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STUDIES AND ARTICLES

HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL INTERACTION AND COMMUNICATION KUMAN-KIPCHAK WITH NEIGHBORING NATIONS IN THE VIII-XII CENTURIES

Ainagul Saginayeva, Gulnara Khabizhanova**, Yestay Kuldibayev****

Abstract

The origin of all the nations of the earth, their history, their traditions, life style, language and culture had an influence to each other. Therefore, the study of ethno-cultural, historical ties between the East and the West, and Slavic peoples and Turkic world from the modern aspects of the review is very important. First of all, interested is paid for the process of cultural integration, national unity and culture similarity and national value features. Currently, the basis of the two main ethnic communities living in the territory of Kazakhstan and Russia is the relations between Turkic people and Slavic people. In this regard, in this article we will search for the issue of special region, especially the historical mechanisms between the two ethnic groups, the integration of ethnic and cultural history of Kipchaks and Slavs in the oldest historical sources. In this article we take a continuous historical dialogue between Slavic and Turkic people as historical experience, the issue inter-ethnic peace and harmony among nations in the region and the development of integration will be discussed.

The importance of this study and interdisciplinary relations is that it was determined that on the basis of archaeological and recorded data impact of the immigration of Turk people, especially Kipchak from the East to the West on the history and culture of European people. Along with that, it was clear that in the process of immigration back of Kipchak people from the West to the East there was influence of western culture on Turk people's life. As a result, in the article it was proved by examples that as a conclusion of immigration process of people between the West and the East there was cultural integration.

Key words: *Cuman, Kipchak, Slavs, Bulgarians, Khazars*

Introduction

It is common in the historical literatures to investigate the relations between Kipchak-Slavic peoples in the 8-12 centuries in accordance with the results of political events. Because as we know from the chronicle database that prove the Kipchak-Slavic relations, commonly the agreement between the Kipchaks and Slavs were established in order to protect themselves from the other state which cause the danger. But this does not mean

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that the problem is one-sided, this was a requirement of that time. However, research work is being done on the fact that relations of the nomadic Turkic and Eastern Europe local Slav people were made on the cultural, spiritual, economic, and sometimes trade basis. As a result the idea of Eurasianism considers that the cultural heritage of Turks and Kipchaks, Kaganates and associations which has an important part in the history of early medieval Kazakhstan covered the entire territory of the Eurasia and had a positive impact on the neighboring nations. It is obvious that Turks who converged East and West, played a role of the bridge and strong connection to exchange culture between the people and made an invaluable contribution to extend civilization treasures cannot be out of the world civilization.

That is, Turk people in Eurasian territory in the Middle Ages, especially migrational process of Cuman-Kipchak people from the East to the West had an influence on European people and nation's history and culture (Ilyushin, 2016: 15). Therefore, nowadays it is important to assess historical initiatives of relations between the West and the East based on the material we have in our hands.

One of these important topics is Kipchak-Slavic cultural relations. There is no any clear opinion about the cultural, linguistic, and economic impact of these two super-ethnics on each other. The topics of value of the Kipchak-Slavic symbiosis, the beginning of the cultural relations of the Turks and Slavs, the cultural impact of Turkic-speaking people included in the Slav people have not been explored yet till these days.

In general, taking into consideration that the record of the history is given the language of the database, recorded databases on this topic are rare, but there are some fragmented information about some nations, states, and ethnic groups, Khagans and masses etc (Omarbekov, 2015: 55-58). Considering by means of comparison of that little information with the data of archaeological research, it is possible to reflect the value of the relations of Kipchak-Slavic in terms of their language, politics, culture and trade. If we call the inhabitants of the heirs of the Western Turkish Kaganates in the 8-12 centuries, the origin people of Eurasian steppes such as Oguz, Kimak, Cuman, Kipchak, Bulgarian, Pesheneg, the people of the Khazar Khanate, and etc. the tribes Turkic people, then they have been directly, sometimes indirectly in the relations with the Slavs during the various stages of the history.

"Russia has one and a half thousand year history since it started establishing the relations with the Turkic world, and it is clear that in the beginning there were not peaceful relations between them" – wrote Gumilev. L.N. about the first relations of Turks with Slavs: (Gumilev, 2006: 10). But recorded database proves that along with the war there were the peaceful living, cultural exchanges, and marriages between their people. "Over the centuries, the history of the Slavic-Turkish relations is not only determined by the war, but vital symbiotic processes have been revealed as well. This trend has been saved until now. It ensures the preservation of civil peace and political stability in Eurasia" – said the famous scientists S.G. Klyashtorny (Klyashtorny and Sultanov, 2004: 5). Evaluating such viewpoints, we can firmly say that many cultures were formed as a result of Slavs and Turks relations.

The unit of the social structure of Eurasian states, their ethnical-cultural relations, the similarity of the political organizations the period when they lived – 8-12 centuries can be considered as a whole historical and cultural period (Habizhanova, 2015: 5).

The development of relations of people of South Russian steppes and the areas of

Early Russia, namely nomadic Kipchaks and Slavs, the early state structures, socio-political, cultural, psychological and economic relations can be considered on the basis ethno-geo-adaptation of two ethnic systems.

As the result of research of this article through a comprehensive review and study of available data, making interdisciplinary comparative and historical analysis, researching the relationship history between Kipchak and Slavic people on a basis of archeological databases, putting the historical parallel, finding ethnic, cultural and religious values, relations between Slavic peoples and Turkic and people of Kaganates in the land of Kazakh can be considered in the context of the historical civilization. The study gives the new data on the cultural influence of the Kipchak people on Slavs and their common values (Klyashtorny, 2013).

As a result, during the studies it was investigated that the influence was not only from the East to the West, but vice versa. It can be proved by the archaeological and recorded data used in the article. Moreover, Turk-Slav linguistic relations was proved by common words used in both Turk and Slav people. It is clear that two large ethnic groups had influence of each other in terms of culture and history (Köbdenova, 2015).

Overview of the history of the Turkic-Slavic relations

Experienced political events of the nomadic peoples of the Great Steppe had an impact on their western neighbors – Slavs in Eastern Europe. Until recently the history of the Turkic peoples and their government was considered as a part of the history of Russia and the USSR, and Turkic people were separated from their own national history. In order to study the relations of Turks with Slavs it is necessary to investigate the ethnic composition of the tribes included in two super ethnos and the historical case when these tribes were merged.

Medieval Turks were the leading state in the international arena; the European Empires would have a huge reputation if they were allies with Turks. For example, the Byzantine historian Menander Protector in his book titled “History” wrote about the relationship of the Palace of the Byzantine Empire with Turks, the life and culture of the Turks in Altai in the 6th century, valuable data about the mission of Zemarx. What is more he wrote that Menandr had reported that Turkic people were not “Varvars”, but they were equal nation with the Empire, and demonstrated that the kagan of the Turks was in equal level with the emperor (Protector Menander, 1860).

In the 6-12 centuries Turk people of Eurasia established a government masses in the Central and Middle Asia, South Siberia, Lower Volga and in the North Caucasus. In the mid-sixth century AD, a population of Turkic origin appeared in the steppe region of Inner and Central Asia, they came from the southern area of the Altay mountains and up to the eighth century AD they possessed political authority over a vast region in the steppe zone, forming the political entity known from Chinese sources as the Turkic Khaganate (Lyublyanovics, 2015: 9). Great Turkish Empire (552-605 / 630) occupied the territory from Manchuria to Kimmer Bosphorus. After Kaganat had collapsed several empires were established on its territory which kept the state's structure of Kaganat: in Mongolia the Second Turk and Uighur Khanates, in Yenisei – Kyrgyz Republic, in Irtysh – Kimak and Kipchak states, in Zhetisu Turkish and Karluk Kaganates, in Volga and the North Caucasus in the form of such Turkic Kaganates – Bulgar Kingdom and Khazar

Kaganates (Pankova and Torgoev, 2012). States created by this Kaganats was the beginning of states composed by Turkic and Slavic nations today.

When analyzing Turkic-Slavic relations we can notice that while Slavs were first combined as a state structure Kimak then Kipchak States were the most prosperous states in the great steppes. Turkologists still cannot come to the same conclusion about the ethnogenesis of Cuman and Kipchak. The problem is that since the ethno names of Kipchak union have various names. Arabic, Persian, Georgian, Armenian, Mongolian, Chinese data has the name “Kipchak”, but in Byzantine and Latin data calls the western part of the Kipchak “Cuman”, and Hungarian and Latin letters annals call them “Kun”, and Russian chronicles called them “Polovtsians” (Ahinzhanov, 1993).

The cultural relations of Turks and Slavs can be considered as the cultural value of Turkic tribes who lived beside them and moved to the territory of the Slavs. So this issue of the migration of Turks to the land of Slavs is related to Bulgars. S.G. Klyashtorny in his “Heirs of Turkic ale” was against A.P. Novoseltsev’s assumption that Bulgarians came from Turkic Ogur tribes, and the ethno names of Bulgarian tribes which lived in the North of Kazakhstan, their language description has a mistake and is not chronologically correct, but subsequent in this study he wrote that according to fragments of Byzantine historian Prisk Paniskiy’s work Ogur, Saragur and Onogur emigrated from Asia on the Black Sea coastline in 463 (Klyashtorny and Sultanov, 2004: 146).

About Ogur tribes in Western Europe P. Golden wrote the following: “In 557 Avars conquered some of their tribes and they kept their Asian internal political structure elements. According to Byzantine and Latin sources, their rulers took the title “kagan”, later the title “tudun”, all terms has the start from Asian internal, protomongol tribes” (Golden, 2004: 114). As we see from the notes above Bulgars are the tribes which could indeed move from the Kazakh lands.

Today, in spite of belonging to Bulgars to Slavs, the initial Bulgars’ ethnic origin is still a controversial issue. The known scientist P. Golden writes: “The origin of the Bulgars has tight connection with Turks, later they were mixed with Slavs and became Slavs ... we know this from the early works of Muslim geographers who wrote about Volga’s Bulgars; Ibn Rusta in his work Bulgars’ land had bordered Burdas. They live near the river which goes into the Khazar Sea, it is referred to as Itil. They are located between the Hazars and Sakaliba and adhere to the religion of Islam” (Golden, 1992: 252-254).

There are many written sources of such information, for example according to the Arab data about the well-known the ethno name in the 9th century “Burtases”, which inhabited the territory of the Eurasian is written by al-Idris: “Burtas are neighbors with Khazars “Basjirt” are the Bashkirs now, their cities are Mastr and Castr” (Konovalova, 1999: 192).

About Rus conquered Bulgarian, Burtas, Hazars in Eastern Europe Al-Idris wrote based on the work of Ibn Xaukal the following: “When we wrote this book Rus conquered Bulgarian, Burtas and Hazars”. At the same time, the data on the Volga’s Bulgars is available in the records of the Arab traveler Ibn Fadlan in the 10th century, he wrote that Bulgars accepted Islam in 922, which means that in the 10th century Bulgars accepted Islam in accordance with their political and economic interests and in order to develop the trade relations with the Middle East and Central Asia, and he added that Suva (Savi) and Esgel (Oguz tribe) were their vassals (Fadlan, 1939). Also, he has a

number of information about Guz, Bashkir, Bulgarian, Khazars, Ruses' ethnography in his work.

There are some records that the second Bulgar State was Turkic one. In Uighurs' Runic record Basmyl, Yabaku, Chomuldar called as "forty tribes of Basmyl". Basmyl came from the tribe of Asen (Ashen-Ashina, Osen) formed in 1187 the second Bulgarian khanate (Kljashtornyj, 2013: 32). That is, on the basis of these facts that the initial Bulgars came from Avars, we can be see that their origin was Turkic and later they joined Slavs.

Hazars' origin, location, and material culture are studied well today (Pletneva, 1976). "The ethnic name of their homeland – the land of North Caucasus in the Byzantine data is "Savir" – says Byzantine historian Prokopii Caesaria (Procopius of Caesarea, 1950, 168).

He also writes that "Varvars" invented closed light ram for sedentary work, which was not known for Byzantine engineers, as well as they constructed a high rock fortresses. About the fact that Hazars had the fortress P.V. Golubovskii wrote: the following "Khazars built the fortress on the river Khazar to protect from Oguz". In this work he calls Turks, as well as Peshenegs and Berendeys as "Kara kalpak" (black hat) (Golubovskii, 1884: 142) and their positive influence in shaping the culture of the southern Russian lands was mentioned as well. As we can see before the formation of the Slavic countries in the land of Eastern Europe the Turkic people lived along with Slavs, and taking into consideration the fact that the majority of people were Turkic Turks, it is obvious that Turk culture had an impact on Slavs.

With the collapse of Khazar Khanate the last Turkish Khanate collapsed in Eastern Europe, Western Eurasian, on the eve of the Mongol invasion there was not the Turk states in Eastern Europe, some of Hazars were included in Peshenegs and Kipchaks, and some adapted to the culture of the city were included in Kiev Rus (Golden, 1992: 243). In other words, Khazars being the biggest tribe for a few centuries in the East of Europe, with the dominant Turkic elements were integrated with different tribes and finally disappeared from the stage of history.

Rus has its origin in Kiev Rus, in the 9th century in Novgorod the eastern Slavic tribes were conquered by Viking-skandinav, and the knyazs of the dynasty Ryurikov began their authorities. According to Russian Chronicles the base of Kiev Rus was formed by brothers Kiya, Shet and Horeb in the 6th century: «Подем же жившемъ всоѡѡ и володѣющею и роды своими иже и до сѣзъ братьѣ баху Полане и живаху кождо съ своимъ родомъ и на своихъ мѣстѣхъ владѣюще кождо родомъ своимъ на своихъ мѣстѣ [и] быша г братьсѣ единому имѣ Кии а другому Шекъ, а третьему Хори въ [и] сестра ихъ Лѣбедь» (Completed Collection of Russian Chronicles, 1926-1928: 10). In this period the nation lived near the Dnieper was called as Polyane. So, taking into account the fact that back to 6th century BC the Great steppe people as Scythians, Huns, and later Turks and Khazars crossed the Dnieper and lived on the surrounding areas of the Dnieper, we can see that the events of the twelfth century described in the Russian records are true.

Slavic having experienced the Great Migrations, sometimes joined other nations, sometimes they separated from the new ethnic groups which were formed by them, they did not lose their ethnic elements, but there was time when they adopted the culture of other tribes (Body of the oldest written notice about the Slavs, 1994). The similar situation took place with the Turk people. They also experienced the Great Migration. New tribes

and the khanates and new ethnic groups in the steppes of Central Asia were formed, but their historical roots were not cut off, their culture and way of life were delivered continuously from generation to generation (Klyashtorny, 2003).

By the time when Slav formed the state structure the power in steppe was in the hands of the association of Kipchak. Kipchaks gathered all Turkic people of the previous Turkic Khanates under their power and formed the greatest state ever; we know that even the Kipchak language has become international communication tool (Kudryashov, 1948).

As this Kipchaks were known as “92 cascade Kipchak”, a number of tribes can be hypothesized, the names of the main tribes are Cuman, Kipchak, Kimek (Imel, Kimak), Toqsoba, Shigil, Kangly, Yagma, Karluk, Oguz, Itoba, Elborili, Targıl, Pesheneg, Targıl, Terter and etc. (Kaziev, 2014: 315-326). Inheritance of power transmitted within the family members. The Russian Chronicles tell us that Kipchak association was governed by the Crown Prince and King inheritors. For example, in the mid twelfth century Kipchak was combined by two tribal alliances: Elborili and Toksoba.

The great rulers from Elborili are Bonyak and his son Sevench, Sharukan and his son Atrac are from Toqsoba, his son Konshaq, his son Yurgi (in Russian Yuri, George). The mentioned Yurgi in Russian chronicles «Бонакова брата а Сутра еша и брата его а Шаруканъ едва оутече... болише бѣ всехъ половець... и приведоша занѣ Юргевъну Кончаковича» (Completed Collection of Russian Chronicles, 1926-1928: 197). Later this tradition of hereditary transmission of power was continued in Russian Knyazhestvo.

Known specialist of Kipchak's history B.E.Kumekov wrote that Kipchak Kings were in close relationship with the East European countries. Bulgarian, Hungarian, Byzantine rulers were in desperate need of help of Kipchak, moreover Kipchak took an important place in the history of Russia, Poland, Germany, Czech Republic and Lithuania (Kumekov, 2013: 18).

For example, “in the 11th century in order to avoid the danger from Peshenegs the Byzantine Empire was allies with Kipchaks” wrote Anna Komnina in “Aleksiada”. The Emperor Alexei Komnin was ally with Kipchak rulers Maniak and Togortak against Pesheneg and won them: “The main leaders of Cumans warriors were Togortak and Maniak ...”, – she writes (Komnina, 1996: 233).

“As a result of the formation of Kipchak factor in Eastern Europe the Kipchak language dictionary” Codex Cumanikus “(13th century) (Figure 1) was written. There was a need to know Kipchak language as an instrument of international relations in order to control trade over the land and water Kipchak” (Kumekov, 2013: 18).



Figure 1. "Page manuscript «Codex Cumanicus»" at en.wikipedia – Transferred from en.wikipedia (Public Domain).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codex_Cumanicus#/media/File:Codex_Cumanicus_58.jpg

At the same time, there was a demand in experience of Nomads trained in martial arts and horse riding in the Middle Ages. Kipchak people's calvary was formed well. "The army is almost entirely composed of cavalry. Light cavalry were armed with bows. For melee used swords and spears. Neck noble nomad defended by barmitsa chain mail, and face mask or half mask. In order to protect the nobility of the body Kipchak mail was used mostly." – Y.V. Pipipchuk describes the army of Kipchak people (Pilipchuk, 2013: 187).

All the neighboring countries adjacent to the Eurasian steppe tried to have relations with the nomads, including military alliances, unions with the marital ties and mercenary troops, etc. For example, the Georgian King David Agmashenebeli (1089-1125), was married to the daughter of Atrak who is the son of the ruler of Kipchak Sharuqan, in 1118 in the war with Seljuk relied on the help of his father-in-law (125-126 p). Another data on the formation of the marital and political alliance of Kipchak with Russians, Hungarians is the following: in 1223 the war between Kipchak Khan Kotyan and Mongols along the Kalka River the son-in-law of Kotyan Russian Prince Mstislav Mstislavich helped, but lost the war with Mongols. Kotyan ask for help from Hungary King Bella IV, he helped Kotyan and share tha land to settle (Korobeinikov, 2008: 390), and later created a political-marital union the daughter of Kotyan Elizabeth the Cuman was engaged with his son Istvan V. It seems like Russian Knyazs family marriage is considered as the basis of alliance with Kipchaks. It is known from the history that not only their daughters were married to Kipshaks, but they married to the queens of Kipchaks. For example, in 1094 in Kiev Svyatopolk married the daughter of Kipchak Khan Tugorqan. Another Kipchak's king Asen's grandson was married Vladimir Monomakh's son Yuri, as well as the Turkish king's daughter was the bride of the Great Andrey. Igor's son Vladimir married Konchak's

daughter in 1187 and in 1205 Yaroslav – the son of Vsevolod Suzdalskiy married the daughter of the Kipchak king Konchak (Pechenegs. History..., 2013: 151).

We can conclude that it is obvious that inter-ethnic relations at first begun as the conflict nature, but as record data shows the neighboring nations, Slavs and Turks established the union in the cases of the war, and culture of two nations completed each other as a result of peace living.

Material culture – the common values

Turkic people in the steppes of Eurasia united within the one history and one culture for many centuries, civilized and left more heritage to future generations. The change of one tribal union with the next one in the history stage did not have any effect on the ethnic, political, cultural structure, instead new names and new countries appeared. Whichever state was formed, their history, culture was related to the neighboring people. This cultural communication started from as far back as the Bronze Age, in the era of Turks kept its unity and continuity. Archaeological artifacts found in the territory of Eurasia can prove this. Defining the culture as Turkic or Slavic due to the similarity in the cultures is wrong from the aspect of modern civilization. There are no the meaning like the first and the second nation, the cultural achievements of two nations completes one another continuously over the centuries. Many conclusions are made on the basis of individual assumption of Turkic scientists due to a lack of data and the difficulties of determining the ethnic relations on the basis of archeological materials (Kumekov, 1972).

For example, stone monuments holding a cup with two hands found in the Irtysh, the Central and Semirechensk are related to Kimaks and Cumans (Figure 2).



Figure 2. “Sanctuary Kipchak time of Central Kazakhstan”
(from the book: Ermolenko L.M. Srednevekoye kamennye izvayaniya kazahstanskih stepej. Novosibirsk, 2004).

They are the prerequisites of the “The old lady stones” in the southern Russian steppes, according to the Russian Chronicles they were brought by Kimak and Kipchak (Zelensky, 2015: 125). As the Persian poet and traveler Nasir-i Khusrau Marvazi indicated in the 11th century the land from Irtysh River to the Dunai lands were inhabited by Kipchak, and we know that the land called “Dashti Kipchak”, which means the steppe of Kipchak (Pankova and Torgoev, 2012: 184). Kipchaks not only governed the Great steppes, but they led to changes in the ethnic composition of the population and their culture (Figure 3). Kipchaks had cities as well. There are few records confirming it, however according to the record we have Alan and Kipchaks lived in the forests of southern Slavs. In the beginning of the twelfth century Sharukan, Sugrov and Balyn cities between 1111 and 1116 were destroyed as a result of attacks of Russian Knyazw (Kononova, 1999: 104).




Figure 3. “Camping of Vladimir Monomakh in the Polovtsian steppe at the beginning of the XII century” (from the book: Kargalova V.V. Rusi kochevniki.M.: Veche, 2008).

The fact that Sharukhan and Sugrov were Kipchak’s cities (Golubovskij, 1884: 106) well-known scientist P.V. Golubovskiy recorded.

The monuments similar to Orkhon-Yenisey, Talas left by Turks were found in the territory of the Khazar empire in Volga Region, the North Caucasus and the Don. No one have not detect Western version of Runic inscriptions yet. Continuity between all cultures is not questionable, but until we solve the dilemma such as whom Western version of the Runic record statements are intended for, and what the event is described on them, there is no relations can be found between eastern and western Turkic cultures.

Housing and style of clothes is the mirror of the ethnic culture. K. Valishevskiy who studied the cultural influence of the Turks on Slavs wrote: “Conquerors did not have any negative impact on the cultural development of Rus in the XIII century, instead they developed their culture with their civilizations ... inhabitants of Moscow wear the clothes in Samarkand model: shoes, azyam, armyak, zipun, chebygi, kaftan, ochkur, shlyk, cap, hood, tafya, temlyak” (Valishevskij, 1993: 90). In other words, in this period clothes of

people of Moscow were in Samarkand model, and we can be sure that the name of their clothes was shoes, azyam, armyak, zipun, chebygi, kaftan, ochkur, shlyk, cap, hood, tafya, temlyak.

The achievements of material culture show that Kipchak way of life was associated with horses and military journeys in order to lead nomadic way of life and to protect their territory and to migrate to the new places (Figure 4). Clothing, some of the parts clothes, horse accessories can determine to which Khanate the tribe is included.



Figure 4. "Steppe warrior XI century"
(from the book: Kargalova V.V. Rusi kochevniki.M.: Veche, 2008).

The most important part of the clothes was the belt. Archaeologists believe that the belts shows cultural and political image of the certain ethno-social group (Azbelev, 2008: 287). "Belt is decorated differently in the different periods of life, by reading the information in it" it is possible to identify which ethnic and social groups it is related to. For example, "heraldic" belts are common for "Salt" culture, it appeared later after the Mongol era (Azbelev, 2008: 290). The other type of belt which is found from the North Caucasus to the Bosphorus, has the image of the eagle's head, similar belts were found in South Siberia (Ambroz, 1970). According the archaeological materials mentioned above, we can firmly say that in accordance with the degree in Turks belts were decorated with gold, silver, etc. materials, and sometimes the titles can be determined by looking at the belts, because the medieval nomads paid attention to their clothes, especially to the belt.

The war or peace between clans and tribes, peoples and nations can be seen on the name of handicrafts. For example, Seljuk tribe of Oguz defeated the Byzantine Empire, then formed the Ottoman Sultanate and Turks of Kokbori which came from the Altai mountains issued money indicated on the surface of metal which they call *kopek* or *tenge* the head of the wolf. Later *tenge* changed to *denga*, *kopek* to *kopeek* in Russian language. The cup called *tostagan* made from the neck of a camel made by nomadic tribes which included in Kazakh, later returned from Russians to us as a glass called *stakan*. The handicrafts of nomads have the similar names in Slavic languages, for example: auyzdyk – uzda, uzdok, nedouzdok, yskyrma jebe – strela, syryq – slega, doreki tosenish – deriuga (Valishevskij, 1993).

Kazakhs, all Turks were brought up to be the heroes, patriots by the fine samples of oral poetry and the heroic poems. Today, excellent written and oral versions of songs can confirm that the Kazakh poetry has deep roots. Coming tired from the attacks Kipchaks listened to khissa epics and were inspired (Kildiroglu, 2013: 210). Kipchaks poetry transferred to Rus when they were located close to the Kipchaks (Pechenegs. History., 2013: 159). Indeed it is certain that Slavic great written work “Slovo o polku Igoreve” was written on the sample of nomads’ heroic poems.

To control the main source of income – the Great Silk Road, the highway which connects China and the Mediterranean countries was one of the most important interests of the Khanates. Because not all Khanates were nomads, there were some of them who were involved in sedentary life style, making crafts, working in agriculture and cattle breeding, it is shown by recorded data and archaeological materials. Blacksmith and jewelry products were the main goods in trade; trade was the main way to sell their material treasures for nations abroad. Famous scientist who researched Kipchaks P. Golde wrote on the basis of the works of Omelyan Pritsak about the role of the international trade in the lives of Turks and Slavs: “Tribal leaders not only used to buy the goods came through the caravan, but they ensure the safety of the traders and their goods, as they had some portion of the profit from their trades” (Golden, 1992: 10). The same opinion can be seen from the work of P.V.Golubovskiy, he wrote: “Conflicts did not destroy the friendly relations between the two countries, trade did not stop ... Nomads separate the trade from the war and as they knew the benefits of trade, they supported it” (Pechenegs. History..., 2013: 159).

The quality of the material culture of the Turks which was offered for the trade was used by Turkic terms among Slavs: gold, ambar, arshyn, bazar, bakaleya, balagan, barysh, batman, denga, caravan, labaz, magarych; the names of the fabric: satin, biyaz, kamka, karmazin, kumach; jewelry: diamonds, turquoise, pearls, etc. (Khudjakov, 1991: 241). These words are used by Slavic at the present time.

So to conclude the idea mentioned above, Kipchaks did not only made a lot of material culture, they inherited it from century to century, developed, contributed to the culture of neighboring nations and benefitted from the cultures of Khanates and other nations, saved national values.

Analysis of Turkic words entered into Russian language

The pulps of the culture are traditions and language. Language is a tool of communication. The language is a bond of the cultural integration. The epicenter of the ancient Turkic ethnic glotogenez is the region in Eurasia East-Central Asia and from the

Southern Siberia and Altai to Hingan. The Czech J. Paysker who studied the relations of the Turkic and Slavic languages in the ancient time showed the influence of the Turkic language on Slavs (Peisker, 1905). His views were criticized, saying that it is impossible. Even if the information that Turks had an influence on Slavs is available in the records, it cannot be possible, because it is at odds with the position of the Slavs. But in Ukraine as it cannot be denied that Slavs and Turks had a contact from the ancient times, we can say with confidence that there was the language integration (Saginayeva, 2015: 12). It can be proved by a lot of the ancient Turkic words being used in Slavic language and there are a lot of those words that large-scale research can be carried out. But this is not our main goal, so we investigate only few of them.

As a result of the relations of Kipchaks and Slavs not only Russian words adopted in our language, instead the Kazakh / Turks / words adopted into the Russian language, and became original. About this E.G. Kovalevskaya wrote in her "History of Russian literature language": "Our intercourse with other nations, with other countries began a long time ago. Already in the Old Russian language there were the words borrowed from Scandinavian, Finnish, the Turkic languages ", but she notes that the problem of the beginning of the letter in Russia is still unresolved question (Kovalevskaya, 1978: 155).

One of the heritage which transferred the Kipchak language is "Words about the warriors of Igor", the first version of the work was not kept. The present version kept in the list of the beginning of the 15-16th century was discovered in 1795. A.I. Gorshkov: "In "Words" we found words borrowed from Greek in an ancient Russian language like: papoloma / silk tissue/, oksami / brocade / and Turk words – ortma / blanket /, yaponcha / Raincoats/, yaruga, ovrog, chagai / slave /, koschey / slave /haralujny / steel/ are very few single words (Gorshkov, 1969: 81). In examples as "Changed koscheev saddle ... Under damask swords..." we can see Turkic words (Seregina, 2011).

The well-known poet O. Suleimenov in his work "Az i ya" proves the fact that Slavic and Kipchak tribes were in relation by work "The language of Word about Igor's warriors" (Suleimenov, 1992). The Turkic peoples have the right to study the work, which has become the heritage of Russia. The founder of Turk and Slav studies O. Suleimenov claims that Turkic and Slavic languages are one of the languages which keep the ancient Eurasian morphological system and the formants. Although there is no genetic relationship between the Turkic and Slavic languages, there are cultural relationship between them, they are cultural related worlds. The title "Pagans (stepnyaki – inhabitants of the steppe) has the Christian-estimated meaning of "Non-Christian".

However, later the word "yazyk" obtained a positive meaning in Russian language and used widely. Yazyk – 1. Steppe. 2. Letter, writing, writings. In Oguz language yazyk is letter, writing, written text". Consequently, settled Christians used to fight the steppe nomads calling them "yazigi, Pagans" and left in the use the word "yazyk" (Kobdenova, 2015).

His works as "Az i ya", "prehistoric Turks", "Language of letter" can be attributed to the Slavic and Turkic studies at the same time (Sulejmenov, 1992). A lot of data related to political and cultural relations of the Slavic and the Steppe people of Middle Ages has been introduced to Kazakhstani public and scientific opinion the first time by these works. O.Suleimenov in his works proved that the imperial beliefs are wrong. According to the scientist, specialists take into account the visible written words Russian borrowings from Turkic language, but do not take into consideration recognizable and invisible

written words. The poet divided words borrowed in the Slavic languages from Turkic language into three categories. They are: clearly borrowed words; the recognizable words; invisible words.

N.J. Shaimerdenova studied the relations of the Kipchak and Slavic languages divided Turk words in early Russian language into two groups. The first has origins of Turkic language, but has one meaning, therefore they were borrowed by Russian language, for example: caravan, orda, kuryan, tamga, yam, yarlyk, etc. Second group has the Turkic origin, but was not included in the Russian language, the words used to describe the specifics of certain monuments: abab, burmet, emshan, esyr, etc. And it is difficult to include some of the words into the Russian language without any etymological studies. For example, a diamond, satin, barsuk, kaftan, kolchan, bogatyr, etc. (Shaimerdenova, 2011: 21-23).

As you can see Turkish words were borrowed by Slavic people for a long time ago, which means that linguistic ties between the two countries have deep roots. N.J. Shaimerdenova analyzed the similarities in Turkic and Slavic languages, the direct and indirect meanings of Turkic words, and explained the language relations on the basis of business documents and records. According to her opinion, "According to the language contact theory based on the relations of two or more ethnic groups led to the interaction of two or more languages. As a result of long relationship of neighboring ethnic and linguistic groups with similar geographic, climatic, socio-economic and living conditions led to formation of the historical-ethnic region with similar material and cultural (home, work tools, home furniture, traditions, etc.) (Shaimerdenova, 2011: 15).

The fact that Turkic had written language in early periods was proved by data. In 568 the Turkish ambassador Maniah came to Constantinople handed in certificates of the Turkic Kagan, the Byzantine historian Menander claims that it was written in Scythian. The ancient Turkish letter was based on it. This letter shows phonetic features of Turkic language. They are "Orkhon-Yenisey" letters (Kljashornyj, 2003: 39). Therefore, written monuments of the Middle Ages are the precious heritage that gives information on the history of the Turkic peoples, culture, literature, language, life, religion. The development of language over the time is measured by the depth of its roots. The mission of next generation is to determine the relation degree with modern languages, through studies of important historical records which has the connection with modern Turkic languages, despite the fact that the time passed.

Thus, finding the roots from the historical heritage of Turk people, in order to learn the formation of the modern language, its changes and development patterns, the ways of its formation it is necessary to study the Turkic ancient written records comprehensively, and clarify how far it related to our mother tongue. As we mentioned, the importance of this heritage in learning the history of our nation, language, culture is great.

The influence of unity of Kipchak culture

The similarity of the culture of Kipchak people and Slavic people is reflected on archaeological scripts and burial traditions in the ancient Turkic period. The spiritual foundation of any national culture is religion. The culture of the people of the Middle Ages formed on the basis of religion, the beliefs, the spiritual canon, the outlook, formed and culture. Culture is a spiritual creativity of tribes, ethnos, which was kept though

thousands of years. It is the spiritual findings, the wisdom of the people and positioning of the whole community, the nation (Bartold, 1968).

In the 8-10th centuries the monuments of ancient Turkic tribes are the records on the rock, Balbal stones, the monument, runic records, funeral places and complexes. They are the cultural achievements of the Turkic peoples that inhabited the steppe and hostage of the early Turkic people for the future generations. Historical monuments were found in the territory of all Eurasia which was inhabited by Turks. The biggest of them is Salt-Mayats culture. This culture is typical for the culture of the peoples of Siberia and Central Asia along with Slavs, it is known as the culture of nomadic and semi-nomadic Turkic peoples (Pletneva, 2003: 146).

Present territory populated by the Slavic was ethnically diverse, which is shown in the work of well-known specialist in medieval archeology Pletneva S.A.: "Bulgarlar contained many ethnic groups is proved by the remainings of the burial place in Netaylovskiy cemeteries in High Salty. This cemetery differs from Penkovskiy, Dmitrievskiy culture. Here the head of the buried person turned toward the north bones "are separated manually". In the next cemetery found along Lower Donna the human head was turned towards west or south-west, human bones were linked, and in cemeteries in Katakomb style found in Novopokrovskoe rural village in the tombs cremated body of a man was found. The feature of the tomb is the individual soldier's weapons, including household items were buried. What ethnic group it is typical for has not clarifies yet, it is not typical for the Bulgarian, the Khazars and Slavs" (Pletneva, 2003: 58-59). As we can see, if the creators of this culture are not the local people, it may be Turks who moved to the west, because scientists believe that the culture is related to around 8-9th centuries, later similar to this related to the 12th century tombs were found in the Front Caucasus (Pletneva, 2003: 60), archaeologists claim that they still can find something to the east, in other words, this is likely to be a culture of nomadic Turkic people.

S.A.Pletneva relates the beginning of the culture of Salt-Mayats to 730 when Arabs attacked the Caucasus. As a result, Alan, Bulgarian, Hazars moved to steppes and forests near the Don and Volga, at that time, the first culture, katakomb was made in 50-60 years of the eighth century (Pletneva, 1989: 169). There lived Slavs, and they can contribute to formation of the culture and he wrote that it mainly can be Alans. Moreover, he wrote: like feudals of Khazar Khanate Alans led semi-nomadic lifestyle, and moved from winter pastures to summer pastures, lived in tents (Pletneva, 1989: 271).

The images of the animals and birds in Salt-Mayats culture, or wolf's teeth, necklaces made from animal bones connected with the tradition of Turks who sacrificed the wolfs. In Hazar's Sarkel culture wolf teeth can be found very often. Images of the eagle, swan, sheep, rabbits found in the burial places is typical to Turks and Alans, this shows that animals, birds were symbols of these tribes (Pletneva, 1967: 174).

Amulets in the shape of the sun were found at the end of 8th and the first half of 10th century of Salt-Mayats culture. It means that they worshiped the god of the sky – Tanir Khan and the god of light – the Sun. Bulgarian khans adhered the worship to leaders before Dunai Bulgarians adopted Christianity, they were priest, built temples in the Madar, they worshiped the image of the Madar King Crum carved on Mount Madar. This is typical not only for the nomads, Slavs did the same, even after the adoption of Christianity the Slavic people worshiped the God of heaven were in the consciousness of Slavs (Pletneva, 1967: 178). We know it from the worshiped of Dunai Bulgar Khan Omurtag to

his ancestors' spirit, the Knyaz of Rus Vladimir Svyatoslavich worshiped the spirit of Perun (Rybakov, 1964: 60).

S.G. Klyashtorny shows that Tengriism is a religion of the four nations in Eurasia, Turkic and Mongol in the Central Asian, Hun of the Caucasus and Dunai Bulgarians, from epigraphic text of Madar memorial the birthplace of probulgarians is the Central Asian steppes and mountains. There is data that Probulgarians' top god was called Tangiri, he believes that the nomadic peoples of Central Asia had connection with Turkic Orkhon records (Klyashtorny, 1994: 8-91).

It is known that Qumans had the cult of worshiping the stars, B.E. Kumekov who studied Kipchaks: "Cumans were involved in astrology, use the links to the stars, and worshiped to them" (Kumekov, 1987: 23).

Slavs believed that the human soul is connected to the star, they thought that when a man is born a star appears in the sky, and when he dies the star disappears from the sky. In Slavs understanding an amazing phenomenon is in hand of God who rules the World, who influences the fate of a man. P.Kesariyskiy wrote about Slavs that there was the god of the gods: "For they believe that one of the gods, creator of lightning is the one Lord of all, and they sacrificed oxen and all sacrificial animals for him" (Body of the oldest written notice about the Slavs, 1994: 183).

We know from the work of Nestor "Novel of temporary years" that in 12th century among the Slavs, namely vyatich and krivich there was the idolatry: «...Аще кто умряше, творяху тризно над ним, и по семь творяху кладу велику и възложашут и на кладу, мертвеца сожъжаху, и посемь собравшее кости вложашу в судину малу и поставляху на столпе на путех, еже творять вятичи и ныне..." (The Tale of Bygone Years, 1950: 5). Thus, from these lines we can see that they set fire to the dead, and buried the remains in a small dish.

The burial style of Slavic Knyazes, there was a tradition where their servants and horses were buried near their tombs, which must be obtained from Turks (Pechenegs. History..., 2013: 160). The well-known traveler V.Rubruk confirms, he write that "Komans built a huge cemetery for dead people, and on the surface they put a stone monument facing east, holding in his hands a cup over the middle of his loin. They built pyramids for rich people, that is, the vertical tip dome, in some of it I could see brick towers" (Journey to the East Plano Carpini and William of Rubruck, 1993: 89).

In Slavs after the death of Knyaz his cousins come to power. This tradition was adopted from Peshenegs, which was in the early time that is the power was not inherited from a father to a child, but it was inherited to a brother (Golubovskij, 1884: 154). Here is a connection of this tradition with the time when Turkic Khanate rulers, brothers Kultegin and Bilge kagans came to the power.

There was a tradition between Kipchak and Russian to set the blood relationship. Kipchak man cuts his hand with a needle, then choose a companion from Russians, who tastes the blood from the wounds, and became one family with one blood and soul. Sometimes they used another traditions to become relatives. They pour a drink in the dish, and drink it swearing to be honest with each other, thereby approve the eternal relationship (Golubovskij, 1884: 160). This tradition was used widely among Mongols, for example we know from the history when Temujin went hunting with Jamuqa, swore to be honest brothers using this tradition. There are a lot of data, studying the cultural values

and features using the interdisciplinary connection might have become the completed research in the future (Rybakov, 1997).

Thus, the conditions of the influence of the unity of Kipchak culture in archaeological research and in the scientific literature as above, a lot of the issues are not identified due to the lack of data, we put the parallel between the two nations by comparing the actual data in every field of science.

Conclusion

The purpose of the culture is to introduce itself to others. Self-expression (translation) is the most important issue in the history of civilization and culture. The Turk people of the Great Steppe and its states established political-ethnic relations with the neighbouring Slavic-Rus people, developed each other in the economic, cultural and spiritual fields. Ethnical culture in the case, which we are investigating, is a life of the two ethnic groups, depending on the mutual connections, in one geopolitical place, their customs and traditions, clothes style, material and spiritual culture. In ethnical culture there are traditions, customs, rites inherited from generations to generations in the neighbourhood or family level, its elements include the traditions, superstitions, oral and written data, monuments and language.

There is no author of the ethnic culture, it is formed, changed and developed depending on the era. The history of human, their customs and traditions, beliefs and cultures is always affect to each other, therefore in this article we investigated the theoretical aspect of the relationship between the cultures of the East and the West, Russia and the Turkic world in terms of historical and modern period.

The interest in the topic is related to the importance and perspectives of the dialog of the process of mutual ethnical and cultural influences. As the recorded data is rear we conducted the research on the basis of archaeological materials and individual assumptions of scientists who studied Turk people, and came to conclusion. Cultural heritage of Slavic and Kipchak people was connected for centuries, which is evident by archaeological research materials.

Therefore, we see the future as unity and harmony based on the integration of incredible (unique) different cultures. In other words, it is a research dedicated for the connection of systems and states and society, considering the interests of the population of the Kazakh.

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**POLYETHNIC POPULATION STRUCTURE
OF NORTHEAST AND WESTERN KAZAKHSTAN
IN THE 18TH – TO THE 60^S OF THE 19TH CENTURIES
AS A POTENTIAL EXPERIENCE IN ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM
OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION**

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Abstract

The article shows that for over a century Kazakhstan has been a region of active migratory movement. Intensification of some migratory processes in most instances was a consequence of a certain state decision. Italy was chosen as the study object in the Mediterranean region, as the country mostly exposed to illegal migration in terms of acceptance of people for residential stay. Research in migration and integration processes in the EU countries as a political, legal and socio-cultural phenomenon has been of great scientific and practical interest. The article provides a detailed analysis of the legal, historical, and social spheres of the Italian society, and offers to use Kazakhstan's experience in resolving the issue of illegal migration.

Key words: *resettlement of the nation, migration trends, use of historical experience, Mediterranean region, Kazakhstan, development driver*

1. Rationale

After gaining its Independence, the Republic of Kazakhstan has faced many problems, and the very existence of the young state depended on these problems to be resolved. The history caused that Kazakhstan in the 20th century became a new native land for many thousand immigrants, who in their majority arrived there against their will. After the USSR disintegration, the Republic inherited its polyethnic population structure with all the arising consequences. The inertness of the “migratory” period when mainly

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European population was arriving to Kazakhstan is still in place nowadays, and will be there for a long time to come. The large-scale immigration niche that was formed in the first half of the 20th century turned after the USSR disintegration into the intensively producing emigration niche. All this would inevitably affect the dynamics of sociopolitical and economic development of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The reasons of many modern problems of multinational Kazakhstan date back to the events of the first decades of the Soviet power. Reconstruction of historic realities can facilitate understanding of ethnic issues and their resolution in the field of ethnic culture development, working out measures to safeguard and protect the rights of the peoples of Kazakhstan. The migratory movement of the European ethnic groups into Kazakhstan and Central Asia was one of the key components of the large-scale processes of Eurasia arid belt development from the north and the northwest.

Some defining factors in the formation of the polyethnic population structure of Northeast and Western Kazakhstan in the 18th – the beginning of the 20th centuries are as follows:

- 1) Dzhungar and Bashkir attacks on Kazakh camping-grounds;
- 2) Accession of Junior and later Middle and Senior zhuzes to the Russian Empire, and as a result, the colonial policy of the Russian Empire in Kazakhstan;
- 3) Russia's migration policy to Kazakhstan in the second half of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries.

2. Basic concept

The study into the major factors of population formation is relevant in terms of the interests of the state, its territorial integrity, and stability strengthening. After the end of accession of the Western Siberia, in the end of the 16th century the Russian Empire borders closely adjoined the camping-grounds of the Kazakh khanate in the steppe Irtysh Land. In attempt to reinforce its positions in the region, and to ensure the security of its new eastern frontiers, the tsar government set up a number of military-administrative fortress localities and stockade towns. In the beginning of the 18th century, the government of Peter I decided to seize the upper reach of Irtysh, and the eastward lands behind it with the aim of further colonization of the region.

3. Materials (primary study conditions)

From the beginning of the 18th century, the tsarism began to carry out its systematic penetration into Kazakhstan as the integral part of its state policy, in two directions: in the Junior zhuz (the western part) and in the Middle zhuz (the northeast part). Owing to the establishment in the 30-70s of the 18th century by the tsar government of a number of defensive strongpoints on the territory from the Caspian Sea to Transbaikal, and strong fortresses from Verkhoyaisk landing stage down the rivers of Uj and Tobol to Tsarev town for strengthening its military presence in the east of the country, and protection of the colonized territories from attacks of “nomadic, wild hordes” (Alekseev, 1995: 144). Strong fortresses were constructed from Verkhoyaisk landing stage down the rivers of Uj and Tobol to Tsarev town. Small redoubts were erected between the settlements to accommodate guard teams, and as refuges from enemy attacks. The redoubts were fitted with high guard posts, so that the sentries could have a good view of the enemy (Archives of Russian Empire Foreign Policy, C.130. R.130\2. F.1. L.56). Fortresses, outposts and

redoubts from Alabuzhinsky to Ozernyi troops were manned by Orenburg Cossacks. The part of this line was called the Orenburg line, the other part was manned by Ural Cossacks (Mukanov, 1991: 8). The aforesaid Cossack troops were formed at different times, with their neighbors being: Kazakhs, Nogais, Tatars, Bashkirs. The Cossacks included Kalmyks, Turkmen, Karakalpaks, Germans of Volga region, Ugurs, Dungans, and peoples of Siberia. The Volga and Yaitsk Cossack troops were the first to be formed in the region. Yaitsk Cossacks were natives of the disintegrated Volga Cossack community, and they settled on the river of Yaik (Bekmakhanova, 2000: 3-4). The ethnic structure of Yaitsk Cossacks was diverse. It was manned at the expense of fugitive peasants from the central and northern regions of Russia, as well as by people of Turkic and Iranian origins: Nogais, Tatars, Kalmyks, Bashkirs, Karakalpaks, etc. The Cossacks consisted of Bashkirs, Meshcheriaks, Kalmyks, Cossacks, captured Poles and Swedes, as well as of Don, Ural and Zaporozhye Cossacks deported for crimes to Siberia. They consisted of convicts, 'free' people, state peasants, etc. (Mikhailovich, 1896: 24). According to R. Pierce, S. Zenkovsky, and other Western historians, the construction of towns and fortresses, fortification lines, and even the very Cossack troops located on the territory of Kazakhstan didn't guarantee the stability of the "Russian supremacy" in the region (Zenkovsky, 1960: 68-69; Pierce, 1960: 108, 120, 138).

4. Initial settlement of the Kazakh ethnos

In the 17th – the beginning of the 18th centuries, the Irtysh steppe lands, extensive and rich in pastures, and inhabited by Kazakh nomads were subject to frequent devastating attacks by Dzungar khanate, thus urging the tsar government to temporarily discontinue its offensive movement, and forcing it to pay attention to the strengthening of its borders. Strengthening of Dzungaria in the 30-40s of the 18th c. prevented Russians lasting settlement, forced them temporarily to refuse offensive movement, and pay attention to strengthening of borders. In 1745 the government made a decision to strengthen the existing fortresses, and to build up additional fortification facilities (outposts, redoubts) in the line stretching by more than 960 km from Omsk to Ust-Kamenogorsk. With the construction of the Irtysh fortresses, Russia took over the portion of the Dzungaria territory (Shuldyakov, 2002: 7). With the increasing role of the fortresses, the government began to pay more attention to strengthening of the available armor, and increased recruitment of the Cossacks at the expense of deported persons and POWs. Throughout the 18th century, town Cossacks were temporarily taken to serve at the fortification line. All attempts of the Command to transfer them to regular service at the fortification were futile. The possible reason was the fear of the tsarism to weaken the internal guard garrisons in troubled Siberian towns. For that reason, in 1747 the tsar government initially sent five dragoon regiments to Kolyvansk and New Ishimsk fortification lines (Minenko, 1975: 44). Then in 1758, for reinforcement purposes, it sent thousand-men detachments of the Don and Ural Cossacks, and five-hundred-men detachments of Bashkirs and Meshcheriaks, arranging for their annual turnover (Petrov, 1965: 208). In 1758, the report was sent to the Government Senate, which informed on sending Meshcheryaks totaling five hundred persons who were a source for strengthening the colonization of the frontier lines (Russian National Military-Historical Archives, C.248. R.113. F.1439. L.13). The formation of some strong points, such as fortresses, outposts, redoubts, was the beginning of the long process of the Russia's colonization policy in the

steppe, the formation of resident population and concentration of agricultural settlements in these places.

The territory of the Junior zhuz, after its accession to Russia in the 30s of the 18th century stretched from the river of Yaik in the west to the river of Turgai in the east. The northern border of the Junior zhuz camping-grounds passed along the Orenburg-Orsk line, and in the south it reached the Aral sea (Sabyrhanov, 1969). Kazakhs of the tama, tabyn, kerdery, shekty, karakessek, etc. families inhabited the territory of the north and northwest of the Aktyubinsk district, the northeast of Irghiz district, the south and the southwest of the Ural region, including the part of the Kustanay district territory. The interfluvial area of the Ural and Tobol rivers was the wintering place of the dzhagalbaily tribe (Eskekbaev, 2004). Originally, the steppe people moved within the territory of the Lake Balkhash and the Syr-Darya, and then their camping places spread to the north in the area of the Nura and the upper Ishim, and on the east to the Irtysh river. From the middle of the 18th century the Kazakh camping-grounds kept moving further and further to the northeast. Peaceful livestock breeders were attracted by wood groves and lake reeds. There, they began to set up their wintering areas (Kolesnikov, 1966). Pre-revolutionary researcher P.I. Rychkov stated the fact of the Kazakh settlements in the territory of the Middle and Junior zhuzes. The Kazakh lands bordered the river Ural in the west where the Kalmyks lived, and the Bashkirs-populated areas in the northwest and the north. The Mongols were the eastern neighbors of the Kazakhs, and in the south the territory stretched to Ishim steppes and up to the banks of the Syr-Darya river (Von Heller Hellvald, 2006).

The Russian government was interested in the territory of Kazakh camping places most of all from the economic point of view. Orders were given to military troops of Cossacks and administrative persons to learn about the locations of the Kazakh winter and summer camps, to find out whether merchant caravans could safely pass the Kazakh steppe (Kussainuly, 2001: 18). With political processes occurring in the first half of the 19th century, the location geography of Slavic settlements in the territory of Kazakhstan extended considerably, and the first settlements of Russian peasants of the Ural and Siberian Cossacks were set up inside the Kazakh camping areas. The steppe areas of the Western Kazakhstan were most intensively inhabited and cultivated, that was closely connected with building up of the New Ilets division. The adoption of the Legal Act of April 10, 1822 stimulated the migration of Russian peasants from the European provinces of Russia to various regions of the Northern and Eastern Kazakhstan.

The formation of strong points, fortresses, outposts, redoubts caused the process of native population settlement. Kazakhs of the Kypshak family – toryaigyr (altybasses), karabalyks and kuldenens settled first. Their location included the areas of the lower reaches of the Tobol and Uj rivers. The Kypshak tribe Kazakhs of the Dambarsk volost (district) occupied Novolineyni district, and in the middle of the 19th century, in connection with the building up of Cossack settlements, they moved to the Tobol river area. The Syr-Darya Kazakhs from the Kypshak altybas family joined them and occupied the territory along the lower reaches of the Tobol river, and in Arakaragai pine forest (Tolybekov, 1959: 311-312). Kazakhs of the following Argyn families resided in Amankaragai volost: yermens, alimbets, and kirykmyltyks (Tolybekov, 1971: 427). The Kazakhs called “internal Kirghiz” inhabited the territory of Kurgan, Ishim and Omsk areas of the Tobol province. The native population living in the territory of the Omsk

region were called "Siberian Kirghizs" (Ermekbayev, 1999: 114). The native population called the Siberian Kazakhs were the main residents of the region, and was ruled by the special establishment through the district orders subordinated to the regional management board. The population structure included Kazakhs, Tashkents, Bukhars, Kokands, etc. The demographic situation in the given period was as follows. The Kazakhs reached a total of 370,000 people, Russian population amounted for 18,000 people (Starkov, 1860: 96-98), and the number of foreigners amounted for 479 people (Central National Archives of Republic of Kazakhstan, C.338. R.1. F.389. L.5).

Along with the native nation, representatives of some other nations inhabited the steppe area. In 1825, Semipalatinsk district was the residence place for 12 people of "Judaic religion", of which 8 were men and 4 were women. It is very likely to assume that these people were Jews-ashkenazi, and not the Bukhara Jews. In 1825, according to the official report of the governor-general of the Western Siberia, Jews lived along the military fortifications line which separated the internal part of the Omsk region from the so-called external one, where the monad Kazakhs moved. The deported Jews were settled in special localities situated in remote places. Siberia was a permanent place of residence for the Jewish population until 1837. Each Jew had to be attributable to the tax-paying social category: the peasantry or the lower middle class (Volkova, 2001: 8-10).

5. Social and economic implications of resettlement

Life realities forced both sides to take steps towards each other. Among merchants there were many natives of the Central Asian territories. Most frequent visitors of East Kazakhstan fortresses were Bukhars. They brought cotton fabrics, skins of wolves, foxes, lambskins, shipskin coats to Siberian fortifications from Dzungaria and Tashkent. In the 40s of the 18th century Kazakhs of the Naiman tribe (a total of 40 persons) of the Middle zhuz visited Jamyshevsk fortress with their goods (horses, furs, lambskins and shipskin coats). In 1747 Asian and Middle Asian merchants delivered goods to Semipalatinsk and Yamyshevsk fortresses in the quantity of 9,749 bales (Kassymbayev, 1986: 65-66). Tashkents, Bukhars from Bukhara Minor, as well as Kashgars with their own and Chinese-made goods arrived to Ust-Kamenogorsk and Semipalatinsk fortresses for trading (Slovtsov, 1886: 223). There were many facts in the history when Asians (Tashkents and Bukhars) were attributed to Kazakh volosts. The border administration made the decision to expel from external districts all Uzbeks, Bukhars and other Asians who lived in the volosts without any specific purpose. If they wish they could engage in trading in these districts and localities as merchants (National Archives of Omsk oblast of Russian Federation, C.3. R.2, F.1902. L.20-20 rev.). In the opinion of the infantry general G. Gasfort, the purpose of the government was in admitting Bukhars, Uzbeks not having Russian citizenship to bring their goods within our territory, to allow them to conduct wholesale trade at exchange yards and bring their goods to Russia (Russian National Historical Archives, C.1265. R.9. F.37. L.4). In 1850-1851 Asian merchants delivered yuft leather skins, tanning products, knee boots, shoes, mittens to Altay fairs. The merchants brought such food products as tea and sugar for sale by tradesmen from Semipalatinsk and other places. On the way back, merchants purchased at Altay fairs bread, honey, and furs. These commodities were brought by trading people to Ust-Kamenogorsk, Semipalatinsk (Shcheglova, 1999: 47). According to the data of 1860, about 280 families of Bukhars, Tashkents, and Kokands totaling 526 men and 539 women not having

citizenship of Russia resided in the towns of Ust-Kamenogorsk, Semipalatinsk and Petropavlovsk (Russian National Historical Archives, C.1265. R.9. F.37. L.2). Many of them chose trading as the main occupation. The government continued to demonstrate its interest in the expansion of the trade and economic relations with the Central Asian khanates by encouraging in every possible way the settling of towns and other localities of Kazakhstan by Bukhars and Uzbek merchants (Kassymbayev, 1986: 99).

The construction of the initial geostrategic and defensive military infrastructure in the north and the east of Kazakhstan in the form of Novoishimsk, Irtysh and Kolyvano-Kuznetsk fortification lines made certain preconditions for the massive migrations of agrarian groups of the European population into the areas adjacent to the fortification lines, and the non-migratory and agricultural colonization of these territories. The peasant colonization of the Northern and Eastern Kazakhstan began in 40-50s of the 19th century when following the erection of fortresses, redoubts and outposts, first peasant settlements began to appear along the tributaries of the rivers of Ishim and Irtysh, and near the bitter and salt lakes steppe lakes. The settlement of the forest-steppe areas of the Northern Kazakhstan by Slavic migrants occurred mostly through voluntary spontaneous migrations.

At the same time, there was a voluntary internal migration along the lines. Peasants-immigrants preferred to live close to the fortification lines. Peasants predominantly settled in Ust-Kamenogorsk region. From 1764 to 1770 peasants who originally lived in Russia were directed to those areas (Gaines, 1866). Parallel to the settlement process of forest-steppes, migration was underway of Siberian peasants to Ust-Kamenogorsk and Semipalatinsk. The considerable part of peasants left Omsk, Tatmytsk and Bergamatsk localities. For example, a total of 104 families, including 260 men left Omsk fortress to reach Upper Irtysh fortresses (Kolesnikov, 1964).

With the introduction of the "1846 Act" with the purpose of strengthening the Siberian troops, a decision was made to forcibly send the part of Cossacks residing at the fortification line inside the steppes, and to settle nearby up to 5 thousand peasants from Little Russia provinces who wished to move to Siberia, inducting them into the Cossacks. It was the beginning of the formation of Shchuchensk, Koturkul, Zerenda, Aryk-Balyk and other villages. There were a total of 13 settlements settled by immigrants from the European Russia, namely the state peasants (Katanayev, 1904: 10). The situation in the agricultural development of the region changed due to the arrival in 1849-1850 of peasants from land-poor Orenburg and Saratov provinces bordering the Siberia. The number of peasants amounted for 3,852 people, later on they were attributed to the Cossack social category (Krassovsky, 1868: 387). Among them were descendants of the Kalmyks, Bashkirs and Mordovians. The Cossacks who in their homeland had been used to agriculture, soon accustomed to the new life conditions. The agriculture was most intensively developing in the internal districts inhabited by the Russian population, namely in Petropavlovsk, Omsk and Semipalatinsk than in external districts of Ayaguz, Bayan-Aul, Karkaralinsk and Kokpekty (Apollova, 1976: 185).

The period from 1847 to 1855 in the history of the migration movement was considered as of particular importance because the government provided peasants with the opportunity to migrate, thus resulting in a great flow of migrating peasants. The migration movement contributed to the agricultural development along the fortification lines. The conditions of immigrants were adequately provided with the works and trades.

In 1848 the Imperial order was issued on the settlement of 3,600 peasants from land-poor internal provinces, and also of Little Russia Cossacks in the area of the Kokchetav district (Morozov, 1900: 84-85). The migrating peasants were given monetary travelling allowances in the amount of seven silver kopecks per person. The arrived immigrants were enrolled into the Siberian maneuver Cossack troops to form the Cossack regiment. From 1849-1851 there was an essential growth in the number of enrolling peasants into the Cossack troops under the government orders. So, a total of 7,500 persons were enrolled into Cossacks troops. Those were the natives of the following provinces: Saratov, Orenburg and Kharkov (Ussov, 1879: 74).

In the middle of the 19th century the tsar government carried out re-organization of its administration of Kazakhs and the migration movement. The improvement of the administrative system and the settlement of peasants were necessary for more intense submission of Kazakhs into the Russian empire. This period of time included changes in the demographic situation in the region. The changes were associated to the political and economic colonization of the steppes by the tsar government. According to the 1840 data, the population of the northeastern Kazakhstan owing to its geopolitical position increased by 31,908 people of both sexes. The given region experienced powerful influence of the migratory flows and caused the peculiar aspects of the demographic situation in Kazakhstan (native population and the Slavs) (National Archives of Omsk oblast of Russian Federation, C.3. R.2, F.1995. L.519). In Akmolinsk district there were a total of 1,096 male and 325 female Russian residents, in Aman-Karagai district: 459 male and 82 female, in Ayaguz district: 531 male and 114 female, in Bayan-Aul district: 356 male and 131 female, in Karkaralinsk district: 1,025 male and 316 female, in Kokchetav fortification area: 1,112 male and 520 female, in Kokpekty district: 202 male and 182 female Russian residents (Central National Archives of Republic of Kazakhstan, C.374. R.1. F.1468. L.2rev.-3). Among Moslems there were representatives of the native population totaling 274,436 persons, 1,189 Tatars, Bashkirs, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Misharis, and Karakalpaks. The native population prevailed and amounted for 91.8%, while other natives amounted for 8.2 % (Bekmakhanova, 1980: 168-171). By the middle of the 19th century the territory of Western Kazakhstan included into the Orenburg Kazakh Region was inhabited by 63,957 persons of non-Kazakh population: Russians, Kalmyks, Bashkirs, Misharis, Tatars, Uzbeks, and Karakalpaks. The overwhelming majority of non-migrating inhabitants of the Western region of Kazakhstan belonged to the Ural Cossack troops. By that time the troops population remained polyethnic by its composition. It included natives of many Turkic and Mongolian people of the Volga region and Southern Ural along with the people of Slavic origin.

6. Kazakhstan's experience in the regulation the modern-day illegal migration in the Mediterranean region

This kind of processes, which involve the integration of diverse ethnicities and cultures have currently been closely associated with the European Mediterranean. The political and historical issues in the Middle East have caused to the ongoing mass migration, including the illegal migration into the territory of the European Union. The migration route can conditionally be divided into the following three corridors:

Western Mediterranean Corridor: A small portion of refugees reaches Europe, travelling from Morocco and Algeria to Spain. According to the IOM, in 2015 alone, this

route was used by 3,845 asylum seekers. In addition, on a regular basis, asylum seekers from Africa are trying to penetrate the Spanish-Moroccan border guarded by the military and representing a 7-meter-high fence.

Central Mediterranean Corridor: A large portion of asylum seekers moving from sub-Saharan Africa (Eritrea, Nigeria and Somali), as well as from Libya, are using the sea route to get to Italy. During 2015 alone, 150,317 asylum seekers landed in Italy. This route path is much more dangerous than the Turkey – Greece route; according to the IOM, in 2015 alone, a total of 2,889 people died using it. Asylum seekers who arrive in Italy are also moving in the direction of Germany and Sweden passing through Austria.

Eastern Mediterranean Corridor: The easiest, cheapest, and safest route to Europe passes through Turkey to Greece. It is the very route used by refugees from Iraq and Syria. There are two ways to get to the destination: by land and by sea. The first way is to take a bus from Istanbul to Greece. This route is chosen by the minority of refugees, because it involves passing through border control points. During the 2015 alone, the Turkey – Greece sea route was used by 801,919 people. Because of the danger of the route, a total of 709 people died during 2015 alone. There is also a number of Syrians coming to Greece by sea from Egypt. Once in Greece, the refugees move through Serbia, Macedonia and Hungary to the north, to reach Germany and Sweden. Due to more rigid border control, refugees are trying to bypass Bulgaria and Romania, which are also on the way (Leto et al., 2016: 789-828).

This process corresponds with the procedures and migration trends, as well as the existence of the multi-ethnic people of Kazakhstan described above.

1. The arriving people do not have a common social platform and long-term living together, as exemplified by Kazakhstan (the former USSR).

2. Religious and ethnic differences are fueled by difference in the standards of living, employment opportunities, assimilation and education and training backgrounds.

The host country which experiences the primary burden is Italy, since it is genuinely the only G7 member country with the largest contribution to the initial reception of refugees. It is necessary to identify the problems that arise because of the above in Italy as a development driver of the Mediterranean region.

The cooperation of Italy and other Member States of the European Community in the field of justice and internal affairs began with the conclusion of the Convention of Naples on cooperation and mutual assistance between local authorities (1957), which laid the foundation for the exchange of information and experience in this field. Since 1975, cross-border cooperation began to develop outside the legal framework laid down by the European Union, particularly in matters relating to immigration and granting asylum. At that time informal conditionalities existed in the exchange of best practices, information, expertise, and ways of development of such relations between the Member States were established. With the same purpose, working groups were established, in particular, the TREVI Group, consisting of the Ministers of the relevant agencies of the Member States. The main issues of this Group were primarily the internal security and anti-terrorism activities, as well as problems of illegal immigration and organized crime.

The Italian immigration laws have passed a long way of development, depending on the pro-governmental policies of the respective parties, and the parliamentary majority of, in turns, lefts- and center-rights. Accordingly, the policy towards migrants and the development of the appropriate legislation was formed based on the liberal attitude

towards illegal migrants, their integration into the Italian society, or based on radically opposite positions, and transfer to a more rigid model in the regulation of migration flows (Chu, 2016: 403-421).

The history of immigration in Italy has traditionally been divided into three stages. The first stage is called the “transit immigration”, when in 70-80-s of the 20th century this country was not the ultimate destination, but rather served as a base for further redeployment. The Government of Italy considered this period solely from the perspective of national security. Although some of these immigrants through various circumstances have changed the countries of destination, and remained in Italy, the presence in the country of foreign workforce was recorded for the first time during the population census in 1981. The second stage dates back to the 80s – the end of the 90s. It is characterized by the uncontrolled and often illegal mass “economic” immigration, which also had its negative socio-economic consequences. The beginning of the third stage dates back to 1998, with the adoption of the relevant law (Turco-Napolitano) which clearly regulated the immigration flows, setting quotas for entrance of the workforce, as well as identified measures to combat illegal immigration.

When characterizing each of these stages in detail, the specific aspect of the first stage was a small number of immigrants in the territory of Italy. According to the Ministry of the Interior, in the mid 70s of the 20th century, the number of immigrants with residence permits did not exceed 300 thousand people.

Italy at that time did not have the appropriate legal migration framework, and migrants could neither have a chance to legalize, nor be expelled from the country. They could live in the country without a clearly regulated legal status. Basically, it was an issue for the southern Italian regions (Knipper, 2016: 993-994).

This number has almost doubled in the 80s, when a total of 490 thousand foreigners, of which number 26% were EU citizens, and 11% were US citizens were officially residing in Italy. The proportion of migrants who have arrived in Italy for work amounted to 30.2% of the total number of persons with residence permits.

The dynamic development of the Italian economy in the 80-90s of the 20th century, and the increased demand for foreign labor force have gradually made Italy attractive for the “economic” immigration. For instance, K. Leto (2016) classified the immigrant worker as a hard-working, a person that costs the employers/scientists much less than the Italian counterpart, and does not compete in the political scene. The researcher raises the question of resolving the problems of immigrants, and proposes not to resort to the traditional tightening of security measures, but rather seek to integrate them into the Italian society.

Furthermore, during the 80s of the 20th century a number of laws relating to migration were adopted. For instance, on the basis of the international legal instruments, the Italian Law No. 948/1986 (the Fosco Act) was enacted with the aim to implement the principles of the Convention No. 142/1975 ILO UN on the protection of immigrants in the employment market, and on the fight against human trafficking. This Law regulated the conditions of employment of foreign citizens in Italy, as well as represented equal access opportunities to labor and services markets, and raised the issue of family reunification.

Migration flows between the countries of North Africa and Italy represent a particular intensity. This is due to the geographical proximity of these regions, as well as

the close economic, political and cultural ties, which were formed back in the colonial period, and strengthened in the framework of the Barcelona Process. For this reason, starting from the early 90s, Italian researchers have begun to call their country a “black door” of Europe.

This prompted the Italian Government to urgently adopt the appropriate immigration law on February 28, 1990, known as the Martelli law (Col. Martelli was then the vice-president of the Italian Council of Ministers). According to this law, the entry and stay of foreigners in Italy was regulated by the permission issued by the police or the public security commissioner of the respective territory. In addition, the law legalized immigrants and provided for control and deportation of illegal immigrants, introduced immigration quotas, imprisonment and fines for illegal immigration. However, the aforesaid law could not have significant impact on the scale of migratory flows into Italy. Immigration showed steady growth at the expense of refugees from North Africa, the Balkan countries, and the countries of South-East Asia. The Italian Government was again forced to seek a way out of the critical situation prevailing in the country due to the rapid growth in the number of immigrants (Akay et al., 2017: 265-306).

At the national level, Italy continued to improve its national migration legislation. So, the Minister for Social Policy of Italy issued an order of September 08, 1993 on the establishment of an appropriate commission headed by F. Contre, who presented the draft law on the legal status of foreigners. In 1994, before the end of powers of the legislature, the commission had completed its activities, and sent to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers the draft of this law based on the principles of similar laws in the EU countries.

The entry of Italy in 1997 into the Schengen zone, the struggle between center-right and the center-left parties further intensified the development of the new legislation, which provides for the further steps of integration of immigrants into the Italian society. For this purpose, at the end of the 1990s the National Commission for the integration policy of immigrants was established on the initiative of Mr. Prodi, which was headed by J. Cincone, Professor of the University of Turin. Over the period of her chairmanship, the Commission issued two reports, which served as a contribution to the understanding of the Italian immigration context, by forming the basis of the Italian model of integration, and taking into account the experience of other countries and the Italian specifics. It was based on the priorities of recognition the values and rights of migrants, the expansion of cultural exchange between immigrants and Italian citizens. The Commission determined this specific migration model called the “smart integration model”, which was based on the two main interrelated principles: the recognition of the human integrity, and the low level of conflicts during the person's integration into the Italian society, or seeking positive interaction with the Italian population. The “smart integration” is based on the recognition of cultural pluralism, the rejection of assimilation and inter-cultural approach, facilitating the exchange between immigrants and the Italian society.

This model became the basis for the continued formation of political and legal integration platform for migrants in Italy, the implementation of which was the adoption of the new law of Turco-Napolitano (Law No. 40 of March 12, 1998) on the regulation of immigration and the status of foreigners, which included the planning of immigration

using the annual quotas system, and the right to stay of migrants in the territory of Italy of up to five years (Hwang, 2016: 941-959).

European analysts pointed out that the Turco-Napolitano law was adopted by Italy only following the pressure from other EU Member States with the requirement to tighten its cross-border cooperation and control the flows of illegal migrants. EU expected from Italy the definition of its national policy on immigration within the EU framework requirements, which would provide for the consistent steps on the issues of monitoring the legal and illegal migration flows. (Brown and Zimmermann, 2017: 11-27). In general, trends in the EU migration “containment policy” provided for the decrease in the flow of immigrants, the requirements for their legal border crossing and, thus, control of the immigration “milestones”. The Turco-Napolitano law to some extent was consistent with the provisions of the European Commission's proposals, particularly, as regards to the labor immigrants, students and families of non-residents in the EU. In the future, these provisions were included in the Amsterdam Treaty, and became the EU legal framework on the issues of asylum granting and immigration.

7. Results

Thus, summarizing all above-mentioned information, we can state that migration processes plays a significant role in the development of EU Member States. The development of migration is essential for the quantitative and qualitative economic growth of the countries.

Italy tried to implement the basic EU initiatives on immigration issues into its national legislation through a number of laws (the Bossi-Fini, the Security Package, etc.). However, the contradictions that emerged in relation to the Italian government circles towards migration processes complicated the mechanism of their implementation. On the one hand, there was a firm belief in the fact that the free movement of capital, goods and people were an asset for the further development of the national economy. On the other hand, immigration from third world countries was considered a threat to the national security of Italy.

A specific aspect of the Italian migration processes is their multi-ethnic nature. Thanks to the close economic, political and cultural relations, Italy remains the regional immigration leader in the Mediterranean. In addition, high intensity migration flows have been observed from the Balkans and the Eastern Partnership countries.

Challenges imposed by the modern-day immigration processes in Italy suggest that neither the host country, nor the immigrants turned out to be unprepared to address the related migration issues. However, at the same time it has to be acknowledged that immigrants have made a significant contribution to the development of public welfare, by filling the jobs that were not in demand by the national citizens.

8. Conclusion

In virtue of its geopolitical position, Kazakhstan has experienced a powerful impact of migratory flows, primarily from Russia, which greatly influenced the course of ethno-demographic processes and caused the peculiar specifics of the demographic situation in the country. Military Cossack and peasant colonization in the XVIII-XIX centuries, the mass migration from the Russian provinces of the Slavic and other peoples contributed to

the formation of a multi-ethnic composition of the population of Kazakhstan, affecting its qualitative characteristics, in particular, the economic structure and the social life.

The issues and special aspects of a combination of cultures of migrants and the host society have been studied on the basis of the four theories of integration: the concept of assimilation (the “melting pot”), multiculturalism, structuralism and complete assimilation.

Among the European countries, despite the high degree of integration within the EU, there is no consensus with regard to the integration of immigrants. Decisions during the formation of the United States and France in the 80s of the 20th century, the assimilation concept were based on the denial on the part of the migrant of its own identity in favor of the identity of the host society. It acquired no relevance during the study period in Italy.

For the multicultural policy, the important issue is the mixture of cultures, which does not lead to their dissolving in the dominant culture. The main feature here is the integration of migrants on the basis of the formation of the civic identity, that is, the empowerment of a person, rather than an ethnic group, which was the fact in Kazakhstan, but so far has failed in Italy. Proponents of multiculturalism believe that the state should support not only the preservation of identity of immigrants, but also contribute to their development, that is, maintain and enhance the differentiation of the society. However, multiculturalism has transformed into its opposite existence of closed communities within the same country. By taking as a basis this very isolation, as soon as by the end of 2010 the concept of multiculturalism has suffered criticism and failure on the part of Germany and the UK.

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**A ROMANIAN DOCUMENT (1904)
ON THE SITUATION OF “ROMANIAN CAUSE IN TURKEY”**

*Stoica Lascu**

Abstract

The study presents a Romanian archive document signed by Lazăr Duma, the Inspector of Schools and Romanian Churches in the Ottoman Empire; it's showing the situation of Vlach national movement in European Turkey. This is shown in the general reforms initiated in Müürzsteg (1903) for so-called “Ottoman Macedonia”. The document is discussed and annotated by resorting to diplomatic sources and press vintage.

Key words: *Balkan Romanians, Aromanians, Lazăr Duma, Ottoman Macedonia, Müürzsteg Agreement*

In the last years of the nineteenth century, the issue of release of European part of the Ottoman Empire – called, in generally, Macedonia –, especially as a result of radicalization actions of Macedonian Bulgarians (Völkl, 1994: 225-226; Hösch, 1995: 180; Popov, 1994: 203-260, 355-415, 465-493), who did not hesitate to practical the political assassination against opponents Christians who disagreed with their preeminence in this multiethnic province (as was the case with the physical elimination, in 1900, of the Macedonian Romanians Ștefan Mihăileanu (Lascu, 2016: 25-39), resulted for the Great Powers setting up a common attitude in the sense of maintaining the *statu-quo*.

According to a synthesis of German historiography, in Macedonia in 1900 were about 4 million people: 2 million Slavs, 600,000 Greeks, 400,000 Albanians 100-150,000 Aromanians, 120,000 Hebrew (at Thessaloniki), 50,000 Turks (Weithman, 1997: 318). In time, however, those figures were different – at least as far as they're concerned Macedonian Romanians; 1906 is advanced 1,180,970 “pour les populations roumaines balkaniques”, respectively 720,970 in European Turkey, and 200,000 in Thessaly and in Greece, 150,000 Serbia, 110,000 in Bulgaria (Diamandi, 1906: 29). In the spring of 1913, a French author appreciates the number of Romanians in European Turkey in the following terms: “Quel peut être le nombre des Roumains de Turquie? La statistique des nationalités, dans la péninsule balkanique, est toujours pleine d'indécision; mais rien n'approche des divergences que l'on peut constater dans l'évaluation des Macédo-Roumains. Selon la nationalité du statisticien, leur nombre variera de 25.000 à 1.200.000”, the author opined, however, that the figure of 500,000 souls as “assez vraisemblable” (Lamouche: 1913: 8-9). At the end of the nineteenth century, the philhellene Victor Bérard appreciate the Vlachs total to about 300,000 souls, of whom 9,000 families – according to figures advanced by Apostol Margarit – the following municipalities in Macedonia: Monastir, Vlaho-Clisura, Blața, Crușevo, Ohrida, Târnova, Magarova, Moloviște, Gopești, Niaușta, Veria (Bérard: 1904: 262-263).

The Powers directly Interested in taking up the issue of European heritage of the Ottoman Empire were other two multinational empires – Austro-Hungary and Russia;

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they concluded in 1897 an agreement was aimed at joining efforts with the aim of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire: "The two Powers, members of two political groups opposing, wanted simultaneously to prevent in the Orient any incident that could have had the dangerous repercussions on the peace in Europe" (Pinion, 1909: 168-169).

In the years that followed, it is developed in Macedonia an anti-Ottoman insurrectionary state, and so the Great Powers were forced to engage directly for limiting the scale and its effects: "Almost every great power has agents that roam Macedonia, making a strong propaganda. This means – comment a newspaper in Bucharest – that the Macedonian issue concerns European diplomacy in highest degree, because who will take predominance in the Balkan Peninsula *is the natural heir of Turkey* (cursive in text – our note)" (Sergiu, 1900: 1). Because disorders have not ceased, in the summer of 1902 the Great Powers are stepping up contacts towards finding a solution to the pacific the region, manifesting itself mainly active in Germany. The meeting at Reval between Wilhelm II and Nicholas II (in August 1902) it's indicated for public opinion, especially in Balkans, the clotting of European consensus vis-à-vis the need to maintain the regional geopolitical structure: "The peoples of the Balkans must be imbued with the truth that neither Russia nor Austria – *concluded after the mentioned meeting, an official from Petersburg* – are unwilling to quarrel pour *Leurs yeux* and that both powers are united in the desire to maintain peace and the status quo in the Balkans" (Moisuc, 1979: 89).

Although international efforts to calm the situation in Macedonia are joined by France and Italy, especially Vienna and Petersburg are designated by "Europe, through a tacit agreement" to speak for them and that they "the Powers directly involved" entrusted "take appropriate measures to maintain peace in Macedonia (Pinion, 1909: 170-171). "As a result, in October 1902 Sultan Abdul Hamid II appoint a general inspector of the three vilayets Rumelia (Macedonia), in the person of Hussein Hilmi Pasha, "the providential man for Turkish, a real *deus ex machine*", as he was characterized by Romanian publicist from Macedonia (b. Crushova 1874-d. Bucharest 1952), Professor Nicolae Bațaria/Batzaria (N. Macedoneanu [N. Bațaria], 1906: 2). This appointment followed on the publication, at December 1, by Padișah, of Instructions that guide to the reform of the Inspectorate General. In fact, they have not changed anything the immobility policy Ottoman to claim fair of the Christian population in Macedonia, so the Great Powers were forced to intervene directly in the next year amid drowning in blood of the Macedonians insurgents in July-August 1903 (Camberi, 1903: 4).

"On September 30, Franz Joseph and Nicholas II met in The study has a Romanian archive document issued by the Inspector of Schools and Romanian Churches in the Ottoman Empire showing the situation Vlach national movement of European Turkey. This is shown in the general reforms initiated in Jurszteg for so-called "Ottoman Macedonia". The document is discussed and annotated by resorting to diplomatic sources and press vintage in Styria to agree on an efficient control of the February program. As a matter of fact, the two rulers decided on a new plan of reforms which, taking into account the wishes of other Powers, admitted their involvement in the regulation of Macedonian question. The text was presented to the Sultan on October 22, at the insistence of the Austrian and Russian ambassador that the Sublime Porte accepted the program of nine articles:

1. In order to establish control of the activity of local Ottoman authorities concerning the application of reforms. Civil Special Agents from Austria-Hungary and Russia are appointed to the office of Hilmi Pasha, and obligates to accompany the General Inspector everywhere, to call his attention to the needs of the Christian population, signal him the abuses of local authorities, transmit their recommendations to the ambassadors in Constantinople, and inform their Governments of all that happens in the country. As aides to the Agents, Secretaries and Dragomans could be appointed and charged with the execution of their orders and are authorized to tour the districts in order to question the inhabitants of Christian villages, supervise local authorities, etc.

The mission of the Civil Agents is to over the introduction of reforms and the appeasement of the populations; their commission will expire in two years starting from the day of their nomination. The Sublime Porte will prescribe tot the local authorities to grant these Agents all the assistance so that they can fulfill their mission.

2. Since the reorganization of the gendarmerie and the Turkish police constitutes the most measure for the pacification of the country, it is urgent to ask the Sublime Porte for the introduction of this reform.

Taking in consideration, however, that the Swedish officers and other people employed until presently, who do not know the languages or the local conditions, and did not render themselves useful, it would be desirable to introduce modifications and supplements in the initial project as follows:

a) The reorganization of the gendarmerie in the three vilayets will be entrusted too general of foreign nationality, in the service of the Imperial Ottoman Government, to whom could be added Deputies, among the military personnel of Great Powers, who would share the circumscriptions between them and who would act as supervisors, instructors and promoters. In this way they would also oversee the behavior of troops towards the population.

b) These officers will ask, if it appears necessary to them, for the addition of a certain number of officers and under-officers of foreign nationality.

3. As soon as an appeasement of the country will be noted, the Ottoman Government will be asked for a modification in the administrative division of the territory in view of a more regular grouping of different nationalities.

4. Require simultaneously the reorganization of administrative and judicial institution and it would be desirable to open their access to indigenous Christians, and to encourage local autonomy.

5. Establish immediately in the principal centers of vilayets Mixed Commissions formed of an equal number of Christian and Moslem Delegates for the examination of political and other crimes perpetrated during the troubles. The consulate of representatives of Austro-Hungary and Russia should participate in these Commissions.

6. Require the Turkish Government to allocate special funds for:

a) reinstatement, in the localities of their origin, the Christian families which took refuge in Bulgaria or elsewhere.

b) help the Christians who lost their wealth and homes.

c) restore houses, churches and schools, destroyed by Turks during the insurrection.

Such commissions will decide the distribution of these funds with the participation of notable Christians. Austro-Hungarian and Russian consuls will supervise their use.

7. In the Christian villages burned by Turks troops and Bashi-Bazouks, the reinstated Christian inhabitants will be free of payment of all taxes during the year.

8. The Ottoman Government will reintroduce with no further delay the reforms mentioned in the project formulated in February of the current year as well as those which become subsequently necessary.

9. As most of the excesses and cruelties were perpetrated by ilaves (Redifs of II class) and Bashi-Bazouks, it is urgent that the first are laid off, and that the formation of gangs of Bashi-Bazouks be absolutely prevented" (Lange-Akhund, 1998: 142-144; 2014: 587-608).

Following the meeting Austro-Russian from Mürzsteg, where they develop and reform program needed to be applied in Macedonia, the two diplomatic representatives ("Agents civilians") in Thessaloniki Müller (Austria-Hungary) and Demerik (Russia) begin in February 1904 formally "reforming their work as agents of Europe"; basically, they had the task to monitor the implementation of that plan "or better not to allow the circle reforms made in the draft to Mürzsteg to expand too much, especially not that somehow bring any curtailment of the sovereign rights of the Sultan" (N. Macedoneanu [N. Bațaria], 1906: [2 March 19]).

With these three individuals, in February 1904 the Head of the Inspectorate of Schools and Romanian churches from the Ottoman Empire, Lazăr Duma, held separate meetings for their operation based on the common position of the representatives of Austria-Hungary, Russia, respectively Turkey: "The impression and logical conclusion that it goes off in all the conversations above is, Mr. Chargé d'affaires, the *mot d'ordre* a reigns here, not to stir the moment no matter which could cause some resentment, that which would have taken as a pretext to hamper reforms designed and for this purpose and recommends any obstacle". It is said that Lazăr Duma was appointed to this position in the fall of 1903, Greek media acknowledging as "proclaimed preacher and rightly apostle of Romanian propaganda", action according to allegations newspaper in Thessaloniki *Alithia* (November 27, 1903), have the purpose "to overthrow the true origin of the country's inhabitants with same blood, to plant in their hearts sentiments alien to and incompatible with fresh blood elinoortodox (*Sic!*) that flows in their veins" (Archives MAE, 1903: 15); dr. P. Mașu, one of the leader of Macedonian Romanians appreciate, in a letter to Alexander E. Lahovary, the Romanian Ambassador in Constantinople, that Lazăr Duma is "very well liked" by Hilmi Pasha (Archives MAE, 1903: 296). In January 1904 in the well-known Parisian newspaper *Le Temps* is a suggestive article expressing positive opinions towards Romania's attitude in Balkan issue: "The Romanian government not pursues in Macedonia an unfounded policy. He has the purpose to help the culture of a population with is closely linked to the origin and common feelings. Romania's attitude towards maintaining the political balance in the Balkans has been well defined. It seeks equal treatment for all nationalities in Macedonia to develop on the cultural path. This concern of Romanian government is all the more legitimate since *in the Ottoman Empire are more than one million Romanian who were, however, unable to develop through their national churches and schools* (our emphasis)" (Atitudinea României..., 1904: 2).

Copy¹

On the *Report* of the Inspector
Schools and Churches in Turkey
N ° 278 of February 24, 1904

Mr. Charge d’Affaires,

Following the letter in which I had the honor of mention of a meeting I had with Mr. Müller, civilian agent of Austria-Hungary, I have the honor to inform your lordship following: On the eve of my departure from Bitola to Thessaloniki making a visit to Mr. Kral, Austrian consul, this learning that I go to Thessaloniki, he strongly recommended to see Mr. Müller, adding that he would write particularly about the questions we care. Indeed, arriving in Thessaloniki, after seeing first His Excellency Hilmi Pasha, Inspector General of reforms, the third day I presented to Mr. Müller, who received me with great kindness and courtesy and where we remained over one hour. Our conversation carried on, reached more political issues are now on the agenda, and finally Mr. Müller informed by Mr. Kral, brought up on issue and Romanian cause in Turkey and especially on our movement and church issue.

This gave me the occasion, Mr. Chargé d’Affaires (it’s about George Derussi, from the Romanian Legation in Constantinople – our note), to make them a summary history of our movement and the situation we are in today. In this context, I have not missed an opportunity to describe Mr. Müller difficulties welcome by the Greeks and the idea panheleniste, obstacles that put us everywhere to thwart the action carried out by us and persecutions endure our clergy from the Greek prelates (Zbucnea, 1999: 127-177; Lascu, 2014: 43-74) citing case our priest pope Theodore from Bitola (W., 1904: 1); and finally, that all the goodwill that we have towards the Patriarchate and our desire steadfast to remain forever Orthodox devoted and faithful to the great Churches Ecumenical, although consent to the lowest possible concessions, to reach an agreement so desired; however, Patriarchate and St. Synod persist in their intransigence, and identifying national political interests with the interests of the Greek Church refuses to give us the lowest law (the Greek media provides numerous examples, each time making this identification as the “divine will, linking the fate of Christianity with Hellenism”, as wrote newspaper *Nea Imera* [Trieste], January 31/February 13, 1904 [Archives MAE, 1903: 81] – our note). Given this hostile attitude of the Greek clergy, I concluded the Romanian people cannot remain indifferent, but will know how to defend their rights already won the national realm, striving to achieve by peaceful the religious rights.

All these explanations, Mr. Müller gave me the following:

“J’ai beaucoup de sympathie pour l’élément valaque d’ici, ainsi que pour la cause des valaques qui est juste. J’ai une estime particulière pour cette nation qui constitue un élément de paix et de progrès dans la Péninsule Balkanique et qui est destinée à y jouer un rôle prépondérant, vu ses qualités et ses aptitudes supérieures. J’insiste sur ce point, parce que les Roumains étant les seuls en Orient qui possèdent une culture et une civilisation

¹ Archives MAE. Fund 71/1900, 1903, vol. 49, 326-329; the Romanian’s Minister to Constantinople submit the copy of the Report to Ion I.C. Brătianu, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on March 12/25, 1904; registered at the Ministry on May 15, 1904, on the forwarding address, the head of Foreign Affairs made the statement: “Compare the language held by ambassadors and grand vizier”.

occidentale, c'est à eux qu'incombe la mission de propager cette civilisation dans la Péninsule des Balkans et d'y jouer le rôle qui leur est assigné autant par leur position géographique, que par la situation supérieure qu'ils occupent parmi les peuples balkaniques. Par conséquent, le mouvement national valaque ne peut nous être que sympathique et agréable, et comme tel, il peut compter sur l'appui de tous les facteurs compétents. Je vous conseille donc de continuer votre oeuvre scolaire et civilisatrice dans la voie de paix et de progrès telle que vous l'avez tracée, mais en même temps si vous voulez bien tenir compte de mes conseils, je vous prie de ne pas toucher à l'heure qu'il est, à la question ecclésiastique et religieuse. C'est une question épineuse qui provoquera sans doute beaucoup de mécontentements et de protestations de la part des Grecs et des Grécisants et ce n'est pas le moment opportun aujourd'hui de mettre à l'ordre de jour une telle question, dont la solution ne peut que haïner et avoir des conséquences incompatibles avec les déployés par les Puissances Européennes et tendant à l'application des réformes et à la pacification de ces provinces. Aussi, en présence des circonstances politiques actuelles, votre mouvement ecclésiastique pourra-t-il bien tourner contre vos propres intérêts et en envisagent la question de ce point de vue, j'estime qu'il sera beaucoup mieux d'abandonner pour le moment et provisoirement ce projet, et d'attendre des circonstances plus favorables".

Thanking Mr. Müller of these tips and assuring him that we Romanians did not do and will not do anything that might hamper reforms designed and would compromise the situation, I took the liberty of adding that the order is not so easy to stop someone national movement, when and as he wills, and that our requirements in the realm of the church are still very modest, reducing the introduction of Romanian language in churches of Romanian communes, where most of the population requires, and the establishment of a Romanian chapel at Bitola, of course noiselessly and without annoying anyone (the Romanian chapel from Monastir/Bitola was open on Christmas 1904 [Silla, 1905: 1-4] – our note).

Mr. Müller, listening to me gingerly, he responded: "Je ne doute point de vos assertions et je suis convaincu du bien fondé et de la justesse de votre cause et de votre mouvement religieux. Aussi je regrette l'enêtement des prélats et du clergé grecs, et en fin je m'étonne de leur attitude incompatible avec les intérêts de l'orthodoxie et de la Grande Église. Cependant, je le répète, ce n'est pas le moment d'y toucher et puisqu'il s'agit d'une chapelle roumaine à Monastir, je crois savoir que vous n'obtiendrez pas à l'heure qu'il est facilement l'Iradée ou la permission voulue car il me semble que c'est ainsi que l'exigent les circonstances. Plus tard quand ces circonstances auront changé et surtout après le printemps, vous pouvez recommencer votre action et j'aime à espérer qu'alors votre oeuvre sera couronnée de succès, car elle est légitime et bienfondée".

About the same language kept me and Mr. Demerik (civilian agency of Russia in Thessaloniki – our note) who specifically requested to see me after the conversation that His Excellency Lahovary (this was the head of Romanian Legation in Constantinople – our note) took with him to Constantinople, and the recommendation that deigned to make me on this occasion. Having learned from Mr. Müller that I find myself in Thessaloniki asked twice to go to Mr. Constantinescu – see what I did.

The Agent Russian Civil not shown so earnestly in the opinion issued above Mr. Müller on the issue and the movement of our church, but to me it seemed that leans more in the sense of concessions wider Patriarch should we pay. After interested in more detail

the movement of past and present revolution Bulgarian Mr. Demerik wondering the number that rises Romanian population in the three vilayets: Monastir, Thessaloniki, and Iuskiub, has expressed his reign surprise about stubbornness Patriarchate and the Greek prelates, who are unwilling to grant us any rights.

Then Russian agent, wondering if our church autocephalous in the country ruled on the schism Exarchate Bulgarian, and if Exarchate allows us Divine Office in Romanian case when we pass under its jurisdiction, I said that the Bulgarian Exarchate would allow us officiating in Romanian it but we would not agree in many respects, because we do not want to get out of the bosom drive great Orthodox Church, and that if we are obliged and compelled to do so, it would be preferable to we have a our religious leader *with national character* (our emphasis), as Bulgarians. It is desirable but – I concluded – to reach an understanding with the Church and give us the same rights who obtained the Serbs.

“Ils sont à plaindre, vraiment, ces malheureux grecs et leurs prélats – *me dit-il* –, car ni le passé ni l’expérience acquise ne peuvent leur servir d’exemple, en vue de concilier les choses et ne pas perdre ainsi les seules ouailles qui leur restent encore fidèles et dévouées – à savoir les Valaques.

Si même l’exemple de la création de l’Exarhat Bulgare n’a pas été en mesure de leur ouvrir les yeux et de leur faire voir le mal qu’ils causent à l’unité de l’Église par leur attitude et par leurs procédés, rien ne laisse espérée, qu’ils reviendront à les sentiments plus justes et plus équitables envers des Valaques qu’ils éviteront ainsi le danger qui menace la Grande Église Orthodoxe, laquelle ne doit pas demeurer uniquement une institution grecque”.

Also, His Excellency Hilmi Pasha, with whom I maintained extensively today before I left here, I recommended particularly (the General Inspector, “because of its favorable attitude towards the Romanians, Greeks called him Hilmescu-Pasha” [Peyfuss, 1994: 80) – our note]) to maintain an attitude of calm in the realm of the church, declaring me that in the present circumstances, the imperial authorities, with all the goodwill you have for us, we can second on this matter, so as not to cause discontent among the Greeks. His instructions are – he said His Excellency – to maintain Status Quo Church and if we ask the change in some parts, it does we refuse to face, but things will winded without obtaining the rights claimed up to occur other and more favorable circumstances.

“Il ne faut pas fâcher trop votre chef religieux”, concluded the general inspector in an ironic tone.

Thanking His Excellency sincere and parental advice you gave me, I still insisted on the right to have at least a chapel Bitola.

“Avez encore un peu of patience, plus tard et vous l’aurez, beaucoup d’autres avantage aurez vous encore, mais vous hâtez step we mark et lentement”.

The impressions and the logical conclusions of all conversations that loosens issued above is, Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, the *mot d’ordre* a reigns here, not now agitate any matter that may cause some resentment, that which it would have taken as a pretext to hamper reforms designed for this purpose and recommends any obstacle.

Believing my duty to bring high acquaintance telling You foregoing, it will allow to inform you through another special report [See also the *Report* of Lazăr Duma – dated June 19, 1904 – on the “conversation” he had with Hilmi Pasha (Archives MAE.1904: 173-177)] about the steps that we have already done for the purposes of carrying out our action in the realm of church and asks you instructions on line of conduct must pursue.

Kindly please accept, Mr. Chargé d’Affaires, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Comments.

About Müller and Demerik (Macedoneanu [Bațaria], 1906: 2). When the leaders of Romanians in Macedonia appealed to Hilmi Pasha and representatives of Austria-Hungary and Russia, because they enable and “Romanians to bear arms” – to defend themselves against attacks gangs Greek –, alone what “then made separate opinion in detriment of the Romanians” was Müller, it saying, “to simplify the Eastern Question, the Romanians must renounce their nationality; those from Northern and Central Macedonia to merge with the Bulgarians, and those from South with the Greeks” (Chestiunea națională a românilor din Turcia..., 1911: 1). See also, the article *Jocul dublu al Rusiei în Balcani* [The Double Game of Russia in Balkans], in “Neues Pester Journal”, no. 249, September 12, 1903: “It is clear to all diplomats and the powers concerned, that Russia, which has developed with Austro-Hungary a draft reform, aims here a special policy tending to the obvious purpose of departing slowly on Austria-Hungary from any influence on the development things in the Balkans” (Archives MAE, 1904: 205).

About “Religious Issue”. In a *Report* of 1911, the Romania’s Minister in Constantinople, Nicolae Mișu, on a meeting with Ambassador of Russia, during which was discussed “the issue of our relations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople”, he shows that as in seven years ago, Russia’s attitude had not changed: “Mister Ciarâcof told me that recognizes fully the legitimacy of the claims Aromanian people to use the language in the church, but that compared to the current difficulties, it is better now dwell for obtaining concessions sporadic before reaching solve the whole matter” (Archives MAE. 1910-1914: 144; Lascu, 2008: 253-279). According to official statistics, published in 1904 in the newspaper *Monastir* in European Turkey there were 58 priests “openly declared that Romanian. Of course, this number is very small compared to the needs of the population there” – the newspaper of Macedonian Romanians who appeared in Bucharest stating further that “The obstacle the main came from there it’s very difficult, almost impossible, to be make new ordinations. Clergy superior being *exclusively in the hands of the Greeks* (our emphasis), they no know would ordain none, if they would surmise that are feelings or sympathy for the cause Romanian” (Bisericile române...: 1904: 22). In 1906, during the antartes Greeks were performing many killings among Macedonian Romanians (recently, Lascu, eds. 2016: 80-217) a known Archimandrite of the Romania on a visit to Macedonia, being recorded her impressions in a book in which, among other things, reveals the bad role of the clergy Greek action denationalization of Romanians: “The Patriarchate, we will ever we put into consideration, because stubbornly remain outside the law and was humbled by the killer role to authorize the hierarchs of Macedonia to curse Aromanians and help gangs the thugs to terrorize and kill those related to the Romanian Church. It is now proven that all the robberies committed by gangs Greek on Romanians, staged by the hierarchs of Patriarchate, which does not show mercy than those who swear before the altar under the stole a priest Greek, that will not give children to the Romanian school, they will not Romanian church tread the Turkish authorities and to declare that they are Greek forefathers. Greeks from the Patriarch, like the Greeks of Hellas, I want to prove to Europe, by terror, because there is not Romanians in Macedonia and that the 800,000 souls who speak Romanian in Thessaly,

Macedonia, Epirus, and Albania are not Romanian, but Greeks bewildered by our propaganda? Test ridiculous if it would be criminal” (Săbăreanu, 1906: 26-27; also, Neexplicabila încăpățănare..., 1904: 1; Vulcan, 1904: 1; Episcopatul..., 1904: 1-2). In a correspondence dated “Monastir, November 19, 1903” the newspaper *Alithia* – from Thessaloniki – wrote on November 27, 1903 under the title *Mișcarea și acțiunea română* [The Movement and Romanian Action], that “the joining at the propaganda Romanian of ellinoortodox priest Papa Theodor” was an “unexpected approach”, recognizing that “resulted in a serious shake our conviction that our blood brothers here had to this priest, because all his hopes in the person caused their sweet”; the judgment of this Aromanian priest to serve in the Romanian language was regarded as a “desertion classes clerical where it was placed and to betray such feelings traditional of his parents”, the correspondent denouncing it to the Patriarchate, to “punish it the swift and mercilessly” (Archives MAE. 1910-1914: 15). The priest Teodor Constantinescu expressed in January 1901, his desire to serve in Romanian: “letting me out of my origin, I have always been animated by the liveliest feelings for the nation and language. I would have said much – *show him in a «matchmaker» to the Romanian Consul in Bitola* – the face of an apostle of my nationality, but the manners peaceful and imperceptibly I thought I could serve both the cause of my nation, advising the occasion my parishioners and combating timely objections and ideas propagated by our enemies” (Archives MAE. 1900: 266). In a *Report* of November 22, 1903, Lazăr Duma appreciate that the priest is “the best that exists in the city” [Monastir/Bitola] (Archives MAE. 1903: 319). The Greek media provides numerous examples, each time making this identification as the “divine will, linking the fate of Christianity with Hellenism” – as wrote newspaper *Nea Imera* [Trieste], January 31/February 13, 1904 (Archives MAE. 1903: 81).

About Austro-Hungarian diplomacy’s attitude towards the national movement of Romanian Macedonians (Peyfuss, 1994: *passim*). The Aromanian press in Bucharest have, in the time, a critical attitude for the policy of Austria-Hungary in Macedonia; thus assess that in the Romanian-Greek conflict, “Austria, although the fault of Greece was very proven, had an attitude that is neither impartial nor sincere. His diplomats and newspapers they were crossing over the causes of conflict and those who have given birth and had air to give advice to Romania, while all the advice and all means of pressure had exclusively directed towards Greece. In the same vein, *the representatives of Austria in Macedonia were clearly of the Greeks* (our emphasis), whose bands encourages them under the table and openly. The second reason – it is argued, further, meaning sincere expression of skepticism about intervention of Austria-Hungary in the settlement of Romanian-Greek conflict – is that Austria is the least desirous of peace and a normal state of affairs in the East. For success of political combinations and his plans of conquest, she wanted to perpetuate the anarchy and unrest in Macedonia, because at a time to seize those lands under the pretext to pacify them. This is why Austria has no disinterestedness necessary and proper moral authority to intervene in the conflict settlement” (*Austria vrea să ne împace...*, 1906: 2). It stressed that the perception of Aromanian in the Old Kingdom/Romania, from the last decade of the 19th century, the position of Austria-Hungary in “Macedo-Romanian Issue” was negative: “Today [in 1893], everyone knows that the principles leading the Vienna attracting peoples are baits, are counterfeit coins, which is valuable only for the blind (...). One is convinced that Austria bears only on the lips sweet talk (our emphasis), in her heart swarm passion discord, agitation, dissolution.

Good counsel and common sense urges world to shun bad races agencies understood their stretch of Austria” ([Editorial], 1893: 1). However, in the fall of 1903, when composing scenarios concerning the fate of Macedonia, dr. A. Leonte, president of Macedo-Romanian Cultural Society, said that if an “occupation” of the Great Powers, whatever “cannot they do not agree; but if it is one, *only* (with) that we could reconcile, it would be the Austrian” (Interview cu d-l dr. Leonte, 1903: 2).

About the attitudes of Greeks and Grecomans. At the beginning of the twentieth century, publishers and Greek scientists were concerned about her “Aromanian Issues” defending the view of Greece, that the ancient Greeks were only Arumuns Latinized (Stephanopoli, 1903: *passim*; Kasasis, 1907: *passim*). For the contemporary period of the report of Lazarus Duma, see, by way of example, an article referring to two articles published in newspapers in Paris and Rome (Dezmintirea..., 1904). In its content, the author (*An Elinovlah from Ruinous Crușova*) reiterates the Greek thesis on the origin of the Greek populations in Macedonia: “There is great need to clarify (*Sic!*) here that are these Romanians about he is talking. It is known that in Macedonia and Epirus, apart from compact masses Greek, there are also many people who speak, out of Greek, and Vlach language, which is nothing but a hodgepodge of Greek and Latin, steps away, but, for Romanian language today. This Vlach language really is a remnant from the time when the Roman Empire in different eras Latin colonies were sent to Macedonia and Epirus. But it is known – *mystify further the correspondent “elinovlah”* – from history, that these colonies foreign coming back, being few in number, and the Barbarians after scoured the country without fate, merged with the first inhabitants, they were assimilated with them and were Hellenized. This clearly demonstrates the great power of Greek citizens, but foreigners coming language was preserved as a broken mother tongue – and thus were formed Elinovlachs, Bulgarians and Serbs today (*Sic!*)” (Archives MAE. 1903: 81). Grecomans – it’s about those Aromanians who had feelings, where even partisans were not convinced of Hellenism or clear anti-Romanian sentiments, were led ably maintained by Greek propaganda (Trădătorii de neam..., 1905: 2; E.M., 1905: 1); “We know everyone who these Grecomans. Are they brothers of ours, many of them are even related to the most significant factors of Romanian movement in Turkey. Between them, in family and out of their homes, the Grecomans speak Romanian, feels and know that they are Romanian. But cultural influence, the old tradition, confused and misguided religious ideas they have developed a strange mania, for many almost inexplicable. Specifically, they all continued to speak and to be called Romanians, they struggle for the Greek cause, contribute to exterminate their own people, often give extremely painful blows to idea and Romanian schools. Grecomans – why not say it – forms the strength and support of Hellenism in Turkey, *where Greeks real not find only near their borders* (our emphasis)” (Noi și grecomanii, 1906: 1).

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INTERWAR UKRAINIAN POLITICAL EMIGRATION IN ROMANIA (QUANTITATIVE CHANGES)

Valeriy Vlasenko, Vadim Guzun***

Abstract

The article deals with the quantitative changes in the Ukrainian political emigration in Romania in the interwar period based on previously unknown documents from the Bulgarian, Czech, Russian and Ukrainian archives and published sources and materials of the Ukrainian emigre press. It focuses on characterizing the factors that influenced the change in the number of emigrants. The article discusses repatriation, re-emigration, naturalization, assimilation, biological extinction of emigrants, as well as their relocation from the national emigre environment. For the first time in modern Romanian and Ukrainian historiography, it presents quantitative characteristics of the Ukrainian emigration in Romania, showing the causes of changes in the number of this complex social and political system. It characterizes the actions of the Ukrainian Supreme Emigre Council (Paris) and the Social and Subsidiary Committee of the Ukrainian Emigration in Romania (Bucharest) regarding the accounting and assistance to emigrants in their adaptation to a new social environment. The article concludes that in the 1920s, the main factors in the reduction of the number of emigrants was repatriation, resettlement in another country (secondary migration) and the adoption of Romanian citizenship. At the beginning of the 1930s, reduction in the number of emigrants stopped due to new immigrants/refugees coming to Romania from the area beyond the Dniester River during the forced collectivization and the artificial famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933.

Key words: *assimilation, naturalization, repatriation, re-emigration, Romania, Ukrainian emigration*

The problem of interwar Ukrainian political emigration in Romania has been given little study, although understanding this complex social-and-political and sociocultural phenomenon is important for this period. In the post-Soviet historiography only the issues dealing with emigrants' arrival in this country (Guzun, 2012, 2013b; Vlasenko, 2014abc) and the Ukrainian military men's staying in the internment camps (Pavlenko, 1999: 251-302; Sribnyak, 1997: 27-33; Guzun, 2013a; Guzun, Vlasenko, 2016) are reflected. The issue of quantitative changes of the Ukrainian emigration in this country in 1921-1939 has not been investigated. It is the reason that made the authors aim at indicating the factors that influenced the changes in the quantity of emigrants.

This article interprets the notion of the political emigration in the narrow sense. It deals only with the part of emigration that was politically motivated, ideologically determined, organizationally structured and who advocated the idea of creating the Ukrainian statehood in its different forms. Its basis was represented by servicemen of separate units of the Ukrainian People's Republic Army, as well as members of the partisan-insurgent detachments and the rest of Nestor Makhno's army who crossed the

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Romanian border in November 1920 and in 1921-1922. Among the political emigration there were also civilians.

At the beginning of the 1920s, South-Eastern Europe became a more or less stable area of settling of the Ukrainian political emigration. In 1921-1922 there were at least 4000 Ukrainian emigrants in Romania (Vlasenko, 2014c: 107) and according to the official data, in the first half of 1922 – 6000 (Guzun, 2013: 67). However, by virtue of some factors quantitative indicators of this social organism changed. Between 1921-1940 the Ukrainian emigration was involved in migration processes. They took place both within a separate country and the entire Balkan Peninsula. However, the intensity of these processes in comparison with the beginning of the 1920s was much lower.

The data concerning the Ukrainian emigrants is based on the indicators of the Public Subsidiary Committee (PSC) of the Ukrainian emigration in Romania that united nearly all the Ukrainian public organizations and primary cells (colonies) of emigrants in the country. At the 1st Conference of the Ukrainian emigration which was held in June 1929 in Prague, delegate Dmitry Herodot (the real name *Ivashina*) reported that the number of the Ukrainian emigrants registered by the PSC reached 3000 people (Conferee, 1929: 42). The same number of emigrants in Romania was declared by the PSC deputy head Vasily Trepke at the 2nd Conference of the Ukrainian emigration that took place in September 1932 in Prague. Besides, he announced that about 2000 refugees from famine had arrived to Romania across the Dniester in the winter of 1932. The majority included Romanians, a few hundred – Ukrainians. However, because of the uncertainty of their legal status, the PSC did not get them registered (A report, 1932).

In June 1939 at the meeting of G. Emerson, the Chairman of the High Commissariat for Refugees, with General G. Filitti in Bucharest the representatives of the Armenian, Russian and Ukrainian emigration took part. V. Trepke reported to the Chairman of the Commissariat on the PSC activity noticing that at the time about 3000 owners of Nansen's certificates ("Nansen's passports") lived in Romania. Meanwhile, the wives and children were not taken into account. In V. Trepke's opinion, under the guardianship of the League of Nations there were approximately 9-10000 Ukrainians (Herodot, 1939: 10). These data seem to us a bit excessive since not all the owners of the "Nansen's passports" had wives and children. And although the PSC registered a few dozens of refugees from famine in Ukraine a part of them lost their relatives when crossing the Romanian border. It should be considered that by such a figure the leaders of the PSC hoped for greater aid from the High Commissariat. Such a number of the owners of "Nansen's passports" was also denied by the new PSC Chairman Yury Rusov. In the letter to General Vsevolod Petriv of December 7, 1940, he reported that the PSC started the reregistration of emigrants because the figure of 3000 "organized Ukrainian emigrants" given by V. Trepke could not be affirmed by the registration data. The card index stated 1728 people (The Ukrainian, 2008: 631). It should be noted that the letter dealt only with the beginning of the reregistration of emigrants, that is their number could increase and it could decrease. Among those registered by the PSC there were some persons who took up Romanian citizenship but did not part with the Ukrainian emigration.

The general tendency of diminishing the number of the Ukrainian emigrants in Romania was caused by a range of factors.

1. Repatriation – emigrants returning home

Repatriation was characteristic of the initial stage of emigration and nearly ceased after the middle of the 1920s. The attitude of the organizers and participants of this process towards those emigrants returning home was different. Soviet Russia (RSFSR)) and Ukraine tried to solve two problems by means of repatriation. On the one hand, they wanted to return home the compatriots to use them to reconstruct the country's industry, on the other hand, in order to put their opponents under control, it was better to perform it in the country rather than abroad. Since the Soviet republics were recognized only by some countries at the beginning of the 1920s, they had to cooperate in the case of repatriation with the League of Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees Fridtjof Nansen. The agreement between the League of Nations (LN) and RSFSR was signed in Berlin in July 1922. The Supreme Commissar took upon himself the organization of repatriation and expenditure connected with it. Novorossiysk was designated as the Central reception station. There the reception of the refugees was under the control of the NKVD representative and commissioner of the Supreme commissar, John Gorvin (Russian Refugees, 2004: 23-24).

At the beginning, the countries of the Entente tried to impede the repatriation process, as they wanted to involve emigrants in their further anti-bolshevist fight. As a result, when it was clear that the plan was impossible to be put into practice at that stage, they shifted the financial burden of keeping the refugees and their repatriation to the LN.

The leaders of the Ukrainian emigration, on the one hand, tried to impede the repatriation because the social basis for the further fight got narrower, on the other hand, as a forced step they wanted to make use of emigrants returning home to form an underground net in order that they might support the future revolt at an appropriate moment.

The recipient countries tried to solve the problem of emigrants on their territory in their own way. In Romania, the local authorities persistently favoured the repatriation of emigrants as they wanted to be safe from certain economic and political problems. It was done quickly and often disregarding the position of corresponding international organizations. In the letter from Nikolay Astrov and countess Sofia Panina's of May 4, 1923 to the commissioner of the Russian community of Red Cross in Geneva, Yury Lodizhensky, there is the report of the High Commissioner for Refugees about the compulsory repatriation of the Ukrainian and Russian refugees from Poland and Romania: "The agreement with the Soviet government giving them right to protect the repatriated does not concern Poland and Romania where this issue has recently become more urgent. The Polish government without any *incentives* on the part of the Consultative Committee has already embarked on the actual proscription of refugees from their territory" (Correspondence with the boards, 1923b).

The Ukrainian political emigration tried to impede the repatriation or at least to restrict it. At the 1st Conference of the Ukrainian emigration in Romania that was held in September 1923 in Bucharest D. Herodot made the following report "About the Repatriation of the Ukrainian Emigration". He told that at the time the conference was conducted there were 80-100 persons, or 2% of the total number of the Ukrainian emigrants, willing to be repatriated. Among the repatriates, there were the natives of Galicia who decided to return home after the government of the West-Ukrainian People's Republic had ceased their work. Mostly military invalids, former captives from the Red

Army and persons who had been compulsorily mobilized to the Army of UPR wanted to come back to the central and Eastern Ukraine. In the resolution on this issue it was pointed out that the conference appealed to the Romanian authorities with the request that “deportation across the Dniester” should not be imposed on the emigrants and refugees who were reluctant to return home (Bulletins Press Bureau, 1923).

On the initiative of Konstantin Matsievich, the Chairman of the PSC, in the summer of 1924, the selective poll (interrogation) of emigrants in Romania was carried out. According to it, at that moment 4.9% of the participants of the poll expressed the desire to be repatriated (Our own, 1925: 28). At the 2nd Conference of the Ukrainian emigration in Romania (1924) Hnat Porikhivsky, member of the PSC, made a report about the repatriation and remigration. In the corresponding resolution it was pointed out that because of the threat of famine and spread of unprecedented unemployment in Ukraine, the Conference warned flatly the citizens about returning home that year (Resolutions, 1924).

At the 3rd Conference of the Ukrainian emigration in Romania the issue of repatriation was raised by Alexander Dolyniuk, member of the PSC. In the corresponding resolution it was stressed that the new amnesty declared by the Soviet power was a trap in order “to bring new emigration victims to shooting, exiles and prisons again”, there was a warning to citizens about the hazard to come back to the Motherland (Bulletins, 1925a). At the Conference, the number of the registered Ukrainian emigrants was discussed. On September 1, 1925, there were 1138 such persons. During the period under review, i.e. since September 1924, 17 persons had returned home (Bulletins, 1925b). On the pages of the emigrant press the materials about the future life of the repatriates in the native land were published. For example, the public figure, doctor and diplomat Modest Levitsky told about the fate of the officer who returned from Romania but he was soon arrested and shot (Levitsky, 1925: 6).

A certain idea of the scale of repatriation is given by representative data about a separate group of the Ukrainian emigrants in Romania – officers (sergeant majors). On the pages of the magazine “Tabor” H. Porochiwsky analysed different data about the life of generals, senior and junior officers. In 1920-1923 this group comprised 235 people. In ten years 26 people, including 14 persons for the “fight” (underground work), twelve – “pleading guilty”, came back to Ukraine. The share of repatriates represented 11% or so, out of the total number of officers, but that of the people who returned voluntarily was 5.1% (Porochiwsky, 1931: 75) that corresponded approximately the data of the selective poll of 1924.

Unlike Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (KSCS) fewer Ukrainians returned home from Romania both in absolute and relative figures. Firstly, in Romania the total number of emigrants born in Ukraine was less than in these countries, but there were more with a true Ukrainian conscious. Secondly, local emigrants were better informed about the developments in the Soviet Ukraine. Nearly every week refugees who spoke about the life there arrived to Romania from the USSR. Thirdly, there was a whole net of public organizations of the emigration led by the PSC in Romania. It enabled the emigrants for a better adaptation to the living conditions. Fourthly, the economic situation in the country in 1924 was also better. There were hardly any unemployed. Romania did not make them return home either (Our own, 1925: 28).

2. Re-emigration (secondary emigration) – removal of emigrants from one country to another

In the first years of staying away from the Motherland the majority of emigrants did not express any desire to adapt to new living conditions in the hope of returning home soon. As soon as it became evident it was impossible in the nearest future, the emigrants had either to adapt to the new surroundings in the country they were staying or move to another country where, in the emigrants' opinion, the living conditions and opportunities to get/complete the education were better. In particular, the latter interested former students and high school leavers.

The number of those who wished to re-move to Czechoslovakia began to increase drastically after Tomash Masarik, the president of the Czechoslovakia, announced the so-called "The Russian Action", in August 1921. According to this initiative, young emigrants (1000 people) were supposed to have an opportunity to get higher education and the Russian and Ukrainian peasants (4000 people) were suggested to get involved in the local agriculture. In the second half of 1921, the transports were deliberately sent from Turkey to Czechoslovakia. After that, young people from Bulgaria, the KSCS, Romania, Poland and other countries went there. In 1922 there were 6000 emigrants from Russia in Czechoslovakia, in 1923 – 21000, in 1925 – 25000 people. By the beginning of 1924 among all the emigrants from Russia in this country, the share of Russians was 56.6%, 36% Ukrainians, 0.74% Byelorussians. The rest were Georgians, Armenians, Kalmyks and other national minorities of the former Russian empire (Dokumenty, 1998: 19).

Due to the initiative of the Ukrainian emigration and pecuniary support of the Czechoslovakian authorities the Ukrainian Free University (UFU) was moved from Vienna and opened in Prague in 1921, in 1922 – the Ukrainian Economic Academy (UEA) in Poděbrady, in 1923 – the Ukrainian High Pedagogical Institute named after M. Dragomanov in Prague. Through the efforts of Fedor Shcherbyna, Leontiy Shramchenko, Yevgeniy Prikhodko, the teachers of UFU and UEA, and due to the pecuniary aid of the Czechoslovakian community of Red Cross in June-July 1924 a special poll (interrogation) of Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Georgian students in Czechoslovakia was conducted. According to it, between 1919 and the first half of 1924, 1811 Ukrainians came to study to this country. Among the participants of the poll the share of 91.6% were men, women – 8.4%, native Ukrainians – 93.6%, Byelorussians – 4.5%, Georgians – 1.9%. 675 people came from Poland, or 37,3% of the total number of students, 110 people – from Romania, or 6.1%, the rest were from other countries (Shramchenko, 1927: 249-252).

The aid to students and hearers of courses of general education was first rendered by "Student Aid" in the Ukrainian academic community in Prague and then by the Czech-Ukrainian committee aiding Ukrainian and Byelorussian students in CSR. Thus, on May 9, 1922, at its meeting the committee agreed to the request of the UFU rector for aid to 17 persons arriving from the camp in Oradea Mare in Romania (In the Name, 2005: 48). The main contingent of UFU students included the Ukrainian emigrants from Poland and Romania (Information sheets, 1922).

Students and studying youth were the most mobile among the Ukrainian emigration in Romania, not burdened with families and ready to move to Czechoslovakia. This is proven by the book of registration of the Ukrainian emigrants in CSR of the Ukrainian public committee (UPC). It should be mentioned that not all the re-emigrants but only those needing pecuniary aid were registered in the UPC. According to the committee's

data between 1921-1924, 171 people came to Czechoslovakia from Romania. Among the re-emigrants there were 49 former students, or 28.7%, and 85 persons had higher education that constituted 49.7% of all the new comers (Registration book, 1924).

Apart from students and studying youth other strata of the Ukrainian emigration moved to different countries. That depended on the range of factors.

In the first half of 1920s the economic situation in Romania in comparison with other Eastern European countries was better. Annually there appeared dozens of joint-stock companies were involved in export-import operations. Romania received reparations from the countries defeated in World War I. This led to economic growth. The agrarian reform ceased the influx of manpower from the villages. It was in 1925 that the economic situation in the country deteriorated and there appeared unemployment. At the 3rd Conference of the Ukrainian emigration in Romania that was held in September 1925 it was pointed out that since the previous conference only 5 persons had moved to other countries (Bulletins, 1925b).

In accordance with the selective poll conducted by the PSC, only 11,4% of the Ukrainian emigrants who wanted to leave Romania for other countries mainly to Argentina, Canada, the USA and France comprised (Our own, 1925: 28). There were more officers wishing to leave Romania (17%). Out of the 235 officers registered in Romania in 1920-1923, 22 persons had moved to Czechoslovakia, 13 – to Poland, 4 – to Bulgaria, 1 – to Austria by the end of 1930 (Porochiowsky, 1931: 76). They moved to the first country to continue education in the Ukrainian and Czech universities since only 3% of officers had a complete university education.

The attitude of the leaders of the Ukrainian emigration in Romania towards Ukrainians' removal to other countries was negative. It is testified in the resolutions of annual conferences of the Ukrainian emigration in this country (Correspondence with the boards, 1923a).

3. Naturalization – acquiring foreign citizenship

This problem is versatile.

Firstly, at international level, the refugees' issue was entrusted to the LN. It was the High Commissioner for Refugees (commissariat since 1924) who dealt with this issue. His main tasks consisted in settling, job placement, regulating the legal status of refugees, their repatriation. The commissariat regarded naturalization of refugees in the recipient countries – as one of the means to solve the problem. At the 9th Assembly of LN (1928) the delegates from Great Britain raised the issue of cardinal solution of the problem of refugees through their repatriation or naturalization. In response, F. Nansen emphasized the impossibility to realize a large-scale repatriation and to make the emigrants acquire another citizenship under those conditions. Besides not all recipient countries had a desire to grant citizenship to emigrants. F. Nansen's position was supported by Alexander Shulgin, the member of the UPR government, at the meeting of the Consultative committee of the Supreme commissariat of the LN in the cases of refugees that was held on February 15, 1929 in Geneva (Genevan, 1929: 11-12). However, the High Commissariat recommended the countries-recipients that they should simplify the procedure of acquiring citizenship.

Secondly, in Romania naturalization issue had political implications as it was related to the unification of Bessarabia and Bukovina in 1918 and the status of ethnical

Ukrainians and Russians on these territories. When the agrarian reform was being implemented in these territories, only a Romanian subject could be a land owner (Reports, 1921). Such a requirement also existed for those people who were in civil service (Schornikov, 2010: 74).

In Romania the registration of emigrants was carried out by the PSC. Thus at the 3rd Conference of the Ukrainian emigration in Romania it was mentioned that the Romanian citizenship had been taken out by 8 persons from September 1, 1924 to September 1, 1925 (Bulletins, 1925b). Among 235 officers registered in 1920-1923s in Romania 16 people, or 6.9% of the total number of officers, had acquired the citizenship by the end of 1930 (Porochiowsky, 1931: 76).

Thirdly, the idea of acquiring foreign citizenship spread in the emigrant environment. This question was discussed on the pages of the emigrants' press by different political camps, in particular, by the weekly "Tryzub" (Genevan, 1929), the organ of the Lead of Ukrainian nationalists "Rozbudova nacji" ("Reconstruction of Nation") (Nationalist, 1929) and others. In the middle of 1930s naturalization became a widespread phenomenon among the Ukrainian emigration.

One part of the Ukrainian emigrants considered the issue of acquiring foreign citizenship from the point of view of higher social status, better financial and legal position. The Romanian citizenship was taken up by some famous Ukrainian political figures, by the doctor, Major-General Mortiry Galin, in particular (Letters, 1935). The second part regarded naturalization as a compulsory step because the emigrants, on the contrary, could lose the job and means of subsistence correspondingly. In the mid 1930s, the Romanian authorities passed some restrictions for emigrants on the legislative level. They were prohibited from working in the enterprises of military-industrial complex. A restriction concerning the number of working foreigners was introduced – no more than 20% of the total number workers at the enterprise (Herodot, 1939: 11). All these factors increased the unemployment rate among emigrants and induced them towards naturalization. The third part acquired foreign citizenship as a result of marriage with foreigners.

4. Assimilation and breaking-off with the emigrant environment

As mentioned above, some of the Ukrainian emigrants acquired another citizenship and formally left the emigration. However, part of them kept in touch with their compatriots in the country they stayed and even took an active part in the public life of emigration. There were also emigrants who gradually dissolved in another ethnic environment while living in the countryside or working for a wage or on the land they had bought. Some Ukrainians, in fact, broke off the relations with the emigrant environment without taking up the Romanian citizenship and ceased to share common interests with the Ukrainian emigration (Correspondence V. Filonovich, 1931).

5. Natural losses

There are no statistical data about the mortality among the Ukrainian emigrants. There are only isolated reports from public organizations about the number of the deceased for a certain period. Thus at the 3rd Conference of the Ukrainian emigration in Romania it was announced that 5 persons had died from September 1924 to September 1925 (Bulletins, 1925b).

By the end of 1930s, 9 persons had died, 2 – had committed suicide, 1 – had been killed by Bolsheviks, i.e. 12 persons, or 5.1% of the total number of officers, out of 235 officers registered in Romania in 1920-1923s. Among them 6 persons died of tuberculosis, 1 – of a cold, 1 – of dropsy, 1 – of an unknown disease. One sergeant major committed suicide because of the unbearable resentment, another – of unhappy love (Porochiwsky, 1931: 76).

The difficult financial position of emigrants, unemployment, home-sickness, illusory hopes to return home soon, little probability to marry a compatriot because of the disproportion in the gender structure of emigrants, another language and ethnic environment made emigrants feel emotional and psychological tension. On this basis, there were cases of suicide (Herodot, 1939: 11). In October 1923 in view of the arrest and accusation of Sotnik Yakov Chaikovsky of the relations with Bolsheviks his wife threw herself out of the window (Letter to the Chief Ataman Petlyura, 1923). In January 1931 Yakiv Tymoshchuk, the member of the Ukrainian colony (group) in the town of Giurgiu, committed suicide (Smutok, 1931: 10-12).

6. Leaving the national emigrant environment

In Romania, sometimes, some emigrants happened to be expelled from the emigrant public organizations. For example, at the 7th Conference of the Ukrainian emigration in Romania which was held on December 26-27, 1936, in Bucharest the issue was about the so-called “returners” who began to conduct lively antinational propaganda praising the Soviet way of life after the Legation of the USSR had been opened in Romania. In the Ukrainian group of Giurgiu there appeared 12 persons wishing to return home. After filling in the corresponding forms they handed it in to the legation, but were refused with the recommendation to apply the following year. Consequently, most of them repented and asked to be accept to the group again. The delegate of the Ukrainian group V. Koryako noticed that all of them were stricken off their lists and the group had nothing to do with them (Herodot, 1937: 9).

Thus, in the entire interwar period, the number of the Ukrainian emigrants in Romania decreased gradually. The main factors influencing this process were repatriation, re-emigration, naturalization, assimilation and natural losses. Despite the arrival of new emigrants from the other side of the Dniester at the beginning of 1930s and birth of children in the families of emigrants, the general tendency remained.

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**ABORTED DEMOCRACY: THE CREATION OF THIRD CZECHOSLOVAK
REPUBLIC (1945) AS AN EXAMPLE OF NATIONAL AND SOCIAL
REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE**

*Jan Bures**

Abstract

The article deals with the restoration of democracy in Czechoslovakia after Second World War and the nature of democracy. It reflects the factors in postwar Czechoslovakia led to a fundamental and radical transformation of the existing so-called liberal democratic regime of First Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938) in a regime of limited democracy, where historically called "people's democracies." The theoretical study is based on a concept Reformulation of internal regime of Alfred Stepan, Huntington's ideas of "second Antiwave" and also based on the theoretical concept of conditions of preservation and stabilization of democracy of Dankwart Rustow.

Key words: *Limited Democracy, National and Social Revolution, Radical Reforms, Moscow negotiations, Communist Party*

Developments in Czechoslovakia after the Second World War still arouses great interest to historians, political scientists and other social scientists. Compared with its Central European neighbors – Hungary and Poland, in which the communist regimes were raised in clear contradiction with the will of the public and with the armed violence of the Soviet Army, Czechoslovakia was the only country of later called "Soviet bloc", in which the destruction of the democratic political system dominant rate accounted internal factors rather than external factors – primarily international situation.

At the same time, if it was true that Hungary and Poland did not have too significant experience with the system of liberal parliamentary democracy even before the war, they prevented the destruction of basis of democracy and the establishment of the communist regime after the war, Czechoslovakia, with the experience a relatively high-quality liberal-democratic parliamentary regime of the time of the "First Republic" (1918-1938), the victory of the Communist Party (CPCS) in democratic elections in 1946 (as the only country in Central and Eastern Europe) was a defining moment of the Communist regime.

This study, therefore, in the context of the above said deals primarily with the issue of factors in postwar Czechoslovakia led to a fundamental and radical transformation of the existing so-called liberal democratic regime of the First Czechoslovak Republic in a regime of limited democracy, where historically called "people's democracy." (Rataj, Houda, 2010: 7)

We will be interested to know what historical experience and arguments leading postwar political elite to the decisions which had far-reaching importance for the future of the state and its inhabitants.

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Third Czechoslovak Republic (1945-1948) is still considered as the democratic regime especially because after its collapse after the communist coup in February 1948 complete destruction of the remains of democratic constitutional regime followed and there the totalitarian regime was gradually built – until 1950, which its fundamentally undemocratic nature did not change until November 1989.

The following factors are considered for the development in postwar Czechoslovakia:

1) Czechoslovakia was liberated mostly by the Red Army and the Soviet Union was perceived as the new principal ally of the state by whole policy elite.

2) Czechoslovak communists dominated in the negotiations on the framework of the postwar political system, demanded fundamental reforms of the political and economic system. Other political parties have accepted most of their demands.

Communist Party's calls especially after major system changes were based on strongly critical distance from the recent past, which were based on the following arguments:

1) pre-war capitalist system failed to solve the consequences of the Great Depression, which spawned Nazism and is thus responsible for the horrors of the Second World War;

2) The economic crisis of the 30s led to the radicalization of the German minority in Czechoslovakia, which has disrupted only the existing political system, but also the state in conjunction with Hitler and the contribution of Czechoslovak bourgeoisie not;

3) The Munich Agreement of 1938 was the result of betrayal of major allies of the Czechoslovakia – France and Great Britain – and marked the disintegration of the allies system;

4) Political right, especially the Republican (Agrarian) party discredited itself by authoritarian tendencies and by open collaboration in the following period (called “Second Czechoslovak Republic” – 1938-1938 and Nazi Protectorate – 1939-1945) (Rataj et al., 2010: 11)

5) Within the meaning of the said then the whole system of liberal parliamentary democracy was perceived as weak and unable to solve the economic, social and political crisis of the 30s. (Broklová, 1992: 145)

These factors were completed by the criticism of prewar political system of First Czechoslovak Republic after Second World War, which was based primarily on the following aspects:

1) The parliamentary system was not allowed to full use of its capabilities – the role of the Members of Parliament has been largely reduced to the statutory consent with agreements, concluded in a narrow circle of party leaders (ie. “The Five”);

2) Opposition's political agenda often showed anti-system and subversive character;

3) The Senate as the second chamber of Parliament did not fulfilled its role of constitutional fuse and in fact served only as a “dumping ground” of retired politicians;

4) The most commonly used form of government of “All-National coalition” effectively wiped of each elections results, because in governments, regardless of the election results lacked almost all Czech and Slovak right-wing and left-wing parties – that led to a decline of voter interest in the elections and maintaining democracy in general;

5) The party system has been atomized into many relatively small parties; in fact several party systems coexisted, based on a national basis (Czech, Slovak, German and the parties of other national minorities);

6) Political parties have been dominated by a narrow elite, which did not allow even a changes of the Leadership, or did not give much space to the active participation of the wider membership base for policy making;

7) The party elites have built a “state of parties” in which the parties have expanded into all spheres of society especially to the media, the economy and government. Reference was also the fact that the parties prioritized their own interests above the needs of society and the state. (Rataj et al., 2010: 18)

The Moscow negotiations and “Government program of Košice” as the basic building stones of limited democracy

Between 22. 3. and 29. 3. 1945 took place in Moscow negotiations between representatives of the London exile government, led by President E. Beneš and communists based in Soviet exile on the program and composition of the new post-war Czechoslovak government. The outcome of these negotiations fatally influenced the postwar development of the country, it accounted for consensus on radical changes to the existing political and economic system. Beneš went to Moscow in the spring of 1945 with the view that “The West has allocated us to the eastern sphere, and we must make the best move in this sphere.” (Feierabend, 1994: 214). President Beneš accepted the dominance of leftist parties in the new government (the Communists, National Socialists, Social Democrats), but he counted with the participation of new agricultural party, which would arise from the ruins of prewar agrarians, as a balancing element in addition to the participation of Christian-oriented People’s Party. He also agreed key requirements of the Communists before the Moscow negotiations:

1) First before the liberation of Czechoslovakia dissolve London exile government and create a new government with representation KSC

2) In foreign policy consistently to fulfill an agreement with the USSR from 1943

3) Program of radical reforms, which under the designation as a “national-democratic revolution” meant (Gebhart, Kuklík, 2007: 483-484):

a) the nationalization of key industries, mines and financial sector

b) new agrarian reform

c) cleansing by Nazis, fascists, traitors and collaborators

d) Building of new Army on the Soviet model

e) creation of “national committees” as the lowest institutions of popular power

f) creation of uniform organization of trade unions, cooperatives and physical education movement. (Klimeš, 1965: 338, Doc. No. 110).

Although primarily a national socialists and social democrats prepared and formulated their own program priorities in London for the Moscow negotiations, they not formally submitted their proposals to the table during negotiations in Moscow. (Kaplan, 1992: 69-88; also Klimeš, 1965: 358-366, Doc. No. 122). This was due to significant compliance wishes of these two parties with the Communists in key proposed reforms: nationalization of mines and energy, heavy industry, transport, banks, hospitals and spas. In the area of agriculture, both sides supported the new land reform and redistribution thus nationalized land to small farmers and cooperatives. Foreign policy should be based primarily on the next alliance with the Soviet Union and the Treaty of 1943, although both sides stressed the necessity to maintain a friendship with the Western Allies. There was also a clear

consensus on the issue of resettlement of German and Hungarian population from Czechoslovakia.

Moscow talks themselves were attended by a total of eighteen representatives of six political parties that were in the New Republic to play a decisive role (Communists, National Socialists, Social democrats, Slovak Democratic Party, Slovak Communists). In formal terms, it was a signal of limited form of Czechoslovak postwar democracy that politicians did not decided cases by majority opinion by voting in Moscow negotiations, but mutually committed themselves to individual decisions will always occur on the principle of unanimous consent. This prevented potential opponents of the Communist Party proposals to build upon action of the special majority coalition. Communists submitted at the beginning of negotiations its comprehensive reform program of political, national, economic, social and foreign policy arrangement of the new republic. Most of their proposals were adopted smoothly. The most radical changes should take place in the political system and in the economic structure. These changes were contemporary politicians' answers to the above experience of the recent past.

Above all, capitalism should be replaced with a mixed economic system, which had, however, from the beginning to play a dominant role nationalized, therefore, the public sector and private enterprise should be relegated to the role of mere adjunct in the consumer products industry and services. The big bourgeoisie should be punished by Nationalization for its involvement in Munich. The national economy should be protected against unwanted spontaneity of its development (which was seen as the culprit of prewar economic crisis) by government regulation its instrument became the two-year plan. This strategy was also supported by arguments need for rapid implementation of post-war reconstruction of the damaged economy. The aim of these changes should be primarily of preventing a recurrence of a structural economic crisis of the 30s. (Vykoukal, Litera, & Tejchman, 2000: 245).

In combination with the limited (ie. The "People") democracy, significantly limiting the possibilities of the right-wing opposition to the direction of the nationalization tools in the economy have established themselves as the only possible path of reform of prewar economic and political system.

Citizens of the German and Hungarian minorities already were not allowed to continue to have the right to remain on the territory of Czechoslovak State and should be in as many moved to Germany and Hungary. Czechoslovakia had fundamentally change the priorities of its foreign policy orientation. Main ally became the Soviet Union. The program first postwar government assumed "the closest alliance with the victorious powers in the Slavic East" as "unwavering leadership line of Czechoslovak foreign policy" and referred to the Treaty on mutual assistance, friendship and postwar cooperation between the USSR and Czechoslovakia (from 12. 12. 1943), as document which "will determine all the future of foreign political position of our state." This trend has been largely supported by the Western allies of Czechoslovakia – Britain and the United States at the end of war. Chief foreign policy adviser to F. D. Roosevelt wrote in his memoirs: "The Soviet government has the same legitimate right to create a regional system in Eastern Europe that would include independent states cooperating with Russia and Russia are favorable, in countries bordering Russia, like the United States had the right to seek the Inter-American system of sovereign twenty-one American republics of the Western hemisphere." (Welles, 1947: 382-383). Now the area of foreign policy in Moscow

negotiations led one of the more serious cases. Communists preferred unilateral orientation of Czechoslovakia to the USSR wanted non-communist parties and President Beneš balance by maintaining links with the democratic West – and enforced the mention of friendly relations with “democratic Western powers and all democratic countries, which stood in the anti-Nazi front of the United Nations” with the express listing Great Britain, USA and France to the draft of government program. (<http://www.moderni-dejiny.cz/clanek/kosicky-vladni-program-5-4-1945>).

The positive image of the Soviet Union was in Czechoslovak society based on three fundamental pillars: 1) long-acting Russophilism and the idea of Slavic solidarity; 2) admiration and respect for the heroic struggle of Soviet soldiers against Nazism and the liberation of Czechoslovakia; 3) positively designed image of the Soviet Union and Stalin also by Western Allies during the war, who emphasized the tendencies of the Soviet system to a certain democratization and humanization. President Beneš also greatly promoted the idea that a Marxist dictatorship in the USSR is temporary in nature, and that as a result of natural cooperation with the democratic states of the USSR anti-Hitler coalition will also internal regime in the Soviet Union closer to Western democracies. (Beneš, 1946: 259-262). The biggest deflection from the principles of parliamentary and competitive liberal democracy meant the creation of a new model of organization of the party system, so-called National Front.

Political and party system should undergo a substantial transformation by reducing the political parties, whose aim was to remove unwanted atomization of the party system of the First Republic. In addition to parties, representing yet German or Hungarian minority should be removed from the system the parties representing the interests of large industry (National Democratic Party), businessmen (Trades side) and farmers (Agrarian Party) before the Second World War. The Agrarian Party was accused of collaborating with fascism due to a significant involvement of its politicians in a political system of the Second Republic (1938-1938) and subsequently the Czech political representation of the Nazi Protectorate (1939-1945). It was therefore a highly asymmetric party model, significantly tilted strongly in favor of left-wing parties and in the Czechoslovak environment completed with two parties of civic center (People's Party, Slovak Democratic Party). (Vykoukal et al., 2000: 245). The new political system of the Third Republic was to be built on a principle of National Front (NF hereinafter), which should concentrate all permitted political parties, while decisions based on the consensus of all stakeholders.

The National Front was to represent the unity of the nation, not only at the political level, but also at national and social level. It was based on the principle that the basic unifying element of Czech and Slovak nation became a common resistance against German Nazism in time of war. Postwar political elite stressed simultaneously the need for agility of executive power to solve complex problems of the society. Political decisions should not be created primarily on the principle of the fight or competition between the interests of different parties and voter groups, but rather on the search for a society-wide consensus through solidarity cooperation among the various interests. Also new, unicameral parliament, was primarily operate on the principle of NF. This political system in some aspects was also linked to the constraints that the political elites of the First Republic brought to the classical parliamentary regime. Especially we are referring to the so-called principle of “The Five”, which reduced the natural conflict of interests of the

various political parties (and their voters) on a consensus rather centripetal functioning system of agreements reached in the narrow group of senior representatives of key political parties in the Parliament. The politicians of the postwar system found significant inspiration also in the format of “all-national coalition” governments of the First Republic. The new political system also took over the practice of the dominant position of party elites in the party-political life – even though the postwar elite opened their parties (sometimes to massive) influx of new members, continues persisted in practice of rather passive membership, whose role is primarily to support the decisions of elites and helping to spread Party ideas in the broader public, and mobilize voters before the election. Political parties continue to be held by them almost absolute privilege of making of political agenda. And finally we can talk about significant influence of changes brought about by the recent wartime past, because the recent experience of the Czech and Slovak companies with the authoritarian regime of the Second Republic and totalitarian regime of the Protectorate, respectively wartime Slovak state helped to a significant reduction of the pluralist nature of postwar party-political system.

Thus set model of the political system was marked as the “people's democracy” by political elites. Its basic characteristics evoked the question of whether it is a real alternative to the classical liberal democracy, or whether it is merely a kind of transition phase towards the Non-democratic regime, in this case the Stalinist type. (Vykoukal et al., 2000: 244). This system ideologically followed so-called “People's Front” of The 30s, and in the economic sphere was its structure built on the idea of convergence between the capitalist system and socialism. (Varga, 1959). Thus introduced model of popular democracy enabled the distance of society from negatively perceived recent national history, therefore, the possibility of a promising new beginning. But the far-reaching structural changes were its precondition and also consequence. In this sense, although it was possible to remove some unwanted mistakes of prewar politics, along with them, but there was a risk of a significant weakening (until depletion) of the concept of liberal democracy itself. (Vykoukal et al., 2000: 245-246). So there was paralyze of possibility of control of policy by (formal and largely and practically non-existent) opposition and to extension of influence of parties elites not only on politics but also economics, judiciary and media, and to a significant reduction in the importance of Parliament. (Rataj et al., 2010: 11). But there also was an essential part of people's democracy: extraordinary means of exercising of power, which in the postwar era was first of all a significant strengthening of the role of executive power, decision making with exceptional legal instruments (decrees) and the temporary dominance of extraordinary justice in the judiciary system (National Court, retribution). In terms of the wider society is to then be added other consequences of just experienced through war: increased level of violence and crime, getting used brutal methods of political terror (torture, executions) and the total loss of the sense of the rule of law and liberal values.

Significant differences at talks in Moscow in March 1945 resulted in only a few topics. In addition to the aforementioned issues of foreign policy it was mainly the reform of the army. The hardest controversy, however, occurred during the debate on solutions to the new form of constitutional arrangement, respectively the relationship between the Czech and the Slovak nation. Czech Non-communist parties argued that the final form of the Czech-Slovak arrangement must decide to Constituent National Assembly; in fact they are hoping for a gradual weakening of communist influence in Slovakia and limiting the

powers of the Slovak authorities, which have seen risk of recurrence of Slovak separatism in the future. President Beneš urged both groups to reconciliation. (Drtina, 1992: 23). National Socialist Party finally withdrew in the form of acceptance of the current status quo of the Slovakia, with this that the political elite will make the final decision on the liberated territory.

Government program of Košice government program, formally adopted and promulgated at the first meeting of the government on liberated territory in Košice on 5. 4. 1945, also stressed the continuation of the practice of Czechoslovak liberal constitutionalism when it affirmed fully guaranteed “constitutional freedoms, particularly freedom of personal, of assembly, of association, freedom of expression, opinion, speech, press and writing, freedom of household, secrecy and freedom of teaching and conscience and religion.” In this sense this program extended the space of political rights even compared to First Republic when lowered the age for voting rights for men and women to 18 years and recently awarded it to the armed forces. In contrary, war traitors and collaborators lost this voting right.

The final form of government program of Košice meant significant victory of Communist proposals. Although the government program confirmed the full range of democratic principles, it was obvious that the most important parts of this program are the reforms, which led to a radical transformation of the political and economic system of the country. Non-communist parties accepted this program agreement with the Communists on the one hand under the influence of the changed international situation and partly from internal political reasons.

Theoretical Conclusions

Radical changes in the political and economic system, described in this article, in a different extent and intensity contributed to the fact that it occurred in Czechoslovakia after the war to an internal reformulation of the regime, as this type of political change, resp. extinction of non-democratic regime named Alfred Stepan. (Stepan, 1986: 65-84). Postwar political life dominated completely politicians returning from exile in London and Moscow; representatives of the domestic resistance movement participated only minimally. The political elite, much like de Gaulle government in France, overestimated the role of the resistance in public interpretations and underestimated the difficult situation of the indigenous population, exposed to occupation repressive regime in the Nazi Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Without this experience it has little in the way to make a fair idea about life in the occupied country. (Macek, 1946). The Nazi occupation transformed the Czech society deeper than the politicians had so wished. On the one hand there was thanks to war significant social and economic pauperization of the population. Czech nation also lost a number of members of the social, political, cultural and economic elites; old conservative elites to cooperate with the occupation regime compromised and eliminated from the postwar share of power. Nazi extermination program-Holocaust also caused appreciable losses in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. (Brenner, 2015: 38).

On the other hand, however, especially the Nazi Protectorate social policy was not without impact and consequences. A considerable part of the population rather adapted to the given circumstances in fear of repression, loss of employment and access to the (already generally limited) material resources and basic living needs. Systematic repression

undermined the confidence of people, their enthusiasm, optimism and faith in the “old” values, and vice versa led to the spread of cynicism or egoism. (Brenner, 2015: 124). A number of contemporary commentators pointed to the complicated of the occupation of life. Writer of comic novels Eduard Bass refuted the idea of the nation of “Švejk” who sabotaged the occupation administration by its regulation romped to an absurd position, and contrary the view that entire nation worked in the resistance. It had mostly ended deaths resistance fighters, and therefore most people it changed her mind, and acted contrary very passively and quietly. (Bass, 1945). On the contrary, the degree of collaboration with the occupying Nazi regime was, as in post-war France, proved to be much larger than the politicians returned from exile are willing to admit. Stepan showed on the case of termination of Non-democratic regime in the form of internal reformulation of system how the need to deal with the legacy of collaboration and with the political structures, which contributed to the fall of democracy, establishing and maintaining a non-democratic regime, leading to significant structural changes in the system. In post-war Czechoslovakia, we observed these changes not only in the constitutional political, but also economic level.

However is true, that the liberation of Czechoslovakia in May 1945 meant the defeat of the totalitarian Nazi occupation regime and hope to (re) build a democracy, we also indicated the main objectives and means of political and economic transformation of post-war Czechoslovak society lead not to renew at least as liberal democratic regime, which was the First Republic, but rather a significant reduction of standards of democracy and the establishment of “limited” democracy.

In search of factors in postwar Czechoslovakia contributed to the fact that the effort to rebuild a democratic system went through a temporary period of limited democracy in the end to communist totalitarianism, we can inspire the theoretical concept of “Antiwaves” in the book of Samuel Huntington “Third Wave” (Huntington, 2008: 278-279):

1) “The weakness of democratic values among key elite groups and the general public” – above, we have shown that it is disillusionment with the political consequences of the crisis of the prewar democracy, and experienced the horrors of war greatly weakened the confidence of politicians and the public in the ability of liberal democracy and capitalism.

2) “Economic crisis or collapse that intensified social conflict and enhanced the popularity of remedies that could only be imposed by authoritarian governments” – also in Czechoslovakia economic crisis in the 30s has reduced the confidence of the population and left-wing political forces (which dominated post-war politics) in the ability of liberal democracy lead the country out of crisis and prevent crises and vice versa after the Second World War has led to the belief that the state needs to play more significant role in the organization of the economy far not only as a regulator of rules and relationships, but also as an owner.

3) “The breakdown of law and order” – caused by the experience of war, violence and repression and liberation struggles in the spring of 1945. The consequences of reducing respect for the principles of the rule of law could be felt throughout the entire period of the Third Republic in the form of retributive application of extraordinary legislation, but also in increased crime and violence in society (eg. against relegated German minority).

4) "Snowballing in the form of the demonstration effects of the collapse or overthrow of democratic systems in other countries" – radical transformation steps of the Communists and their acceptance by the public certainly assisted note that similarly radical transformation of national societies also occurs in other countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. This tendency was still supported by Communists emphasis on the principles of Slavic solidarity and brotherhood that should refocus the interest of Czechs and Slovaks primarily on cooperation with the East, and weaken the pro-Western orientation.

Finally, let us add that Huntington predicted that this weakened democracy often ends in the form of "executive coup d'état" which is made by those who have "gained confidence in free elections" (in Czechoslovakia in May 1946 won the Communists), "abused his powers" and finally, "they concentrated all power in their hands" – exactly the Communist Party has done this after a coup d'etat in February of 1948. If we in contrast with the aforesaid contrary from theoretical concept of Dankwart Rustow, which dealt with the question of what basic conditions must be in the process of democratic transition respected and strengthened, in order to achieve a stable and good democracy, then we must conclude that it is in Czechoslovakia in 1945-1948 gradually lost those factors that would strengthen democracy (Rustow, 1970: 337–363):

1) "The basis of democracy is not maximum consensus. It is the tenuous middle ground between imposed uniformity (such as would lead to some sort of tyranny) and implacable hostility (of a kind that would disrupt the society in civil war or secession).

2) In the process of genesis of democracy, an element of what might be termed consensus enters at three points at least:

a) There must be a prior sense of society, preferably a sense of society quietly taken for granted that is above mere opinion and mere agreement.

b) There must be a conscious adoption of democratic rules, but they must not be so much believed in as applied, first perhaps from necessity and gradually from habit.

c) The very operation of these rules will enlarge the area of consensus step-by-step as democracy moves down its crowded agenda." (Rustow, 1970: 363).

Rustow also pointed the naturally competitive and conflicting character of democracy: "New issues will always emerge and new conflicts threaten the newly won agreements. The essence of democracy is the habit of dissension and conciliation over ever-changing issues and amidst ever-changing alignments. The characteristic procedures of democracy include campaign oratory, the election of candidates, parliamentary divisions, votes of confidence and of censure-a host of devices, in short, for expressing conflict and thereby resolving it. Totalitarian rulers must enforce unanimity on fundamentals and on procedures before they can get down to other business. By contrast, democracy is that form of government that derives its just powers from the dissent of up to one half of the governed." (Rustow, 1970: 363).

In post-war Czechoslovakia's political elite enforced especially the principle of unanimity of political decision by changes in the political system described above, thanks to the institution of the National Front made it impossible the existence of an official parliamentary opposition; rules of political decision aimed at eliminating areas of disagreement in favor of officially highlighted unity of all major political forces. In reality, however, this practice increasingly allowed strongest party – the Communist Party – to push their partners to the adoption of its proposals. In the years 1945-1948, while still was

possible to express the disapproval in the Parliament and government, but opponents of the Communist proposals were subsequently publicly ostracized by the Communists as enemies of the system. In 1947, during demonstrations against the “bourgeoisie” people in Slovakia kept banners reading: “Saboteurs removed! Profiteers hang!” (TV documentary “Potomci a předkové III. – čas rozhodnutí”)

In 1945, an artificially established principle of political unity so greatly facilitate the transition to a totalitarian regime after February 1948. The effectiveness and success of its strategy of outside-parliamentary struggle (strikes, demonstrations) the Communists already in 1945-1948 weakened the confidence of the public and other political forces in the rules and procedures of classical parliamentary democracy and the rule of law.

Although we portrayed primarily those key aspects of postwar development in this analysis, which significantly limited Czechoslovak Democracy finally, it should be noted that the political system of the Third Republic to 1948 was still characterized by the existence of relatively solid democratic basis (Rataj et al., 2010: 11-12): still been maintained (albeit weakened) attributes of the rule of law, existed (although the principle of unified National Front dramatically limited) the possibility of competition of policy alternatives that might apply in free elections; Constitution guaranteed freedom of speech, assembly, press, science and religious faith.

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A HISTORY OF SANITATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT IN IBADAN METROPOLIS 1960-1999

Oluyitan Julius Akinyele, Oladiti Abiodun Akeem***

Abstract

This paper examines the environmental history of Ibadan from independence up till 1999, when Nigeria hosted the 10th World Youth Football championship competition. It discusses the environmental challenges experienced within the city in areas such as public health, waste water issue, sanitation, refuse disposal, sewage system as well as drainage schemes to prevent flood disaster. The state involvement in maintaining proper hygiene, environmental safety and health condition of the citizenry is deplorable due to limited finance, poor planning and weak institutional agencies to enforce standard and best practices in public service. The paper concludes that there is need for the Oyo state government of Nigeria to develop a comprehensive action plan and policy decision towards improving sanitation and waste management in Ibadan.

Key words: *Sanitation, Waste management, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria*

Introduction

According to the United Nations Educational Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO; 1999), the term “sanitation” refers to “Maintaining clean, hygienic circumstances that help to avoid diseases through services such as waste collection and disposal or recycling”.

In a similar perspective, the National Water Resources Management Policy (NWRMP) (2003) defines sanitation as dealing with the principles and practices relating to the collection, removal or disposal of human excreta, household waste water and refuse as they impact upon people and the environment. Good sanitation includes appropriate health and hygiene awareness and behaviour, acceptable and affordable as well as sustainable sanitation services. The basic level of environmental sanitation system must satisfy the following criteria: it must be associated with appropriate method for disposing human excreta as well as household waste water and refuse in a manner that is acceptable and affordable to the users; it must also be safe, hygienic, and easily accessible and must not have negative impact on the environment.

Sanitation and waste management has become a great challenge to emerging cities of sub Saharan Africa since independence. In an online survey of Sahara reporters, an online news media focusing on Nigeria, Ibadan and Lagos were ranked as the filth centres of the world. While Ibadan ranked as the number one dirtiest city in the world, Lagos is rated as the fourth. According to Oyeniyi, in Lagos, as in Ibadan, piles of rubbish littered the roads and street corners. The situation in densely populated areas such as Ketu, Mushin, Lagos Island and Lagos Mainland. (all in Lagos) shows that the unplanned nature of these places

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imposes considerable limitations on waste disposal and waste management, as most houses were built with no adherence to standard (Oyeniyi, 2011).

In densely populated areas such as Oje, Beere, Ojoo, and Agbowo, (all in Ibadan), no saner rule prevails on building construction. In fact, houses built for commercial purposes were often built with no allowance for set-backs, and sewage. Dawodu Oluwaseun maintained that official complicity and graft accounted for the problems as most houses were found to have had no town planning approval. This statement partly serves to explain the waste management challenges in Lagos and Ibadan, which, in any sense of the word, can be described as ancient city. The dilemma of poor sanitation in Ibadan is more pronounced in the urban centres, than the rural areas (Dawodu, 2009). This problem is exacerbated by high population density which results in overcrowding, inadequate planning and poor urban governance (Ayeni, 1981; Agbola and Elijah, 2009; Onibokun and Kumuyi, 2007). This leads to the credence of the need by examining the history of sanitation and waste management in Ibadan. This study traces the problem of sanitation and waste disposal management in Ibadan. Structurally, the paper is divided into eight sections with each focusing on an important aspect of the study. The first section of the paper sets the tone and direction for the study. The second examines sanitation and waste management in pre and colonial Ibadan, the third discusses refuse disposal and sewage systems in Ibadan, the fourth highlights the status of Abattoir slabs, the fifth discusses sewage disposal, the sixth highlights the drainage scheme, the seventh mentions the water distribution and eighth concludes and summarizes the sanitation and waste management in Ibadan.

Sanitation and waste management in pre and colonial Ibadan

Sanitation and waste disposal in pre-colonial Ibadan was largely unorganized and it was never controlled by the state within the town. Public places were usually swept by in rotation of groups of women households while the refuse were deposited in surrounding bushes within the town and burn to decompose (Oke, 2013). According to Fourchard, the inner city area of the town is the oldest and has the lowest quality residence and highest population density in the city. Large compounds for extended families and warriors constituted this part of the city (Fouchard, 2001). In the words of Mabogunje (1968), there was virtual absence of adequate sanitation, slum dwellings characterized with no identifiable sanitation facilities were the most significant feature of the city and no drainage system were found within the town.

Hardly could you find pit latrines or similar of sort in the traditional city of the family compounds. The city's human excreta are disposed off largely by means of septic tanks, pit latrines, and bucket; in some cases, it is wrapped with nylon and thrown into the gutter or stream. The uncontrolled disposal of liquid waste into open gutters, open spaces, and along roads poses serious environmental and health hazards. Inhabitants of the town who lived close to the creeks, rivers and streams pollute the stream with defecation and dump their refuse in the shore of the streams (Fouchard, 2003).

Waste generated in the market (Oja'ba) was indiscriminately disposed and burned within the market space. The waste generated in the market was comparatively more when compared to other inner areas of the city. In a 1945 report written by Maxwell Fry and R.W. Farm on the state of Ibadan during the pre-colonial period described the sanitation in the city as proceeded very little control, formless roads and winding packs, the streets

are nothing more than the spaces left over after house building has taken place. Motor parks, markets and roads were poorly maintained. Due to the narrowness of the roads, accidents have been reported in the public streets (NAI, 1950).

In the core traditional areas in Ibadan waste and sanitation was uncontrolled. Archival evidence suggests that in the 1940s slaughtering of animals such as cattle, sheep and goats was carried out at five recognized slaughter slabs. The best of these was primitive and unhygienic while the principal one, situated at Gegeloshe in the centre of the town, is disgusting, it has to be seen and smelt to be believed. Commenting on the state of abattoir in Ibadan, the senior health officer in Ibadan in his letter dated 28th of May, 1937 noted that:

...about sixty head of cattle are being killed on a ruinous slab, measuring 50 feet by 30 feet, jammed in among dirty houses, with close against it a filthy, dilapidated latrine, and dirty little wooden tables as Butchers 'stalls'. Slabs crowded with butchers, buyers, skinners, and loafers paddling about in the blood, manure, and tramping on the carcasses. Manure in quantity is deposited on the ground, and the earth must be heaving with fly maggots. Blood and 'washings' flow into the adjacent stream, a source of drinking water all the year round...

The senior health officer in his concluding remark about the state of sanitation in the abattoir in Ibadan observed that it was a serious challenge to public health and therefore needed an urgent attention. Although, efforts were made to improve the situation by the colonial authorities, limited financial resources affected the sustainability and development of new abattoir in the city.

Besides, solid waste of vegetable materials from the garbage lorries, slaughter-house, refuse from individual households and cattle dung's from railway tracks were improperly disposed. According to Tokun, Ibadan never had a central sewage system throughout the colonial period. Pit latrines and dunghills used to be the main centres of defecation. The lack of central sewage system made Ibadan a dirty city. The inner city is much worse than the other town planning areas which had septic tank and soak-away system of sanitation (Tokun, 1999).

With the introduction of new city layout with the recommendation and approval of town planning authorities, new European style of housing, hospital, nursing station, educational, recreational and religious facilities were built to serve the British colonialists and the more prominent European business community residing in the town. It became necessary for the provision of urban sanitation for expatriate and the colonial authorities living in the European Reservation Areas (Mabogunje, 1968). At this point, it becomes necessary to ask the question: to what extent did the colonial authorities sustained sanitation management during the colonial period of Ibadan history?

The answer to this question can be answered in two ways. first, the colonial authorities attempted to sustain sanitation management in the town by enacting sanitation laws through the Ibadan town planning authorities, prosecute offenders with the imposition of fines for those who flout the environmental laws, establishment of health committee in alliance with the health department to make appropriate recommendations on the improvement of sanitation as well as introducing health educational programmes to train environmental and public health officials in the city. Secondly, it is evident from

archival records that the native of Ibadan indicted the colonial officials on 28th March 1943 for failure to provide basic sanitary facilities like public latrines and incinerators for the inhabitants (NAI, 1978). The district officer Mr A.F Abell who represented the colonial authorities in a meeting held with the Oluokun hill ward committee explained that it was due to financial constraints confronting the colonial government prevented it to build adequate incinerators and latrines all over the town. He noted that the public latrines were only intended for market people and visitors passing through the town. He advised the people of Ibadan to get private latrines and incinerators in the absence of none provided by the colonial authorities (NAI, 1978).

Besides, available evidence also notes that that the Ibadan natives' health committee also requested from the colonial government the provision of proper sanitary meat stalls as well as slab for the abattoir at Gege. Although the colonial authorities promise to give the request due consideration but there was no evidence to show that these were carried out. Throughout the colonial period, the Gege market was notoriously known for its filth and nauseating odour. The absence of public latrines, abattoir and incinerators in the market partly explains how sanitation management was not sustained under British rule (NAI, 1978).

The stream that was very close to the Gege market was converted to a refuse dump site, latrine for defecation and urination. This point suggests the fact that the colonial authorities did not sustain sanitation management in Ibadan due to finance and political will to enforce sanitary laws with the prosecution of offenders. One of the laws enacted by the Ibadan and District Native authority which stipulated that..... No person shall deposit any matter whatsoever in any stream or water course nor dig or otherwise interfere with any land lying within 6 feet of either bank of any stream or water course. This law was at best in theory; there was no evidence of corresponding punishment or prosecution of offenders who breach this law (NAI, 1978).

Refuse Disposal and Sewage System in Ibadan, 1960-1999

Refuse disposal in Ibadan in the study period constitute a major challenge. The issue made the Ibadan City Council (I.C.C.) to saddle its Health Department with the responsibility of refuse collection and disposal. The Health Department had two sections: Medical Health and Environmental Health Services. The latter had the responsibility of the collection of refuse. The Principal Health Superintendent and his five assistants directly controlled administration of refuse disposal in the city (W.H.O, 1970).

Two to three refuse overseers were assigned to each of the five districts in Ibadan. Their duties included keeping records on the number of lorry loads of refuse collected and the areas served within each district each day. The senior labourer at each disposal site was responsible for keeping a record of the number of lorry loads dumped each day. In addition, a number of labourers were hired on a daily basis as depot cleaners. Their duty was to keep the sites of depots assigned to them (usually not more than five) as neat and tidy as possible.

Almost 90% of the total refuse collected in the city during this period was by the depot method. The depot comprised a concrete block or mud block structure at about 4ft high and about 12ft wide and 8ft deep located just off the edge of a road. There were 142 of these depots located throughout the Inner Core and layout areas. In the former, there were problems with accessibility into compounds and vehicular traffic was essentially

confined to the few public roads. Consequently, people in these areas carried their refuse from their homes to the nearest depot in baskets. In many cases, the distance between a home and the nearest depot was so long as to discourage the constant use of depots (Sridhar and Ojediran, 1983).

The City Council had vehicles for collection of refuse from the depots to the disposal sites. As at January 15, 1970, the collection fleet comprised 19 lorries of semi-circular sliding roof type (W.H.O, 1970). Three major disposal sites were developed by the council at Ring Road in the south west, Oniyere in the south-east and Ijokodo in the north. The method of operation at these sites was end-dumping with essentially no earth cover. There was sporadic burning at all the sites.

A close study of available records on the operations of the Health Department, Ibadan City Council, revealed that the body was extremely weak and ineffective. A perennial problem of uncleared refuse was very rife between 1960 and 1973 (Nigerian Tribune, 1973). This had connection with poor maintenance of refuse depots. It was common to see piles of refuse on the roadsides, open spaces; sites of illegal refuse dump were rampant. The condition of most of the refuse depots was far from being satisfactory, as a result of poor maintenance. The problem of uncleared refuse during this period became so compounded in 1973 that the Western State Government contemplated the appointment of an independent body to take up the duty. Subsequently, some staff of the Ministry of Health and Works were directed to join the Health Department officials in the removal of refuse that inundated the city at the time (Nigerian Tribune, 1973).

The above problem had connection with the poor financial position of the organization which hindered the body to purchase enough refuse collecting vehicles and developed proper disposal sites (sites at Ring Road, Oniyere; Ijokodo were small and operated as open dumps rather than sanitary landfills). In addition, it could not provide adequate maintenance facilities and attract the calibre of personnel required to address refuse problems effectively. The 1969-1970 estimate for refuse management recurrent expenditures in Ibadan was £80,320. It is interesting to note that the comparable figure for Lagos which had about the same population was £564,000 (W.H.O, 1970).

It is very unfortunate that the financial problem which rendered the Health Department ineffective was not addressed by the Western State Government before refuse management was removed from the department and a new Board was formed to address the issue. On October 13, 1973, Brigadier Oluwole Rotimi, the then Military Governor of the Western State, appointed a 14-member Board to manage refuse, conservancy and drainage services in the city of Ibadan (Nigerian Tribune, 1973). The Board was made up of official representatives and six other members; amongst these was Alhaji M. A. Adetunji, who represented Ibadan Chamber of Commerce. The first chairman of the Board was Dr. Olayinka Azeez, a Senior Lecturer at the University of Ife.

Amongst the objectives of the Board were the following:

- (i) To provide within the first five years of operation a sewerage service that is self supporting;
- (ii) To provide efficient and effective conservancy services to those citizens who will continue to require these services;
- (iii) To provide within eight years, an additional one hundred and twelve public facilities in the city;

(iv) To assist family compounds in the Inner Core to construct at least five hundred comfort stations on self-help basis within the first eight years;

(v) To provide a modern sanitary and store-sewerage system at Gbagi, Dugbe, Onireke business districts and the adjoining residential areas of Oke-Bola, Oke-Ado and Molete within the first five years;

(vi) To extend sanitary sewerage facilities to other numerable areas of Ajengba-Felele area; Ring Road area and Bodija/Secretariat;

(vii) To ensure that all refuse deposited in public depots throughout the city is collected promptly, and private household which can be served by means of house to house collection are continuously serviced at least two times in a week.

As a result of heaps of refuse and other insanitary dumps that littered the city before the establishment of the Ibadan Waste Disposal Board, the Governor, in the usual military tradition, ordered the new Board to clear within 48 hours all the refuse depots in Ibadan (Nigerian Tribune, 1973). The Board failed completely to comply with the order due to shortage of refuse collecting vehicles (Nigerian Tribune, 1974).

Consequently, areas like Inalende, Oke-Padi, Idi-Arere, Mapo, Foko, Aremo, Labiran, Beyerunka, Oranyan, Elekuro were inundated with piles of refuse and illegal dump sites. Other affected areas included Agbeni, Oke-Adi, Oke Ado, Oke-Bola, Yemetu, Ayeye. As a matter of fact, the Board could not clear the refuse depots in several parts of Ibadan throughout the year. This was due to financial constraints, which made it impossible for the organization to acquire adequate refuse collecting vehicles and pay the salaries of its employees. The situation did not improve until January, 1974 following a threat by market women all over Ibadan to stop payment of staff fees until the markets were rid of heaps of refuse. This compelled the Board to clear the debris in the markets and other parts of Ibadan. This modest achievement did not last long: by 1975, major roads in the city had been taken over by wastes.

A close study of available records on the operations of the Board showed clearly that the organization did not perform up to expectation. Services provided by the Board were often marred by inadequate refuse depots; few available ones were not cleared regularly due to shortage of refuse collecting vehicles. In addition, adequate number of public toilets was not provided which forced people to continue their unwholesome practice of defecating in the open space and streams. The period, 1973 – 1976, indeed, was one of the grave sanitation problems. It is significant to note that the failure of the Board to provide effective solution to sanitation problems had links with the poor sanitary habits of the people of Ibadan. This was evident in their failure to make proper use of refuse depots. Another contributory factor to the poor performance of Ibadan Waste Disposal Board (I.W.D.B.) was the absence of health education. Public Health officers responsible for this exercise were outlawed in 1969 as a result of their excesses and the Agbekoya uprising (Nigerian Tribune, 1975).

Following the Local Government Reforms in 1976, the I.W.D.B. was dissolved and Ibadan City Council (I.C.C.) which became known as Ibadan Municipal Government (I.M.G.) was appointed to oversee the management of sanitary problems in Ibadan. One would have expected that this development would lead to appreciable improvement in sanitation. The contrary was the case; indeed, sanitary conditions in Ibadan, especially in 1978, became worsened. Heaps of refuse littered the major streets; seven major roads were completely blocked with refuse: Idi-Arere/Mapo, Mapo/Gegelose, Igosun/Orita-

Mefa, Sabo, Abebi/ Oniyanrin, Lemomu Road and Inalende Market/Salvation Army Road (Nigerian Tribune, 1976).

Consequently, there was traffic congestion on these routes. Equally, the situation of the markets like Gege, Inalende, Agbeni, Dugbe, Ogunpa, Orita-merin; Ojaba was extremely deplorable. This unwholesome sanitary condition became unbearable for market women at Dugbe in May, 1978. It actually led to violent riots and protests (Nigerian Tribune, 1978). The women declared that they were fed up with the poor level of sanitation at the market; they stated that the money paid for maintenance of the place was not used judiciously. The incident attracted the attention of anti-riot policemen who used teargas to disperse the women. This problem of uncleared refuse had connection with strike action by Conservancy Workers Union between January and May, 1978 (Nigerian Tribune, 1978). As a result of this, evacuation of refuse from the streets and deposits could not be done. In addition, pail latrines were not emptied. Sanitary conditions in Ibadan during the period were very poor. There was apprehension all over the city that epidemic might break out.

It is instructive to note that poor sanitation in Ibadan during this period did not improve even after the suspension of industrial action by conservancy workers. Inadequate funds provided by the Oyo State Government to the I.M.G. also contributed to the unwholesome and filthy environment. Consequently, the I.M.G. found it extremely difficult to acquire equipment and attract adequate personnel like sanitary inspectors needed to address sanitation problems. In any case, the state government agreed to release N50,000 to the I.M.G. to assist the body in the clearing and disposal of refuse within the city. It also presented 32 refuse collecting vehicles and equipment to the latter. It should be pointed out that this tentative provision did not affect the financial fortunes of the municipal government positively. The I.M.G. as a result of paucity of funds, coupled with imminent danger of an epidemic due to uncleared refuse, came under pressure to purchase transcravators on credit from the Allen Group of companies.

The failure of the I.M.G. to provide adequate services for the removal of refuse from the streets, roads and depots became obvious in August 1978 and this forced the newly posted Military Administrator, Col. Paul Tarfa, to regard the issue as a challenge. It is clear that he personally led a detachment of soldiers and Health Workers for weeks in the night (between 9.00p.m. and 6.00 a.m.) to clear refuse from streets and depots. The exercise was carried out in the wee hours of the night so as to reduce disruption to traffic. Locations of the affected refuse depots included Lemomu Road, Salvation Army Road, Bere, Oje, Idi-Arere, Sodipo, Feleye and Ogunpa/Oyo Road.

There is no doubt that Paul Tarfa's era (July 1978 – September, 1979) brought about improvement in the level of sanitation in Ibadan. However, findings revealed that he was not completely successful in the war against filth. Sanitary conditions in the Inner Core were still deplorable; people dumped refuse in the gutters, streams and open space. Situation in the outer areas was also far from being satisfactory. Illegal refuse dumps were still noticeable in Ibadan.

It was this unwholesome sanitary conditions which led the Bola Ige administration (1979-1983) to launch anti-refuse campaign in 1980. Secondary school students were mobilized and organized into clubs, the Young Pioneers. They were usually used for environmental cleaning exercise at the end of each month. In addition, 19 refuse collecting trucks and six pay loaders purchased at a cost of N.5 million were presented to

I.M.G. The State Government also went ahead in its struggle against poor sanitation by creating a new ministry for environment and water resources in April, 1982.

In December, 1983, the Shehu Shagari administration (1979 – 1983), was toppled by a tough military junta led by Buhari/Idiagbon. Their determination to rid the country of vices and indiscipline was demonstrated through the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) launched in March, 1984. Environmental Sanitation was a major focus of WAI. In Ibadan, as in other parts of the country, people were compelled on the last Saturday (between 7.00 a.m. and 12.00 noon) of each month to clean their surroundings with military personnel monitoring compliance and promptly arresting violators. Offenders obtained speedy trials in special mobile courts and fines. Those who could not pay were jailed. Besides, the Waste Disposal Board was established for the collection and disposal of refuse within the Ibadan metropolis. It is on record that the organization had access to funds, but the problems of sanitation were far from being resolved (Daily Sketch, 1984). Heaps of refuse littered the markets, motor parks and road sides. This ugly situation occurred due to indiscriminate dumping of refuse and shortage of sanitary facilities at strategic spots.

In 1985, the Buhari/Idigbon regime replaced the Babangida administration. Consequently, WAI gave way to Mass Mobilization (MAMSER). Environmental Sanitation continued under the umbrella of MAMSER, but the hours of compulsory cleaning reduced from 7.00 a.m. to 10.00 a.m. and the enforcement procedure as well as the punishment became relaxed. By September, 1985, Col. Adetunji Olurin became the Military Governor of Oyo State. He was overwhelmed by the poor sanitary conditions of Ibadan. Among the steps he took to improve the situation included the demarcation of the city into several zones (Daily Sketch, 1985). This was done to facilitate unimpeded evacuation of refuse to the disposal sites. The State Government directed landlords to provide dustbins in front of their houses and pay promptly monthly rates to private refuse contractors.

Furthermore, street trading which is one of the reasons for poor sanitation and disruption of free flow of traffic was restricted to some areas. It continued with the government support in some places like Agbeni, Oritamerin, Ojo'ba, Ifeleye and Mapo on a daily basis; while it was done in areas like Olomi market, Ijokodo, Onireke on specified days (Daily Sketch, 1985). In addition, mechanics and allied professionals were directed to vacate roadsides and move to designated places referred to as mechanic villages. This was intended to bring about a clean environment.

However, findings revealed that the above arrangements did not guarantee a clean environment (Daily Sketch, 1985). Most of the landlords failed to provide dustbins in front of their premises. A law on street trading was observed for days. Members of the Task Force employed on street trading had a running battle with the traders and at the end, they gave up due to the recalcitrance of the traders. Equally, the directive on the resettlement of mechanics was not effective. Those that moved to the villages as a result of threats of prosecution returned within months to the roadsides. They claimed that the location of the villages was far to the city and that this would discourage their customers from patronizing them. The mechanics also stated that the villages lacked water and toilet facilities.

In spite of the problems identified above, campaigns against sanitation problems continued. Environmental Sanitation days were observed and during the exercise, surroundings and neighbourhoods were tidied up. But each exercise was marred by

noticeable sight of blackish sand and slimy rubbish scooped out from open gutters. In addition, long queues of refuse remained along major streets for days and weeks due to insufficient refuse vans.

Following the dumping of toxic waste at Koko, Delta State, in 1988, there was a flurry of political and policy activities in the country which ultimately led to the establishment of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) (Note 2). This resulted in the formation of State Environmental Protection Agencies. In 1990, the Oyo State Environmental Protection Agency came into existence with the head office in Ibadan.

Among the responsibilities of the Agency are the following:

(a) To formulate and enforce policies, statutory rules and regulations on waste collection and disposal;

(b) Render advisory services and support all local governments;

(c) To prepare master plan on solid waste collection and disposal.

It is instructive to note that the functions of the Oyo State Protection Agency remained as advisory while the actual collection and disposal of refuse were done by the State Sewage Board.

By 1991, the Ibadan Municipal Government (IMG) considered too large as a local government was split into five local governments: Ibadan North, Ibadan North East, Ibadan North West, Ibadan South East, Ibadan South West. This step forced the State Government to dissolve the State Sewage Board and replaced with the Ibadan Waste Management Board. It became saddled with the collection and disposal of refuse in the five local governments.

Besides, late A. K. Adisa, the then Military Governor of the State, appalled at the poor level of sanitation in Ibadan directed that the second Saturday of every month be used for environmental sanitation. This was in addition to the national one which normally fell on the last Saturday of every month. It is significant to remark that the activities of the members of the Ibadan Waste Management Board as well as cleaning exercises done monthly did not have far reaching impact on sanitation in Ibadan. Five to six years after the inception of the Board, Ibadan was still dirty and the sights of refuse on the roadsides as well as uncleared refuse at the depots were yet to disappear. Excreta, together with refuse, were indiscriminately discharged into open drains, especially in the indigenous areas like Itamaya, Gegelose, Ode-Aje, Bere, Labo, Foko, Adeoyo, Oje, Oja-ba, Oranyan, Kobomoje, Ita-Ege, Eleta, Opo-Yeosa, Isale Ijebu. The level of sanitation in other areas like Sabo, Nalende, Agbowo, Oke-Ado were far from satisfactory. Situation in the markets was extremely deplorable; there was absence of incinerators, toilet facilities and water. All these are indispensable for adequate sanitation.

There is a strong indication that the population of Ibadan increased in the 1990s and this consequently affected the volume of refuse generated in the city as shown in Table 1 (Note 2). This seemed to have overwhelmed the Ibadan Waste Management Board. In addition, shortage of adequate personnel like Health Inspectors definitely had a negative effect on the performance of the organization. Furthermore, haphazard urbanization, poor physical planning, especially in the Inner Core; insanitary habits of the people were some of the reasons for deplorable sanitary conditions in Ibadan.

Table 1: Estimated and Projected Volume of Refuse Generation in some Nigerian Cities

<i>Urban Areas</i>	<i>1982</i>	<i>1985</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>
	<i>Tones Per Year</i>			
Lagos	625,399	681,394	786,079	998,081
Ibadan	350,823	382,224	440,956	559,882
Kaduna	257,837	280,925	324,084	431,314
Onitsha	242,240	263,929	304,477	386,593
Port-Harcourt	210,934	229,821	265,129	352,853
Aba	131,903	143,712	169,719	236,703
Jos	99,871	111,905	135,719	236,703
Uyo	12,508	13,628	15,721	20,923
Suleja	9,383	10,514	13,311	21,336

Source: Federal Ministry of Housing and Environment, "The State of the Environment in Nigeria", Monograph Series, No. 2, Lagos (no date)

Street trading could not be checked in areas like Agbeni, Ogunpa, Foko, Mapo, Bere, Oje, Bank Road, Dugbe, Itamaya. All these areas were notorious for unwholesome sanitary habits like indiscriminate dumping of refuse and excreta in the stream. However, environmental sanitation days were normally observed in the areas as well as other parts of the city. But each exercise compounded sanitation problems as heaps of refuse remained on major streets for days due to shortage of vehicles. As a matter of fact, monthly sanitation exercise, in the 1990s, had lost its steam and had degenerated into a monthly ritual!

In 1997, another organization, the Ibadan Waste Management Authority emerged with the responsibility of collection, transfer and disposal of refuse within the Ibadan urban area (Note 3). Other responsibilities of the body include the following:

- (a) Collection and registration of private refuse contractors in the city;
- (b) Preparation of management information on sanitation and environment;
- (c) Maintenance and proper use of vehicles and buildings from the state government entrusted to the Board;
- (d) Ensuring proper use of governmental budgets allocated for solid waste collection;
- (e) Maintenance of land fill sites around Ibadan and to charge economic rates.

The waste disposal services of the Authority were under the day-to-day control and management of the General Managers. The organization had the following departments: Finance, Logistics, Personnel, Enlightenment and Enforcement. In order for the organization to achieve the primary reasons for its establishment, it provided 63 refuse collection depots in the city, it also acquired refuse collection vehicles as well as skip-eaters. Collected refuse were disposed off at sanitary landfill site at Ajakanga and Aba Eku on Akaran Road.

Barely a year after the inception of the establishment, Nigeria's application to host the 10th World Youth Football Competition (Nigeria 99) in 1999 was approved by the Federation of International Football Association (FIFA). Ibadan was one of the centres for the soccer fiesta. This compelled the state government to address the needs of Ibadan Waste Management Authority. Substantial funds, equipment and personnel were provided for the body so that it would be able to tackle sanitation problems (Adeniyi, 2006). The organization recruited hundreds of street sweepers for the clearing of major roads in the

city, this was unprecedented in the history of Ibadan (Nigerian Tribune, 1999a). Ad-hoc committee referred to as task force on environmental sanitation emerged to enforce sanitation rules.

Besides, “Operation Keep Ibadan Clean” was launched by the State Government. This was co-ordinated and directed by members of the Ibadan Waste Management Authority. There was offensive on street trading and general dirty habits. Illegal structures at Bank Road, Sabo, Mokola, Isale Ijebu, Molete, Oke-Ado, Oke-Bola were demolished (Nigerian Tribune, 1999b). Furthermore, electronic and Press Media disseminated information on the need for personal hygiene and clean environment. All these activities involved substantial amount of money; not less than N27.1 million was spent on public sanitation as a result of soccer fiesta that lasted for two weeks (Nigerian Tribune, 1999b).

There is no doubt that government’s attempt to present a clean environment was accompanied by huge success. For the first time in the history of Ibadan, the city was described by observers as very clean. However, this feat was temporal; few months after the completion, sights of refuse became noticeable again. This situation had connection with scant attention given to public sanitation after the event. The task force on environmental sanitation was dissolved and radio jingles as well as printed messages on the need for a clean environment stopped. More importantly, the needs of the Ibadan Waste Management Authority did not attract the priority it deserved. The authorities failed to release adequate funds needed to employ required personnel and procure necessary equipment. Consequently, sanitation deteriorated considerably. Markets, motor parks, open space became scenes of uncleared refuse.

Abattoir slabs

Abattoir slabs are public spaces within markets, designated areas or other available spaces created by the state or local government authorities or the private butchers association used for the slaughtering of animals ranging from cattle, ram, sheep, goats and pigs. These abattoirs were used in the processing of meat products consumed by the inhabitants of the city and its environs (Abiola, 1996), the blood and bones of the animals were used as feeds for catfish and the bones are useful in the making of ceramic objects such as cups, plates and other household items (Aganga and Aganga, 2001).

It is estimated that in Ibadan alone, in Oyo state, there are about twelve functional abattoir sites located indiscriminately within the town with little or no government regulation and planning. Examples of some of the abattoir slabs found in Ibadan in the period covered by this study include, those at Bodija market, Akinyele, Moniya, Lalupon, Monatan, New garage, Iwo road, Odo-Ona kekere, Adegoke area opposite Ladokun feeds company and Orita-merin area (Abiodun, 2016). However, it is instructive to note that, of all these abattoirs found in Ibadan, only Bodija Municipal abattoir was built with government exclusive funding and resources (Olaoba, 2000) while the second was built in a private-public- partnership arrangement in 1999 (Oladele, 2015). The plan of building the abattoir was commenced by the Executive governor of the State, under the administration of Alhaji Lam Adesina. The project of building another modern abattoir along the Ibadan-Oyo expressway in Akinyele Local government was informed due to the heavy traffic at the Bodija market as well as the frequent uncontrolled killings and inter-ethnic clashes between the Hausa and the Yoruba traders within the market (Akosile, 2016).

Bodija abattoir slabs are located in Ibadan North Local government area. It was established alongside the operation of a modern market where trade in goods and services are traded in 1987 (Bwala *et al.*, 2015). The abattoir slabs in Bodija market is rated as the second largest abattoir in South-western Nigeria after the Oba abattoir in Lagos. Cattle both locally raised within Nigeria and trade cattle across the northern states in Nigeria are moved and transported mainly from Hausa land towards the Southern and Eastern part of the country especially in Lagos and Ibadan where they are slaughtered daily in thousands for meat consumption. Ibadan “the largest city in West Africa” serves as the distribution network centre for the marketing of the large percentage of these cattle. Indeed, the Bodija municipal abattoir receives cattle from different parts of Nigeria and even beyond the Nigerian borders (Bwala *et al.*, 2015).

At the abattoir slabs in Bodija, there were no government measures put in place to ensure safety of human health, environmental hygienic standard and proper handling of animals. Hardly could you find government officials regulating ‘ante-mortem’ inspection of animals, handling of the bleeding and removal of the internal organs of the animal where done on the bare floor contaminated with blood and intestinal contents (Adeyemi and Adeyemo, 2001). Mistreatment and cruelty to animals were observed and no protective clothing was used by the butchers in the abattoir. Blood meal processor move freely to collect animal blood without restriction while the animals are being slaughtered. In addition, the abattoir is largely overcrowded due to the activity of pick-pockets, touts, slaughter hands and blood meal processors for catfish. There is acute shortage supply of portable clean water to the abattoir (Adeyemi and Adeyemo, 2001).

The situation explained above is similar to other abattoirs founded by private butchers association of the cattle meat sellers found in the city. The butchers rely on hand dug surface water for their water needs during and after the slaughtering of animals in the abattoir. This seemingly poses a great challenge to human health and the spread of zoonotic and infectious diseases from animal to human (Adeyemi and Adeyemo, 2001). Proper government legislations on standard hygienic practice were not maintained, as well as measures to ensure effective regulations, standards, control and enforcement of environmental laws were not functional. Also, restricting movement of blood millers within the abattoir are not enforced as well as provision for railings to move animal meat from one section to another without touching the ground (Adeyemi and Adeyemo, 2000).

Since inception, the state involvement in the operation of the market has been poorly maintained, regulated and functional. Apart from the collection of rents from traders, the environmental and safety condition of the abattoir is filthy, unhygienic and unsafe to human health. Essentially, there is poor handling in the transportation, meat processing and the handling of animal dung’s and waste in the market. Generally the abattoir slabs owned the private butchers Association poses even more challenges to the environment. These abattoir slabs mostly located in the central district of the town in the urban centres often discharge blood and animal waste to the flowing streams. This blood coagulates in drains, where it becomes putrefied causing bad odour as well as sanitary and environmental degradation (Adeyemi and Adeyemo, 2009). In Ibadan, the capital city of Oyo state and like in other states in Nigeria, environmental laws regulating standard practice and monitoring are weak, unorganized and lack the vision to fix penalties, charges taxes and incentives to achieve certain environmental goals (Mabogunje, 1992).

Sewage Disposal

About 10% of the population of the Inner Core did not have toilet facilities during the study period. This situation made people to defecate indiscriminately in adjacent vacant lands, streets and gutters. Consequently, the Ibadan City Council organized conservancy system. This was regulated by the Night Soil Adoptive Bye-Laws Order, 1959. The operation was under the jurisdiction of the Medical Officer of Health and supervised by a Senior Public Health Inspector. The standard household pail, recommended by the Medical Officer of Health and on which the standard charges for the conservancy were based, was an open galvanized metal pail. It was the responsibility of landlords to provide the pail (W.H.O., 1970).

Household collection of night soil in the period, 1969-73, was carried out on a contract basis. The contractor was expected to appoint labourer(s) whose duty was the collection of excreta which he carried on his head to the transfer depot; where it was emptied into larger depot placed at the road side by the I.C.C. Conservancy lorries provided by the latter collected the depot drums and conveyed them to a site on Akanran Road where the contents were disposed of by trenching (W.H.O., 1970). Frequent spillage occurred during the operation. Besides, the fact that the system involved human contact with excreta rendered it as an undesirable method for the disposal of excreta. Furthermore, the following features of the system resulted in serious public health risks and nuisance:

- (a) Open containers at the households and at the transfer depots;
- (b) Inadequate cleaning of containers;
- (c) Lack of reasonable cleaning facilities at the depots and at the trenching grounds;
- (d) Uniform and protective clothing were not provided for the conservancy workers.

It is significant to remark that the reason for cholera outbreak in Ibadan in December, 1970, 1971, 1973; 1974, may not be far-fetched if the above features of the conservancy system and the problem of shortage of toilet facilities in the 1970s were taken into consideration. The first cholera outbreak in Ibadan (that of December, 1970) affected 1,384 persons (Lawoyin *et al.* 1999). Out of these patients, Inner City dwellers had the highest number of persons with the disease comprising 64% (886/1384) of all admissions with death rate of 6.4% (57/886) (Lawoyin *et al.* 1999). 26 out of 1384 (1.9%) of the patients were from the sub-urban periphery low-density areas of the city (Lawoyin *et al.* 1999). It is clear that this area had the lowest number of cholera cases throughout the year and there were no reported deaths from the zones (Lawoyin *et al.* 1999). Those from sub-urban periphery high-density areas comprised 30.6% (424/1384) of all patients with 4.2% (33/424); those from the transitional medium density comprised 3.5% (48/1384) of total patients and 2.1% (1/48) of them died (Lawoyin *et al.* 1999).

It is evidently clear that conservancy system in the period, 1973-1976 (era of Ibadan Waste Disposal Board (I.W.D.B.)) did not improve. As a matter of fact, pail latrines were not emptied for months! Equally, the Ibadan Municipal Government which succeeded Ibadan Waste Management Authority (I.W.M.A.) did not provide effective conservancy services. Residents with pail latrines between 1976 and 1979 experienced untold hardship as a result of epileptic services provided by the organization. It is unfortunate to observe that the above situation did not improve between 1983 and 1999. Indiscriminate defecation was rampant at the motor parks, most of these parks did not have toilet facilities (Lawoyin *et al.* 1999).

Drainage Scheme

Following the 1960 flood, the Western State Government appointed a firm of consultants, Ove, Arup & Partners to survey and design a flood drainage scheme for Ibadan. The outcome was unsuccessful due to lack of funds. Subsequently, the State Ministry of Works and Transport carried out a study of the main drainage of the city between 1961 and 1963. Consequently, the Ministry entered as a capital item in their estimates a project called "Ibadan drainage Scheme". It was estimated to cost £1,500,000 (W.H.O., 1970). It is unfortunate that this laudable project was not executed due to lack of funds.

It is instructive to note that the people of Ibadan paid dearly for the failure of the Western State Government to carry out the recommendations of the above studies. On 14th May, 1969, a relatively small rainfall caused considerable damage – destruction of houses, roads and goods worth £50,0000 due to absence of adequate drainage (W.H.O., 1970). By 1973, there was another flood disaster which resulted in the loss of lives and property. Areas affected included Lebanon Street, Yemetu, Alafara, Oje, Mokola, Adamasingba, Gege, Labo and Oranyan (Nigerian Tribune, 1973). This flood occurred when River Ogunpa and Kudeti with their tributaries overflowed their banks and flooded adjoining houses. In 1978, another destructive flood popularly referred to as "Omiyale" occurred in Ibadan (Nigerian Tribune, 1976b). Over 150 deaths occurred while property worth over N2million were destroyed. It was the magnitude of the loss that forced the Jemibewon administration to award a N12.4million contract for the channelization of the Ogunpa River (Nigerian Tribune, 1978). Much work was yet to be carried out on the river when the project was suspended in 1979 due to the failure of Oyo State Government to settle over N2 million debts to Messrs R.C.F. Building Construction & Civil Engineering Nigeria Company Limited (Daily Sketch, 1979).

The consequence of this ill-advised step was highly detrimental to safety of lives and property. This was because the calamity and destruction which accompanied the rain that fell on August 31, 1980 would have been minimized or avoided provided adequate and modern drainage had been provided (Note 4). There is no doubt that the flood disaster which occurred in 1980 was largely as a result of absence of adequate and functional drainage system in Ibadan.

It is unfortunate that to date, concrete steps that could prevent similar disasters in the future has not been taken. It was true that immediately after the 1980 flood disaster, structures and buildings hindering the free flow of the Ogunpa River were demolished. Equally, it was true that Dugbe market was reconstructed and displaced traders at Gbagi; Ogunpa were resettled in a new area along Ibadan-Ife Road. A new market (now Bola Ige International Textiles Market) equipped with basic sanitary facilities like toilets, litter bins as well as spacious lock up-shops and warehouses were built. In addition, about 60 acres of land was provided in the area for accommodation of interested textile traders. However, adequate measures like the construction of functional drainage system and completion of Ogunpa channelization and dredging project were not given the priority they deserve. In fact, in 1997, there was another flood disaster due to the failure of successive administrations and people of Ibadan to learn from history.

It will be completely erroneous to assume that the failure and negligence of the successive administrations in Oyo State to provide adequate and functional drainage system was the only reason for flood disasters in the period under examination. There

were other contributory factors, among which were the poor sanitary habits of the people. It is evidently clear that the people, especially those residing close to the Ogunpa River and the inner city dwellers as well as people in other areas preferred to dump their refuse inside the river and gutters thereby clogging the river channels with refuse.

Water distribution

Water distribution is a serious challenge in Ibadan in the period, 1963-1972; there was acute shortage of clean water for drinking and for other purposes. The reason for the shortage of water supply was connected with the dwindling capacity of the Eleyele water works to meet with the water demand of the rising urban population. It was in order to solve this problem, that the Western Nigeria Water Corporation law was promulgated in 1964 and 1966. Consequently, this led to the establishment of the Western Nigeria Water Corporation in the city. The Corporation commenced work on the Ibadan Water Supply Expansion project known as Asejire Water Project. It gulped €10 million and was expected to supply 16 million of water per day. Prior to 1972, when the project was completed, an interim arrangement was made. A water tank which produced 3 million gallons of treated water at an estimated cost of €305,000 was provided. The completion of the Asejire water work, phase 1 and 2 relieved considerably the problem of water shortage in the city. Water was available from Asejire and Eleyele water works for consumption of the ever increasing population of the town. However, people in areas like Oke Foko, Mokola, and Idi Ape found it extremely difficult to obtain safe and clean water for drinking. It was this problem which compelled some of the residents of the area in 1974 to resort to polluted water which sent over 200 of the people to their graves! (Tokun, 1997).

By 1976, the distribution of water supply in Ibadan was under the supervision of the Oyo State Water Corporation. Between 1976 to 1979, the Corporation did not perform well. Districts such as Mokola, Molete, Coca-cola, Inalande and Agugu were not supplied with water for several months. The situation often forced children and women to resort to neglected ponds and streams. The consumption of polluted water in the period had a severe negative impact on the health conditions of the people (Tokun, 1997).

B.F. Iyun pointed out that diarrhea and dysentery became the ten top diseases of patients admitted at the general Hospital in Adeoyo and the University College Hospital in Ibadan between 1969-1974 (Iyun, 1994). Medical experts in the government hospitals confirmed that the consumption of unclean water was responsible for the diseases mentioned. Other waterborne diseases like cholera, typhoid fever, poliomyelitis and guinea worm were also found among patients in the hospitals (Sridhar, 2005).

It is instructive to note that, the inefficiency of the Water Corporation to meet the water demand of the citizenry partly explained the poor attitude of water subscribers to pay for services of water supply in the city. As at December 1978, the Corporation was indebted with over N1 million from the subscribers (Daily Sketch, 1979). Another related problem which confronted the Corporation during this period was the failure on the part of the Ibadan Municipal Government to remit the balance of water revenue to the account of the Corporation (Daily Sketch, 1979). Other problems which affected the distribution of water include poor planning, poor funding, and damages to underground water mains during road construction, leakages from pipes and the inability to expand

service delivery. All these bottlenecks obviously prevented water to reach the majority of the people in Ibadan (Olaniyan, 2016).

This problem of water distribution in Ibadan became complicated in 1980 due to the destructive flood which accompanied the rain that fell for 9 hours on 31st August, 1980. The flood disrupted water supply to many parts of the city and caused extensive damage to water pipes and equipments. The Eleyele Water Works which supplied about 30% of water to various homes was completely submerged by the flood and the treated water stored in the tank became contaminated (Nigerian Tribune, 1980). Equally, Asejire dam was not spared; mud and other polluting agents entered the dam; the brooks and wells were also contaminated (Daily Sketch, 1980a).

This situation compelled people to fetch water from doubtful and unhygienic sources. However, the problem did not persist for a long period; because barely a week after the flood, water was restored (Daily Sketch, 1980b). It is instructive to note that restoration of water in Ibadan after the unforgettable incident of August 31, 1980 did not last long. This situation coupled with other obstacles compelled people in the new residential layouts like Akobo, Alakia and Wakajaye areas to dig wells and sink boreholes. But it is obvious that people in the Inner Core could not dig or sink wells due to shortage of space or funds. Consequently, people in these area as well as people in the outer areas had little or no option than to resort to water sources of very low quality. It is even erroneous to assume that all the people in the new residential layouts could afford the cost of sinking boreholes.

The poor distribution water supply seriously affected water consumption and usage for other domestic chores from the 1980s continued up to the 1990s. People residing at Monatan, Mokola, Oke Bola, Oke Ado, Odo Ona, Apata and Ring Road could not get water for over a month in 1995 (Sunday Tribune, 1995). This situation forced the Military Governor of the State, Col. Ike Nwosu, to approach the African Development Bank for financial assistance, A loan of N2.7 billion was given by the Bank to the state government and this was used to complete phases 3 and 4 of the Asejire Water Project (Sunday Tribune, 1996).

The late General Sani Abacha commissioned the project in May 1996. One would have expected that the completion of the Asejire Water Project would put an end to the water crisis in the city, but the contrary was the case. Water released from the dam could not reach most of the residents in the city due to rusty and leaking pipes. This ugly development forced the Water Corporation of Oyo State to shut off most of the areas in Ibadan from the main generating pipes (Ajayi Adeyemi, 2005). Other reasons that accounts for the poor distribution of water supply in Ibadan in this period include poor electricity supply, non-availability of chemicals for water treatment, lack of spare parts and poor maintenance culture (Ajayi Adeyemi, 2005). The poor distribution of water supply in Ibadan persisted till 1999. This problem compelled one of the leading soft drinks manufacturing company in the country, Nigeria Bottling Company, to close its only plant in the city (Sunday Tribune, 1999).

The outcome of the above development was that people were compelled to obtained water from doubtful and unhygienic sources, this definitely had adverse impact on sanitation and health generally. The poor distribution of water supply in the town greatly affected hygienic practices in public latrines, public health and government hospitals. The inability to meet up with the demand for water supply is a serious challenge that greatly

affected the people (Sunday Tribune, 1999). Water distribution problem in Ibadan were compounded in some areas like. Gegelose, Itamaya, Foko, Orita-Merin, Agbongbon, Idi-Aro, Elekuro, Ekotedo, Abebi, Opo-yeosa and Inalende (Ajayi, 2005). At Gegelose, the only abattoir in the market was in a very poor condition due to absence of adequate water for washing and cleansing. The place was infected with maggots and flies (Note, 5). Incidentally, meat and other edibles are sold in the market (Note, 6).

Arising from the acute shortage and poor water distribution in the town, these led to new developments in the drilling of boreholes by private vendors and the selling of sachet water for drinking (Note, 7). The practice of selling sachet water from polymer material became another source of trading and commodity to gain financial income in the 1990s. Various brands of sachet water became introduced to the town to complement treated water that is safe and affordable for drinking. The implication of these further aggravated new forms of waste generated in the city. Since the 1990s, It is now a common scene to see heaps of empty sachets of sachets water on the roadsides and open spaces in the town. As at date, no serious regulatory measures have been put in place by the Oyo State government to regulate these behavioural attitudes of the people (Adeniji, 2016).

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it has been established in this study that sanitation and waste management in post-colonial Ibadan society was poor and distasteful. Since Independence, evidence of sanitation and public hygiene was poor and far from being satisfactory. Heaps of refuse and other solid waste were indiscriminately littered in major road junctions, market squares as well as other open spaces. Efforts put in place by successive government to improve the situation have been inadequate. It has not yield the desired results of maintaining proper hygiene and waste management. Water distribution and supply of water to the citizenry is equally very poor. This situation obviously had adverse impact on the health of the population in Ibadan.

The only exception to this trend occurred in 1999 when Ibadan served as one of the centre of the 10th World Youth Football Competition in Nigerians. Ibadan, for the first time in history, was described as clean. The government in the state recruited hundreds of street sweepers for the clearing of refuse at open public spaces and road junctions to ease sanitation problem. This action had important effect to the improvement of sanitation and waste management. However, this development was temporal.

Notes

1) For comprehensive information on the organization, see Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team, *Nigeria's Threatened Environment: A National Profile* (Ibadan: Intec Printers Limited, 1991), p. 287.

2) It is unfortunate that accurate data on population in the country is not available, provisional results in 1991 showed that Ibadan comprising Ibadan North, Ibadan North East, Ibadan North West, Ibadan South East and Ibadan South West was 1,222,579.

3) For details, see Edict No. 10, Ibadan Waste Management Authority Edict, 1997.

4) The level of destruction was so much that the Federal Government declared Ibadan as a national disaster zone. For more information, see the following: Nigerian Tribune, "Black Sunday in Ibadan" Flood, Flood, Everywhere", September 2, 1980, p. 1; Ibid., "Comment: Till death do us

part; harvest of death: Ibid, "200 feared dead, thousands homeless", p. 16. Nigerian Tribune, "200 Died: Ige on flood disaster", September 23, 1980, p. 1.

5) Investigation from butchers and traders showed that the poor sanitary condition of the abattoir and the market is not recent. This information was corroborated by archival material, N.A.I., Iba Div1/1 File 1978 Vol. 1, Health committee, Ibadan: Minutes of the Ibadan Health Committee Meeting held at Mapo Hall on 26 February, 1944, p. 147.

6) This market is one of the largest meat vendor markets in Ibadan.

7) Nigeria Tribune, "Water Scarcity hits Oyo". 12 September, 1995, p.5. Attempts to obtain data of patients who were infected with water-borne diseases at the Ade Oyo State Hospital, Ibadan was frustrated by poor record keeping at the institution. Equally, authorities of the University College Hospital, Ibadan appeared too secretive and extremely bureaucratic. These factors prevented the writer from obtaining the number of patients with water related diseases between 1983 and 1999.

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TRANSFORMATIONAL REFORMS OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM: A GENEALOGICAL OVERVIEW

Bardhok Bashota, Bujar Dugolli***

Abstract

UN objectives, through its peacekeeping system for managing conflicts and building an environment that promotes sustainable peace throughout the world, remain its ideals and primary function. However, besides facing the new challenges and very complex conflict situations, an organizational and functional nature of this system has evolved too. This paper aims to briefly elaborate the evolving trends and transformational reforms that the UN has undertaken periodically in an effort to make this system more efficient when facing conflicting challenges. To achieve this purpose, in this paper is applied a genealogical approach that reflects the specific activities that have brought transformational changes in the UN's peacekeeping architecture. Referring to some of the key strategies of the UN leadership's reform in this regard, it is analyzed how the various peacekeeping missions have taken ever more extensive powers within their mandates. Finally, special attention is paid to the multidimensional and complex character of sixteen Peacekeeping Missions currently operating on the ground, in order to understand to what degree their powers have reached, as well as to recognize the expectations of future missions which would be mandated.

Key words: *peacekeeping, statebuilding, reform, multidimensional, sustainable peace*

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping system is presented as a complex activity within the vast array of activities that this organization exercises. Therefore, since the UN's tendencies to create a more peaceful international environment continue to remain its top priority since its inception, then, the peacekeeping system remains an important instrument for advancing international peace and security. Consequently, through the application of this system – embodied through peacekeeping missions – the UN remains the world's largest collective security mechanism.

Viewed in the contextual context, the UN peacekeeping mission's philosophy was inaugurated shortly after its foundation, because immediately after World War II, a large number of conflicting elements were re-activated, which consistently produced crises and conflicts. Under these circumstances, the UN collective security system faced serious threats from multiplication of interethnic conflicts and civil wars. These circumstances made the classical nature of international conflicts (which were mostly interstate) dramatically transformed and it became clear that since 1945, “conflicts have been in and around states, not between them” (Hensel, 2001: 4). More specifically, since 1945, about

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22 million people are estimated to have died in various conflicts, where one quarter of those deaths occurred in the early 1990s. But the 1990-1995 period was twice as deadly as any previous decade, including 93 wars in 70 countries (United States Institute of Peace, 2008). In addition, only in 1997, 2005 and 2011, there has been a temporary increase in the number of armed conflicts (Schreiber, 2012: 1). Likewise, recent studies show that conflict and unilateral violence within states remains evident. The last five years have witnessed a dramatic increase in organized violence, especially in the Middle East, where this trend continues to deteriorate further. Only in 2014 over 100,000 people were killed in organized violence, which is the highest count of fatalities in the last twenty years (Melander, 2015: 1).

Being faced with such a conflictual situation in the international system, the UN has, from time to time, undertaken a series of active roles in maintaining peace in the most critical areas of conflict throughout the world. Thus, during this period, the UN has been faced with several new phenomena, such as the state of 'failed state', the state of 'disintegration', the state of 'state collapse', and even even with the practice of 'creating a state'. Each of these situations had its specific conflicting elements, which required specific peacekeeping missions for their management. The main forms of their exploitation emerged as 'UN civilian administrations'; 'UN transitional administration'; 'Transnational administrations'; to the newer concepts of 'international territorial administration' or 'international governance of a society' (Reka, 2003: 97-103). At present, the phenomenon of international governance, in the form of an international territorial administration under the authority of an international organization, is a relatively new phenomenon in international relations. Primarily, it is a twentieth century development

The role of contextual perpetrators in the transformations of the UN peacekeeping system: a theoretical interpretation

In the theoretical plan, constructivism can be the most appropriate theoretical approach in analyzing contextual factors and their impact on the transformation of the philosophy and the role of the UN peacekeeping system. This is because the constructivists (as well as other positivist theories) develop the events in world politics as inseparable from the evolution of the standards and norms that the international society of states creates and conforms to which it behaves.¹ Consequently, the phenomenon of administration and peacekeeping in the international system is strongly influenced by systemic factors and circumstances.

Constructivists also argue that depending on the peace-war relationship that prevailed in this system, the shape of international administrations has evolved, starting with the guardianship system to move to transitional, then territorial, and at last, to the international governance of a society. Based on this perception, the constructivist explanation also considers the end of the Cold War as an event that contributed

¹ Constructivism emphasizes that war or peace will take on a more developed character in relation to each other depending on the evolution of standards and norms that may change the structure of the international system, making it more conflicting or more peaceful. Constructivists, first of all, when they study the events in the MN, start from premises such as: the cause and course of certain events are directly dependent on the evolution of the international system in the sense that it advances. Constructivists argue that over the centuries, international institutions and rules have become stronger, more complex and more important.

significantly to the evolution of the nature of the modern international system, directly affecting the nature of UN peacekeeping missions.

After the end of the Cold War, the UN modified traditional peacekeeping patterns, which led to multidimensional peacekeeping operations (Friedrich, 2005: 225-238). Therefore, in this period there has been a rapid increase in the number of peacekeeping operations. With a new consensus and a sense of common purpose, the Security Council authorized a total of 20 new operations between 1989 and 1994, increasing the number of peacekeepers from 11,000 to 75,000 (<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>). During this period, the Security Council accelerated the pace of its work by adopting 185 resolutions versus 685 in the previous 46 years of UN history and launching 15 new peacekeeping operations compared to 17 in 46 years Past (Malone, 2004: 6).

Following these 90s missions, the UN has completed the twentieth century of its peacekeeping activity to start new operations. Aware of the challenges that could be faced with, the UN in 2000 began reforms to advance its activity and its peacekeeping missions (2009). But before joining the 21st century, it undertook three peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, East Timor and Congo. Through these missions, the UN proved willing to undertake even more complicated operations and a multidimensional action field. Today, these multidimensional operations are more common (Vuong, 20012: 4). In Kosovo, as a post-conflict society, the UN imposed its Provisional Mission (UNMIK, 1999-present), the United Nations Transition Administration (UNTAET, 1999-2002) was established in East Timor, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo was established – the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, 1999-2010).

The XXI century arose with the undertaking of a series of very complex peacekeeping operation. Currently, the UN is the largest provider of peacekeeping operations, comprising more than 128,000 civilian and uniformed personnel and serving 39 missions (16 of which are peacekeeping missions and 23 special political missions) on four continents (HIPPO Report: 2015: 1). The need for such a large-scale peacekeeping operation is directly related to the conflicting circumstances that have already affected dozens of crisis (hotbeds).

Transformational reforms in the UN peacekeeping system: from peacekeeping into peacebuilding

In the course of this analysis, a series of questions can be asked such as: What were the contextual factors that influenced the emergence of new generations of peace operations? What were the objectives that were claimed to be achieved? What approach was used to achieve these objectives, etc.?

Being faced with new evolving circumstances in the international security environment, the UN undertook concrete steps in taking new responsibilities for addressing and managing situations with conflicting elements. Consequently, the need was imposed to expand instruments and approaches in order to create more favorable conditions on the ground to manage conflict situations wherever they may be. In this regard, among the concrete initiatives were those that launched a new discourse of redefining some of the concepts so far traditional as were issues about state *sovereignty* and *non-intervention from abroad*. Closely related to these developments about redefining these concepts is the empowerment of another increasingly popular new concept of human security. This concept simultaneously marginalizes the notion that the two preliminary

concepts were unintelligible. Therefore, as one of the first introductions that had introduced the idea of human security was the Agenda for Peace of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali. In this report, he added that after the end of the Cold War, people had been exposed to much more hazards compared to states, which imposed the need to protect them in accordance with the opportunities and circumstances (Agenda for Peace, 1992).

Following this report, some institutions and organizations have continued to use this concept, and with the publication of *'Responsibility to Protect'* in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the concept seems to be well rooted in the international arena, albeit with a very vague definition (Coelho, 2008: 20). This commission, in an effort to empower the concept of human security, has redefined its sovereignty more as a right for self-government (negative sovereignty), and has given more of the attributes of a "responsibility" institution that forces governments of states to guide citizens on moral principles and to be in their service (positive sovereignty) (Ibid). Despite the problem of definition, the concept involves a reinterpretation of sovereignty and puts the idea of *'humanitarian intervention'* close to the field of moral duty, undermining the principle of classical sovereignty. The introduction of human security makes some less controversial interventions, and then facilitates the pursuit of state-building activities by foreign forces (Wilen, 2007).

Another important moment in the efforts of the UN to improve the peacekeeping system at the beginning of the 21st century, in addition to the re-conceptualization of the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention, is the one of extended dimensions in building sustainable peace. In fact, in the evolving process of UN peacekeeping activity, the expansion of access to building a lasting peace represents the most important and at the same time the most transformative reform of this process. Taken by the UN's top leadership, this extended approach shows that it was a top strategic objective that should at all events be achieved so that the UN peacekeeping system was more efficient in the face of challenging conflictual situations in new circumstances.

In fact, by revising the Ghal Agenda, the first concrete concepts and measures that were taken by the UN could be found in order to create conditions for building a lasting peace. In this Agenda, this was foreseen to be achieved through a co-ordination of post-conflict activities aimed at "identifying and supporting those structures that tend to strengthen and establish peace in order to avoid conflict return" (Agenda for Peace, 1992). This objective, from the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which was the predecessor of the Peacebuilding Commission in the UN system, is defined as a "harmonious and integrated action on many different fronts: military, diplomatic, Political, economic, social, humanitarian ". In other words, apart from the task of building national institutions, peacebuilding can include humanitarian assistance, repatriation of refugees, and military demobilization, etc. (Coelho, 2008: 70-71).

Regarding the interaction of these components, special emphasis is also on the reaffirmation that was made to them in the "*Brahimi Report*", which also initiated the creation of a "*Peace-Building Unit*" for a better coordination of peace operations. In addition, the report stressed that further strengthening of capacity for peace building in the broader sense should remain the main concern for the UN (Durch et al., 2003). Then, in accordance with the efforts to establish mechanisms in the service of international peacekeeping, in 2004, the Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and

Changes of the Secretary-General advised the establishment of a '*Peacebuilding Commission*' to oversee international administration Of post-conflict and failed states (Chandler, 2007: 70-88).

Regarding the transformational reforms and the nature of UN peace operations, it is important to refer to the statement of former Secretary-General Annan, who in his 2000 report: "*We the peoples*" presented a clear distinction Between traditional peace operations and modern or complex and multidimensional operations. He stated that: "While traditional peacekeeping was mainly focused on cease-fire monitoring; Today's complex peace operations have very different objectives" (Annan, 2000: 48).

As part of the capacity-building process for sustainable peace building, in 2008, the Field Support Department (DFS) was set up in order to focus on improving administrative and logistical capacities. DPKO and DFS also received support from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which has the mandate to monitor and evaluate the evolution of the political situation in the world by providing advice to the Secretary General, management of special emissaries and political missions. But despite all these reforms being undertaken to enhance the UN's capabilities, the UN still faces serious obstacles in establishing peace operations (Coulon, 2010: 17).

As noted, building a sustainable peace through an expanded approach is a rather complex and multidimensional process. This multidimensionality is created by the combination of factors and technical-procedural and ideological-political concepts. The first factors consist in the coordination of administrative and logistical procedures under the umbrella of the second factor and their service.

Therefore, the peace operations undertaken by the UN were also based on several political theories such as the "*liberal peace*" that emerged as the conceptual point of beginning a peace-building. This theory starts from the assumption that liberal democracy and market economy are the best guarantor of peace and the best premises to resolve violent conflicts peacefully (Chandler, 2007: 74). According to the theory of liberal peace, in building peace, many different social structures strive to act politically and economically. Therefore, the expansion of duties influenced the enhancement of cooperation between the United Nations and various governments as well as non-governmental organizations, international financial institutions, but especially with regional organizations in the implementation of security tasks (Richmond, 2005). Therefore, given this broadened approach to sustainable peace building, the UN has taken on a large number of tasks and has increased the co-operation network with more international and regional mechanisms.

Despite the aforementioned efforts to advance the peacekeeping system, on the eve of the seventies of the UN establishment and the posting of its first UNMOGIP peacekeeping mission, its leadership continued to identify the challenges and flaws of peacekeeping. In 2015, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) published a comprehensive report with remarks and recommendations for the UN peacekeeping system.

Peacebuilding multidimensional missions: between present and future

There is already a consensus that the biggest qualitative changes in the peacekeeping system have occurred over the last two decades. So peacekeeping missions have moved ahead of the classical tasks that have been largely monitoring – in taking multidimensional

mandates that include a wide range of peacebuilding tasks, such as security sector reform, institution building and reconstruction, and development Of self-governing capability (S / RES / 2086 (2013)).

Usually in literature it is considered that the earliest practices of applying such multidimensional missions (even categorized as state-building missions) such as it can be mentioned UN Mission Interim in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Moreover, as we may see below, the peace operations mandated by the Security Council, as in these two cases, were far more multidimensional than previous missions. This multi-dimensionality has been characterized by UN co-operation with many other international and regional mechanisms in the performance of many functions. In an attempt to understand the governing and state-building agendas of the new UN missions of the early XXI century, it is important to start from these two practices falling under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, namely UNMIK And UNTAET.

Undoubtedly, besides the presentation of the Millennium Declaration, another major event that marked the beginning of the XXI century for the United Nations, in the wake of the reform process and emergence of new security challenges, is the adoption by the Security Council of two Very important resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is about Resolution 1244 and 1272 on territorial administration, as was the case with Kosovo and East Timor. Chapter VII, however, has been called only twice for the creation of international territorial administrations, in Kosovo and East Timor (Zevraki, 2008: 10). But despite the fact that both missions were approved under Chapter VII, they differ from other UN's latest administrations such as Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, New Guinea or Mostar and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is because their mandates do not have a single purpose, that is to create peace in the region, but, through a multidimensional act, whether clearly stated in their mandates or not, constitute a prelude to statebuilding (Ibid. 10).

Given these practices, policy makers and scholars have called for an increase in conceptual categories to describe these activities or practices of international administrations as multilateral / multidimensional (and other international) intergovernmental operations in post-conflict societies (Wilde, 2003). For example, as Caplan has observed, there are difficulties in capturing the complexity of these activities in a meaningful theoretical way. However, what he observes in these multidimensional peacekeeping operations is their responsibility for the functionality of the territory or the state itself. Their most unique feature is "setting up temporary structures with broad responsibilities for managing public assets and providing public services, they simply exercise some of the essential functions of a modern government" (Caplan, 2005: 86). A somewhat clearer definition of the multidimensional nature exercised by modern transitional international administrations is offered by Coelho, according to him these administrations demonstrate their effectiveness by performing double responsibilities: '*interim international governance*' and '*agent state building*' (Coelho, 2008: 70). This dual mandate exercised by an international administration consists and aims to increase the 'empirical citizenship' of the territory under administration – in other words, that the state authority can effectively control its entire territory and offer basic physical and economic security of its citizens (Ibid: 18).

Moreover, since the first decade of the 21st century was overwhelmed with complicated conflict situations mainly within the state, then immediate need was made to mandate certain peacekeeping operations with multidimensional authorizations. This was precisely done by the UN Security Council through Resolution 2086/2013. This resolution underlined that complex multidimensional missions remain crucial in confronting and managing conflictual situations in any hotbed of the crisis. Specifically, the resolution confirms that these missions exercise a wide range of powers to manage immediately with the situation in the countries where they are located. On the other hand, the resolution reconfirms the authorizations for these missions in building the overall institutional infrastructure and development of self-governing capability as instruments to create an environment conducive to lasting peace (S / RES / 2086 (2013), para a) -j)).

However, it should be noted that the Security Council, despite the multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Congo (MONUSCO), the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and Mali (MINUSMA), has given mandates with extensive multidimensional powers, yet again, SC make a re-affirmation of 'trinity of virtues' – impartiality, host state consent and non-use of force beyond self-defense and defense of the mission mandate. This practice has also influenced that HIPPO report, in its background of findings, argues that the UN's large-scale operations increasingly blur the lines between political mediation and classical *peace-keeping* on one hand, and *peace-building*, *peace enforcement* and state-building on the other. (Labuda, EJIL Talk!: 2015).

However, in almost all of the UN's efforts to enhance the efficiency of the peacekeeping system, the role of multidimensional missions has been reaffirmed, especially in their institution-building role. This can be clearly seen in the three most important reports in this regard: HIPPO report (HIPPO Report: 2015, para 10); The Advisory Group of Experts' Report on the 2015 Peacebuilding Review (AGE); and The SG Report on Women, Peace and Security (The SG Report on Women, Peace and Security: 2014, para 82).

Currently, from sixteen peacekeeping missions, most of them are clearly mandated by the SC with multidimensional authorizations (CIC: 2014, 13). All these missions “an internal analysis of the Security Council mandate language shows at least 64 separate mandated tasks related to institution building and capacity development” (Smith, 2016: 4). A summarized form of tasks considered to contribute directly or indirectly to institution building and capacity development is provided in the following table.

Table 1. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions and mandate for institution building

MISSIONS	INSTITUTION-BUILDING MANDATE	National Border Control/Customs/ Coastguard	Rule of Law: Police, Corrections, Judiciary	SSR and DDR	Electoral Institutions	National Human Rights Institutions	Extension of State Authority/Local Administration/Governance	Administration of Natural Resources	National Dialogue and Reconciliation	Resettlement and IDPs
MINUSCA (2014)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MINUSMA (2013)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UNISFA (2011)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MINUSTAH (2004)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ONUCI (2004)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UNMIL (2003)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MONUSCO (1999)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UNMIK (1999)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Sources: Leanne Smith, *Institution-building as a Bridge Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus* (Policy Brief), International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operation, 2016: 5

Additionally, in the context of analyzing the nature of the mandates that have multidimensional presentations, it is also important to analyze the strategies the UN should pursue for shaping the peacekeeping system in accordance with the goals to make it more effective in meeting the new challenges. In this regard, the HIPPO report, besides making the cataloging of the challenges it faces peacekeeping, it generally orphers four recommendations for necessary changes so that the peacekeeping system can take a new look and respond more effectively to the challenges in the 21st century.

First, the report emphasizes that the design and implementation of peace operations should generally be politically managed. More insistence on finding political solutions than technical and military, so that the peace process is kept on track. Second, peace operations should be more flexibly used to respond to changing needs in the field. This means that more detailed analyzes and strategies are needed in prioritizing priorities, addressing responses, and so on. Third, in order for the effectiveness of a misconception to be crowned with peacebuilding and sustainable security, the UN should strengthen its partnership with member states and regional organizations. Thanks to this partnership, it is aimed at expanding consultations and cooperation to enable quick and effective responses to concrete crises, based on mutual responsibilities. Fourth, the report also provides criticism of the highly bureaucratized structure and procedures of the secretariat at the central level regarding the management of peacekeeping operations. It recommends

a greater concentration of management capacities on the ground, building structures that respond more effectively to the protection of people in crisis areas (HIPPO Report: 2015: 9).

Conclusion

Since its inception, the UN continues to reaffirm its three primary objectives, which at the same time justify its activity as the world's largest collective security mechanism. These objectives consist in preserving peace and security, overall development, and affirming and protecting human rights, especially in the crises of hotbed. Since these objectives or tasks are functioning and interdependent, then their fulfillment by the UN is for the sole purpose of managing conflict situations and creating an environment that promotes lasting peace. These objectives, the UN has been trying to consistently strive within the system of its peacekeeping missions. Of course, in achieving these objectives, the peacekeeping system has faced serious challenges, because the peacekeeping system has, over time, been confronted with different types of conflicts, each requesting specific management approach.

These contextual factors have directly influenced the peacekeeping system to evolve in that direction to be more effective in responding to such conflictual situations. Thus, as noted above, the UN peacekeeping system has had a dynamic development in the sense that it should have adapted to the factual circumstances. This shows that, in general, the reforms undertaken by the UN lead were 'passive' in the sense that they followed the events and redesigned the peacekeeping system in that direction to be adequate in actions consistent with the nature of the conflict. Thus, classical peacekeeping missions of the first generation have evolved to the point that they have received additional authorizations more and more. So, from peace-keeping missions they later passed into peace-building missions. So, directly influenced by contextual factors, such as complex conflict situations, the UN leadership has, at some point, undertook a series of reforms to make the peacekeeping system more flexible, professional and efficient in responding to such complex situations. These reforms have had an "active" sense in the sense that they have aimed to provide the peacekeeping system with strategies and preventive preventive instruments, while attempting to keep the peacekeeping system from extinguishing or managing the elements that lead to conflicts. So, thanks to the reform agenda, there has always been evidence of the weaknesses and failures that the peacekeeping missions have faced and on the other hand solutions have been solved and solutions have been recommended that have recommended the application of new strategies.

Undoubtedly, the Security Council's commitment to mandating peacekeeping missions with complex and multidimensional powers constitutes in itself a radical reform towards enhancing the efficiency of peacekeeping missions. This practice came especially in the first decade of the 21st century. Now, the process of sustainable peace building through such missions has taken on a developmental trajectory that these missions are also labeled as a builder. But, nevertheless, the UN and its leadership are still facing serious dilemmas and challenges regarding the guidelines that are now needed for the peacekeeping system. Facing a number of conflicting situations such as the phenomenon of intrinsic conflicts (where warring parties are often ethnic, racial, religious factions), then global terrorism, have imposed a new discourse on the debate over where the authorizations of the multidimensional missions of today can go. One of the current open

debates is also related to the possible authorizations that these missions may have in the use of force in a wider dimension than that of self-defense. Then, in addition, a part of the debate is also about the responsibilities that the peacekeeping system has or should have to combat global terrorism. So far, the current debate shows that there is no readiness of the international community – as a consequence of the UN – to extend the spectrum of strategic action to use force in punitive measures as well as an authorization of peacekeepers to be involved in the war against Global terrorism.

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INCREASED TERRORIST THREAT IN EUROPE AND THE EU'S RESPONSE

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Abstract

The article focuses on the impact that the metamorphosis and amplification of terrorism has on the European Union. Based on a mixed methodology, both qualitative and quantitative, we have analysed the response capacity of the European Union, which was forced to revise its anti-terrorist policy, and to adopt multiple solutions – some direct, radical and assertive, and other indirect, consisting of strategies to harmonize of social and international relations. This article emphasizes the pressure of the multifaceted crisis, represented by the multiplication of terrorist attacks in Europe, the radicalization among young Europeans and the refugee crisis, under which the European Union has to survive. So we were surprised to find out that the EU is facing with a dilemma – to adopt solutions that must respond simultaneously to the security and freedom and rights of the European citizens. In the context of recent events during 2015-2016 it became clear that the EU must coordinate and jointly fight against global terrorism, and to redefine cooperation with international actors, especially with the Russian Federation, which plays a key role in this area of counter-terrorism.

Key words: *EC, Russia, terrorism, migrant crisis, dilemma security-freedom, anti-terrorist measures*

Introduction

The world today faces one of the biggest threats to human rights and fundamental freedoms: terrorism. Terrorism has been manifested from- ancient times in various forms, knowing diversification and evolution in the last century. Definitions of terrorism are numerous and very diversified as analyzing this phenomenon from different points of view, and placing it in a social ontology also very complex. Terrorism “presents itself as a social phenomenon extremely complex, consisting of spectacular manifestation of violence, in order to attract attention, to frighten and impose a certain type of behavior, sometimes just to terrorize, through a wide range of actions limit, in which the man is both weapon and the victim” (Văduva, 2002: 19). Terrorism is presented as an iceberg that threatens not only what is seen, but rather what is not seen. It can be explained, but can not be justified.

This phenomenon has become “popular” following the attacks of 11 September 2001, when, according to the American political analyst assessments Harvey Sicherman, it

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has entered into a new historical epoch, the “war against terrorism”. Internationally were completed numerous conventions and have adopted a series of documents in order to prevent and combat terrorism. Especially in the last few years, the problem of global terrorism has generated many debates and deep analysis (inter alia: Горбунюв, 2012; Капитонова, Романовский, 2016; Сидоров, 2015; Atanasiu, Stăncilă, 2014; Hauck, Peterke, 2016; Masys, 2016; Reuveny, 2010; Richardson, 2013).

Terrorism is not a recent threat to Europe. The whole history of the continent was marked in one form or another, by terrorist acts, and today, more so. Between 2009 and 2013, 1010 attacks took place in the EU Member States, resulting in 38 deaths. In the year 2013, 152 terrorist attacks took place in the EU. Most of them were produced in France, Spain and the UK. After growth recorded in 2012 (219 attacks), the number of terrorist attacks in Europe from 2013 fell below the level recorded in 2011 (174 attacks) – Report TE-SAT 2014 (European Police Office, 2014: 12). Terrorism continues to be one of the main threats to European security and to EU Member States.

Moreover, in the new security context, the terrorism problem and immigration in the European Union, is a controversial topic of literature that generates heated debate, and an avalanche of information (Базаркина, 2014; Потемкина, 2015; Baker-Beall, 2016; Londras, Doody, 2015; Tsoukalis, 2016). Many researchers, politicians and media regard the refugee crisis, migration and immigration – as sources of conflict and risks associated with terrorism, catalyzing negative attitudes, anti-immigrant, anti-refugee, and igniting latent conflicts in member states with large immigrant communities (Потемкина, 3 июля 2015; Magherescu, 2015; Wike, Stokes, Simmons, 2016).

According to statistics presented by the 2015 Global Terrorism Index: “Countries which have the highest levels of refugees and IDPs also have the most deaths from terrorism. In countries that have high levels of terrorism, there appears to be a relationship between proportional increases in terrorism and proportional increases in asylum seeker applications to Europe” (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015: 60).

The purpose of this article is to analyze, based on analytical methods qualitative and quantitative, the increasing terrorist threat in Europe in recent years, with the focus on the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters recruited from the immigrants that have arrived on the continent and even the European citizens, and on the reaction and response capacity of the EU. Under the pressure of new security threats, the European Union is forced to rethink the counter-terrorism measures and how to implement them on European soil.

Thus, in the present article are presented the new counter-terrorism measures adopted by the European Union in 2015, and their implications on a fundamental European principle – freedom of movement. It should be stressed that the refugee crisis from the Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa, brought the European Union into a turning point- that of finding solutions to ensure the security of European citizens, so as not to limit their freedoms, primarily freedom of movement.

Being engulfed in an unprecedented crisis, the EU must find adequate solutions, sustainable and long-term for a range of global issues extremely complicated and intertwined. “Combating cross-border crime and terrorism is a common European responsibility” (European Commission, 15 July 2014: 9). Equally, the *European Agenda on Security*, published in April 2015, identifies terrorism as one of the fundamental threats to European security. After the terrorist attacks in Madrid, London, Paris, Copenhagen and

Brussels in the period 2004-2015, the European Parliament (EP) adopted the *European Parliament resolution of 11February 2015 on anti-terrorism measures*. The measures recommended by the European Parliament resolution were subsequently assumed by the *European Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism*, as outlined four policy priorities to combat terrorism by Justice and Home Affairs Council of March 2015 (European Council, 2016). They were then integrated into the revised *EU Internal Security Strategy 2015-2020*, and translated into concrete measures and subsequent sectoral action plans through the *European Agenda on Security* (Council of the European Union, 1 June 2015). The EU counter-terrorism strategy is based on four pillars – prevention, protection, prosecution and response. Of the four pillars underpinning the EU Strategy on combating terrorism, we consider that the most important are “prevention” and “monitoring” as taking effective measures can ensure a stable security environment in the European Union. Remember that today, the terrorist threat in Europe has reached its highest level in recent decades, including the period compared with the outbreak of war against terrorism.

Terrorist threats and their impact on European security

The security situation in Europe has changed dramatically in recent years owing to new conflicts and upheavals in the EU's immediate neighbourhood, the rapid development of new technologies, and the worrying rise of radicalisation that is leading to violence and terrorism both within the EU and in neighbouring countries. Whereas prevention strategies to combat terrorism should rely on a multifaceted approach aimed at directly countering the preparation of attacks on EU territory, but also at integrating the need to address the root causes of terrorism; whereas terrorism is a global threat that needs to be tackled on the local, national, European and global levels in order to strengthen our citizens' security, to defend the fundamental values of freedom, democracy and human rights and to uphold international law (European Parliament, 11February 2015: 3).

Specifically, manifestations of terrorism in Europe have imposed change and adapting counter-terrorism measures implemented by *EU counter-terrorism Strategy* adopted in 2005, which has focused on four main pillars (prevention, protection, prosecution and response) and has recognized the importance of cooperation with third countries and international institutions. “The four pillars of the EU's Counter-Terrorism Strategy – prevent, protect, pursue, and respond- constitute a comprehensive and proportionate response to the international terrorist treat. The Strategy requires work at national, European and international levels to reduce the threat from terrorism and the vulnerability to attack. The European Union is an area of increasing openness, in which the internal and external aspects of security are intimately linked. It is an area of increasing interdependences, allowing for free movement of people, ideas, technology and resources. This is an environment which terrorists abuse to pursue their objectives. In this context concerted and collective European action, in the spirit of solidarity, is indispensable to combat terrorism” (Council of the European Union, 30 November 2005: 6). In 2015 the European Union has gone through some difficult crisis, which triggered a crisis state, and reassessing anti-terrorism strategy European and an action plan to prevent such attacks in the future. The terrorist attack in Paris in early 2014 and six coordinated attacks by Islamist kamikaze terrorists of 13 November 2015 highlighted the urgency of more effective measures to combat the terrorist threat of which manifestations are changing.

EU counterterrorism policy responses to the Paris events and the emergency-led policy-making logic pose two fundamental challenges: first, to free movement, Schengen and Union citizenship; second, to the democratic rule of law and fundamental rights (Bigo, Brouwer, Carrera, Guild, Guittet, Jeandesboz, Ragazzi, Scherrer, 2015: 12). Some of the EU policy initiatives foregrounded in the wake of the most recent Paris attacks raise major questions as regards their compatibility with free movement and the Schengen framework (Bigo, Carrera, Hernanz, Scherrer, 2015: 218).

A series of deadly attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005), Glasgow (2007), Stockholm (2010), Paris (2015), Nice (2016) and attempt threat in Berlin (2011), Copenhagen (2010), Brussels (2015) and Amsterdam (2015), demonstrates that the threat of violent extremism exists, it is real and immediate, especially in view of the European vulnerability pronounced. If in 2014 a total of 774 Individuals were arrested for terrorism-related offences, according to EUROPOL (European Police Office, 2015: 9), in the first months of 2015, 154 people were arrested in Europe for terrorist offenses. Today, Europe is facing with terrorist threats simultaneously – DAESH and al-Qaeda (which remains relevant despite its lower profile in Europe), in other words, with a particularly worrying phenomenon – that of extremism and the Islamist radicalization.

DAESH presents a multi-faceted terror threat that requires a multi-faceted response. DAESH has been constructed as a quasi-state with a conventional military capacity; an inspirational propaganda machine, recruiting fighters from around the world, and encouraging others to wage their jihad wherever they are; and as a clandestine threat, hidden among refugees, or as battle-tested soldiers returning from the frontlines in Syria and Iraq to carry on the fight at home (Englund, Stohl, 2015: 31). In these circumstances, the policy of combating terrorism adopted by the European Union should ensure the prevention of future violence, the elimination of potential terrorist actors (European Commission, 15 January 2014), and also proper preparation of the society for the emergence of such attacks and public feedback. One can say that at the moment, the EU faces with various terrorist and security threats, such as: Islamist radicalization and extremism within the Union; the enlistment of young Europeans alongside ISIS; online recruitment network and cyber attacks; risks associated with transnational terrorism and organized crime by illegal migration and human trafficking; regional conflicts and resetting global powers; risks and vulnerabilities on the external borders due to unprecedented migratory pressure in the second half of 2015.

Human rights organisations warn us that we should not confuse or associate refugees with terrorists since they are often the very opposite, namely victims of terrorism. This is a valid point and by and large true but, as usual, reality is more complex. Migrants can become terrorists (or refugee warriors) and vice versa or be both at the same time (Schmid, 2016: 41). In recent years european countries have begun to question the success of multiculturalism, promoted under the impetus of “the unity and diversity” logo, outlining Muslim immigration as a threat to national identity (Spînu, 2011: 83).

The integration of new arrivals in Europe or the inability to integrate these migrants can feed a latent violent extremism. The refugee crisis, the impact on Schengen, migration out of control which presents risks associated with international terrorism, and the radicalization within the European Union have fueled growing euroscepticism, many Europeans becoming distrustful of the European project. The suspension of Iceland's accession process in March 2015, the Greek crisis in June 2015, the difficulty of the UE to

have a common position on the major themes, the Great Britain's referendum for leaving the EU and the increasing political instability in Turkey in July 2016, transmitted a current of skepticism in other European countries and accentuate the medium and long term destabilization of the European project.

The current multifaceted crisis has a long term impact on European identity and the future of the European Union in several ways: it had resized the EU's role in international relations and its capacity of intervene; is resized the principle of European solidarity; is put a great pressure on the security of EU external borders; is reviewed the principle of freedom of movement within the EU and the Dublin Agreement after the suspension *de facto* during the refugee crisis; is reviewed the agreement with US on data protection (safe harbor), after it was declared illegal by the ECJ; were redefined common policies and the implementation of European law in the Member States; is redefined cooperation in areas such as terrorist financing, transportation and borders, mutual legal assistance or extradition, and also the cooperation with international partners (with Countries in the Western Balkans, the Sahel, North Africa, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and North America, as well as in Asia).

Terrorist threats do not respect borders and must be addressed both at national and at European and international level. To build international consensus and promote international standards for fighting terrorism, the European Union works with international organisations including the UN and the Global Counter Terrorism Forum, and regional organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the League of Arab States or the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (European Council, 7 April 2016). Also, in the context of current terrorist threats the EU needs more than ever to cooperate with Russia, a country with great experience in combating terrorism. Counter-terrorism cooperation between EU and Russia became a significant point of the common spaces of European and international security.

In 2010, EU and Russia signed an Agreement on the protection of classified information, considering that the EU and the Russian Federation agree on the need to develop cooperation between them on matters of common interest, especially in the sphere of security (Council of the European Union, 2010). The agreement was supposed to increase the efficiency of cooperation against terrorism. Besides, a working dialogue on fighting terrorism started in February 2011. The last EU-Russia common initiative – the Joint statement on combatting terrorism – was made on January 28, 2014, just after the EU-Russia summit. In the Joint EU-Russia statement on combatting terrorism the parties committed to: – considering possibilities for further strengthening cooperation in response to crimes committed by terrorists and organized crime, including exploring prospects of signing cooperation agreements in the future, to ensure, inter alia, an information exchange between Russia and the EU in the sphere of combating terrorism in conformity with their respective internal legislation including data protection standards; – expanding cooperation in exchanging best practices in counter-terrorism and training experts in counter-terrorism through joint seminars, training courses and other activities; – intensifying cooperation in the UN framework and other multilateral fora such as the G8, in particular G8 Rome/Lyon Group, and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), OSCE, and the Council of Europe, as well as other international organizations actively involved in combating terrorism (Council of the European Union, 28 January 2014: 1). The last EU-Russia common initiative – the Joint statement on combatting terrorism –

was highly appreciated both in the EU and in Russia; it appeared to be the only visible result of the EU-Russia summit before the political dialogue was frozen. In July 2014, during the meeting between the RF Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Federica Mogherini, future Head of the EEAS, the parties also confirmed their desire to dispose of threats emanating from the Near East and the Northern Africa and touching upon both the people of the region and those in Europe and Russia. It should be noted, however, that operative contacts between Russian and European security services and law enforcement bodies have never been interrupted, but in the absence of political dialogue, their activities have become more complicated. (Potemkina, 2015: 1-3).

The crisis in the EU-Russia relations, as well as the terrorist attack in Paris, in Brussels and Nice determined the European Union to reflect on the necessity of dialogue and cooperation with Russia in security sphere and to recognize Russia's key role in fighting the global threat – as evidenced by the *EU Global Strategy*, providing “substantial changes in relations between the EU and Russia, which are interdependent” (European Council, June 2016: 33).

At the 20th Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum 2016, the European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker declared that:” Today, and in spite of our differences, the European Union works with Russia to tackle a number of global issues and regional conflicts, ranging from the fight against terrorism to the nuclear programme in Iran, and the conflict in Syria. We are interdependent. If our relationship today is troubled and marked by mistrust, it is not broken beyond repair. We need to mend it, and I believe we can. I want to build a bridge.” The Russian President Vladimir Putin responded positively to the European proposal:” For the European Union and Russia, the prize, one day, could be great: a vast region governed by the rule of law, trading freely and working together on common projects. We remain a reliable partner and a committed actor on the world stage. In the face of the biggest refugee crisis since the Second World War, we have restored order and put in place a European response” (Juncker, June 2016).

The new EU counter-terrorism measures and the impact on the freedom of movement in Europe

2015 has a special significance in terms of the fight against terrorism in the European Union from several points of view. This year the reflection on political and security at Community level on new developments of terrorism, has culminated in 2015 with the adoption of a new package of anti-terrorism measures at European level. Terrorist threats, in the last years, have generated an apparently hopeless situation that has infiltrated in almost all political, economical and social fields, thus entering in a vicious system.

European Parliament resolution on anti-terrorism measures, of 2015, stresses that addressing the threat posed by terrorism in general requires: an anti-terrorism strategy based on a multi-layer approach, which comprehensively addresses the underlying factors of radicalisation leading to violent extremism; to encourage the Member States to exchange best practices on the matter; to strengthen the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN); the adoption of a European strategy for countering terrorist propaganda, radical networks and online recruitment; optimal use of existing platforms, databases and alert systems at European level, such as the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the Advanced Passenger Information Systems (APIS); a judicial cooperation between Member States based on the available EU instruments, such as ECRIS, the European Arrest

Warrant and the European Investigation Order; the need to step up the effectiveness and the coordination of the criminal justice response through Eurojust; etc.(European Parliament, 11February 2015: 4,5). Faced with the phenomenon of *foreign terrorist* fighters, Europeans traveling to Syria to join forces DAESH, but also that of radicalization and extremism among European immigrants, the EU has strengthened reflection on the effectiveness of the implementation of the *EU Strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism*, adopted in 2005 and revised in 2008 and 2014(Council of the European Union, 19 May 2014).

The avalanche of Islamic population with a very different civilization, and a new way of approaching the values and rights of individuals, directly affects the European culture and way of life. Nowadays, Europe is the subject of a complex form of extremism, to which is added the phenomenon of Muslim immigration, as an important cause of trend of Islamic radicalization in European countries. Given that the new terrorism greatly benefits from freedom of movement and looseness of border controls, especially in the Schengen area, the public debate in the European Union stressed the tendency of strengthening border controls within the European Union and seen that as an effective measure to prevent and *combat terrorism* in Europe.

The European Union is challenged to reconcile public safety requirements with those of “open European society”, in other words “within a consolidated legal framework the EU must provide an effective European response to cross-border terrorism that would guarantee simultaneously both the security and freedoms of European citizens” (European Commission, 28 April 2015: 3). Migration crisis has exerted and continues to exert a strong pressure on the Schengen area and on the external borders of the Union, generating the need to secure them by a vigilant control of persons crossing European borders. So, through *Smart Borders Package*, EU aims for a more efficiently processing of European databases concerning travelers to and from Europe.

To enhance more effective collection and sharing of information about *foreign terrorist* fighters, European authorities have reformed and updated *Schengen Borders Code*, launched a new generation of the *Schengen Information System* (SIS II), and strengthened its legal duties and analytical protection EUROPOL data on system *Secure Information Exchange Network Application* (SIENA). To expand attributions of EUROPOL in combating terrorism and the exchange of intelligence, were consolidated antiterrorist structures of EUROPOL (such as *Focal Point Travellers*, *EU Passenger Name Records*), including cooperation with INTERPOL's database of *Stolen and Lost Travel Documents* (SLTD), etc. All these databases collect, analyze and store personalized information of travelers to and from the European space, including citizens of European states.

Perhaps the most controversial counterterrorism measure implemented in 2015 by the European Union, although not necessarily the worst in terms of violation of privacy and freedom of movement, is a directive on the establishment and operationalization of Passenger Name Record (PNR), in the European Union. According to FRONTEX, the majority of suspected terrorists from the European space travel using air transport. Consequently, more effective control of passengers using air transport is considered a key measure to prevent terrorist attacks (European Parliament, April 2015: 9). The EU measures relating to external border control integrate measures of at least three major sectorial strategies of the Union: the *EU counter-terrorism strategy*, *Internal Security Strategy* and the *EU Migration Strategy*, adopted in 2015.

To the European Council meetings, during 2015, due to migration crisis, it was raised the question of the inapplicability Schengen and Dublin, as existing now, and of the security risks for the Union. European Council sought to find an appropriate response to an unprecedented migratory pressure on the EU borders and resources, which has generated a series of medium- and long-term implications, such as: the reconsideration of European values, with emphasis on security and measures to prevent and combat extremism and jihadist terrorism; the review of European law on asylum and borders; the reformulation of European solidarity in crisis situations; social tensions within Member States but also between them on a common approach to the crisis; measures and strategies to combat extremism that violates fundamental rights and European values such as freedom of expression, movement and association.

In 2015, due to the extreme pressure of migration flows on Greece, due to the inability of recording all these migrants circulating freely and unregistered from a European frontier to another, European Commission President accepted Germany's request to reintroduce temporary border controls with other EU Member States, particularly on the border with Austria. The possibility of suspending freedom of movement within the borders of the EU Member States and Schengen is producing a crisis, and the EU has the obligation to ensure the principle of proportionality of such measures so that open borders and free movement would return to normality in a short time.

In the new security context, the fundamental principle of the European Union, freedom of movement, is endangered. The Commission took into account the revision of the Schengen Borders Code and Schengen procedures, in order to allow systematic checks of EU citizens coming into Schengen and to detect suspicious movements, particularly of *foreign terrorist* fighters. The current Schengen rules allow border control to consult the police database on European citizens who seem suspicious. The implications of European identity by restricting freedom of movement within the European area are profound and may cause domino spoilage of other European principles on cooperation and unity among European states.

The migration crisis and the repeated terrorist attacks have weakened the EU's values and the solidity of the European project. Being under the impact of the need to respond to an unprecedented humanitarian refugee crisis, it's hard for the EU to find appropriate solutions that ensure the protection and safety of European citizens without diminishing the fundamental European freedoms.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be noticed a permanent concern of the European Union for the rights and freedoms, in parallel with the adoption and implementation of the new package of counter-terrorism measures in 2015. Therefore, initiatives such as PNR or introducing clauses on monitoring and gathering of personal data in EU countries are measures that have excited a negative reaction both to the level of European institutions, of public opinion and the media.

Not lastly, we would like to emphasize that although some counter-terrorism measures adopted in 2015 by the European Union, are controversial and criticized, as a whole and in the conditions of its very effective politico-bureaucratic application, they can offer a viable solution to the dilemma of security-liberty which is at the center of

European debate. By adopting the anti-terrorist measures, the European Union starts from the premise of maintaining reasonable and necessary a freedom of movement (and not only to European citizens), in order to be able to counter the terrorist threats within and in the vicinity of European borders.

In the context of recent events in the years 2015-2016 it became obvious that the EU must coordinate and jointly combat radicalization, terrorism and illegal migration (which could get out of control amid the political instability in Turkey).

Today, the European Commission presents further steps to support Member States in preventing and countering violent radicalisation leading to terrorism. The Commission is today outlining actions in seven specific areas where cooperation at EU level can bring added value: countering terrorist propaganda and illegal hate speech online; addressing radicalisation in prisons; promoting inclusive education and EU common values; promoting an inclusive, open and resilient society and reaching out to young people; boosting research, evidence building, monitoring and networks; focusing on the security dimension; strengthening the international cooperation (European Commission, 14 June 2016).

In April 2016, was published a Written declaration, under Rule 136 of Parliament's Rules of Procedure, on a united fight against terrorism, in which some members of European Parliament argue that: "the European Union must take the lead in uniting all forces and finding all allies around the globe in the fight against the terrorists. Operational cooperation must be reinforced between the European Union, Russia, the United States and other potential allies" (European Parliament, 11 April 2016).

To ensure the security of citizens and its fundamental values, the European Union must cooperate closely with Russia in the fight against global terrorism. Russia plays a key role, because in the 20 years of experience, has managed better than anyone this problem. Moreover the *Russian Federation* has an incommensurate experience to share, being visible that Russia's help to manage the process of reconciliation in Syria, having access to valuable information about the terrorist network of Islamic state. It would be a shame for Europeans to turn their backs of such aid, given that their enemy has evolved so dangerous and unpredictable on so many levels. Therefore the EU must act responsibly and realize that cooperation and constructive dialogue with Russia are vital for European security, which is put under pressure from terrorist threats.

To weigh the odds of Russia and the West teaming up against global terrorism, Russia Direct talked to Andrey Bezrukov, a strategy consultant to Rosneft and an associate professor at MGIMO University in Moscow, who said: "The area of counter-terrorism, will be one of the drivers of much deeper, much broader, much more comprehensive cooperation between Russia and European countries, because it is not only a common concern, it is an existential threat to us and to European countries. We have to cooperate" (Khlebnikov, 2016).

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

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Abstract

The geostrategic research of the Black Sea region, the conflicts existing in this region and the potential, but also the possible effects deriving from the evolution of the regional security environment, is a topical field that arouses interest and leads to the need to strengthen the system of security and cooperation both in the region but also globally. The cooperation is a very important aspect that perfects the good evolution of the economic, political and security situation of the Black Sea region, an evolution which can result in the development of successful projects in the future.

We considered it necessary to analyze the Black Sea region alongside with the evolution of the security environment, given the security indicators, specific to the region, causes of risk, and the cooperation relations in the area, because we consider that these are the defining indicators that outline and explain the current situation in the region. Being the only region on the European continent where we still encounter frozen conflicts, it is important to realize an analysis of the evolution of the security environment and the prospects for cooperation, so that we can try to shape the possible scenarios with which the international environment will interact in the future.

Key words: *The European Union, expansion, relations, Black Sea region, security*

Theories and conceptual clarifications

The world that we live in is in continuous transformation and the confrontation strategies are increasingly intertwined with the political-economic cooperation, the crisis management actions and the international conflicts. Thus, the complexity of the economic, social and military aspects from the current security environment tend to turn any attempt to understand them in an analytical approach, and one of the spaces that meet the most need of such an analytical approach is the Black Sea region.

Before we start debating the security climate from the Black Sea region, a matter within the scope of interest of the international relations, we should review a few specific aspects of this field. The concept of “security” represents a multidimensional term that encompasses both political and military aspects, as well as the economic, social or cultural ones. Experts have tried to outline a more clear definition of the concept of security, most definitions retrieved and accepted internationally, highlight various aspects of the national security such as for example the duration and intensity of threats, the state of peace or acceptable lifestyle. One of the definitions of “security” is found in the Oxford dictionary:

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“The safety of a state or organization against criminal activity such as terrorism, theft, or espionage.”

National security is built on the idea that the state is the main actor of the international relations, and in a world placed in full process of globalization, the security provided by the existence of a state of security nationwide, or the lack of it, affects consequently the stability of the global security system. Thus, when we refer to a security problem, it is often materialized as an issue of the national state, a threat of its stability, territory or of the society itself.

Eugen Badalan defines security as the sense of trust that is present in the absence of threats, the defense being the means by which we obtain the security status. The sources of insecurity have become increasingly diverse in recent times, with origins in phenomena such as: terrorism, illegal migration, proliferation of weapons, chemical and biological technologies of mass destruction.

So far there has not been published a methodology for analyzing the concept of security, but the action to define it is a very important subject, found in official documents of international organizations, such as for example the United Nations, which in the UN Charter mentions in Chapter 1. Art. 2” All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, defines the concept of security as: “Art. 2 The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.”

The European Union – one of the most important partners of NATO, mentioned in its first Security Strategy of the EU from 2003, that the response to the risks, dangers and threats to the European security must be adapted to each of them through a multiple strategy and a comprehensive approach. Thus we understand that for peacekeeping it is no longer sufficient the military intervention of powerful nation states, but it requires a network of regional or global security, such as the UN, NATO or the EU.

Why is the Black Sea important?

The illustrious geopolitician Halford Mackinder, in his study “Geographical Pivot of History” published in 1904, included this area in the Heartland (interior area – which included the basin of the rivers that discharged into the Baltic and Black Sea). His famous dictum, brings into focus now more than ever the true importance of this area: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world”.

Regarded for centuries as, the sea of the Greeks the Turks or the Russians, the Black Sea is actually a fault line between the Muslim world, the Slavic world and the European civilization. Romania, following the entry into the EU, aimed to bring to the foreground the strategic position of the Black Sea and put it on the agenda of the Union. The Enlargement of NATO and of the European Union, the existence and persistence of

conflict areas and frozen conflicts near the Black Sea (the Caucasus, the Kurdish area, the Transnistrian region, the Middle East in Syria and Iraq) and the dynamics of the interests of coastal states, have led to the exponential growth of the importance of this area in the last decade.

The main role that the Black Sea can play in the architecture of the European, the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security environment, is of fault zone between civilizations, religions and mentalities; the intersection of the north-south and east-west Axes, along which were developed almost all the major confrontations, and the great Eurasian buildings, including the commercial area of contact between the two continents; the characteristics resulting from the fact that it's positioned in an area that is included in the Eurasian energy corridor, where there are substantial hydrocarbon resources, but also on the European maritime strategic corridor, which gives it a special significance by the oil shipments. The Black Sea is a strategic binder for the neighboring countries in terms of the reconstruction of the old Silk Road, both from a traditional and modern perspective.

The security environment in the Black Sea is in a process of reconfiguration, a linear process and also contradictory that derives from the interests and strategies of the riparian countries. The Wider Black Sea area is marked by conflicting areas by frozen conflicts and even hot conflicts. The Syrian, Balkan, Caucasian, Transdnistrian problems, in close proximity to the Black Sea, the Iran's problems and those of the Islamic civilization in Turkey transform the region into a space that needs to be rethought in the security strategies of NATO and the EU.

The importance of the Black Sea region rose after the Russian military intervention in Syria, the Russian fleet in Sevastopol providing logistical support to the expeditionary body. This is one of the reasons the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean have become a common space of security. Turkey's role is very important for cooperation in the Black Sea, Romania being keen to strengthen political, economic and military ties with that state, a strategic partner of the country. Security in the Black Sea, solving the crisis in Syria but also the management of the, the migrants in The Middle East depend on Ankara's position.

The dialogue between EU-NATO continues beyond the roughness recorded lately and the political-military cooperation in NATO can be even stronger in the Black Sea region through Turkey's contribution, the country with the strongest fleet and aircraft among the allied states in this space. The installation of a new administration at the White House brings a new breath to NATO, but also in bilateral relations, Turkey is an important country for the United States for its security interests in The Middle East.

The Black Sea region in the current geopolitical and security context

The Broader Black Sea Area is a extremely complex space from a variety of causes: different states as power level, as system of government; the existence of significant resources; the quality of transit space with maximum impact on the energy security of European countries, but also for the economic security of exporting states, in this case, Russia; the existence of multiple cooperation initiatives, whose impact can be considered relatively low; the fact that in this area meet several regions, each with its specific character; the proximity to the The Middle East; US and NATO influence through partnerships, etc. All these have a substantial impact on how the major players are building and developing their vision on the security environment in this space.

Europe is undergoing a challenging period resulting from the current changes in the national, regional and global security environment, but also from the major institutional reconfigurations. The Black Sea region is the main arena for all the processes that are ongoing or scheduled to begin, the assessment of the vulnerabilities and risks to regional security are the starting point for the formulation of regional, national and supranational actors. The Black Sea is a region of convergence of major actors' interests on the international stage, and the positions of smaller players must constantly refer to these interests.

The events taking place in Ukraine represent a continuing concern, not only for the regional actors, but also for the whole world, radically changing the geostrategic landscape of Eastern Europe. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe has become the scene of the fight for world supremacy, carried between the US and the Russian Federation. The competition between the two great powers was felt in several areas but the military aspect of it played the lead role.

The Black Sea under the influence of political and military events, was transformed into an intersection of geopolitical and geo-economic boundaries. Global geopolitical developments were determined by the advancement of the Euro-Atlantic frontier to Central Asia.

The concept of the "Black Sea Region" has been intensely debated over the last decade, both in the academic world as well as in the strategies and official documents of NATO and the EU. The Black Sea is a continental sea, positioned between Europe and south-eastern Asia Minor, which became, especially after 11 September 2001, along with NATO's enlargement in 2002, a place for the intersection of Euro-Atlantic geopolitical and geo-economic interests. This configuration of the Black Sea region has been projected since the early 90's, with papers tracing the pipes that were to carry energy resources from the Eastern Euro-Atlantic area.

Along with the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, the view of the Western states towards this region has totally changed, and later, the NATO and the EU enlargement to the borders of the Black Sea, and the overall aspirations of these two organizations have brought the Black Sea region on the strategic map of global security. Moreover, the Black Sea is the point of convergence of major actors' interests on the international scene, such as the Russian Federation – the successor of the USSR, Turkey and of course the European Union.

The Black Sea has a great importance for all the regional actors such as neighboring countries, but also for the whole world, the Black Sea is a bridge in power between the west and east, as well as a natural barrier against transnational threats. Its geostrategic positioning has sparked the interest of NATO, and other regional powers such as Turkey or Russia, who also want to impose themselves in this region, and this can be a driver for conflict, especially if we consider the position of the Russian Federation toward NATO's presence in the Black Sea, which considers the conduct of military operations as a direct threat to its security.

For NATO, which has pursued the expansion of its military bases in Europe closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, this turn of events was a clear signal that Russia finally began to actively resist the Alliance plans. In practical terms, this means that the soft methods of NATO's expansion in the Eastern Europe will no longer work with the same efficiency, and here we have in mind, especially the situation in Ukraine.

Over the years, a number of organizations for cooperation have made their appearance in this region in order to strengthen relations and to resolve existing conflicts, with the help of joint cooperation projects.

Currently, the evolution of the security environment in the Black Sea region and the Caucasus is defined on one side by a process of reaffirmation of the regional security architecture, as part of the Euro-Atlantic structures, and on the other hand by the existence of a state of conflict caused by “not so frozen conflicts” in this region, and we are talking here about the Ukrainian crisis, the situation in Crimea, the sanctions applied to the Russian Federation, as well as the amplification of other threats such as: illegal immigrants, terrorism, human trafficking and drugs. In this context, it is easy to observe the geostrategic importance of the region and the role that the Black Sea plays on the regional and global security stage, becoming the checkpoint of the Euro-Asian space and the Middle East.

The geostrategic value of the Black Sea region will grow along with the awareness of its importance by all the local, regional and global actors, and one of the mechanisms to promote security and stability in this area is the internationalization of the process of securing the region. The Black Sea is a strategic challenge for NATO, which has a duty to project security and stability outside its borders, but more than that, for the European Union, which through the new Global Security Strategy, has made the first steps towards consolidating its quality of security guarantor, and which together with its main strategic partner – NATO, calls for global cooperation when it comes to security cooperation.

The new Global Security Strategy of the EU highlights the importance and need for cooperation at a global level; the main actor on the international scene, as form of organization, is the nation-state, but most current challenges act by their nature at a supranational level, globally, precisely this is the reason why international organizations like UN, NATO and the EU are making their presence increasingly felt when it comes to the evolution of the security environment.

The strategy for transforming the Black Sea Region into a pillar of security and stability, corroborates with the fight against terrorism. The unparalleled magnitude of the fight against terrorism and organized crime, while boosting competition for energy resources and their transportation routes, brought the Black Sea from the periphery to the spotlight of the main European and Euro-Atlantic bodies. A potential solution to the region's problems can only be based on an expanded security concept that incorporates regional integration, democratization, economic growth and redefining policies and strategies for the Black Sea.

Along with the expansion of NATO and the EU to Eastern Europe, a region that has at its borders countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, the countries of the former Yugoslav space, the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and a segment of the broader Middle East, territories that are far from the notion of stability, bring this issues to European security and stability.

Placing the Black Sea region on the list of strategic priorities is not only a necessity of the current global interest, but also a condition for the evolution of stability and regional security. States bordering the Black Sea (Romania, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Georgia, Turkey and Bulgaria), cooperate, not only at regional economic level, but often showed their desire to create a stable security space.

The European Union turns slowly but with sure steps into an identity that goes beyond the economic reasons, becoming currently, with the launch of the new Global Security Strategy, one of the main political-military actors in the region. EU was directly involved in maintaining stability and security in the Black Sea region through various cooperation programs, involving not only the EU member states or countries that aspire to EU membership but also other important players such as for example the Russian Federation.

After the accession of Romania and Bulgaria (2007) to the EU, the European organization reached the Black Sea, and the specific problems of this area began to gain importance for Brussels. The EU has launched a series of initiatives in this area, that have evolved into real tools for promoting peace and stability into the immediate vicinity, and the EU interests related to this space. Of these, the most notable are the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership, to which we can also add initiatives such as the Black Sea Synergy, the enlargement policy and the partnership with Russia. Basically, overall, the EU has outlined an economic and commercial approach with the states in the Black Sea region, trying to promote and to strengthen the European security. Also, relations between the EU and the Black Sea region have developed gradually, until the situation in which the EU has become their main trading partner.

When we talk about security in the Black Sea, we must also remember another actor with a great importance – Turkey. Turkey is a major influential actor on the stability and predictability of the Black Sea security environment. Turkey is a member of NATO (since 1952) and partner of the EU, having the candidate status for EU membership.

At the same time, Turkey is also a considerable military power in the Black Sea, and this quality is enhanced and supported by the membership to NATO; from this point of view, it constitutes the nearest area of the Alliance to the Black Sea, the South Caucasus and the Middle East. Turkey has always had an important geostrategic position in the Southern Black Sea, in close proximity to the Russian Federation and the Middle East. Thus, if during the Cold War, the status of member state of NATO secured close relations with Washington, united by the common Soviet threat, later, its geostrategic importance has been identified by its proximity to the Middle East, in the context of the “war on terror” led by the Euro-Atlantic community in this space. Moreover, the international developments, have given Turkey a very important position in the context of European energy security.

The United States and the EU security matters turned the Black Sea region, into one of actuality, bringing into question issues such as terrorism, non-proliferation, etc. and Turkey has been very receptive to proposals from the international environment, not however convinced that the problems mentioned had truly existed in the Black Sea region, being rather concerned that international powers would be able to use this vehicle (problems in the Black Sea) as a pretext to invade the political regime and legal framework of the Turkish straits, Turkey did not agree to give the US an important role in this matter, or to share powers with countries like Romania or Bulgaria, anything that could limit the prerogatives and privileges of Turkey on this issue is not acceptable. Moreover, in the vision of Turkey, a stronger involvement of NATO and therefore US in the region, would create more instability than security.

At the same time, the fact that Turkey is a pillar in the Black Sea region is visible not only in terms of geopolitics and energetic geostrategy, this actor having an important role

in maintaining stability and security throughout the area by the fact that it controls both straits linking the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, but also because it is a state with a majority Muslim population, that is secular and strongly anchored in the euro-Atlantic institutional architecture. The relations that Turkey establishes with its neighboring environment features are reflected in the security from the Black Sea region. Along with the Russian Federation, Turkey is another key regional power for the evolution of security in this environment. In the center of the Turkish foreign policy, we can also find the principle of “zero problems with neighbors”.

Turkey is working on promoting cooperation in the region, as for example the activities of various regional organizations: The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation, The Operation Black Sea Harmony, The Black Sea Maritime Force, all this being mechanisms which include all littoral states, including the Russian Federation; Turkey focusing a lot on avoiding confrontations, and the preservation of the status of controller of the straits regime, and by this trying to place itself in the center of the events conducted in the Black Sea region.

Turkey and the Russian Federation are two of the most important actors in the Black Sea and not infrequently there were speculations about a possible alliance between these two great powers, which if achieved would, surely represent the monopolization of the region. Turkey's relations with the Russian Federation are however very diverse, sometimes characterized by tensions, othertimes being quite close; which is why, specialists in international relations are not rushing to strongly assert the possibility of a formal alliance between the two great powers.

Russia is one of the emerging powers internationally identifiable, visible both through sustained economic growth primarily by the production and export of hydrocarbons and confirmed by rhetoric toward the US, NATO and the EU. Regarding the Black Sea region, the Russian Federation aimed at three main areas of interest. First, it is the value of the region in terms of energy, as a transit space, but also in terms of resources. Secondly, it is the close proximity of Russia and its relations with the states in this space, which it considers traditionally, under its sphere of influence; and, thirdly, the dynamics of relations with the EU, NATO, US, characterized by the reluctance of Moscow in terms of expanding the borders of the two organizations toward its borders, but also by a real dilemma of security in relationship with the US based on the problem of the construction of the US missile shield.

The space of the Black Sea has represented since the time of Peter the Great, an area with great geopolitical and geostrategic importance, being considered by many Russian analysts in this field, as the “key” to maintain a considerable influence on Europe, influence that can be preserved if Russia remains the most important, if not the only, supplier of energy to Europe. By analyzing official documents we clearly understand that Russia's foreign policy focuses on two major coordinates. The first one consists of its role in the world, while the second focuses on the relations with the neighboring area.

Vladimir Putin's initiative in 2011 to create a Eurasian Union, similar in function, significance and way of organizing to the European Union is part of the same line of thought.

Thus, Russia not only creates a space for economic maneuver, but ensures the economic markets from neighboring states, and creates also a central position in the future international relations between West and East. By maintaining political and

economic relations in the terms of Russia, based on a clear and stable influential space, Russia settles the foundation for asserting and confirming its role of regional power and also, world power.

NATO became an riparian actor at the Black Sea along with Turkey's accession (1952), but during the Cold War, its involvement in the region was almost nonexistent. Only after 2004, when Romania and Bulgaria became members, the Alliance's involvement in the Black Sea region was amplified, especially in the late '90's, when the US attention was drawn by the Caspian energy resources.

The US policy in the region is considering, in particular, keeping Turkey on the side of NATO allies considering that this would ensure the highest level of peace and security in the Black Sea. In other words, Turkey, as a the leader of the straits regime plays a critical role in the framework of NATO when it comes to issues related to the straits, or the Black Sea. US policy also promotes cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, in particular on issues related to the Black Sea naval issues, security and development. In the long term, Turkey can get dividends by the offer to play the role of mediator, as a member of many international organizations and economic and military guarantor of security in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict resolution.

When it comes to military balance in the Black Sea region, we can say that it never existed. From a historical perspective, the Black Sea region can be characterized as an area of confluence of different political views on the Black Sea. If after the 90's, appeared the expectancy of cooperation in this region, with the events in Georgia, and later, the crisis in Ukraine and Crimea have made it clear that this international goal is far from being achieved. Unfortunately, the Black Sea is about to become a separator border between the Russian Federation and the West.

The Black Sea has a special geostrategic importance, from the this region the power can be projected, to the Eastern and Central Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Eastern Mediterranean region; an area of strategic importance in energy and transport, which is why the Russian Federation, has strengthened and rebuilt its military capabilities in the extended Black Sea region, fact generated by the instability that characterizes this area in recent years.

Although the analysis of the interests of the main players in the Black Sea reveals a complex relational reality, often marked by divergences and contradictions, all these approached actors face common security problems. However, the same actors have also common interests related to this space. Therefore, after the end of the Cold War, in the Black Sea region, there have been developed a series of cooperative organizations.

Thus, apart from NATO and the EU, as organizations bordering the Black Sea, with specific interests in this space, there is also a number of other mechanisms and organizations addressing economic, political and military aspects. Among them we can mention the following: The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; the Community of Independent States; GUAM; the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI); The South-East European Process for Cooperation (SEEPC); the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE); the Collective Security Treaty Organization; the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC); the Black Sea Regional Energy Centre; the Black Sea Commission; the Trade and Development Bank of the Black Sea; the Group for the Black Sea Naval Cooperation (Blackseafor);

Southeast European Brigade; the Multinational Peace Force from Southeast Europe; the Danube-Black Sea Regional Intervention Force.

All these organizations were created as a result from the awareness of the need for cooperation bodies, in which divergent interests to be discussed, but also from the need that security problems (international terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) to be addressed jointly, this being the only solution to prevent or reduce the manifestation of their effects in an efficient manner.

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PROMOTING CYBER SECURITY: ESTONIA AND LATVIA AS NORM-SETTERS

*Anna Gromilova**

Abstract

This article investigates development of efforts to battle cyber security threats. In the recent decades we observed drastic increase in use of cyber capabilities and warfare – recent events in the U.S. is a clear example of how hacking can directly influence something as crucial as the presidential elections outcomes. Realizing full danger coming together with development of cyber capabilities, it is essential to investigate which actors are especially active in international security environment. Understanding “cyber norm” as a set of appropriate behaviour standards, this article delves into promotion and internalization of this norm both internationally and domestically. Firstly, this paper looks at the main international actors calling for intensification of the cyber security protection. Secondly, this paper presents analysis of two case studies – cyber security protection in Latvia and Estonia – delving into efforts undertaken by these countries both internationally and domestically to bolster cyber security dialogue. Ultimately, this paper shows how both Baltic States, despite their size, can be regarded as important norm-setters in the cyber field.

Key words: *Cybersecurity, norms, cyber warfare, Estonia, Latvia*

Dedication

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Introduction

“A cyber attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremists groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11”
- Leon E. Panetta, Former US Secretary of Defense

In light of the prominence of cyber security issues in international security environment, it is important to address measures undertaken by some states to enhance security dialogue and cooperation. Recent presidential elections in the United States had shown how Russian cyber campaign managed to manipulate the American body politic. Over the last decade, we have observed a number of other prominent cyber offences in Georgia (2008), Iran (2011), USA (2009), Tunisia (2011) and Ukraine (ongoing). These and other instances of violations in information field shed light on the complexity of cyberwarfare. Firstly, it is extremely hard to identify those behind cyberattacks – offensives might involve countries, coalitions of countries, political parties, rogue states and movements, autonomous third-party groups and individuals. Secondly, the tactics and strategies of cyberwarfare are constantly evolving and adapting to the new era realities. Cyberattacks allow the aggressors to reach their goals with minimum losses and almost

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total anonymity. Moreover, in combination with use of traditional military forces, cyberattacks make the success of any operation more likely. It leads to another threat coming with the age of cyberwarfare – cyberterrorism – when not only infrastructure but the entire population of a state becomes the main target. As expressed by the former Information Operations Issue Manager of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), John A. Serabian, Jr., “(c) cyber attacks offer terrorists the possibility of greater security and operational flexibility. Theoretically they can launch a computer assault from almost anywhere in the world, without directly exposing the attacker to physical harm” (2000).

Realization of dangers coming together with the development of cyber capabilities, led to intensification of dialogue on how to secure the information technology environment. This paper delves into the development of cybersecurity as a norm in the international relations field. What are the main attempts to advocate such norms that one can observe and how can we assess the role played by specific countries in this process? In order to find answers to those questions, my inquiry proceeds as follows. Firstly, important methodological remarks are made, providing background on promotion of cyber security as a “norm” in international relations. Secondly, this paper provides an outline of measures undertaken by Estonia and Latvia to promote cybersecurity protection on both state and international levels. Ultimately, this inquiry contributes to better understanding of how cyber security as a norm is promoted by both countries and the incentives behind these measures.

Cyber Security as a Norm

Before turning to the analysis of how Estonia and Latvia promote security of cyber space on domestic and international levels, it is important to make some clarifications on the nature of “cyber security” as a norm in the international relations literature. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) define “norm” as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”. At the same time, these authors mention that some actors are more active than others in pursuing these norms and calling for a normative change. These actors – the so-called “norm entrepreneurs” – play crucial role in the diffusion of specific ways of behavior, building support for this behavior among the public. They “identify a problem, specify a cause, and propose a solution, all with an eye toward producing procedural, substantive, and normative change in their area of concern” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 8).

In regards to cyber space, Anna-Maria Osula and Henry Rõigas (2016) define two main types of norms – legal and political ones. First group is related to international law, including norms that “carry a legally binding obligation”. Second group includes norms that promote specific way of behavior without being “subject to legal enforcement mechanisms” (Osula and Rõigas, 2016). 2015 report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) also makes a difference between binding (legal) and “voluntary” non-binding norms (political). In regards to the latter group, the report states that such norms “reflect the expectations of the international community, set standards for responsible State behavior and allow the international community to assess the activities and intentions of States” (United Nations, 2015a). For the purposes of this article, I will focus on the proposed norms in cyber field that would have a politically binding character. Therefore, analysis of the already existing international law doctrines in cyber security falls beyond the purview of this paper.

Turning to the discussion of the existing initiatives in regards to setting of international “cyber norms”, there are a few that are worth mentioning.

Firstly, the International Code of Conduct for Information Security put by four members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – Russia, China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – in September 2011 called for “enhanced coordination and cooperation among States” in order to combat “the criminal misuse of information technologies and, in that context, stressing the role that can be played by the United Nations and other international and regional organizations” (United Nations, 2011). Second version of the Code, signed by two other members of SCO (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), was laid in a letter to the UN Secretary General in January 2015 (United Nations 2015b).

Secondly, Global Conference on Cyberspace (GCCS) that saw its launch in London in November 2011 aims to set principles “for governing behaviour in cyberspace”. One of the most significant results of the GCCS was the Seoul Framework for and Commitment to Open and Secure Cyberspace (2013). “The realization of the need for norms on cyberspace in London”, according to the conference chairman, South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, “has taken concrete shape in Seoul framework” (as quoted in Farnsworth, 2013). It offered “guidelines for governments and international organisations on coping with cybercrime and cyberwar” (GCCS, 2015).

Thirdly, in 2013, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agreed on 11 voluntary, politically binding confidence-building measures (CBMs) in order to address security of information and communication technologies (ICTs). According to this decision, participating states are among other things encouraged to exchange national views on national and transnational threats to ICTs, to cooperate with each other, to adopt appropriate effective legislation in order to facilitate the information exchange (OSCE Decision No. 1106, 2013). Moreover, it created an Informal Working Group of representatives of the states involved to “discuss information exchanged and explore appropriate development of CBMs” (OSCE Decision No. 1106, 2013). On 10 March 2016 OSCE adopted second set of CBMs. Recommendations, inter alia, included sharing information on remedies to ICT vulnerabilities, promotion of integrity of the ICT-enabled critical infrastructure on both national and transnational levels as well as developing proper shared responses in case of threat to that infrastructure (OSCE Decision No. 1202, 2016).

Fourthly, the July 2015 BRICS summit had cybersecurity issues high on its agenda. It set Working Group of Experts of the BRICS states on security in the use of ICTs. Its main aim was to “initiate cooperation in the following areas: sharing of information and best practices relating to security in the use of ICTs; effective coordination against cyber-crime; the establishment of nodal points in member states; intra-BRICS cooperation using the existing Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT); joint research and development projects; capacity building; and the development of international norms, principles and standards.”(Ufa Declaration, 2015) September 2016 saw the BRICS Security Advisers meeting in New Delhi where they agreed to cooperate in the area of cyber security in order to combat global terrorism (“Security Advisers of the BRICS(...)”, 2016).

Last but not least, it is important to stress the ongoing work of the above mentioned UN GGE. In late August 2015 the fourth GGE issued its Report – a product of consultations among 20 countries to develop cyber norms and measures against cyber

threats. Despite challenges associated with the diversity of views among its members, the Group's agreement has been cited as a "breakthrough" and "a strong consensus report" (Korzak, 2015). According to it, *inter alia* states committed:

- not to inflict damage on states' critical infrastructure;
- not to pose any impediments for national Computer Security Incidents Response Teams (CSIRTs or CERTs)- main cyber emergency responders;
- to respect and commit to peaceful use of ICTs;
- to cooperate and assist in investigation of cyber crimes in case it was launched from the country's territory (Kulikova, 2015).

In his foreword to the GGE's report, the former Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, noted: "Few technologies have been as powerful as information and communications technologies (ICTs) in reshaping economies, societies and international relations. Cyberspace touches every aspect of our lives. The benefits are enormous, but these do not come without risk. Making cyberspace stable and secure can only be achieved through international cooperation, and the foundation of this cooperation must be international law and the principles of the UN Charter"(United Nations, 2015c). Currently, there is a fifth Group established for the period 2016/2017. It is asked to report on its results at the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly, in September 2017.

As it is evident from the outline above, there are numerous actors involved in promotion of cyber norms. At the same time, level of involvement in such activities varies and is dependent on different political, historic and economic factors. The following two sections will be dedicated to the analysis of efforts undertaken by the two former Soviet Republics, Estonia and Latvia, to promote cyber security on both domestic and international levels. Both countries are bordering Russia, who is among the countries believed to have the "most developed cyber warfare capabilities" (Breene, 2016). Moreover, both countries have complicated relations with Kremlin due to their minority policies, perception of their Soviet period as 'occupation' and, in Estonia's case, lack of the border treaty. These factors explain why, in light of Russia's cyber activities during wars in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (ongoing), both countries feel their national security being directly threatened.

Estonia

Estonia became the first country in the world to face a cyber security attack. In 2007, right after the "Bronze Night" – the removal of Soviet World War II memorial from the centre of Tallinn to the military cemetery which led to massive protests and riots – Estonian government networks were attacked by unknown foreign intruders. Fueled by botnets, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in Estonia almost resulted in shutting down of the entire Estonian digital infrastructure. Jaak Aaviksoo, the then Estonian Defense Minister cited 2007 events in Estonia as the "first time that a botnet threatened the national security of the entire nation" (as quoted in Holden, 2013). Attacks targeted governmental web sites, major Estonian media channels (such as Postimees) and Estonia's biggest bank. 2007 attacks in the country – which sometimes go under names of Cyberwar or Web War I – lasted until mid-May when they suddenly stopped.

Estonian government believed Kremlin to be behind the attacks, pointing to some direct connections of some of the hackers' emails to Russian officials. "When there are attacks coming from official IP addresses of Russian authorities and they are attacking not

only our websites but our mobile phone network and our rescue service network, then it is already very dangerous,” – said the former Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet in 2007, being convinced that “the largest part of these attacks were coming from Russia” (as quoted in Bright, 2007). “The European Union is under attack, because Russia is attacking Estonia,” said Paet in his interview to Guardian (2007), spreading concern from the state to the EU level. Kremlin denied any connections to the Estonian attacks. Russia's ambassador in Brussels, Vladimir Chizhov, in his reply to the Guardian found Estonian accusations to be “serious allegation that has to be substantiated” (as quoted in Bright, 2007).

In practice, apart from having a good motivation to launch the attacks, Russia had not been proven guilty of the offence. The problem with cyber warfare is that it is extremely difficult to have solid proof of where attacks originated. Therefore, majority of agencies that investigated the event, admitted that they could not find the grounds to attribute attacks to Russian government. Johannes Ullrich, chief research officer of the Bethesda commented on the difficulty to track distributed denial-of-service attacks in Estonia: “It may as well be a group of bot herders showing 'patriotism,' kind of like what we had with Web defacements during the US-China spy-plane crisis [in 2001]” (as quoted in Brenner, 2007). Arbor Networks, the Security division of NETSCOUT, reported no Russian government connection while pointing to the fact that many attacks were coming from the US and other countries (Holden, 2013).

It is important to add that in light of unexpectedness of the attacks, Estonia managed to deal with the crisis quite successfully. By default, Estonia is more sensitive to attacks of this sort – over the years of regained independence, the country built itself a reputation of tech savvy and the “most wired” country that pioneered the “e-government”. Nevertheless, during the crisis, Estonians, shutting down foreign access to their websites, managed to relaunch some services within hours. Bill Woodcock, an American Internet security expert, praised actions of Hillar Aarelaid, manager of Estonia's Computer Emergency Response Team: “There aren't a lot of other countries that could combat that on his level of professionalism”(as quoted in Landler & Markoff, 2007)

There is a level of disagreement on whether the events in Estonia can be classified as a cyberattack or even more so – as a “cyber war”. NATO web pages on the history of the cyber security attacks characterizes 2007 events in Estonia as “more like cyber riots than crippling attacks”(NATO, 2017). Nevertheless, significance of the conducted cyberattack in Estonia cannot be underestimated. Researchers, politicians and commentators around the world started talking of how to avert the repetition of the Estonian scenario elsewhere. Linton Wells II, the then Pentagon's principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for networks and information integration believed that the Estonian events would become a “watershed in terms of widespread awareness of the vulnerability of modern society”(as quoted in Landler & Markoff, 2007). With Estonia being its member, NATO was especially concerned about situation in Estonia, sending its specialists to observe the attacks.

At the domestic level, since 2007, Estonia took major steps towards better cyber security protection. In 2010 National Cyber Defense League (Küberkaitsealiit) was established. League's mission involved creation of the organisation aimed at protecting Estonian cyberspace. It is composed of IT security specialists, programmers, lawyers and management specialists from different sectors that voluntarily provide their assistance

during cyberattacks (KAITSELIIT, 2017). Since June 1st 2011, the Estonian Informatics Centre has been re-organized to the Estonian Information System's Authority (EISA). EISA's aim is to help "private and public sector's organisations to maintain the security of their information systems" (EISA, 2011). There is also Department of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) that advises "the owners of information systems on how to assess risks and how to protect vital services" (EISA, 2011). Moreover, CERT Estonia (Computer Emergency Response Team Estonia) – organization established as early as 2006 – is managing security incidents in ee computer networks, assisting Estonian Internet users in preventive measures against possible security incidents (EISA, 2017).

On 2 December 2015 Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Roivas told Reuters that his country really learned from the 2007 events: "We were already able to defend ourselves in 2007, but now we are so much more ready because of learning from those attacks"(as quoted in Scrutton & Mardiste, 2015). The country also decided to take advantage of the computing clouds, uploading much of its government which would be helpful in case of the cyberattack as it would enable running the country from servers based in Estonian embassies abroad in case of disasters or attacks (Scrutton & Mardiste, 2015). In 2014 global cybersecurity index conducted by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU Estonia ranked fifth in the world (Hankewitz, 2015).

At the international level, since 2007, Estonia had been extremely active in promoting changes in the cyber domain. Former Estonia's President Toomas Hendrik Ilves raised concerns about the future of cyberattacks and its possible repercussions: "Shutting down a country with a cyberattack would be very difficult but not impossible. If you did that, why wouldn't that be a case for Article 5 action?" (as quoted in Joinfo, 2015) Article 5 requires NATO members to help any member subject to armed attack. In 2010 Estonia hosted the cyber security conference organized by the NATO-accredited Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Ilves, in his opening speech at the event, complained about "lack a response doctrine" in situations when it would be possible to find out who stood behind the cyber aggressions (as quoted in Magone, 2010). On 5 September 2014, at the Wales Summit, NATO approved a new Cyber Defence Policy (NATO Wales summit Declaration, 2014). It included digital attacks into the provisions of NATO's Article 5 invocation (Ranger, 2014). On 20 November 2014, during his meeting with President Ilves in Tallinn, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (2014) positively evaluated Estonia's commitment to the Alliance. He especially praised country's "showing leadership when it comes to cyber-defence", mentioning NATO's biggest ever cyber-defence exercise that Estonia was hosting (Stoltenber, 2014). Accredited in 2008, Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (CCDCoE) has its headquarters in Tallinn, serving as a "military organization [that] focuses on technology, strategy, operations and law" (NATO CCDCOE). Estonian solid expertise in cyber security issues was one of the main reasons behind choosing Estonia as the site for CCDCoE (e-Estonia.com).

In May 2015 Estonia's Defence Ministry came up with a cyber hygiene initiative to develop common standards of cyber behavior (The Baltic Course, 2015). It aimed at promoting e-learning courses on the issue in Europe. Estonian Minister of Defence Sven Mikser explained why his country's leadership is crucial for the initiative: "Estonia has a very good reputation in the field of cyber security and hence we are also expected to show

cyber security boosting initiative” (as quoted in The Baltic Course, 2015). International cooperation and promotion of EU’s cyber security is among the main country’s goals according to Estonian Cyber Security Strategy 2014-2017 (2014). It is important to note that Russia is still perceived as a major threat in Estonia in cyber domain. 2008 Russo-Georgian war (when Russia utilized both cyber and armed attacks against Georgia) and cyber warfare during Russia’s on-going conflict in Ukraine, add to the existing memories of 2007 Estonian attacks. As Estonia’s Defence Minister Sven Mikser stated during the press conference on June 23, 2015, in Tallinn: “We have reason to believe that Russia views the Baltic region as one of NATO’s most vulnerable areas, a place where NATO’s resolve and commitment could be tested” (Mikser, 2015). Therefore, Estonia has been also actively supporting Ukraine, providing cyber security related training there.

Looking at other notable cyberspace initiatives it is important to mention the 2015 platform on norms of behavior in cyberspace set up by Estonian Foreign Minister Marina Kaljurand and her Dutch counterpart, Bert Koenders. Both countries consider themselves to be leaders in the promotion of cyber norms and proper conduct of states (Government of the Netherlands, 2015). According to Mr Koenders, cyber operations conducted by some states creates “instability in international relations and cyberspace” (as quoted in Government of the Netherlands, 2015).

To conclude, Estonia is among the most active European countries when it comes to defending security in the cyberspace. During international conference on cybersecurity and international law on 5 May 2016, Ms Kaljurand stressed the importance of finding a way to enhance international law in order to battle cyber threats. “The behaviour of states and various experiences in cyberspace provide a basis to formulate norms for responsible behavior”, Kaljurand added (as quoted in Republic of Estonia MFA, 2016).

Latvia

Unlike its Baltic neighbor, Latvia has never faced a large cyber offensive. Nevertheless, the country shares same concerns about its eastern neighbor and former patron, Kremlin. The country has the largest percent of ethnic Russians living on its territory in Europe.¹ Moreover, approximately 12% of Latvian residents are the so-called “non-citizens” – de facto stateless persons that reside on Latvian territory without citizenship of any state. Over the years of its independence, Latvia had been continuously accused of the on-going discrimination against its ethnic minorities by both Russian Federation and the West. These policies also led to establishment of two separate cultural and information spaces – Latvian- and Russian-speaking – with very different views on policies of the Russian Federation. That makes the Latvian government extremely concerned about dangers of information warfare. Reflecting on the hybrid dimensions of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine², Latvia’s Ambassador to the U.S., Andris Razans expressed his fears of the Kremlin’s propaganda: “What does it mean for freedom and openness and the right of people to receive uncontrolled information [when] this open

¹ Estimated 25,6 percent in 2016

² The first to define “hybrid warfare” was Bill Nemeth who in his work on Chechnya defined it as “the contemporary form of guerrilla warfare” that “employs both modern technology and modern mobilization methods” (as quoted in Daugulis, 2016).

information space is penetrated by clear propaganda instruments, instruments of modern warfare?” (as quoted in Freedberg, 2014).

Some analysts expressed that in the post-Soviet space Latvia is most likely to become Russia's next target after Ukraine (Birnbaum, 2014). “Russia is trying to use the Russian-speaking minority as a tool to aggressively promote its objectives”, said Latvian Defence Minister Raimonds Vejonis (as quoted in Birnbaum, 2014). It is important to stress that Latvia is also a NATO member and thus relies on the Article 5 to ensure its security in case of the conflict – therefore, inclusion of cyber threats to NATO's defense clauses, was of crucial importance for Latvia.

Internationally, although Latvia probably cannot compete with Estonia's tech savvy country reputation, it definitely has an equally active stance in regards to cyber security promotion. During the Hague conference on cyber security in April 2015, Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs summarized his country's perspective on a single, free and secure cyberspace. He highlighted one of the main priorities of the Latvian six months Presidency of the Council of the European Union – *Digital Europe*. It maintained Latvia's dedication to promote confidence in the Digital Single Market, establishing “digital by default” principle in cross-EU public administration. “Latvia supports an open and free Cyberspace, while protecting human rights in Cyberspace including freedom of expression, access to information, and privacy. I am convinced that wide and affordable access to the new technologies and free access to the content also facilitate the development of more transparent and inclusive governance”, said the Foreign Minister Rinkēvičs (2015). He also expressed his belief that the international community has not done enough to ensure minimum security standards and enforcement of the information infrastructure in light of the growing number of cyber-attacks (Rinkēvičs, 2015). On 2-4 May 2015, Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organisation (UNESCO) World Press Freedom Day. Its main theme was freedom of expression in the digital age (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, 2015). The already mentioned Global Cyber Security Index placed Latvia on the seventh place in its ranking of countries with the best cyber capabilities (Latvia.eu, 2015).

Domestically, as it has been mentioned above, Latvia is extremely concerned about battling propaganda. Latvia's Information Technologies Security Incident Response Institution – CERT.lv – has been in force since 1 February 2011 under the auspices of Latvia's Ministry of Defense. It set requirements for Internet Service Providers, IT infrastructure owners and Public sector IT specialists to follow legal regulations and rise cooperation in cyber domain on a national level. By 2016, it trained almost 19,000 persons, handling thousands of IT security incident (The Baltic Course, 2016). Nowadays it continues monitoring electronic information space and issues recommendations on cyber security threats prevention (The Baltic Course, 2016). With the support of the European Commission, CERT.lv launched one of the biggest IT security events – Cyberchess 2016. The conference covered such topics as mobile casting, quantum computing, hunting malware, privacy, responsible disclosure, ransomware, and others (Cyberchess 2016).

In March 2014 Latvia had also launched its Cyber Defence Unit. According to one of the Unit's members, there is no difference between fighting in the real battlefield and in the cyber field: “Just like a soldier has to know how to handle his weapon and how to

shoot, a cyber guard has to understand what kind of methods are being used in an attack and how to deal with those methods” (as quoted in Gelzis, 2014).

Conclusion

As it was noted by the World Economic Forum’s Head of Security Jean-Luc Vez, “(t)he digitization of society has created progress and empowerment. But it also has a dark side: cybercrime and cyber warfare.” Dependence on the Internet created a new battlefield for actors to launch their attacks in. The nature of cyberspace is unique – it is extremely difficult to attribute malicious cyber operations and hold states responsible. Rise in cyber warfare popularity led to intensification of discussions on how to make the information environment more resistant towards possible threats.

This article delved into establishment of “cyber norms” – promotion of certain type of behaviour in cyberspace. The emphasis was put rather on the political rather than legal norms – promoted standards of behaviour that are not legally binding. I have outlined the most salient norm entrepreneurs in the cyberspace, mentioning activities of the SCO, BRICS countries, UN GGE etc. It is evident that in the upcoming years we will see even further development of normative mechanisms in order to ensure cyber security.

Second part of this article was dedicated to analysis of two specific case studies – Estonia and Latvia. Both countries have high rankings when it comes to cyber capabilities – fifth and seventh according to ITU, respectively. It is clear that both countries have deep security concerns about its eastern neighbor, Russia, especially in light of the ongoing hybrid war in Ukraine and past Russian cyber activities during its war in Georgia and possible involvement in 200& Estonian events. It is important to note that both Estonia and Latvia are NATO members, relying on the alliance’s protection in case of aggression. Therefore, it is important to mention Estonia’s role in making cyber threats part of NATO’s Article 5 – major breakthrough in cyber security protection. It is clear that both countries promote cyber norms internationally. In this respect it is especially important to mention Estonia’s role in providing cyber security trainings to and hosting NATO’s cyber-defence exercises. Stellar reputation of one of the most digitalized countries in the world also explained the Alliance’s choice of Tallinn as CCDCoE headquarters. In its turn, Latvia can be praised for choosing digital concerns as the main topic during its Presidency of the Council of the European Union and hosting a number of large conferences dedicated to cyber security and freedom. At domestic levels, both Baltic States continue to take measures in order to promote cyber security awareness and enhance their cyber infrastructures. The presented analysis thus shows that, despite their size, when it comes to norm promotion in such complex fields as cyberspace and both Estonia and Latvia can be seen as major cyber norm entrepreneurs.

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HISTORICAL REFLECTION IN THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS: AN AXIOLOGICAL APPROACH

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Abstract

The current analysis of teaching problems is dominated by an instrumental and technological approach. However, some works have already traced the idea that historical reflection should also become a major factor in teaching. This is primarily due to the axiological aspects that form our worldview and outlook. Openness as a principle and condition for the development of the world educational system has forced the authors to address the problem of actualization of historical reflection. Historical reflection is the basis of the value orientations of learners' outlook, and the formation of such a reflection is an objective component of the continuous educational process. The authors believe that the problem of historical knowledge and its interpretation has long been a source of the social and moral split of generations, and historicism as the basis of the historical way of thinking loses its objective content. The differentiation of current regulatory value systems distorts axiological meanings, and the social experience of previous generations as the basis of social memory is deprived of the semantic content. Modern Russian educational system in its humanitarian component often substitutes historicism for presentism, which in its extreme form acts as a "historical pop". The authors prove the necessity of a historical and informational approach as a neorealist (structuralist) option of historical knowledge as well as regard the axiological component of historical knowledge as the basis for the creation of objective historical knowledge.

Key words: *historical reflection, axiological approach, educational process, historical knowledge*

Introduction

In the International Dictionary of Psychology, Stuart Sutherland gives an ironic but summarizing definition of consciousness. He writes that consciousness is "a fascinating

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but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved.” (Sutherland, 1990). The maxim, formed a quarter of a century ago, is still relevant. At any rate, the problem of consciousness / mind / intelligence remains acute for the widest range of sciences. This statement was confirmed by Ray Kurzweil in his work *How to Create a Mind: The Secret of Human Thought Revealed*. The central idea of the book is the idea of reverse brain engineering (in other words – artificial intelligence), but as R. Kurzweil rightly argues, consciousness is always characterized by two features: a) “we tend to equate consciousness with our memory of events” and b) intelligence can be defined as “the ability to solve problems with limited resources, in which a key such resource is time” (Kurzweil, 2013: 44; 402).

Eventivity in the discourse of time is in fact what in individual consciousness can be interpreted as a phenomenon, which is presented to the person (individual) as history in the process of teaching (education). Therefore, a historical and informational approach is a kind of cultural strategy, to the extent of which historical memory can be “deployed” in any direction. Currently, this is how individual, group and public consciousness is manipulated.

The basis for the authors’ further discussion is the fact that an appeal to historical memory is closely related to the problem of historical alternatives. In this case, we will rely upon the fact that the experience of history and its lessons do not guarantee that if we do not follow mistaken predecessors, we will act correctly, because the quality and completeness of historical memory is largely characterized by the breadth and depth of awareness of historical alternatives. It is in this aspect that the content of historical memory itself can act as ahistorical consciousness field organized in a certain way (eventivity and its analysis). The value of the analysis of eventivity, represented procedurally, consists in the adequacy of this analysis. However, this value can be “evaluated” only by those subjects that are out of the event itself, thus getting an opportunity to “analyze the analysis”.

The objective of this paper is to consider the problem of the formation of historical reflection in the Russian educational system, paying particular attention to its value aspects. Is history valuable for learners? Are they capable of reflection on past social reality? Do they have a readiness for reflection being formed in the teaching process?

Materials and Methods

A remarkable paper by I. Savelyeva and A. Poletayeva *History as Knowledge of the Past* postulates the idea that the connectedness between history and “the construction of past social reality” as “a semantic definition of historical knowledge, formed in the XX century, highlights its temporal characteristics” (Savelyeva and Poletayeva, 2000: 1-29). Given this idea, one cannot emphasize it in the plane of those interests that are introduced in the process of this “construction”. We believe that the determining subject of this construction at least in the field of education is the state. It is no coincidence that educational courses of any level, associated with the reconstruction of the past, are based on the idea about the polarity of the West and the East. This polarity was mentioned by K. Jaspers, who interpreted it as a form of splitting of the spiritual world in general. Jaspers shows that “now although objective historical analysis reveals that the West has played a paramount role in shaping the world, it also discloses an incompleteness and deficiency in the West which render it perennially apposite and fruitful to ask of the

Orient: What shall we find there and what became truth, that we have let slip? What is the cost of our paramountcy?" (Jaspers, 1965: 68).

"The fight for history" is a real trend in shaping historical consciousness and national identity. This is explained by the fact that no national political elite, standing at the head of the state (and "constructing" consciousness as national identity), cannot (and should not!) abandon the idea of "introducing" a particular system of assessments and perceptions (values) with respect to the social past of the country, which corresponds to its (of the political elite) meaning and objectives, through mass historical consciousness (history education). Thus, the axiological factor becomes crucial for shaping not only and not so much the identity, but for the mentality of the nation.

This trend is growing and continuing in the discourse of the search for methodological foundations of modern history education in Russia. In his speech, academician V.A. Tishkov emphasized that the basic consensus that forms the foundation of national identity should be not so much and not only the confrontation of the East and the West, but also mass historical consciousness. This is because "the unity and stability of any modern society is based on the solidarity of its citizens, and this solidarity is based on people's adoption and preservation of history. This basic consensus, if it can be achieved, is the basis for the formation of national identity" (Tishkov, 2010). It is hard to underestimate the role of actual history education as the main forming "mechanism" of corresponding historical reflection in this process.

Up to a certain time, it was considered very productive to review history education in the discourse of structuralism (meaningful neorealism), the classics of which are Hans Morgenthau, Robert Gilpin and Kenneth Waltz. The six principles of classical realism generated by H. Morgenthau in his classic work *Six Principles of Political Realism* are usually accompanied by methodological papers on international relations. But, in our opinion, at least one of them should be applied to the study of mass historical consciousness. This is the statement that man cannot be driven only by moral principles or a desire for power (Morgenthau 2005: 7-14). The second principle is formed and presented by R. Gilpin. Its essence consists in the fact that selfishness is an unaltered quality of human nature and the purpose of education is not to destruct it, but to strengthen this principle through the explication of individual past experience (Gilpin, 1986).

According to K. Waltz, the consideration of any object (the historical process itself for the analyst is the object of application of his or her intelligence) as a system involves the definition of this object as a dialectic of structure and its filling elements. While the majority of "classic" realists tended to explore the elements of the system (historical facts / events), neo-realists consider the structure to be the main subject of study, i.e. those principles (laws), according to which the elements are arranged in the system. Formally, any structure is the choice of constraint tolerances and is characterized by anarchy, the lack of differentiation of elements' functions (historical facts / events) and the distribution of elements (facts / events) in accordance with the interests of the analyst (Waltz, 1979).

Until recently, according to a leading expert in the field of history education E.E. Vyazemskiy, Russian history education was dominated by an academic pedagogical model of historical studies, which generally corresponded to classical realism. He highlighted the following examples of consequences and problems of the academic model:

- high requirements for subject results (factual – auth.);

- low motivation to study history and social science (the distribution of elements in accordance with the interests of the analyst – auth.);
- the lack of incentives in shaping the person-centered important educational trajectory (the lack of differentiation of elements' functions – auth.);
- teachers and educational establishment administration's lack of experience in realizing the relevant meanings.

In his opinion, this model generally corresponded to the state and social order and even public expectations, but did not meet the massive social realities of modern Russia in the global world. As a result, E.E. Vyazemskiy concluded that the development strategy of socio-humanitarian (historical and social) education needs to be substantially adjusted (Vyazemsky, 2014). According to many Russian researchers of history education, such an adjustment is possible within the framework of preventing the historical past of Russia from being falsified. V. Zhukov, articulating the state orientation to “the adjustment of the strategy”, writes: “In the early XXI century the struggle for history between liberal and patriotic movements worsened, but only at the end of the first decade it became clear that at the government level patriotism had ceased to be perceived as “the last refuge for scoundrels” (Zhukov, 2010).

Results and Discussion

The confrontation between “liberals” and “patriots” for the Russian historical tradition, including history education, is a conventional phenomenon (Terekhov, 2009: 51-61). However, for them history is “an arena” for discussion and implementation of mainly political purposes and meanings with corresponding functions to manipulate individual and group consciousness, while for any citizen (especially for those who study not on an “instructional” basis but on an individual one) history becomes the moral basis of existence, a certain “field” to develop life meanings, values and attitudes (Kudashov et al., 2016: 583-593). The conscious selection of historical alternatives is the “functionality”, in the discourse of which an individual's historical knowledge and historical consciousness as well as personal identity is formed. It is this temporality of “history as the present” that is the task of history education. I. Savelyeva and A. Poletayeva present a very substantial argument, which helps to distinguish between the meanings of everyday and theoretical historical reflection. It includes the distinction between the concepts of “the construction of past reality” and “the reconstruction of past reality”: “The construction of past reality, which is an integral function of all historical discourses, recognized in a given society as knowledge, needs to be distinguished from the reconstruction of past social reality. The reconstruction is regarded as an attempt to recreate the image of past social reality that existed in this very reality, i.e. among those people who lived in this reality, and for whom it was “real” (Savelyeva and Poletayeva, 2000: 3).

This methodological message shows that everyday historical reflection, the form of which is the construction of past reality (in the form of a school or university history course or a textbook, for example), is designed for education as the transmission of historical knowledge for “all” or “a great many”. These “all” or “a great many” will use and even translate this knowledge in the virtually unchanged (with respect to the previously obtained) form to “others” (e.g. children in the family). In this case “historical memory” appears as “a warehouse of facts / events” represented by the author or any other official way. The reconstruction of past reality often serves as the subjective

experience of the older generation. Professional theoretical historical reflection, associated with “the re-creation of the image of past social reality that existed in this very reality”, i.e. with knowledge “of the past as the present”, is the prerogative of the analyst-researcher, whose subjective experience in the present is practically equal to the subjective experience of the investigated “object of past social reality”.

There is no doubt that, saying the above, we abstract from many problematic aspects associated with both everyday and professional historical reflection. However, there is a sufficiently extensive plane that unites these two types of reflection. This extent is the value of both the construction and reconstruction of the social past. The fact is that objectively the social past is united for both the common man (learner) and the scientist-historian (“determinant” – translator – interpreter of historical knowledge). This is true since historical knowledge (in its ordinary and scientific form) in all its diverse manifestations appears a reflection of the past, which, as mentioned above, exist and existed independently of the scientist and the common man, outside of their reflective and released from this reflection historical knowledge.

As far as historical reflection is functionally different for the common man and for the analyst, with regard to K. Waltz’s ideas, we can say that the common learner reflects on the “elements” of the historical process and rarely goes beyond this line, while the analyst-scientist, as a history expert, has “already” crossed it. Furthermore, today, the domestic educational system in many ways has become a hostage to the current global situation, and historicism has been didactically replaced by presentism, when historical events are treated as belonging to different temporal planes, having their own historical patterns. F. Hartog, emphasizing this statement, argues that because the properties of any narrative are consistency and continuity, they can only apply to the representation of events, but not to events themselves (Hartog, 2004). Teachers and learners are merely the representatives of the historical process, in whose “activities” the present absorbs the past and the future, reducing them to the uniqueness of a single time. The dynamism of the present is associated with the occurrence of separate, unrelated processes of mutation and transformation (Khapayeva, 1999: 311). The reality of a representational approach in the educational process consists in the transformation of history into a certain demonstration, sometimes completely distorting the past (as an analytical state of time) and the future (as an aggregate of consequences determined by the dialectic of the past and the present). “The audience is supplied with the historical material that has been recycled, emasculated, transformed in a certain way. This material has been deprived of the moral principle and meaning, and real historical figures have been replaced by mannequins” (Razumovsky, 2006: 10).

Each society chooses the historical vector and the mechanism of its implementation itself, so the concrete variant includes the ability to analyze not only its own socio-historical experience, but also the experience broadcast by various social systems. As of today, the issue of effectiveness, as well as the inevitable limitations in the use of the experience of neighboring societies, remains open, since this process is of the nature of interaction and is determined by many objective conditions and subjective factors. However, there are always certain axiological attitudes in the basis of such a mutual exchange of experience.

The value features of history are largely determined by the idea of unity, which is the link between the sources and the goal, therefore the unity of history, positioned as the

complete unification of mankind, cannot have a complete form. Besides, the modern state of historical epistemology determines the fact that we are witnesses of a constant, complex process of differentiation of historical knowledge.

The fact that the axiological system potentially provokes arbitrary social constructions in the modern global world, which are often based on the agnostic basis, is of fundamental importance. With this approach, the values of a particular society are ignored. The process of divergence separating the specialization of ethnocultural communities is gradually replaced by convergence, which is characterized by the universalization of the ways of reproduction of societies.

The condition of functional unity is hierarchy, which nevertheless does not form the integrity of society. It should also be borne in mind that functional unity has the limit of its optimization, because, despite the multiplicity of variations, the potential for optimizing their combinations is limited.

The formation of a global world should be based on the development of systematic principles for the development of a universal community based on dialectic laws. The modern civilized integrated universal society has its own patterns of development at different levels, which have their own specifics and are not only global in character.

That is why the need to foresee the future is one of the sustainable needs that can be found in all human societies known to us at different historical stages. Such a need is generated by the specifics of the subject-practical activity, which is connected with the engineering as peculiar manifestations of goal-setting. However, the knowledge of past epochs can serve as a basis for predicting the future only if there is the ability to have special cognitive structures. This refers to a special logical mechanism that guarantees the adequacy of the transfer of information about the past, which is no longer there at the moment, for the future that is yet to come. Moreover, some scientists are skeptical about the predictive function of history because such an approach contradicts the definition of a historian as a specialist who studies the past.

The importance of taking into account the axiological component in historical education stimulates students to the conscious choice of their worldview guidelines for solving problems related to cultural and national identity. The definition of one's place in a particular society, as well as the development of one's own attitude to the social processes that take place in it are also of great importance. Today, sociologists are forced to state that the orientation toward satisfying personal interests becomes a goal for a significant part of the younger generation, including student youth. Naturally, such axiological attitudes prevent the formation of strong horizontal and vertical connections in society, which, as a rule, act as the basis for stabilization. It is known that the establishment of strong horizontal connections indicates that the person has certain moral guidelines, due to which constructive relationships with peers are built.

History plays a fundamental role in the reproduction of "collective memory", in the ability to connect the interests of the formation of the individual with such basic historical categories as the world community and civilization in the historical production.

Prospects for the formation of a global world order on the basis of a single axiological scale are due to multilinear theories, which assume the variability of development models, without being confined to the evolutionary paradigm.

The value of history education, in our opinion, is the return of moral principles and meanings to "the subject of history" through the authenticity of historical events and

personalities. The latter is the task of historical studies, the first – of teachers and learners. However, this separation does not contribute to the formation of historical reflection as an integral phenomenon at school or university, or even within the framework of self-tuition. The civilizational scenario of the historical process, which determines the methods of history teaching today, as P. Stearns rightly argues, leads to the fact that “for world history can become a victim of a mindless survey approach in which one factual parade follows another with few seminal events to break the flow and even fewer analytical mechanisms through which reasonably coherent chunks of chronology can be isolated and discussed (Stearns, 1987: 561).

Any holistic image should in its historical and information plan cover the entire way, without distinguishing between its temporal constructs of the past, present and future. In a certain sense, this means that the entire time, covered in this way, represents one “continuous present” because the learner extracts a holistic image of “oneself”, “fate” or “events” from the chronologically well-defined moment that separates, rather than unites the past and the future. Moreover, as far as in the teaching process the historical material is reorganized in accordance with the socially given project (a linear structure, a concentric structure, etc.), a creative and project-oriented attitude should but is not attached to the past and the future. That is why history teaching is dominated by the methods of natural sciences, an academic model and a knowledge-based / reproductive approach. Therefore, the development of goals of social and humanitarian education in the world is a constant dichotomy between “statists” and the formation of a cosmopolitan’s self-identity. However, from the perspective of modern didactics, neither one nor the other is feasible, at least because its present status itself is uncertain. Accordingly, in modern anthropological pedagogy and philosophy of education, a didactic transition from the academic and reproductive models of history education to the complex multifaceted model is being actively developed (Vyazemskiy, 2014: 9). In such a way classical realism with its recognition of public interest as “an absolute standard” (H. Morgenthau) is transforming into globalist realism, describing historical reality in the discourse of globalization and informatization, riskology and uncertainty (Panchenko, 2008: 323-331).

That is why the social values that determine cognitive work as well as a learner and a teacher with historical information form the basis for shaping the structure of their value-laden categorical targets. The reason is that any historical event will never be deprived of its objective, spatial and temporal characteristics, but it can be accepted or not accepted by society as a very significant fact in order to become a source of historical, social, ethnic, religious or other identity, in its turn. The fundamental principles of identity may include the historical events that are different in scope and significance, which will undoubtedly lead to the conflicts of various historical memory options. This situation provides ample opportunity for the manipulation of individual and collective consciousness. J. Rusen generally suggests considering such a situation as a crisis of social memory, which comes in a collision between historical consciousness and individual experience that does not fit into the framework of usual historical representations, which endangers the existing foundation and principles of identity (Rusen, 2000).

Should and can historical reflection in the context of risk society that is generated by the redundancy of reliable and unreliable historical information be formed as objective? Didactically this question is deprived of the semantic content as far as didactics of history education itself is full of contradictions (Vyazemskiy, 2014: 9). A subjective assessment of

the historical and information factor in shaping an indefinite global worldview primarily involves studying not the linearity of historical events but historical imagology, which focuses on analyzing the “mutual perception” of countries, nations, states in terms of their conflict interaction. In this case, the key to historical reflection is not a historical fact (event) but an “imagema”, i.e. a national image, a stereotype of perception (interpretation) of the fact (event). Our concept is based on the assumption that each culture in its subjective-reflexive perception is divided into “domestic” (as natural) and “alien” (unnatural). The boundary between them makes it possible to understand the relativity of any assessments and values. The didactic development and interpretation of these statements suggests that the task of historical reflection is a conscious selection on the basis of historical memory, and the task of the learner is to hypothesize about the event (fact), to prove the value of this hypothesis and to draw personal conclusions.

Conclusions

In this case the opposition of “liberals” and “statists” takes on new meaning, as far as the main referent, reflecting on the historical event and its interpretation, is not the state and the teacher but the learner– the subject of activity on studying the historical process, the interpreter of the past and the present, the moderator of the future. R. Kurzweil’s definition of intelligence as “the ability to solve problems with limited resources, in which a key such resource is time” could not be more suited to historical reflection as the ability of a reasonable individual (Kurzweil, 2013). In this sense, any history is valuable for the learner. However, the ability to reflect as a deeply individual opportunity is not always realizable due to various reasons, and the readiness for such a reflection should be seen more as a goal of upbringing rather than teaching. Modern didactic architecture of the educational process does not make it possible to fully solve or even raise these issues.

In our opinion, this is due to the excessive politicization of history education, on the one hand, and a very limited amount of time for studying humanitarian disciplines, on the other hand. Therefore, the teacher acts (forced to act) more often as a presenter, not as an analyst, and his or her function as a creator of the relevant history of values is extremely limited to the same idealization. Recognizing the importance of patriotic component in historical reflection, we believe that it does not acquire the status of an absolute determinant, and the process of history teaching should not be replaced by the process of forming patriots. Currently, the goals of history teaching are obvious and the inadequacy of the means by which teachers realize these goals is clear. However, this is the subject of another work.

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UNDERSTANDING MODERN SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN GLOBAL TENDENCIES

Vladimir Cherny*, Elena Savicheva**

Abstract

The article analyzes the evolution of the meaning of *sovereignty* and its modern understanding, especially in the context of globalization. The various theoretical concepts of sovereignty as one of the main attributes of the state are considered. A number of outstanding politicians and famous experts in this field have presented different interpretations of sovereignty. They take fundamentally different approaches to its interpretation: some of them proclaim the end of sovereignty, others deny even the fact of its erosion.

The purpose of the article is to define the role of a sovereign state in the modern international relations. The ratio of internal and external aspects of sovereignty are also analyzed. For instance, the situation in Tatarstan (Russia) in the 1990s shows the problem of competing internal claims to sovereignty. Two dimensions – external and internal – of such a phenomenon as *self-determination* and the issue of a balance between the right of self-determination and the right of territorial integrity in the international law are also considered.

One more problem, that the authors focus on is the priority of influences, on a sub-regional basis, in defining sovereignty. The Pacific Rim countries such as the USA, Canada and Russia are chosen as the case study. The authors conclude that different influences affect each region's views on sovereignty and the order of these factors may be presented as follows: political ideology; culture, including ethnicity, religion, history; economics; geography; globalization.

Key words: *sovereignty, modern international order, globalization, self-determination, territorial integrity, democracy*

“Sovereignty: supreme excellence or an example of it; supreme power over a body politic, over the territory and right to exercise it; freedom from external control; independent state” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary)

When England's king Henry VIII declared his own realm an “empire” in 1533, he meant that his kingdom was sovereign and independent of any external power. The first edition of Samuel Johnson's dictionary of 1755 defined empire as “supreme dominion; sovereign command...the region over which dominion is extended.” (Johnson, 2013). By now the concept of sovereignty has turned from a rather narrow and primitive notion that aimed at justification of monarchical authority on a particular territory to a quite broad political science and international law category.

Starting from the XVI century, nation-states sought to implement the following four objectives: territorial domination, administrative control, cultural identity and ensuring the political legitimacy through the expansion of democratic participation. Today, all of these functions of the state have been changing.

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The system of nation-states, characterized by the so called “inner world” of territorially bounded politics and “the outside world” of international military and diplomatic relations that make up the state-centered system is experiencing a serious transformation. This situation is regarded as “the elimination of the territorial dimension of politics, power and control” (Held D., McGrew A., Goldblatt D., Perraton J. (1999).

To claim that the people are sovereign, means to know how they can exercise their right to sovereignty. Around this problem, since the XIX century, a serious political and cultural debate started (Modisett, 2002:133).

In 1991 the end of the great-power standoff between the USA and USSR, and the ensuing surge in global economic relations, seems like a new age in international relations. The era of 1648 year's Treaty of Westphalia was coming to an end. (Beaulac, 2004). Dramatic transition in both local and transnational power forces underlined an importance of national politics and change the meaning of the modern understanding of sovereignty.

The phenomenon of sovereignty is considered by experts in the context of interaction between international actors, as well as through the prism of security issues at all levels – national, regional and global. The most celebrated comment on sovereignty was made by the ex-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992, in his report to Security Council: “The foundation-stone for [peacekeeping] is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by any reality” (Ghali, 1992).

Japanese businessman Kenichi Ohmae, one of the world's leading business and corporate strategists, known as Mr. Strategy, calls diminishing stature of the state in the modern world as “a borderless world” (Ohmae, 1992). The impact of globalization remains conjectural and controversial. Governments acting on behalf of states are losing their room for maneuver. Sovereignty as operational politics is increasingly divorced, then, from its essential and foundational idea of autonomy. Indeed, transnational social forces have managed to produce significant results in the domains of human rights and environmental policy, exemplifying possibilities for empowerment from below. Impressively, indigenous peoples have used global arenas to build a movement that has generated surprisingly strong support for their claims for self-determination, which were once dismissed as mere nostalgia.

With the end of the cold war, there was hope that humanity finally creates a new world order based on the leading role of the United Nations and the rule of international law. In the immediate aftermath of the cold war, world order is driven by seemingly contradictory pressures on the state that is exposing the double inadequacy of sovereignty as either a descriptive or prescriptive master principle. We live in an era of globalization – rapid mutual penetration and interdependence of national states. Globalization brings with it some clear benefits for humanity. It contributes to the worldwide dissemination of scientific and technological revolution, the growth of material production, improvement of medical care, better education, accelerates the revolution in transport and communications, in microelectronics. But at the same time globalization promotes the growth of new threats that mankind may confront only united and working together.

Globalization erodes borders, making even the most powerful of states seems unduly porous in relation to unwanted forms of penetration. Religious and political extremism makes it more hazardous than ever before to be a foreign, even a prosperous tourist, as

terrorist tactics are deliberated being directed toward cutting links between governing authorities and the outside world.

The unprecedented liberalization of world economic relations and intensification of cooperation between national economies take place. Multinational corporations with global interests, already control more than 1/3 of the assets of all private companies.

European institutions would have provided the foundation for new types of multi-state sovereignty without the pretensions of absolutism that underpinned the statist claims, especially in the pre-liberal era.

While the state has lost its status as the almost sole actor in the international arena, sovereignty—one of the main attributes of the state —has lost its absolute character. Professor Louis Henkin who has characterized the concept of sovereignty as variable, stated that sovereignty meant many things, some essential, some insignificant, some controversial; some that are not warranted and should not be accepted. He has written: “Sovereignty is a bad word, not only because it has served terrible national mythologies; in international relations, and even in international law, it is often a catchword, a substitute for a thinking and precision” (Henkin, 1995).

The UN General Assembly’s 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States enumerates the implications of sovereign equality, some of which are related to internal sovereignty but most of which concern the external aspects. The states enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of the economic, social, political, or other nature (Declaration on Principles of International Law, 1970).

In the former Soviet Union, the 1977 Constitution laid down that each “union republic shall be a sovereign Soviet socialist state which united with other Soviet republics in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (Конституция СССР, 1977). The adjectives “Soviet” and “socialist” implied certain limitations on the republics’ sovereignty. Moreover, the powers of the union republics under the 1977 Constitution were rather limited and were hardly consistent with full sovereignty since most powers were vested in the central authorities. This situation changed drastically with the collapse of the center in 1991, and all the union republics have become independent since the Soviet Union disintegrated.

Perhaps an even more interesting case of competing internal claims to sovereignty is the situation of Tatarstan, which used to be an autonomous republic within Russian Federation of the USSR. In 1990, Tatarstan proclaimed its own state sovereignty. This declaration was confirmed in 1992 with a referendum in which a large majority answered in the affirmative to the question, “Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign State, the subject of international law, forming its relations with the new Russia, other republics and states on the basis of equal agreements?” (Khakimov, 1996). While the relations between the two have been regulated by various agreements, so far Tatarstan continues in practice to be part of the present Russia.

Self-determination, one of the most enigmatic and controversial notions of international law, has two dimensions. External self-determination refers to the right of every people, whatever that term may mean, to choose their own international political status, including independence or merger with another state. Internal self-determination refers to the right of the citizens of any existing state to represent democratic government. While internal aspect of self-determination can easily be reconciled with sovereignty, the

external aspect may constitute a grave danger to the sovereignty of the state insofar as it threatens the state's territorial integrity by legitimizing secessionist movements. Various UN General Assembly resolutions have tried to strike a balance between the right of self-determination and the right of territorial integrity, but to do so adequately is practically an impossible task. Similarly, internationally accepted rules on human rights and humanitarian law have granted to individuals and to groups certain rights against their state which consequently limit the latter's sovereignty.

The ethnic revival presents yet another severe challenge to old notion of sovereignty. Since several thousand peoples or ethnic communities exist in the world- and the planet is too small to provide each of them full sovereignty over a piece of land – compromises must be found to satisfy at least partially the aspirations of these various groups. As it follows, the term sovereignty can be used in a flexible manner, and it is possible for both the central government and regional or autonomous authorities each to be lawful bearers of a share of sovereignty without necessarily prompting the disappearance or dismemberment of the state. G. Gottlieb has proposed a “state-plus-nations” approach that deconstructs the notion of sovereignty into “sovereignty as power over the people and sovereignty as power over territory” (Gottlieb, 1993: 37) and redistributes competence accordingly. D. Elkins has proposed “a greater role for non-territorial organizations and identities” for the XXI century (Elkins, 1997: 142).

The concept of sovereignty experienced a serious challenge by the so-called humanitarian interventions. Humanitarian interventions, as a rule, were accompanied by an attempt to revise the principles and norms of international law.

The theoretical concept of sovereignty has been the object of various reproaches and criticism. In its absolute form, it justifies totalitarian and expansionist regimes. Leaders may use sovereignty as a pretext for justifying the violation of a state's international obligations. Even at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, a round table on “The end of sovereignty?” did not delete the question mark in its title.

However, sovereignty has undergone great changes due to the growing interdependence of states and the need for diffusion of power within the state. Modern developments seem to justify a careful study of the theory of pluralistic sovereignty developed at the beginning of the century by L. Duguit, H. H. Krabbe and H.J. Laski. (Shapira, Tabory, 1999) This concept was intended to convey the idea that various political, economic, social, and religious groups dominate the government of each state.

The terrorist attacks of 9.11.2001 only reinforced this situation.

Vision of a future is not state-centric anymore. Dr. F. Fukuyama, in his essay “The End of History?” (1989), manager P. Drucker, in his “Post-capitalist Society”(2013), and banker W. Wriston, in his “The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming Our World” (1992) have written about transition from “material” economy to an “information economy” and have concluded that amount of capital is undermining sovereignty”. R. Rosecrance expressed his optimistic view of the influence of globalization on the “post-nation-state”: “nation-states will remain the main organizing factor in international politics... they will continue to compete” (Rosecrance, 1999).

Indeed, globalization means increased competition. Competition and balance of power between nations always cause and will cause in future conflicts. In the modern world the theory of balance of power has not lost relevance (Бажанов, 2001).

At the same time, in the states, there are often serious internal difficulties: economic, social, ethnic, ideological, environmental, etc. In such a complex environment, globalization is a highly useful for preserving a peaceful environment. Along with the positive factors can occur and negative characteristics. For example, the process of reforms in the country could collapse under the weight of numerous problems. For example, if the country's chaos, from which will grow, as it usually happens, ultra-nationalist dictatorship.

Pessimists can see more conflicts and decline than prosperity of the nation-state. S. Huntington, in his "The Clash of Civilizations?" analyzing present worldwide cultural situation argued that "the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future" and conflict between "the West and the Rest", constituting that Confucian-Islamic connection would challenge Western "interests, values and power" (S. Huntington, 1993: 46). D. Kaplan, in "The Coming Anarchy" (2002) and "The Ends of the Earth" (1994) also presented disturbing portrait of the future. He shared pessimism of the neo-Malthusian's idea and accepts M. van Creveld's conclusion of subnational and low-intensity conflicts, by breakdown of authority, increased violence, rule by warlords or guerilla armies and urban mafias (Kaplan, 1994: 73.).

T. Friedman, in his "The Lexus and the Olive Tree" (Friedman, 1999) offered a synthesis of both optimists and pessimists. While "olive tree" represents resistance to changes from traditionalists struggling to preserve cultural roots, "Lexus" symbolized global revolutionary changes of security, politics, business culture, finance, technology, and the environment. In his mind globalization "does more good than harm". Thus, the "electronic herd" can help global investors to move billions of dollars to nondemocratic countries for "building blocks" of democracy. It might create also super-empowered individuals, acting independently on the world stage, like Jody Williams, Nobel Prize Peace winner for engineering global ban on land mines against wishes of five members of UN Security Council.

J. Micklethwait and A. Wooldridge, in "A Future Perfect: the Essential of Globalization" (2000) fuse optimism and pessimism. They believe that the number of the people who have benefit from globalization is far larger. At the same time they write, that far from bringing nations together, globalization has often helped awaken old nationalist or fundamentalist impulses (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2000).

As Kenneth Waltz concludes, "politics as usual prevails over economics" (Waltz, 1999: 694).

As noted at the outset, the ways these contending visions get sorted out already have a direct impact on the future of the entire world. If the view of the post-nation-state optimists prevails, the world countries can maintain sufficient capabilities across the spectrum of conflicts to deter any potential challenges.

Thus, sovereignty refers to the relationship between states: internal sovereignty means supremacy over all else in one's territory, and external sovereignty means independence from authorities outside that territory. Sovereignty maintains that all states are equal, but one of the truisms in world politics is that nothing is distributed equally on the face of the globe – not people, not resources, not climate, not geography, not technology. So while sovereignty carries with it the principle of independence the outside authority, it does not ensure equality in capabilities or independence from outside interference.

Intrigued question is to discover perspectives on sovereignty of the Pacific Rim countries like the USA, Canada and Russia, which have deep European roots. What differences exist, and what the implications are. From the point of formal topic, “the priority of influences, on a sub-regional basis, in defining sovereignty”, the basic issue is really how different influences affect each region’s views on sovereignty – and the implications of these differences.

The order of factors affecting the view of sovereignty may be presented as follows:

- Political ideology;
- Culture, including ethnicity, religion, history, etc;
- Economics;
- Geography;
- Globalization.

Admittedly, there is a degree of overlap between many of these factors, in particular, ideology and culture. But it was useful to try to distinguish between them.

The U.S., Canada and Russia are mature nation-states sharing a European tradition and broad, general agreement on what sovereignty means: effective rule over territory and population and recognition by other states. This long-standing historical view was reinforced by the Cold War, in which maintaining control over sovereign territory was seen as a life-or-death security issue. Even then, despite political differences, there is generally agreed understanding of sovereignty – and its importance.

This helps explain *why political ideology* is the most important influence in understanding of shared views on sovereignty. A common belief in the principles on which the state is founded is more important than shared ethnicity or religion -indeed, the U.S., Canada and Russia view themselves as nations of immigrants, in which nationalism is defined more by shared values than by blood. In the case of United States and Canada this is a liberal democratic ideal. For the Soviet state it was a socialist model that transcended borders. Today’s Russia continues to move toward the liberal democratic model – creating a new bond with Western Europe, the U.S. and Canada.

Culture is closely related to ideology. Its main influence is in tradition of inclusion, rather than exclusion, which results in an adaptable society. Since many groups have historically made up the populations, differences of religion or maternal language have either been accepted or downplayed. Minority rights have thus been an integral part of the concept of sovereignty.

Geography plays a somewhat different role in the case of North America and Russia. In the former, geography is certainly beneficial. The continent is generally removed from the site of conflict – it’s a nice neighborhood, and interstate relations with neighbors are relatively simple. Canada has one territorial neighbor and the USA has two. From a Canadian perspective, the proximity of the USA, although not a territorial threat (at least not recently), is nonetheless a pressure on sovereignty due to immense economic and cultural influences. The Soviet Union strived to create a peaceful – or, at least, safe-neighborhood by building an empire of like-minded states on its borders; for Russia, the situation is much more complicated – a vast territory that borders on more than a dozen countries and at least one significant internal challenge to Russian sovereignty.

Apart from Canada’s sensitivity, *economics* is not a large determinant in defining sovereignty in North America. The Canadian and U.S. economies are similar and closely linked, and NAFTA is intended to increase this closeness. Canadian and US companies

seek international partners and international investment, and are open to a significant degree of foreign ownership; foreign ownership and foreign investment is rarely a significant concern. Both the US and Canada are rich by comparative standards and can be classified as “Haves”, vice “Have Nots.” Russia – resource rich, albeit cash-poor – is working hard to integrate with the world economy, while at the same time ensuring it controls economic activities taking place within its borders. And while Russia is less concerned about a military threat from the West, it remains concerned about the potential economic impact on its sovereignty from wealthier countries.

Finally, *globalization* is a much less significant factor for Russia, or the US and Canada. For example, there is a little fear of losing of cultural identity as a result of expanding of neoliberal economy and finance, and implementation of the Internet technology. In general, all countries believe that they have more to gain than lose, politically and economically, through globalization – and thus promote it.

What does this set of priorities mean? First of all, the both countries will be sympathetic to those with a similar ideology – whether it is a state or a group within a state. Second, their emphasis on inclusiveness increasingly extends beyond their own borders – and thus into other regions and countries. Third, because they are liberal democracies and will respond to the concerns of their citizens, many with roots or ties in other parts of the world. The result is likely to be greater willingness to intervene in other countries for humanitarian reasons. Finally, in the event intervention is necessary, they are likely to seek regional partners. Sovereignty, while perhaps no longer the absolute it once was, is still so important that the USA, Canada and Russia are unlikely to want to challenge it lightly – or alone.

So, nowadays a chance for progressive development might come from the democratic system and self-determination of the nation and the people in the country, and the creation on this basis of a new state. Democracy is an ideology that allows bridging the gap between states and allows uniting them. Objective factors contribute to the development of all of modern humanity on the path of democracy.

First, it is the lessons of history, the results of left and right totalitarian regimes in the XX century. They proclaimed different ideals, pursue different goals, but the consequences of their actions are the same – the bloodshed, enslavement of people, degradation and total collapse of state and society. The present generation must not fail to take into account the sad experience.

Second, the ideological factor plays the important role. The principles of democracy are universally recognized, enshrined in the UN Charter and other important documents of our time. And even the most notorious dictators are forced to imitate the democrats and progressive sounding of the Constitution, on the stage of the elections to produce a kind of Parliament to declare their commitment to protect the rights of citizens.

Thirdly, democratization contributes to raise the cultural level of the broad strata of the population. In the early twentieth century the vast majority of people could not read and write, they saw in their rulers the messengers of God on the Earth and were meekly prepared to obey them. Now in many countries people are not just educated, but well aware of the value of their leadership and value of their rights and freedoms.

Fourth, authoritarianism reinforces and exacerbates all the social problems, including corruption, nepotism etc.

Finally, the modern economy also requires democratization. Totalitarianism stifles the incentives for the manufacturer to work, hinders initiative and the exchange of ideas, goods, financial and technological resources hinders the free movement of people.

Some people argue that democracy isn't for everyone. Their arguments, however, do not sound convincing. Because in real life the objective factors of democracy contribute to the development of modern humanity. The globalization of democracy has led to an erosion of the foundation of the totalitarian regime – unleashes centrifugal forces and gives rise to political and ideological opposition in a number of states. In this case, we are witnessing the stratification of society, a fierce struggle between various political groups, ideological currents and social groups, between the center and the regions, ethnic groups, etc. The political crisis usually leads to poor management of economic processes. The center is unable to develop a single integrated strategy for economic transformation. In addition, it fails to implement such a strategy in practice. In the end, such regimes collapse. Further development of the state can only be on the principles of democracy, otherwise stagnation and collapse is inevitable. And on the way to democratization, the principles of sovereignty play an important role in maintaining peace and prosperity of nations.

Conclusion

The issue of sovereignty has become particularly relevant nowadays due to the need for awareness of the impact of globalization on such a traditional actor in world politics, as the state. In the course of historical evolution the concept of sovereignty has undergone the certain transformation, which, however, does not affect its foundations. Despite the heated debates on the issue of sovereignty in the world political science practically all international relations paradigms view sovereignty as one of the key categories with a status of a fundamental norm. Sovereignty – it's like a bridge: on one end of each is total liberty and on the other one – is comprehensive responsibility.

At the same time nowadays the state has lost its status as the almost sole actor in the international arena, and sovereignty has lost its absolute character. Sovereignty has undergone great changes due to the growing interdependence of states and the need for diffusion of power within the state. In practical terms the resolution of the problem of sovereignty often depends, in many respects, on interests not only of the directly concerned party, but also on influence of national interests of the states – powerful leaders of the modern world, and on economic interests of non-state players – multinational corporations. The ethnic revival presents yet another severe challenge to old notion of sovereignty.

The concept of national sovereignty has two main aspects – internal and external. Sovereignty refers to the relationship between states: internal sovereignty means supremacy over all else in one's territory, and external sovereignty means independence from authorities outside that territory. So, its, on the one hand, the state's freedom to choose its own path of economic development, political system, civil and criminal law, etc., and, on the other hand, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, their equality and independence.

According to the UN documents, states enjoy sovereignty and equality. They have equal rights and duties and they are equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of the economic, social, political, or other nature. But formal legal equality of states cannot undo the fact that they differ in their territory, population, natural resources, economic potential, social stability, political authority, weapons, etc.

These differences lead to the inequality of states in terms of national power and possibilities of the state to defend its sovereignty.

Various UN General Assembly resolutions have also tried to strike a balance between the right of self-determination and the right of territorial integrity. While internal aspect of self-determination can easily be reconciled with sovereignty, the external aspect may constitute a grave danger to the sovereignty of the state insofar as it threatens the state's territorial integrity by legitimizing secessionist movements.

We live in the era of globalization, the rapid mutual penetration and interdependence of national states. A powerful factor of globalization – the failure of former Communist countries and regimes with socialist orientation, their rejection of the old development model, and inclusion in a single world economy. Unprecedented liberalization of world economic relations has led to increased cooperation between national economies.

Identified in the process of democratization and globalization, the apparent decline in the status of the state is sometimes associated with the modern world's costs, which looks like a “world without borders.” The impact of globalization on the state is contradictory. Government, acting on behalf of the states lose maneuver in the open world space. As a result, sovereignty as a political function more and more is separated from the idea of autonomy. Indeed, some movements, joining together in transnational social forces, have managed to achieve significant results in the area of human rights, politics, in the environmental field. They have shown examples of acquisition of power “from below”.

Some critics, however, argue that globalization has exacerbated the dependence of small and weak states from strong and large. But weak and small do not always depend on their antipodes. Economic dependence remains, but gradually becomes mutual. Strong and large depend on previous objects of control and exploitation. Developed countries lose from high oil prices, from violations of freedom of passage through international straits, suffering from waves of refugees, the flow of drugs from conflict zones, terrorism, fueled by backwardness and deprivation.

In general, the globalization can make different groups of mankind so interrelated that in the end they get rid of the habit to resolve differences through violence, to learn to cooperate with each other. As globalization promotes the growth of new threats the mankind can confront them only by uniting and working together. In this case, there is hope that the XXI century will be less bloody than the last twentieth century.

Further development of the state can only be on the principles of democracy, otherwise stagnation and collapse is inevitable. The chance for progressive development might come from the democratic system and self-determination of the nation. In real life the objective factors of democracy contribute to the development of modern humanity. And on the way to democratization, the principles of sovereignty play an important role in maintaining peace and prosperity of nations and new countries.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Ionel Căndea, *Cetatea Albă. Cercetări arheologice și istorice*. Coordonare a versiunii engleze: Constantin Ardeleanu [Cetatea Albă. Archaeological and Historical Researches. Coordination of the English version: Constantin Ardeleanu], Editura Istros a Muzeului Brăilei "Carol I", Brăila, 2016, 318 pp.; ill., plans, drawings. ISBN 978-606-654-216-6

The research on Moldavian medieval fortress of Cetatea Albă, a "fabulous historical monument" (p. 183: all references are to the text English), [Akkerman; today – Belgorod-Dnestrovskoo, Ukraine] have been devoted in recent years valuable monographs of historians from Moldavia and Ukraine (Andrej Ktasnožon, Mariana Șlapac, and Vitalie Josanu). In the 90s has conducted research and a well-known Romanian mediaevalist archaeologist, Professor Ionel Căndea from Museum of Brăila; his studies were collected in this volume, bilingual (Romanian: pp. 1-181; English: pp. 183-301).

Cetatea Albă in the Romanian Historiography (with the subchapters – *The Chroniclers. A. Moldavia; B. Wallachia; The Modern Historiography*) (pp. 183-241). After showing that "Located at the mouth of River Danube, Cetatea Albă has attracted, since the beginnings of its existence, the interest of all those who have known it, in a way or another, in its entire splendour and grandeur" (p. 183), the author shows "the most significant contributions of the Romanian historiography referring to this fabulous historical monument. We shall naturally start with the earliest references from the chronicles written in Slavic, and then we shall continue with the chroniclers from the 17th and 18th centuries. We have to say that all information from those times are of interest for us, regardless if they refer to the *fortress*, the *district*, the *civil settlement* or the *harbour* of Cetatea Albă. Then, we shall strive to mention the contributions regarding Cetatea Albă from the age of the Enlightenment and the Romantic period up to mid-19th century. From B.P. Hasdeu to A.D. Xenopol and from the latter to Ioan Bogdan, Romanian historians opened a new era in the scholarly interest for the medieval fortress from the mouth of the Dniester. Genuine pioneer and builder of remarkable institutions in the Romanian historiography, N. Iorga is also the author of a monumental work. *Istoria Chilie și Cetății Albe*, which has remained the most important Romanian volume on this topic since its publication. The interest for the citadel grew with Gheorghe Brătianu, due the significant contributions of this historian, a contemporary and worthy successor of Iorga. The Romanian rule at Cetatea albă (1918-1940) brought about an increase in the interest for this cherished historical heritage, which resulted in the first Romanian archaeological surveys and collection of data relevant for the scholarly debate on Cetatea Albă. After 1945, as well as after 1989, the presence of Cetatea albă in the Romanian historiography is related to conjunctures which have been more or less favourable to their fruition" (pp. 183-184).

The Archaeological Excavations from Belgorod-Dnestrovsk (Cetatea Albă) in 1997/1998 (pp. 243-277) – about the history of the archaeological researches at Cetatea Albă; the placement of the excavations; stratigraphy; description of the construction remains; description of discovered materials; and Conclusions: "As far as 1997 archaeological season at the citadel from Belgorod Dnestrovsk is concerned, drawing conclusions is certainly premature. Firstly, the two researched surfaces were excavated halfway to the foot of the citadel foundation. Thus, we can say are halfway in our research. Then, previous unpublished researches and the uncontrolled interventions of treasure seekers made the first surface (S1) a verification of what had happened in front of the citadel's northern all, between the cellar and the north-eastern tower" (p. 266); and "The 1998 archaeological season took place in relatively good conditions and mainly pursued the only medieval complex which had been reached since 1997 (i.e. the garbage pit below wall no. 7). It is situated near the citadel's eastern wall (tangent at one moment and then parallel to it about 20-25 cm), and its content could clarify the questions referring to the moment when the citadel was built.

Up this moment and under the reserve of studying all the materials inside, we tend to consider that this complex is not older than the 14th century. Secondly, tomb no. 1 cannot have a great contribution to clarify these questions due to its stratigraphic position” (pp. 276-277).

The Ottoman Siege of Cetatea Albă in 1484 in a Less-Known Italian Source. It's about the account of Andreea Cambini, published in the book *Libro della origine de Turchi et imperio delli Ottomanni* (Florence, 1537), historical source translated and used in Romanian historiography, for the first time, by Nicolae Bălcescu, in 1846, in *Puterea armată și arta militară la români* [The Military Power and Art at the Romanians]; and then by Bogdan P. Hasdeu and N. Iorga. Professor Căndeia reverses a critical analysis on the text of author from Florence, especially in discussing “a piece of information which is a confirmation by a contemporary source regarding the existence of a written treaty between Vlad Călugărul and Bayezid II. This is what Cambini wrote: «As a result, in the hope of getting good results from the part, he sent his envoys to humble beg for peace. Bayezid listened to them benevolently and he easily accepted it, and after a treaty had been concluded, according to which he was to be paid a certain amount of dinars as a tribute, he received the Wallachian ruler under his protection and then, without lingering, he crossed the Danube, and, as a model to his people, he led his army to those places where the navy was stationed, waiting for the infantry to come from Moncastro (emphasis of Professor Căndeia – our note)».

As we can notice, Andrea Cambini's mention regarding the treaty between Vlad and Bayezid II concluded in 1484 and *known since 1537* from the work published by the Florentine author does not appear in the long list of proofs brought by M. Maxim in this sense. We are glad we can mention it here on top of the list, as it appeared in Western sources before 1537. It is true that M. Maxim referred to the events that occurred between 1475-1484/1486 [Mihai Maxim, *Țările Române și Înalta Poartă (Cadru juridic al relațiilor româno-otomane în Evul Mediu)*, București, 1996, pp. 93-95], but only from the perspectives of the relations between Stephen the Great and Bayezid II, also regarding Cetatea Albă and the border between Moldavia and the Porte.

The rest of Cambini's fragment on the siege of Cetatea Albă is generally, well-known. It remains for a future research, once we have access to both mentioned Italian editors (1537 and 1654) and after an ample corroboration with other categories of sources, to explain the omission of the siege of Chilia in Cambini's work, as justly questioned by N. Iorga. In other works, which would be the source or source with so many rich details on the preparation of the expedition against Cetatea Albă and Chilia, but with references only to the former?” (pp. 286-288).

The Altar of the Church from the Citadel of Cetatea Albă and the “Ottoman Hypothesis Regarding the Construction of the Citadel. In another part of this volume, the author – based on critical analysis of a study by the architect Mariana Șlapac from Moldova – clarify an issue in an effort “to decipher the mysteries of the fabulous monument”. Showing that “We would like to highlight the author's contribution to keep the topic alive among the scientific community and to clarify essential aspects regarding the genesis of the citadel, the oldest fortification of the medieval ensemble preserved at Cetatea Albă”, he states unequivocally: “The direct contact with the monument allowed us to notice that what the author of the article called the «Ottoman hypothesis» cannot be maintained. Moreover, the remark made by Mariana Șlapac in a footnote («This hypothesis can only be accepted as the entire reconstruction from the ground of the citadel after 1484») is wrong” (p. 291). And in “conclusion, «the Turkish or Ottoman hypothesis» of building or reconstructing the citadel cannot be maintained. We also cannot agree to the suggestion of potential Cuman or Slavic constructors created by them. The Christians architectonic forms, typical to a synthesis of Eastern and Western elements, are only the point of departure for a definite answer. In this context, we have to also consider a Byzantine hypothesis regarding the building of the chapel, and implicitly of the citadel, where the employment of Genoese engineers cannot be excluded” (p. 293).

Religious Edifices at Cetatea Albă and the Citadel of Suceava (14th-15th Centuries). It is a comeback of the author at allegations of the mentioned researcher from Moldavia: “Certainly, her intention to correct and minimize us becomes even clearer in the case of the second inaccuracy she imputes to us” (p. 298).

With a rich illustration, the volume of well-known Romanian mediaevalist is a very important contribution, known as the author's documentary accuracy, at the better clarification of some aspects of the Cetatea Albă's history; and honestly, Romanian scientist (elected in the summer of 2016 corresponding member of the Romanian Academy) shows that he "is aware that the new titles and authors will come up out of the thoroughly researched past of the medieval monument, papers and scholars that we have unintentionally overlooked. We look forward to such new approaches on this place and the facts related to it, wherever they may appear" (p. 242).

Stoica Lascu

Ioan Bolovan, Rudolf Gräf, Harald Heppner, Oana Mihaela-Tămaș (eds.), *World War I. The Other Face of the War*. Edited by... (Romanian Academy. Center for Transylvanian Studies), Presa Universitară Clujeană/Cluj University Press, Cluj-Napoca, 2016, 478 pp.; ill., facsim. ISBN 978-606-8694-61-0; 978-606-37-0028-6

The studies included in this volume represent the results of Conference held at "Babeș-Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca (October 12-14, 2015), as well as other papers in accord with the topic. In *Foreword* (p. 7), the editors explain the substance of their approach: "«The other face of the war» indicates there are some need to focus on World War I, which had a great impact on later generations influencing not only the interwar period, but also some thinking and acting till near present. «The other face of the war» symbolizes also the readiness to study not only the military but also the civil aspects including the perspectives of the contemporaries on the other sides of the fronts. «The other face of the war» may also show the respect to all small contemporary people too involved unwillingly into a period of dense violence. Finally «the other face of the war» means the reason to participate at an international discussion on World War I Studies focusing on less known subjects for working in favour of a larger horizon".

The volume is divided into three themes – *Political Thought and Memory* (14 studies: pp. 11-192), *Nationalism* (8 studies: pp. 193-295), and *Civil Society* (11 studies: pp. 297-474). The studies in *Political Thought and Memory* (pp. 11-192): Hadrian Gorun, *France and the Romanian Public Opinion at the Beginning of the Great War* (pp. 11-17) – study based on some testimonies from "Universul" and "Adevărul" newspapers; the author believes that "The public opinion in the Kingdom of Romania did not play a decisive role in influencing the final decision of the government" (p. 17); Raluca Tomi, *An Intellectual during the Neutrality Period: C.I. Istrati* (pp. 19-32) – study based on Constantin I. Istrati's *Jurnal* (unpublished), the well-know Romanian scientist and political man, who care avut two missions in Italy (September 1914, December 1914-March 1915): "The journal of C.I. Istrati is still a source, which has not been explored by the Romanian historians, which brings new information about the diplomatic activity of the neutrality period and reflects the state of spirit of the politicians who during the neutrality period gad to solve dilemmas on which depended the survival of the Romanian State" (p. 32); Marius-Mircea Mitrache, *Vox clamantis in deserto: The German and French Peace Movements and the Difficult Dream of Peace during the Great War* (pp. 33-49); Joseph Schmauch, *A Highly Contested Future. French and German Governmental Plans for Alsace-Lorraine in the First World War* (pp. 51-69) – in his conclusions, the French author shows: "Through these experiences in Paris as well as in Berlin, one can learn about some Alsation-Lorrain specificities, whose complexity both the French and the German alike failed to understand and to manage. They both faced some of the same obstacles and hit part of the cultural heritage left by the enemy nation in this crossroad region Nevertheless, it can be highlighted that all these tensions have been positive. The local legislation in Alsace-Lorraine has helped France to build up its own Welfare system, which is one of the most protective ones in Europe. It was an Alsatian, Pierre Pflimlin, who convinced De Gaulle to initiate some decentralization in France. It was a Lorrainer, Robert Schumann, who was one of the pioneers of French-German reconciliation and of European

construction” (p. 65); Mihnea-Simion Stoica, *Political Discourse As Romania Entered World War I. An Analysis of the Speeches Given in the Chamber of Deputies*, 1916 (pp. 71-79); Vlad Popovici, *Sketches from the Activity of Romanian MPs in the Parliament of Hungary during World War I* (pp. 81-94); Ovidiu Emil Iudean, *Bridging the Gap: Romanian Parliamentary Elite in Aid of their Communities during the First World War* (pp. 95-107) – the author presents a concrete situation: “The present case study will focus one of these connected individuals and the way they lent and intermediated support, taking as an example the correspondence of the Romanian parliamentary representative Ion Ciocan, between January and July 1915” (p. 95); Mihaela Mehedinți-Beican, *Sequences of the First World War in the Press. Transylvanian Romanians between Ethnicity and Politics before the Great Union* (pp. 109-122) – the study discusses the role of Romanian press from Transylvania in preparing the Great Union, with examples from more newspapers (“Cultura creștină”, “Drapelul”, “Gazeta Transilvaniei”, “Gazeta poporului”, “Cosânzeana”: “The three key moments of the war from a Romanian perspective, namely October 1914, August 1916 and December 1918, are well represented in the pages of most Transylvanian periodicals, which thus had a major contribution to preparing Romanians for the post-war reality, specifically a much larger country incorporating vast territories which used to belong to empires that were now extinct, and for the numerous challenges that stemmed from the situation” (p. 122); Ioana Mihaela Bonda, Oana Mihaela Tămaș, *Romania’s Neutrality in the Eyes of Banat Intellectuals (1914-1916)* (pp. 123-131); Mircea-Gheorghe Abrudan, “My Participation in the First World War”. *The Manuscript Diary of the Transylvanian Saxon, Otto Folberth* (pp. 133-142). Mihai D. Drecin, *Russian Images and Impressions in the Correspondence between the Refugee Hortensia Cosma-Goga and Octavian Goga (January-April 1917)* (pp. 143-150); Mihai-Octavian Groza, *Transylvania and Banat in the Autumn and Winter of 1918. “The revolutionary Violence” As Reflected in Memoirs* (pp. 151-161); Ioan Bolovan, Adrian Onofreiu, *Orphans, Widows and Invalids in Transylvania during and after the Great War. Statistical Contributions Concerning Bistrița-Năsăud County* (pp. 163-177) – the authors noted that “13,370 Romanians were mobilized to the front from the former county of Bistrița, alongside 1,252 individuals who were mobilized for the sedentary administrative services. Those who perished on the battlefields included 1,463 Romanian soldiers; 423 died in prisons or hospitals from the injuries they had incurred and 989 went missing. 693 disabled Romanians returned home. Those who were killed in battle left behind 1,125 widows and 2,564 orphans” (pp. 172-173); Alessio Fornasin, Marco Breschi, Nelu Dan, Matteo Manfredini, *Italian Military Deaths in the WWI. National Estimates and Regional Differences* (pp. 179-192).

The studies in *Nationalism* (pp. 193-295): József Lukács, *Interethnic Relations and the Attitude Towards War As Reflected in the Cluj Press in the Spring and Summer of 1914* (pp. 196-210); Dzhumyha Yevhen, “Between the Game and the War”: *Children’s Patriotism in Odessa during the Great War (1914-1917)* (pp. 211-222) – the author’s analysis of this documented article concludes, among other: “Perceptions of the First World War by children depended on their families. Many children, however, remained without parental attention because of the growth of social problems. Germans were represented as cowards, traitors, and aggressive, extremely cruel soldiers in the press for children. Children perceived war as a game, an adventure. Therefore, boys and girls fled to the front line, especially in the autumn and spring. Society condemned this, but permitted the presence of children on the front. Soldiers often helped children to get to the front. In the home front, war games became popular among children. Children were involved in charity. It was not only their wish, but also their duty. Boys and girls prepared dressing materials, gathered sugar, money, warm clothes and so on” (p. 222); Alina-Oana Șmigun, *Romania in 1915: National Interest in Neutrality Years. Between Press Bribery, Royal Hopes and Popular Expectations* (pp. 223-236); Kamil Ruzsala, *Rumours, Fear, Anxiety, War? Social Mood and Situation at the Beginning of the First World War in Smaller Towns in West Galicia* (pp. 237-246); Marc Stegherr, *Loyalties and Disloyalties. The Question of Treason and Collaboration in the First World War and the Ruthenian “Irredenta”* (pp. 247-257); Cătălin Turliuc, *Nationalism at Work: Justifying World War One* (pp. 259-267); Iulia-Dorina Stanciu, *The Soldier’s Relationship with the “Home Front” Captured in the Romanian War Songs* (pp. 269-279); Stefano Santoro, *WWI and the Radicalization of Nationalism. The Case of the Transylvanian Pedagogist Onisifor Ghibu* (pp. 281-295).

The studies in *Civil Society* (pp. 297-474): Răducu Rușet, Tiberiu Iordan, *The Assassination in Sarajevo Reflected in "Gazeta de Transilvania"* (pp. 299-314); Ana Victoria Sima, Mirela Andrei Popa, *Children during a Time of War. A Transylvanian Perspective on World War I* (pp. 215-230); Valeria Sorostineanu, *And There Was Still War. Transylvania in 1915 between Propaganda and Donations* (pp. 331-343); Diana Covaci, *"By Word and Example": Mobilizing People through the Circulars Issued by the Romanian Greek-Catholic Church in Transylvania (1915)* (pp. 345-363); Cristian Bârsu, *A Significant Success of the Preparations for War in Romania in 1915. The Book War Surgery by Iacob Iacobovici* (pp. 365-377); Giuseppe Motta, *The Joint Distribution Committee and the Relief of Russian Jews* (pp. 379-395) – author refers in his study at the situation of the Jews in Russia ("The conditions of Jews in Tsarist Russia were strongly conditioned by the existence of the Pale of Settlement, which practically represented a sort of open-air prison for the majority of Russian Jews, who were concentrated in some «special» areas next to the western frontiers, almost the entire Ukraine including Bessarabia, Russian Poland and the Lithuanian and White-Russian provinces", p. 380), the Great War and Russian Jews ("The Great War represented an occasion for those Jews hoped to reform Tsarist misrule and improve Jewish conditions. In many synagogues prayers were offered up for the success of German army and it was not surprising, therefore, that many Jews viewed the Great War as the perfect occasion to change the situation of Russia Jews, and most of all, of the Tsarist Empire" – p. 382), about the actions of Joint Distribution Committee: "The relief funds sent since the outbreak of the war until July 31, 1918 were directed in particular towards Russia (\$2,812,300.00), Poland (\$5,376,662.98 (Austria-Hungary (\$1,583,700.00) and Palestine (\$1,571,485.86) while only \$616,004.30 reached Turkey and \$135,900 Romania" (p. 294); Dana-Emilia Câmpean, Maria Aurelia Diaconu, *Between Sadness and Agony. Disease and Death behind the Front Line* (pp. 397-409); Mária Lupescu Makó, Radu Mârza, *Sending Greetings during the Great War* (pp. 411-331); Carmen Țăgșorean, *A Devoted Friend and Ally, Henry Mathias Berthelot. The Image of The French General Presented in The "Românul" Newspaper* (pp. 444-454) – the French general, a true friend of our people, is depicted in the newspaper of Arad as a "real hero", Berthelot, according the author, "is among those rare men of providence who came in and changed history for the better in a country that ran low on hope and high on despair, a nation whose aspirations were dashed along history, a prisoner of false foreign promises and domestic demagoguery. He remains in the Romanian collective memory as a great man who contributed decisively to the unification of all Romanians into state and to its emancipation that took the country into modern times" (p. 454); Ionela Zaharia, *A Different Face of the War. Romanian Habsburg Military Chaplains on the Home Front* (pp. 455-466); Igor Chiosa, *The Activity of Police Forces in Bessarabia during World War I* (pp. 467-474).

The volume published under the auspices of the "Babeș-Bolyai" University dedicated to "other face" of the Great War, by its novelties and thematic interpretation, by the quality documentation of all studies, is a scientific contribution of the most important of Romanian historiography today at the issues of WWI. The merit is alike of each author and of editors (three well-known scientists, as well as a young and promising servant of the Muse Clio).

Stoica Lascu

***Domnul Constantin Brâncoveanu, omul și faptele unui sfânt martir (1688-1714) [Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu, the Man and the Deeds of a Saint Martyr (1688-1714)].* Editor-coordonator: Gheorghe F. Anghelescu, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2015, 344 pp. ISBN 978-973-45-0698-9**

The celebration of 300 years of Constantin Brâncoveanu's martyrdom (Voievode of Wallachia: 1688-1714; b. 1654), with their four sons – Constantin, Ștefan, Radu, and Matei – and devoted his counselor Ianache, occasioned in 2014 honoring them in a special way – this year was declared by the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church *the Brâncoveanu Year – 2014*. On

this occasion they were organized numerous cultural actions, including the deployment of the symposium and book publishing. This book is one of several published in 2014-2015; it contains the communications presented, in 2014, at the National Conference 'The value of the Romanian Culture and Spirituality of the Epoch of the Reigning Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu for the National History – Târgoviște (April 8), Constanța (April 13), Hurezi (September 22), Sâmbătă (September 23), Bucharest (October 28), held on the occasion of the celebration by the Romanian Patriarchate of 300 years since the sacrificial death of the Holy Martyrs of the Brâncoveanu family.

The studies in the book are not only talking about the person and personality of Martyr Voievode. As said the editor (*Domnul Constantin Brâncoveanu cel Sfânt – simbol al jertfei răscumpărătoare pentru neam și țară* [Saint Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu – Symbol of the Redemptive Sacrifice for the Nation and Country, pp. 7-10], "Any act of culture arises from a belief and can often be crowned by including him in worship. Therefore, the honor that we bring a personality such as Prince Martyr Constantin Brâncoveanu comprises she mysteriously a world, a whole generation of personalities of his time, without which his epoch would have not had this glow that is evoked today. The service that they had, promoting beauty, harmony and anonymous spirits what transposed in deed the inspired coordination of Prince Constantin, ought to be assessed together with him like founders representative of our culture" (p. 9).

Acad. Dan Berindei, *Constantin Vodă Brâncoveanu – Domnitorul* [Constantin Brâncoveanu – the Ruler] (pp. 13-15) – in his essays, the well-known Romanian scientist shows that it is the most powerful evidence of Christian faith that may be invoked among the Romanian rulers; acad. Gheorghe Vlăduțescu, *Protoumanismul în epocă* [Proto Humanism during Constantin Brâncoveanu's Age] (pp. 16-19); acad. Constantin Bălăceanu Stolnici, *Constantin Brâncoveanu – diplomatul* [Constantin Brâncoveanu – the Diplomat] (pp. 20-41); prof.univ.dr. Radu Ștefan Vergatti, *Some Viewpoints on the Relations Between the Saint Martyr Prince Constantin Vodă Brâncoveanu and Tsar Peter I the Great* (pp. 42-58) – the author shows that the Prince's uncle, Seneschal Constantin Cantacuzino, reorganized the Chancellery of Voievode Brâncoveanu according to modern standard; after the Tsar was defended by the Sublime Porte, Constantin Brâncoveanu was accused of treason by both the Tsar and Ottoman Empire, and this hastened his tragic end; pr.prof.univ.dr. Florin Șerbănescu, *Cheia biruinței sintezei brâncovenesti – măsura – văzută prin ctitoriile domnești din părțile Târgoviștei și ale Bucureștilor* [The Key of the Brâncoveanu Architectural Synthesis: Proportion, Seen via the Princely Constructions of Târgoviște and Bucharest] (pp. 59-89) – according to the author "the feature of Brâncoveanu's artistic synthesis in the well-balanced refinement of using elements of different origins, the key of success being the sensitive prevalence of traditional elements, of a mainly post-Byzantine origin, where ingredients originating in the Occident art – mainly baroque – or in the Arabian-Muslim oriental universe are wisely, having secondary role – only to accentuate, here and there, having the purpose of conferring the synthesis the personality, and imprint of an age that generates the opening from the Middle Ages towards the Modern Age" (p. 59); pr.prof.univ.dr. Constantin Păuleanu, *Constantin Brâncoveanu și relațiile sale cu Europa veacului al XVIII-lea din perspectiva reformei educaționale* [Constantin Brâncoveanu and His Relations to the 18th Century European Countries, From the Perspective of the Educational Reform] (pp. 90-112); prof.univ.dr. Paul Bruszanowski, *Transilvania în epoca Sfinților Martiri Brâncoveni* [Transylvania during the Age of the Holy Martyrs Brâncoveanu] (pp. 113-132) – the author reveals that "right during the first year of Constantin Brâncoveanu's reign, the social group (*stările*) of the Transylvanian Principedom were forced by the imperial army to make an oath of allegiance to the Habsburg Dynasty which fact was confirmed by an international treaty only 11 years later. However, the Transylvanian hostility to the new domination did not cease, in spite of the attempts of the Vienna Court of integrating politically and economically the Principedom (including through the religious union of the Transylvanians with the Church of Rome) into the Habsburgs' monarchy" (p. 133); pr.prof.univ.dr. Alexandru Ioniță, *Sfinții Martiri Brâncoveni – model și reper al identității și conștiinței naționale* [The Holy Martyrs Brâncoveanu – A Model and Milestone of National Identity and Conscience] (pp. 133-156); pr.prof.univ.dr. Alexandru I. Stan, *Pomazania sau ungerea ca domn a lui Constantin Brâncoveanu – Sfântă Taină sau ierurgie?*

[Constantin Brâncoveanu's Pomazania of Anointment as A Ruler Holy Sacrament or hierurgy?] (pp. 157-172); dr. Gheorghe Mănușu Adameșteanu, Camelia Mirela Vintilă, Ingrid Poll, *Cercetări arheologice la Biserica Sf. Nicolae "Dintr-o Zi" din București, ctitorie a Doamnei Marica Brâncoveanu* [Archaeological Researches at St. Nicholas "Built In A Day" Church of Bucharest – An Edifice Built by Constantin Brâncoveanu's Wife, Marica Brâncoveanu] (pp. 173-182); pr.conf.univ.dr. Nechita Runcan, *Constantin Brâncoveanu – iubitor de cultură și spiritualitate ortodoxă* [Constantin Brâncoveanu – An Admirer of the Orthodox Culture and Spirituality] (pp. 183-196) – in his synthesis, the author writes the "The great Wallachian Voivode Constantin Brâncoveanu was one of the great founders of holy place of worship. During his reign, a beautiful and minute church art has been designed, both in architecture and in painting, called the «Brâncoveanu style». The Romanian historians and researches inventory 19 churches that Constantin Brâncoveanu had built from scratch or rebuilt, repaired and embellished all over Wallachia and 5 more in Bucharest" (p. 183); pr.conf.univ.dr. Constantin Claudiu Cotan, *Ierarhi cărturari la curtea domnitorului Constantin Brâncoveanu* [Intellectual Hierarchs at Constantin Brâncoveanu's Court] (pp. 197-210); prof.univ.dr. Terezia Agnes Erich, *Biblioteca lui Constantin Brâncoveanu de la Hureș* [Constantin Brâncoveanu's Library of Hureș] (pp. 211-216); conf.univ.dr. Ileana Tănase, *Refuzul de a trăda: Constantin Brâncoveanu – scurt comentariu la o legendă populară românească* [Denial to Betray: Constantin Brâncoveanu Brief Comment on A Romanian Traditional Legend] (pp. 217-220); pr.lect.univ.dr. Adrian Ignat, *Biserica Ortodoxă Română în timpul lui Constantin Brâncoveanu. Aspecte social-filantropice* [The Romanian Orthodox Church during Constantin Brâncoveanu's Reign. Social Charitable Aspects] (pp. 221-235); Dan Falcan, *Prințul și Stolnicul* [Prince and High Steward] (pp. 236-242); prof.univ.dr. Radu Ștefan Vergatti, dr. Cristina-Narcisa Vergatti, *The Expression of Church Mural Painting in Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu's Age* (pp. 243-270); pr.conf.univ.dr. Constantin Claudiu Cotan, *Relațiile domnitorului Constantin Brâncoveanu cu Europa Apuseană* [Ruler Constantin Brâncoveanu's Relations in Western Europe] (pp. 271-286); – the author shows that "the reign of Constantin Brâncoveanu has also opened one of the most interesting pages of foreign policy in our history, the Wallachian prince having become a well known competent politician. Many features of Brâncoveanu's foreign policy reflected the characteristics of a modern moderate policy, studying the advantages and opportunities, but most of all starting from the idea of avoiding military conflicts in the area of Wallachia, but from where he obtained most precious information through his envoys, with the Habsburg Empire in expansion, with Peter the Great's Russia, the military power that started to show its force in the European politics, as well as with the pragmatic Venice, and even with the Catholic Rome" (p. 270); protos.dr. Melchisedec Dobre, *Moștenirea Sfântului Bincredincios Voievod Martir Constantin Brâncoveanu* [The Heritage Left by the Faithful Prince and Holy Martyr Constantin Brâncoveanu] (pp. 287-294); asist.univ.dr. Gianina Maria-Cristina Picioruș, *Un domn și un ierarh providențial* [A Providential Ruler and a Providential Hierarch] (pp. 295-310); asist.univ.dr. Mihaela-Cerasela Enache Bănică, *Epoca lui Constantin Brâncoveanu (1688-1714) – posibil model pentru activitatea traducătorilor epocii noastre* [Constantin Brâncoveanu's Age – o Potential Model for the Contemporary Translator's Activity] (pp. 311-315); pr.conf.univ.dr. Constantin Claudiu Cotan, *Geopolitica Ortodoxiei și relațiile stat-Biserică în timpul domniei Sfântului Martir Constantin Brâncoveanu* [Orthodox Geopolitics and the State Church Relations During the Reign of the Holy Martyr Constantin Brâncoveanu] (pp. 316-327); prof.univ.dr. Gheorghe F. Angheliescu, *Cuvânt lămuritor la un proiect științific despre cinstirea Domnitorului Constantin Brâncoveanu (1714-2014)* [Explanatory Word on a Scientific Project About Honoring Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu (1714-2014)] (pp. 328-333) – the paper summarizes the events occurred during this cultural pilgrimage, reminding the participants, the subjects approached and the results of these cultural-spiritual and scientific events" (p. 328).

The volume coordinated by the laborious Professor Gheorghe F. Angheliescu is a pious homage, with a strong and pregnancy scientific load dedicated to Prince Martyr Constantin Brâncoveanu, and he added to numerous other books published with the occasion, in 2014, of Celebration "Brâncoveanu Year".

Stoica Lascu

Aurel-Daniel Stănică, Gabriel Custurea, Daniela Stănică, Emanuel Ploeanu (editori), Dobrogea. Coordonate istorice și arheologice [Dobrogea. Archaeological and Historical Coordinates], StudIS, Iași, 2016, 398 pp. ISBN 978-606-775-387-5

In this volume are collected the papers presented at workshop *Dobrogea. Archaeological and Historical Coordinates*, held in Tulcea (October 20-22, 2016), organized by “Pro Noviodunum” Association in partnership with The Institute for Eco-Museum Researches “Gavrilă Simion” Tulcea, The National Museum of History and Archaeology Constanța, and the Faculty of History and Political Science at the “Ovidius” University of Constanța. The workshop is part of a wider project of cultural cartography missing medieval castles in Dobrogea, financed by the Administration of National Cultural Fund (in January-November 2016 period). This brings together the volume presented at the Workshop “Dobrogea Ottoman – historical and archaeological coordinated “, held from 20 to 22 October 2016 in Tulcea, organized by Pro Noviodunum Tulcea in partnership with The Institute of Eco-Museum “Gavrilă Simion” Tulcea, National Museum and Archeology Constanța and the Faculty of History and Political Sciences of the University “Ovidius”. The workshop is part of a wider project of cultural cartography missing medieval castles in Dobrogea, financed by the National Cultural Fund Administration, roll in January-November 2016 period.

The studies cover a wide thematic, regarding the period of Ottoman Dobrogea, less researched in Romanian historiography – Aurel-Daniel Stănică, *Fortificațiile dispărute din Dobrogea. Studiu de caz: fortificațiile turcești* [The missing fortresses in Dobrogea. Case study: Turkish fortifications] (pp. 7-36); Adrian Ilie, *Karasu-Medgidia în perioada dominației otomane (sec. XV-XIX)* [Karasu-Medgidia during the Ottoman dominations (15th-19th Centuries)] (pp. 37-48); Constantin Nicolae, *Noi date despre fortificația otomană de la Hârșova* [New data about the Roman fortification from Hârșova] (pp. 49-84: ill.: pp. 72-84); Laurențiu Radu, *Note cu privire la istoria Mangaliei în epoca otomană* [Notes about the history of Mangalia in the Ottoman era] (pp. 105-104); Niculina Dinu, *Observații privind ceramica otomană din Dobrogea (secolele XV-XIX)* [Observations] (pp. 105-112); Aurel-Daniel Stănică, Daniela Stănică, *Economy and Commerce in Tulcea in the 14th-16th Centuries* (pp. 113-134); Ileana Căzan, *Cartografia în secolele XVI-XVII – de la reprezentare simbolică la știință. Studiu de caz: Dunărea de Jos, Marea Neagră și Dobrogea în atenția Casei de Austria* [Cartography in the 16th-17th centuries – from symbolic representation in science. Case study: the Lower Danube, the Black Sea and Dobrogea in the attention of the House of Austria] (pp. 135-166); Aurel Mototolea, *Elemente de urbanism în Dobrogea otomană (sec. XVI-XVIII)* [Elements of urbanism in Ottoman Dobrogea (16th-18th centuries)] (pp. 167-202); Aurel Vilcu, Gabriel Custurea, *Un tezaur de falsuri după monede otomane de la Ahmed I descoperit la Movilița, jud. Constanța* [A treasury of counterfeits after Ottoman coins from Ahmed I found in Movilița, Constanța County] (pp. 203-218); Andreea Atanasiu-Croitoru, *Relatări ale corespondenților de război din 1877-1878 despre scufundarea monitorului otoman “Seyfi”* [Reports of war correspondents from 1877-1878 about the sinking of the Ottoman river monitor “Seyfi”] (pp. 219-228); Silvana Rachieru, *Teritoriu vechi, stăpân nou: vizite regale în Dobrogea după 1878, în perspectivă otomană* [Old territory, new ruler: The royal visits in Dobrogea after 1878 in the Ottoman perspective] (pp. 229-234); Sorin Mureșeanu, *Dobrogea în contextul construcției naționale. Reflecții în perspectivă integratoare* [Dobrogea in the context of the national construction. Reflections in an integrative perspective] (pp. 235-260); Valentin Carată, Valeriu Țurcan, *Ocupația rusă și emigrarea populației turco-tătare din Dobrogea* [The Russian occupation and the emigration of the Turkish – Tatar population from Dobrogea] (pp. 261-272); Tiberiu Cazacioc, *Pietrele funerare din Balabancea, mărturie despre musulmanii kâzâlbashi din Anatolia* [The tombstones from Balabancea, testimony about the kâzâlbashi Muslims from Anatolia] (pp. 273-282); Nuredin Ibram, *Conviețuire interetnică și interconfesională în Dobrogea. Repere istorice și culturale* [Interethnic and interconfessional cohabitation in Dobrogea – Historical and cultural highlights] (pp. 283-300); Stoica Lascu, *Dobrudja in Ottoman Times. A Romanian Bibliography (From the 50s of the Twentieth Century Until Today)* (pp. 301-358); Gabriel Custurea, Andrea Andrei, *Osmanistica în Dobrogea – repere bibliografice* [Osmanistics in Romania.

Bibliographical highlights] (pp. 359-374); Daniela Stănică, *Istoria Imperiului Otoman reflectată în manualele de Istorie* [The history of the Ottoman Empire reflected in the History textbooks] (pp. 375-384); Lavinia Dumitrașcu, Gheorghe Dumitrașcu, *E timpul operelor capitale în problema minorităților etnice din România – în mod expres comunitatea turcă și tătară* [It's time for the capital works in the issue of the ethnic minorities from Romania – Specifically, the Turkish and Tatar minority] (pp. 389-396).

Of late years, the research institution from Tulcea, named for its great founder Gavrilă Simion, was at the origin of several research projects, with archaeological and historical heritage; she got a well-deserved international reputation by hearty research projects that have been started or who was co-organizer. This volume, initiated by laborious mediaevalist archaeologist Aurel-Daniel Stănică, represent, at a highest scientific degree, the historical research in North part of Dobrudja and it is a definite – and encouraging – a real success of our present-day osmanistics.

Stoica Lascu

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Reference citations

I. Reference-List Entries for Periodicals (APA Style)

a. An Article in a Journal with continuous paging

Harrison, R.L., & Westwood, M.J. (2009). Preventing vicarious traumatization of mental health therapists: Identifying protective practices. *Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training*, 46, 203-219.

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Madu, C. (2010, March-April). A cure for crime. *Psychology Today*, 43(2), 12.

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II. Reference-list entries for books and other separately published materials

a. A book by one author

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The 1990 book: (Sternberg, 1990: 45)

The first 2003 book: (Sternberg, 2003a: 23)

The second 2003 book: (Sternberg, 2003b: 25)

The 2007 book: (Sternberg, 2007: 139)

All four works in the same citation: (Sternberg, 1990, 2003a, 2003b, 2007)

Damean, S.L. (2004). *România și Congresul de Pace de la Berlin (1878)*. București: Mica Valahie.

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III. Archival Documents and Collections

a. Collection of letters from an archive

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IV. Reference to a web source

J.G. (2016, April 11). 7 Deadly Environmental Disasters. Retrieved April 25 2016, from <http://www.history.com/news/history-lists>

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