German school, the parish house, the Mayor's hall and also the weekly fair. The street leading to the citadel was inhabited by the richest of the Saxons who also filled administrative positions, and the main street was inhabited by the merchants and craftsmen. Romanians lived in a different area delineated by the following streets: Pe Deal, Părăului and Hudîță. After 1700 the Saxon administration of the borough sold to the Romanian a barren field behind the main street to build houses. This was called *Gusgasse or The small street/alley at the back* and it was close to an area where vegetable gardens were and known as *Verzerii* and *Între grădini (Between the Gardens)*. Romanians built their houses here, their first school in Romanian language whose taxes were payed by the community. An Orthodox church was raised by the Greek merchants who often came to the area for merchandise on the main street.

Similar to the situation all over king's land, it was forbidden for Saxons and Romanians to mix. Therefore, the perception of the other in Transylvania acquires special features. The Saxons along with the Szekelys and Hungarian nobles represented for years political power and they made decisions for the province of Transylvania. Their rights in this respect are endorsed by the policy favored by the Hungarian Kingdom.

Romanians represented the majority of the population but they did not have political or religious rights. They were perceived by the Saxons as incapable to organize themselves and even lazy. This is one of the aspects tell telling about the perception of the other and there are numerous such examples in the two areas described by this study. More often than not the Saxon authorities complain to their higher forum, University of Saxons from Sibiu, about Romanians who trespass their lands with the cattle, practice various trades outside the guilds 'supervision or are lazy. In their turn, Romanians saw the Saxons as the ones who had taken hold of their lands as masters.

Perception of the otherness reveals the following: "le bon sauvage – the kind savage" as the Saxons perceived Romanians, and the image of the enemy trespassing your territory, as perceived by the Romanians.

This situation was overcome in the XIX century when both Saxons and Romanian historiography is imbued with a national ideology and targets the absolutist policy enforced by the royal court from Vienna. After 1918 the Saxons supported Romanians in acknowledging and supporting Romanian authorities. In Transylvania the cross acculturation between the two populations has been a permanent feature of this area.

The urban features change in both towns after 1918 and especially after 1950. Two of the gates of Sighișoara citadel are taken down, blocks of flats are built. Thus new living spaces for new comers are made available. The urban space changes considerably as the population increases and new plants emerge.

The urban environment was a mix of populations that was largely decreased by the migration of the Saxons after 1990 to Germany.

Conclusions

Transylvania is a particular instance of historical model in terms of social organization and economic structures. It is an area of a diverse mix of populations that can be described as part of the evolution of Western civilization, rather than Balkan civilization. The inner Carpathian province was targeted by its neighbor from early historical times because of its riches and geographic positioning. For 1000 years it was under the rule the Hungarian or Austro Hungarian Empires. Nonetheless, the local features have been preserved. The Saxon and Szekely colonization led to the latter's cohabitation with the majority population made of Romanians. At the dawn of the Middle Ages, this province is under administrative reorganization, urbanization, economic evolution (if guilds are taken into account) and social structuring.

For the two areas compared by this study, the above aspects are all characteristic. The building and fortification of some citadels was a difficult endeavor. The citadel from Sighișoara had a wide inner area surrounded by massive defense walls with high towers and contained churches, schools, a cemetery and dwelling places. It has been inhabited since the XIII century and that is evidence enough of the continuity and consistency of a citadel and community that faced numerous political events, military invasions, plagues and internal conflicts and yet managed to survive to this day.

The fortress from Rupea is of smaller size and was not permanently inhabited. It was considered important because it was on the royal salt road (a merchandise brought from Central Europe and hence largely coveted for in Transylvania) and was also a fortified outpost of the Hungarian garrison. As such it became a complex structure made up of

three different structures once it is subordinated to the German colonists. In case of danger and invasion, dwellers would find refuge inside this fortress.

The economic development in both towns was possible as a result of guilds' activity and from commerce. The necessary food for the population was ensured through ploughing the available land. Another important aspect was the social structuring of neighborhoods and their moral role. Their regulations tell a lot about the fact that nothing in the social environment was random and that the most important moments in a family's life like weddings, christening, funerals were spent with the community.

Even though the Saxons and the Romanians lived separately, there were mutual influences. A lot of linguistic borrowings is to be found in Romanian and in the Saxon dialect. The architecture of the houses also testifies to that to this day: high surrounding walls, one storey houses, underground basements and well organized vegetable gardens. Even the recipes are evidence of the fine cross acculturation.

In conclusion, Sighișoara and Rupea are models of how King's Land was organized towards the end of the XIX century, good examples of cohabitation between Romanians and Saxons and small snapshots from Transylvania's history.

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**THE BALKAN ROMANIANS
IN REPORTS OF SOME ROMANIAN TRAVELERS (1882-1914)**

*Stoica Lascu**

Abstract

The study shows the presence of Romanian intellectuals to Vlachs in the Balkans – namely in the area of Ottoman Macedonia; the travellers (Teodor T. Burada, Radu C. Pătărlăgeanu, Alexandru Pencovici, Ion Nenîescu, Pericle N. Papahagi, Constantin N. Burileanu, Ion Manu, Constantin I. Istrati, and Mitu Dona) reveal the size of Balkan Romanianism (the most Aromanians and Megleno were under the influence of Hellenism), especially showing common origin, their habits, the situation of Romanian schools. The relations and travel notes were published both in newspapers and magazines of the time, as and in volumes.

Key words: *Balkan Romanians, Aromanians, Al. Pencovici, I. Nenîescu, C.N. Burileanu*

In the second half of the 19th century, the Balkan Romanians issue has been a concern ever growing part of many cultural and political personalities of the Romanian State. “There is not a state in Eastern Europe, no country from the Adriatic to the Black Sea which does not contain pieces of our nationality. From shepherds in Istria, from Morlacs in Bosnia and Erţegovina, we find step by step fragments of this great unit ethnicity in the mountains of Albania, Macedonia and Thessaly, in Pindus as in the Balkans, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece to beyond Dniester, to near Odessa and Kiev” – wrote in 1878 (October 26) Mihai Eminescu in the newspaper from Bucharest *Timpul* (Eminescu, 1989: 123). He would return, moreover, several times on the issue of Balkan Romanians (Carageani, 1990: 8), his interest in “the historical past, the contemporary situation of and future prospects of the Balkan Romanity world (being) constant and passionate” (Tanaşoca, 1993: 5).

Not only our National Poet, not only Romanian intellectuals will be shown increasingly interested in the fate of their brethren in the Balkans, but also many publicists and foreign travelers. The interest of the European intellectuals, of Romanian cultural personalities and statesmen, for the national, ethical and material situation of the Balkan Romanians, has more extensions; for they are made the most praising assessments: “The most beautiful characteristic of Aromanians is the desire of studying, in order to make their life easier. This is a surprise in the countries of the Balkan Peninsula. They are smaller than the Bulgarians, the Albanians and the Greeks. They are smart and with modest claims” – wrote about them the German scholar Gustav Weigand (Bardu, 2016¹: *passim*; 2016²: *passim*). Another one, Felix P. Kanitz, reveals that “The Aromanians have inclination towards the works of art and an extraordinary ability for the architecture”, while the British Mary Walker, who visited in 1860 the regions inhabited by Aromanians, noticed that “the Aromanians are the best regarding the trade, the work and the intelligence” (Tega, 1983: 180; Lascu, 2013: 123-124).

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In the mid 70s of the 19th century, there are appearing works with the objective of informing the European public about the existence of the Balkan Romanians, works like those of Émile Picot, in 1875, Nicolae Densușianu and Frédéric Damé, 1877; over a decade there are also published works of Romanian authors for knowing their contemporary history and situation – within some travel notes, printed in a volume.

In the early 80s of the 19th century Teodor T. Burada, a veritable tireless globe-trotter in the areas inhabited by Romanians, did not published – as it did in the case of the other voyages – a special work regarding the visits made to Aromanians; instead, in 1890 he published his well-known monograph on the Romanian schools in European Turkey (Burada, 1890: *passim*) and in its content he mentions, at a time (pages 32-33): “In the voyages that I made to the Romanians in the Balkan Peninsula in 1882, and also in 1889, besides the other researches made on them, I focused especially on the situation of Romanian schools up there – and I saw until today the fight for the existence of those schools between the Romanians from there and the agents interested in the Greek cause, among who there are unfortunately also many with Romanian origin but Greeks in ideas and in fact because of their social position and personal interests; those are combating with much bitterness and by all means the Romanian idea and feeling. According to positive information and notes *that I collected in this regard on-site* (our emphasis), as according to more relative documents found in special occasions, today I can give information, documents about the founding of each school, about the difficulties encountered, about the main phases through which they have passed, about their didactic staff, about the number of pupils and in general about the current situation of this question”; to mention that, in the age, Ștefan Mihăileanu expressed critical statements about the way in which was made the documentation for this book, the author “for convenience and for quickly winning a merit, transcribes reports purposely made and sent them from Macedonia to those entitled from București” (Mihăileanu, 1893: 2).

In 1884, Radu C. Pătărlăgeanu, dedicates one of his “writings” to Queen Elisabeth of Romania, “in order to show the situation of the Macedonian Romanians, because *I do not think it is good and decent for the Romanians from Romania [România liberă] to be indifferent with our brothers from far away* (our emphasis)” (Pătărlăgeanu, 1884: 5). The voyage took place in the summer of 1882, the author being accompanied by Teodor T. Burada, during two months, at the end of which they discover that the territory of Macedonia, Thessaly and Albania is inhabited “by Romanians, Albanians, Bulgarians, and Greeks”, the “most beautiful” villages being those of Romanians (Pătărlăgeanu, 1884: 31). There are detailed their traditions and lifestyle, the relationships with the few Greeks from Crușova: “there is no Greek, but the fanatic partisans of Greeks found on the frontispiece the following inscription in Greek: *National School*. Two years ago, they removed the adjective “national” and replaced it with “Greek” (Pătărlăgeanu, 1884: 40). Regarding the establishments inhabited by Romanians in the region of Pind “to the old borders of the Greek Kingdom”, there are “over 70 villages” (Mărgărit, 1874: 198), with a population over 150,000 persons who “talk only Romanian” (Pătărlăgeanu, 1884: 40). There are inserted in this work some popular poetic creations, in dialect, in order “to demonstrate that the Romanian who live in those regions have remained until today Romanians with the language, the songs and with all the customs of their ancestors” (Pătărlăgeanu, 1884: 88).

In April-May 1882, the Romanian employee Alexandru Pencovici makes, within an European periplus, a visit in Macedonia and to Mount Athos, the travel impressions being

published in two newspapers from Bucharest (Lascu, 2003: 264-266), and in 1885 also within a brochure (Pencovici, 1885: *passim*) with parallel text in Romanian and in the Aromanian dialect. (In his periplus, he was accompanied by the delegation counselor C.G. Popovici, who submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs several reports; after this, he made other voyages, also mentioned in reports submitted to the tutelary ministry, in 1911 announcing even that “they will be published in a volume, which I hope it will soon appear” [Istrati, 1911¹: 1]; still, the announced volume was not published anymore.) In the newspaper *Timpu*, Mihai Eminescu prefaces “the letter” sent by “the former director of Statistics in Romania”, expressing the pertinent opinion that the security of the Romanians in the Balkans, threatened by Greeks, consists in obtaining the religious autonomy, “like the Bulgarians and the Romanians from Banat did, the Eastern Church is national; *the service must be officiated in the language spoken by people* (our emphasis)” (Eminescu, 1989: 477). Alexandru Pencovici reveals the Greek propaganda’s substrate, the impartiality of statistics regarding the minimization of the number of Romanians, argues with *Le Messanger d’Athènes* and pleads for starting an action supported by the Romanian State of discovering the realities from European Turkey, where he detected a large number of Romanians in the Balkans: “The more civilized countries are often sending explorers all over the world, even from a scientific point of view. Maybe it is also time for us explore the Balkan countries, *where we have the science and also the heart* (our emphasis), in order that a commission composed from wise and devoted men to find out the exact number of Romanians and of their villages” (Pencovici, 1885: 22).

This national necessity was not materialized, regarding the involvement of the State’s institutions. The researching and the revealing of the historical past, of the civilization and of the political dimensions of the Romanian spirit in the Balkans are fulfilled as private initiatives, without having the coherence of other countries’ propaganda. In fact, as it was revealed in the plenary of the Romanian Academy, on May 12, 1911, by the professor Constantin Istrati, “we must unfortunately recognize that there are few Romanians who traveled in these regions, although, thank God, the number of passports is annually increasing, and the million often spent pointless abroad, are far from decreasing...” (Istrati, 1911¹: 2).

Among “the few” Romanians, people of culture, who are making this kind of long voyages in the Balkan Peninsula, with the declared intention of seeing the necessities and the life of Romanian nation in this region, it is also the statesman (doctor of Philosophy) Ioan Nenițescu. The most important relating on a voyage to the Aromanians comes, in the last decade of the 19th century, from the author of the well-known poem *Pui de lei* [Lion’s Whelps]. Practically, our traveler visited only few settlements (Perleap, Crușova, Nijipole, Gopeș, Bitolia, and Resna), so, it was correctly revealed that the trip “has more the character of a historical and geographical office research” (Istrati¹, 1911: 2). Since 1893, the professor Ștefan Mihăileanu (born in Ottoman Macedonia, established in Bucharest) expressed his scepticism – regarding a process of intention, even – on the finality of Ion Nenițescu’s voyage, from the perspective of knowing the real situation of Romanians from the Balkans: “And how the profane world is supposed to know that the sending of Mr. I. Nenițescu is not made with the desire of research, but only for breaking once and for all the silence imposed and for showing a fake interest regarding the national question from Turkey?” (Mihăileanu, 1893: 2).

Nenițescu had as objective of the voyage, made in the summer of 1892, “to see myself the change which gave birth to the Romanian school from Turkey, school which, on its turn, revitalized the national and cultural life of the Aromanian”, and also “to discover the number of this brother nation, because the old and the recent writers, who I have studied before leaving, are not in an agreement” (Nenițescu, 1895: 10). Our traveler situates the number of “the Aromanian people” to 861,000 inhabitants, including only the Vlachs from the European Turkey.

There are described their main settlements, especially Crușova (Nenițescu, 1895: 85-114) – in 1900, the town had 11,000 inhabitants, “from which 7.000 are Romanians” (Cionescu, 1900: 92) –, their customs and traditions (Nenițescu, 1895: 137-158 /wedding/; 282-308 /birth/; 436-446 /death/; 525-538 /beliefs, superstitions/), the history of the schools in the Balkans, the teachers’ activity, especially that of Dimitrie Athanasescu: “The fights, the torments and the pains of this Aromanian teacher form the first and the most full of sorrow page in the history of the foundation of Romanian schools in Macedonia, history which is a long martyrdom” (Nenițescu, 1895: 159-160). Ioan Nenițescu also reiterates the history of the famous Moscopole (Nenițescu, 1895: 340-343), which, in that period, had only 3,260 souls and two primary schools, the Aromanians’ settlements from the region of Pindus, a Greek source showing that Samarina, for instance, had in 1880, 15,000 inhabitants (“I think there were 12,000 souls”), those being “also Vlachs who must be hellenized no matter what” (Nenițescu, 1895: 407).

The voyage of Ion Nenițescu, materialized by the apparition of the massive volume – awarded by the Romanian Academy with The Prize Năsturel-Herescu –, will be remembered, over the years, by the Aromanians intellectuals from the Balkans, some of them distinguishing it – despite the reality; in 1911, a Aromanian newspaper published in dialect in Thessaloniki by the lawyer Achile N. Pineta was bringing again in the memory of the Aromanians as the man that was and still is the only “brother one who saw us, studied us and presented to the world as we are [*frate ți nă vru cu adevărat, că năș fu și easte ninca singurlu care nă vidzu la noi, nă studie și nă spuse a lumilei ași cum him*]” (Ioan Nenițescu, 1911: 2). Instead, Nicolae Bațaria remembers in other way this visit to Crușova, Ion Nenițescu “leaving the most pleasant memories. His presence of few days has scattered the darkness of many minds and revealed the courage and the energy in many hearts”, the Aromanians having, from now on, the possibility of realizing the Romanian identity in the north and south of Danube, scorned by the opponents: “The Greek teachers and the Greeks’ fanatic partisans could not stand, seeing on the street and in the houses, groups of Aromanians among who, the proud and imposing Nenițescu.

- Seller of spindles! [*Jupânlu! fusarlu!*]

These were the terms – insulting in their opinion – through which the Greek teachers and their partisans expressed their anger caused by the presence of this dear brother of blood in their Greek Crușova.

Some of them, in search of comic situations, were following and listening him in order to understand some words in Romanian, the language of Gypsy breeders of bears. But instead of laughing they started to understand the majority of words and became to be serious, attentive and with their feelings changed. They saw that the language of the brother over the Danube is not so ugly and rough, as the teacher and the metropolitan said.

They were starting to realize that this language resembles too much with the

Aromanian dialect, that it is one and the same and that the things are not so serious as their leaders said.

- *But this man talks almost like us* (our emphasis).

This was the final impression about the man who was considered a Gypsy and a seller of spindles” (Bațaria, 1904: 52-55).

In the following years, the interest of the Romanian journalists still remains low regarding the knowing of the Balkan Romanians’ life, and even when, in the spring of 1897, one of them makes “a travel in Macedonia for studying the Aromanian question”, the results are made public only over 11 years, on the grounds that “Unfavorable circumstances stopped me – wrote in 1908 the journalist *Alexandre Rubin* – until now to publish them”; the travel of the journalist – sent in Macedonia by George Lahovary, the director of *L’Indépendance Roumaine* newspaper – took place in the area of Neveasca, Vlaho-Clisura, Perlepe, Crușova, and Târnova. He was received with “so much love”, by the “good Romanians” who were celebrating in this way “not a person, but an ideal within their steeled souls” (Rubin, 1908: 275). It is relevant to show in this context that in 1913, he will publish later an important monograph (richly illustrated, with pictures which had not been published until then in Romanian publications) which will fructify all the Romanian and foreign researches regarding that question, the author – now, “*Rédacteur en chef de L’Indépendance Roumaine*” – still mentioning in *Préface*, that he met the Aromanians, “pour avoir été chez eux, parmi eux. J’ai appris à apprécier leur courageux dévouement à la cause de leur nationalité, leur héroïque volonté de rester roumains (our emphasis), ainsi que leurs réelles aptitudes, qui font d’eux l’élément d’élite des régions qu’ils occupent” (Rubin, 1913: 5-6).

If such laudable initiatives were not finalized, then we can understand the concern of a newspaper from Bucharest, expressed in 1900, when was observing that “Today we do not know very well the localities from Albania and Macedonia which are inhabited by Romanians and neither their exact number. This concern was left for the foreigners, who many times have intentionally decreased the importance of the Romanian element. The Romanian State, who began to help the Aromanian culture in Macedonia, *had not even the time to realize that it would be necessary an action plan, based on a study on site* (our emphasis)”; the newspaper’s scepticism was also obvious regarding the proposal from *Timbul*, “through which the professors and the teachers from there must elaborate a statistics of the Aromanian population”, considering entitled that “This work must be initiated by a Romanian from the Country [Romania], which can impartially fulfill it, thus bringing a great favour to the Romanian world” (*Unde și câți sunt armânii?*, 1900: 1).

If our century begins with some collective trips in Greece (one of them organized by the professor Grigore T. Tocilescu), regarding the Balkan Romanians the century begins with a scientific interest of their representatives in organizing trips (in autumn, a group of Greek students will visit, on their turn, Romania ([Petru Vulcan=] Picurar’lu de la Pind, 1901: 2). (In the list of those 286 trippers, lead by professor Tocilescu – most of them being students –, we discover a single Aromanian, at least according to his name, student of Medicine *Filip Mișea*, future deputy, in 1908, in the Ottoman Chamber.)

This interest has materialized with the travel of the native Aromanian, professor (correspondent member, elected in 1916, of the Romanian Academy) Pericle N. Papahagi, in Meglenia, expression of the Romanian society’s interest for knowing the life of Romanians in the Balkans, with great impact within the public opinion. The travel to the

Romanian from Meglenia took place in June 13-23, 1901, the author being present in almost all the localities. Then, he described them within a public lecture, on May 24, 1902 at the Romanian Academy; according to the author, *The Description of the Villages and of the Town Ghergheli*, and *The Numbering of the Megleno-Romanians* shows the following situation:

Nr. crt.	Locality	Number of inhabitants; homes, families	Churches; schools	Remarks
1.	Nânta	5,500; 550 homes (and 30-40 Gypsy families)	Many mosques; Turk school.	They are the only representatives of the Balkan Romanians converted to Islam.
2.	Birislau	560 inhabitants; 55; 80	The Romanian church "Stavineri" seems to be new. Romanian school with its own building.	These churches [from Meglenia] are most of them painted by Anastas and his sons [Constantin and Evanghele] from Crușova in the second half of the 19 th century.
3.	Lundzini	1,400 inhabitants; 130; 200	The church "The Saints Cosma and Damian" officiates in Romanian. The church "Saint Nicholas" is big and beautiful but with the religious service in Greek.	On November 1 st , when they celebrate the patron of the [Romanian] church, people are coming to party. The youth plays Hora and a fight of athletes; after that, they eat with the families from Lundzini. The next day they go home.
4.	Oșani	2,100 inhabitants; 250; 300	The church "The Assumption of Mother of Christ" celebrated on August 15, in Romanian. The church "Saint Nicholas" is big and beautiful but with the religious service in Greek. School: the building is very beautiful.	Four Romanian priests: Emanoil, Econom, Papa-Dionisie Anastas, Papa-Crista Bujin and Papa-Gheorghe Christa, called also Papa-Gona, a giant. The last was sick [he died in January 1902], following some convulsions for the Romanian cause with the distinguished patriot Gușu Gaga. The bishop from Florin paid two times some assassins to shoot him and Mr. Gaga.
5.	Liumnița	3,045 inhabitants; 350; 435		
6.	Huma	980 inhabitants; 90; 140	The churches "Saint Tanas" and "Stavineri" only in Romanian by the priest Papa-Atanas; Romanian school (2 teachers, 43 pupils)	I notice that all holidays of Friday and Saint Mary are celebrated with fast by the Romanians from Meglenia and by all the Romanians from Pindus. It seems that these two holidays are considered national days for the Romanians in the Balkan Peninsula. The patron of the church is celebrated not on September 8, but on July 22.

7.	Sirminina	700 inhabitants; 75; 100		
8.	Conștea	1,050 inhabitants; 110; 150		
9.	Cupa	945 inhabitants; 90; 135	The church "Saint Mary" officiates in Romanian. There is no Romanian school.	Papa-Gheorghe, called also Zarcada reads in Romanian. Although he is very old, he began to learn and to read the Gospel in Romanian.
10.	Țărnașca	1,070 inhabitants; 100 homes		
11.	Barovița	1,400 inhabitants; 130 homes		
12.	Ghevgheli	500 Romanian inhabitants; 60-70 families	Two Turkish schools; three Bulgarian schools; two Serbian schools; two Greek schools.	
13.	Leascova	650 inhabitants "Romanians almost Bulgarians"		
14.	Livedzi	2,500-3,000 Macedo-Romanians		
15.	Gumenge	500 inhabitants "towards the conversion to Bulgarians"		

"We have roundly 23,000 Romanians – *concludes Per. Papahagi* – in the Caragiova mountains, of who 20,000 Megleno-Romanians, the other Aromanians. The Megleno-Romanians are more spread in villages such as: Fuștani, Tușim, Dragomanți, Isvor, in the manor «Mărdzeți» and others, because every year one or two families are migrating in the Bulgarian villages".

There are also important information regarding *The agriculture and the Inhabitants' Occupation; Food; Costume; Population* – our traveler detailing the socio-economic components of the Romanians from Meglenia for their brothers from North of Danube; thus it is specified the fact that "the land of Meglenia is very fertile", the villages have many waters, sources, wells and small rivers". Of all Blakan Romanians, those from Meglenia are the only one who systematically practice agriculture, this being their "main occupation"; it is exported lot of paprika, and the silkworm rearing "is made in all the Romanian villages from Meglenia and if the entire region produces 400,000-600,000 kg of cocoons, then it must be known that half of that is produced in the Romanian villages"; also the beekeeping "is in great development in these villages", and you can "hardly find a house without hives". In the end, there are described the main customs and popular traditions of those who are devoted to the national idea, the Romanian cultural-national movement making great progresses in the years that followed the visit of Aromanian professor (Papahagi, 1902: 11-27, 43-44).

In the spring of 1904, the former Metropolitan of Hungaro-Wallachia Ghenadie Petrescu makes a visit to the Mount Athos (Petrescu, 1904: *passim*), and when he returns in April, he halts also in the localities inhabited by the Aromanians from Macedonia; in Bitolia and in the villages from surroundings, Târnova, Magarova, and Moloviște, he is welcomed with enthusiasm by Aromanians; instead, the Greek clergy is not so excited with this presence, elaborating intrigues and complaints, with the Primate Metropolitan of Romania, complaints which have received from the former Metropolitan a public answer:

“I never expected to cause an ecclesiastic difficulty with my arrival in Macedonia; I never expected Your Happiness, who used to receive me with love and to praise me in the Patriarchate’s newspapers, to take canonical measures, a hostile way for my mission, leaving my soul full of sadness but still with an endless love!...” On his returning in the country, the former Metropolitan makes “important declarations and remarks regarding the Macedonian Question”, with the objective to “increase the cultural level of the Romanians from Macedonia”, considering that “first of all, *the Macedonian Romanians need priests in order to read the Gospel in their language and to make education* (our emphasis). If there are no priests to give them some advices, then *many Romanians were Hellenized and Slavicized* (our emphasis), because of the influence of Greek and Slavic priests”; the conclusion is without doubt: “we must hurry to send Romanian priests in Macedonia”, says the former Metropolitan” (Rex., 1904: 1; also, Aromân, 1904: 1).

In the context of the events from Macedonia, the interest for the brothers from the Balkans is gradually diversifying; in 1905, Constantin N. Burileanu, a graduate of the Colonial Diplomacy School of the Royal University from Rome, will visit Albania with the support of Antonio Baldacci; the well-known Italian naturalist – elected in 1913 Foreign Honorary Member of the Romanian Academy – will write the preface of his book, being appreciated by the one of the Balkan Romanians’ magazines of the time (*Un invitat italian tri noi*, 1907: 73-76; Baldacci, 1913: 253). His action had also a political and national reason – he thought that it was possible to create *pragmatic* friendly relations between the two countries (Romania and Italy – our note) by the *Latin* element from the Balkans”, which has to be revealed to the Italian public opinion – less educated in this problem – “many of them are making confusions between Romania and Armenia or with Rumelia, the Romanians with the Armenians, the our București «Bucarest» with Budapest!” (Burileanu, 1906: VIII). The work is extremely instructive, with information about the history, ethnography, folklor, statistics, and an unique iconography: “when I saw those poor people, neglected by us and even by God, my heart was shattered and melt of pity!” (Burileanu, 1906: IX), confesses the author of “the most conscientious work” (Istrati, 1911¹: 2) regarding this problem (until 1911).

After he returns in Romania, Constantin N. Burileanu expresses his ideas in a large interview – in the influential and widespread newspaper *Adevărul*, from Bucharest –, pleading among other things, for the support of these travels which can “reveal the real state in the Balkan Peninsula”, the scarcity of direct collected information affecting the ethnical realities: “Because of this, many people from Romania consider the Romanian element from the Balkans as a *scarecrow* with which we must only scare the Serbians, the Bulgarians and the Greeks and they thought to give the Romanians from the Balkans to those who are torturing them, without considering also the consequences...” (N., 1906: 2). It is also pointed out in this context that the Romanian public opinion was informed about the situation of the Aromanians in the pages of the same newspaper, also in 1906, by the impressions of an editor of the Parisian newspaper *Le Courrier Européen*, his opinions being very eloquent: “the strongest impression he had was the contact with the Aromanian population from Macedonia. The qualities of this ethnic group, the intellectual and the spiritual ones, really captivated him, because almost anyone has insisted on the psychological complex of the Aromanian population, so the surprise, being pleasant and consisting in something special, was even grater” (Cornel, 1906: 1).

An important voyage, less known, to the brothers in the Balkans was made in the spring of 1908 by the lawyer Ion Manu – “during which he studied very seriously the Romanian question in this region” ([Manu], 1908¹: 3-4) –, the son of the general and statesman Gheorghe Manu, his impressions being reflected in the press from Bucharest.

The rarity presence of a North-Danube Romanian among Aromanians was immediately dotted and by the *Românul dela Pind*, “national press organ of Romanians from right Danube” [*organul național al românilor din dreapta Dunării*], who used to appear in Bucharest; lamenting that they are known “only by hearsay and from books and not seen by them with their eyes”, he expresses unequivocal: “I. Manu *has made the difference* (our emphasis). He saw the Aromanians to their homes, spent time with them, and talked with them”. From the interview ([Manu], 1908²: 1) it resulted first of all the distorted image that our traveler had about the realities from the Balkans, discovered by the direct contacts with the Aromanians: “I can say that I was surprised in a pleasant way regarding the Romanians from Turkey, I could say it was a revelation. Here, in the country, we wrongly believe that the Romanian movement started from here and has political goals. I have seen that *it has strong roots for the Romanians from there and that they are following an ideal goal* (our emphasis), independent from the political goals that of maintaining untouched their ancestral language and its bodies: the church and the school”. It is a precious testimony, which illustrates the real dimension, the historic and motivational resorts marginally received by the Romanian society from [Romanian Old Kingdom] as a whole. Our traveler is very enthusiast about the Romanian feelings often expressed with the price of their lives: “You cannot imagine if you have not saw that. Defending the national cause is a real heroism in Macedonia. I saw, in the Good Friday, the brave priest Teodor from Bitolia with the epitaph of Christ through the Romanian district, framed by two pagan policemen, for defending him against the Christian brothers. Until now, the Greeks, who cannot forgive that he passed from the Greek Church to the Romanian one, attacked him three times in the street”.

The voyage of Ion Manu included the most important Aromanian settlements – Bitolia, Târnova, Magarova, Nijopole, Crușova, Perlepe, Resna, Ohrida, Pogradet, Corița, and Pleasa; an impressive welcome had from the Aromanians from Albania, “a vigorous race, with beautiful costume, with a good material situation and with unshakeable Romanian feeling. Here I had a very enthusiast welcome. In the village Pleasa we have been accompanied by all the armed boys until the top of the mountain where was the village”. But the state of the Romanians was not the same in all the localities, and Ion Manu makes public the causes for a better perception of the Aromanians’ life and desires: “The most unsatisfactory situation is in Bitolia, the most important center. And this is not because the Greeks are there in a greater number. There are only three Greek families. The population includes 1/3 Romanians, 1/3 Bulgarians and the rest Turks, Israelites, and Gypsy, etc. With all the high number of Romanian, I was surprised to find in the small Romanian church even in Resurrection Night a relatively small number of believers. The mystery was revealed when I went to the Greek church, a huge cathedral, full of people. *All around be were speaking Romanian* (our emphasis). The Romanians from Bitolia are supporters of the Greeks, even because of the commercial interests or *because their tradition is to listen the liturgy in Greek*. In Târnova and Magarova the entire population is Romanian and they do not know to speak Greek. They do not dare to declare themselves Romanians. In these localities were committed many assassinations against the Romanians

and the Romanian school was closed because no one dared to send the children there”. Besides the travel impressions, Ion Manu also makes relevant specifications, considering that “The mistake of our policy is that of being too reluctant”; he criticizes the closing of Romanian schools for budgetary reasons and makes some proposals: “Why, for instance, it was taken from a credit of 600,000 *lei* voted for Macedonia in 1904, the third part for making luxury at the Church from Sofia, while most of the schools and churches from Macedonia are very poor compared with the Greek institutions? In Bitolia there are no funds for maintaining the school, which is in a very poor condition. In Corița, the religious service is made in a room, in the priest’s house!” In the end of his considerations, Ion Manu asks his compatriots “to visit these countries, which besides the beauty of nature, it offers a large field for political studies. Only meeting them in their country, we will have an idea about the Romanians from Macedonia and about their cultural and politic desires”.

The voyage and the considerations of Ion Manu were appreciated by the Aromanians intellectuals from Romania, express their trust regarding the interest of the society for the fate and martyrdom of our brother from South: “if many Romanian would make what Mr. Manu have made, then we can be sure that the love of the free brothers will be greater for the Macedonian Romanians established in Romanian country because of the terror of the Greek barbarian gangs” (D-I I. Manu, 1908: 1).

The most important voyage to the Romanians from the Balkans, until the World War I, was made between April 1-20, 1911 by a group of 29 trippers, led by the professor Constantin I. Istrati – among who there were personalities of the Romanian public life, such as Al. Alessiu and Matei Balș (magistrates), the astronomer Nicolae Coculescu (native Aromanian), the professors George Murgoci and Ion Cantacuzino, the publicist François Lebrun, the admiral (in reserve) Vasile Urseanu, and others. The itinerary included the localities (with its surroundings) Bitolia, Perlepe, Crușova, Skopje, Târnova and Magarova, Moloviște, Resna, Thessaloniki, and Veria.

The trippers have had a guidebook (Murgoci, Papahagi, 1911: *passim*), and their impressions were presented in a meeting of the Romanian Academy, by the Professor Istrati, together with relevant remarks regarding the national-cultural condition of their brothers: “For this people, the national consciousness is very high. Its sight, regarding the future, *is directed with love towards us, their beloved big brothers* (our emphasis), and towards modern Turkey, to whose fate is connected, as they have realized, their future existence” (Istrati¹, 1911: 18). Returned in the country, the professor Constantin Istrati makes public his impressions in a newspaper from Bucharest, about the voyage and in the same time he reveals “the social conditions of the Macedonian Romanians”, the necessities within the national-cultural structure: “The Aromanian population is feeling the need of taking care about the school and the church by its own means, creating local institutions. Our role is that of helping them in the future only those localities that have not yet the necessary funds. Thus, our fraternal help will be real and the cultural and national movement will be positive and fruitful. *The most important and urgent thing that the Romanians from Macedonia need is the priests and a religious leader* (our emphasis). They were killed hundreds of them for their national church, and the few priests – the oldest of 37 years, today in Thessaloniki – were often tortured and escaped of being killed, like the case of that priest from Monastir, on who they tried until now three attacks. *We need to worship in front of this nation, which often bury*

their children and parents without priest, in order to remove the Greek clergy (our emphasis)” (Missirlu, 1911: 1).

The voyage to the Romanians from Macedonia was highly publicized in the press but also later, by the publication of some volumes that described it in details, showing to the society the real state of those – precious testimonies for the discovering of the geographic environment, of the Aromanian psychosocial and mental components. After the meeting from the Romanian Academy, Constantin I. Istrati will also publish a separate relating, entitled *Macedonia* (Istrati², 1911: *passim*), and will write the preface of an album also entitled *Macedonia*, elaborated by other two participants, François Lebrun and I. Voinescu (Lebrun, Voinescu, 1911: *passim*) (text published also in French).

Also the pupil from Ploiești, Ioan Dem.-Agraru, will publish his notes in the magazine *Curierul Liceului* [“The High School Messenger”] from Ploiești, and also in a volume in 1912, preceded by considerations about “their cultural and social condition”, giving to his compatriots a real answer to the question: “How it is possible that the Aromanian have preserved until today their nationality, traditions and language? There are two main causes that favorized their preservation. *The first is: the distinct character of the entire Romanian nation, the tenacity with which it preserves everything it belongs.* For example we have the Romanians from Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia whom, removed for denationalizing Caucasus, have the same life as before, and even made people around them to learn their language in order to communicate. The second cause is the rustic life they had and still have there in the mountains, with their particular activities, far from the agitation of the cities, without getting in contact with other nations, and descending only for the winter.

For this reason they can be considered uneducated, but few of them do not know to read and many shepherds have more judgement than our people from towns have. A shepherd told as to take care of them because otherwise they are lost [*S’nă cățați câ him chiruți!*]” (Dem.-Agraru, 1912: *passim*).

Another work signed by Lăptuca Șvarț – is the most massive of all and it represents in fact a literary description, incisive by the multitude of details which are creating the feeling of photographing the entire voyage: “Although it was sun, we were wearing leather jackets and leggings; then, we went in the garden where we took some pictures with us, in order to leave for the posterity *the image of the heros who had the noble mission of spending the Easter in the regions of Macedonia together with our Aromanian brothers* (our emphasis). In the end, it rained for giving a logic reason to our clothes. Thus we could enter in the railway station without being so stage” (Șvarț, 1912: 3) – with these considerations begins the description of the voyage, often impregnated with savoury remarks. The final remains in the same terms: “Dizzy in love (with a colleague, in the birth of the ship, at a prolonged party – our note), I slipped the bottle from my arms and I worked in my reserved bed, losing the contact with the reality. It was the last night that I spend with my companions.

Next day I worked on the Romanian land, or more precisely, on the Romanian water, being in the port of Constanța. The train for Bucharest takes us to this city, to our daily activities, as if there was no Macedonia. From the railway station, the last travellers [*șeteriști*] spread towards their homes, taking with them a pleasant memory of the days spent on Turkish land” (Șvarț, 1912: 235).

In the years that followed this first voyage of the Romanians to their brothers in Macedonia, which had a positive result “in Turkey and in the Country, almost among the

Aromanians” (Un glas autorizat. 1911: 28), the aggravation of the international situation in the Balkan area did not allowed these kind of connections between the Romanians from north and south of Danube. But these connections remained individual, some of them being made public by the press or by some independent works (of course, besides the numerous correspondences from the areas inhabited by Aromanians, published in the newspapers from that period, or the notes of Romanian diplomats accredited in Thessaloniki, Monastir/Bitolia, and Ianina).

In the years that followed until the outbreak of World War I – after this first group trip Romanians to their brethren in Macedonia, which had a positive effect “produced in Turkey and the country, especially in the branches Macedonians [*recte* – Aromanians]” – whirling situation international Balkans (1912-1913), respectively at the continental level (summer 1914), did not allow such periegeses; individually but ties between Romanians south of the Danube and the North-Danubian course there were some of them being made known to the public in the Old Kingdom through the press (they are supplemented still numerous correspondences in areas inhabited by Aromanians, housed in newspapers of the time).

Among the few trips to the Balkan Romanians, in the period 1912-1914 (Cosmescu, 1912; Palade, 1916), it was publicized that made by Romanian journalist Mitu Dona (native Aromanian) – namely in May-June 1914 – to Aromanians of Albania in the context of its modern rebirth as an independent state, to the building which had an intake and Albanian Aromanians, respectively Romanian State.

As the correspondent of newspaper from Arad *Românul*, it sends substantial correspondence under the title *In New Albania*. In their contents – are shipped from Corița town, centre of an area inhabited by Romanians Balkan – the author details the beginnings (in the 80s of the 19th century) national awareness of Farsherots, the undisputed leaders celnic Spiru Balamace or his nephew, the priest Haralambie Balamace – the latter assassinated on March 23/April 5, 1914, by elements of Greek chauvinists: “the growing persecution on the part of pan-Hellenism, the more develop national consciousness among Romanians from Albania. So besides Romanian Schools from Pleasa and Corița, which were opened in 1883-1885, with the support of martyr the priest Haralambie Balamace, being seconded by veterans Nasta Balamace – his father – and his uncle, the celnic Spiru, they were open more schools in Moscopole, Gabrova, Nicea, Bitcuchi, Șipsca, and Lânca, and later opened at Berat by Mr. Haralambie Gugiamaua [Gogiaman], and Elabasan by Mr. Anton Becea” (Dona, 1914: *passim*; Lascu, 2012: 159-167, 175-178, 189-208, 328-333).

The author noted that not all of Aromanians from Corița/Corcea/Curceaua were animated by the Romanian national sentiments: “The Farsherots only passed in the nationalist camp, while Moscopoleans until recently were grecomans”. The School from boys and girls was attended by about 160 children, and Romanian chapel (church is not there) was the house of priest Balamace; after his assassination, “Romanians have found it necessary to bury him even place vacant, bought in the city center, where they will build both the Romanian church and a monument to the martyr who fell a sacrifice for love of nation and homeland”. Is detailed the celebrate receipt by Farsherots of prince Mihail Sturza, attaché at Romanian Legation at Durazzo, who along with French publicist Pierre de Pimedon, paid a visit to Corița, they have the opportunity to “admire and young Farsherots who enlisted volunteer in the Albanian army”. Eyewitness, Romanian journalist

detailed his visit to Aromanians from Pleasa (about 250 families), they all being aware of membership of Balkan Romanianism, “since 1883”; Guests are greeted by the entire community, led by priest and four schoolmasters, is sing *Wake Up, Romanian!* [*Deșteaptă-te române!*] and *On Our Flag is Written Union* [*Pe-al nostru steag e scris Unire*], they are kept fiery patriotic speeches. The next day, the town is visited Moscopole, “the old cathedral of Romanianism (*Si*) of Pind, once inhabited by over 12,000 Romanians”, now reduced to the size of a village. Here, Romania’s representative meets with delegates Farsherots in Southern Albania, these demanding, inter alia, involving more effectively Romanian State action to assist national-cultural development; namely the establishment, first, a Romanian bishop in Albania, based in Moscopole, opening a Romanian consulate, a commercial school at Corița, the establishment of a seminary and a high school at Durazzo, Tirana, or Moscopole, “where the Romanian population is majority”.

In the interwar years, periegeses of Romanians (including ministerial officials) at their Balkan brothers will continue to take place, but without the public echo and significance of the information to the period to which were circumscribed the above facts.

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**THE GOVERNMENT ALTERNATION
BETWEEN THE NATIONAL-LIBERAL PARTY
AND THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY: A FUNDAMENTAL TOPIC
REFLECTED IN THE ROMANIAN PRESS (1895-1914)**

*Cosmin-Ștefan Dogaru**

Abstract

Given the fact that not even the universal male suffrage was guaranteed, Romania could not really be defined as a democratic society at that time. It was built nevertheless on the basis of a liberal regime that contributed to a great extent to the consolidation of the press among other improvements in the Romanian political life such as the consolidation of the two political parties, the National-Liberal Party (1875) and the Conservative Party (1880), the positive part played by Charles I within the political regime, the involvement of both the liberal and the conservative political leaders in the evolution of the two-party system (developed according to the British classical model of government), the reform of the electoral system etc.

The present study intends to show how the press encouraged and supported the government alternation of the liberals and the conservatives between 1895-1914, which fostered the consolidation of the Romanian two-party system. My research will thus concentrate on some relevant articles collected from the press of the time in order to present the mode in which the government alternation between the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party was reflected in the Romanian press in the last years of Charles I's reign (1895-1914). In that period, the press gradually became a fundamental tool of communication, information and also political attack. Furthermore, the article aims to analyze the way in which the Romanian press supported the functioning and, gradually, the consolidation of the Romanian political regime during the years 1895-1914.

Key words: *Romanian press, public opinion, National-Liberal Party, Conservative Party, Charles I*

Introduction

In my research attempt, I am proposing an analysis of the historical facts with the methodology of the political science. During that time and especially in the Romanian realm, the press was rather in its incipient stages, but it gradually started becoming an important pillar of the political regime¹.

The public opinion, a modern concept, started becoming relevant for the Romanian realm especially after 1866, when a new political regime was created. This regime was supported by the fundamental law of the state and by the clear constitutional and institutional framework it generated. Whatever the political colour of the newspaper, the press represented the meeting point of the Western European principles, ideas and values regarding the organisation of the state (at all possible levels), which could thus manifest and develop in the newly created Romanian state.

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¹ See also Cosmin-Ștefan Dogaru, *Charles I and the Romanian Two-Party System (1866-1914): History Seen through Political Science Lenses*, Bucharest: Editura Universității din București, 2016, 440 pp.

One can assert that certain newspapers appeared before the formal foundation of the Romanian political parties. The newspapers were initially a means of information, of communication, of the spreading of new ideas, principles and values and they served the interest of different segments of the Romanian society. But gradually, the press became an instrument of attack within the political struggle, which was very much alive during that time, within a liberal political regime that was in full swing of democratization.

The 1866 Constitution and the freedom of the press

The freedom of the press was clearly stipulated in the 1866 Constitution and was respected as one of the most important citizen liberties. In Article 5, it was mentioned the fact that: *“The Romanians enjoy their freedom of conscience, the free education, the free press and the freedom of assembly”* (*Constituțiune și Lege electorală (Constitution and Electoral Law)*, 1884: 2). Likewise, in Article 24 it was explicitly specified that: *“the Constitution guarantees to everybody the freedom to communicate and publish ideas and opinions outspokenly or through the press /.../ Neither censorship nor any other measure /.../ could impede them”* (*Constituțiune și Lege electorală (Constitution and Electoral Law)*, 1884: 8-9). In this regard, the freedom of press turned out to be a major progress for that time for the young Romanian state.

The fundamental law undoubtedly constituted the juridical basis of the new regime configured in 1866. The political actors, the liberals, the conservatives and Charles I played an important part in the configuration and the creation of the political regime of the time. Together with the fundamental law, the constitutional and institutional system of the new political regime was also created. Reading the Constitution, one could notice the manner in which the political decision makers became aware of the necessity to create a liberal political regime. The new political regime was established and sustained by the political elite and the young prince with the purpose of creating a new chapter in the consolidation of the young Romanian state, and in this regard, the press was a fundamental instrument.

King Charles I – a pillar in the political regime

One can sketch here the constitutional-institutional aspect because, through his prerogatives, Charles I played an important part in the configuration and the functioning of the political regime of the time (Damean, 2016: 131-137). It is true that sometimes, under the umbrella of the constitutional factor, Charles I went beyond the function of an arbitrator, which was assigned to him, in order to manage and control the numerous political passions that could generate violent conflicts, which were extremely unproductive for the country: *“the action of the parties is related to the human passions and the control of such passions is extremely difficult and the education of the people is also extremely difficult. But the Crown is above all passions, it is our mentor and guide during this difficult work and it cannot encourage such tendencies”* (*Un minister anarhic? (An Anarchic Ministry?)*, 1901: 1).

In time, Charles I became a factor of stability of the political regime, managing to keep under control some unfruitful desires or personal interests of certain politicians. Nonetheless, gradually, after the stabilisation of the Romanian two-party system in 1895, Charles I's influence had been considerable in the political life, becoming a factor of balance, fact recognized by both the liberals and the conservatives. Regarding the evolution of the press in that period, “although often attacked in the press, Charles I respected the fundamental liberties sanctioned by the Constitution and did not limit the

freedom of the press” (Dogaru, 2016: 302). Still, Charles I proved to be a constitutional monarch and appreciated the need of a strong press in the construction of the Romanian state.

Towards an organized alternation – step by step

Gradually, both the liberal leaders and the conservative ones started recognising the role of the government alternation of the two important political forces and the necessity of an organised alternation. The route to an organised alternation was achieved with difficulty nevertheless due to the general mentality of the politicians. However, in time, Charles I managed to adapt the political-social reality of the country to the new system and to impose a new political demeanour, according to the western European standards.

In time, both the conservative and the liberal press became interested in the configuration of the political regime through the operation of the power alternation of the liberal and conservative groups and, later, of the two government parties, the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party (the formation of the two parties went through a long process – the National Liberal Party was formed in 1875 and the Conservative Party in 1880). The political leaders, both liberals and conservatives, became conscious of the need of an organised alternation with the goal of consolidating the Romanian state. The Crown became a part of this state and guaranteed the normal functioning of the political regime. Gradually, the constitutional monarchy, became a factor of mediation between the two political parties and a sort of political balance was instituted between the Crown and the two government parties.

The part played by the two parties in the framework of the Romanian political regime

In a pertinent article from *Timpul* (*The Time*), the role of the two parties in the configuration of the Romanian political regime was mentioned: “*the political history of the country was the same as that of the two great political parties [the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party]*” (*Partidele politice I (Political Parties I)*, 1890: 1). Moreover, the British model of government was really appreciated as a viable model to be followed in Romania during that time. The British model offered stability and the Romanian state needed this stability in order to strengthen the modernisation process that started in 1866. This way, again in *Timpul* (*The Time*), it was noted that: “*England offers us a useful piece of advice: the two great parties that, under the names of whigs and tories, have existed for centuries, could fully satisfy the multiple needs and different aspirations that appeared during this long period of time*” (*Partidele politice III (Political Parties III)*, 1890: 1).

Also, in *Constituționalul* (*The Constitutional*), in a relevant article, the existence of the two parties, the liberals and the conservatives, within a political regime was analysed as follows: “*against a liberal party there always is, in all constitutional states, a conservative party. This is what happens in all constitutional states. This is natural and indisputable*” (*Conservatorii (The Conservatives)*, 1894: 1). Although in the fundamental law there is no article that would refer to the concept of political party, the two groups (the liberal and the conservative) together with Charles I configured and elaborated the Constitution of 1866, which was to become the juridical basis of the new political regime: “*it is obvious that the wise Constitution that asked for two parties hinted at the possibility to compare the capacities of one party and those of the other*” (*Guvern capabil (Capable Government)*, 1895: 1).

The National-Liberal Party – ready to come in power

The liberals would remain in opposition for seven years (1888-1895), the government alternation being decided to a great extent by king Charles I, who was convinced that the National Liberal Party had to come back to power. The king, a rational and wise man, wanted a real balance of power between the two important parties of the country: the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party.

Between 1891 and 1895, the Junimea group participated in the government alongside the Conservative Party but it behaved as a separate group while in opposition – obviously, out of pragmatic reasons: “*after the fall [1895], they do not remain in the Conservative Party organisation, but they go back to their club and call themselves “the Constitutional”. Through such a deed, they admit that they worked as a separate group that was united with the Conservative Party only as long as they governed together*” (*Acțiune rea (Bad Action)*, 1901: 1). Through this article, the newspaper *Conservatorul (The Conservative)* attacked the Junimea group that had left the government in October 1895 and opened the way for the liberals. However, the accession to power of the liberals was decided by the monarch in order to permit the stabilisation of the two-party system. After 1895, this was achieved through the functioning of another type of alternation, in which the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party naturally alternated in power in an organised manner (each of them governing for about four years).

Thus, the peaceful transfer of power was achieved in 1895, a moment in which one could observe the passing from a disorganised alternation to an organised one, which was more efficient (1895-1914). This relevant episode was mentioned by the newspaper *Timpul (The Time)* in 1899, which referred to this aspect of the new type of politics (the government alternation had become a reality to which the politicians were already accustomed): “*we, the conservatives, set the bases of the beneficial system through which the natural rotation of the parties in ruling the state was done without violent changes through the intervention of the Crown*” (*Pretențiune absurdă (Absurd Pretention)*, 1899: 1). The conservatives styled themselves as the creators of the organised government alternation of the liberals and the conservatives, but both parties alongside the king contributed to this political mechanism.

The organised government alternation of the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party – a normal and practical custom of that period (1895-1914)

Along time, king Charles I, after getting used to the Romanian political class, naturally introduced the organised government alternation of the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party in order to avoid too long an office for any of the two political parties, which could create abuse in the game of power and could generate an involution of the liberal political regime on its way to democracy.

Whatever its political power, the press was very active within the Romanian political regime. The government alternation of the liberals and the conservatives was a highly debated issue also in the newspaper *Era Nouă (The New Era)*: “*in the natural order of the facts /.../ when the liberals will fall, the conservatives will have to take their place. We will be surely satisfied to see our friends having again the occasion to apply their ideas in government and use the experience they gained during their last period of government*” (*Era Nouă (The New Era)*, 1896: 1).

The liberal government lasted since 1895 until 1899. Under these conditions, the causes of the fall of the liberal government can be observed in two directions: the first reflects the errors made by D.A. Sturdza abroad and the second is configured around the

strong and frequent internal fight within the National-Liberal Party. Thus, in *Constituționalul* (*The Constitutional*) is reflected that “*the crisis in the Liberal Party legitimates the transfer of power to the conservatives /.../ The conservatives received the task to create the new government*” (*La capăt* (*At the End*), 1899: 1). The consolidation of the two-party system was a certitude and the government alternation was being developed within the well known parameters.

The government succession between the liberals and the conservatives becoming a custom

G.Gr. Cantacuzino (president of the Conservative Party) also supported the two-party system. In 1899, he was analysing the mechanism of government alternation in *Constituționalul* (*The Constitutional*) as follows: “*once the liberal government falls, it is in the natural order of things that the Conservative Party comes to government /.../ without a regular government alternation of the parties, the parliamentary regime would become the worst of all tyrannies, the anonymous tyranny /.../ when the liberal party could not rule the state anymore, it was the Conservative Party’s turn as, when we are not able to rule the state anymore, it will be again the liberals’ turn*” (*Discursul program* (*The Programme Discourse*), discourse delivered by the Prime Minister G.Gr. Cantacuzino at the party that took place in the National Theatre Hall on the 14th of May, 1899: 1). The president of the Conservative Party militated for the balance of power, which could be achieved only through the regular succession of the two government parties.

The organised government alternation of the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party permitted the stabilisation of the Romanian two-party system and lead to a collaboration of the two political forces towards the good of the country. Consequently, the newspaper *Viitorul* (*The Future*) considered that “*the collaboration of the two parties /.../ could be a means of political education for the future generation and a proof for everyone and even for the foreigners that we are a people full of life that get together in cases of danger*” (*Partidele politice* (*Political Parties*), 1907: 1). Indeed, the collaboration between the two parties had to be a viable desideratum for the political elite. Also, the press turned out to be an agent of political education, regardless of the newspaper’s political attachment. So, the government alternation was reflected in both newspapers, be liberal, be conservative, ascertaining a clear direction in this matter.

Throughout that period, the political strife was strong and, in 1910, the conservatives were confronted with a strong opposition both from the liberals and from the democratic conservatives, their older colleagues until recently. In 1910, “*The Conservative Party was called by the Crown to succeed the Liberal Party and thus the Carp government was constituted /.../ the Crown /.../ considered /.../ that the only party that could take the lead after the withdrawal of the liberals were the conservatives, the only ones who could form the government*” (*Noul guvern conservator* (*The New Conservative Government*), 1910: 1). The Conservative-Democratic Party created by Take Ionescu in February 1908 was not among Charles I’s favourites because it represented an obstacle in the functioning of the power alternation of the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, the two government parties. It is an irony that, before the creation of this party, the newspaper *Ordinea* (*The Order*) (a newspaper that belonged to the conservative group lead by Take Ionescu) discussed the efficacy of the operation of the two strong political forces of that time, the liberals and the conservatives: “*it is in the interest of the country that none of these two parties become disorganised or weak*” (*Spre democrație* (*Towards Democracy*), 1908: 1).

During that time, when one of the political parties was in power and was confronted with a difficult situation (the voting of an important law, a problem of foreign politics etc.), the opposition was organising meetings and public gatherings, attacks in the Parliament and in the press, the latter representing also a means of attack in the political strife. The reasoning behind this was simple and one can translate it through the wish of the opposition to determine Charles I to get involved in order to solve the political crisis (created sometimes in an artificial manner). But Charles I was able, in time, to detect if the political conflict was true or false. Yet, under these conditions, the process of appointing a new government was pursued. There were consultations between the political leaders and Charles I, one of them was appointed as prime minister and, finally, there were elections organised. Thus, Charles I was calling the other party to govern the country in order to maintain the political balance, which could ensure the good operation of the state. However, after the stabilisation of the Romanian two-party system, *“the time when the governments were ousted under the pressure of the street had passed”* (*Fiascul opozițiunei (The Failure of the Opposition)*, 1912: 1).

Towards the end of the government alternation of the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party

In the last part of Charles I's reign (1895-1914), politicians of any political colour became conscious of the necessity of the operation of an organised alternation, which could offer political stability to the country.

Cantacuzino again supported the alternation of the two parties, the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, in order to exclude any third political force from power. Under these conditions, the possibility of the existence of a third political party was unconceivable and could represent a real danger in the operation of the government alternation of the two government parties, which were already constituted and strengthened within the political regime and the general mentality of the Romanian people. Cantacuzino believed that the functioning of the government alternation became a necessity for the reformation of the Romanian state: *“out of the gradual collaboration and alternation in power of the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, the modern Romania appeared”* (*Discursul d-lui G.Gr. Cantacuzino (The Discourse of Mr. G.Gr. Cantacuzino)*, 1911: 1). In that period, a close collaboration of the two government parties was a desideratum of Charles I and also of the conservative and liberal leaders.

At the end of Charles I's reign, the newspaper *Conservatorul (The Conservative)* was strongly attacking the Democratic Conservative Party lead by Take Ionescu: *“he had created a party and pretended to replace the Conservative Party with his own party. At that time, Mr. Take Ionescu did not even want to hear of the existence of three parties of government. He could only admit two – the Liberal Party and his own Democratic-Conservative Party /.../ But then, instead of governing alone, but periodically, alternatively with the opposition, he preferred to enjoy only a little, but permanently all the governments of all parties”* (*Un partid de colaborare (A Party for Collaboration)*, 1914: 1). The creation of the Democratic-Conservative Party in 1908 represented a crucial point in the evolution of the Conservative Party.

The operation of the Romanian two-party system intersected with the reign of Charles I. From a domestic perspective, the death of the king led to the end of the government alternation between the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. In the year 1914, in the newspaper *Acțiunea (The Action)*, the idea of a national government

was admitted in the political arena. Thus, the majority of the political leaders went to another direction: “*through the collaboration with a national government instead of a party one*” (*Guvernul național* (National Government), 1914: 1). King Charles I was not convinced of this project and, until his death, militated for preserving the power alternation between the two great parties, the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. In the domestic realm, the political elite tried to achieve the last national desideratum: the Union (this was achieved in 1918, a moment in which the Old Kingdom was united with the other Romanian territories occupied by foreign forces along time – that is: Bessarabia, Bucovina, Banat and Transylvania). In the foreign realm, the First World War started. The Romanian political elite adopted a neutrality position (1914-1916) out of rational reasons.

At the end of Charles I's reign, in 1914, out of pragmatic reasons, the liberals supported the universal suffrage and an ample agrarian reform. They also wanted their political opponents, the conservatives, on their side. In an article from *Voința Națională* (*The National Will*), the liberals addressed an invitation to the conservatives to support them for the two reforms: the electoral and the agrarian, as it also happened in the case of the elaboration of the fundamental law: “*the progress is historically immanent and those who open its way were and will always be blessed while those who oppose it will be condemned*” (*Scrisoarea unor fruntași conservatori* (The Letter of Some Conservative Leaders), 1914: 3). Even if they were political adversaries, both political forces understood that a real collaboration was needed towards ample reforms – a collaboration supported also by king Charles I, who was convinced that the great reforms were achieved with the help of the two parties, the National-Liberal Party and the Conservative Party.

The Socialists were left outside the political game

The press in Romania during that time had an active character and also a free one. Even if they did not have the possibility to get to power, other political groups were also manifesting in this register of the freedom of expression.

The harshest attacks were coming from the Socialists, who were dissatisfied with the two-party system, which was clearly excluding them from power. The Social Democratic Party of the Romanian Workers (SDPRW) was using its newspapers in different situations. In the party newspaper, *Munca* (*The Work*), around the 1892 elections, they published the following analysis: “*who are those who ask for your vote? They are /.../ the so-called “historic” parties /.../ since the Constitution and the elections exist in our country. In front of all the bourgeois political parties, there stands the Socialist Party, the party of the workers*” (*Manifestul Partidului Muncitorilor către Alegătorii Coleg. al 2-lea din Capitală* (The Manifest of the Workers' Party to the Electors of the 2nd College in the Capital), 1892: 1). In the same newspaper, the political mechanism that founded the Romanian political regime was explained in the following terms: “*the country, under the knee of Lascăr Catargiu, frightened and saddened, already expressed its will. It is conservative now as it was liberal before, under the liberals!*” (*După alegeri* (After Elections), 1892: 1).

In 1907, in another socialist newspaper, *România muncitoare* (*The Working Romania*), a severe critique was fired against the political regime of that time, providing a clear statement: “*the lack of courage of the bourgeoisie to openly impose the personal rule, the absolute monarchy, tempered only by a weak council of ministers and the alternation of the two servant parties*” (*Comedia a început* (The Comedy Has Started), 1907: 1). Further on, the newspaper explained, from the perspective of the 1907 events, that: “*the peasant movements, as they happened, are the*

crown of the anarchism of the government of the two political parties? (*Anarhie și Legalitate (Anarchy and Legality)*, 1907: 1). Certainly, the peasants' situation was indeed quite difficult and the liberal or conservative governments did not totally manage to solve this problem. It was only after 1918 that the two reforms, the electoral (M. Of., no. 191 from 16/29 November 1918) and the agrarian (M. Of., no. 214 from 15/28 December 1918) were promulgated and thus, the political regime passed to a new stage of its development: the democratic regime that succeeded the liberal one.

Conclusion

Despite all the constraints of the Romanian state of the time, one can acknowledge the fact that the press represented a positive aspect of the political regime and not only that. It was also a positive aspect of the entire age for the Romanian society in an international context. The press shaped the public opinion and led to a series of social, cultural and political changes not only in other different European states, but in Romania as well. In the Romanian case, the press was a milestone for the local political elite and led to the configuration and the consolidation of the liberal political regime that was created in 1866. The press was an instrument in the political strife and also, ensured a sort of political education in the country in that period. Nevertheless, the government alternation between the liberals and the conservatives in the last years of Charles I's reign (1895-1914) was a debated topic, reflected clearly in the Romanian press, regardless of the newspaper's orientation. In this sense, during that time, the press played an important role in the political game, perceived as a positive feature in the functioning of the liberal political regime.

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**“CHOOSE ONE OF TWO: THE DUMA OR THE GRAVE”: THE IMPACT
OF TERRORISM ON THE ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA
IN THE PERIOD OF THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION**

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Abstract

In 1905-1907 terror became a powerful tool in the Russian opposition's struggle with the government and acquired unprecedented scales. The militants terrorized not only civil servants but also average citizens. They made proscription lists, killed people who did not want to comply with their requirements. It limited to a considerable degree the most important civil liberties in the country: freedom of speech, press, assembly. The problem of impact of the revolutionary terror on the polls in the I and II State Duma of the Russian Empire has not become the subject of specific research in domestic and foreign historiography. The purpose of this article is to trace the influence of political terror on the behavior of voters, the electoral tactics of parties – participants of the first two Duma election campaigns.

This research was made on the basis of archival documents, most of which are firstly introduced in the scientific turn, as well as the materials of the periodical press of that time. The research uses the historical-typological method (for classification reviews, features articles in the press), historical-genetic, chronological, synchronous and comparative methods. The research showed that the revolutionary terror in the First Russian Revolution impeded the creation of moderate and right-wing political parties. The population that was frightened by terror, feared to participate in the elections, which was another reason for absenteeism in the Duma elections in those provinces where terror got a special scope. In addition, terror impeded election talk and the moderate right-wing political parties and, in a certain degree, contributed to the victory of the Cadets in the elections to the State Duma I, helped them and left the electoral campaign in the II Duma.

Key words: *I State Duma, II State Duma, terror, elections to the Duma, political parties, absenteeism*

Sources and historiography of the question

Historiography of Duma election campaigns of 1905-1907 developed in parallel with this process. From 1905 till October 1917 the main approaches to the problem appeared. Belonging of the authors to the confronted political parties led to distinguishing of authors' concepts and assessments in the interpretation of Duma elections problems. The features of this period were the abundance of journalistic works (Milyukov, 1906; Struve, 1907) and memoirs (Santsevich, 1906), a serious analysis of the Duma electoral right (Vodovozov, 1906; Kotlyarevsky, 1905), the publication of a huge number of statistics data (Borodin, 1906; Statistical Yearbook of Russia, 1905).

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The research of tactics of political parties in the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Empire continued in the post-revolutionary period. For obvious reasons Soviet historians studied mostly election activities of the Bolshevik Party: by 1989, Soviet Duma tactics historiography of the RSDLP (b) in the revolution of 1905-1907 had about 300 works (Tsiunchuk, 1989). At the same time practically there were no publications on election activities of ultra-right political parties. Since the mid-50s, during the so-called "Khrushchev thaw" historiographical situation begins changing: there are works devoted to political parties for the right- and left-centrist position in the first national parliament, in the first place – the Cadets and the Octobrists (Shelokhaev, 1983, 1987). The geography of research expanded significantly: the history of Duma elections in various regions of the Russian Empire begins to attract the increasing attention of scientists (Maltusynov, 1979). The most significant foreign research histories of the first Duma elections are the works of English-speaking historians (Emmons, 1983; Haimson, 1905-1914).

Since the beginning of the 1990s the important changes began to occur in the Russian historical science, associated with the gradual abandonment of dogmatic assessments and conclusions, one-sided interpretations of historical facts and events. Modern Russian historians continue to study the events of 1905-1907. Historiographical works were created, dedicated to the parliamentary elections in pre-revolutionary Russia and the activities of the first State Dumas (Vasiliev, 2001; Mogilevsky, 2007; Sadinov, 2001). The research of the organization of election campaigns in the I and II State Duma in different regions of the Russian Empire expanded (Glushkovetsky, 2013; Pireev, 2015; Smirnova, 2012). There are currently studied in detail the election programs (Omel'yanchuk, 2006) and tactics (Kostylev, 2007; Omel'yanchuk, 2014) of political parties and unions, the causes of victories and defeats in the elections to the State Duma (Patrikeeva, 2006), electoral behavior (Seleznyov, 2006), government interference in to the election process (Baranova, 2014; Minakov, 2012).

The basic material for the research was deposited in two central archives: State Archive of the Russian Federation (funds: 102 – Police Department, 115 – the Union of October 17) and the Russian State Historical Archive (funds: 1276 – Office of the Council of Ministers, 727 – E.Yu Nolde). An important source for the study of pulse of the nation during the first two election campaigns is the periodical press of that time.

Problem statement and research methods

As we can see, the research on the history of elections to the I and II State Dumas of the Russian Empire, is numerous and varied. However, the problem of the impact of political terror of 1905-1907 on the Duma elections of this period still has not been the subject of a special study. Only a well-known Israeli historian A. Geifman mentions that the Social Democrats and the Bund, believing that the parliament is a threat to the revolutionary struggle, along with propaganda against the Duma elections, have resorted to armed attacks on polling stations (Geifman, 1997).

The object of this article is to trace the influence of political terror on the behavior of voters, the electoral tactics of parties – participants of the first two Duma election campaigns.

This article uses chronological, historical and typological, historical and genetic, contrastive, illustrative methods of analysis. The chronological scope of the research is limited to 1905-1907: from the beginning of the election campaign in the I State Duma

before the end of the election campaign in the II State Duma. As we know, the I and the II Duma elections were held on the basis of a single electoral system, the main regulations of which were laid in preparation of concerning discussion and preparation of bills "Bulygin Duma". Historical and typological method allows analyzing the attitude of the revolutionary terror on the Russian public, classifying the main points of view on terrorism presented in the press of that time (see Table 4). Historical-genetic method in content to the greatest extent corresponds with the principle of historicism. It helps to identify the causes and consequences span of revolutionary terror, its influence on the course and results of the first elections to the Duma. The contrastive method is used to compare the terrorist attacks in the Russian Empire (the quantity, type and execution method) before and after the convocation of the State Duma I (see Table 1.); during I State Duma (see Table 2), as well as to compare the results of elections in the I and II Duma elections (see Table 3).

The extent of terror in the Russian Empire during the revolution of 1905-1907

The terror acquired an unprecedented scale during the election of the I and the II State Duma of the Russian Empire. According to incomplete data of the Police Department, only from February till May 1906 terrorists shot and seriously wounded 1421 person. In 1907 there were made 3487 terrorist attacks (Leonov, 1997). Stolypin requested from the Police Department the information about the number of terrorist acts in the empire during his preparation of the government post by August 24, 1906. From 1 January till 20 August 1906 (the election campaign during the I State Duma), the police became aware of 382 succeeded and 112 failed terrorist attacks against officials, 127 attacks against private individuals. In total, there were committed 1183 terrorist attack during this period, there were killed 88 private individuals and 233 ones were wounded. The picture of terror in the empire appeared before the Prime Minister as follows:

Table 1. The figures on the number of terrorist acts in the Empire during the period from January 1 till April 27 and from July 9 till August 20, 1906 (According to the draft of the Government report).

Subdivisions of acts of terrorism by their type	The number of terrorist acts: in all	In particular, with the use of bombs	The number of killed officials	The number of wounded officials	The number of killed private individuals	The number of wounded private individuals
Succeeded attacks on officials	382	27	272	253	7	46
Failed attacks on officials	112	22	1	7	0	2
Attempted murders on private individuals	127	23	5	1	55	85
Attacks on public institutions (banks, stations, post offices, state-owned wine shops)	367	6	34	35	5	9
Attacks on private sales rooms and apartments	195	29	0	4	11	42

The number of victims of explosive shells, discovered accidentally and during searches	20	0	0	3	10	49
Total	1183	107	312	303	88	233

Moreover, during the work of the State Duma I the number of attacks continued to be high enough.

Table 2. The figures on the number of terrorist acts in the Empire in the period from April 27 till July 9, 1906. (According to the draft of the Government report)

Subdivisions of acts of terrorism by their type	The number of terrorist acts: in all	In particular, with the use of bombs	The number of killed officials	The number of wounded officials	The number of killed private individuals	The number of wounded private individuals
Succeeded attacks on officials	177	16	94	129	21	17
Failed attacks on officials	52	6	1	0	0	3
Attempted murders on private individuals	88	2	0	1	50	41
Attacks on public institutions (banks, stations, post offices, state-owned wine shops)	189	2	8	10	2	4
Attacks on private sales rooms and apartments	93	1	0	7	16	19
The number of victims of explosive shells, discovered accidentally and during searches	1	1	1	0	1	2
Total	600	28	104	147	90	86

Judges, gendarmes and police suffered from terror struck above all. Their positions often became the suicides' positions. Terror absolutely affected the behavior of civil servants: not all of them possessed the necessary strength to carry out their duties in good faith. In the capitals and the provinces a lot of officials and police left their positions because of fear of terror. Thus S. Yu. Witte in December 1905 received a letter with the ministers' criticism who left their posts at a difficult moment for the country, "the darkest peasants say who those Ministers are, when it was all right, then no minister tendered one's resignation... Then it's time of troubles in Russia, a lot of governors went into retirement, fearing they would be killed" (Letter to S. Yu, 1905). The conservative public blamed judges for passing too lenient sentences for terrorists because of fear of terrorist attacks against themselves. So, on August 12, 1906 the Kyiv office party legal order wrote to Stolypin: "... the murder of faithful servants of the Tsar and civilians, who performed their duty, not only continues, but in some areas of the Empire increased with terrifying

power ... Places of confinement became the anarchist clubs, where dangerous criminals leave away with the vaudevillian ease. Courts ... acting among the defenseless people abandoned to terror, play not only pathetic but dangerous role, definitely undermining public confidence in the force of law and public authorities". The government was proposed to clean up its ranks: "... those who are weak and weak-willed have no their place now in the public service in general, and among senior government officials in particular..." (Letter to P.A. Stolypin from the Kiev Department of the Party of Legal Order, 1906).



View of the garden facade of the Prime Minister of the Russian Empire P.A. Stolypin after the attack on Aug. 12, 1906.

The photo is taken from the Wikipedia site: <https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki>

The terror was directed not only against the authorities, but also against public leaders, ordinary citizens and even foreign nationals. On September 17, 1906 the General British Consul in Warsaw A. Murray informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom E. Gray, that in connection with the expected in the nearest future murders of Jews in the Warsaw socialists openly declared about their intention to kill the consul, in order "to provoke foreign intervention...", with "general belief" that it's really going to happen was so great that a lot of the employees of the diplomatic service left the city. However by his own confession A. Murray always being skeptical "regarding the riots, which were pointed in advance" informed his superiors that in case of unfavorable

forecasts, “duplicate keys from a consular safe are at the embassy in Berlin” (Consul-General Murray to Sir Edward Grey, 1906). The British consul was killed not, but a lot of foreign employees were affected by terror. In October 1906 the worker Korneev killed mechanic Sheridan who was a member of “Nevsky Thread Mill” in St. Petersburg. After this incident three directors of the English factories in Russia, paid a visit to the British ambassador, informing him of the desire of a lot of British specialists to return home because of the fear of terrorist attacks. The directors were convinced that if “one fatal incident happens, the entire corpus of the English workers will leave St. Petersburg”, which will lead to the closure of factories and unemployment of 5,000 workers (Nicolson, 1906).

The terrorists achieved that fear had become a permanent factor in the country's life, determining the behavior of its citizens. Intimidate society often did what the terrorists demanded. Kutaisi governor wrote: “A rigorous and consistent application of the system of terror to the people who oppose the revolutionary movement, rigorous and systematic course of committee actions that has at its disposal considerable funds, led to the fact that all his orders, sent by some unknown persons, are executed implicitly by the whole population, fearing revenge for disobedience” (Reports of the Kutaisi Governor to the temporary Kutais Governor-General on measures to combat the revolutionary movement, 1905). Such messages were received from other places of the empire. The population felt a neurotic fear of possible terrorist attacks. For example, a terrible panic and stampede began in Rzhev in summer in 1907 during a cross procession when some “ill-intentioned people” as it turned out who wanted to commit theft, using panic, began to shout: “a bomb was thrown” (Report of the Police Department of Tver Province). The provincial member of the city Duma of Poltava Zemstvo V.I. Mezentshev in his letter to Yu. Witte correctly noted the national mood at the end of 1905: “All the peaceful and sensible society is terrorized.” You should not appeal upon the support of well-thinking people; they cannot, they do not dare to utter a word against terror that seized them – although they do not sympathize with the revolution at all” (Letter to S.Yu, 1276).

Elections to the I State Duma

Of course, such situation could not have failed to influence the behavior of political parties and citizens during the first and second election campaigns. After the promulgation of the Decree of 11 December 1905 the first Duma election campaign started, all the newly formed parties of the Russian Empire, as well as the parties that were able to be formalized, involved in to the election campaign.

In Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century in the time of practically absence of a large number of bright, well-known names in politics, with the weak development of the media it was very difficult to win the election alone. Thus, the elections in St. Petersburg showed the “total and decisive” predominance of party lists to individual candidates and the complete failure of small parties, non-partisan lists (Elections in St. Petersburg, 1906; Lensky, 1906). The activity of so-called «non-partisan Committee of St. Petersburg» was not prosperous. Moscow elections also had “doubtless result of the voting not for a person, but a party program” (Venevsky, 1906): there were only 0.6% of all votes for the non-partisan candidates (Elections in the City of Moscow to the State Duma of the first call, 1908). As the local reporters pointed out, in the elections in Tiflis voters also voted “not for individuals, but for the party” (I.K., 1906). The example of the

first parliamentary elections in Kiev is significant in this respect. Non-partisan candidates were forced to hold a special meeting where a question was: whether to support the struggling party or to put their own list of electors from united “wild” candidates (Sikorsky, 1906). Only the Cadets were organized, disciplined, with “the European manner” at the Elections to the I State Duma. They were the ones who walked away with the election in the I Duma. They studied very carefully the experience of election campaigns of those states where parliamentary democracy had been existed more than a dozen years – Great Britain, France, and USA. Their pre-election propaganda was purely targeted, the cadets appealed primarily to a group of voters, who made up the party support and electoral commission carried out door-to-door round of the residents in order to ascertain their political affiliation, and the recruitment of new members to the party. Selection of the Electoral College was carried out very carefully and cautiously. At the final stage of the election campaign the Cadets used very effectively the unproven and unavailability of the technology of voting. The voter had to fill in the ballot the names of worthy, in his opinion, candidates for electors in his area. However, it was not mentioned in the instructions for the elections: whether the voter should do it by one’s own, and only if at the polling stations. Taking this into account, the constitutional Democrats stocked up in advance with lots of filled hard copy ballots and the day before and on Election Day, they handed out to everyone. “... They made a simple thing, – Cadets’ ill-wishers noted – ballots with the names of their candidates were sent to all voters. Just come and drop. And the forms were the Duma ones, so for the dull voter it was equivalent to the order of the authorities” (Diary of S.I. Smirnova-Sazonova, 1906). Constitutional democrats were not afraid of the revolutionary terror: because of their tactics and attitude and to the radical organizations the Cadets were perceived by the public as the left political party. By the end of 1905, they believed that “now is not the time to fight with the extreme parties”, and those who want to fight the revolution, they offered “to leave the party and the political life” (Minutes of the Central Committee and foreign groups of the Constitutional Democratic Party, 1994). Constitutional democrats did not condemn the terror of the left parties, but they justified it by using it in their struggle for power (Portnyagina, 2014). In May 1906 in the newspaper “Rech” it was published a large program article of one of the leaders of the Constitutional Democratic Party N.A. Gredeskul that reflects the attitude of the Cadets to terror. The author said that the party would assess terror with not moral, but only with political positions.

The power was declared the culprit of terror in Russia, and revolutionary terror was only a response to terror on the right: “We have before us – on the right – such rapists and terrorists, to whom all the left terrorists became pale” (Gredeskul, 1906).



March 1906. The electors of St. Petersburg in the conference room of the City Council.
Photo was published: <http://zavodfoto.livejournal.com/4629100.html>



1906. Electoral Group in to the I State Duma from St. Petersburg in the Salt town hall.
Photo was published: <http://zavodfoto.livejournal.com/4629100.html>



March 1906. The group of voters on the stairs of Stock Exchange,
where the election of electors takes place in to the I State Duma.
Photo was published: <http://zavodfoto.livejournal.com/4629100.html>


The right monarchist camp unlike the Cadets was not prepared for electoral battles. An acute shortage of campaign literature, and clearly sets out the main provisions of available electoral programs; lack of talented speakers that could influence voters; catastrophic inability to competently hold discussions with political opponents; lack of coordination in the election campaign that prevented them from spending their candidates; inexperience in political technologies were founded. Such state of affairs has given rise to a number of even modern scholars view that elections to the I State Duma, the extreme right simply boycotted (The authorities and the opposition. The Russian political process of the twentieth century, 1995; Kirillov, Kirillov & Popov, 1999; Smirnov, 1998).



March 20, 1906. The election of electors in the I State Duma in Salt town hall.
St. Petersburg.

Photo was published here: <http://zavodfoto.livejournal.com/4629100.html>

“Union of October 17” had a similar situation where the first Congress, despite the abundance of resolutions, failed to develop a clear election program. Octobrists sought to compensate the absence of an effective electoral program by advocacy among the general population. Immediately after the formation of the “Union” its leaders began to create their own publishing organs and the selection of journalists, which was rather difficult, and completely new activity for them. Thus, according to the correspondent of the newspaper “New time” that was popular at the time of the writer S.I. Smirnova, the leaders of the “Union of October 17” had repeatedly referred to her with a request for cooperation, recognizing that “they do not understand anything in the newspaper business” (Diary of S.I. Smirnova-Sazonova). As a result the I Duma election campaign was failed completely for pro-government parties and unions: none of the candidates of the extreme right took the place in the parliament and Octobrists took place in trace amounts. Most of the deputies were the Cadets and the non-party peasants.



Tauride Palace Hall meetings on the eve of the opening of the I State Duma April 27, 1906 Central State Archive of Film and Photo Documents of St. Petersburg (St. Petersburg CSAFPD) E 16232.

Elections to the II State Duma

The election campaign in the II State Duma, was significantly different from The election campaign in the I one. The Cadets had a new dangerous opponent – left socialist party, and the party standing to the right of the Cadets, had learned lessons from the I Duma campaign. “The Black Hundred “for the new year was far better organized than at the beginning of 1906” (Rech, 1907), – the Cadet “Rech” wrote in January 1907. II State Duma was much more inclined to the left than the first one was. The Socialist parties won about 40% of the seats. The Cadets suffered a real defeat at the election. They were about 90 people in the II Duma – and it was twice less than in the I Duma. However, the II Duma election campaign allowed the Cadets to test their programmatic slogans more thoroughly, to work through techniques of pre-election propaganda. The election results in to the II State Duma were more favorable for pro-government parties in comparison with the last election campaign.

Throughout the country, pro-government forces managed to win a quarter of the electoral votes and stood on a par with the left block (25.8%). “The Black Hundred” and Octobrists won 54 parliamentary seats – that was a tenth of the parliamentary seats”. The elections to the II Duma brought us not a defeat, but a brilliant victory, – “Russkoe Znamya” wrote about this. Our deputies will be in Duma; they will stick like a limpet: there are few of them, but let us remember how our Union was born, whether there were

a lot of members in it in the terrible year for Russia and how many they are now” (Russkoe Znamya, 1907).

Table 3: The number of deputies from the main political parties of the Russian Empire in the I and II State Dumas (The State Duma of the Russian Empire, 2008).

	I State Duma (27.04-08.07.1906)	II State Duma (20.02-02.06.1907)
Total number of deputies	497	517
Cadets	178	124
Octobrists	40	35
Laborists	110	78
Social Democrats	18	64
Socialist-Revolutionaries (the SRs)	–	38
Right	–	49

The influence of terror on election campaigns

In addition to the above-mentioned difficulties of the election campaign, right-wing and moderate parties faced with another difficulty: it is quite dangerous to belong to these parties, to be their leaders. Just the members of the Union of the Russian people during the revolution of 1905-1907 mostly suffered from terror (Book of Russian sorrow. Monument to Russian patriots who died in the struggle against the internal enemy, 2013); V.M. Purishkevich during 1905-1906 received four death sentences (Ivanov, 2011). And if the men-at-arms of “the Black Hundred” limited themselves to fights with the revolutionaries, the latter answered them terror. One of the major terrorist attacks against the St. Petersburg branch of the Union of the Russian people was an explosion in a restaurant “Tver”, where the workers monarchists gathered. 20 people were injured, six of them were seriously injured, and two were killed because of three bombs that were thrown in the restaurant window. In fact, only seven victims belonged to the Union of the Russian people (Bulatsel, 1906). A certain revolutionary Serge wrote about this terrorist attack to his foreign correspondent: “In response to the fact that ‘the Black Hundred’ beat revolutionary-minded workers at the outskirts of the capital, the militants threatened them with death, and they performed it by throwing three bombs at the meeting of the leaders of the hooligans at the Nevskaya Zastava”. Then the reporter announced with pride that in addition to this, gunmen killed “leaders that were sentenced to death”, and daily terror kills “the general, police officer and two policemen” in the provinces (Excerpt from a letter that says, “Sergei – to E.N. Pavlinova”, in Paris, 1906). The representatives of the right and moderate parties had to show a lot of courage to carry on their election campaigning, not responding to the terrorist threat. V.M. Purishkevich had to endure a lot of anxious days during the elections in the II Duma from Mr. Ackerman. Moreover, he constantly received letters with such kind of threat, “choose one of the two: the Duma, or the grave”(Russkoe znamya, 1907) his phone did not work and his state-owned packages addressed in his name, “disappeared without a trace” (Russkoe znamya, 1907).



V.M. Purishkevich – one of the leaders of the right monarch party “Union of the Russian People.” Photo is posted on the Wikipedia site: <https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki>

On January 17, 1907 in Simferopol there was an attempt to murder the deputy chairman's daughter of the local branch of the Union of Russian People; A.V. Grankina, she was 22 years old, she was a good speaker, who lacked 'the Black Hundreds'. Monarchists considered this fact as a pre-election provocation of the left who were seeking to “make the Union of Russian People lose their balance” (Drug, 1907). The passions were rising extremely during the second campaign in Kursk. The local party committee of SRs scattered about the city seven thousand copies of leaflets that were threatening attacks all the candidates from the moderate parties (Russkoe znamya, 1907). This threat did not remain a mere name: on January 24, the chairman of the Kursk department of “Union of October 17” homeowner N.I. Plovov was killed because he did not deselect in elections (Kurskaya Byl', 1907). Right and moderate press (Russkoe znamya, 1907) wrote about this tragic event, even the British Ambassador A. Nicholson mentioned it in his report to E. Gray (A. Nicholson to Edward Grey. Report on the Events in Russia for the fortnight ended, 1907). The newspaper “Russia” in its article dedicated to the murder of N.I. Plovov directly accused in the cadets that they do not judge and ignore incidents of the left terror, use it to carry out their candidates to the Duma. The correspondent of “Russkoe Znamya” by the example of this case argued that the revolutionaries and the Cadets, using terror (“any means to an end”), violate freedom of speech and belief in Russia, “straining every effort to frustrate or derail the candidacy of moderate and right ... terrorize weak peaceful souls of townsfolk” (Cherny, 1907). Apparently, a lot of cases of threats to candidates in general are recorded nowhere, or recorded only in the minutes of the electoral assembly. For example, during the elections to the I State Duma in Chisinau the farmer-elect of Khotyn County, the right-wing S.D. Tulyulyuk was shot at the street. When was the later reported about it at the election

meeting, the engineer P.P. Dolinsky said: "When you come back to the village, you will get shot even better." Discouraged farmer appealed to the preside, asking whether it is necessary to say that he was shot and threats by engineer to the prosecutor or restrict the entry of these facts in the minutes of the meeting. The issue caused difficulty in the end, the statement elector was written in the minutes (Drug, 1906). Perhaps it was the terror that became the reason for refusal for some electors to accept the election. For example, in Kashira the mayor that was elected by the elector, Octobrist, has refused to accept the election. Instead of him, the commission approved the elector another person (Russia, 1906).

In the first election campaign the pre-election campaigning coincided with the process of organization of liberal and right-wing parties. I.I. Vysotsky, the editor of the right-liberal "Rizskij Vestnik", became one of the initiators of the department of the party "Union of October 17" in Riga, where the terror was rampant. He described the difficulties of creating a moderate party in the city in the letter of Central Committee of the Octobrists party. According to his words, citizens who were frightened by terror in the constituent meetings requested "not to read the lists of members of the congregation even at the meeting", that's because it wasn't possible to publish in time in the press department the membership of the party and to begin actively election talk: "just yesterday, on December 30 we managed to convince eight people to take over the duties of heads of sections for receiving entries in the members, for providing all sorts of explanations and election talk (Letter of I. Vysotsky to the Central Committee of "Union of October 17", 1906).

I. Vysotsky on the pages of "Rizskij Vestnik" accused cadets that their press calls them bureaucrats, "the Black Hundred" and reactionaries of all who disagree with the provisions of the program of their party, so people from the fear of being enrolled in "the Black Hundred" go to the Cadets (Rizskij Vestnik, 1906). Apparently, the fear of terrorism forced the leadership "of the Union of October 17" to announce the party list at the last moment, explaining the precautions (Novoe Vremya, 1906). As a result, the list of candidates to the electors in St. Petersburg from the "Union of October 17" and belonged to him the electoral bloc of parties was published in press only on March 16, 1906, i.e., four days before the election (Ibid). The names of the Moscow electors from moderate parties appeared in press three days before the election (Russkoe Slovo, 1906). According to convictions of a well-known publicist, future parliamentary correspondent A.A. Pylenko, the voter simply did not see this list (Novoe Vremya, 1906).

Despite the danger of terrorism, Octobrists and the right, unlike the Cadets, became those social forces, which actively joined the fight against this terrible phenomenon. First of all, they began to form hostile attitude towards terror of public opinion (Portnyagina, 2014). Octobrists made the fight against terror one of the key ideas of his campaign for the elections to the II Duma. Thus, "Voice of Moscow" constantly published calls of the Central Committee Party to the citizens of Moscow who wanted a workable Duma and for those who came out "against anarchy and against violence on the part of the revolutionary parties," to vote for Octobrists. Besides condemnation of terrorism, the electoral appeals of the Central Committee consisted of the criticism of Cadets, who refused to renounce violence in the I Duma (Voice of Moscow, 1906). However, during the revolution, not these social forces, but left-liberal press had a huge impact on public opinion in the country. In a short time the Cadets, in addition to the central organ of the

party newspaper “Rech”, could start the production of more than 70 party newspapers and magazines, thousands of copies of brochures and leaflets. The Cadet press regarded the revolutionary terror not as a crime but as a means by which a society is forced to use in the struggle against the autocracy and arbitrary of the power. Certainly such attitude of the left liberals to terror contributed to its scope.

Table 4. An attitude of Russian public towards the revolutionary terror

The focus of social thought	Press that expresses public opinion	Attitude to terror
The right-wing conservatives	“Drug”, “Den”, “Kurskaya Byl”, “Russkoe Znamya”	Active condemnation of terror, creating a negative public opinion in relation to the terror
Moderate conservatives	“Novoe Vremya”, “Russia”	Active condemnation of terror, creating a negative in relation to the terror of public opinion
The left liberals	“Rech”	Did not condemn the revolutionary terror, they used it in the struggle for power
The right-wing liberals	“Warszawa Vestnik”, “Voice of Moscow”, “Rizskij Vestnik”, “Slovo”	Active condemnation of terror, creating a negative in relation to the terror of public opinion

Terror as a cause of absenteeism of voters

Participants of the first and second elections to the Duma faced with such phenomenon of the election campaign as the absenteeism of voters, in other words – evasion of voting. “... Our main opponent showed in the elections to the I Duma. It was the absenteeism of voters” – the candidate from the right V.V. Shulgin remembered (1990). Most often, the polling congress attracted about 10% of the electors, in some cases, their number decreased to 1-5% (Rech, 1906). There are shown different causes of absenteeism in historiography: the urgency of the election, the weakness of party propaganda, government pressure on voters, rejection of the idea of popular representation, the influence of the idea of a boycott of the election in the I State Duma by the left parties and others (Kostylev, 2005; Malysheva, 2015; Patrikeeva, 2007). However, the researchers have overlooked one more reason for absenteeism – political terrorism that gained incredible scope at the time of the first and second election campaign and which prevented the voters come to the polls in the first place in those provinces where the scope of terror was particularly strong. A lot of citizens feared then that the terror would complicate the elections, would not let freedom of speech and assembly be realized. Moscow citizens, the participants of the first election, asked the government not to mitigate the emergency protection, fearing that otherwise they would be “deprived of their liberty and the rights granted by the Emperor ...” (Den, 1906). Russian population of the Polish Czeszochow believed that revolutionaries “by universal terror ... try to prevent the convocation of the State Duma” (Warszawa Vestnik, 1906). During the second campaign, “Official Gazette” lamented that the revolutionaries, making proscription lists, terrorizing society, largely limiting “the actual use of the population of the freedom of speech, press and assembly...” (Bulletin of Government, 1906). The right newspaper “Den”, preparing its readers for the first parliamentary elections in the Russian Empire, placed on its pages an article about the election meetings in England, where one of the speaker was thrown a the herring in to the face. The newspaper expressed the fear

that in Russia at the election meetings is not limited to “only throwing herring in to the speakers’ faces”, alluding to the bombs (Den’, 1906).

During the first and second election campaign all kinds of rumors, fears, who received confirmation in reality circulated in the country. A lot of people were afraid of possible terrorist attack directly at election meetings. “Rumors that during the election day in the provincial election meeting revolutionaries by terror will pluck these elections” were spread in Moscow (Slovo, 1906). Moscow voters feared to participate in elections to the State Duma, “pointing out that the whole point of elections concentrated in the hands of city employees who are supporters of the revolutionary movement.” The statistical office had up to 5,000 applications of this kind (Den’, 1906). There was thrown a bomb into the room where the elections were held in Bobruisk (Russia, 1906); similar cases occurred in the territory of the Poland Kingdom (Warszawa Vestnik, 1906). There were also rumors about the possible theft and destruction of electoral lists. In order to reassure the public, the government has taken measures for its protection (Russia, 1906, February 25, March 7). However, in Libava, Lodz, Samara, Odessa, the postmen who delivered the electoral agenda, printing workers, party activists, prepared the lists of electors were attacked (Russia, 1906, April 7).

Conclusions

The State Duma was the first Russian nation-wide representation and its elections were the first experience of the national parliamentary election campaign. These elections passed in 1905-1907 so they reflected the prevailing opposition sentiments in Russian society, the crisis of confidence in the authorities and, at the same time, expectations of the general public on a profound reform of the existing regime. The victory in the elections of leading opposition liberal party – the Constitutional Democratic was rather natural. Institutionally and intellectually pro-government parties were much weaker than their liberal opponents. However, terror had a significant impact on the elections in the I and II State Duma; it received an incredible sweep during the revolution of 1905-1907. Intimidated society during the elections to the Duma expected terrorist attacks in election meetings and at the polls. A lot of these expectations came true. The terrorists did not limited with threats of terrorist attacks, they really threw bombs into the premises of election meetings, destroying not only the lists of electors, but also undesirable from the point of view of candidates. At this stage of the research, it is impossible to determine exactly how large the number of threats to the candidates was. Apparently, these threats and warnings in general are recorded nowhere, or recorded only in the minutes of the electoral assembly. Perhaps the terror became the reason for some electors to refuse accepting the election of deputies. And, of course, terrorism became one of the most important causes of absenteeism in the elections in the provinces, where it received a special scope. In addition, it impeded election talk of the moderate right-wing parties and unions, to some extent, it was one of the reasons why the Cadets win the elections in the I Duma, helped them and left political parties the election campaign in II Duma. The Cadets used terror of the left for seating their own candidates in to the parliament; they did not condemn it, and ignored the incidents of the left terror.

During the revolution in 1905-1907, Russian media actively shaped public opinion in regard to revolutionary terror, but they could not work out a common position in condemning terror. This fact complicated the fight of the power with this phenomenon

and contributed to the further growth of the revolutionary terror. The right-wing liberals and monarchists, the governmental press actively fought against terror, shaped a negative public opinion in relation to it in the country. However, the left-liberal publications, both quantitatively and qualitatively superior to moderate and right publications introduced the tone of the relationship to the terror in the society. Left-liberal press looked at the revolutionary terror through the prism of struggle with the hated government, laying the blame on the government for its scope.

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**THE INTERPLAY OF TOWN PLANNING AND COLONIALISM:
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ALBERT THOMPSON
TO URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN LAGOS, 1920-1945**

Abiodun Akeem Oladiti, Samuel Ajibade Idowu***

Abstract

This paper examines the historical development of town planning in Lagos under colonialism. Unfortunately, the contributions of British town planners to the development of Lagos have not been given scholarly attention by historians. It is therefore against this background that this study attempts to historicize the development and politicization of town planning activity in the colony of Lagos from 1920 to the end of the Second World War in 1945. This work also highlights the contributions of British town planners to urban development in colonial Lagos with particular emphasis on the specific roles played by Albert Thompson. During the period of study, the colonial government employed surveillance, inspection, modification of built form, provision of municipal facilities, and the demarcation of space to plan the environment. However, the challenges faced by town planning during the years of the great depression and the Second World War were conspicuous; these are also discussed in this paper. Finally, some directions for future research were suggested.

Key words: *Town Planning, Colonialism, Urban Development, Lagos*

Introduction

Town planning took root in the conscious regulation of the urban environment by the State (in one institutional guise or another). In Britain, parts of Western Europe and in some U.S. cities, it began as a response to the legacy of 19th-century industrialism and problems associated with the management of urban growth. Around the turn of the century, the idea of regulating the use of private land in towns acquired an unprecedented appeal. Reformist opinion argued that a healthy, pleasant environment could be obtained at little cost, while better housing promised to relieve social tensions. Cross-fertilization between national states permitted an international leap forward in planning theory and practice. Urban conditions were conducive, the imperatives for reform were well grounded and an elite group of highly influential people. In colonial Africa, the colonialists embarked on modern urbanization, which was mainly one-sided. Similarly, town-planning efforts in Africa during colonialism suggest that colonial cities were often dual cities, and spatially segregated between the colonial administrative employees and the native settlers. Town planning in Britain's colonies was thus intended to benefit the colonial officials and British business rather than the subject peoples. Nevertheless, these contributions cannot be neglected or wholly criticized as they have created a platform upon which modern town planning in Africa subsists. Town Planning as a modern

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phenomenon and a 19th Century term first formally used by the British in 1906 as contained in Housing, Town Planning, etc Act of 1909. The modern planning activity within the corporate Nigeria is traceable to Lagos, being the well known point of early colonial adventure in the country. Before the appointment of Albert J. Thompson in 1928, colonial planning was done without the benefit of a resident professional town planner. However, with his appointment as the colony's Town Planning Officer, town planning in the colony of Lagos in particular received more professional flair. For example, Thompson redesigned the Yaba Housing Estate and prepared a report proposing strategies for economizing layouts between 1927 and 1928 (Njoh, 2007: 76).

In order to achieve the objective of this paper, the work is divided into seven sections. The introductory section sets the tone of the entire study. The second examines colonialism and the advent of town planning, while the third discusses the influence of British Town Planning in Nigeria, the fourth highlights the contributions of Albert Thompson to Urban development in Lagos, the fifth examines Town Planning and the Great Depression. The sixth analyses the impact of the Second World War on Town planning while the seventh is the summary and conclusion on how British influence affected the development of planning following the challenges of the Great Depression and the Second World War.

Advent of Town Planning in Nigeria

Arguably, colonial town planning in Nigeria was informed by two major factors namely to enhance trade and to improve the comfort of the European settlers. Town planning schemes were also employed as a strategy for promoting public health. It would be recalled that the Lagos Town Improvement Ordinance promulgated in 1863 as the first known planning-related legislation was informed by the poor state of sanitation in Lagos. The colonial administration did not engage in developmental efforts for the general populace until the bubonic plague of early 1920 when planning of Lagos commenced. The administration concentrated efforts on the provision of housing to its staff in the railways, police, and civil bureaucrats; this led to the formation of government residential areas (G.R.A.) and some African quarters. These efforts later led to the development of workers housing estates Olugbenga (2014). Thus, town and regional planning in Nigeria began when the British colonial authorities initiated programs towards housing development, improving road construction, building control, public health safety, environmental hygiene, zoning land for specific developmental purpose and the development of ports. Njoh (2007). The most striking of these programmes included colonial government initiatives on the massive project of building new roads and construction of railway lines from Lagos to Ibadan between, 1895-1912, Port Harcourt to Enugu line 1913-1915 and the Kano-Apapa railway line to link the North across the south and cementing geographical integration in the country Oyemakinde (1974). However, the tremendous rise and increase in the volume of trade encouraged the British colonial government and private enterprises to commit huge sums of money to the development of infrastructures. Extensive schemes of harbor and dredging were undertaken and successfully completed. This facilitated and enabled the first ocean-going vessel to enter the Lagos seaport in 1913 Olukoju (1992).

Lagos, which is one of the earliest administrative headquarters controlled by the British, was annexed in 1861. It was later developed as a new city that attracted people

from neighboring towns and villages. The urban development in the city provided job opportunities for young school leavers and artisans to work in the newly established railway corporations and laborers in the road construction project of the city during this period. Urban development took place in other political and administrative headquarters such as Kaduna, Port-Harcourt, Enugu and Maiduguri due to the commercial and economic interest of the British and her domineering political influence. Thus, infrastructural networks of roads and railways were laid to speed up the process of evacuating goods from the producers in their interior to the coastal ports for onward transmission to Europe Fourchard (2001).

Similarly, the colonial authorities exercised political authority through spatial and physical planning. In this regard, they seized every opportunity to influence the spatial structure of villages, towns, and regions. This was done through the writing and promulgation of laws designed to regulate the timing and growth rate of the environment for construction purposes. According to Omotola (1991), planning laws were created to protect the interest of colonial officials and other European residents and business entrepreneurs in the colony. This explains the reasons why the British colonial officials enacted laws to protect human health and welfare that were applied almost exclusively in the colonial districts of European settlers. Thus, the native settlers in the urban areas were segregated from the Europeans.

Urban regulations in the colony were specifically aimed at combating health problems faced by European within the colony (see Delancey, 1978, Curtin, 1985, Aka, 1993). The laws introduced by the colonial authorities in 1863 were the town improvement ordinance. This was followed thirteen years later by the passage of the land Act of 1876. This act gave the colonial secretary the authority to acquire for public use either by agreement or compulsion, any land within the crown colony of Lagos. One year later, the swamp improvement ordinance of 1877 was passed. However, it is instructive to note that until 1900 that these planning ordinance began to have a far-reaching effect in other towns and cities in the interior areas of Nigeria.

In 1902, an ordinance establishing European-only reservation went into effect in major towns through the colony. This ordinance was in principle intended as a form of a social control device to separate the native from living in the European neighborhood. Fifteen years later another Township ordinance number 29 of the Township Act was introduced. This Act provided regulation on matters relating to health, hygiene, sanitation and the physical separation between the European settlers and the native settlers. Aka (1993). With the introduction of planning laws, the policy of land use compartmentalization marked the influence of British town planning in Lagos metropolis. This policy emphasized the planning of sites in conforming to predetermined standard. This standard was modeled along British practices that were in force in Britain. The land use policy in the colony regulated features of plot size, floor area ratio, building heights and setback for buildings Aka (1993).

In the same vein, urban planning laws under colonialism dealt with urban infrastructures and service provision, growth management, zoning, subdivision regulation, urban design and economic development. The planning schemes that were exercised in Lagos for example covered mainly housing and road mapping. Housing delivery under colonialism generally took its origins from the power relations between the British Crown and the Colony based on the need for housing. This was in tandem with a similar working

class groups in Britain; the housing provision was through direct government intervention (Pugh, 1994). The single family housing form was occupied by the colonial masters and the key beneficiaries who were the expatriate colonial workers and those who served and protected British interest and a few indigenes that formed the social focus group that served the interest of the British (Aradeon, 1978). The colonial authorities believed that this was a logical approach to cater for their own. These houses were mainly constructed for the colonial/European settlers in the city of Lagos. The neighborhoods of the European Reserve Areas were characterized by their modern architectural designs and seclusion from the indigenes in colonial Lagos. For much of the colonial period, urban facilities were concentrated in the European residential areas and in the areas where public offices were located.

Road mapping was another significant contribution of the colonial authorities to city planning in Lagos. Mapping of the city provided a master layout plan for the city growth and development. Colonial mapping started in 1791 with the establishment of the Board of Ordnance Survey and the extension of British systems such as education, government, military, operations to her colonies. It was clear to the colonial powers that maps were essential for all development projects in the colonies. Thus a program of topographic mapping had to be embarked upon prior to, or simultaneously with, the development projects. However, Mapping in Nigeria is reported to have started in 1910, corresponding to the end of the Second World War, the pace was not commensurate with that of the colonial headquarter. The advent of the First and Second World Wars appeared to have placed the necessity for reliable and up-to-date maps in the British colonies. This made the colonial office be in want of maps of the colonies (including Nigeria) for various purposes. Hence, the need to embark on the mapping of these colonies. By 1945 the colonies office approved the establishment of the Directorate of colonial (Geodetic and Topographical Surveys) (DCS), which was later renamed as Directorate of Overseas (Geodetic and Topographic) Surveys DOS. This became the central mapping organization charged with the responsibility of carrying out geodetic and topography surveys in British colonies and was to be financed under the colonial development and welfare Act. They were, however, to carry out geodetic and topographical surveying and mapping if they had the resources. (Balogun, 1987; Obafemi, 2003) Balogun (1992) has classified colonial mapping in Nigeria into five different periods: the period dominated by exploration and the mapping of Nigerian rivers (1788-1861); the period of colonial expansion and consolidation and the mapping of colonial units (1861-. 1910); revenue searching and mapping for geological and revenue surveys period (1910-1926); period of systematic triangulation (1926-1939); and the period of aerial survey and topographical mapping (1946-1960). Each of the periods was marked with a definite mapping program. According to him, by 1939 when the Second World War started, the triangulation of the country had not been completed. However, the adequate foundation had been laid for accurate topographical mapping, which started after the war. In Lagos, the early British town planners who were invited to plan the city by the colonial government articulated the city mapping. Thus, streets and roads linking one another and housing were named and numbered in serial order within the neighborhood in the mainland, Island and in other parts of Lagos state.

The Influence of British Town Planning in the colonies of British West Africa

The British colonial authority greatly influenced town planning activity in Nigeria. According to Morris (1983), Britain was the chief exporter of municipalities and through the agency of her empire broadcast them everywhere. Half of the cities in American East owe their genesis to the British Empire, most of the cities in Canada, many of the cities in Africa, all the cities of Australasia and the city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong. Urbanism was indeed the most lasting of the British imperial legacies in the colonies of the British West Africa. Modern cities in Nigeria and other parts of British West Africa were created through the British influence.

According to Home (1990), British overseas expansion in Nigeria was achieved through the 'planting' of municipal and town planning activity. The British greatly influenced town planning with the wide geographical disparities in the level of urbanization and population. The introduction of laws and legal institutions of the imperialists into the British colonies of West Africa was an indispensable instrument for protecting and safeguarding their interest. For example, ordinances modeled along British laws were declared in 1863 that 'the laws of England shall have the same force and be administered in this settlement as in England, so far as such laws and such administration thereof can be rendered applicable to the circumstances of this settlement'. With the introduction of ordinances in the colonies of British Africa, the English law became a firm basis for British colonial administration and town planning organization.

The British established their colonial presence first in the coastal areas and later in the hinterland, conquered the African territory and governed it directly, with no indigenous authority protest. The expansion into the interior of African colonies in Africa in the early 20th century was controlled by the legal device of indirect rule. Town planning in Britain's colonies was thus intended to benefit the colonial officials and British business rather than the subject peoples. For instance, the large Yoruba towns of Western Nigeria with the exemption of Lagos, which was the political and economic hub of colonialism were virtually ignored by the town planners apparently because of official reluctance to interfere with the 'traditional' social structures. Apart from the creation of the ports, mining activity from extractive industries, communication and other new settlements created by the needs of colonial administration, the indigenous subjects attracted little or no town planning activity Home (1990).

Colonial influence shaped the political structure of planning. The urban built environment expressed their aspirations and ideals through the funds received from colonial officials. It was to be well-ordered, sanitized and amenable to regulation. The strategies employed to achieve this were surveillance and inspection, the modification of built form, provision of municipal facilities and the demarcation of space. The desire to protect British interest in West Africa made it necessary to recruit town planners of British nationality into the departments of Land and survey, public works, and Health departments. The Professional British Town planners recruited by the colonial government were both Architects as well as urban city Planners. Home (2007).

Architecture and planning in colonial Nigeria shaped urban landscape as British architects mainly designed buildings, public works and laying out of towns. In the early twentieth century, many architects were active as town planners in the colonies Oladiti (forthcoming). Some of them included Colonel R.H. Rowe, a civil engineer and the prime mover of the Lagos Executive Development Board, Albert Thompson, an Architect and

planning advisor and consultant to the ministry of Land Survey in Nigeria. Maxwell Fry and Jane Drew later in 1942 were appointed to serve as planning Adviser to the Resident Minister of the colonies of British West Africa in Gambia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra-Leone Home (2007). Inclusive was Mr. K.W Farm who held a diploma certificate in Town planning. He was an Associate member of the Royal institute of British Architect (ARIBA) and an assistant to Maxwell Fry Oladiti (forthcoming).

Other British Town planners who worked in other colonies in Africa and Asia included Sir William Mclean (1877-1967) who worked as a civil engineer in Sudan and Egypt, Mr. A.E. Mirams, who worked as a surveyor and engineer in Bombay and Uganda, H.V. Lanchester (1863-1953), the founder of the Town Planning Institute; he worked in New Delhi, Madras and Zanzibar. Their histories and contributions to town planning are worth examining as case studies in the development of planning in India, Uganda, Egypt, and Singapore respectively Home (1990).

These Planners generally advised the colonial government on how to commence effective town planning in the city. This advice assisted Town Planning Authorities, to initiate and implement town planning scheme dealing with land utilisation and layouts, tarring of major town roads, proposed new roads, market development, refuse collection, drainage of streams and swamps, conservancy service and sewerage scheme, car parks, improvement and extension of water supply, control of advertising and building control mechanism.

The British involvement in the laying of towns in the environment in West Africa synthesized the architecture of European culture in the design characteristics of new buildings like the prisons, the University College, government secretariat, European reserved areas and government hospital buildings. The erection of these structures by the Europeans provided the enabling environment for human activity, ranging from public buildings and parks or green space to the neighborhood. It included other supporting infrastructures such as water supply and energy networks. This was aimed at improving the community well-being with the construction of 'aesthetically, health improved and environmentally friendly landscape and living structures'. The colonialists, through a coordinated development plan, built an environment that combined physical elements, resources and energy to create habitable, working and recreational environments for the administrators in British colonial West Africa. (Njoh: 2007).

Albert, J. Thompson: His contributions to Town Planning and Urban Development in Lagos

Albert Thompson (1878-1940) was a British Town Planner and Architect who served as a government town planner in Nigeria from 1927 to 1932. He was born in London and trained as an Architect in the practice of Raymond Unwin and Barry Parker in London. His main contribution in the planning of modern cities in the United kingdom was recorded with the planning of Letchworth and Hampstead garden suburb. Before his new appointment in Nigeria, He had worked previously in South Africa for seven years where he designed the pinelands garden suburb of Cape Town and Durban estate. Pineland was a private township modeled closely on Letchworth, developed by a board of trustees on an 80-acre site granted by the Dutch government. Robert Home described the Pineland garden as the first garden city in South Africa. It was the first in the direction of trying on a small scale in Africa designed principles upon which great and inspiring achievements

have been reached by Europeans and American nations in the building and rebuilding of cities. Thus, Thompson helped in planning places in South Africa and Nigeria, transposing garden city ideas to a range of colonial urban circumstances Parham (2013).

In 1927, Albert J. Thompson left South Africa on an invitation by the colonial authority to take up a position as a Town Planning adviser with the colonial government in Nigeria, a position which he held for five years before his return to England in 1932. Between 1927-1932, this period witnessed significant professional activities of British Town planners in the city of Lagos. Prior to his posting to Nigeria, the British colony of Nigeria did not have a resident professional Town Planner with extensive and vast experience in the planning of cities. The term and duration of his appointment were unknown. He was placed on a salary 1400 pounds per annum with (240 pounds duty pay), on the recommendation of the consulting engineers for the Lagos drainage project, Howard Humphreys, and Sons, who had also worked in South Africa. However, there was evidence that his appointment became necessary following the criticism of the colonial government on the lack of foresight in planning new layout, pressure on the rapid growth of Lagos due to commercial and trading activity and the acute shortage of housing for the accommodation needs of the growing number of natives working under the colonial administration. At that time, the Nigerian colony was spending heavily on capital projects (water, electricity, and hospitals). In addition, another important factor that may be attributed to his appointment in Nigeria was that he had fervent enthusiasm for all that made for improvement in civic development and housing conditions in the urban metropolis and his relationship with consulting engineer whom he had earlier worked with in South Africa (Home: 1997).

Thompson took up his post within the Land and survey department following the recommendation of the consulting engineers for the Lagos drainage project handled by Howard Humphery and Sons. His first assignment in the ministry was to re-plan the Yaba housing estate, which was, according to the Nigeria Annual Colonial Report, 1924 the worst areas of Lagos town. He successfully completed this project where he achieved saving 25 acres land available from the original scheme. In 1928, the Lagos Town planning ordinance came into being in response to the outbreak of the bubonic plague which afflicted Lagos due to poor sanitary conditions Home (2007).

The Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDB) was set up under this ordinance to undertake a comprehensive land use planning and development in the city of Lagos covering housing, slum clearance (re-development) and resettlement schemes. This board set out a general principle governing land layout, construction of African staff housing scheme in Surulere, improving drainage on Lagos Island after the plague of epidemic outbreaks in the city, the reclamation of Victoria Island, West Ikoyi, Apapa and the industrial layout of Apapa, Iganmu, and Ijora Under the LEDB. The colonial government provided the initial funds of 200,000 pounds earmarked to cover the cost of drainage, swamp reclamation, slum clearance, market planning and development of suburban estates for African employees of government and European firms at Apapa, Yaba, and Surulere in the Lagos mainland Omotola (1991).

Beyond Lagos, Thompson contributed immensely to town planning in the hinterland. His design plans contributed to the development of new settlements created by colonial government especially in Enugu, Warri, Sapele, Benin and Onitsha. For example, Thompson prepared the report that attempted to economize road layouts and planned a

new industrial area for coal-related processes although; the colonial authorities did not approve it. This was due to the fact that there were local resistances from the native inhabitants opposing the implementation of the scheme following the report given by Albert Thompson to the colonial government. In addition to this, there was the drastic cut in the finances of the colonial administration on town planning due to the reality of the great depression of the 1930's Home (2007). Following the years of the great depression, (1929-1939) planning activity was redundant in the Ministry of Land and Survey Department. Consequently, he retrenched abruptly in Nigeria in 1932. Home (2007).

Town Planning and the Great Depression in Lagos

Town planning during the years of great depression 1929-1939 was a period commonly described by historians as the period of stagnancy in the provision of town planning services in the city of Lagos and its environs. It was a period in which nothing happened due to the bankruptcy that befell the British colonial government in Nigeria. Owing to the financial stringency, no new roads were constructed, as well as limited social services like water medical; education and sanitation were provided in urban areas during this period Ochonu (2006).

There were drastic reductions in the constructions of public buildings and heavy retrenchment in staff to a minimum necessary for the administration of the Public Works Department henceforth (PWD) for the maintenance of services for roads, bridges, buildings and various electric light and water undertakings in Lagos metropolis. The economic hardship faced by the colonial government reduced government expenditure on public works, road construction, Housing development, industrialization, Land use control, transportation, municipal services, physical expansion, social organization, sanitation, public health and social projects Ochonu (2009).

According to Olukoju (1992a) the great depression deeply affected every facet of the economy and society in Lagos, of which town planning was inclusive. A combination of factors has been ascribed to the causes of the depression. One, The British commercial interest in the colonies of West Africa affected trade and economic growth in the society. Two, there was a reduction in the demand for West African produce, of which as at that time, its profit was used in the development of some selected urban projects such as pipe-borne water supply, road construction, Housing development and other basic essential services like sanitation and environmental hygiene. Hence, the European merchants decided to limit the purchases of essential items of agricultural produce and the imposition of a differential duty for palm kernel export. Closely related to this, all buying of agricultural produce ceased under the instruction from British imperial authorities. The great depression in the year 1931 was described by Robert Home as an *annus terribilis*. It was a period people all- over the world were complaining of its usefulness to African colonies. In the words of Home, "it was a period recognized in history as a tentative experiment or a luxury suitable for times of prosperity instead of an insurance against waste and the application of common – sense to city development." Home (2007: 173)

During the years of the great depression, the ministry of land and survey, public works department (PWD) and the ministry of health controlled town and country planning activities in Lagos. These ministries were very weak, largely unorganized, and with limited resources to operate effectively and functionally. Often times, they were confused with its mission towards overall planning development and modernization. The

much-needed direction and encouragement from the colonial government were virtually none-existent. Thus, the federal government relegated the activities of town and country planning to the local government that was largely ill-prepared for the tasks Aka (1993).

However, as challenging as the great depression was, it is instructive to note that Lagos and some other main administrative towns in Southern Nigeria enjoyed certain town planning activities during the years of the depression. This was evidenced in the colonial annual report of 1930, in this report, it was clearly stated that public works in Lagos benefitted from municipal services like the provision of water and electricity supply. For example, Agege, a suburb of Lagos was provided with a continuous supply of water from the trunk main to other parts of the city. The water supply in Lagos was improved with the addition of aeration and chemical purification plant at the Iju water works department. Similarly, there were significant improvements in electricity distribution in the generating power plant in the power station at Lagos to improve the street lighting system in the city (NAI, 1930).

Town Planning and the Second World War in the colony of Nigeria

Town planning growth and development faced many challenges during the years of the great depression, and the consequent outbreak of World War II had a major impact on the spending cuts by the colonial administration for the growth of planning in Nigeria. Throughout the war, finances used in the administration of the colonies were dropped and this consequently affects the huge finances required for planning. Nigeria involuntarily participated in the Second World War (1939-1945); given its status as a colony to Britain. During this period, Britain was less prepared for the world war that eventually broke out in 1939 due to its financial incapability to financing the war. It was against this background that Britain needed all the support it could from the colonies to prosecute the war. Nigeria, one of the largest and biggest British colony did not disappoint Njoku (2015).

With the sudden outbreak of the World War II, funds originally kept aside for the running of the Nigerian colony were diverted to provide relief to war victims in Britain and its allies. Sir Bernard Bourdillion, the governor of the Nigerian colony launched the Nigerian War Relief Fund (NWRF). This fund was for the provision of relief materials to assists victims of the war in Britain and other allied countries Njoku (1977). A national working committee was put in place to oversee the coordination and distribution of the funds. Donations to the NWRF were received from individuals, civil servants and compulsory levies on people working in the colonial establishments Njoku (1977). Inevitably, the war affected town planning development in several ways. First, there was no coordinated action or plan towards the improvement of road networks, waste management, building control, the building of educational institutions, construction of an international Airport, National parks, walkway and the building of bridges and the introduction of an efficient and viable transport sector to run the growth of the economy. Throughout the war, all developmental and planning projects for the colony were suspended by the British imperial authority. The Nigerian political leaders started the agitation to question their own subject status and demanded freedom and right to self-determination and democracy to Nigerians Coleman (1965).

The emergence of the United States of America and the Soviet Union as the world's leading powers – both anti-colonialists and the diminution of Britain as a world power

weakened the cause of colonialism in Africa. Darwin (1988). It was until after the war that some developmental projects were introduced with a ten-year developmental plan for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the colony. Among the major projects that were executed and completed in Lagos during this period was the construction of the first Nigerian International Airport in 1947.

Conclusion

It has been established from this study that colonialism laid the foundations for urban planning and development in Nigeria. However, the country as a result of multiple factors including the two World Wars and the Great Depression did not enjoy effective coordination of urban planning development under colonialism. Most of the legislation of urban planning laws were not enforced and implemented by the colonial authorities. The advice of planning advisors on the colonies was not carried out due to limited financial support by the colonial government. The colonial government was reluctant to give the political will and support needed for the implementation planning program in the colony of Lagos especially in road transportation and road networking linking the mainland to the Island. The contributions of Albert Thompson, a British Town Planner in the development of Lagos was a milestone in the building of the town layout of the city and the creation of housing for expatriates and African natives working as civil servants in Lagos. The great depression and the eventual outbreak of the Second World War stampeded town planning in the city of Lagos until 1946 when a ten-year development was initiated by the colonial government aimed at the reconstruction of the Nigeria. Future studies may be carried out by other local researchers on the contributions of Colonel R.H. Rowe and K.W Farm to Urban development in Nigeria.

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THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN POST-COMMUNIST SPACE

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Abstract

The theories explaining the arguments of national foreign policies and actions are abundant in the scientific debate. However, the shifts of the current international security environment argue for a more specific analysis in the field of international relations. After the fall of the Soviet Union, many of the former communist states faced, among other challenges, the need to define their own foreign policies, in a world described as global. Starting from a review of the orientation these actors adopted on the international relations 'arena, this paper aims to scrutinize the way in which these strategies encompass the theoretical definitions of action. The new type of threats upon the Eastern democracies, forcing a prompt response from the political stakeholders, put under public scrutiny the frame of security strategies and common defense policies.

Key words: *security, theory, realism, international relations, Eastern Europe*

Introduction

The main goal of public policies in any modern state finds its fundamentals in ensuring a state of security, whether we speak in economic, social, political or military terms. Certain systems of states or global geopolitical demands require less security concerns than others, some of the nation-state's prerogatives in this matter being transferred to other supranational entities. After the Second World War, along with the appearance of the opposing military blocks, new geostrategic contexts emerged, offering states reliable alternatives for building common defense systems. However, leaving either of this blocks leaves said states in a situation of insecurity, each of them being in the situation of identifying viable solutions in this matter. Back in early 1990s this was the situation of the former communist-socialist countries in Eastern Europe, who installed new governing regimes, and needed to find an alternative security identity on the international arena.

Throughout time, there have been various interpretations and approaches for the concept of "*security*". Usually, it is defined in the meaning granted by Hans Morgenthau (Morgenthau, 2007: 125), being understood as the equivalent or consequence of accumulation of power. But, we often find it defined as an asset, and the power – in the meaning of Weber (Weber, 1992: 152), as "the possibility for a person, or a group of people, to accomplish their own goals through common actions, even against the opposition of others", as the way in which it can be obtained.

Among other characteristics, the concept of security is also expected to generate debate and theories about national security (Baldwin, 1997: 11). No theory of international politics emphasizes security more than the neorealist theory, which posits it as the primary motivation of states. Given the importance of security in neorealist analyses, they have devoted remarkably little attention to explaining what security

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means. In an often quoted passage, Kenneth Waltz observes: “In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured, can states seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit, and power” (Waltz, 2006: 126).

Once the systemic antagonism between USA and the Soviet Union came to an end, the understanding of the concept of security also came to a change. The traditional goal of defending national sovereignty in terms of territory, citizens and governmental system was based on two leading hypotheses: first of all, the states were considered to have absolute sovereignty, and the conflict between capitalism and communism impossible to overcome (Allenby, 2000: 5). The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in the East European states lead to the appearance of a void of power, which, translated in terms of security, represented the absence of viable long term solutions for the countries to protect themselves against the multiplication of the nature and sources of threats. We must however, in this matter, also recall the arguments of Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: “*the end of the Cold War and the uncompromising ideological confrontation it engendered opened up unique opportunities for overhauling the European system on the basis of indivisible and equal security and broad cooperation without dividing lines*” (Lavrov, 2016).

Besides, the existence of a stable construct of security and stability in Europe cannot be built without taking into account Russia, as a major player. NATO’s Eastern expansion, and its ever growing proximity to the Russian borders is regarded by Russian annalists more and more as a threat to the concept of “common European home”. The very idea that by expanding a military-political block, not being threatened by Russia at all, one may stabilize European security, is very doubtful (Gromyko, 1997: 24). This type of behavior from the former communist states in the region, and especially, from the former allies, is expected to generate nationalist reactions in Russia. As the former Russian diplomat, Anatoli Gromyko, states, “to envisage Europe of our time as a play-ground for NATO to the detriment of Russia will ultimately impair security of the whole continent. Russia will have no choice but to strengthen its armed forces and to turn to new alliances”.

Unilateral, collective and common security

The matter of security has been approached differently by states throughout history, either as a national task, or as an issue best solved through a system of alliances. The idea of nations getting together to defend from common known or presumed enemies is not of recent date, much less specific for the international organizations of the XXth and XXIst centuries.

In a world of nation states, the most frequently used concept in the matter of security was that of *unilateral competitive national military security* (UCNMS) (Newcombe, 1990: 9), each of the terms used having an accurate meaning. We can define as “unilateral” an action that is being put into effect without consulting others; “competitive” means engaging in an activity with the purpose of winning, usually while others loose. “National” can be defined as something that belongs to the broader concept of nation-state, while “Military”, of course, describes the use of force or the mere threat of using force. “Security”, as stated above, is a term that caused the spread of a large number of definitions, which can be summed up as protection from any kind of threats, implying the preservation of the conditions of the system. As Newcombe argues, the concept has been so well ingrained in our consciousness that we *equate* “security” to UCNMS without considering other meanings of “security,” or other means for achieving it.

But, as some authors argue, security cannot be achieved at the expense of others (Schäfer, 2013: 6). Actors deprived of security are possible threats. Security can only be achieved by combined efforts. This kind of conception on the international arena is definitely one that belongs to the realistic theory, although, in time, the international arena has changed due to the evolution of some of the rules of international law, by states joining intergovernmental organizations, even with a military profile, by the recent manifestation of morality, equity and reciprocity regarding the ethic norms, and by multiplying international contacts of economic nature or even between individuals. Despite these evolutions, the realist model is still fit to describe the main features of the international system.

Collective security is a system meant to provide a certain legal order – based on the principles of law – in a world defined by the existence on many leading powers, in which the international organizations do not have the ability to anticipate their enemy. According to the Dictionary of International Relations (Vaisse, 2008: 311), collective security means the fact that the security and integrity of a state are based not on its own military effort, but on the ability to seek negotiated solutions or install a system of collective guarantees. This principle is the foundation of international pacts, such as the United Nations (UN), or the former League of Nations, and it implies the acceptance, by all member states, of the collective decisions, as well as their will to apply them, including with the use of force. Some specialists in the field of international relations argue that, regarding the international organizations, the task of setting in practice the collective security belongs to the Security Council (UN), which depends on the will of the permanent members, which are the great powers. In other words, the actions taken in the name of collective defense follow mainly the interests of these major actors, assimilating or ignoring the will of the smaller member states, which often obey the collective decisions. This would explain, for instance, why the League of Nations did not succeed in setting in practice collective security. Rejecting the aggression and the aggressor appears as a successful tool of the collective security system, but, in fact the UN have a limited part, as the Americans are the ones leading all the international operations (Vaisse, 2008: 311-312).

On the other hand, common security, which can also be described as mutual, is a system created in a theoretic framework that resembles more the sociologic field, in the bipolar world, in which the enemy is known, or, it can at least be presumed. Unlike collective security, common security cannot be defined as a clear sequence of how and when the action will take place, in which the obligations of partners are clear, and in which the system can only have two situations: either war, or peace, both of global dimensions.

Common security is much less neat; we can often present it as a plurality of ideas and models used in the aim of avoiding confrontation, both in between superpowers and their areas of influence, as well as in regional crises spread all over the globe, in which local bipolarities and obvious enemies exist. Common security focuses mainly on the idea of avoiding war, one of the directions approached during the nuclear era, in which a global war implies catastrophic consequences, and even regional conflicts have a high degree of danger associated with the risk of conflicts escalation. Besides, common security does not necessarily imply the existence of an institutional security system, but rather a state of balance among the power of the states in the international scene.

While the systems of antagonism between the SU and the US continued, threats were conceptualized in a dual way, as a threat to state institutions by force (capabilities), and by

ideas (ideology) (Buzan, 1983: 109). In this context, the threat still addressed the state, and, therefore, any risk was defined and approached in the context of the nation-state's security.

Olson stated that "common security may not require a common structure. Small may be necessary as well as beautiful. But that means our having more faith in pluralism than most of us really possess. We ask for pluralism for ourselves when we assert our right to differ in Toronto or Vancouver from the Establishment. But we are less ready to let the rest of the world be genuinely different on its own terms and to arrange security in ways that may not fit our own definitions of *common*".

The evolution of the post-communist European countries

In the first years after the events of 1989, several ideas picturing the future of world politics emerged, in order to fill, at least in part, the void created by the collapse of the former world order. The scenarios created covered a wide range of possibilities, from Francis Fukuyama's announcement on "the end of history", to Samuel Huntington's predictions on "the clash of civilizations". The latter one, in particular, has implications on the evolution of international relations after the Cold War, such as the incidence of bloody conflicts that seem to be evolving around the idea of "identity policies", which includes culture, ethnicity of religion. Fukuyama's approach, launched in 1989, right before the collapse of the communist regime, was based on the theory that there were no more ideological debates to argue on. His theory proclaimed a world in which the historical progress, explained as seek of individual freedom, has reached its final destination once the fact that the communist promises were mere illusions had been demonstrated. Just like the hereditary monarchies, fascism, or other ways of governing experienced in various times, communism, the last big challenge to liberal democracies, had failed in delivering the promised advantages (Lawson, 2010: 90-91).

Despite this, the victory in the Cold War, ironically, made the implementation of the "wilsonian" American dream of collective security even more difficult to achieve. In the absence of a world power with the potential to dominate, nations do not regard the threat to peace in the same manner any longer, nor are they any more willing to take the same risks in defeating those threats they acknowledged (Kissinger, 2007: 704). As Kissinger explains, the global community has enough good will to cooperate in "peace keeping", as well as in establishing the policy regarding peace keeping, but is reserved in making peace, suppressing the effective challenges to establishing world order.

The end of the Cold War created what some specialists call "a world that belongs to one single superpower". But the United States is not in a better position to dictate the global agenda than they were at the beginning of the Cold War. As Kissinger wrote, without doubt, America is more predominant than it was ten years before, but, ironically, power also got more dispersed. Therefore, America's real ability to use it to shape the rest of the world has decreased (Kissinger, 2007: 704-705).

History has proved that the real advantage belongs to those who prove to be capable to maintain and expand the areas of political and economic cooperation within which the use of force or even the mere threat of use is replaced by diplomacy. Even the evolution and the end of the Cold War can be considered as proof of this statement (Buzan, Little, 2009: 376). While the West was capable to build a common security area and expanding economic cooperation, the communist world was left behind regarding its

economic performance and not only failed to create a security community among its members, but frequently resorted to political and military confrontation (China-SU, SU-Yugoslavia), or even invasion and war (China-Vietnam, Vietnam-Cambodia, SU-Hungary, SU-Czechoslovakia).

Regarding the social and economic landscape and evolution in these states, Fawn argues that two features should be underlined as essential: “two are strikingly important for the 27 European and former Soviet post-communist states that encompass one-fifth of the world’s surface: the reorientation from the all-encompassing ideology of Marxism-Leninism that purported to understand the past and prescribe the future, and the rebirth or re-ignition of the collective identities of nationhood” (Fawn, 2005: 29).

Furthermore, specialists in the field of economics draw analyses revealing that the current evolution in this region is much more alike the one of other “older democracies” than one would expect. In a paper dedicated to the evaluation of the results achieved by these former communist countries, 25 years after the change of regime, it is stated (Shleifer and Treisman, 2014:), as a conclusion, that “it is time to rethink the misperceptions that inform debates about this period. Market reforms, attempts to build democracy, and struggles against corruption were not failures, although they remain incomplete”. Building their research on factual proof, including the amount of product exchange (import and export) with other capitalist countries, number of foreign economic contacts, but also internal market indicators, such as average consumption per capita or gross domestic product, the authors sustain the idea that the transition from closed communist markets to liberal capitalism is a successful one, based on various comparisons with other countries’ evolution patterns. In addition to this, they argue that the sudden change from socialism-communism to democracy and liberal capitalism proves to be the best solution for these economies. “The claim that a gradual path of economic change would have been more effective and less painful is contradicted by the evidence. The post-communist transition does not reveal the inadequacy of liberal capitalism or the dysfunctions of democracy: it reveals the superiority of both over all attempted alternatives” (Shleifer and Treisman, 2014: 14).

But engaging in global affairs would not be possible, especially with the ideological inheritance of these nations, if they would not also manage to perform a proper integration in the international organizations and institutional buildings that so much define the world in the XXth and XXIst centuries. The geographic setting of these countries dictates a rather ambiguous geopolitical route for them, being torn between the appeal of western democracies and the predicaments of former allies. If, regarding the economic interactions, the specifics of the global free trade do not impose the need to choose, in terms of security, this represents an even more serious issue, the orientation and alliances settled defining the path to be taken.

After the democratic transition in Eastern Europe began, the governments of many countries in the region defined the accomplishment of membership to the Western structures of security and integration as a primary goal for their foreign policy efforts. As some research indicates, the leaders of the former communist countries perceived NATO as the only option of an international organization able to provide the means for peaceful development in their countries, also based on the opinions and orientations of the majority of the population (Kostadinova, 2000: 235).

For the former communist countries in Eastern Europe, the evolution was from a collective defense system, under the control of the Soviet Union, using the Warsaw Pact, to the creation of unilateral foreign policies in the first years after the collapse of the communist regime. However, Russian officials seem to commit rather to contributing for cooperation along with the other democratic countries in ensuring international security (Porumbescu, 2016: 73). In the years 1999-2009, many of the states in this region joined NATO, thus entrusting their national security to the broader Euro-Atlantic context designed by this organization. It can be stated that this decade represented the passing to a common security identity for the countries in Eastern Europe.

NATO was even involved in the politics of shaping legal and institutional arrangements in countries of the former Communist bloc, particularly in the area of defense. Through systematic interactions with political elites from Central and Eastern Europe, NATO helped shape definitions of appropriate liberal democratic identity in those states. The organization was involved in disseminating a particular set of norms governing civil-military relations, and contributed to the construction of corresponding institutions in former Communist countries (Gheciu, 2005: 8).

An alternative to the common security system created by NATO was the founding, in 1992, of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (“Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности” – in Russian). This organization is assumed to be the main multilateral institution embodying the role of addressing the insecurities inherent to the ruling regimes from Belarus to Tajikistan (Baev, 2014: 40). In order to legitimize the presence of military Russian troops on the territories of the “secessionist republics”, not only to the partners in the Community of Independent States, but also to the international community, the Russian Federation decided to create this organization, with the purpose of “consolidating peace, security and stability both regionally, as well as international; collective defense of territorial independence, integrity and sovereignty” (Dinu, 2010: 14) of its member states, Armenia, Kazakhstan, The Republic of Kirgizstan, Belorussia, The Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

This organization is a military and political alliance created by some of the states of the Community of Independent States, based on the Collective Security Agreement, on May, 15th, 1992. According to several experts, the creation of CSTO reflected Russia’s desire to prevent the expansion of the Euro-Atlantic borders towards East, and, also, to maintain under its military influence the “close vicinity” (Baev, 2014: 22).

Looking deeper in the meaning of this organization and the ways in which it works, one can acknowledge how a disorganized security complex can be transformed in a wider institutional entity. This adds to pretending to inherit the great legacy of the Pact of Warsaw. If, at the beginning of the 1990s, the organization offered Boris Eltin’s Russia a tool for maintaining its influence in the post-communist space, by irregular assistance grants and military simulations, the new millennium brings Moscow in the era of Putin’s geopolitical offensive, which culminated in the military intervention in the neighboring areas (Georgia in the summer of 2008, Crimea). According to Baev, the CSTO pretends to be a traditional regional organization, despite encompassing three dissimilar regional security complexes – the East European, the Caucasian, and the Central Asia – and is positioned to play a useful role in neither one. In the turbulent post-Soviet period, these regions have been rich in violent conflicts, but not once has the CSTO been able to make any meaningful contributions.

Conclusions

Regarding the foreign evolution of the former communist states after the fall of the “iron curtain”, and the global geopolitics involved, one of the scenarios implied would have assumed that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union would invite discussions of NATO’s eventual disestablishment. Instead, those developments have served to justify NATO’s perpetuation – even rejuvenation, some may argue- as a bastion of stability in a potentially disorderly Europe (Santis, 1994: 62-63). Furthermore, as we stated above, the foreign political options of the Eastern European states stimulated the expansion and enforcement of NATO’s activity, and encouraged the development of security alternatives for the states in this region. Any interest in the geopolitics of this area, considering the chain of events that occurred after the 1990s, involves the inquiry: if the Cold War is over, why is there still a competition between the East and the West? And why the constant need for the ex-communists to fit in the frames of the “developed” countries, through a never-ending and costly transition process?

The liberal idea of “democratic peace” seems to have been successfully implemented in these states, as one of its leading advocates, Bruce Russett, argued after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. He claimed that the end of ideological hostility matters double, as it represents surrender to the western values of economical and political freedom. While the countries once led by authoritarian systems became democracies, one aspect becomes obvious in the international relations: in the modern international system, democracies almost never fought each other. This statement represents a complex phenomenon: “a. democracies rarely fight each other (which is an empirical statement), because b. they have other means for solving the conflicts among them and they do not need to resort to conflict, and c. they perceive the fact that democracies should not fight each other (a normative statement about the principles of correct behavior), an element that strengthens the empirical statement. According to this reasoning, the more democratic countries there are in the world, the less the number of potential opponents... and the democracies will have a wider areas of peace” (Russett, 1993: 4).

Analyzing the evolution of the post-communist democracies reveals that these states have changed a lot, considering the social, political, and economic conditions. While on average resembling their peers, the new states of the East have become far more diverse. Shedding the Moscow-imposed model, they have yielded to the pull of a new geographical gravity, converging not with the West but with their non-communist neighbors. Central Europe has become more European, Central Asia more Asian. Some specialists even argue that during the future decades these countries’ paths will continue to reflect the competition between the same two elemental forces – the global dynamic of economic modernization and the tug of geographic specificity (Shleifer and Treisman, 2014: 2).

Considering these evidence, cooperation and integration through global connections proves to be the most successful strategy for the modern states. Several analysts argue that a competitive national and military security system no longer fits even the interests of the national state. While, apparently, on the short term, military power still discourages aggression and the great powers still military interfere with the deals of the smaller states, on the long term national interests are better served by creating institutions that serve common multinational interests. Just like individuals, who, within primitive societies, reached the conclusion that building communities together proves more productive on

the long term, than working alone, the states gradually reach the same goal, although not yet universal.

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**RUSSIA – EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS
UNDER THE IMPACT OF THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS**

Marina A. Shpakovskaya, Mihaela-Alexandra Vezuină***

Abstract

The article analyzes the evolution of relations between Russia and the European Union, as well as the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on them. The purpose is to define the conceptual obstacles to mutual understanding between Moscow and Brussels. Decisions taken on the line Moscow-Brussels, during the events of the period 2014-2015 are fundamental in analyzing the bilateral dialogue and narrow spectrum of possible interactions. Are also analyzed the main problems in relations between the parties arising from the wrong perceptions, distrust and misunderstanding on issues of common interest and mutual respect. In the actions of both parties stands noticeable lack of strategic planning, from where appears also the inertia of relations between Russia and the EU. At the same time, the interdependence of bilateral cooperation, and understanding the need for stable cooperation for internal development of each of them does not enable the parties to move to the direct confrontation.

Key words: *Russia, the European Union, the Ukrainian crisis, bilateral relations, the interdependence of cooperation*

Introduction

The relations between Russia and the EU over the last two decades have experienced many ups and downs, on the sidelines of a crisis more than once. The number of problems that have arisen in this relationship after the collapse of the Soviet Union, had a negative impact on the quality of Russia-EU partnership.

The crisis in Ukraine, which put the Russia-Europe relations to the brink of rupture for the first time after the end of the confrontation between the two systems, made many to talk about a new Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar world order. Indeed, the severity of this crisis it is unprecedented. For the first time in 25 years there was the threat of a new dividing line in Europe, which after the completion of bipolarity was considered the most stable region in the world. The current crisis in relations between Russia and the West in addition to their own mistakes and failures is a result of stress in the individual links of a multi-polar system, generated by its own dynamics of international relations after the end of bipolarity.

In hindsight the conflict in Ukraine and the consequent rupture in EU – Russia relations were a ‘perfect storm’ generated in the context of a combination of choices and mistakes made by all the parties. A lot of mistakes have been made and a lot of trust

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essential for the restoration of ties has been lost (Forsberg, Haukkala, 2016: 8). By the outcome of the conflict depends not only the future of the European continent, but also, the international stability and security. However, it will take long until we really have a clear result on ending the crisis (Dorca, 2014: 39).

Russia and the European Union: the dynamics of relations

Until the spring of 2014 the Russia – European Union relations were ambivalent. In general, these relations have developed – on a sinusoidal curve between pragmatic cooperation and strategic partnership.

The high degree of economic interdependence and close positions on some issues of foreign policy and security require systematic cooperation emanating from purely pragmatic interests, and its importance and permanence is the basis for public assurances from both sides that they continue to consider themselves strategic partners (Борко, 2014: 21). But the events of 2014-2015, particularly the deep internal crisis in Ukraine, so abruptly changed the situation, that relation between Russia and the EU for the first time in 20 years can not be assessed otherwise than as confrontation, which encouraged to remember the forgotten days of the Cold War.

At the end of 2013 there was and still continues a bitter conflict, the participants of which are Ukraine, Russia and the European Union. It is generated by the interaction of three factors – the deep internal crisis in Ukraine, the EU program Eastern Partnership (EaP) adopted in 2009 and the progressive divergence of the vectors of development and EU and Russian policy.

The EU and NATO enlargement to the countries of Eastern Europe had a great influence on the formation and further development of the relations of these countries, including Ukraine, with Russia (Орлик, 2015: 27). The internal instability in Ukraine has long been an irritant to its two main neighbors – Russia and the EU. The culmination of this competition was the chain of events from November 2013 to early March 2014 (Арбатова, 2014: 7). Nominated for the end of November, the Summit of member states of the Eastern Partnership was conceived as a day of triumph of the EU's Eastern policy: Ukraine had to sign an association agreement with the EU, including the creation of a common free trade area; Armenia, Georgia and Moldova – the same initial agreement; Azerbaijan – agreed in principle to allow the preparation of the same document. A week before the summit, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich announced that the signing is postponed, and at the same time it became known that Russia offered Ukraine a long-term loan of 15 billion euros, including 3 billion immediately. For this act was followed by a chain of others, two of them determined the course of events. March 1, President Vladimir Putin ordered Russian troops into the Crimea, to take under the protection of Russian-speaking population and to ensure the free conduct of the referendum on self-determination of this republic and the city of Sevastopol.

Ukrainian crisis has escalated into an international crisis, radically changing the relations between Russia, on the one hand, and the European Union, the US and NATO – on the other, into an open political confrontation. For eighteen months, these relations have gone through several stages, the first – in March-April 2014. Held on 6 March the EU emergency summit adopted a three-stage program of sanctions applied to Russia, if it continues the occupation of the Crimea, and, moreover, will continue to escalate aggression against Ukraine. The first two parts of the sanctions were put in place as early

as mid-March, including the abandonment of the scheduled for July first annual EU-Russia summit, which is scheduled to be held in Sochi, and the suspension of negotiations on visa facilitation and on a new basic agreement to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which term had exhausted in November 2007.

Moreover, the sanctions include a ban on entry into the EU of a group of officials and people close to the Russian President, as well as the confiscation of their assets that are stored in European banks. Russia was excluded from G8, and the negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development were suspended (Cristian, 2015: 112). EU introduced in April and in July expanded economic sanctions, tightening the conditions under which foreign banks provide loans to Russian companies, and imposing a ban on exports to Russia of dual-use technology used in the industries of its military industry.

Economic sanctions in the event of combination with other measures (military and political) may cause long-term effects (decline in GDP growth, the loss of jobs and opportunities for the development of the business sector), and the full economy feels its effect not immediately, but after a certain time. Moreover, lifting the sanctions is not always as fast as introduced (Клинова, Сидорова, 2014: 68). So that, in August Moscow has imposed retaliatory sanctions by banning imports of many agricultural products, raw materials and food produced in the EU, the US and in the several other acceding States.

Meanwhile, even before that the Brussels and Moscow entered into a “war of sanctions”, center of events in Ukraine has moved to the east. Two “breakaway republics” – DNR and LNR – announced withdrawal from the Ukraine and the intention to create a unified state “New Russia” with the prospect of joining it another six Eastern and Black Sea regions. Stopping the escalation of military action was possible only through the joint efforts of the EU and Russia. To do this, instead of a blocked their cooperation mechanism, they had to find another format resumption of contacts and political dialogue. The first step for this was the visit to Moscow, on 7 May, by the President of Switzerland and the OSCE Chairman Didier Burkhalter. At once at the end of the long conversation in private the President Vladimir Putin announced at a press conference an action plan, the implementation of which will allow Moscow to consider the Ukrainian presidential elections scheduled for May 25 as a “step in the right direction”. Meeting on 7 May and the statement of President Putin can be considered the beginning of the second phase in Russia -EU relations after their March crisis.

Moreover, on June 6-7, there was a meeting of foreign ministers of Germany, Russia, Ukraine and France, who discussed the situation of conflict in the Donetsk Basin and the crisis of the Ukrainian economy. In fact, at the meeting it was the beginning of the formation of the so-called “Norman Quartet” who, on September 5 signed the “Protocol on the results of the consultations of the Tripartite Group on common measures aimed at implementation of the Peace Plan of the President Petro Poroshenko and the initiatives of the President Vladimir Putin” (hereinafter – the Minsk protocol I). It was signed by the leaders DNR and LNR. Briefly, this document can be summarized in five points: 1) to immediately halt the use of weapons by both sides; 2) to withdraw from the territory of Ukraine all illegal armed groups; 3) the release of all hostages and illegally detained persons; 4) to take measures to improve the humanitarian situation in the Donbass; 5) to carry out “in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions” (ie within the DNR and LNR) the decentralization of authority and pre-term elections to the local self-government. The

Protocol also defines the role of the OSCE – monitoring of the cessation of the use of weapons, as well as the situation on the Ukrainian-Russian border. (European Parliament, 16 March 2015).

Instantly approved by the Heads of States “Norman Quartet”, the Minsk Protocol I was the first document, which identified priorities for their cooperation with the aim of transition from military confrontation to the political methods of solving the problems of Ukraine’s internal structure and of distribution of powers of the central government and the regions. In political terms, the most important outcomes of the Minsk-I, II was the fact that they have defined mechanisms to improve the implementation of the plan, to keep under control the situation in the conflict zone and to respond to its aggravation.

Future relations between Russia and the European Union: problems and prospects

In the middle of 2015 the relations between Russia and the EU have been in the worst form in their history. Official political contacts were blocked, except for the activities of their representatives, respectively, in Brussels and Moscow, as well as cooperation in the “six” in the talks on nuclear issues with Iran. The European Union actually interacts with Russia within the framework of “Norman Quartet”, but Germany and France, representing its interests, have no official mandate of the European Commission.

Not better, but rather worse there are relations in the economic sphere. In effect, the EU and Russia for the third year are in economic warfare. The European Union was one of the largest economic partners of Russia. Over the years, the EU and Russia cooperated closely in trade, as well as took part in the bilateral investment of the energy sector of economy. However, the political disagreements that have arisen between Russia and UE in 2014, because of the military conflict in Ukraine, have led to a sharp deterioration in trade relations, which are equally important for both (Апремова, 2015: 2). After increasing in 2012, both the EU exports in Russia and Russia imports in EU have experienced a continuing recession, 2015 being recorded the lowest values (73, 88 billion euros from the 123.1 billion euros in 2012 respectively 135, 7 billion euros from the 213.9 billion euros) (Бордачев, 2016: 6). Russia has suffered a lot more, but also the European countries have experienced huge losses.

In Russia, the current leadership has announced a radical change in the geopolitical and foreign targets even before the events in Ukraine. The idea of active participation in the construction of a “united Europe” has replaced by the idea of “Eurasian integration”, under the leadership of Russia and the movement of the center of its interests in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR). In reality, Moscow has started implementation of the project immediately after the deterioration of relations with the EU and the United States.

Instead, Russia is entering a period of domestic uncertainty and rebalancing its foreign policy to emphasize its Eurasian neighbors and China. Europe should take note. In order to develop an effective strategic approach toward their biggest neighbor, Europeans must deepen their understanding of the changing realities in Russia (Trenin, Lipman & Malashenko, 2013: 1).

It seems that Russia’s relations with the EU, and especially in the economic field, will not experience a major improvement in the near future, because, following the evaluation of the implementation process of the Minsk Agreement, the European Council decided to

extend the sanctions for another six months until January 31, 2017. Just days before EU member states extended the punitive measures for another six months, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and Russian President Vladimir Putin held their first meeting in more than two years in St Petersburg, promising to keep “close contacts” in order to improve frosty bilateral relations. In his speech, Juncker offered to build a new “bridge” to overcome the gap between the EU and Russia, “to keep the door open, even when economic sanctions are in place” (Valero, 2016).

The Russian Foreign Ministry considers the extension by the European Union of the anti-Russian sectoral economic sanctions until January 31, 2017 as illegitimate from the point of view of international law, as a continuation of short-sighted policy of Brussels. European Union with his own hands transformed the Russian-European relations into a hostage of the irresponsible games of the Ukrainian authorities. “The sanctions confrontation causes mutual damage – to both Russia, and the European Union, but Brussels turned a blind eye to the negative effects of anti-Russian sanctions on the European economy in the name of the notorious trans-Atlantic solidarity. EU determines the lifting of sanctions with the implementation by the Russia of the Minsk agreements. Most of Russia’s key economic partners from Europe understand very well that these restrictive measures cause damage primarily to manufacturers in European countries, where gradually increases the critical mass of those who are in favor of the revision of the sanctions” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016). In the longer term, diminishing economic interdependence between Russia and the EU – still Russia’s largest trading partner – bodes ill for political relations and institutional interaction (Averre, 2016: 7). Entrepreneurial organizations of a number of EU countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Finland, Bulgaria and several other openly expressed negative attitude towards sanctions.

Despite all this, the question about the prospects of EU-Russia relations are constantly being discussed in Moscow, Brussels and the capitals of the EU countries. It is clear that even the successful outcome of the Ukrainian crisis will not return the EU-Russia relations to the previous ones. However, there are vital issues for both sides, where their cooperation is imperative. This is, above all, the security sector. At present, Russia and the EU (with the participation of NATO) are engaged in the military build-up its own security capabilities. But in general, the European security can be ensured only by their joint efforts. Such a system has been established and operated under the conditions of the Cold War (the Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE creation, the Soviet-American agreements on strategic nuclear missile forces, “confidence building measures”). After its completion, the system gradually deteriorated, and in 2014 ceased to exist having. They have to recreate it together. At present the European security, even more than in the past century, is linked to the global security, with the global challenge that is thrown by Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism. This is a deadly threat to the entire XXI century, the same for Russia, the EU and the West in general. They can only join all forces and resources.

Also, in the context of current terrorist threats the EU must cooperate more than ever with Russia, a country with great experience in combating terrorism. Counter-terrorism cooperation between EU and Russia became a significant point of the common spaces of European and international security. Besides, a working dialogue on fighting terrorism started in February 2011. The last EU-Russia common initiative – the Joint statement on combatting terrorism (Council of the European Union, 2014) – was made

on January 28, 2014, just after the EU-Russia summit. It was highly appreciated both in the EU and in Russia; it appeared to be the only visible result of the EU-Russia summit before the political dialogue was frozen (Potemkina, 2015: 1). The terrorist attacks in Paris, in Brussels and Nice determined the European Union to reflect on the necessity of dialogue and cooperation with Russia in security sphere and to recognize Russia's key role in fighting the global threat – as evidenced by the *EU Global Strategy*, providing “substantial changes in relations between the EU and Russia, which are interdependent” (European Commission, 2016: 33).

Furthermore, the EU-Russia relations should be build up anew, as well as the strategic and practical cooperation in specific areas of economy and politics, whereas it is necessary, appropriate and mutually advantageous (Колобов, Хохлышева, 2015: 70). Even if there is an objective necessity for unlocking the mechanisms of dialogue and cooperation, created over 20 years, between the EU and Russia, is no signal, indicating the willingness of Brussels and Moscow to resume their action. This prevents extremely uncertain situation in the conflict zone and in Ukraine, in general.

As concerns the economic relations between Russia and the EU, radically revised the approach to these relations. If before, the high degree of economic interdependence was seen as a cornerstone of strategic partnership, it is now perceived as a threat to economic security. European Union's efforts are directed primarily at the maximal weakening of energy dependence on Russia, particularly in gas imports. Moscow considers that the most important task is to diversification its economic relations with the outside world and to significantly decrease the share of the EU in its trade, which has been maintained for many years at 50% of its value. Since the beginning of the “war of sanctions” Russia proclaimed the policy of import substitution. To meet these challenges, both the EU and Russia will take a long time. So, in the long term, 15-20 years, they will remain interdependent and interested economic partners for each other.

The normalization process will begin with practical matters, and the first step in this direction will be a full or partial lifting of sanctions. It will not be easy, especially the European Union, where the decision to terminate them must be taken by consensus among all the participants, who differ sharply in their approach to relations with Russia. What will prevail – pragmatic economic interests or political confrontation – is impossible to predict.

The area of practical cooperation space is very wide: foreign trade, investment, industrial cooperation, energy, science and technology projects, cross-border cooperation, the environment, education, visa, tourism, as well as joint actions to ensure internal security. But it will not be a return to the past, and especially in the main field of their economic relations – bilateral trade. In the first half of 2015 the share of the EU in Russia's foreign trade has decreased to 46.5% compared to 49.5% for the same period of 2014. This trend will intensify in the next “Sanctions” year and is likely to continue after the lifting of sanctions. The policy of reducing dependence on imports of Russian energy resources, especially gas, was taken by the European Union in the second half of the 2000s. In 2014, Brussels has taken new efforts in this direction, in fact disrupting the gas pipeline “South Stream”.

The political clash over Ukraine is impeding the EU and Russia from finding solutions for contentious issues impacting on the energy relationship, for example: the Commission's Antitrust Case against Gazprom; the arbitration procedure by the former

foreign shareholders of Yukos and the verdict against Russia; as well as conflicts over bundled infrastructure projects such as the OPAL pipeline and the planned South Stream pipeline. EU-Russian gas relations receive most of the political and public attention. Electricity cooperation overall is a special area, decisive for the modernisation of the network and generation capacities but has received much less public attention (Gusev, Westphal, 2015: 7, 9).

At the same time, cooperation in combating illegal migration, transnational crime and international terrorism, should be developed more intensively. Today, it does not exist a strategy for relations between EU and Russia. The concept underlying the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and its key idea – the creation of the four EU-Russia common spaces: economic; freedom, security and justice; external security; science, education and culture – unfortunately, have gone into past.

At present EU-Russia relations in general and in the area of freedom, security and justice, in particular, are largely determined by the political situation in Ukraine. The parties have not taken active measures aimed at the gradual restoration of dialogue. Obviously, this is due to the fact that the European Union, who initiated the suspension of cooperation, can not see from the signs of easing Russia's position on the Ukrainian crisis. In this context, European politicians have fears that their steps forward can be qualified as a review of its original position on the Ukrainian question (Войников, 2015: 65-66). However, this fact shall not constitute a waiver or suspension of the implementation of the "Common Steps", because this process is a mechanism of fruitful and mutually beneficial cooperation in the common space of freedom, security and justice.

The yield in this situation is seen in the gradual recovery of the contacts on the most acute and topical issues of common space of freedom, security and justice. First of all it concerns cooperation in the field of migration, the fight against terrorism and organized crime. These issues are less politicized, therefore, the coinciding positions on them will be very probable.

In these conditions, negotiations held for many years on the renewal of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia (which has exhausted its action in November 2007), have lost their meaning. Moreover, the new joint concept of future relations between Russia and the EU is impossible in principle. With regard to their own concepts, defining their attitude towards each other, then the European Union has no this concept although Brussels has announced it will be developed in the near future. Formally document defining Russia's strategy towards the EU, also does not exist, but in fact it is part of a new geopolitical concept, which is described in a number of speeches by President Vladimir Putin.

If the Brussels administration will fulfill its commitment to develop the EU strategy towards Russia, its preparation and coordination with all the Member States will take a lot of time. It is not excluded that the final version of it will be carefully polished, text containing many common phrases and getting around sharp corners. In reality, the bilateral relations between Russia and the EU Member States will be developed in the coming years much more intensively than with the EU.

Regarding future relations with the European Union in May 2016, President Vladimir Putin said, "that there are no unsolvable problems in the relations of Russia and the EU, expressing the view of the need to return to a constructive channel of interaction with the European partners. He believes that in order to return to the path of multi-faceted

partnership, “it is only necessary to give up the evil logic of the game with only one goal,” as well as take into account the views and interests of each other. V. Putin is convinced that from the events in Ukraine should make proper conclusions and begin to establish a zone of economic and humanitarian cooperation, based on the architecture of equal and indivisible security from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. An important step in this direction is intended to be the harmonization of European and Eurasian integration processes” (Владимир Путин, 2016).

Scenarios are one way to deal with the unpredictability of the future. So that, were developed four scenarios for relations between the EU, the Russian Federation, and their Common Neighbourhood in 2030, namely: 1) all Europeans share one home – for pragmatic reasons; 2) Europe is home to nations bound together by common values; 3) the European home lies in ruins; 4) Europeans live next door, but apart from each other. The conflict over Ukraine has put into question the premise on which the EU’s Eastern Policy has been built so far. Apparently, it has become impossible for the EU to reach out to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and build a strategic modernisation partnership with the Russian Federation at the same time. One lesson learned is that the EU’s policy approaches vis-à-vis its Eastern neighbours cannot be viewed independently from each other. The dynamics of the Ukraine-Russia Crisis illustrate – once more – that one should never be too sure, and that more of the usually unexpected is likely to happen in the future (Hett, Kellner & Martin, 2014: 7-9).

Although the danger of a truly calamitous scenario of NATO/EU-Russian military confrontation is fairly low, in 2025 the EU-Russia relationship will remain complicated – an uneasy mix of continued cooperation interspersed with bouts of confrontation (Haukkala, Popescu, 2016: 69).

Conclusions

Ukrainian crisis was a key factor that radically changed the development of relations between Russia and the EU as a whole, and the common space of freedom, security and justice, in particular, requiring a strategic rethinking by both parties. Global, EU-wide consequences of the protracted conflict in Ukraine go far beyond the relations between Russia and the European Union.

The fundamental divergence between the Russia, Ukraine, the US and the EU in the approach to this internal conflict, does not give reason to hope for a speedy achievement of mutual understanding, including the previous level of mutual understanding between Moscow and Brussels. It is clear that the West has a totally different opinion from that of Russia regarding the source of the outbreak of events in Ukraine. This give to Moscow too fewer hopes in terms of the rapid change of the EU Member States policy toward the Russian Federation, suspension and cancellation of anti-Russian sanctions. Inside the European Union, there are differences and contradictions on how to build the relations with Russia. Leaders of several EU countries have questioned the appropriateness of the current sanctions policy pursued by Brussels, some EU member states openly declaring its opposition.

Ukrainian crisis has had a negative impact on both the multilateral and bilateral Russian-European relations. So the question is not so much about the separatist tendencies in the EU, as the attempts of certain Member States to establish an effective

cooperation with Russia in the new environment and to compensate for the costs and losses “of sanctions war” between Russia and the EU.

One of the main objectives of the new EU policy towards Russia should be to preserve the partnership with this country that is mutually beneficial in many areas. Undoubtedly, the vector of the EU’s internal development will have a decisive influence on the development of policy towards Russia. For all the EU member states, Russia is not only a supplier of energy resources, markets for goods, capital investments, but also an important neighbor of the European Union, a European power by means of which can ensure human rights, democracy and international security.

Undoubtedly, relations with Russia will remain an important area of the European Union’s foreign policy and its members, above all, because of Russia’s role as an important actor in global and regional international politics and as the nearest EU neighbor. Although some manifestations of rivalry and confrontation in the region can be periodically increased, long-term imperatives of cooperation between EU member states and Russia will prevail in the medium and especially in the long term.

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**COHABITATION BETWEEN SUPRANATIONALISM
AND INTERGOVERNMENTALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

Bujar Dugolli, Bardhok Bashota***

Abstract

This paper attempts to shed light on a specific dimension that has characterized the history of integration path of the European Union (EU) from the early 1950s until now. The attention is focused in analyzing the interaction between supranational and intergovernmental tendencies that have continuously followed the trajectory of the EU integration and its precursor structures. Initially, the EU integration process was treated from the viewpoint of main theories of international integration. Another point, which is the analytical focus, relates to the analysis of efforts to reanimate the project of the European Constitution, as an ambitious project through which was attempted to achieve the culmination of a supranational integration into the EU, and this union was expected to create the legal and political basis to function as one federal entity. Meanwhile, the study deals with the functioning of the EU in conformity with supranational and intergovernmental tendencies set by the Lisbon Treaty, especially in the field of foreign policy and EU enlargement. Whereas, in the attempts to materialize even more the specific position and the role of these tendencies and their reflection on the EU enlargement process, the current position of countries in the Western Balkans in their collective journey towards the EU integration was treated.

Key words: *supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, constitution, foreign policy, enlargement*

Introduction

In the context of contemporary studies dealing with integration of the supranational nature and level, some researchers pay attention to some ideas that go as far as to call for the creation of such communities such as “United States of Europe”. For example, after the idea of Winston Churchill (1946)¹, the idea for “United States of Europe”, was used by Vivian Reding, Commissionaire for Justice in the European Commission (European Commission, 2014). However, despite the declarative level, as it seems, the process of integration in the European context practically has never gone beyond a partial and difficult separation of power and competences between the state and supranational levels of integration structures (Goldstein, 2000: 413). Such processes were even typical for integrated practices of the European Community (EC) and now for the EU.

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¹ He formulated his conclusions drawn from the lessons of history in his famous ‘Speech to the academic youth’ held at the University of Zurich in 1946: “*There is a remedy which would in a few years make all Europe free and happy. It is to re-create the European family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe*” (Maas, 2005: 799).

European integrations, especially those that led to the creation of antecedent structures of the EU, did not have as its primary goal the creation of institutions with pure supranational elements. In the contrary, the supranational character of the EU is derivative and procedural. This becomes evident with the fact that even nowadays, the EU with its institutional structure, has evolved from a typical intergovernmental cooperative entity, into an entity that functions by a combination of undivided intergovernmental and supranational elements. This becomes clear on the fact that after each stage of integration, which bears the stamp of relevant treaties (especially the stage Maastricht-Lisbon), there is produced a level of pure supranational integration that would be crowned, with a “European State”, and would contain elements that resemble an entity such as a federation (Gould & Messina, 2014: 1). In addition, other researchers argue that even after the empowerment of the Lisbon Treaty¹, intergovernmental tendencies have been strengthened in report to those supranational (Schout & Wolff, 2011: 2).

However, issues dealing with the analysis of current position of supranational tendencies within the EU after the Lisbon Treaty, still remain open. For moreover, before proceeding with the analysis of current position of supranational tendencies within the EU, there has been offered a simplified scheme from some main theoretical schools that reflect briefly on the integration practices in Europe, especially on the antecedent and current structures of the EU. First of all, it involves theories of functionalism, intergovernmentalism and supranationalism (or federalism). The conception of these schools created an analytical cohesion making it possible to understand more clearly the current position of these tendencies (supranational or intergovernmental) and to understand which tendencies dominate the institutional and functional structure of the EU.

Another important aspect of clarifying the relationship between the intergovernmental and supranational tendencies in the process of deepening the EU integration lies in the analysis of those attempts of the European leaders to give even more powerful supranational characteristics to the EU through the implementation of the project for the “European Constitution”. However, as it will be seen below, after a long confronted debate between two conceptual dimensions: intergovernmentalists regarding the realization of the project of European Constitution between years 2004-2007, the intergovernmentalist victory prevailed, failing this project.

In the meantime, after the failure of the empowerment of the Constitutional Treaty for the EU, there started a new stage of attempts to clarify the functional and institutional structure of the EU, and the report between intergovernmental and supranational tendencies in its ranks. This stage was developed between the years 2007-2009, and it was crowned with the implementation of a new treaty (known as a Reformative Treaty of Lisbon Treaty), which would replace the legal and political vacuum remaining from the failure of implementation of the Constitutional Treaty of Europe.

Even though, the Lisbon Treaty borrows elements from the Constitutional Treaty, again, it failed to give a more powerful character to the supranational principles in relation to intergovernmental. However, with the strengthening of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has

¹ The official name of the Lisbon Treaty is: Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), (2008), *Official Journal of the EU* C115, Volume 51, 2008/C115/1, 9 May 2008).

taken enough qualities of a supranational entity, but by closely balancing between intergovernmental principles.

In order to analyze more precisely the position and the report between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in the institutional and functional structure of the EU in the light of the Lisbon Treaty, the attention is focused in a pectoral dimension of the EU policies, specifically in the field of foreign policy and the process of enlargement towards the Western Balkans. More precisely, this elective approach applies to the fact that the foreign policy, can be considered as the most effective indicator that can measure the coherence and compactness in leadership and decision-making among member states and EU institutions.

For moreover, the context of analyzing effects of the Lisbon Treaty in foreign policy and in the process of the EU enlargement, a considerable part of discussions was directed towards the efforts in understanding how the EU, through the process of expansion, has practically affected the trajectory of transformation in the political, legal, socio-economical fields and the security situation in the Western Balkans enlargement countries. Also, another important point for analysis is concerned with analyzing current position of countries in the Western Balkans towards the EU integration, as well as the challenges that they are facing in this process.

A theoretical and conceptual framework

It is evident the fact that the process of integration which characterized the evolving trajectory of the EU from its original form to what we know today, has been extremely complex and multidimensional, by giving a unique nature to this process. Therefore, due to the reflection of these circumstances of cooperation, the attention of scholars of international relations was decisively focused on the formulation of different theories and concepts. Initially, they used the term “integration” to describe what was happening in Europe according to their observations. However, from the beginning of the European Integration, in discussions about these developments, an important role has played three most important theories such as: fictionalization, intergovernmentalism, as well as supranationalism or federalism (Wiedenfeld & Wessels, 2002: 398).

In fact, federalism is the first theory which can be used to describe initial efforts for integration between the European countries. This is because the first ideas for integration in the European context refer to the creation of a federal form of cooperation based on the idea of the “United States of Europe” (Spoaloro, 2013: 127). Such an idea in essence was characterized by a liberal spirit and aimed the creation of a system where European countries would not follow one-sided and destructive policies (Ibid: 126-128). These attempts were never implemented due to the fact that the European countries were not ready for the creation of such mechanisms which would have supranational qualities. Instead, they preferred the creation of institutions that would be led by the principles of intergovernmentalism. After the speech of Churchill in Zurich (1946), at The Hague Congress (1948) there were engaged intergovernmentalists against federalists or supranationalists. Instead of the federation of the “United States of Europe, there was constructed the Council of Europe (1949), a typical intergovernmental forum (Wiedenfeld & Wessels, 2002: 400).

However, although it was evident that this integration had already started to challenge the neo-realists conviction, according to which the states were strictly autonomous and

will not accept any other institutional authority that would weaken their own authority from the sovereign (Brown & Ainley, 2005: 94), in fact, European countries have never abandoned basic principles of neo-realism. These principles, that conceptualize the state as a “rational actor”, which is based on the maximization of its personal interests, have been the promoter of first concrete movements of the European Countries towards the creation of specialized technical organizations that go beyond national boundaries (Alexandrescu, 2007: 25), and, that led towards the more integrating structures, even though countries demand practical means to meet necessary functions in their interest (Close, 2000: 91).

In fact, the European states which had established the foundations of today's EU, were based precisely on the functionalist approach of cooperation that was typical for the EC until the Maastricht Treaty in the early 90s (Spolaore, 2013: 131-134). In addition, from the perspective of intergovernmentalism, for example, France had to intensify and deepen the level of European integration from an economic cooperation towards a political integration from the 90s until today, in order to gain relative strength of Germany, which was becoming more powerful, thus to prevent the potential marginalization of France (Close, 2000: 92). This theory supports the idea that integration between countries can be achieved, but only by preserving the sovereign independence and their national identity (Schout & Wolff, 2012: 21). Based on this logic, it is evident that (at least in short term perspective), there is no other pure supranational form of international organizations without the presence of a constructive element of the nation-state (Heywood, 2002: 154).

However, despite these theoretical conceptions about history of integration in Europe, D'Arcy says that for achieving objectives through their collective actions and policies, countries which wanted European integration, have built special institutions, that are not similar to classical international organizations, nor to a federal form or to a confederation. This complex institutional system sets the right equilibrium between the necessary crossings of the sovereignty of supranational institutions (D'Arcy, 2003: 19-20). This form of cooperation, in this context, is deemed by some other researchers as “the most successful system in the world for collective governance” (O'Brennan, 2013: 1). In such cases, sovereignty continues to be perceived through a unanimous process of decision making, and each state has the right of the veto for delicate issues. But, on the other hand, supranationalism marks a power that is “superior” to that of the state and has the authority to impose its will upon the latter. “Therefore, the EU includes a mixture of intergovernmental and supranational elements” (Schout & Wolff, 2012: 22). This fact, made some authors to claim that supranationalism is to large extent intergovernmentalism in disguise where “the original European Communities represented a negotiated compromise, in which rhetorical commitment to integration, even to eventual federation, was intertwined with the promotion and protection of national interests” (Wallace, 2007: 523-542).

However, having said that, it is noted that this mixture of intergovernmental and supranational tendencies in organizational and functional structure of the EU has occasionally made conceptual ambiguity in the usage of these terms (Rosamond, 2000: 49). Therefore, in this article, in order to describe the term supranationalism as a notion, is used the definition given by Ruszowski. According to him, semantically the Latin prefix “supra”, used as in compound word, should be translated not only as “beyond” or “high”,

but also as an opposite meaning to the prefix denoting “under” or “below”. Therefore the notion of supranationalism means that something happens above nations and its importance is recognized by all citizens, such as ideas, values, etc (Ruszkowski, 2009: 2; Close & Ohki-Close, 1999: 10-11).

Based in this conceptual approach, European supranationalism is a method of decision making that is typical for multinational political communities, where the power is transferred to higher authorities than those of member state governments. Due to the fact that decisions in some supranational structures were taken by the majority of votes, (Sieberon, 2010: 926), then it is possible for a member state in this union that their decisions for implementation are bound by other member states (Close, 2000: 90-92). Therefore, unlike a federal state, member states perceive their formal sovereignty with it, even though some have shared sovereignty with, or affect the supranational body (Reka, 2010: 149-158). The supranational authority, according to this conception, can have some independence from the governments of member states, even though not so much independence as with federal governments.

Among other things, regarding the conception of the supranational character of the EU, traditional approach applied in this regard is described by a set of features, the most important attributed to the fact that the EU has the “status of a permanent entity and legal personality, legal capacity and privileged and immunities” (Sieberson, 2011: 926). Moreover, besides the internal scope, supranational characteristics of the EU also appear in the activities conducted by the EU in the representation of member states in the arena of international policies, while representing the EU as a unique actor acting on behalf of these states.

The Project of Constitution for Europe and the agony of European supranationalism in the XXI century

Attempts to strengthen closer cooperation within the EU have been key themes that have characterized the political discourse between the constituents of this union since its establishment until now. The debates on these issues were intensified even more due to the attempts to prepare a constitutional project for Europe which will determine the political, legal and constitutional identity of this union in the beginning of the XXI century (Norman, 2005: 17).

Developments within the constitutional project for Europe, aiming to strengthen supranational tendencies in the EU were evident, especially in long term plan. Therefore, with the opening of the European Constitutional Convention, in early 2002, its chair Valeri Giscard D’Esaing, among other things, stated that:

“If we succeed, in 25 years or 50 years – the distance separating us from the Treaty of Rome – Europe’s role in the world will have changed. It will be respected and listened to, not only as the economic power it already is, but as a political power which will talk on equal terms to the greatest powers on our planet, either existing or future, and will have the means to act to affirm its values, ensure its security and play an active role in international peace-keeping” (D’Esaing et al., 2002: 11).

This convention, as a working body of the EU, was convened as a new working method. Symbolically it should emit the message of historical analogy of drafting the Constitution of the USA and the spirit of Philadelphia Convention of two centuries ago. But, European conventionalists, on the other hand, since 2001 have had a different intention: to devise non-national constitution, but rather a supranational constitution for

Europe, even more clearly stated, a hybrid constitutional or international treaty, which had involved constitutional elements (Lévy, 2007: 21).

As seen later, expectations from this convention were high, but results few. Despite the fact that attempts among member states and the EU leadership in the creation of a constitutional format as a legal basis for the enforcement of supranational tendencies within the EU were real, it was noted that they could not overcome old clashes between national and supranational tendencies. This resulted in having a broad debate on the Constitutional project of the EU, mainly focused in two conceptual directions: “eurocentrism” and “statecentrism”, which actually reflected main theoretical directions of “Europhiles” and “euroscepticists” (i.e., between supranationalists and intergovernmentalists).

In fact, the whole political debate prior to the drafting of the project on Constitutional Treaty of the EU, was developed within three official coordinates of the three biggest states of the EU: Germany (for federal Europe), Great Britain (for the Europe of free nations) and France (for the national federation of states) (Reka, 2007: 161-162).

Moreover, based on these circumstances, Jean-Louis Bourlanger, would ironically describe the yesterday's and today's situations of the EU with these words: “Until now, Europe functioned under its three components: French imaginary, German determination and British avoidance. Today, however we are witnessing the British imagination, French determination and German avoidance” (Bourlanger, 2008: 3). But, really, what was the aim of the constitutional project in report to the strengthening of supranational tendencies of the EU?

It is a fact, that the EU is an organization with some strong supranational characteristics, and tendency that the supranational scale is raised and strengthened, had already been aimed through the Constitution of the EU (Schout & Wolff, 2012: 21). It was expected that through this Constitution, the EU would add even more supranational tendencies, especially in the legal and political fields. In the legal field, the constitution would join all basic agreements of the EU in one, and all of it would represent the common legal basis of the EU. With this constitution, the EU was tended to be given the legal personification, thus enabling it to sign international agreements on behalf of its members (Archick, 2014: 8). On the other hand, on the political level, this Constitution represented the basic political document of the EU, which was supported by the will of member state nations. However, everything remained only on paper. As noted later, countries which set the referendum procedure, had fully risked the project for the formation of the common federal state of Europe (this was done by citizens of France and Netherlands¹, who did not trust the project for a union with common legal and supranational basis) (Ibid: 3-6).

¹ It is worth mentioning that in 2005, for the first time in France, after 200 years of conflicts between left and right wing parties, they became united and voted against the constitution OF the European Union. So, the left wing has voted for the same cause sought by ultra-right winger Le Pen: for ‘No’ empowerment of the EU...*“Then, in a much-anticipated national referendum in late May 2005, French voters overwhelmingly rejected the proposed constitution of the European Union. Turnout was high with estimates ranging from 70 percent to 80 percent and of those who voted, approximately 55 percent voted ‘Non’ or ‘No’ in opposition to the draft constitution, while 45 percent voted ‘Yes’ in favor of it”.* (Coleman, 2014).

Therefore, the causes of the failure to implement the Constitution of Europe, according to some authors, can be found in the fear of the citizens of these countries for the replacement of their national state through the creation of a “supranational state” (Toops, 2010: 23-24). However, the second failure for implementation of a federal form of cooperation between European countries only strengthened the Brezezinski’s thesis launched immediately after the Leaken’s summit in 2001 that the formula for functioning of the EU is: “integration and not unification” (Brezezinski, 2000: 21).

The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 in the French and Dutch referendums was considered as a first test against the supranational constitutional philosophy. Perhaps, the estimates regarding the project failure of the European Constitution with topics such as: “the death of European constitution”, “united Europe crisis”, “the end of the idea for European integrations” (Duff, 2006: 15-25), were exaggerated, but it is noted that this was the most profound shock for the EU since its establishment. In addition, efforts to establish common constitutional basis for the EU appeared to be in front of the “act committed” when showed the hesitations from some other member states for ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Therefore, based on these complicated circumstances, came also conclusions that the Lisbon Treaty was “the salvation of the European Union” (Ibid).

EU in the light of Lisbon Treaty: the balance between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism

There was an extensive estimation that the failure of the project for the Constitution of Europe caused an existential crisis within the EU, especially in the field of foreign policies (Blockmass, 2014: 2). As a result of this failure, it was considered that attempts to strengthen leadership and coherence in the foreign policy of the EU was the first victim; while the second victim was the further enlargement of the EU (as a tool and essential component of this policy), particularly against the Western Balkans (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 58-60).

Based on these findings, at this stage, analytical approach against the Lisbon Treaty is quite elective. It is focused mainly in explaining the role offsetting that this document has in reorganizing the architecture of the new foreign policy and agenda, for the further enlargement of the EU after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. Therefore the analysis in this field of the EU policies is made due to the fact that the foreign policies are the real indicators that measure the coherence and compatibility of leadership and decision making among member countries and institutions of this union. In addition, the analysis of the role of the Lisbon Treaty from this point of view makes it possible to clearly understand the weight of international trends in relation to those supranational in the formulation and realization of main principles of the EU foreign policies.

The system of the EU foreign policy in the framework of the Lisbon Treaty

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it was concluded a decade of the EU attempts to be institutionally generally reformed and hailed a start of a “new era” of the EU, as was stated by the Swedish presidency (EurActiv, 2009). Therefore, based on these expectations, the essential question arising from different authors, is whether it was achieved a unified institutional framework with the Lisbon Treaty, through which could

be achieved a greater coherence for action within the EU, especially in the system of its foreign policies? (Mauri & Gya, 2009: 7).

According to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, after the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty, a common institutional and inclusive framework already exists on paper, but in reality the policy making is distributed through different methods by which are defined the competencies of the actors of Foreign Policies of the EU. They symbolically describe the institutional framework of the foreign policy system of the EU as: single by *name*, dual by method, a *multiple by nature*” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 63).

More specifically, the idea for this single institutional framework refers to the interdependent functioning of the institutional rectangle, containing: Council of Ministers, European Commission, European Parliament and European Court of Justice, with the support of central actors such as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Permanent President of the European Council (Risteska, 2010: 119). However, within this institutional framework, the system for the foreign policy of the EU is guided by two main policy making methods: the “community method” (dominated by supranational tendencies) and the “intergovernmental method” (dominated by national tendencies) (Schout & Wolff, 2012: 22).

Community method is operationalized through a system that preserves institutional *balance* and the decision making *coherence* through the European Commission, which defines and protects common interests; Council of Ministers, which decides with the majority of votes on the most important issues in foreign policy, the European Parliament as co-legislator and the Court of Justice ensuring uniform interpretation of Community law (Ibid: 3). On the other side, intergovernmental method of drafting foreign policy is guided by the principle of *transferring* powers of member governments within the institutional framework of the EU, but still retaining the *control* of policymaking through the dominating position of the Council and its implementation through the process of unanimous decision making (Sieberson, 2010: 969-971). This means that the CFSP is, and probably will remain, a policy with intergovernmental character, even though after the Lisbon Treaty, the decision making in foreign policy remains consensual, and the capacity of member states for developing national foreign policies will not be curtailed.

However, despite the fact that intergovernmental tendencies dominate in report to those supranationalist, when we talk about the role that the Lisbon Treaty has in empowerment of leadership and coherence in the system of foreign policy in the EU, it can be said that this treaty inaugurated many features giving the EU an epithet of a supranational political entity. It is worth mentioning the fact that the Lisbon Treaty, which follows and borrows elements from the European Constitution, turned the EU, for the first time, into a single legal entity, giving it the possibility to express a clear position regarding partners worldwide. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty also inaugurated the institution of the High Representative of the CFSP and that of the Permanent President of the European Council that effectively play an important role in the unification of the EU foreign policy in global relations (Paul, 2008: 4).

But, what is the real nature of the foreign policy of the EU? The answer to this question can be found further in this study.

Structural nature¹ of the foreign policy of the EU and its impact on the enlargement towards the Western Balkans

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the EU began to apply a more rigid policy of expansion, as a response to post-communist and post conflict challenges in some parts of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC). The EU enlargement policy was the most proven instrument of impact of the EU, as a transformative power for the democratic transformation of the post conflict societies of the CEEC, as well as the key tool in promoting general socio-political stability in these areas (Landaburu, 2006: 1). Viewed in this context, the enlargement was and remained first and foremost geopolitical process, (Schukink & Niemann, 2012: 7) and less technical, it was also considered not an instrument chosen by the EU, but also as an imposed necessity (Herzog, 2008: 23). Therefore, at the same time that the EU was trying to adapt to a new changing environment, in the beginning of the 21st century, managed to conclude the most important action of the foreign policy so far: accession of 10+2 CEEC in 2004 and 2007, which was conceived as the enlargement of the model “Bing bang”.

However, even after the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty and innovations that it brought to the institutional reform, the EU continues further to apply the same approach for enlargement against potential candidate countries of the Western Balkans, being more effective in promoting structural changes in the countries of this region (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 212). The only difference between the previous enlargement and current process that the Western Balkans is undergoing is especially the model of enlargement. Instead of Bing bang model of enlargement as the CEEC, for the Western Balkans the EU preferred the *regatta* model or individual accession towards the Brussels based on their individual achievements and merits in implementing reforms.

Despite this difference, in the regional geopolitical alignment with the Western Balkans, the EU foreign policy is directed through the enlargement policy (Reka, 2010: 349-361). This means that, in essence, even after entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the actual priority of the EU policy in the Balkans is the transformation of perceptions created in the society and individuals for each other, change of their identity and change of the norms and values that support their actions, or simply saying: promoting structural changes (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 261).

The specifics of the integration of Western Balkans

At this point, the analysis is focused in the EU enlargement process of the Western Balkans, respectively in the process of integration of the countries of this region in the EU, after the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty. Among the most important issues that characterize this process are: how the EU, through the enlargement policy, has practically affected the trajectory of transformation in the political, legal, socio-economic and security

¹ On a theoretical interpretation, in the context of foreign policy of the EU, of the sector for enlargement, the structured policy refers to a specific dimension of this policy, which is developed in a longer period of time and aims to affect or create sustainable political structures, legal, socio-economic, of security of the countries aiming to be integrated into the EU. These policies, unlike traditional, do not refer only to interstate relations, but to the multilateral spectrum of relations, the typical being the relations organization –state. Through the foreign structural policies, the EU has devoted a considerable attention to the dimensions of the human and social security. (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 33, 263).

fields of these candidate countries. Another important topic to be discussed is related to the analysis of the current position of the Western Balkans countries towards the integration in the EU, as well as the challenges they are facing during this process.

There are estimates that with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the process of enlargement towards the Western Balkans was eventually opened (Risteska, 2010: 120) after it was envisaged that for any potential enlargement of the EU, especially after the one in 2004, it should be created the legal and institutional basis¹, which was already offered by the Lisbon Treaty (O' Brennan, 2013: 38). All conditions have been already made for advancement of the process of enlargement, and this was also claimed by the leaders of the major countries of the EU. Here we are referring to the statement of the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe where she said:

"We have undertaken important steps [for further enlargement] and we will continue to do so. This is regarding Albania and other Western Balkans countries and through the Lisbon Treaty we have the legal right to grant membership to more than 27 states, which already are a part of the EU. Until now, we were blocked and could not grant membership to Croatia because until recently the EU was established in the form that was limited to grant membership to more than 27 countries" (European Council, 2008).

However, despite long expectations, after the accession of Croatia in the EU in 2013, the perspectives of enlargement for the remaining part of the Western Balkans were distant and the process of enlargement has lagged significantly (CSES, 2014). This becomes even more worrying considering the fact that eleven years have passed since the time when the European Council in the Thessaloniki Summit made it clear that the future of Western Balkans countries will be in the EU, even though they did not give specific time frames (Presidency Conclusions, 2003). Even now when we are on the eve of the twenty seven anniversary of the break-up of former Yugoslavia, only two constituent units of this federation have been granted the membership to the EU: Slovenia and Croatia (CSES, 2014).

These are only some of the many indicators that serve to ascertain that there are serious setbacks on the way to membership of Western Balkans countries into the EU. However, the most important issue in this stage is to find the causes for this setback. Also, to see the consistence of these setbacks, their nature, to whom do they address and how can they be overcome, in order to advance the positioning of these countries in their journey toward the integration into the EU.

Now, there is almost a wide consensus among scholars that the cause of slow pace of the integration of Western Balkans countries in the EU is not solely attributed to: a) prior "enlargement fatigue" of the EU and preoccupation with the challenges of the economic crises and the survival of the Eurozone, but it also has to do with the: b) causes within the countries of the Western Balkans, especially those with their own backlog in meeting the membership criteria set by the EU (Archick & Morelli, 2014: 14).

Firstly, when analyzing the effect that caused the enlargement fatigue, it has been concluded that it has become a very important issue for the EU. Despite the latest

¹ After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, was completed the process of institutional reformation in Amsterdam and Nice – which was interrupted with the Constitutional Treaty – to function as an enlarged European Union.

accession of Croatia and the continuous efforts of the EU for granting membership to other Western Balkans countries, experts say that a number of European leaders and many citizens of the main countries of the EU remain cautious regarding the further enlargement of the union (Ibid). This means that the enlargement is under threat by the EU itself.

In this context, opinion polls display growing skepticism among citizens in the EU member states towards further enlargement. For example, in 2013, 53% of citizens opposed a further enlargement of the EU in report to 37% of citizens who support it. The highest levels of skepticism can be found in Austria, Netherlands, Finland, France and Germany, where three quarters of citizens are against any further enlargement of the EU (CSES, 2014).

Besides the further enlargement fatigue, the EU is currently preoccupied with the economic and financial crisis and the survival of the Eurozone. In these circumstances, the leaders of the EU are facing not only the correction of financial problems in the Eurozone, but also with uncertainties regarding the future direction of the EU. As a result, they can be less inclined to push forward the enlargement agenda (Archick & Morelli, 2014: 14). These two obstacles, the enlargement fatigue as well as the economic crisis, can be considered as “passive factors” that have influenced the agenda deadlock for the further enlargement of the EU.

However, despite all these obstacles, the EU has never stopped its attempts for the advancement of the agenda for the enlargement towards the Western Balkans. Such practice was demonstrated also in the case of Bulgaria and Rumania in 2007, despite the fact that the EU faced serious challenges in the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.

Secondly, regarding the causes of the stalemate within the aspiring countries of the Western Balkans, the attention should also be focused on the economic and political factors. For example, the effect of the economic crisis in the Eurozone, significantly affected the countries in this region. The real indicator in this direction has been largely characterized by the slowdown of the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) of the powerful EU countries. This has directly and indirectly affected the macroeconomic stability of these countries, and as a result, it has contributed to slower the overall pace of reforms as a condition set by the EU (O'Brennan, 2013: 40). Governments of these countries focused on combating the negative consequences of the crisis, by paying little attention to the realization of systematic reforms related to the EU integration process. However, despite this, all governments of this region have declared that their efforts for transformation will continue and they remain committed to meeting recommendations and criteria set by the EU (European Commission, 2014).

This has had a direct and indirect effect in macroeconomic stability and as a consequence, has affected the slower overall pace of reforms, as a condition put forth by the EU (O'Brennan, 2013: 41). The governments of these countries were focused in combating negative consequences of the crises, while paying less attention to the realization of systematic reforms related to the EU integration process. But, despite this, all governments of the countries in the region have declared that their attempts for transformation will continue and they remain committed to meeting recommendations and criteria put forth by the EU.

Another important factor that caused delays in the advancement of the countries in the Western Balkans towards the agenda for integration, is related to some political

disagreements expressed in two areas: Political disagreements of internal stakeholders in countries like: Albania and Bosnia & Herzegovina, as well as bilateral disagreements, such as the case with Greece/Macedonia and Kosovo/Serbia. Therefore, these countries facing such political obstacles throughout the whole process of their integration in the EU have impelled the EU and some of its member states (especially Germany) to apply an increasingly complicated approach of requirements and contingencies that the countries of this region necessarily have to fulfill before accession to the EU.

The list of the criteria set by the EU for all these countries is longer than for CEEC. In addition to three standard criteria (political, economic and legal) formulated by the Council of Europe in Copenhagen in 1993¹, for the latter, the Balkans countries have additional obligations. First of all, they refer to some additional and politically sensitive criteria, which some researchers have called: “Copenhagen ‘Plus’ Criteria” (CSES, 2014). Among these criteria, the most important are: the EU’s requirements, especially for Serbia, of full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as normalization of relations with Kosovo; then, resolution of bilateral standoffs such as between Greece and Macedonia over the name issue (Ibid).

However, other conditions set by the EU for these countries are towards the achievement of good governance-maintenance of the rule of law, independent judiciary, efficient public administration, civil society development, media freedom the fight against corruption and organized crime².

In addition, in order to analyze the current position of these countries in the process of integration in the EU, it is also important to interpret the ways in which the intergovernmental tendencies are disclosed in report to those supranational within technical procedures within the EU regarding the accession of a certain candidate.

Another important dimension which clearly describes intergovernmental tendencies in the international decision-making structure of the EU and its member states regarding technical procedures for the accession of a country is related to the manner of decision-making. Thus, after the European Council concludes negotiations with a candidate country on all 35 chapters, the achieved agreements are included in a membership draft treaty, which has to be approved by the Council of Ministers and European Parliament. This procedure is characterized by a unanimous decision of the European Council as well its ratification for membership, in all member states (Archick, 2015). All this complicated process can last up to two years (Archick & Morelli, 2014: 6). Also, another intergovernmental element of technical procedures for accession is shown by the possibility of a member who individually can significantly affect the accession prospect of another country, as this option is provided in a way of unanimity in decision making, inaugurated in the Lisbon Treaty (Bartovic et al., 2011: 213-217).

This hidden intergovernmental mode for decision making regarding the enlargement, is as clear as it was with the case of Slovenia when it raised bilateral issues with Croatia, or

¹ These criteria were attributed to building sustainable democratic institutions, a functional market driven economy and capacities to adopt and implement the increasingly broad corpus of legal acts of the EU (*acquis communautaire*).

² See more: European Commission (2011), ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council’, *Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012*, COM (2011) 666 final, Brussels, 12 October 2011 [database on-line]; available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/ks_rapport_2011_en.pdf

the case of Greece opposing the use of the name Macedonia. Also, the case when Albania has applied for membership in 2009, Germany indicated that it would wait for the formal approval of the Bundestag, asking the European Commission to formulate an opinion on Albania's application. Another case was when the Council of Ministers delayed the answer to Serbia's application from December 2011 to March 2012, requesting from Serbia to further fulfill the conditions set for the beginning of normalization of relations with Kosovo (Balfour & Stratulat, 2012).

On the other hand, despite intergovernmental tendencies, the moment where supranational tendencies prevail, within the technical procedures for accession of an aspiring country, is related to some conditions foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty that the EU has started to apply for aspiring countries.

With the Lisbon Treaty, it is stipulated, that for accession into the EU, each candidate should respect "European values" (TEU Article 2). First of all, these values include: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, law enforcement and respect for human rights and freedoms, are fundamental values set by the Lisbon Treaty. More specifically, to legally guarantee these fundamental values, the Lisbon Treaty has included in itself European Charter of Fundamental Rights¹, which is legally binding for the EU, as well as member states. Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty represents an additional conditionality regarding the implementation of this Card for each aspiring country (Risteska, 2010: 121).

Therefore, based on these conditions and technical membership procedures foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty, it can be concluded that the opportunity for rapid accession of the countries of Western Balkans into the EU, now is made more difficult and complicated.

In fact, the EU, since the establishment of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in 1999, has continued with the same integration strategy for this region. This strategy was characterized mainly by an "infusive approach", where after each conditioning for these countries has followed an incentive, reaffirming their European future. The last event that proved this approach of the EU refers to the Conference of Western Balkans States in Berlin, under the chairmanship of German Chancellor, Angela Merkel and the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso. At this conference, Merkel said:

"I believe that the EU prospects of all those countries have made this possible. We have promised EU membership to all countries in the Western Balkans, and we stand firmly behind this promise. It is clear that more time is needed in the Balkans" (Press Release of Conference, 2014).

Based in the current position of the countries of Western Balkan, some researchers are inclined to make skeptical predictions regarding the perspective for potential integration of these countries in the EU. According to them, the perspective for enlargement of these countries is distant. In this context, Montenegro and Serbia which commenced their formal negotiations in 2012, respectively 2014, are not likely to join the EU before 2010. In this trend, Albania can also roughly be included. Citizens of Western Balkans (with the exception of Croatia) will have to wait more than 20 years since the launch of the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 1999, and 30 years since the end

¹ It is important to emphasize that the European Charter of Fundamental Rights is legally binding. This Charter, which was solemnly signed in 2000 and since then had simply had a declarative character, with entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty it became legally a binding part of the primary legislation of the EU.

of Communism, to join the EU. In case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo it is likely to be closer to 40 years (CSES, 2014).

Hopes for a rapid integration into the EU in a short term period, especially with the case of Albania and Kosovo, is specifically presented in the statement of the Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama for the EU, saying:

“The Balkans should work to overcome the fear of the big European family and its fatigue for the enlargement. Balkan people will be tired of patience and afterwards there is no EU that will make them come together. The EU is stuck on its own fear. Today, we are in a unique battle for Europe, to restore the state and legitimacy in the individual report to the country”. (VOA, 2014).

Conclusion

From the above discussions, different specific conclusions can be drawn about the process of integration in the current and precursor structures of the EU. First of all, despite the fact that each of the three theoretical viewpoints such as: federalization, intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, offer important parts in explaining this process, however, none of these theories can conceptualize totally this integration process and what exactly the EU is, in terms of its legal and political subjectivity. Therefore, based on these different theoretical viewpoints, we can come to another basic conclusion. Despite the fact that the process of integration into the EU has moved towards a union with supranational elements, nevertheless, it has never achieved the level where supranational elements would dominate over those intergovernmental.

Further, as noted above, these claims seemed to end with the failure of attempts to implement the Constitutional Treaty for the EU, which aimed to give to this union a character more similar to a federation. Therefore, with the beginning of this ambitious initiative, the ideas for the advancement and deepening of the European integration started from the beginning and with them the attempts for the creation of a federation of the “United States of Europe”, initiated sixty years ago. However, the real integration position of the EU after the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty represents a kind of a collective system of governance guided by a combination of intergovernmental and supranational elements. Therefore, considering this fact, the combination of these two elements, often raises the question; what is the designation of the EU?

Some authors conclude that the balance between intergovernmental and supranational elements, determines the impact of the EU member states within the system, in one side, as well as the effect of this system on the national sovereignty of these countries, on the other side. “At the heart of this balancing act is the matter of majority voting” (Sieberson, 2010). Moreover, we can notice that after the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU deals more with “*tier*” supranational elements rather than “*authoritative*” or “*legitimate*”. It is also noted that an organization has authoritative power to influence the sovereign authority of its constituents, only to the extent that the latter are able to delegate such authority. This practice, maybe, answers the question about how supranational is supranationalism itself?

In addition, another important point that clarifies the relation between intergovernmental and supranational tendencies is related to analyzing effects of the Lisbon Treaty in restructuring the institutional framework, especially in attempts to strengthen the leadership and coherence in the foreign policy of the EU and policies for further enlargement towards the countries of the Western Balkans. It is noted that the

system of the foreign policy of the EU, within this institutional framework is led by two main methods of policymaking. The community method operates through a system which maintains institutional equilibrium and decision making coherence within the European Commission. On the other hand, the intergovernmental method, is led by the principle of transferring competences of member governments within the institutional framework in the EU, but, still retaining the control over policymaking through dominant position in the Council.

In the context of the EU foreign policy, before and after the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty, it can be said that enlargement was the most proven instrument of impact of the EU as a transformational power in promoting structural transformation of post-conflict societies of the countries in the Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the key tool in promoting overall socio-economic stability in this region. Therefore, in explaining nature and transformative role of the EU foreign policy, and enlargement as its concretization mean, a constructivist interpretation in theoretical plan, has a special significance. This is due to the fact that constructivism is considered to have influenced foreign policy of the EU but also have provided constituent elements of its foreign policy (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 261).

However, despite the fact that the enlargement of the EU in the model of Big bang, in accessing 10+2 from CEEC, is generally considered as a success story, in report to the countries of the Western Balkans, the EU seems to be very clumsy to repeating a similar geopolitical triumph. Moreover, in the context of enlargement toward the Western Balkan, apparently it is gripped by the further "*enlargement fatigue*" towards this region as a consequence of the earlier "*enlargement fatigue*". Another factor that makes the situation even more hopeless for a rapid accession of the countries of the Western Balkan is directly linked to the lack of a time limit when these countries will join the EU.

But, despite the fact that the EU has continuously guided the process of integration of the Western Balkan countries, it is apparent that the acceleration or deceleration of the process of integration of these countries into the EU would be directly dependent on two other relevant factors. In one hand, except the individual success that each country will achieve in meeting conditions set by the EU, on the other hand, another very important and relevant factor in acceleration or deceleration of the process of integration of this region into the EU, is related to the conditions for a reciprocal cooperation which is the only key for a collective advancement towards integration into the EU.

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**PROPOSING AN ANALYTICAL BORDER CONTROL-ASSEMBLAGE
MODEL (BCAM) TO EXPLAIN EU MOTIVATIONS TO COMPLY
WITH THE REGULATIONS AND DECISIONS GOVERNING
THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS ACROSS BORDERS AND ADDRESSING
THE REFUGEE CRISIS (2014-2016)**

*Anca Parmena Olimid**

Abstract

The present paper is aimed to propose an Analytical Border Control-Assemblage Model (BCAM) to explain EU motivations to comply with the regulations and decisions governing the movement of persons across borders and addressing the refugee crisis for the period: 2014-2016 as follows: a) Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016; b) Decision (EU) 2016/253 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015; c) Decision (EU) 2015/2248 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 October 2015; d) Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014. The analysis enables the polarization of the main topics encountered in the legal documents of the European agenda concerning the refugee crisis and the migration policies presented above following the main topics: interest, rights, safety, surveillance, control, border(s) check and control.

Key words: *interest(s), right(s), movement of persons, border management, security*

Introduction

The European Union increasingly relies on values and cooperation which are the main topics of the European agenda since its birth (Ambühl & Zürcher, 2015: 76-98). The present paper concentrates on the analysis of the regulations governing the movement of persons, as one of the most important values of the EU architecture and on the policies addressing the refugee crisis, as one of the most challenging approaches of the European current historical, political and ideological landscape (Kirdar, 2012: 453-486). Nevertheless, first, we look at the differences between concepts and second, we will carry out a measurement of the items selected toward the notions of rights, interest, safety and control (Hierro, Maza & Villaverde, 2012: 396-411; Bahna, 2008: 844-860; Moretto & Vergalli, 2010: 318-342; Kosłowski, 1994: 369-402; Barrell, Fitzgerald & Riley, 2010: 373-395).

Methods and methodology

The study explains the polarization of the main topics used in the latest legal documents of the European agenda concerning the refugee crisis and migration policies and it proposes an analytical Border Control-Assemblage Model (hereinafter BCAM) needed to explain EU motivations facing these challenging times. BCAM is based on the empirical analysis of the documents in the area of freedom, security and justice, free movement of persons and crossing external borders as follows: a) Regulation (EU)

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2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code); b) Decision (EU) 2016/253 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on the mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument for immediate budgetary measures to address the refugee crisis; c) Decision (EU) 2015/2248 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 October 2015 on the mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument for immediate budgetary measures under the European Agenda on Migration; d) Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.

The following step is to figure the key terms and legal themes using a three-step process: a) identifying one/ two main topics, concepts and key words for each approach of the domain: interest, right(s), border, check, surveillance; b) mapping the main accordance with the legal texts; c) codifying each research selection using the BCAM model approach: $BCAM_{1-niA-N}$ ($n=1, 2, 3, \dots, n$; $N=1, 2, 3, \dots, N$).

We will focus the analysis on two main important regulations, Regulation (EU) 2016/399 and Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 analyzed by counting and codifying the following topics: a) In Table 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014: “interest(s)” & “safety” approach; b) In Table 2 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014: “right(s)” approach; c) Table 3 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014: “border(s)” approach; d) Table 4 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014: “check(s)” approach; e) Table 5 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014: “control” & “surveillance” approach.

Besides some important aspects regarding the European social and political context, the study mainly focuses on the accordance and use of the topics in the texts of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 and Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 by exploring some key items that polarize the EU policies in the field of the movement of persons across borders and especially addressing the refugee crisis (Kureková, 2013: 721-739; Geddes, 2005: 787-806).

For each table, we categorized each topic for each Regulation using a “topic analysis” and we listed the results from 1iA-F using the following nomination and category for each topic selected: a) “topic” $BCAM_{1iA-F}$ (first column titled “Topic”); b) number of items counted for each topic (second column); c) main accordance with the text of the Regulation and legal base (third column) and Codification to enable the BCAM model: $BCAM_{1iA-F}$ (fourth column) for each regulation: Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias & Pickles, 2015: 894-891; Nowok & Willekens, 2011: 521-533). After the items score distribution, each item is identified and the correct codification is underlined.

This division is essential and it notes the theoretical polarization of the optimal items emphasized for each topic according to the legal base of each Regulation (a number of most important items were distributed for the first analysis reaching to eight items) as follows: Regulation (EU) 2016/399: “interest(s)” $BCAM_{1iA-F}$; “rights(s)” $BCAM_{2iA-H}$; “border(s)” $BCAM_{3iA-D}$; “check(s)” $BCAM_{4iA-D}$; “control” $BCAM_{4iA-G}$ and Regulation (EU)

No 656/2014: “safety” BCAM_{1iG-I}; “rights(s)” BCAM_{2iI-J}; “border(s)” BCAM_{3iE-G}; “check(s)” BCAM_{3iE}; “surveillance” BCAM_{4iH-I}.

The precise measurement of items and key concepts is a useful step based on the correlations between the individual item (topic) (column one of each table)-measurement (number of items)/ Regulation (column two of each table)-legal accordance with the text (column three of each table)-codification and evaluation of the multiple individual measurements (column four of each table). In this context, the issue of measurement is designed to measure a particular topic monitoring data selection to ensure accuracy (Columns 1-3 of each table) and checking the codification outputs presented in Column four of each table. Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) has to be related to the Decision (EU) 2016/253 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on the mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument for immediate budgetary measures to address the refugee crisis specifies the urgent procedures, measures and instruments to be applied for the “Flexibility Instrument” providing the sum in order to manage the refugee crisis (Baele & Sterck, 2015: 1120-1139; Marques, 2010: 265-291).

Furthermore, Decision (EU) 2016/253 mobilizes “the payment appropriations corresponding to the mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument” (Article 1) considering four different levels: a) first level: EUR 734,2 million in 2016; b) second level: EUR 654,2 million in 2017; c) third level: EUR 83,0 million in 2018; d) fourth level: EUR 58,6 million in 2019. The same mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument is considered by the Decision (EU) 2015/2248 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 October 2015 on the mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument for immediate budgetary measures under the European Agenda on Migration. This Decision “allows the mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument within the annual ceiling of EUR 471 million (2011 prices) to allow the financing of clearly identified expenditure which could not be financed within the limits of the ceilings available for one or more other headings” taking into account the management of the refugee crisis (see Point (1) and Article 1 of the Decision (EU) 2015/2248). Moreover, the same Decision explains the conditions for the payment appropriations corresponding to the mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument (Article 1).

Results and discussion

A. “Interest(s)” & “safety” approach

The first analysis focuses on the analysis of the “interest(s)” & “safety” approach in the legal texts of both Regulations. According to the analysis, the topic of “safety” is listed in the text of Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 as follows: “safety of life”, “safety of persons”, “capability of safety, navigation & communication” and the topic of interest(s) in the text of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 using the following legal nominations: “interests of clarity and rationality”, “border control is in the interest”, “the interests of public policy and the internal security of the Member States” and “common interests” (see Table 1).

In Table 1, to support in interpreting the items selection of “interest(s)” and “safety” are correlated underlying the main accordance to the legal text to the “interests of clarity and rationality”: Point (1), “fundamental interests of society”: Point (27) and “Border control is in the interest”: Point (6).

Table 1. Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014:
“interest(s)” & “safety” approach


Topic	No. of items	Main accordance with the text of the Regulation and legal base	Codification
“interest(s)” BCAM _{IiA-F} Regulation (EU) 2016/399	8	“interests of clarity and rationality” – Point (1)	BCAM _{IiA} _principles
		“Border control is in the interest” – Point (6)	BCAM _{IiB} _control
		“fundamental interests of society” – Point (27)	BCAM _{IiC} _society
		“the interests of public policy and the internal security of the Member States” TITLE II EXTERNAL BORDERS, CHAPTER 1, Crossing of external borders and conditions for entry, Article 5, Crossing of external borders – Point 2 (a)	BCAM _{IiD} _public policy & BCAM _{IiE} _internal security
		“common interests” – Article 29, Point 2	BCAM _{IiF} _community
“safety” BCAM _{IiG-I} Regulation (EU) No 656/2014	15	“place of safety” & “safety of life” CHAPTER 1 General Provisions, Article 2 Definitions, Point (12)	BCAM _{IiG} _safety of life
		“safety at sea”, “safety of the persons”, “the safety of the participating units” CHAPTER 1 General Provisions, Article 3 Safety at sea	BCAM _{IiH} _safety of persons
		“the availability and capability of safety, navigation and communication equipment” CHAPTER 1 General Provisions, Article 9 Search and rescue situations	BCAM _{IiI} _capability of safety, navigation & communication

Source: Author’s own compilation based on the analysis of the text of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014

Column two shows the item number for each topic as follows: “interest(s)” – BCAM_{IiA-F} in the text of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399: 8 items and “safety” – BCAM_{IiG-I} for the Regulation (EU) No 656/2014: 15 items). Column four codifies the uses of each topic selected and summarizes the main accordance with the BCAM model that we propose as follows: BCAM_{IiA}_principles, BCAM_{IiB}_control, BCAM_{IiC}_society, BCAM_{IiD}_public policy & BCAM_{IiE}_internal security, BCAM_{IiF}_community, BCAM_{IiG}_safety of life, BCAM_{IiH}_safety of persons, BCAM_{IiI}_capability of safety, navigation & communication (see Figure 1).

Items analysis described in Table 1 selects the nature of the understanding of the “fundamental interests of society”: Point (27) and it improves the effectiveness of the codification and their validity. The developments described in Columns 2-4 associate the focus on social capital that bridges the fundamentals of the society, the public policy sector and the border control. These three priorities rate the support for the common interests underlying the safety of persons and internal security tasks.

Figure 1. Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014:
“interest(s)” & “safety” approach



Source: Author's own compilation based on the analysis of the text of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014

B. “Right(s)” approach

The second analysis of the legal text of both Regulations encounters the “right(s)” approach. If the first items “interest(s)” and “safety” counted 8 and 15 items, the topic of “right(s)” is used in 30 different legal nominations in the text of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 and in 28 different legal nominations in the text of the Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 identifying the following codifications: “free movement”, “right to move”, “fundamental rights”, “international protection”, “right of entry”, “right of asylum”, “right to appeal”, “protection of fundamental rights”, “fundamental rights of migrants” (see Table 2).

Moreover, because of the nature of rights as system of freedoms, rights might enable determinants or variables to constitute elements of free movement “in particular as regards non-refoulement” (Article 3 Scope b) of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399. As will be seen in Table 2, rights as a communitarian normative system, operate on various levels, from the free movement: BCAM_{2iA} to right to move: BCAM_{2iB}_right of entry: BCAM_{2iE}_right to stay: BCAM_{2iF}_right of asylum: BCAM_{2iG}_right to appeal: BCAM_{2iH}.

Table 2. Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014:
“right(s)” approach


Topic	No. of items	Main accordance with the text of the Regulation and legal base	Codification
“rights(s)” BCAM _{2iA-H} Regulation (EU) 2016/399	30	“rights of free movement” – Point (5)	BCAM _{2iA} _free movement
		“right to move” – Point (22)	BCAM _{2iB} _right to move
		“fundamental rights” – Point (36)	BCAM _{2iC} _fundamental rights
		“the rights of persons enjoying the right of free movement under Union law” – Article 3 Scope (b)	
		“the rights of refugees and persons requesting international protection, in particular as regards non-refoulement” – Article 3 Scope (b)	BCAM _{2iD} _international protection
		“right of entry of persons” Article 8 Border checks on persons – Point 2	BCAM _{2iE} _right of entry
		“right to stay” Article 13 Border surveillance – Point 1	BCAM _{2iF} _right to stay

“rights(s)” BCAM _{2iH-J} Regulation (EU) No 656/2014	28	“right of asylum and to international protection” Article 14 Refusal of entry – Point 1	BCAM _{2iG} _right of asylum
		right to appeal Article 14 Refusal of entry – Point 3	BCAM _{2iH} _right to appeal
		“protection of fundamental rights” Article 4 Protection of fundamental rights and the principle of non-refoulement, Article 9 Search and rescue situations, Article 10 Disembarkation, Article 13 Report	BCAM _{2iI} _protection of fundamental rights
		“fundamental rights of migrants” – Point (5)	BCAM _{2iJ} _fundamen tal rights of migrants

Source: Author’s own compilation based on the analysis of the text
of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014

In the direction of the analysis described in Point A of our study, Table 2, Column 4 codifies the uses of each topic selected “rights” and summarizes the main accordance to the BCAM model identified as follows: “free movement”, “right to move”, “fundamental rights”, “international protection”, “right of entry”, “right to stay”, “right of asylum”, “right to appeal”, “protection of fundamental rights”, “fundamental rights of migrants” (see also Figure 2).

Figure 2. Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014:



Source: Author’s own compilation based on the analysis of the text
of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014

C. “Border(s)” approach

The “border” approach is analyzed in Table 3 entitled Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014: “border(s)” approach that categorizes the following legal approaches: the topic of “border(s)” is identified in 463 legal nominations in the text of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 and in 65 other legal nominations in the text of the Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 listing the following codifications: “border check”, “common borders”, “internal borders”, “external borders”, “border surveillance”. The accordance to the legal texts of both Regulations is categorized as follow: a) for Regulation (EU) 2016/399: “border checks at external borders”- Article 9 Relaxation of border checks, “internal border” – TITLE III INTERNAL BORDERS, CHAPTER I, “external borders” – Article 1 Subject matter and principles and b) Regulation (EU) No 656/2014: “external borders”, “border crossings”, “cross-border criminality”, “border checks” – Point (1) (see Figure 3).

Table 3. Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014:
“border(s)” approach

Topic	No. of items	Main accordance with the text of the Regulation and legal base	Codification
“border(s)” BCAM _{3iA-D} Regulation (EU) 2016/399	463	“Border checks at external borders” Article 9 Relaxation of border checks	BCAM _{3iA} _border check
		“common borders” Article 10 Separate lanes and information on signs	BCAM _{3iB} _common borders
		“internal border” TITLE III INTERNAL BORDERS, CHAPTER I, Absence of border control at internal borders, Article 22, Article 28, Article 29, Article 32	BCAM _{3iC} _internal borders
		“external borders” Article 1 Subject matter and principles, Article 2 Definitions Point 2, Article 3 Scope, TITLE II, EXTERNAL BORDERS, CHAPTER I Crossing of external borders and conditions for entry, Article 5, Crossing of external borders	BCAM _{3iD} _external borders
“border(s)” BCAM _{3iE-G} Regulation (EU) No 656/2014	65	“external borders”, “border crossings”, “cross-border criminality”, “border checks” – Point (1)	BCAM _{3iE} _external borders
		“border management” – Point (2)	BCAM _{3iF} _border management
		“border surveillance” – Points (1), (3), (8), (9)	BCAM _{3iG} _border surveillance

Source: Author’s own compilation based on the analysis of the text of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014


The BCAM model identified according to the Point C of our analysis encounters the following main accordance: “border surveillance” – “common borders” – “internal borders” – “border management” added to the BCAM model categories identified in the Point A (principles-control-public policy-internal security-community-safety of life-safety of persons-capability of safety, navigation and communication equipment) and Point B of the analysis (“free movement” – “right to move” – “right of entry” – “right to appeal” – “right of asylum”) (see Figure 1; Figure 2 and Figure 3). According to the Figure 3, the border(s) forms the most important part of the European surveillance system, particular in the system of “border management” and “internal borders”. Legitimation of the “border” approach can be associated both with the internal and external borders and with the border check management.

Border(s) are often entwined with the normative system of rights and the other aspects of control and check on persons (Article 8 Border checks on persons of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399). All determinations of the rights approach in Figure 3 accords with the system of border surveillance, but especially with the system of border management. Figure 3 also argues the legal relationship with the system of “common borders” which serves as normative for the other encounters of the topic such as: “external borders”, “border crossings”, “cross-border criminality”, “border checks” –

Point (1). Therefore, such approaches can be evidence of EU border surveillance practice, and therefore of the existence of a border check management.

The recourse to the analysis of the interests, rights and border in the analysis of the border control-assemblage model in the interpretation of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 and Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 serves another purpose: by analyzing how the EU law system deals with the migration involving the border check management, an insight into the spectrum of “control procedures” and for check at border-crossing points can be detected. It may be also noted, that Figure 3 points that both documents set a common legal denominator for the BCAM_model of the “border(s)” approach meaning the “border surveillance” that reflects a key to the understanding of the rights-border check legal relationship.

Figure 3. Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014:
“border(s)” approach



Source: Author's own compilation based on the analysis of the text of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014

D. “Check(s)” approach

Table 4 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014: “check(s)” approach analyses the “check” approach by identifying 172 items for this topic in the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 and 7 items in the text of the Regulation (EU) No 656/2014. The main accordance with the text is described as follows: “control measures” – “control procedures” – “border-control” – “staff and resources for border control”, “implementation of control” – “border surveillance” (see Table 4).

The codification of for this topic is identified in Column four of the Table 4 such as: “border check”, “rules for check”, “security checks”, “checks at border crossing points”. The selected topic of “check(s)” is identified in 172 items of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 and in 7 items in the text of the Regulation (EU) No 656/2014.

Table 4. Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014:
“check(s)” approach

Topic	No of items	Main accordance with the text of the Regulation and legal base	Codification
“check(s)” BCAM _{4iA-D} Regulation (EU) 2016/399	172	“Specific rules for border checks”	BCAM _{4iA} _border check
		Article 18 Joint control	
		“Specific rules for checks on certain categories of persons” Article 20 Specific rules for checks on certain categories of persons	BCAM _{4iB} _rules for check

		“Checks within the territory” Article 23 Checks within the territory	BCAM _{4iC} _checks within the territory
		“ security checks” Article 23 Checks within the territory	BCAM _{4iD} _security checks
“check(s)” BCAM _{3iE} Regulation (EU) No 656/2014	7	“checks at border crossing points “ CHAPTER III Specific Rules, Article 5 Detection, Article 6 Interception in the territorial sea, Article 7 Interception of the high seas	BCAM _{4iE} _checks at border crossing points


Source: Author’s own compilation based on the analysis of the text
of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014

Figure 4 categorizes the codifications of the BCAM model for the “check” approach: rules-check within the territory-security checks (see Figure 4). Another important issue to be analysed regards the interpretation of the “check” formulations and their configuration within the structure of Figure 4.

Particularly, how the EU law system relates and motivates the “check within the territory” involving the particular rules and procedures for border check and “specific rules for checks on certain categories of persons” (see Article 20 explains the “specific rules for checks on certain categories of persons” examining the security control within the within and also at the border check points).

The codification within the Column four of the Table 4 shows the connected topics related to the “check” approach: BCAM_{4iA}_border check and BCAM_{4iB}_rules for check. Figure 4 also underpins the border check practical development and implementation reflecting a move from the “rules for check” to “security check”. The “check” approach must be also interpreted in the light of the “specific rules for checks on certain categories of persons” (Article 20) focusing on two dependent directions dependent in the process of decision making: a) applying the “interception in the territorial sea” (Article 6) and b) the “interception of the high seas” (Article 7). It can be argued alternatively that the justification of the “checks at border crossing points” is addressed within the classic formula of “rules” beyond the “specific rules for checks on certain persons”.

Figure 4. Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014:
“check(s)” approach



Source: Author’s own compilation based on the analysis of the text
of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014

E. “Control” & “surveillance” approach

The fifth Point E of the analysis focuses on the “control” and “surveillance” approach in the legal texts of both Regulations. According to the analysis presented in Table 5, the topic of “interest(s)” is listed in the text of Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 as follows: “border surveillance”, “border surveillance operation at sea” – Points (1), (4) and in the text of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 using the following legal nominations: “control measures” – Point (15), “control procedures” – Point (17), “border-control” – Point (18), “implementation of control” – Article 16 Implementation of control (see Table 5).

Table 5. Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014:
“control” and “surveillance” approach


Topic	No of items	Main accordance with the text of the Regulation and legal base	Codification
“control” BCAM _{4iA-G} Regulation (EU) 2016/399	125	“control measures” – Point (15)	BCAM _{5iA} _control measures
		“control procedures” – Point (17)	BCAM _{5iB} _control procedures
		“border-control” – Point (18)	BCAM _{5iC} _border-control
		“Control of external borders and refusal of entry” CHAPTER II Control of external borders and refusal of entry, Article 7 Conduct of border checks	BCAM _{5iD} _control of external borders
		“Staff and resources for border control” CHAPTER III Staff and resources for border control and cooperation between Member States, Article 15 Staff and resources for border control	BCAM _{5iE} _staff and resources
		“implementation of control” Article 16 Implementation of control	BCAM _{5iF} _implementation of control
		“joint control” Article 18 Joint control	BCAM _{5iG} _joint control
		“Absence of border control at internal borders” TITLE III INTERNAL BORDERS, CHAPTER I Absence of border control at internal borders	BCAM _{5iC} _border control
“surveillance” BCAM _{4iH-I} Regulation (EU) No 656/2014	23	“border surveillance”, “border surveillance operation at sea” – Points (1), (4)	BCAM _{5iH} _border surveillance
		“surveillance operations” – Points (3), (8), (9), (10) and “surveillance activities” – Point (4)	BCAM _{5iI} _surveillance operations

Source: Author’s own compilation based on the analysis of the text of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014

Figure 5 describes the main findings for the BCAM model as follows: “control measure” – “control procedures” – “border-control” – “joint control” (see Figure 5). “Control” and “surveillance” approach enables two different aspects as a double-sided approach based on the “control measures” and “border-control” procedures. This derives from the EU unique perception of border control procedures which entails the “border surveillance”, “border surveillance operation at sea”: Points (1) and (4) and “surveillance

operations”: Points (3), (8), (9), (10) and the “surveillance activities”: Point (4). Figure also 5 correlates the control measures and procedures to the “joint control” activities leading to the conclusion that advances the codification described in Column four of the Table 5 (BCAM_{5iA}_control measures, BCAM_{5iB}_control procedures, BCAM_{5iC}_border-control, BCAM_{5iC}_control of external borders, BCAM_{5iD}_staff and resources, BCAM_{5iE}_implementation of control, BCAM_{5iF}_joint control, BCAM_{5iG}_border control, BCAM_{5iH}_border surveillance, BCAM_{5iI}_surveillance operations).

Figure 5. Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014:
“control” and “surveillance” approach



Source: Author’s own compilation based on the analysis of the text of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014

According to the Points A-E of our analysis, the BCAM that we proposed codifies the following topics: “interest(s)” & “safety” approach (Table 1), “right(s)” approach (Table 2), “border(s)” approach (Table 3), “check(s)” approach (Table 4), “control” and “surveillance” approach (Table 5). The third column of the tables identify the main accordance with the text of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 & Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 and categorizes the “safety of life”, “internal security”, “control measures”, “control procedures” and “surveillance” approaches. The codification summarizes the main accordance as follows: principles-rules-procedures-measures-surveillance.

Conclusions

The present paper codifies the legal-migration divide by conceptualizing the BCAM model as a viable alternative to frame the various uses of the “in-between” the legal texts governing the EU policies and strategies in the field of the migration policy and refugee crisis. The analysis enabled the EU common practices and trends by “measuring” an objective BCAM model with five-option items selection: “interest(s)” & “safety” approach (option items selections 1), “right(s)” approach (option items selections 2), “border(s)” approach (option items selections 3), “check(s)” approach (option items selections 4), “control” and “surveillance” approach (option items selections 5). As a theoretical perspective, the study concludes the main features and categories delineating the legal framework in the field: rights-interests-control-safety-surveillance balancing between the control procedures-surveillance operations and border-control management.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Stoica Lascu, Melek Fetisleam (eds.), *Contemporary Research in Turkology and Eurasian Studies. A Festschrift in Honor of Professor Tasin Gemil on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday* (Babeș-Bolyai University. The Institute of Turkology and Central-Asian Studies), Cluj-Napoca, Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2013 [2015], lxxviii+1.056 pp.; ill., maps, tables. ISBN 978-973-595-622-6

Last autumn – of 2015 – a massive volume has been published, which had been in preparation since 2013, in honor of the renowned Romanian Turkologist – of Tatar origin – the scholar, researcher and archivist Tasin Gemil. The book is published in English (a few of the studies are in French, and one is in German), thanks to the labor and care of Professor Stoica Lascu – acclaimed Balkanologist – from the “Ovidius” University of Constanța, and the researcher (Doctorand) Melek Fetisleam, and the volume constitutes a proof of the superior level reached by contemporary Romanian historiography, being part of a series of similar *Festschrifts* dedicated to other personalities such as Constantin Bușe, Carol Iancu, Corneliu-Mihail Lungu, Ioan-Aurel Pop, Petre I. Roman, Ioan Scurtu, Vasile Ursachi, etc.

The editors have organized the 59 studies in five thematic sections – Part One: *Central Asia. Middle East* (pp. 1-189), Part Two: *Crimea. Tatars* (pp. 191-329), Part Three: *Empire Ottoman/Turkey. Balkans* (pp. 333-578), Part Four: *Romanian Principalities. Dobruja* (pp. 581-829), Part Five: *Varia* (pp. 833-934).

A number of 63 contributors (see *Notes on Contributors*, pp. lxxv-lxxviii) from 16 different countries (Republic of Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey, the United States of America, and the Republic of Uzbekistan) have honored one of the best known European Turkologists, the one who, in the first issue (2013) of *Studia et Documenta Turcologica* yearbook, writes: “We believe that *Turkology* comprises not only the history, language, culture, and civilization, as an ensemble and particularly (for each people and community) of the Turkic world also the geography, economy, geopolitics, state structure, and past and present politics of this consistent part of the humankind. Despondently, there is still a plethora of clichés, misconceptions, and unfounded conclusions regarding the Turkic peoples, all coming from the depths of history. We believe that a correct and deeper awareness on this world, on its connections with other peoples and states, is meant to provide a more realistic perspective on the current and future cooperation with all the peoples and communities of the Turkic world”.

The authors and subjects approached in this landmark volume are:

Part One: Central Asia. Middle East

Marina Tolmacheva (Middle Eastern Genealogy in Central Asian Islam. Belief, Legend, and Privilege), *Alice Y. Borisenko, Yulius S. Khudyakov* (Ancient Turkic Nomads Images on Bronze Plaques in Central Asia), *Albert A. Burbanov* (The Region of Middle Amudarja in Ancient Times and the Middle Ages. Historical, Archaeological, and Geographical Essay on Lebap Region of Eastern Turkmenistan), *Bulat L. Khamidullin* (Khazars’ Participation in Creation of an Independent Kingdom: Abazgsk (Abkhazia), *Rodica Pop* (Turkish Origin Vocabulary in the Secret History of the Mongols, 13th Century), *George Grigore* (Ibn Baṭṭūṭa and his Visit to Nusaybin, Dara, and Mardin during the Artuqid Period), *Zulkehumor Mirzaeva* (The 1950-1990s: Uzbek’s Literature as the Public Square of the “Ideological Struggle”), *Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont* (Aspects des sociétés des républiques musulmanes soviétiques et post-soviétiques d’Asie Centrale et du Caucase d’après les stèles funéraires locales), Vasile Soare (The Islam in Azerbaijan. A Historical Evolution and Current Trends), *Marian Zidaru* (Great Britain and the Moslem World at the End of the Great War: An Analysis Document of the British Cabinet), *Radu Ștefan Vergatti* (The Pan-Iranian Zone. Elements

of Geopolitics, Demography, and History), *Alieva Lala* (Historical Study of the Palestine Intifada Literature), *Andreea-Paula Ibănescu* (Incremental Politics: Iran and Turkey's Post-1990. Cultural Diplomacy in Central Asia. Inferring New Concepts: Geo-Culture, Geo-History, and Geo-Religion).

Part Two: Crimea. Tatars

Illnur M. Mirgaliyev (The Sons of Tokhtamysh Khan in the Struggle for the Golden Horde Power), *Margareta Aslan* (Relationships between the Crimean Khanate and the Principality of Transylvania in Transylvanian Chronicles, 16th-17th Centuries), *Nuri Kavak* (Daily Life in Crimean Tatars, 17th-18th Centuries), *Costel Coroban* (Charles XII's Retreat in the Ottoman Empire and his Contacts with the Tatar Khans, 1709-14), *Sergean Osman* (Introduction à la documentation française sur le Khanat de Crimée. Recherches sur documents concernant l'histoire du Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 1739-1768), *Giuseppe Cossuto* (Crimea and Crimean Tatars in Laurence Oliphant's Description of Black Sea, 1852), *Melek Fetisleam* (Education and Identity Assertion of the Tatars in the Russian Empire. The Mid-19th-Early 20th), *Liliya F. Baybulatova* (Rizaetdin Fahretudin about Russian Muslim Community and its Problem since 1905: According to the Newspaper of *Vakyt* and Journal of *Islam*), *Svetlana M. Czerwononaja* (Tatar *Shamayls* in the Modern Culture of Turkic World) *Iskander Gilyazov* (Scientists at the Service of War. The Perusal of Letters of the Tatar Prisoners of War in Germany during the First World War).

Part Three: Empire Ottoman/Turkey. Balkans

Shahin Mustafayev (Ethnolinguistic Processes in the Turkic Milieu of Anatolia and Azerbaijan, 14th-15th Centuries), *Paul Bruszanowski* (Christians and Converts to Islam in the Balkan Peninsula during the Ottoman Rule), *Dragana Amedoski*, *Gordana Garić Petrović* (Transformation of a Medieval Town into an Ottoman Administrative Center. Case of Kruševac (Alaca Hisâr), *Nagy Pienaru* (Sigismund de Luxemburg and the Islamic Orient, 15th Century), *Ioan-Aurel Pop* (The Extent and Revenues of the Ottoman Empire in Documents of Some Venetian Baili, 16th Century), *Gábor Kármán* (The 'Abdname of Sultan Mehmed III to András Báthori, Prince of Transylvania, 1599), *Birsen Bulmuş* (Mustafa Feyzi Hayatizade Efendi's Treatises on Syphilis in the Ottoman Empire, 1681-2), *Selim Aslantaş*, *Judith Aslantaş* (Bericht des Franz Freiherrn von Ottenfels-Schwind über die Revolutionen in den Jahren 1807 und 1808 in Konstantinopel), *Julieta Velichkova-Borin* (Premiers projets européens sur l'Empire Ottoman, 1840-1853), *Manos Perakis* (Capitulations Abolition Attempts in Crete during the Halepa Regime, 1878-89), *Dalibor Jovanovski* (The Greek-Ottoman Crisis in 1888), *Kemal H. Karpat* (The Emigration of Turks from Romania to Turkey and Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver), *Dimitris Michalopoulos* (Constantin Caramanlis et l'affaire de Chypre: le nœud gordien à résoudre), *Boyka Stefanova* (Explaining the Electoral Preferences of the Ethnic Turkish Minority in Bulgaria (1991-2013): A Case of Ethnocultural Voting?).

Part Four: Romanian Principalities. Dobrudja

Laura-Adina Fodor (The Image of the Tatars in the *Moldavian Chronicle* (1662-743) of Ion Neculce: Deconstructing Negative Representations), *Ionel Cănde*a (Turks and Tatars in the Neighborhood of the Măxineni Monastery (Brăila County), 17th-18th Centuries), *Gabriel-Felician Croitoru* (Le *kaza* de Giurgiu entre les traités de paix de Passarowitz (1718) et de Svichtov (1791). Quelques aspects militaires et politique), *Ileana Căzan* (Administration et système fiscal – le modèle occidental et la tradition levantine en Valachie au XVIII^{ème} siècle), *Călin Felezeu* (Between Phanariotism and the Movement of National Emancipation. The Cantemir Model of Approaching the Image of the Ottoman Empire in the Romanian Written Culture), *Veniamin Ciobanu* (Le problème des monastères dédiés, pendant le règne d'Alexandru Ioan Cuza), *Daniela Bușă* (Les relations de la Roumanie avec l'Empire Ottoman dans les premières années après l'Indépendance), *Gheorghe Dumitrașcu*, *Stoica Lascu* (Dobrudja under Ottoman Rule. With an Additional Bibliography), *Dan Prodan* (Franz Babinger et la Dobroudja ottomane dans les XVI^{ème}-XVII^{ème} siècles), *Margarita Dobrev*a (Muslim Primary Education in the Central and North Dobrudja. In the 1860s-70s), *Adrian Ilie* (Tatars Involved in the Local Administration of Medgidia City. The Second Half of the 19th

Century), *Lavinia Gheorghe* (The Collection Dr. Ibrahim Themo in the National History and Archaeology Museum of Constanța), *Stoica Lascu* (Aspects of Spiritual Life of the Turkish–Tatar Community in Dobruja (1913-5). With Two Appendices: The Turks and Tatars in Romania. According to Censuses From 1899 to 2011), *Virgil Coman* (Archival Data on the Muslim Community of Medgidia in the Interwar Period).

Part Five. Varia

Szabolcs Polgár (The Ethnonym *Pecheneg* (*Pecinaci*, *Pecenaci*) in the *Chronicle* of Regino. The Beginning of the 10th Century), *Andreea Atanasiu-Croitoru* (Navigation and Dangers in the Black Sea International Maritime Regulations, 13th-14th Centuries), *Elizaveta Cvilincova* (Gagauz Variant of the *Epistle about Lord's Day* (Sunday) from the Point of View of Ethno-Cultural Inter), *Barbara Kellner-Heinkele* (Manuscripts from the Middle East in the *Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin*, the Former Royal Library), *Ioan Scurtu* (From the History of Relations between the State Archives of Romania and State Archives of Turkey, 1992-4), *Mieste Hotopp-Riecke* ("The Pasha of Magdeburg": New Fields of Research and Teaching for German Turkologists between Regional History, Intercultural Studies, and German-Tatar Interferences), *Raluca Iosipescu, Sergiu Iosipescu* (La Protection du Patrimoine Culturel Subaquatique en Roumanie. Quelques remarques preliminaries), *Constantin Hlibor* (Geopolitics of National Minorities in Cyberspace Age. Are the Turkish-Tatars a Single Virtual Community in World Politics?)

Within the *Preface* (pp. xiii-xl) – subtitled *The Scientific Career of a Leading Contemporary Romanian Historian Publications of Tasin Gemil* –, the scientific career of the celebrated scholar, Tasin Gemil, is detailed, the editors revealing that "Among the representatives of Clio's servants that have been prominent in Romanian historiography since late '70s of the last century, Professor and researcher Tasin Gemil occupies a top and distinct position, both in the quality and depth of the documentary studies and published volumes, and no less by their thematic novelty; on the other hand, the genuine and honest intellectual personality of this Romanian ethnic Tatar is fully dimensioned by his involvement after December 22, 1989, in the social and political life of his country, both as a representative of the respective ethnic community and as a high official (Ambassador) of the Romanian State".

The volume boasts a broad *Introduction* (pp. li-lxxiii), where, in short, the content of each contribution is presented, almost each of them being enriched by bibliographical references – some of them very detailed –, which proves that the editors are up to date with the latest scientific developments in this field of study. In the end of this section, the editors believe that "The various topics which were addressed in this volume reveals, we believe, no less – beyond of own concerns of the contributors – the major growing interest in the scientific world by enjoys today the Turkologie, and especially the research on the history of the Ottoman Empire (see: *Additional References. Books on Ottoman Empire, 2000-2013*) – including in Romania –, and Eurasian Studies in general; as revealing of the connections and reciprocal influences of the Romanian space with the South-East European in the course of time, can be, surely, a contribution to knowledge of the whole European history, and even Eurasian".

The studies approach numerous subjects which are related to their respective thematic sections, many of them introducing new documentary sources into the scientific arena (we also mention here the section, *Publications of Tasin Gemil (1968-2013)*, pp. xli-l). Besides the studies themselves, the editors have put together an extensive (pp. 935-997) *Bibliography*, which is alphabetically ordered (and is subdivided in *Books* and *Studies*), and includes all the possible bibliographic citations, thereby creating a landmark list of references at a worldwide level in the field of Turkology and Eurasian studies. Furthermore, one of the editors, Professor Stoica Lascu, has included two inedited sections in the volume – *Additional References. Festschriften for the Scholars in Turkologie and Central Asian Studies* (pp. 999-1017), respectively *Additional References. Books on Ottoman Empire (2000-2013)* (pp. 1019-1056). In the first one over 270 scholars are listed from all over the world, scientists in whose honor *Festschriften* have been dedicated which represents a pioneering endeavor in Romanian historiography. Not less important is the list of works referring

to the worldwide scientific production of books about the Ottoman Empire published in the period 2000-2013; the effort of the editor is commendable, as he has produced an up-to-date image of contemporary Ottoman studies that is very difficult to reach otherwise, and which stands proof for the ever increasing interest of the specialists in finding out or researching about different themes or regions of the Ottoman Empire.

This substantial and rich volume dedicated to Prof. Tasin Gemil, edited in Cluj-Napoca (by Presa Universitară Clujeană), under the aegis of The Institute of Turkology and Central-Asian Studies, laboriously and meticulously abridged – according to the Western scientific requirements and habits regarding the referencing and bibliography, which has been unified across its huge number of 59 studies plus the additions contents – and representing an important achievement of contemporary Romanian historiography, compels the reader to express the greatest praise and recognition to the two admirable editors: “And if these studies can interest the specialists – as the editors justly conclude –, it means that the volume in honor Professor Tasin Gemil has made a small contribution to the progress of contemporary Romanian historical science” (p. lxxiii).

Costel Coroban

Gabriel Stelian Manea, *Un adulter în familia comunistă. România și SUA în anii '60* [An Adultery in Communist Family. Romania and USA in the 60s.] (Asociația pentru Dialog Intercultural și Studii Istorice INTERMARIUM), Târgoviște, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2016, 336 pp. ISBN 978-606-537-190-3

The volume with a title potentially exciting – especially, perhaps, in hope of a marketing editorial – is “based on” a worthy Doctoral Thesis presented on July 10, 2013 at “Ovidius” University of Constanța, with the theme explicitly and adequately stated: *Romania's image in the USA from 1964 to 1971. Politics and Culture* (scientific coordinator: Professor Valentin Ciorbea; members of the Commission – chaired by a philologist, Professor Adina Ciugureanu – were professors Constantin Bușe and Ioan Chiper, and the Associate Professor – to date – Florin Anghel).

In a welcome *Preface* (pp. 7-11) – in fact, a veritable historiographical essay with approach that has accustomed us lately – the author, teacher of former student, today both colleagues of Department, not circumstantiates era only by an interrogative sentence (*Ceaușescu and America, Romania and Nixon. Together?*) but reveals also it takes a real “effort, curiosity and, above all, a great deal of courage. For, assuming no bouts apocalyptic writings on the foreign policies of the totalitarian communist regime in Romania is a lesson of honesty, integrity and respect (our emphasis) to those who bestow this book” (p. 7). In fact, the main merit of the present volume consists primarily in an uninhibited attitude of a young servant of Clio approach to research the history of Romania in the second half of last century, in its scientific coordinates. It is a hope that through such thematic monographs the young Romanian historians come gradually to scale national historiography in the wake of its traditions.

One of these young scions of our historiography today, the author of this volume develops a methodological attitude without complex in *Foreword*: “It is necessary to clear up waters from the outset to avoid future confusion, exaggerated interpretations to appease the pro-Ceaușescu enthusiasm those who see the communist leader and nothing more than what was in reality. The distinction proposed is between intentions foreign policy of the regime – either hidden or affirmed – and the real possibilities that Romania had in those years between the goals set by the leadership «of the party and state» for the Romanian diplomacy and limits it able to act under the country's international status, between the personal ambitions of Nicolae Ceaușescu, who dreamed an international leader whose words have weight, and contingencies known that Romania could handle at the time. In other words, there is a realistic and idealistic dimension of the Romanian foreign policy, even though the line between them was, not infrequently, extremely fluid” (p. 13).

The volume's architecture is divided into five chapters (thematically subdivided) – “An Unreliable Connection, Dimensions of Bilateral Relations” [*O legătură inconstantă, dimensiuni ale relațiilor bilaterale*] (pp. 29-85), “Romanian Diplomatic Offensive and an Ambitious Goal: The Sympathy of the United States” [*Ofensiva diplomației românești și un obiectiv ambițios: simpatia Statelor Unite*] (pp. 86-146), “Face to Face. Ceaușescu-Nixon Meetings” [*Față în față. Întâlnirile Ceaușescu-Nixon*] (pp. 147-194), “By Culture Closer to the United States” [*Prin cultură mai aproape de Statele Unite*] (195-257), “Professor in the United States, But in Attention of Regime from Romania. ‘The Recovery’ of Mircea Eliade” [*Profesor în Statele Unite, dar în atenția regimului din România. ‘Recuperarea’ lui Mircea Eliade*] (pp. 258-308). As you can see, we are dealing with a genuine insight into the postwar history of the Romanian-American relations, the young author by calling (as can be inferred from *Bibliography* – pp. 319-336 – carefully segmented according to rules and usages at a Doctoral Thesis) to a variety of documentary sources – including and especially the press – in addition, of course, thorough consultation with the various general and special papers. It's emphasized that care of the young historian to browse practically all published source, authentic testimony of a specific seriousness researcher. As can be seen before entering the proper analysis of the theme explicitly defined and bounded chronologically, the author introduces the reader to the “prehistory” Romanian-American relations, providing examples and explaining historiographical sources.

It resulted, finally, in this volume (which, if it could be translated into English and distributed mostly among members of the Romanian communities in North America, would contribute to a more appropriate and historical information of them, especially the younger generations of Romanian Americans) a developer of historical images of the most extensive and reliable information on the Romanian-American relations – for a period, too, the most productive and spectacular in Romania's international positioning 60s; eighties and especially new that followed, had to change but gradually your problem, as concluded the worthy author (and also carefully analyst): “But because a series of international crises found their denouement in early 70s, Bucharest importance for Nixon Administration and those that followed began to fall. Vietnam War ended, signing of the Helsinki Accords, did that from now on human rights to be at the center of East-West relations, a chapter which Romania have major deficiencies. Concern for human rights which replaced thus the preferred realist paradigm by Nixon Administration and who offered to Ceaușescu enough space for maneuver and affirmation” (p. 318).

Stoica Lascu

Gareth Stedman Jones, *Karl Marx. Greatness and Illusion*, Allen Lane an imprint of Penguin Books (part of Penguin Books Random House UK), [London], 2016, 750 pp., ill., maps. ISBN 978-0-713-99904-4

The interest of scientists from West Europe to the life and work of great personalities who influenced overwhelmingly the thinking and political development in 19th and 20th centuries is proved and through by the appearance of numerous books about Karl Marx (born in Trier: May 5, 1818, he died in London, March 14, 1883). It's about the works both aimed at new interpretations, as new “readings” of its fundamental texts, or resynthesis of his life and, in context, of his works and ideas. There are, in generally, non-partisan approaches – as is the extensive volume published recently, in the summer-autumn (the *Acknowledgments* are dated: *Cambridge, 11 June 2016*) at one of the most prestigious and well known international publishers.

From the beginning, the author shows to the reader that “Perhaps in order to steer clear of once violent and still simmering political passions surrounding these texts, scholarly biographers of Marx have tended to offer descriptive account of Marx's theoretical writings, and have preferred to concentrate on his life. By contrast, I have decided to pay as much attention to Marx's thought as

to his life. I treat his writings as the interventions of an author within particular political and philosophical contexts that the historian must carefully reconstruct. For all his originality, Marx was not a solitary explorer advancing along an untrodden path towards a novel and hitherto undiscovered social theory. Instead, whether as philosopher, political theorist or critic of political economy, his writings were intended as interventions in already existing fields of discourse" (p. xv). Really, the British Scholar (b. 1943) – Professor of the History of Ideas at Queen Mary University of London, familiar and exegete with the ideas of Marx and Engels (it's signatory to a consistent and broad introduction – 180 pp. – to the Communist Manifesto) – has not the complexes – unwarranted, in substance, for a scientist – of the intellectuals in the East whose countries have experienced Marxism; he unfolds before our eyes a panorama of the development of economy and society, of contemporary ideas with the hero of his research. Takes place before our eyes a panorama of the development of economy and society, of contemporary ideas with the hero of his research.

The work is harmoniously structured in accordance with the rules of a genuine scientific approach – has 11 chapters (pp. 7-588), each named suggestively; so – 1 *Fathers and Sons: The Ambiguities of Becoming a Prussian* (pp. 7-30); 2 *The Lawyer, the Poet and the Lover* (pp. 31-54); 3 *Berlin and the Approaching Twilight of the Gods* (pp. 55-83); 4 *Rebuilding the Polis: Reason Takes On the Christian State* (pp. 84-121); 5 *The Alliance of Those Who Think and Those Who Suffer: Paris, 1844* (pp. 122-167); 6 *Exile in Brussels, 1845-8* (pp. 168-204); 7 *The Approach of Revolution: The Problem about Germany* (pp. 205-248); 8 *The Mid-Century Revolutions* (pp. 249-313); 9 *London* (pp. 314-374); 10 *The Critique of Political Economy* (pp. 375-431): "The growth of trade societies, the foundation of the International, the success of the factory movement, the growing strength of cooperative production and, above all, the increasing popular agitation for (political) reform all enabled Karl to imagine new and possibly non-violent ways of precipitating revolutionary change. In the 1850s, imagination of a global crisis on the horizon had been abstract and remote. Pictures of revolutionary change were still overwhelmingly derived from the great Revolution in France. But in the mid-1860s, in place of the peremptory replacement of one social order by another, as had occurred in France in 1792-3, another vision of transition had begun to take shape. In this picture, change could be envisaged not as a rapid succession of revolutionary *journées*, but as a cumulative process composed of both political and social developments and occurring over a much longer period of time. In this sense, the transition from capital to the rule of the 'associated producers' might be more akin to the transition from feudalism to the rule of capital between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries. To aid such a comparison was one of the reasons why in 1867, in place of the *Grundrisse's* speculative account of the destruction of ancient communities by the value form, Karl chose to substitute as his final chapter the more memorable long medieval and early-modern history of the 'So-Called Primitive Accumulation' of capital" (p. 431); 11 *Capital, Social Democracy and the International* (pp. 432-534); 12 *Back to the Future* (pp. 535-588): "How far was Karl's theory responsible for what became known as 'Marxism' in the 1880's and after? How far was 'Marxism' a joint product of Karl and Engels in the years after 1867? Karl's contribution was substantial, but it was only one of the sources upon which the new doctrine was built. In 1867 and even in the preface to *A contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* of 1859, Karl had appeared to open himself up to a much more determinist view of man than had been evident before; and this seemed to be reinforced by the significant theoretical statement with which he was prepared to associate himself in his afterword to the second German edition of *Capital* in 1873" (p. 564).

In *Prologue: The Making of an Icon, 1883-1920* (pp. 1-5), the author writes that "The aim of this book is to put Marx back in his nineteenth-century surroundings, before all these posthumous elaborations of his character and achievements were constructed. Karl, as we shall henceforth call him, was born into a world just recovering from the French Revolution, the Napoleonic government of the Rhineland, the half-fulfilled but quickly retracted emancipation of the Jews, and the stifling atmosphere of Prussian absolutism. It was also a world in which there were escapes, even if for the most part only in the imagination. There were the beauty of the Greek *polis*, the

inspiration of the poets and playwrights of Weimar, the power of German philosophy, and the wonders of romantic love. But Karl was not just the product of the culture into which he was born. From the beginning, he was determined to impress himself upon the world” (p. 5). In *Epilogue* (pp. 589-595), it reveals that “The historical and philosophical themes which preoccupied Karl in his last years did not long outlast his death. Neither the scholarship underlying claims for the archaic village community nor the politics which accompanied them survived into the twentieth century” (p. 589).

The thematic chapters of this volume – richly illustrated (30 illustrations; also, 4 maps) –, are accompanied by numerous and detailed, often, *Notes and References* (pp. 597-709) (not located in the footnotes, but in a separate section, as endnotes – which complicates somewhat – the reading), respectively by *Bibliography* (pp. 711-730), subdivided: *Scholarly editions*, *Popular editions*, *Primary sources*, *Other primary documents*, *Secondary sources* (virtually all the books are in English). The work benefits also by a very useful Index (pp. 731-750).

Through this work, the Professor Gareth Stedman Jones proves very good knowledge of the life and work of Marx exposed honestly, with an obvious narrative talent and a scientific level what honors him. This volume can be also, I think, to continue and deepen the study, especially by young researchers – including from Romania – the life and work of one of the largest and influential personalities of the 19th century (whose bicentennial will be in 2018).

Stoica Lascu

Ioan Scurtu, Corneliu Mihail Lungu, *Istoria Asociației Oamenilor de Știință din România* [History of Association of Romanian Scientists], vol. II: 1956-1996, București, RAO Distribuție [and] Editura Academiei Oamenilor de Știință din România, 2016, 360 pp.; il., facs. ISBN 978-606-8516-11-0; 978-606-8636-21-4

After the appearance of two years ago of the first volume of history of Academy of Romanian Scientists [*Academia Oamenilor de Știință din România*; established in 1935], which covers the period 1935-1948 /288 pp./, behold recent the two meritorious authors continue advancing its scientific labor by offering our readers a second tom (to be continued and a third: “the Congress of the Association of Romanian Scientists met in 1996 decided that it should change its name to Academy of Romanian Scientists. This opens up a new perspective in the history of this institution, whose activity – *say the two laborious historians* – will be recorded in a distinct volume” – p. 9).

It was necessary, no doubt, to continue research documenting of the history of the academic institution established after more than eight decades; in 2010, at the Academy of Romanian Scientists, the “authors” Ioan Scurtu and Ștefan Iancu published a first *Short History of Academy of Romanian Scientists* [*Scurtă istorie a Academiei Oamenilor de Știință din România*] /290 pp./, volume which were prefaced by the professors Vasile Cîndea and Gheorghe Buzatu, and “collaborators” Sabin Professor Doru-Delion, economist Maria Sașalovici, respectively Mihai-Liviu Sima, and Mihai Sindile (engineers formation). The success of this scientific approach was from the outset guaranteed, given that this work was commissioned to two of the most valuable Romanian historians today recognized by the of accuracy research and intellectual honesty, servants of Clio which, from the opening pages – in the *Foreword* – shows that “the rich research material may be a source of investigation for all researchers, not only for those in history but, equally, even the contesters who unknowingly and in bad faith unduly attacking an institution that has proven to be anchored in the cultural life of the country and in the specific realities of each period that Romanian society has come” (p. 7).

The work is divided into four chapters – *Înființarea Asociației Oamenilor de Știință (1956) și activitatea acesteia până în anul 1963* [The Establishment of Association of Scientists (1956) and Its Activity Until 1963] (pp. 13-89), *Activitatea Asociației Oamenilor de Știință în anii 1963-1975* [The

Activity of Association of Scientists in the Years 1963-1975] (pp. 90-159), *Asociația Oamenilor de Știință sub coordonarea Consiliului Național pentru Știință și Tehnologie (1975-1989)* [Association Science Under the Coordination of the National Council for Science and Technology (1975-1989)] (pp. 160-241), *Reorganizarea și activitatea Asociației Oamenilor de Știință (decembrie 1989-octombrie 1996)* [The Reorganization and Activity of the Association of Scientists (December 1989-October 1996)] (pp. 242-331); respectively – *Conclusions* (pp. 332-343) *Selective Bibliography* (pp. 345-348), and a useful onomastic *Index* (pp. 349-360).

Going through the pages of volume – very richly illustrated not only photos, but also suggestive facsimiles of documents –, the reader acquainted with over four decades of Academy's history [*recte*: Association] of the most troubled; as acquaint equally, as dominants and assembly particularities of our national history; and it played, of course, in the context of international developments (see, eg, pp. 206-208). The exposure narrative, in a sober style, of Academy's history – stuffed, it is accentuated, by numerous and suggestive official documents (letters, reports, minutes, programs of scientific meetings) –, shows that its activity was uninterrupted during the period under consideration, full of political and institutional changes, despite some shortcomings and difficulties generated by the specific social-political and economic, especially in the 80s. It is the merit of the two authors – well-known historians of contemporary Romanian historiography – to relates without *parti-pris* the place and role of the Association in cultural-scientific ensemble of society, highlighting that at its activities were participating scientific well-known and valuable scholars of the country; that most of the projects were themes approached from new scientifically perspectives. For example, in 1987 the Association of Scientists have in the structure of scientific research nine committees and no less than 46 collective study – including, by way of example: *Chemistry of Future*, *Scientia (Science of the Sciences)*, *Politology (Science Policy)*, *Global Problems of Mankind*, *Praxiological Modeling*, *Science and Philosophy*, *Lasers*, *Organ Transplant*, *Artificial Organs*, *Robotics*, *Artificial Intelligence*, *Medical Imaging*, *History of Mentalities*, etc.: “A such structure, so arborescent, seems to be rather made in office – *rightfully comment the authors* – expressing a wish rather, than a reality” (p. 221).

Anyway, but even so, the multitude intentions purely scientific elements manifest vanguard, representatives of prominent scientific community national – and this at a time when, as revealed by volume, interference of political factors were of increasingly sharp – Association of Scientists gives a preeminent place in the whole national research. And this volume of professors Ioan Scurtu and Corneliu Mihail Lungu attest to the fullest, in terms of revealing document vintage, urging reflections on past knowledge institution it is today Academy of Romanian Scientists.

Stoica Lascu

A.U.C.H. Manuscript Submission

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Reference citations

I. Reference-List Entries for Periodicals (APA Style)

a. An Article in a Journal with continuous paging

Harrison, R.L., & Westwood, M.J. (2009). Preventing vicarious traumatization of mental health therapists: Identifying protective practices. *Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training*, 46, 203-219.

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The 1990 book: (Sternberg, 1990: 45)

The first 2003 book: (Sternberg, 2003a: 23)

The second 2003 book: (Sternberg, 2003b: 25)

The 2007 book: (Sternberg, 2007: 139)

All four works in the same citation: (Sternberg, 1990, 2003a, 2003b, 2007)

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III. Archival Documents and Collections

a. Collection of letters from an archive

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IV. Reference to a web source

J.G. (2016, April 11). 7 Deadly Environmental Disasters. Retrieved April 25 2016, from <http://www.history.com/news/history-lists>

In-text citation (<http://www.history.com/news/history-lists>)