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STUDIES AND ARTICLES

COMMENTARY BY JAN ZAMOYSKI, THE ROYAL SECRETARY, ON LEGAL CUSTOMS OF THE VLACHS OF SAMBIR FROM 1568

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Abstract

The aim of the presented article is, first and foremost, to edit a source – extremely rare for the areas of the old Poland – of a narrative character on the Wallachian settlement, which consists of fragments of the inventory on the Sambir domains from 1568. It presents key elements of the political organisation of this community, of both individual mountain settlements and entire groups which created a supra-rural structure referred to as a *kraina*. It contains information on geographical realities of the ecumene which the Vlachs inhabited, but also on relations between the settlers and land owners, and in particular the subsidies and fees paid by the former to the latter. The account written in the old-Polish language is difficult to access for the European studies, hence I have made a decision to publish it in English and provide it with quite extensive footnotes where I have placed explanations of terminology which could have raised interpretational doubts in the text. The translation is preceded by information on the origins and process of Jan Zamoyski's mission, which are presented against the background of political battle that took place in Poland in the second half of the 16th century.

Key words: *Wallachian law, pastoralism in the Carpathians, Wallachian settlement, mountain farming*

Aims and Progress of Zamoyski's Mission in 1568

Jan Zamoyski, the author of the account presented below, was at that time a 25 year old royal secretary. This thoroughly educated humanist (a graduate from Sorbonne, Strasbourg and Padua, where he attained his doctorate degree) was to play an outstanding role in the future in the Polish politics at the turn of the 16th and 17th century by undertaking the office of a vice-chancellor, chancellor of the Crown, and great Crown hetman. This brilliant career was a result not only of his education or influential relatives, but also of an extraordinary conscientiousness in his court registry duties and effectiveness in performing the tasks entrusted to him (Korolko, 1991: 240). Writing of the *Inventory* (*Inwentarz*) took place in the circumstances of a conflict. It should be noted here that individual complexes of the royal domain in the old Poland were managed by the magistrates referred to as 'starostas' (*capitanei*). They were appointed with extensive judicial and administrative powers over the population living in area subjected to them and they performed police tasks, but in their hands rested also the economic management of 'starostwo', the county (*capitaneatus*), entrusted to

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them. The high income acquired by those means was passed to the royal treasury, but from the 15th century onwards these domains were more frequently becoming a pledge in exchange for loans granted to the monarch by the nobility. Until the moment of repayment, the income from the properties went to creditors, becoming the foundation for building the gentry's fortunes and the dominant political position of this group in the country. For this reason, one of the most important postulates of the political faction acting against the gentry – which was formed by the middle and wealthy nobility (the so-called movement for executing the laws and goods) – was to restore the properties to the ruler by a compulsory purchase of pledges. Implementation of this postulate was in an obvious way undermining the financial position of the magnates. Hence, it is not surprising they resisted the attempts of the repossession (Falniowska-Gradowska, 1984: s. 17-18).

All the abovementioned issues are visible also in the case of typically mountainous areas of the county with its centre in Sambir, situated in the Crown Ruthenia by the border with Hungary. Its previous tenant – a voivode of Podolia, Jan Starzechowski, died before the 16th of October 1567 (*Magistrates*, 1998: 145). He obtained the Land of Sambir and the county of Drohobych for life as a pledge for a loan granted to the royal treasury in 1564 in the amount of 21 000 zloty (Sucheni-Grabowska, 1974: 232, 244). Neither his sons, nor his widow implemented the Sejm provisions, which had ordered to return these rich areas to the king on the basis of the repurchase principle. For this reason the king delegated Zamoyski with a mission to take back the two counties, to collect the dues from the subjects, and what is the most important for us – to make a detailed inventory of the royal holdings in these domains which had been variously depleted during Starzechowski's lifetime. The mission of the royal secretary, commenced in autumn of 1567, had a dramatic course. The royal envoys were not allowed to enter Sambir, the roads they travelled on were damaged, and there were open threats and even physical violence. Ultimately, however, the mission ended with success. The family of Starzechowski was removed from the estates by the repayment of old debts of the monarch from 1569 and the family never recovered their previous position. On the other hand, the fortune of Jan Zamoyski rose due to the generous royal grants while the county of Sambir was obtained as a lease by the family of Herburt, his relatives (Grzybowski, 1994: 30-32; Leśniewski, 2008: 18-19). The result of this mission was also to make a detailed inventory of the seized domains, the fragment of which includes the description of legal customs of the Vlachs living in the area.

Presentation of the Published Source and Editing Rules

The presented archival item in the form of a manuscript, a fair copy of the volume, has an original title: "Inventory of the Sambir County Profits Obtained in 1568 after the Death of the Local Starost, Lord Starzechowski, a Voivode of Podolia, Written by Jan Zamoyski, a Royal Secretary". It is stored in Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (The Main Archives of Old Documents) in Warsaw, in the group: *Tak zwana Metryka Litewska* (The So-called Lithuanian Record), section IX, B, marked with a reference number 22 (AGAD, ML 22). It is still not available for scholars in a form of scanned pages published on the Archives' website. Its usage is further complicated

by the lack of proper page numbers which are mixed up particularly with its foliation. The last page was given number 532. Jan Zamoyski ordered his description in accordance with the adopted and consequently implemented model. The first part (pp. 1-307), written in the old-Polish language, consists of a very detailed description of two towns (Sambir and Staryi Sambir) and individual villages, which always includes the following elements: geographical locations and their borders, names and nicknames of residents together with the acreage of land cultivated by them, and the amount of rent paid for it; lands belonging to knyazes and popes, and the mills, windmills, fulling mills and taverns, etc. existing in individual settlements. Described on separate pages are the local saltworks and granges with the characteristics of crops and revenues they were providing. The next part (pp. 308 – sheet 488), written mainly in Latin, is a registry of documents, which in the majority refers to individual Wallachian lands of knyazes and privileges for popes. In the final part of the volume (sheet 489-532), individual towns and villages of a small county of Drohobych are described in an analogical way as in the case of Land of Sambir.

Serious research on the Wallachian communities living on the northern slopes of the Carpathians is not possible without reaching out for the mentioned sources. It should be pointed out here that the county of Sambir, situated near the border with Hungary in a typically mountainous area, played an exceptionally important role in the history of the Wallachian colonisation. The immigrants from across the Carpathians appeared there already in the 14th century. During the reign of Louis I of Hungary in Poland (1370-1382), when the power over this region was held on his behalf by Duke Wladyslaw of Opole as a governor of Ruthenia, it was here that the functioning of a Wallachian military district was recorded, undoubtedly modeled after this kind of organisations existed earlier in the Kingdom of Hungary. This demonstrates a significant potential of such settlement in Ruthenia in its oldest phase which is tangible in the sources. In 1377-1406 the office of a voivode of the Sambir Vlachs was held by Dziurdz (Romanian: Gheorghe) of Stupnica and Jurang after him (Fastnacht, 1962; 218-219; Gilewicz, 1929: 28-32; Wyrostek, 1932; 56; Jawor, 2013, chapter 3). There was a true explosion of this settlement here in the 16th century since the number of villages founded on the Wallachian law increased – compared to the previous period – by 90% (Inkin, 2004: 12-20).

The fragments of the inventory volume presented below is a source which is unique in this part of Europe for its author attempted not only to characterise the Wallachian community's customs in a larger area, but also to exceptionally aptly indicate the reasons for the expansion of this settlement model, in which the shepherding and agricultural activities were skilfully combined. It provides much more extensive interpretative possibilities in comparison to the analysis of documents associated with particular rural settlements, i.e. individual cases which historians usually use. Meanwhile, the language barrier and the already mentioned limited access to this source, narrow down the opportunity for its analysis and for that very reason the text is not known to scholars apart from those who are able to use Slavic languages. Therefore, I decided to translate it into English and I added scans from the original as an annex to this article. In the footnotes I included explanations of some terms, which could cause misinterpretation, and I indicated academic publications

regarding these matters. It is worth emphasising that various fragments of this source were cited – in a more or less professional way – by a few authors. This was done by I. A. Linničenko (1894: 171-174) already towards the end of the 19th century (in Russian language – and also in old-Polish language in footnotes), and then – on the basis of his work – a translation into Czech language was done by K. Kadlec (1916: 332-333). The renowned expert in the Wallachian topics, V. F. Inkin (1975: 299-330; 1978: 114-147), a historian from Lvov, often referred to the abovementioned work. It is also worth mentioning a Polish scholar S. Szczotka who also used this source (1949: 363-366).

Description of Legal Customs of the Vlachs of Sambir from 1568

[p. 3c] Location and Size of Land and Settlement of the County of Sambir

This county, as is apparent from chorography made on the occasion of this revision, is situated – not to mention fragmented private properties – between the lands in Mukachevo (Munkács), Uh, and Khust (Hust) from the side of Hungary, while in Poland – between the lands in Lesko, county of Przemyśl, Gródek, Drohobych, Stryi, to which it adjoins in a way that all the counties create a kind of one whole. Counting from the mountains known as the Beskids, along a straight line from the Hungarian border, counting from the south to the north, it has 12 miles¹, and 30 or more if counted by the roads. There are 2 towns in this county, 118 villages, and in addition 3 villages subjected to the saltworks. Moreover, the county has parts in a few villages where one or two peasants live. During the conducted revision it was stated that 24 settlements had been separated from the county. In the part examined by Jan Zamoyski, there are (apart from the fields belonging to towns and granges' areas):

- people on the farms 2733
- horticulturists (*zagrodnicy*)² and landless cottagers (*podsadkowie*)³ 285
- farm-manors (*dworzyszczka*) or feoffs⁴ 1352 ¹/₄

[p. 3c] Rivers of the C[ounty]

There are four considerable rivers in this county which collect water from numerous streams and smaller rivers, and they all flow into the Dniester. The first one is the Dniester, the second is the Stryi, and the third one is the Bystrytsia. Since all the villages are situated in the mountains on the rivers or their tributaries, the mountainous villages are commonly divided into three regions (*kraina*): of Stryi, of

¹ It is uncertain what type of 'mile' is referred to in the text. Depending on their type, they would stretch from 6300 metres to 7810 metres (Szymański, 2004: 164).

² In the Latin sources they are referred to as *bortulani*, who were a poorer group of the rural population. They owned buildings and small land plots, and made a living as labour wage-earners or they did handcraft activities (Samsonowicz, 1954: 194-196).

³ In the Latin sources they are referred to as *inquilini*, peasants who were deprived of their own land, forced to make a living by labour work (Jawor, 1991: 24-29).

⁴ Initially the farm-manors, *dworzyszczka* (Lat. *area*, *curia*), typical for the Russian and Wallachian law, were units of diversified size, dependent on the condition of soil, amount of land in the village and the needs of the granges. The tendency to spread them, align them, and then finally to associate them with feoffs (*lanens*, *mansus*) measuring around 25 hectares can be observed in some areas from the mid-15th century, while in other areas, more economically backward, only in the 16th century (Inkin, 1974: 27-29).

Dniester, and of Bystrytsia¹. *Kraina* of Bystrytsia was currently divided: a part of it was pledged to lord Stanisław Herburt, a castellan of Lvov, and the second part – to lord Jan Starzechowski, a voivode of Podolia. For this reason, the revision was conducted only on a part of the area and described together with the grange of Sambir. The fourth river of this county is Strwiąż, the upper stream of which belongs to the county of Przemyśl; below, on the river, are situated the properties of lords Tarłów and lords Herburt; further down, a few villages inhabited by farmers are the king's possessions. The river flows to the Dniester – next to the county of Sambir flow also the river San and Opor – and on its other side, from the west, also the river San.

[p. 2-4²] **On Wallachian Villages, Measurements of Cultivated Fields, Knyazes, *Krajnicy*, Assemblies Referred to as *Zbory***

Because the land of the county of Sambir is situated mostly in the mountains where winter crops are not born since winter lasts there for a long time and it quickly freezes in autumn, the vast majority of villages in the county of Sambir is founded on the Wallachian law. Their residents, apart from the few settlements situated closer to the fields, have no obligation to bear feudal burdens. For due to a poor land, there are no granges in there. Only for their own needs [3] oats, some rye, and cattle is b[red ...7] they perform on behalf of the king⁴. They pay tribute in the form of rams and pigs on behalf of the king, they also supply wood to sawmills and some settlements supply ash to dyeing fabrics, and all the Vlachs are obliged to repair the castle in Sambir and supply it with wood (for fire). Since the villages are far away from the manor-house, the following customs prevail there: each *kraina* has its own *krajnik*⁵, to whom knyazes are subjected; each village has a knyaz, to whom peasants are subjected and they keep order within the village. All people from those villages get together in towns twice a year for assemblies (*zborny*), one of which takes place on the day of St. Peter⁶ – they refer to it as a “spring assembly”, and the second on the day of St. Martin – they refer to it as an “autumn assembly” [11 *listopada*]⁷. Therein, the knyazes bring rents and tributes from the residents of villages; also the courts take place there. Throughout the assemblies, the sentences are issued and penalties are imposed and charged. On this account, the starostas obtained considerable income. Nevertheless, they complained that legal penalties had been inscribed not as their income, but the king's [8]. (Apart

¹ *Krainy* were a type of ultra-rural communities which were characteristic for the Wallachian law. Until the mid-16th century it was a rule that there was one *kraina* in one set of land properties. Later on, their gradual division took place which resulted from the increasing number of population and the growing farm economy (Inkin, 1975: 304; Jawor, 2013: s. ...). They were probably organisations analogous to the structures common in the Romanian areas led by knyazes of the valleys (Popa, 1970: 10-14).

² Due to pagination error, page 3c is followed by page 2.

³ A few words are missing from the broken bottom edge of the sheet.

⁴ It most likely concerns some works done for the king.

⁵ Plural version: *krajnicy*; provided by the author for the clarity of the translation.

⁶ It most likely concerns a festive day on the 29th of April.

⁷ The issue of the Wallachian assemblies known as ‘zbory’ or ‘strungi’ was discussed by me in a few publications (Jawor, 1997: 179-186; 2013: chapter 5).

⁸ The further short fragment is obscure. It most likely refers to the fact that starostas were entitled to 2/3 of the imposed judicial penalties.

from *krajnik* and *knyazes*), the courts include also a deputy head of a county (*vicecapitaneus*), a royal court judge appointed to them. One can appeal to the *starosta* against their sentences. They are onerous to people for even if they have no dealings during the assemblies they must participate in them and labour in vain. For this reason, during the magistracy of Starzechowski, the *starosta*, those who had no court cases paid 4 groszy each in exchange for being released from the obligation of participating in the assembly.

Due to the function they hold, *krajnicy* receive cheese from every person who breeds sheep. *Starostas* appoint to this magistracy a person from amongst the *knyazes*. In the royal villages the *knyazes* usually have a few grain fields, socages from the residents and tributes referred to as *kołęda* (Latin: *strena*), *kołaczę* (Latin: *crustulum*), etc. In their villages they have windmills, fulling mills, they keep the third part of royal rents, third part of a tribute in a form of sheep and pigs. (At times) instead of *kołęda* or *kołaczę* for Easter and Christmas, or socages, they pay to the *knyazes* their equivalent in coin. On the other hand, the king has 2/3 of all rents, tributes and payments. (A new village was founded in such a way) that a peasant would go to *starosta* and ask him to allow him to settle a village by one of the streams. In return, he would pay several hundred or sometimes even one thousand zloty to the magistrate. (While entering such a contract) he would at once reserve for himself (material remuneration of the *knyaz's* lands) in a form of arable land, 1/3 of rents and tributes paid by the villagers, (right to build) windmills, etc. *Starostas* willingly agreed to such a contract because they did not rely on seeing rents and tributes paid by the residents of a newly-founded village since the period of a total exemption from payments lasted several years¹. *Starostas* immediately received the money without caring about the future. The proof of a contract between *starosta* and a tenant of a new village was an appropriate document which was then approved by the royal chancellery. *Knyazes* also benefited from this because after having redeployed the land (in a newly-founded village), they received 60 groats from the arriving settlers for the right to settle there. This is such a common payment that no one even haggles over it. The payment of this fee meant that the peasants – having paid it to the *knyazes* – treated these lands as their own heritage and therefore they traded it amongst themselves².

In order for the *knyazes* to attract the settlers more easily, they asked *starostas* for the non-payment period to last as long as possible. Although they were expected to divide the land for the farm-manors (*dworzyszcza*)³, their size varies in individual

¹ Depending on the customs prevailing in the individual property complexes, the timespan of the so-called 'wolnizna' (*libertas*) lasted from a few to even 24 years. Throughout this time the settlers coming over to a new village did not pay any liabilities to the owner.

² In the modern sense of the word, peasants were not owners of land in the old Poland. There is a considerable terminological chaos in the historical studies regarding those relations. It seems that the most convincing is the term: hereditary lease. This means that the land – with the formal consent of the owner or sometimes also after paying a special fee – passed from a peasant to his descendants.

³ See footnote no. 4, p. 10.

settlements. In the places where – during the foundation of the village – the knyaz paid more to starosta, they include more land.

[sheet 288-288 verso] **Tributes Paid in Rams and Pigs**

Apart from rents and fees mentioned above, each village – founded on the Wallachian law where sheep and pigs are being bred – pays a tribute in rams and pigs¹. Tribute in rams is paid around Whitsunday [May or June], which is referred to as *straga*², and in pigs – for Saint Martin's Day [the 11th of November]. These are paid not only by the villages that belong to the king, but also by the nobility and their subjects who let sheep and pigs graze on the royal lands. This tribute was once given also in oxen when there were not that many villages in the county, but nowadays this it is not done anymore. A higher income could have been obtained from this if the rams and pigs were paid for in coin. This would be more convenient also for the peasants and it is also possible the income of the royal treasury would have increased in this respect.

There is a custom that when the deputy head of the county (*vicecapitanens*) travels to the mountains to collect the tributes paid in rams, each settler gives him one grosz as a fee known as *kuchenne* (*coquina*). Having calculated the entire income claimed from the houses in the villages where the *straga* is collected, it amounts to 69 zloty, 14 groszy. Together with the second *straga*³, this income amounts to 138 zloty and 28 groszy. Those who collect this tribute together with the deputy head of the county spend a part of this sum on food: meats, beer, etc. This *straga* lasts one and a half week. During this time the deputy head of the county and his people consume 7 achters (barrels) of beer⁴, two heifers, and eight rams. He receives as much oats as he needs, and also chickens, butter and eggs for free from the peasants. Knyazes provide them with bread. They pay 40 groszy for one achter of beer, 2 zloty and 15 groszy for a heifer, and 18 groszy for a ram. Overall, the pay 38 zloty and 8 groszy for food during two rounds of *straga*.

Conclusions

The text presented above provides a fairly detailed image of – in particular – legal and economic aspects of the functioning of the Wallachian communities from the northern slopes of the Carpathians. Its analysis should include the circumstances that the text was written relatively late, i.e. 1568. This was the time of the fall of the settlement based on the Wallachian law in the regions situated further away from the mountains. On the other hand, the mountainous villages were at that time subjected to a strong pressure from the great land properties, the aim of which was to adapt the system of the Wallachian obligations to the developing money-goods economy and to foster the economic model based on the production of crops in granges where peasants provided free land tenure. Apart from the effort to change the traditional Wallachian obligations, these attempts were aiming at limiting or completely

¹ The system of shepherds' tributes in the Wallachian villages is discussed by me in a recently published article (Jawor, 2018: 465-479).

² Wallachian word *straga* (*stronga*, *strunga*, *strunka*) had a few meanings, i.e. a tribute mentioned in the text, but also a judicial assembly – *zbor* (Jawor, 1997, 179-186).

³ It refers to an income from spring and autumn 'straga'.

⁴ According to J. Szymański (2004: 170), achter is around 34 litres of liquid.

eliminating the Wallachian customs and its specific autonomy. This is manifested in the text even by the appointment of *krajnik* by *starosta* while in the Middle Ages it was the Wallachian community itself that selected him. This direction of transformations is also clear even in the postulates made by Zamoyski, like i.e. a change from tributes paid in natural products into rent paid in money. The problem for the detailed studies in the future is to distinguish between the archaic elements in the text, the roots of which date back to previous centuries, and the realities of the 16th century, new and imposed on the Wallachian communities from outside. This will not be possible without undertaking ambitious team research covering in its scope the entire area of the Wallachian migration in a broad timeframe. Otherwise, the studies will remain in a sphere of narrow and detailed research, the side effect of which are misconceptions or erroneous opinions resulting from the lack of understanding the extraordinary variability and diversity of this settlement trend in time and space.

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Annex

Fragments of: *Inwentarz pożytkow starostwa samborskiego, które się pokazały roku MDLXVIII po zejściu starosty miejsca tego Pana Starzechowskiego-wojewody podolskiego, spisany przez Jego Mości Pana Jana Zamoyskiego, sekretarzaowi Króla Jegomości* [Inventory of the Sambir County Profits Obtained in 1568 after the Death of the Local Starost, Lord Starzechowski, a Voivode of Podolia, Written by Lord Jan Zamoyski, a Royal Secretary], in Old Polish language. Ex: Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie.

Figure 1: page 3c, with the chorography of the County of Sambir




Figure 2: page 2, with the description of rivers in the county and the beginning of the information on the Wallachian legal customs




Figure 3: page 3: continuation of the previous page, description of the process of founding new Wallachian villages




Figure 5: sheet 288: description of a typically Wallachian tribute paid in rams and pigs




Figure 6: sheet 288 verso: continuation of a description
from the previous sheet

O Byżyciu rben w frt galy nadye kofnarofcy w am...
birania toz dnt barvam : lacy oflowit z dym...
Lubienica po pi... Czo d...
wlos p...
Arag...
6/14.

Na drugi raz byłu zjini wsiarbo m 138/28

Wydanie tego na żywność, aby było z Łódźskiem
bywało na miejscu piva w. Odprawił się do
za kulbory, ażeby. Wyjechał na miasto Łódź
na 7. galowicz, dwie. Baranow. 8. Owożo dawno
dać, aby był j. W. Na 7. galowicz, dwie. Baranow.
Oblicza. Za piva Łódźsk, płaci po 40. Za
Łódźsk 2. 15. Za Baranow 18. Czym za obie:
Łódźsk na żywność, aby

Лофан № 100/20

Skąd odia wzięj ufoze na potrzeby na Kozłom, p'ic
zostaw

90/20

© BILAKA naprzed w lozarni. Lozarni. Laftbowky
Jaszyonki

LA PSYCHE. Vozne krijivice, luborbonja, Zmaga
Krnjane, Srblanština de Lumeza i Zupan oglebo
sami se gde. Po rbo vozi merimo gnaz: Baranov albo
sivim de Voznoje.

**STRUGGLE OF THE RIGHT ON THE SEA
IN THE BRITISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS:
THE CASE OF THE CREOLE SLAVES REVOLT (1841)**

*Nguyen Van Sang**, *Piotr Robak***,
*Nguyen Duy Phuong****, *Luu Trang*****

Abstract

The article analyzes British-American relations on the Creole case from 1841 to 1842. This study is based on correspondences, diplomatic papers and treaties between the two countries from the time explosion of Creole case to Webster-Ashburton treaty. The study focused on three fundamental issues: the process that the Creole became an international case in the British-American relations; diplomatic activities of the two countries to address the Creole case and maritime rights relating this incident; the Creole case after signing the Webster-Ashburton treaty. The study found that Creole is a special case of slave ship compared to the previous cases. The Creole vessel was sailed to a British colony due to the rebellion of the slaves aboard rather than other reasons. Neither the Great Britain nor the United States had ever dealt with similar cases, so the two sides failed to find a unified view regarding the differences in the laws and policies of the two countries on slavery. If the Creole case was not resolved, it could have more impacts on the relations between the two countries, eventually pushed the two countries into a war. In that situation, the solutions given to the Creole affair were only temporary. However, the Creole case opens the way for the settlement of maritime rights for the British-American relations at the next stage.

Key words: *Creole case, Creole vessel, the United States, Great Britain, Webster, Ashburton*

The slave revolt in the Creole was the largest event in British-American relations involved slavery and maritime rights. This event also directly affected the Webster-Ashburton treaty negotiation process¹.

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¹ In fact, the Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves of 1807 prohibited the import of slaves into the United States from 1 January 1808. However, due to the labor demand in the South states, the legal trade of domestic slaves continued to grow rapidly. By 1841, there were hundreds of slave boats descending to the southwest coast of the United States, along the Gulf Coast to New Orleans (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/sl004.asp), (Johnson, 2008: 239).

The Creole was an American slave ship owned by Johnson and Eperson from Richmond. It departed from Richmond, Virginia on Monday, 27 October 1841, bound for New Orleans, Louisiana, under the command of Captain Robert Ensor (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 147). The ship was transporting 135 slaves, 10 crews, 8 black servants, 4 passengers¹ and large barrels of tobacco² and several family members of the crew³. Like domestic voyages, slaves were held on the deck. In the evening, they were limited to the underside of the ship, divided into two areas: the men in front and the women in the back. The two groups were separated by large boxes of manufactured tobacco to prevent possible exchange, which could be a risk to the interests of slave owners⁴.

The Creole made the journey as usual and everything remained quiet until the evening of November 7, 1841⁵, Madison Washington, who was described as “the chef of slaves” and 18 other men rebelled⁶. They overwhelmed the crew, killed John Hewell and took control of the ship⁷.

When controlling the ship, the slaves ordered William Merritt to command the ship at their request. Merritt and the leader of the revolt discussed the next destination together⁸. First, Washington wanted to take the ship to Liberia, which was established by the United States as a free colony in West Africa⁹. However, Merritt said the

¹ The crew consists of 10 people. The commander was Robert Ensor – the captain, Zephaniah C. Gifford – the first mate and Lucius Stevens – the second mate. Members of the crew included Blinn Curtis, William Devereux, Francis Foxwell, Jacques Lacombe, Jacob Leitener, John Silvy, Henry Sperrk. Four passengers include William Henry Merritt, John R. Hewell, Thomas McCargo, Theophilus J. D. McCargo, Jacob Leitner (Downey, 2014: 7-9).

² Initially the Creole left Richmond with 103 slaves, then picked up another 32 slaves in Hampton Roads, Virginia (<http://www.blackpast.org/gah/creole-case-1841>).

³ Ensor's wife and daughter, McCargo's niece and nephew, were also on board (Rupprecht, 2013: 255).

⁴ Only Lewis, a longtime man servant of McCargo and six female servants, were allowed to remain in the cabin (Jervey & Huber, 2013: 197).

⁵ Now the Creole was about 200 miles north of Miami, about 130 miles from the southernmost point of Abaco Island in the northwest of the Bahamas, a British colony (Downey, 2014: 138).

⁶ The leaders of the slave revolt included Madison Washington, Ben Johnstone or Blacksmith, Elija Morris, Doctor Ruftin, George Grandy, Richard Butler, Phil Jones, Robert Lumpkins or Lumpley, Peter Smallwood, Warner Smith, Walter Brown, Adam Carney, Horace Beverley, America, Addison Tyler, William Jenkins, Pompey Garrison, George Basden, George Portlock (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 144).

⁷ The people who were thought to be involved in Hewell's death included Elijah Morris, Ruftin, Madison Washington, Peter Smallwood, Addison Tyler (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 137).

⁸ The people who participated with Madison Washington on the night of November 7, 1841 to discuss the next destination included Doctor Ruftin and George Grandy, Peter Smallwood, Warner Smith, Walter Brown, Adam Carney, Horace Beverley, William Jenkins (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 147).

⁹ Liberia was a Negro republic located on the west coast of Africa between Sierra Leone of British and the Ivory Coast of France. The area was about 40,000 square miles and the population was about 2,000,000 (Adam, 1940: 270-271).

voyage was impossible because they did not have enough food and water. Another leader of slavery, Ben Blacksmith, suggested that the ship should be sailed to the British West Indies because he knew that the slaves from Hermosa¹ had been free there the previous year (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 154), (Jervey & Huber, 2013: 200). Washington ordered Gifford to take the ship to Abaco or else, the crew would have been thrown into the sea (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 149). Meanwhile, Merritt suggested to Washington that they should go to the British port in Nassau Bahamas, where they would gain freedom². After further discussion, they decided to let Merritt take the ship to Nassau.

Around 8 am on November 9, 1841, the Creole arrived in Nassau, New Providence. Upon arriving at the lighthouse, Washington ordered that all weapons had to be thrown onto the board before entering the port. With this decision, it seemed that the mutineers had placed themselves in the tolerance of the British government³. As the ship arrived at the shore, since Captain Ensor was seriously injured, Gifford, the first mate captain was asked to land as soon as possible and inform American Consul, John Bacon about what had happened (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 135). Bacon agreed to get the wounded ashore and asked the Bahamas governor, Francis Cockburn (http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/cockburn_francis_9E.html) (<https://doverhistorian.com/2017/02/11/sir-francis-cockburn-canada-belize-bahamas-and-dover/>) to guard the Creole in order to prevent the escape of the men related to Hewell's death (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 127). Cockburn expressed doubts about his authority over interfering in everything. However, in this situation, he would fulfil the requirements after having discussed with Gifford and received a formal request from the American consul (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 127). Cockburn ordered 24 black soldiers, commanded by a British officer to protect the ship. Meanwhile, the council at Nassau held a special meeting and after a discussion, declared that the court was not competent enough regarding the mutineers and that the matter would be referred to the British Minister in Washington⁴. Cockburn asked Bacon's opinion towards the decision and received the satisfaction of Bacon.

Shortly thereafter, the Bahamas governor sent two inspectors aboard the Creole to investigate and Bacon was also present. The investigation lasted on November 10 and 11. However, on November 12, after attending the meeting of Bahamas council, Bacon worried that the British government would apply a ban on slavery to slaves of

¹ The Hermosa case was an incident related to the liberation of 38 American slaves by Britain in 1840 (Rodriguez, 1911: 340).

² Nassau Bahamas was one of the places in which Christopher Colombo set foot in 1492. The Nassau Bahamas was officially founded in 1670 by a British nobleman named Charles Town. In 1695, it was renamed Nassau (Marley, 2005: 3-16).

³ Slaves on board the Creole hoped that they would gain freedom in the British colony, except for 19 mutineers who worried that they might be thrown into jail, or worse, they would be returned to the United States (Downey, 2014: 15), (Jones & Rakestraw, 1997: 86).

⁴ Three issues reported by the Bahamas Governor to Bacon included: The Bahamas court did not have sufficient jurisdiction over alleged criminals at sea; All the Creole mutineers would be detained in Nassau until a decision was made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs whether or not to transfer them to the United States; All those who are not involved in the revolt would be free (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 126-127).

Creole vessel, therefore, Bacon had developed a secret plan to regain control of the ship¹. Bacon intended to steer the ship out of British authority with the slaves still on board. A group of American sailors approached the ship on November 12, intending to steer the ship to Indian Key. The plan failed because a black soldier on board saw them and warned the British officer on the Creole. 24 soldiers with guns and bayonets were ready to fight toward the ship of Captain William Woodside. Woodside was forced to leave the Creole². In the protest, Gifford and his crew blamed the failure for the intervention of the British colonial authority in Nassau (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 158).

After being studied by the court, on November 13, 1841, the Bahamas attorney boarded the ship and claimed that the slaves aboard were free, except for 19 slaves related to the revolt and Hewell's death³. The prisoners were taken to Nassau prison and some died after being injured during the revolt. After the slaves were detained, the issue becoming a subject of debate between the American consul and the British colonial authority at the time was that whether 19 slaves were to be brought to trial in Nassau or sent to the United States for trial or brought to Jamaica. Finally, the Creole case was decided to be taken to New Orleans. On November 19, 1841, the Creole departed Nassau and arrived in New Orleans on December 2⁴.

More than a month since the incident occurred, news of the Creole had not reached Washington yet. In fact, at the second session of the 27th Congress on December 6, 1841 and in presidential traditional message of Tyler one day later, the Creole case was not mentioned⁵. When the news of the Creole arrived in the United

¹ On November 12, 1841, Bacon was asked to join the Bahamas council. At the meeting, Bacon was informed that the council had directed a prosecuting attorney along with a provost marshal and police along with the military ashore on board (Downey, 2014: 43).

² Captain William Woodside of board the Louisa boarded the Creole with Bacon. Here they agreed that Woodside with the four crew members of the Congress ship would boarded the Creole with weapons. They together with the crew would rescue the Creole from the British officers then drive it to the Indian Key, about 400 miles from Nassau where an American warship was being parked and then drive it to New Orleans. Eventually, they would bring 19 slaves related to the case to the United States for trial (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 157-158).

³ In fact, most of the slaves who were allowed to be free left the Creole except for five slaves (three women, one boy and one girl) (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 129-132, 156).

⁴ Before the Bahamas attorney general boarded the ship, American consul and Captain of the Creole spoke to the Bahamas governor. The American consul expressed his desire to bring a US warship from Indian Key to protect people and cargo on the Creole cruise from Nassau to New Orleans and a person to guard during that time. However, this request was denied. The consul continued to make a proposal to allow the crews of American ships at Nassau port to board the ship and take it to New Orleans. He also asked for a guard on board until the American sailors took over the ship, but this request was also rejected. Bacon finally suggested that American sailors on American ships at the port would board the Creole and be armed by Governor Nassau for the purpose of protecting the ship and cargo to New Orleans. However, this request continued to be rejected (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 128).

⁵ In the message, relations with Britain occupied a dominant position. Tyler emphasized unresolved issues with Britain such as McLeod, Caroline and the right of visit (Benton, 1850: 368-376).

States, the South immediately reacted strongly to the British intervention in maritime affairs of the United States and to request compensation for slavery. Southern slave owners were angry because the British government not only violated the property rights of American slave owners but also encouraged a slave revolt (Rugemer, 2012: 192). They feared that the remaining slaves in the South would be affected by the Creole, and have the idea that only when reaching British land would they be free (Downey, 2014: 43). Even in Orleans, there was an explosive atmosphere on the Creole. A protest by Gifford and his crew members for details of the event related to the Nassau revolt was sent to the United States government with the testimony of the crew¹.

William Ellery Channing² feared that the Creole case would stir up the anger of the South, which might lead to the risk of a retaliatory attack, as well as the opportunity for Britain to implement the policy of abolishing slavery they were pursuing (Hicks, 1932: 517). The South worried that the British influence could encourage slave revolts and harm domestic slave trade at sea (Jones & Rakestraw, 1997: 36). In response to the Creole case, Alexander Barrow said that the Creole problem was very important to peace or war in the Anglo-American relations.

At the same time, Barrow posed the question of whether the British government had the right to abolish the slave trade towards the United States. Other senators such as William R. King³, William Preston⁴ and William Cabell Rives⁵ agreed with Barrow's view and predicted that a war between the two nations was not far off, so preparations for defense were needed.

Among the Southern Senators, John C. Calhoun was one of the people having the strongest opinion⁶. On 10 January 1842 in Congress, Calhoun introduced the

¹ Under maritime law, an appeal, about the ship's damage on the voyage by storm or other factors, shall be written by a captain and must be authenticated by a judicial officer or a notary. The protest of the first mate Captain Gifford (since Captain Ensor was severely wounded in Nassau) was witnessed by Merritt, Cargo and authenticated by Leidner (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 151-159).

² William Ellery Channing (1780-1842) was an American theologian born in Rhode Island. He was the author of *The Duty of the Free States; or Remarks Suggested by the Case of the Creole regarding the Creole issue* (<https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-Ellery-Channing>), (https://theodora.com/encyclopedia/c/william_ellery_channing).

³ William R. King (1786-1853) was a politician, diplomat, US senator from Alabama and 13th Vice President of the United States. (https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/VP_William_R_King.htm).

⁴ Preston (1816-1887) served in the House of Representatives (1830-1832, 1844-1845), the Senate of Virginia (1840-1844), the US House of Representatives (1847-1849) and the Federal Senate (1862) Head of the Navy (1849-1850) (https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/media_player?mets_filename=evm00002634mets.xml).

⁵ William Cabell Rives (1793-1868) was a United States Senator from Virginia (1841-1845), Secretary of the United States in France (1849-1853), who supported the abolition of slavery (Thomas, 1981: 64-66).

⁶ John Caldwell Calhoun was an American politician. He had held many important positions such as Secretary of War, Secretary of State, Vice President of the United States (Bartnicki, Michalek & Rusinowa: 44-45).

solution to the Creole case. Calhoun's solution was accepted by Congress. However, on January 18, 1842, Webster sent a report to the President explaining that neither the owners of the slave nor the insurer had requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' assistance. Webster announced that he would send a letter to Everett, the Secretary of the United States in London.

On January 29, 1842, Webster wrote a letter to Everett, American Minister in London expressing his first view on the Creole case (Jay, 1842: 4-11). Webster said that this issue seriously threatened peace between the two countries. According to him, the fact that the Creole made the trip from port to port of the United States was legal and the ownership of slaves aboard was recognized by the United States Constitution. Webster asserted that the British authority in Nassau should have been responsible for assisting the American consulate to return the ship and cargos to their owners. The property of individuals could not be affected by national law if it was brought into the territorial sea by force and rebellion (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 115-123). This view was confirmed by Everett towards Aberdeen in London. Everett spoke that cases such as Comet, Encomium, Enterprise¹ and Hermosa and the slaves aboard were liberated by the British. In similar cases to the Creole, the United States government took a part of the slaves of traders, claiming compensation from the British government for the liberty property of the traders – as an implicit apology for British intervention in the internal affairs of the United States (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 115-123).

In parliament, this issue had become a subject of serious debate among slavery abolitionists. On March 21 and 22, 1842, at House of Representatives, Joshua R. Giddings proposed nine measures to encourage slave freedom and the Creole. Giddings said that when the Creole vessel had left Virginia, the slavery laws of Virginia had been suspended for the people on board and they had to obey the laws of the United States. Explaining the rebellion of 19 slaves, Giddings said it was only a restoration of personal freedom and did not violate the United States laws and was not responsible for the punishment. Giddings pointed out the state of slavery, its application to international laws, and that the government's attempt to re-establish slavery was not consistent with the honor of the United States². Therefore, Giddings said that the US consulate in Nassau should stop pressuring the Bahamas and that Webster should stop punishing the British government for the incident (Downey, 2014: 137). The House of Representatives has censured Giddings with a 126-69 vote³,

¹ Enterprise was the name of an American ship. On February 11, 1835, the ship transported 78 slaves and cargo, but due to bad weather, it was forced to go into the Bermuda waters where Britain declared abolition of slavery since 1834. All property on this ship was confiscated and this event became a problem between the United Kingdom and the United States, known as the Enterprise case. In 1853, the British-American Compensation Board officially accepted compensation for American slave owners involved (Horne, 2012: 137).

² Of the 9 solutions proposed by Giddings, only 3 solutions had proposed principles that applied directly to the Creole case (Rodriguez, 2007: 317-318), (Savage, 1936: 28-39).

³ Censure was the official voting form of censure by the majority of members when a member of parliament made something wrong. To remove the membership of that person required two

in which all Democrats and most of Whigs voted against Giddings¹. After that, on March 26, Channing published an essay titled "*The Duty of Free States or Remarks Suggested by the case of the Creole*" (Channing, 1842). Channing said that although the rebellion might appear on the voyage, a country's local law was not applicable in another locality. The essay immediately spread and received the support of Southern leaders like Charles Sumner² and Joshua Giddings (Hicks, 1932: 523-525).

While the American public reacted very strongly to the Creole case, the British government received very late information. By mid-December, news of the Creole case arrived in London. However, only a few days later, the incident of the warships sinking in Nassau made the British government more anxious. In fact, relations between the two countries had been tense for decades and the Creole case might initiate a further risk of a war. In that situation, Aberdeen, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, announced to Everett, the United States Minister in London on Ashburton's special mission. Everett then quickly informed Webster about Ashburton's mission. Although the news arrived in London, not until January 28, 1842, did British Ambassador to the United States Henry S. Fox send a report on the Creole case to Aberdeen. In the letter, Fox expressed the view that the British government had no right to request any compensation from Great Britain for the case of fleeing slaves. Fox cited cases similar to the Creole³. In particular, Fox claimed that the testimony of the Creole crew on the incident was inaccurate. Fox denied the responsibility of the British government and consider it as the responsibility of the insurer involved in the loss of slaves of American owners in Nassau (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 160). Therefore, the British government pay little proper attention to the Creole. Ashburton regretted the Creole incident, but the British warmly welcomed Peel's policy against slavery and there would be no compensation for free slaves from the ship (Jones, 1956: 42-43). He did not recognize any laws of the United States on punishing slaves. The British law recognized mutineers as objects, human beings who could act rather than properties (Sale, 1997: 143). Neither Aberdeen nor Ashburton had had preparation for this (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 153). In fact, on February 8, 1842, Aberdeen gave Ashburton instructions as the

thirds of the votes of the members of the parliament (<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195142730.001.0001/acref-9780195142730>).

¹ Joshua R. Giddings is a Whig party member from Ohio. After being rejected by the House of Representatives, Giddings resigned from Congress to protest. On May 5, 1842, more than 7,469 voters backed Giddings back to his place in a special election (Morris, 1982: 220-221), (Ludlum, 1936: 49-60).

² Charles Sumner (1811-1874) was a US politician, the United States Senator from Massachusetts. He was the leader of the fight against slavery in Massachusetts (<https://www.history.com/topics/19th-century/charles-sumner>).

³ Earlier, the United States and the United Kingdom also experienced the incidents related to slave ships entering the British colonies. Under Britain's slave-abolition policy, since 1834 all foreign slave ships entering Bermuda and the Bahamas would be confiscated from slaves and property without compensation. Slave ships such as Comet, Hermosa and Enterprise went into the British colonies, so the confiscation of slaves initiated booming events between the two countries on the issue (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 112).

official guide towards the talks prior to coming to the United States. However, the Creole affair was not mentioned¹.

By early 1842, the connection between the United States and Great Britain became fragile. The British government wanted to improve relations with the United States, so it was a good idea to start with a fair approach to small issues (Jones, 1956: 49). In response to issues arising in bilateral relations, Ashburton arrived in Washington on April 4, 1842. However, at this time, the event of Dorr's rebellion in Rhode Island caused distress for both Tyler and Webster². When some issues were resolved, both Webster and Ashburton quickly participated in informal discussions on a range of issues. Although the Creole was not mentioned in Ashburton's instructions, however, due to the public agitation on the matter, Ashburton felt that it was necessary to take the issue into consideration (Adams, 1912: 770-771). Ashburton realized that security for the future was of paramount importance to slave owners in the South rather than compensation for losses. Both Webster and Ashburton were concerned that the Creole could interrupt other issues, even the Maine border problem³.

In the tension between the two sides, the British government eased the situation by offering a promise that slaves of future revolts would be returned to the United States. However, soon afterwards, Aberdeen, in the letter to Ashburton, gave no guarantee of this. He pointed out, however, that, under the influence of weather or force, slaves must be free within the sphere of British jurisdiction. Great Britain would not offer any guarantee for any future voyages and recommended the United States should probably use a guard system (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 256). In contrast, the main point in American's view of the Creole relied on opposing British intervention against American ships in search of shelter and demanding the return of fleeing slaves (Gordon, 1908: 213).

From the response of the United States and Britain to the Creole case, two issues were considered to lead to the failure in finding a solution to this problem, namely maritime security in the Bahamas and the crime extradition. Webster and Ashburton all looked forward to an extradition treaty⁴. On April 28, Ashburton wrote to Aberdeen to present Webster's wishes for linking the Creole affair to a general

¹ Aberdeen pointed out Ashburton's mission to the United States. It was to address issues such as the Northeast Frontier, the Oregon border, the Northwest Frontier, the Caroline incident and the right of search (Adams, 1912: 766), (Van Sang, 2018: 35-48).

² The revolt was the struggle of middle class people led by Thomas Wilson Dorr, seeking to extend the democratic rights in the Rhode States of the United States between 1841 and 1842 (Raven, 2010).

³ At the moment, the United States and the United Kingdom were in the process of negotiating border issues such as the Oregon dispute, the northeast border problem in Maine and New Brunswick, the Texas problem (Jones, 1956: 48-58), (Adams, 1912: 766), (Van Sang, 2018: 35-48).

⁴ In fact, before Ashburton arrived in Washington, Webster sent a letter to a friend in Massachusetts, Joseph Story. Story advised Webster that it lacked of legal basis to return 19 slaves that were being arrested in Nassau. Webster had asked Story about the clause to come to a treaty to resolve the issue of a ship being taken to a foreign port as well as extradition (Jones, 1977: 145-146).

extradition treaty. Ashburton presented Webster's suggestion that British colonial officials should not only avoid all interference with slave ships stopping at British ports due to bad weather, but also beyond that, in the events of the slave revolt, help the owners restore the ownership of their ship (Adams, 1912: 776). However, Aberdeen argued, the extradition treaty could lead to some difficulties in defining the commitment clauses regarding liberating slaves, especially in the case on the sea, where the local laws did not exist. Aberdeen said that the extradition treaty should be considered, but must be submitted to the State for Foreign Affairs before it could give its views (Adams, 1912: 776). As far as maritime security was concerned, Aberdeen insisted that it was impossible (Webster, 2010: 254).

Aberdeen's inconsistent directions to the Creole case, the reaction of the United States and the uncompromising resolution of the British parliament pushed Ashburton into dilemma in negotiations with Webster. The dilemma of the two sides was expressed by Webster in his letter to John David on April 16, 1842. In his letter, he argued that the position of the United States in the Creole matter was misunderstood and incorrect (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 241). Not receiving advice from Aberdeen after two talks and great pressure from the South, Ashburton had expressed his complaints towards Aberdeen (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 254). He said that both the President and almost all of the Senate had strong views on the Creole¹. He described: "He [the president] is very sore and testy about the Creole" (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 261).

Having received no instruction from London while Ashburton had to act decisively on the final days of his mission, he decided to act in his own way. Ashburton thought that, because the incident was the cause of strong reactions, involving both nations and international law, Ashburton would refer this matter to London once again. There, Ashburton hoped the two governments would connect at a meeting on an extradition treaty with a satisfaction on the Creole case. Ashburton was also thinking of compensating for the lost slaves. But he believed the British government was unlikely to accept it (Jones, 1977: 147).

As a result of lengthy negotiations, the security of Bahamas Channel and the extradition were quite limited. It failed to reach an extradition treaty. However, Ashburton, in the official letter to the United States government, had suggested that delicate matters could best be settled in London (The Department of State, 1848: 83-91), (Kaufman & Macpherson, 2005: 295). Ashburton promised to limit informal interventions as the American vessel attempted to seek shelter in the British port (Jones, 2002: 130). This promise was addressed in Ashburton's letter to Aberdeen on 26 May 1842 (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 717-712). To prevent future cases like the Creole and placate the groups that opposed slavery in the United States and Great Britain, Webster and Ashburton, in the treaty signed August 9, 1842²

¹ See in the letter, Ashburton wrote: Ashburton acknowledged: "The President, as a Virginian, has a strong opinion about the Creole case, and is not a little disposed to be obstinate on the subject" (The Houses of Parliamentary, 1842: 267).

² This treaty was also known as the Webster-Ashburton treaty. At first, Webster and Ashburton signed 2 treaties: one on border issues, one dealing with other issues in bilateral relations. However, the two treaties were then grouped into one, in which, seven articles were related to

established a clause on the mutual extradition of defectors of seven types¹. This clause was opposed mainly by the British side. Opponents said that this statement would apply to all fleeing slaves (Gordon, 1908: 232). The misunderstanding was later explained by Aberdeen (Moore, 1905: 256).

In the United States, on August 11, 1842, President Tyler submitted a treaty to Congress. The views of Congress's members were very different. Thomas Benton said that in practice it was very difficult to come into effect (Benton, 1856: 444). However, John Calhoun expressed his support that the treaty would bring peace to the two countries and he found Ashburton's guarantee of security measures in maritime transport. On August 20, the Senate voted 39-9 on the content of the treaty. This support was beyond the imagination of Webster (Gordon, 1908: 217). By 1846, the issue of the treaty, including the Creole case, continued to be debated in Congress. Webster acknowledged, although the advantages for the United States maritime rights had not been achieved yet, the matter of solving the Creole case had been conducted with the utmost effort from his talents and morals. After the treaty was signed, the two countries also took part in a trial regarding disputes between slave owners, the Creole owners and insurers involved in the damages from the revolt².

In fact, the United States and Great Britain solved the problem of the Creole on the account of the immediate interests of the two countries. The injuries involved in the liberated slaves were not mentioned and the judgment of the Creole case was temporarily halted. On October 31, 1853, the British commissioners asked Joshua Bates³ to be the arbitrator and this proposal received the consent of the United States commissioners. On November 2, Bates officially accepted the proposal and two weeks later the matter was resolved. However, Bates' decision was not accepted by both parties. In 1855, Joshua Bates declared another judgment. In this judgment, Bates asserted, although slavery was against humanity, the laws of nations could not prevent a nation from establishing it by law. The Creole was on a legal voyage. Bates said that, when necessary, it was inevitable to drive the Creole to Nassau and the Creole had the right to seek shelter from a friendly nation. Regarding the slaves, Governor of Nassau should have helped the Creole officers get them back. Bates ruled that the British Liberation Act was not responsible for the case, as no local law would allow the armed forces to board another nation's ship. Because Nassau officials violated international law, the British government had to pay compensation to the

border issues, Articles VIII and IX were related to the establishment of common guards off the African coast, Article X were related to the extradition of crimes. The treaty was extended by the British and American governments twice in 1889 and 1931 (Miller, 1931: 82).

¹ Crimes included all persons who, being charged with the crime of murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or Forgery, or the utterance of forged paper (Miller, 1931: 88).

² In March 1845 the New Orleans Supreme Court ruled between McCargo and the Merchants Insurance Company of New Orleans. McCargo's proposed compensation to the insurance company was \$20,800. However, the court ruled that the insurance company only compensated McCargo \$18,400 (Robinson, 1845: 335-339).

³ Joshua Bates (1788-1864) was born in Weymouth, Massachusetts. He was an international financier – the owner of Baring Bank (Jack, 1918: 11-12).

Creole's slave owners. The British-American Claims Commission decided that the British government had to compensate the owners of the lost slaves for \$30,330 (Moore, 1898: 417). The Creole problem ended after more than seven years of controversy between Britain and the United States. The settlement of the Creole case had an important position in the British-American relations regarding slavery.

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A UTILITY RECLAIMED BY OUR CENTURY'S CIVILIZATION THE METRIC SYSTEM (1872-1875)

*Alexandru Ionicescu**

Abstract

Currently, the usage of the metric system is spread, with little exceptions, on the entire globe. Over a century and a half ago though, the perspectives of adopting the meter and the kilogram were not so bright, a lot of problems and difficulties being met on the way. Initially adopted in 1864, the percepts of the metric system proved to be hard to adapt to the reality of the young state – Romania. The situation was dallied for almost two decades. As a result of adhering to the International Metric Convention (1883) and also by establishing the Central Service for Measures and Weights (1889), Romania made the jump from only an intention of adopting the measures and weights to concrete actions for implementing these new measures. Through this study, our objective is to put a light on the legislative efforts made for the introduction of the metric system between the years 1872-1875. Although lacking the desired finality, the initiatives promoted by the Lascăr Catargiu Government (1871-1876), represent an essential landmark in understanding the difficulties raised from the adoption of the measures and weights to the level of Western Europe. By questioning the documents from the epoch, through press materials and debates carried between the years 1872-1875, the subject of adopting the metric system proved to be of vital importance. Its implications, both in the activities of the state and the commercial branch were treated with utmost responsibility and seriousness by Lascăr Catargiu's conservative members.

Key words: *Metric System, the Conservative Government, Conversion, Ștefan Fălcoianu*

Used since immemorial times, the first means of measuring the length, surface, capacity and weight inspired from and perfected in accord with the immediate necessities of the human body which could be well considered an endless river of practical possibilities (Iacobescu & Ilioiu, 2003: 11-14). Overlapping the old domestic way of measuring, the Roman system did not entirely replace the units and means of measuring previously used. In other words, the process of acculturation did not exclude the totality of the pre-Roman elements, which, with some exceptions, were used on a large scale until the late 19th century¹.

More precise information regarding the measurements and instruments used are coming from the Middle Age period of time. For evaluating the lengths, relatively modern measurements like the “*elbon*” or “*stanjenelul*”, with their multiples and submultiples, were concomitantly used with a series of archaic practices and methods for appreciating distances like “*șvarlitura de băf*”, “*aruncarea de bardă*”, “*bătaia de sageată*”, respectively “*cât o privire de ochi*”². As for the agrarian measurements, alongside the

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¹ Between the measures inherited from the Romans we find “the finger”, “the palm”, “the step”, “the line”, “the falcea” and “the elbow”, see Iacobescu & Ilioiu, 2003: 55-60, 80-83.

² For great distances “the post”, “mila”, “mile” and “the wheel” were used, see Iacobescu & Ilioiu, 2003: 84-102, 152. For the description and enunciation of all the measures and length

“rope”, “acre” and “falce”, unprecise methods were also used like the “*place or land*”, “*the day for ploughing or mowing*” and, in some cases, even evaluating the surfaces by the size of the grains or other harvested products¹. The approximation for the capacities and weights of various objects was made in a similar way. “*Vadra*” and “*ocaua*” for liquids and “*găleata*”, “*banița*”, “*obrocul*”, “*dimerlia*” for dry materials imposed over the centuries, most of them being used, with little exceptions in the Romanian Country (Mioc & Stoicescu, 1963: 1356-1378, Zanne, 1873: 53-54) and Moldova², for measuring the capacities. On the other hand, for the table the “*ocaua*” was used, with its multiples – the scale, “*povara*”, “*carul*” or the “*maja*”, means also used for weighing precious metals or pharmaceutical products³.

In spite of the fact that the names for the measurements were common everywhere, the interminable fluctuation of the values gave birth to many complaints and cases of abuse. In this respect, as an attempt to limit the arbitrary, we recollect the various efforts of establishing some standards and stable indicators. The incapacity of permanent checking if the standards were being met made this attempt a futile one. Among the codes and dispositions that had the rank of regulation, the initiatives of Matei Basarab, Șerban Cantacuzino, Grigorie Callimachi, Grigore Alexandru Ghica (1776), Alexandru Vodă Ipsilanti, Constantin Brâncoveanu and Scarlat Callimachi distinguished themselves during the XVII-XIX centuries. The main focus manifested for fixating immovable values for some of the measures used⁴, reflect the direct implication of the authorities in the adjustment of the economic area – an area from which they got, on a regular schedule, important resources. Aside from the purpose earlier mentioned, the elimination of fraud, common among both the merchants and the state agents was also pursued (Iacobescu & Ilieș, 2003: 148-157; Brăescu, 1913: 33-34, 54-55; Mioc & Stoicescu, 1963: 1353).

The effort for regulating some constant values became more concrete through the Organic Rules. For units like the “acre”, “falcea” (Brăescu, 1913: 31, Zanne, 1879: 36), “chila” (Mioc & Stoicescu, 1963: 1364, 1368-1370), “prăjina”, “stânjenul și stânjenul pătrat”, “ceasul de mers”, “the day for plow”, “the day for digging”, “the day for mowing”, “the day for ploughing” and the “palma domnească” were values and limits well established (Negulescu & Alexianu, 1944: 38-40, 201-202). Despite the new norms, the abuses recorded in different measurements continued in the same old way.

instruments used in the entire Romanian Country, see Mioc & Stoicescu, 1965: 639-651, 658-665.

¹ Without being universally quantifiable, denominations represented the expression of old and respected habits between private citizens and the authorities as well as the procedure to valuing the work capacity, see Iacobescu & Ilieș, 2003: 102-119, Mioc & Stoicescu, 1965: 651-658, Mioc & Stoicescu, 1964: 87-105.

² For an extended analysis on the medieval measures and instruments used in Moldova, see Stoicescu, 1965: 221-227, 278-284, 326-333, 375-380.

³ For the multiples and submultiples of the measures used for capacities and weights, for registered frauds in the epoch, as well as for the lack of immutable values, see Iacobescu & Ilieș, 2003: 119-148, Iacobescu & Ilieș, 2004: 164-241. For the multiples and submultiples of the “stânjenel” and “the palm”, see Brăescu, 1913: 8.

⁴ Establishing fixed values for measurement units like “banița”, “mierața”, “cotul” or “stânjenul”.

Before long, both from practical and fiscal reasons, the metric system and the ideal of standardisation of all the measures demonstrated its superiority and necessity.

Established ever since 1799, the metric system, the meter and the kilogram, were adopted in Lombardy, Holland, Belgium and Greece between the 1805-1836 (Zanne, 1879: 7) while in France, the state which patented the new system, had it in current use by the year of 1838¹. As for the first attempts of adopting the metric system in the Romanian Countries, we mention the proposal of Mihail Ghica, from 1835 and the study of Barbu Știrbei, which the Romanian ruler supported before the Crimean War². Although not achieved, the two initiatives mark a turning point in the direction of awareness, of understanding the deficiency and shortage of the means of measurements previously used³. A last tentative of introducing the metric system had, this time for the young state of Romania, Ion Ghica in 1859. Although rejected, the draft law elaborated and supported by Ion Ghica became the base for the law in 1864.

The abolition of the old measures and the adoption of the new metric system applied to the whole scale of the country became a reality on 15 September 1864. Beyond the need for adjusting to the new values and units for length, capacities, solidity, weight and the agricultural section (Bujoreanu, 1873: 1964), the law stipulated measures, terms and procedures for the distribution of standards to all the authorities tasked with verifying the measures⁴. In order to respect the term for the implementation of the law – 1 January 1864, but also for a correct instruction of those meant to apply the law, Mihail Kogălniceanu disposed, since December 1864 the elaboration and expedition throughout the territory, of the tables that contained the conversion diagram and the actualization of the units and measures used before (Bujoreanu, 1873: 1965-1971).

The difficulties related to the acquisition and to the distribution of the metric system in the territory, the inexistence of a structure responsible with the elaboration of a schedule of law implementation, and, probably, the resistance manifested in regard to the new system (Iacobescu & Ilieș, 2004: 253), alongside the late appearance of the *“Regulamentului relativ la mesuri și greutăți și verificarea lor în executarea Legii dela 15 septembrie 1864”*⁵ justify the late implementation of the metric system.

¹ The law regarding the adoption of the new system in France was promulgated ever since 1812, see Iacobescu & Ilieș, 2003: 157-159, Brăescu, 1913: 2.

² If the proposal of the Mihail Ghica was rejected, the study, initially approved by Barbu Știrbei, was ultimately abandoned by the same ruler in favor of the unilateral of the size of the “stanjen”, which was fixed at the size of 2 meters, see Iacobescu & Ilieș, 2003: 160-161, Brăescu, 1913: 4, Mioc & Stoicescu, 1963: 1355-1356.

³ A relevant fact was, without being adopted, that the metric system was used to determine the length of the *“stânjenul lui Șerban Vodă”* (1,92 m) since 1835. Also, following the same logic, the project and works of the tow paths was used and also the construction of bridges and roads, see Iacobescu & Ilieș, 2004: 246-247.

⁴ For being utilized, the measures and weights needed the press plate from competent authorities. The selling and usage of the new etalons were highly supervised by police officers and communal verifiers, see Bujoreanu, 1873: 1964-1965.

⁵ The Regulation was decreed on 8 January 1866, seven days after the initial term settled for applying the law. The regulation contained instructions and dispositions regarding the forms and materials from which the measure and weight instruments were to be confectioned from,

Through a draft law adopted by the Assembly of Deputies in 22 January 1866 the law was programmed to enact beginning with 1 January 1870. The law was not promulgated because the Senate did not support it. Through a second legislative initiative dated 3 September 1866, the term for a definitive introduction of the metric system was advanced to 1 January 1868, but, not even then did the law pass because the Parliament did not rule on the subject (d. 512, f. 416). The situation perpetuated until 1872 when, through a new draft law, the problem of the metric system entered a new register.

The standardisation of the metric system at the scale of the entire country represented a priority for the Government Lascăr Catargiu. In this sense, the Project of Law sent to be debated in the Assembly of Deputies, on 29 November 1872, expressed the confirmation of the Government's interest in the matter (d. 512, f. 413). For the minister Nicolae Cretzulescu, the initiator of the law, the perturbations and abnormalities generated by the multiple units of measurements used in the entire country could've only been dissolved by definitively acclimatizing the latter (*Proiect pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de măsuri și greutăți în țară*, 1873: f. 416).

Proiectul de Lege pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de măsuri și greutăți în țară provided in the content of the seven articles, dispositions to implement the initial law from 15 September 1864. The dispositions included the Government's commitment to distribute comparative panels with the new measurements and weights to the central and local authorities as well as to the school in Romania alongside the way of postage of the new measures and weights, their form and model agreed upon the Ministry of Public Work. The project established the deadline to be 1 July 1873, both for the introduction of the new measures and weights in Ministries, Customs, Salines, Posts, Hospitals, Prisons and the Army, as well as for the inclusion of a new scholar discipline – implementing the metric system, which, according to the initiator, was meant to be “*un obiect obligator de examinare*” (*Proiect pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de măsuri și greutăți în țară*, 1873: f. 416v). The new measures and weights were to be generalized throughout the whole country, in all the financial and commercial transactions beginning with 1 January 1874, deadline to which all the Councils of the Urban Community had to adhere to by opening and maintaining offices of monitoring and public weighters¹. Despite the enactment of a coherent calendar regarding the gradual introduction of the new measures, the draft law was not analysed and debated in the Assembly of Deputies², remaining thus only a project.

Even so, the efforts of reformation of the system of measurements and weights entered a new phase in March 1873 with the occasion of a debate on the adoption of

stipulation regarding the checking of the process and the tasks of the verifiers, as well as the plan to identify and punish the criminals, see Bujoreanu, 1873: 1972-1978.

¹ For the accommodation of the population with the new system, the Government and the municipalities decided that until 1 January 1876 to proceed, through all the addresses and documents emitted, to clarify, parallel and enlighten with examples regarding the replacement of the old units of measures and weights with the new ones, see *Proiect pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de măsuri și greutăți în țară*, 1873: f. 416v.

² The draft law was sent to the research sections on 30 November 1872, see *Proiect pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de măsuri și greutăți în țară*, 1873: f. 417.

the “cotul lui Fălcoianu” for “mesurătoarea vaselor cu liquide”. It is important to note that the system elaborated by Ștefan Fălcoianu did not represent an absolute novelty at that time. Having its merits and advantages, the Government admitted ever since the beginning of 1872 (Tufescu, 1891: 521) the necessity of its introduction in the country. In this regard, through numerous excursions in the county seat, publicity (*Românul*, 1872a: 94) and public conferences, Ștefan Fălcoianu carried out during the year 1872 an ample promotional campaign of his own formula¹ “de cotitu și mesuratu capacitățile” (*Românul*, 1872b: 1061).

Regarding the legislative development of implementing Ștefan Fălcoianu’s system, we record that, in the first stage, he obtained in the Senate a comfortable majority of 35 votes and only two against in March 1873². As a consequence, the draft law was submitted to the Assembly of Deputies³, in order to be debated and subjected to the vote. Submitted to analysis a year later in March 1874 (*Proiect votat de Senat pentru admiterea cotului Fălcoianu în măsurarea vaselor de lichiduri*, 1874a: 329), the project did not get to be included on the agenda and, therefore, remained only a prototype. Despite its unsuccessfulness⁴, up until the end of the 19th century, Ștefan Fălcoianu⁵ managed to sell approximately, 20000 “elbows” each costing “20 de franci bucata, luînd de la comuni vr’o 400 de mii franci”. This operation only attracted a series of criticism, both regarding the system’s total lack of practical utility and its doubtful scientific honesty (Tufescu, 1891: 521-522, 530-533).

After the unsuccessful draft law supported by Nicolae Cretzulescu in November 1872, we record a new attempt to establish the metric system on unitary basis in May 1874 (*Proiect pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de mesuri și greutăți*, 1874b: 576). With G.Gr. Cantacuzino as an initiator, the new “Proiect de Lege pentru aplicarea Sistemii Metrice de mesuri și greutăți” was founded on a “really particular care” in the direction of applying the new metric system in a “progressive and methodical” manner. For the eradication of “surprises and perturbations” G.Gr. Cantacuzino carried through and presented a series of preliminary dispositions that targeted the process of educating the entire population on the grounds of the new metric system, which was meant to be gradually introduced. The dispositions also included the formation of a special committee engaged in the surveillance of the implementation of the law and in the adoption of the necessary means to ensure a real and integral application of the new system (*Proiect pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de mesuri și greutăți*, 1874b: 579). Evoking the proximity of

¹ For the modality of concluding the volume through the method “cotul lui Fălcoianu”, see Tufescu, 1891: 530-533.

² The draft law for the admission of the “cotul lui Fălcoianu” was presented and adopted in the session from 20 March 1873, see *Monitorul Oficial al României*, 1873: 553.

³ The draft law was submitted in the Assembly of Deputies on 24 March 1873, see *Proiect votat de Senat pentru admiterea cotului Fălcoianu în măsurarea vaselor de lichiduri*, 1874a: 326.

⁴ As a result of abandoning the project, which contained the whole replacement of the old elbow with the system proposed by Ștefan Fălcoianu, starting on 1 January 1874, used, as in the past, the old system of determining the volumes, see *Proiect votat de Senat pentru admiterea cotului Fălcoianu în măsurarea vaselor de lichiduri*, 1874a: 328. For the old “elbow system”, see Tufescu, 1891: 528-530.

⁵ On June 1873, Ștefan Fălcoianu was designated director of the Public Work Ministry, see *Presa*, 1873: 1.

the deadline on 1 January 1876 of the Austro-Hungarian metric system implementation and the high interest in developing commercial relations with the Empire, G.Gr. Cantacuzino requested a definitive solution for the matter because its utility was regarded as an “essential instrument of our century’s civilization” (*Proiect pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de mesuri și greutateți*, 1874b: 579v).

The new draft law was inspired, the same as the previous one, from the Law from September 1864. The Government decided to instruct the authorities and the schools by distributing until 1 January 1876 comparative panels with the new weights and the ones that were meant to be replaced¹. This new process of implementing the metric system was a progressive one. In this manner, according to the agenda, the new measures and weights were meant to be introduced in the Ministers, Customs, Posts, Army, Hospitals, Prisons and Urban Municipalities until 1 January 1877² and in the Rural Municipalities two years later, on 1 January 1879. Two years later, in 1881, the new system became compulsory for all the activities, transactions and operations throughout the entire country³. According to the draft law, covering the necessary sums planned for the acquisition of the measurements and weights necessary to all the communes and subordinated authorities was the County Council’s responsibility (*Proiect pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de mesuri și greutateți*, 1874b: 580).

Sent to be debated in the Assembly of Deputies barely on 15th of January 1875 (*Proiect pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de mesuri și greutateți*, 1874b: 581), the draft law was debated and analysed by the Committee of Delegates whose rapporteur, Ion Titulescu, finished his rapport on 23 January the same year (*Proiect pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de mesuri și greutateți*, 1874b: 611). Although fined by one of the sections and categorically rejected by the other⁴, the project obtained everyone’s vote in the end, maintaining the form proposed by the Government. Greeting the precocious spirit that guided G.Gr. Cantacuzino, who showed a great interest in the work and the preliminary measures that paved the road for a coherent application of the law, Ion Titulescu highlighted the importance of the draft law that mainly consisted of a “regular application of a law already existent” (*Proiect pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de mesuri și greutateți*, 1874b: 612).

Taken into account in the meeting from 29 January 1875, the draft law was adopted on articles (*Românul*, 1875a: 87) and voted with a total majority of 63 in favour of the law and 6 against it (*Presse*, 1875: 1). In the Senate, the draft law went through the same easy process. In the meeting, held on 10 February 1875, with “a

¹ The comparative panels could’ve been bought by the public with the prices that will “cost the state”, see *Proiect pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de mesuri și greutateți*, 1874b: 580.

² On the same time, the scholar classes on the subject of the metric system became compulsory, and the urban communal councils established checking points and authorized public weighters.

³ For facilitating the assimilation and usage of the new measures and weights, between 1877 and 1881, the Government and the municipal authorities were to use comparative panels with the old units and the new ones.

⁴ Section I proposed the modification of the metric system calendar by shortening the term of its measures and weights introduction while section IV rejected the project because of its lack of opportunity and utility considering that “we have our old ways that we are used to and it would be too difficult to transition from old traditions to a new system”, see *Proiect pentru aplicarea sistemului metric de mesuri și greutateți*, 1874b: 612.

unanimity of 31 votes in favour of the law and 5 abstentions” (*Monitorul Oficial al României*, 1875a: 1186-1187), the senators adopted the project in the form voted by the Assembly of Deputies. Although promulgated on 18 February 1875 (*Monitorul Oficial al României*, 1875b: 1186-1187), the “*Law for applying the metric system of measurements and weights*” resolved only partially the problem of its practical introduction in the everyday activities. Alongside the adoption of a coherent calendar regarding the introduction of the new measurements and weights, the most stringent problem that the Government faced proved to be the acquisition and the distribution of the materials for the new system to all the state’s authorities.

The solution of the new Public Work Minister, Theodor Rosetti, was forwarded in the Assembly of the Deputies on 9 June 1875 (*Proiect de convențiune pentru cumpărătoare de mesuri și greutăți de la Dnii Lamaitre și Bergman, pentru aplicarea sistemului metric*, 1875: 147). The perspective of a new convention with “*D-nii Lemaitre and Bergmann*”, for the acquisition of the materials after the failed one in 1865 and 1866¹, seemed the most suited strategy both for the accommodation of the French Government’s susceptibility and for the process of applying the new metric system. Inspired, the conservative Minister pursued both the closing of a problematic file and also the acquisition of a limited quantity of measurements and weights with 2 million new lei². The reimbursement of the acquisition costs was broken down in a period of four years and the traders Lamaitre and Bergmann each received, as compensation, 565 thousands of francs, for the prejudices and expenses of the cancelled convention from 1865 (*Proiect de convențiune pentru cumpărătoare de mesuri și greutăți de la Dnii Lamaitre și Bergman, pentru aplicarea sistemului metric*, 1875: 162v-164).

Sent to be debated in the sections on 13 June 1875, the draft law was adopted by the Delegates Committee a week later³. In the rapport presented in the session on 24 June 1875, C.N. Brăiloiu, the rapporteur of the Delegates Committee showed that all sections admitted the convention and although an intention to modify it existed,

¹ In 1865, The Government signed a convention with a duration of 5 years with Lemaitre and Bergmann in which the latter gained the monopoly over selling weights and measures on Romania’s entire territory. After the vote in the Senate, on January 1866 the convention was rejected. After official interventions from the Government of France a new convention signed with the same individual on 3 September 1866 in which Lemaitre and Bergmann took the responsibility to deliver measures and weights valuing 18000000 old lei, money that the Government was obliged to reimburse in five years. Submitted to the vote of the Assembly of Deputies, the convention was rejected on 29 March 1867, see *Proiect de convențiune pentru cumpărătoare de mesuri și greutăți de la Dnii Lamaitre și Bergman, pentru aplicarea sistemului metric*, 1875: 162. For the context of the end of the convention from 1865 as well as for the reasons that justified the rejection of the contract in January 1866, see Iacobescu & Ilieș, 2003: 190-194.

² The prices of acquisition were the ones from 1865. For completing the necessary number of weights and measures the Government had the liberty of rising the stocks through financial operations with other suppliers at lower prices, see *Proiect de convențiune pentru cumpărătoare de mesuri și greutăți de la Dnii Lamaitre și Bergman, pentru aplicarea sistemului metric*, 1875: 165-166.

³ C.N. Brăiloiu, the rapporteur of the Delegates Committee, finalized his project on 20 January 1875, occasion in which the draft law was printed to be registered on the daily agenda, see *Proiect de convențiune pentru cumpărătoare de mesuri și greutăți de la Dnii Lamaitre și Bergman, pentru aplicarea sistemului metric*, 1875: 161, 233.

“after serious consideration”, the delegates ended by “simply accepting it”¹. The repeated allusions to the energetic French interventions determined Mihail Kogălniceanu to take position in the general debate. Distrustful of the French pressure in the matter and concerned with the perspective of a dangerous precedent, Mihail Kogălniceanu implied that he was not willing to accept the intervention of a third party into a private issue. After Vasile Boerescu’s nuances on the affair, who rejected the existence of deceit and constraints and supported the subject by declaring it a moral intervention, made the draft law to be taken into consideration and, without much debate, adopted it with a majority of 74 in favour of the total 89 (*Românul*, 1875b: 567). On 27 June 1875, the Senate debated and with 40 votes in favour and 7 against, the project was adopted (*Monitorul Oficial al României*, 1875c: 3176).

Despite the good intentions manifested and despite the integral implementation effort of the new measures – from 1877 until 1881² –, the metric system was not generalized to the scale of the entire country only until the late part of the year 1884. Among the causes that slowed down the introduction of the new system was the inability to manufacture stamps and distribute standards to all the communal authorities in Romania (Iacobescu & Ilieș, 2003: 185). Although used in the army and among the public services and institutions even before 1884 (Iacobescu & Ilieș, 2003: 162, 188-189, 195), the procedure for imposing the metric scale to the entire country was to popularize the new system and to instruct children through scholar programs. In this respect, the contribution of the Lascăr Catargiu Government cannot be doubted. The long period of time reclaimed by the preparation of the society on the matter and the accumulation of a sufficient number of measures and weights stretched over a period of two decades³.

Nicolae Cretzulescu, G.Gr. Cantacuzino and Th. Rosetti, although in different degrees but nonetheless driven by the same sincere wish to create a case where the solution laid in the introduction of order and predictability in the operations of measuring and verification solved the problem of the new metric system. Even though their work was not marked by durability, the epoch’s times and not the legislative deficiency influenced the outcome.

¹ Considering that the entire section represented a matter of morality, “of law and national interest”, the delegates insisted to receive the convention and the project law, see *Proiect de convențiune pentru cumpărătoare de măsuri și greutăți de la Dnii Lamaitre și Bergman, pentru aplicarea sistemului metric*, 1875: 236-236v.

² The convention signed by Th. Rosetti and Lamaitre and Bergmann on 6/18 June 1875 was promulgated by Carol I on 4 July 1875. According to the convention, alongside the weights already existent in the main towns, Lamaitre and Bergmann were responsible to supply weights and measures in the years 1876, 1877 and 1878, the payment to the state remaining to be made according to the quantity turned over, see *Monitorul Oficial al României*, 1875d: 3341-3350.

³ Romania adhered to the Meter Convention in 1883. By later elaborating the verifying procedures but also through establishing a central committee with a role of coordination and verification – the Central Service for Measures and Weights, in 1889, the metric system was definitively implemented and regulated in Romania, see Iacobescu & Ilieș, 2003: 181-182, 188-189, 199-201.

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**COMPONENTS OF THE MODERNIZATION OF DOBRUDJA
WITHIN THE ROMANIAN STATE (1878-1916)
(I)**

*Stoica Lascu**

Abstract

The study presents a synthesis of Dobrudja's place and role in the overall development of modern Romania are outlined in direct relation to the historical necessity of the unitary evolution of the State, the advantage of the existence of a large maritime facade. The economic, social, cultural, urban, political progress of Dobrudja [*Dobrogea*] in the period up to World War I – was possible as a result of the State's constant concern for the modernization of the two counties between the Danube and the Black Sea. The state of development of the Dobrudjan industry in the Modern Times reflects the social, mainly agricultural, structure of this Romanian space. The ethnic minorities benefited from a legal framework favorable, resulting in what is called the "Dobrudjan Interethnic Model". In 1913 is the recovery of Southern Dobrudja, in the context of maintaining the balance of the Balkan territory and strengthening the Romanian border security.

Key words: *Modern Dobrudja, Industry, Agriculture, Constanța-Port, Constantin Pariano*

Introduction

As shown in a well-known synthesis of our historiography, in the chapter *Dobrujan's Reintegration into Romania* (Rădulescu, Bitoleanu, 1984: 202-213), "The setting up of Romania through the union of Wallachia and Moldavia in 1859 opened to all Romanian historical provinces held under foreign rule for foreseeable opportunities for their liberation and union with the national state, a prospect that was in accordance with the imperatives of the time and with the trends manifest in the modern world. The evolution of the state after that date revealed the incompatibility and the anachronism of Ottoman suzerainty and, gradually, of the European powers' protectorate".

The period of 141 years is marked by a positive trend due to both the Romanian State by substantial investments and organizational efforts, and also to the bulides contractors in Dobrudja, hard working people: the picture of modern and contemporary Dobrudja is the result of their labour and creativity. Actually, the most extraordinary achievement of the Romanian State consists in the fact that the two trans-danubian counties – Constanța (7,150 sq. km) and Tulcea (8,626 sq. km) –, once a backward territory both from the economical point of view and also regarding the elements of civilization, have finally turned into a modern, prosperous and dynamic region of the Romanian Old Kingdom, characterized by an advanced level of education – superior to those accomplished in other countries –, by an well-balanced distribution of land ownership and also by a much more tolerable socio-economical discrepancy (Lascu, 2018: 77-110). This process was to be continued throughout the period between the two world wars and, in the second part of our century, especially

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beginning with the '70s, spectacular changes – economical, of public utility, socio-cultural and also in the infrastructure – proved the Romanian State to be constantly concerned in carrying on the process of modernization of Dobrudja.

Dobrogea's Place and Role in the Development of Modern Romania as a Whole

The place and the role that Dobrudja have played in the developing process carried on by modern and contemporary Romania are in close connection with the historical necessity represented by a unitary evolution of the Romanian State, and also the necessity of having a large sea façade (Ciorbea, 2018: 301-305; Lascu, 2018: 77-110). "Dobrudja, in the present situation, is interrupting the territorial and ethnical continuity between the Slav people from North and South, from the geographical point of view and also from the point of view, of ethnicity, in the meantime ensuring the Romanian nation the access to the mouths of the Danube and to the Sea.

In our national, political and economic development, Dobrudja represents the Gate of Romania towards the entire world (Vitanos, 2018: *passim*; Lascu, 2019: 621-627).

May our enemies argue on the genesis of the Romanians nation in this land; yet the Romanians have strong roots in the land of Dobrudja – was Professor Ion Bănescu (1851-1909) (Lascu, 2018²: 312-314, Lascu, 1999: 351-352, 427-435, 448-457), mayor of Constanța, writing on the 9th of December 1903: "This is their Homeland. So be it known".

On a *Report* directed to the prime-minister, on the 24th of January 1906, it was highlighted the indissoluble relation existing between Dobrudja and the rest of the country/ from the historical point of view and, beginning with the modern era, also from the point of view of geographical and economic national interests: "The seashore and the Danube mouths have always been the lungs for the entire Romanian nation to breathe towards the Sea ever since Romanians first settled down in the Danube valley; they are connecting Dobrudja to our country and turn in into a genuine Romanian geographical expansion. Under these circumstances we have every interest in binding Dobrudja once and for all to our Kingdom.

We have great interests to be defended here, strong interests relating to our nation and the state itself. We could hardly think of a free Romania without the land of Dobrudja and the mouths of the Danube. For our national, political and economic evolution and strength to be accomplished, we have – by all means – to preserve our ownership over this province, to make it Romanian territory by any sacrifice".

Reiterating the importance of Dobrudja for the Romanian State, in a speech made in September 1910, in Tulcea, prime-minister Ion I.C. Brătianu (1864-1927) (Lascu, 2018²) pointed out the fact that the citizens of Dobrudja had also obligations towards the Romanian State: "Dobrudja, the eldest Romanian territory, should prove itself to be also the youngest in her nationalism and patriotism. If the inhabitants of other zones have had epochs of detestable political morals, the Dobrudjans, who only now enter the whirlwind of struggles, should use the experience of others and approach only new and civilized means" (Lascu, 1999: 482). Another Romanian political figure, the conservatory representative Take Ionescu (1858-1922) highlighted – in a speech made, on the 2nd of November 1908, at Constanța – the organic relation

between Dobruđa and the Kingdom: "There are only two axioms that matter to me: if Dobruđa weren't to belong to Romania, would have been lost from the economic point of view, a piece of land who would disappear, thrown away towards North, and would not be an artery for anyone and for nothing.

What about Romania? What would Romania be without Dobruđa? *One could never think of Romania existing without Dobruđa, just like no one could think of Romania without Bucharest* (our emphasis" (Lascu, 1999: 408).

The economic, social, cultural, of public interest and political progress of Dobruđa in the years leading up to WW I it was remarkable (Lascu, 1999: *passim*, 2018¹: 89-132; Bulei, Dominte, 2009: 210-231; Tușa, 2011: *passim*, 2018: 133-157; Ciorbea, 2013: 117-140, 2018: 301-305; Pătrașcu, 2014: *passim*). These were realized only due to a constant concern of the Romanian State in modernizing the two counties situated between the Danube and the Black Sea. The prefect of Constanța Scarlat Vârnav (1851-1919) pointed out the essence of the above mentioned concern, in a speech made, on the 14th of November 1903, in the presence of Romanian prime-minister Dimitrie A. Sturdza (1833-1914): "You have had a great contribution by following our Sovereign thought, by acting with a determination and energy – worthy of envy by the elder ones – towards accomplishing his royal will, you have followed every stage of evolution in the words done in the Port, by periodical and frequent visits, you have always been aware both with the progress made and also with the needs to be encountered".

On the celebration of 25 years since Dobruđa was reintegrated to the Romanian State, it was reported that: "Today, due to a vivid and constant concern showed to Dobruđa, this province proved to have the aspect of a civilized country (...) Everything to be done has been done in a short period. Everything that in other provinces needed centuries in order to be achieved has been done here in a period of only 25 years". In a *Memorial* issued by the local representatives of the county of Constanța, in January 1906, directed to the King, it was stated that "in over 27 years of Romanian rule, Dobruđa accomplished significant progress in every domain:

- The population has doubled its number the Romanian ethnics are four times more than in the moment of annexation;
- The agriculture has extended on a surface of five times larger than that used in the past, with better results;
- The trade has been developed, being now ten times more intensive;
- The industry, inexistent before, has been born now, trying to find its ways;
- The education has spread due to the sacrifices made by the Romanian State and especially by the local population, so that we could say with pride that the percentage figure of literacy is higher in Dobruđa than in other part of the country;
- The public welfare is undoubtedly superior than in the past;
- The relationship among the population of Dobruđa, blessed by the King himself, praying to God for this, in the moment of annexation, is no longer only ideal, but it is for real, because the population living here, no matter their religion or nationality, are the expression of brotherhood and national conscience, sowing their love both to their Sovereign and their Country" (Lascu, 1999: 356-357).

The Agriculture, a Fundamental Branch of the Modern Economy (Including in Dobrudja)

She has made – from the perspective of region's modernization – a remarkable progress (Marcu, 1983: 124-124); Rădulescu, Bitoleanu, 1998: 352-404; Dumitrașcu, Lazia, 2010: *passim*; Lascu, 2011: 223-251).

It had, in the two Transdanubian counties of the Romanian Old Kingdom, a significant development in the context of the state ownership policy, knowing a faster and more efficient rate than in the rest of the counties in the process of transforming the feudal type property into a modern property, capitalist type.

Despite the legislative and practical efforts of the authorities, “the Romanian element is the owner of two of three parts of the Dobrudjan land”, respectively – in 1905 in Constanța county from 19,993 owners, the Romanians were 13,369 (66 percent), having 332,836 ha out of a total of 439,952 ha (75 percent); in Tulcea county – there were 9,742 Romanian owners, out of a total of 21,187 owners (45 percent), they owned 97,096 ha, out of a total of 227,361 ha (43 percent). At the beginning of the last century, based on other appropriation laws – of veterans and spouses (in Constanța county there were over 7,500 heads of household, and in Tulcea county about 2,000) –, the Romanian element strengthens significantly, despite some dispossession, which are made after 1903 and of the difficult situation, initially, of some of the owners.

The application of a modern agricultural legislation in the Dobrudjan counties, respectively of the properties operated in several stages, had as positive consequence the constitution of the properties of medium type in a proportion not found in the rest of the Romanian Old Kingdom; thus, in 1913 the number of properties between 10 and 100 ha amounted to almost half (48.8%) in Constanța county, respectively almost one third in Tulcea county (30.3%), under the conditions in which the national average is only 4.4%.

The Number of Agricultural Holdings in Dobrudja (1913)

	Total		Up to 10 ha			
	Number	Surface	Number	h%	Surface	h%
România	1.133.201	5,840,621	1,079,535	5,3	3,236,889	5.4
C-ța county	23.398	434,919	11,696	0%	68,063	5.6
Tulcea county	19.884	187,836	13,877	9.8	71,537	8.1
Dobrudja	43.282	622,755	25,573	9.1	139,600	2.4

	Between 10-100 ha				Over 100 ha			
	Number	h%	Surface	h%	Number	h%	Surface	h%
România	50,247	4.4	923,484	5.8	3.420	0.3	1,680,248	8.8
C-ța county	1,142	8.8	263,379	0.6	281	1.2	103,477	3.8
Tulcea county	5,981	0.1	110,294	58.7	26	0.1	6,005	3.2
Dobrudja	7,402	0.2	373,673	60	307	0.7	109,482	7.6

The number of large agricultural holdings (over 500 ha) was appreciable in Constanța county – 59, (21% of the total farm holdings, placing the county in fifth place among the 32 counties); the largest properties were in Ialomița county – 103 (56%), then Ilfov – 71 (27.5%), Vlaşca – 65 (40.1%), Botoșani – 61 (53%); proportionally, the number of these large agricultural holdings was lower than the situation in the mentioned counties, in favor of medium-sized areas. In Tulcea county, however, there were only three such large agricultural properties (11.5%) (Lascu, 2018: 96-97).

Despite the dispossessions, of the difficult situation of some of the landlords, it was constantly appreciated that “Without a doubt, from the point of view of economic conditions, *the Dobrudjan peasantry is not better than the peasantry on the left side of the Danube* (our emphasis), but and from a cultural point of view she is superior to them. Thanks to the tireless zeal and perseverance of the teacher – *it was shown, on 1st May 1912, in a newspaper written by the teachers from Constanța, entitled, suggestively, Dobrogea nouă [New Dobrudja] –, the Dobrudjan peasants give a small percentage of illiterates as those from beyond*” (Lascu, 2018: 97-98).

The needs of the Dobrudja agriculture – of the rural localities, in general – the necessity of improving the means of working the land, cultivating the cereals and raising the animals were the concerns of some of the owners, especially in Constanța county – such as Constantin Pariano (Dumitrașcu [Gheorghe], 2016: 25-31) (he had a model farm at Hasancea/=Valu lui Traian) and Dumitru Alessiu.

The first (1846-1930; in his house in Constanța – built in the Neo-Romanian style –, on the seafront, is the “Ion Jalea” Sculpture Museum today), and founder and head of the Constanța Conservative Party organization – he was one of the Dobrudjans who contributed most to the modernization of the region’s structures: “In 1893, the work of improving the field work in Dobrudja began. The beginning was difficult. The inhabitants were foreigners and they did not want to facilitate even the smallest means of existence or work. He was denied housing and water from wells, so he was forced to live three months in a chandelier. But with wisdom and patience – *the portrait was written in 1906 by the Petru Vulcan* – resisting any weight, building wells, a model farm, introduced improved agricultural tools, wheat and rape culture, develops a prodigious activity and so persevering, that it it imposes on the natives, who in a short time took parable and imitated the work of the great owner”.

The other, “In 1892, passing in Dobrudja (he was an agronomist, trained in France; he was born in Bucharest – our note), he bought the Lasmahale estate, which today is cultivated by Mr. Alessiu, transforming into a true garden the land of Dobrudja *and giving evidence that this land is productive when systematically cultivated* (our note)” (Lascu, 1999: 185).

At the end of the 1880s, the first magazine that appeared in Constanța – named, symbolically, *Dobrogea* – pleaded, in its program, firstly for the improvement of agriculture, those who subsidized the publication being big owners: “Improving the culture systems by introducing plants predators and fodder, almost unknown to the natives, facilitating agricultural work by means of improved tillage tools, the introduction of small domestic and agricultural industries are both necessary and useful conquests, as long as the routine is harmful. Viticulture (vine culture) and

arboriculture (fruit tree culture) being almost unknown in four out of five parts of Constanța county and part of Tulcea, inhabited mainly by the Tatar element, we will endeavor by all means to introduce and propagate these useful cultures, in all villages completely devoid of any vegetal element”. Noting the backward stage of agricultural techniques: “because of this way of cultivation back our cereals cannot compete in commercial markets for foreign cereals”, it is rightly appreciated, “that this harmful state of both the plowman and our trader and that the effects of this state being felt almost daily, *we will reach we will reach a economic ruins* (our emphasis)”.

The solution was, “as seen in America”, to create agricultural associations, as was shown in 1893 in the *Gazeta Dobrogei*: “In order to lay the foundations of our economic emancipation, we appeal to all members of society, without distinction, to work together in the development of agriculture, will be the progress of your guild; I will group you, educators of the people, for the agricultural emancipation of the peasant will result in the realization of your ideal – intellectual emancipation; group yourself, intelligent from all branches, because *the happiness and prosperity of the country is the property of the sole of the house* (our emphasis) and grouping with all to leave once the Oriental apathy in which we lie, so that we can call ourselves a small part of East Belgium” (Lascu, 1999: 182).

The creation of such an agricultural association – so beneficial in the process of modernization of the Dobrudjan agriculture (for the situation of agriculture in “New” Dobrudja/Quadrilater – see Lascu, 1999: 708-710) –, similarity with which today, unfortunately, the Romanian agriculture – does not find the discontent echo, which is why on 8th October 1897 it is again tried to launch a such initiatives, by the owner Constantin Pariano; it is also made up in the *Appeal* to plows and livestock savings in Dobrudja for the establishment of the Society of Cattle and Livestock Economics in Dobrudja [*Apel către plugarii și economii de vite din Dobrogea pentru înființarea Societății Plugarilor și Economilor de Vite din Dobrogea*], not yet completed.

The following year, the initiative is resumed by Simeon Petrescu, who had the opportunity to see in several countries – including in the U.S. – the results of the modern means and forms of organization of agriculture; he publishes the publication *Echoul agriculturii*, with the aim of “Spreading agronomic science in all its branches, close to our climate and especially to Dobrudja and according to the newest procedures, such as: (...)”. Simion Petrescu, former gymnastics teacher – the son of teacher Petrică from Silistra –, will be himself an innovator, setting an example to other owners: “He collected lots of notes on different cultures from abroad he sent his savings to buy a small estate and lay the foundations of a culture consistent with the combination of its observations. Today [in 1898], having returned from his long journey, he has taken the direction of his estate, with the intention of applying the observations made and giving, first, the example of innovations”.

But the progress achieved in the region couldn’t entirely do away with social needs, especially the peasantry had to encounter – periodically – many troubles because of cold winters or droughty summers, that lowered the production of cereals or affected there catties. Despite all these problems, generally speaking, the peasantry situation in Dobrudja was superior to those living in other regions of the country: “Every peasant in Dobrudja or at least 95% of the entire peasantry are landowners;

many of them own more than 30 hectares. The taxes are low taking into account the income proceeded from the land in his ownership. Another advantage for the peasant in Dobrudja consists in the low taxes he has to pay for feeding his cattle in the pastures, i.e. 3 lei for every cow. Unlike the peasant in Dobrudja, Romanian peasant from the Kingdom has only 7-8 hectares of land in his possession! Another proof that the peasant in Dobrudja has a higher income and also a higher living standard unlike the country is the fact that the peasant in Dobrudja has to pay his taxes only once a year, in the autumn, unlike the peasant in the country, who has to deal everyday with tax collectors, be it winter or summer time”.

During the period up to the First World War, here (Constanța county) were (in 1916) the largest owners, “who cultivate their estates alone”: Constantin Pariano (1,926 ha), C. Solacolu-Traian (1,626 ha), Penciu Atanasov (2,412 ha), Aldea Nistor (913 ha), Atanasie V. Rigani (1,200 ha), Voicu Moțoi (943 ha), Luca Oancea (5,175 ha), Dumitru I. Suditu (1,200 ha), Gheorghe Aldea (1,240), Radu R. Băbuș (1,200 ha), G. Stoicescu (3,230 ha), Ivanciu Hagi Stoian (1,690 ha), Gheorghe Găitan (432 ha), Ion V. Tomoșoiu (1,270 ha), N. Oancea (544 ha), Ion I. Mandai (500 ha), Alexe A. Roșculeț (400 ha), Niță Gologan (310), Căp. N. Blăniță (1,180 ha) (Lascu, 2018¹: 96-97).

Industry

The stage of development of the Dobrudjan *industry* in the modern period reflects the social structure, mainly agricultural, of the counties in this part of the country (Rădulescu, Bitoleanu, 1998: 366-371; Lascu, 1999: 173-175, 185, 261-262; Cheramidoglu, 2003: 104-113). In Constanța county the prefect Remus N. Opreanu, stated in 1881 that “The actual industry there is little in this county. A large leather factory (founded in 1879, with the support of the administration), on the outskirts of Constanța, from Mamaia, a timber cutting machine in Constanța are the only establishments. The craftsmen are not numerous. Outside the city very few are in the rural communes where almost the entire population deals with agriculture. There are seven steam mills in the county (4 in Silistra Nouă, 1 in Medgidia, 2 in Hârșova, and 1 in Constanța), there are still few spirits factories, but these establishments cannot be called industrial” (Lascu, 1998: 130).

Until the first decade of the twentieth century, one can hardly speak of a Dobrudjan industry, with all the existence of various natural riches, which could be processed: “From the sciences collected until now, for the creation of a picture of establishments and workshops, the industry throughout Dobrudjan [until 1892], it appears that industry is as primitive as possible, and systematic industries do not exist at all.

Until the alleged factories of gaseous water, beer, here and there tanneries, etc., there is nothing. And all these pre-projects of factories use the most primordial means of manufacture (primitive – our note) and everywhere almost manual labor has the most important place”. The inexistence of the industrial branches is all the more lamentable, as they are valuable natural wealth, raw materials awaiting their valorization, the country not having to import the processed products of these double wealth: “It is really sad – wrote in July 1892 *Buletinul Camerei de Comerț și Industrie*

Constanța – let's see our skins being exported, our wool through the industrial countries and then repress them in another form to meet our needs”.

Therefore, the rare initiatives are welcomed and popularity, as is the installation at Lazamahalea /=Lazu/, on the estate of N. Alexiu, of a “model milking with systematic machines, with which it produces fresh milk butter of the finest quality. The instruments to be used are the most advanced, their use does not last more than ten years, of which cause even in the West are still little widespread. It would be desirable – *write the newspaper Constanța in the autumn of 1893* – that these devices *should be introduced in the greatest number in Dobrudja, and that the system used is everywhere widespread* (our emphasis)” (Lascu, 1999: 185).

The lack of industrial establishments was also felt in Tulcea county (Lascu, 1999: 239-241, 335; Dima, 2015: 76-85), not being seen here, by the newspaper *Istrul* in January 1898, “no factory basket [in 1898], nor at least one grain processing plant” in flour or in a spirit factory”. In 1894 the research on the ore deposits in Northern Dobrudja (stone quarries and copper deposits) begins, “whose practical importance cannot yet be predicted [in 1904], which until now are the subject of four mining concessions and one more many operating permits”.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, foreign capital begins to show interest in the exploitation of the riches of Dobrudja, a consortium of English capitalists obtaining a government concession for setting up “necessary facilities, which then give them the right to exploit for 50 years”; it is about cultivating cotton in the Delta, the English specialists reaching ‘the conclusion that we will come to a day like Romania not only that it will not import cotton, *but will still be in a position to make and export* (our emphasis). What supports this idea is that from the meticulous research done so far – *it was shown in September 1898 in the publication Centrul Dobrogei, which appeared in Babadag (it was printed in Constanța)* –, it was proved that the cotton of Romanian origin will be with far superior in quality than even that of America and the Indians” (in the end, the whole operation is not completed).

On the other hand, the initiatives of foreign entrepreneurs in Constanța county materialize, at the beginning of the twentieth century, by the establishment of the Cement Factory in Cernavodă, by a group of Belgian capitalists (comes into operation in 1901), as well as the Screw Factory in Saligny, with capital of Franco-Swiss origin (operating since 1909), or of oil stations. On the other hand, in Medgidia, benefiting from the advantages of the Law for the Encouragement of the Industry, from 1906, the founding, in 1908, of the Ceramic Products Factory “Medgidia”, “of their engineers Albert Kinbaum and Alfred L. Mendel, who enjoys – *showed in 1912 Dobrogea ilustrată review* – of the highest consideration”, with “workers, even specialists, exclusively Romanians from Dobrudja, trained for three years by masters who were brought from abroad” (Lascu, 1999: 558-559).

In the counties of “New Territory” – Southern Dobrudja/Quadrilater, recovered in 1913 –, the industry was represented by the mill and bakery branch, mills processing the rich cereals in the area. They were, by far the majority, driven by the force of water; in Balcic there was also a “flour, macaroni, and pasta factory”; also, in Caverna there were 3-4 tanneries, “primitive, for the oppressing material and which do not produce hygienic products like ours”, and at Balcic, Silistra, and Dobrici/Bazargic

there were also mechanical workshops for repairing agricultural machines (Lascu, 1999: 710-711).

Trade

Dobruđja's *trade* has benefited from an organizational framework similar to that of the rest of the country; from 1880 the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Constanța operates, and in 1909 the same institution will be installed in Tulcea, the lack of which was felt "both for the commerce itself and for the raising and flowering of all other branches of activity on which the economic state has a great influence". For a long time, the banks polarized the activities and the commercial operations in the area; in 1880 the "famous fair from Medgidia" (*panair*) (Lăpușan, Lăpușan 1996: 96-98; Ilie, 2012: 62-78) is reopened, in June and October, and in 1889 its activity and annual swing (15-25 September) start in Hârșova. They will, however, represent a brake factor in the progress and expansion, especially in the villages, of the commercial activities, which is why, already in 1892, they demand their abolition, hoping that, in their absence, "we will succeed – *the newspaper* Constanța *was trusted, in December 1892* – to establish Romanian merchants in other cities in the county shortly".

In the idea of the same encouragement of trade, one pleads (as he does in a public speech in Constanța, on 5th September 1910, in the presence of Ion I.C. Brătianu, the printer and entrepreneur of Armenian origin Grigore M. Grigoriu) for "the establishment of a higher school of trade, which is of the utmost importance for this port, because from directing our youth to trade, preparing it with social knowledge, the nationalization of trade depends"; moreover, Constantin N. Sarry (1878-1960) – the well-known Dobrudjan journalist up to the Second World War including (the founding director, in 1904, of the newspaper *Dobrogea jună*) –, demands, in 1912, that "The Commercial Academy, which is about to be set up, to be established in Constanța".

Indeed, measures were imposed that would bring the access of Romanian entrepreneurs to the branch of commerce, dominated, in Constanța, especially by allogeneic elements: "The big owners and traders of cereals, manufacturing, grocery, the representatives of the industry, finally the whole movement of the agora. She was and is a foreigner – *she wrote, painfully, in 1905, in the magazine Ovidiu, the publicist Petru Vulcan* –, as a proof I give a thousand lei to the one who will show us a Romanian grocer all over Constanta right now (our emphasis)" (Lascu, 1999: 351).

Infrastructure and the Port of Constanța

In the field of national infrastructure (Lascu, 1999: 261, 678-679, 721-722; Dominte, Miu, 2009: 94-109; Dumitrașcu [Gheorghe], 2011: 170-184; Dae, 2016: *passim*), the construction of the "King Carol I" [*Podul "Regele Carol I"*] Bridge across the Danube, in Cernavodă, is undoubtedly one of the great achievements of the Old Kingdom from the period up to the First World War (Lămureanu, 2004: 115-148); both at the laying of the foundation stone (9/21 October 1890) and at the inauguration (14th/26th September 1895) the Sovereign is also present, his speeches emphasizing the significance of the construction of the Bridge, "wanted by a quarter

of an age of me”. At that time, the construction of a bridge was also carried out in Hârșova (Lascu, 1999: 698-700), the King himself showing interest in this new connection, with great strategic and operative impact, of the Dobrujdians counties with the rest of the Kingdom: “His Majesty, when he descended from the ship in 1912 – *he showed up in Dobrogea jună in January 1915* – he got in the car, accompanied by his General Staff, on the fortifications in the north of the city, from where he gave explanations to those around him, about the importance of the place of passage of the armies in the city. an eventual war, indicating HM himself where the strategic bridge should be built”; the construction of a new bridge was seen (for example: by lawyer and publicist Șt. Cișmigiu, in 1914) as a more complex enterprise, from a conceptual point of view, “a bridge that will surely be built smarter, repairing the mistake of a simple road, as well as that of a carriageway”.

At that time, the idea of building a waterway between Constanța and Cernavodă was also conveyed, and in 1914 – by the lawyer, and publicist, Anton C. Diamandopol – its economic and strategic importance, becoming “a paramount necessity through the development of Constanța, suppressing a useless maritime journey of 23 hours from Constanța, Sulina, and Galați. This waterway, in addition to the shortened sea route shown, will remove the difficulties of navigation on the Sulina-Galați waterway, which due to the narrow expose the vessels to frequent collisions and at the mouth of the lack of sufficient water flow often causes bottlenecks, preventing the navigation for days. And on the other hand, not allowing the lifting of tonnage vessels in Galați, they are exposed to stay for weeks until they find favorable time to take the rest of the cargo, thus bringing colossal damage to the navigation”.

The construction of a *competitive port* (Ciorbea, 1996: *passim*, 2007: *passim*; Cojoc, 2006: *passim*; Covacef, 2014: *passim*) in Constanța is one of the great constructive works of modern Romania, still in 1878 Professor Grigore Cobălcescu showing that “the sacrifice of 10 million is insignificant besides the immense material and even political advantages that would derive for us from the construction of this port, because not only would it be a place of approach for all ships floating towards the Black Sea, but it would still become for our trade the true opening of its breathing trachea, allowing it to exercise at sea and in winter.

In addition, the existence of such a port would have the greatest influence on the twinning we have the duty to follow with the inhabitants of Dobruđa, because it would put us in the most frequent and close relationship with them”. Thus, the economic importance of a functional port, in Constanța, as well as the fermenting role of the strengthening of Romanianism, was noticed, the presence of hundreds of workers and porters, at the beginning of our century, of Romanian origin, confirming the assertion of the scientist from the University of Iași.

First, however, the port facilities due to the investments of an English company through the '50s-'60s of the 19th century had to be repurchased, Romanian State officials proving clairvoyance when they insisted in Parliament to make this move into ownership as quickly as possible To the Romanian State of the respective installations. Now, in 1882, prime-minister Ion C. Brătianu told parliamentarians that “Lungs, the mouth through which to breathe and breathe Romania is the Romanian port at sea and Kiustengea will be the city of Romania, with it we have to relate to the world

whole, through it we will have the best way of communication of our trade. We will spend another 16, 20 or 25 million, as we will have to make the port and the bridge over the Danube, which we have to do, and with this we will prove to Europe the strongest that we are a nation”.

As in the case of the construction of the Cernavodă Bridge, and for the Constanța Port, the Sovereign had, along with the executive governors, a special and constant concern, assisting both the laying of the foundation stone (16th October 1896) and its official inauguration, on the 27th September 1909, when he pointed out: “From the beginning *I pursued with the most lively interest and supervised these works* (our emphasis), which gave our trade such a powerful advance and connected Dobrudjia ever more closely. In short, therefore, we can look upon it *as a factor of our economic propensity and as a national pride* (our emphasis)” (Lascu, 1999: 201-202).

An achievement of the Romanian State during this period is also the establishment of the bases of the *National Commercial Fleet*, the establishment of the Romanian Maritime Service, in 1895, certifying the long-term intentions of the state authorities (Ciorbea, Atanasiu, 1995: *passim*): “After the building of the great Bridge «King Carol I», after the work of the Port was put into operation, aided by God, I set up the Maritime Service of the Romanian State, *to take a new and decisive step in our economic development* (our emphasis)” – it was mentioned in the baptism act of the ships “Regele Carol I” and “Principesa Maria”, ceremony performed in Constanța on 1st July 1898, in the presence of the Sovereign.

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PROPAGANDA OF TRANSYLVANIANS IN AMERICA FOR THE RECOGNITION OF THE ROMANIAN CAUSE

*Marilena Rîzescu**

Abstract

The Romanian propaganda activities remained quite limited throughout the war period, although the Romanians were in the most favorable position. Romania entered the war on the part of the Allies in exchange for achieving Greater Romania by annexing Transylvania and the adjacent territories of Hungary, with Wilson's consent. As the common minister of United States of America in Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia, in the person of Charles Joseph Vopicka, decisively opted for diplomatic methods, by mobilizing Romanians, in the end a massive wave of immigrants, almost exclusively from the Habsburg Monarchy made their way to the United States of America. The initiative of the Romanian government to send in early 1917 to America a patriotic mission composed of Vasile Stoica, Vasile Lucaciu and Ioan Moța represented a necessary political tactic to achieve propaganda for the Transylvania's cause by organizing a volunteer unit consisting of Transylvanian immigrants in the United States to support the French front. This mission had a double role in presenting the sufferings, the struggles of the Romanians from Transylvania, as well as the aspirations of the oppressed peoples.

Key words: *Romanian propaganda, the United States of America, Vasile Stoica, Charles Joseph Vopicka, Theodore Roosevelt, Thomas Woodrow Wilson*

In 1883, Romania entered into an alliance with Austro-Hungary, although it never gave up the national ideal, as stated by King Carol in the same year: "No nation agrees to be deprived of its political aspirations, and those of the Romanians are permanently kept in tension by Hungarian oppression, but it is not an obstacle to an amicable settlement between the two neighboring states" (Mitrany, 1917: 17).

This alliance was an agreement by which Romania agreed to support, for the time being, its legitimate claims in exchange for unrestricted security against its own development. However, two circumstances of a different nature, but at the same time identical in their effect, have actively led to the breakdown of this compromise. While rapid progress made Romania more and more independent in its external relations, the Transylvanian problem was clearly emerging, as Vienna was incapable of mastering the growing excesses of Hungarian chauvinism: "Romania has been an invasion country since the beginning. How many tyrannical masters laid their heavy hands on the people dominated, crushed and mistreated" (Marie Queen of Rumania, 1916: 20). Painfully, Romania, as she suffered for her ideal, through the will of her King and most important political men, expressed her belief that this sacrifice was

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worthwhile and that she did not regret it. Romania risked everything for justice and freedom, leaving justice and independence to be her reward (Leeper, 1917: 24).

When Romania entered the war, Vasile Stoica, a militant for the realization of the rights of the Transylvanian Romanians and of the national unification, as an officer of the 11th Infantry Division, fought in the operations in Jiu and Olt. The Romanian headquarters used it more as an information officer, exploiting their knowledge about the southern part of Transylvania behind enemy lines. The struggle of the Romanians from the mother country was animated by the belief of Nicolae Titulescu, according to which: "Romania could not be whole without Transylvania, because Transylvania was not only the heart of political Romania, but it was the heart of geographical Romania!" (Titulescu, 1967: 142-143).

Arrived in the Old Kingdom, Vasile Stoica intends to work in the military field in the field of aviation, together with the army to liberate Transylvania from the occupation of the dual monarchy. Eventually, it will receive a notification from the War Ministry, which was notified that there were no available places in the aviation school, and will be among the favorites when new places will be distributed. As an unfavorable context, in the years of the war, aeronautics in the Old Kingdom was "almost non-existent" and was to make progress during 1917 (Kirîțescu, 1989: 16).

First of all, it was absolutely necessary for Romania, speaking from the point of view of Romanian interests to take part in the World War: in the Kingdom of Romania there were 7,000,000 Romanians; 4,500,000 in Transylvania, Banat, Bucovina and parts of Maramureș and Crișana from Austria-Hungary; another 2,000,000 in Bessarabia; 1,000,000 over the Dniester, 500,000 in Macedonia; and 200,000 in Serbia on the Timoc Valley. More than half of the Romanians lived beyond the borders of the Kingdom: "Romanians are poor and ignorant. They are neglected and superstitious, but there is great nobility in their race. They are modest and compassionate, their needs are few, and their wishes are limited. There is a great dream that every Romanian cherishes in the depths of his heart: to have a Romanian nation" (Marie Queen of Rumania, 1916: 9).

The fate of Romanians in Transylvania was to be decided by the Kingdom's actions with the support of the great powers on the international stage (Theodorescu, 1941: 72). The cohabitation between the Romanians and the Hungarians was seen as a permanent war, marking the adversities that have evolved permanently, reflecting the social and interethnic conflicts, as well as the effects of the Hungarian rule and propaganda, together with "the machiavellian plan to hungarianization the Romanians" (Lehrer, 1989: 66).

The Hungarian system had a practice of convincing the rest of the states that in all situations "the Romanians had adaptation problems" and the conflicts did not intervene because of their behavior towards them (Clark, 1922: 142). The Romanian national consciousness became stronger with the humiliating persecutions, promoting the awakening of the national feeling of foreign domination, marked by a single thought towards their liberation: "the democracies of the world must understand the Romanian cause and their cause, and the conscience of the world rest because from the grave the Romanian cry will be heard" (Lupu, 1919: 42).

In the spring of 1917, the Romanian government decided to send to America a patriotic mission made up of known Transylvanians, to activate among the Romanian Americans and to form legions of volunteers to fight on the French front against the Central Powers, contributing to the cause of the brothers at home, being a political tactic for the difficult days in which Romania was in support of its demands, based on the participation in the struggle for “making propaganda for the cause of Transylvania” (Popescu, 1940: 132) and to “organize a volunteer unit among the Transylvanian Romanians in America for the French front” (Kirițescu, 1925: 294). On April 18, 1917, by order of the Great Headquarters of Iași, with the number 1082, the mission had the task of enlisting a legion of Romanian volunteers, of the 150,000 Transylvanians and Bucovinians immigrated to the States, to fight alongside the American army on the western front. European (Glant, 1996: 166).

The proposal for the young Vasile Stoica to go on this mission belongs to the father Ioan Moța, following the devotion and the energetic spirit that he had shown through the involvement in the war, along with the talent of being a multilingual speaker: the young professor Vasile Stoica who was, in the service of the army he was a translator-lieutenant (Opriș, 2008: 70).

The mission was to visit the cities inhabited by the Transylvanians, organizing public meetings to make known the national cause of uniting Transylvania with Romania. Favorable was the context in which only Vasile Stoica spoke fluent English, as evidenced by the establishment of several contacts among prominent people in America. The Romanian authorities offered them a sum of money worth 1,200 lei, mostly in Russian rubles, helping them only for travel and clothing. The mission was cataloged to be “national patriotic mission, sent by the government, without having official diplomatic character” (Iacoș, Achim, 1988: 408).

In the long and random journey, the mission will travel to Russia in chaos, then with the Trans-Siberian express will travel for 11 days to Vladivostok. From Charbin through Korea, Mukden, Simonoski-Tokyo where they stayed for a few days, Yokohama, the Hawaiian Islands and the city of Honolulu, and after 16 days they arrived by boat to San Francisco on the west coast of North America, and from there they will take the train to Washington. They stayed here for a week to provide information, then to Cleveland, where most of the Transylvanian Romanians were established, with the mandate of the Romanian government to “stimulate the American interest in the Romanian problems” (*San Francisco Chronicle*, 1917).

After a long two-month trip through Russia and Japan, the first news in the US press about their arrival appeared on June 22, 1917: “Romanians in the United States – the mission arrives on the Pacific coast, on its way to Washington. Vasile Stoica, I. Metza and Basaile Luacci are members of the mission. Lieutenant Stoica wore the Russian uniform in the war. This mission was expected to stimulate the interest of the immigrant Romanians to form an army, which is expected to include 400,000 militants” (*The Ogden Standard*, 1917: 7).

In a diplomatic mission, three Romanian government officials Vasile Stoica, Ioan Moța and Vasile Lucaci were aboard a Japanese ship for a conference with Washington government officials. The mission arrived in Japan because of the difficulty and danger of reaching the United States through Europe and then across

the Atlantic. Captain Vasile Stoica wore a "light blue uniform with a lot of gold lace, being different from the English and American uniforms" (*Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 1917: 9).

According to the American opinion, from a technical point of view, Stoica was an Austrian subject, a deserter in the Austrian army and in accordance with the laws of the nations, subject to execution if captured on Austrian territory, but "by inheritance, attachment and legitimate connections of nationality, he was Romanian" (*The Washington Herald*, 1919: 5) born in Transylvania, a territory inhabited especially by Romanians. The desire of all Romanians for the liberation of Transylvania and its unification with the Kingdom of Romania was colossal, but: "Romanian tendencies of unity have always been met with hostility by both Russians, Austrians and Turks" (Stoica, 1919: 17). The situation in the country was pressing for the Romanian mission, and the hardships on the Russian front implicitly condemned the Romanian army: "Stoica said that until the Russian situation will improve, there is little hope that the Romanian offensive will be resumed due to the difficulty of obtaining ammunition" (*El Paso Herald*, 1917: 1).

This mission, along with the British, French, Italian and Russian missions, was responsible for recruiting and organizing a large number of military companies, which were to be sent to the eastern front, where Russia had to resume the offensive: "They claim that Romania is far from being crushed by the German invasion that led to the occupation of more than half the country and the killing or capture of the majority of the Romanian army" (*Los Angeles Herald*, 1917: 2), "Romania lost its southern half of the territory, including in the oil areas. The capital was moved from Bucharest to Iasi, in the north of Romania, together with the Romanian parliament it was in secession there. The Romanian army was reorganized and mobilized with new equipment and it is understood that it is ready to start the offensive if Russia reorganizes its army and ammunition. "The Romanian offensive had to force the Germans to retreat on other fronts" (*El Paso Herald*, 1917: 1). "Things in Romania don't look as bad as they were designed: the Romanian army is still a powerful military unit. Half of the men are in front and the other half are in reserve. Romania has not been deleted from the war map. Romania is ready to fight to finish with its allies, and the country believes in the final victory" (*San Francisco Chronicle*, 1917: 1).

At the beginning of July 1917, Vasile Stoica was received by Robert Lansing, the leader of the US State Department, and N. Baker, the Secretary of War, following a conference tour between 1917 and 1918, at which time he held a conference tour will strengthen contacts through meetings with former President Theodore Roosevelt or with journalists of the US press from *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*. The concern for the Romanian cause will benefit from a favorable impetus at the beginning of 1918, with the support of the Romanian Legation established in Washington, under the command of dr. Constantin Angelescu, and will establish cooperation relations with future leaders of Czechoslovakia, Poland or Serbia (Thomas G. Masaryk, Ignacy Jan Paderewski, H. Hinkovici) (Buzatu, 2011: 24). Finally, the arrival of the Romanian mission is notified: "The Romanian mission reaches the capital. The mission is not diplomatic in nature and will be largely

dedicated to the efforts to recruit the army among Romanian nationals in America” (*Oklahoma City Times*, 1917: 9).

In Washington, the three arrived on June 29, 1917, establishing their residence in the Lafayette Hotel, and on July 2: “We were received in audience by Robert Lansing – the Secretary of State, promising us that they will give their full support to the Romanian Kingdom for the continuation of the fight”. Even if the mission did not have an official character, the Romanian flag was flown on the State Department building, at which time the letters of accreditation from the US businessman in Romania J. Andrews were read (Stoica, 1926: 7).

On July 2, 1917, at the recommendation of French Ambassador J.J. Jusserand, Lansing received the mission. Father Lucaciu, as a spokesman, briefly explained the mission’s objectives and asked for American support for the Romanian unification. Lansing’s response was a general one, praising Romania’s resistance against Germany, but abstained from approving its war aims. He was always suspicious that the Allies were trying to lure the United States into their projects and share their burden, and during the conversation he realized that the Transylvanians could be subjects of Austro-Hungary, with whom the United States was not at war.

Along with the letters of recommendation of Andrews Business Commissioner to the State Department, the arrival of Father Lucaciu, Ion Moța and Lieutenant Vasile Stoica, all political exiles from Transylvania, are notified. The objective of the mission was to stimulate the movement for the unity of Romanians among Romanian immigrants from the United States, almost all of them being natives of the Kingdom of Romania. In addition, Lieutenant Stoica wanted to recruit a Transylvanian Legion to fight alongside US expeditionary forces on the Western Front. “Our purpose” said Vasile Stoica “is to win the American leader on our side, to convince them of the justice of the Romanian cause, and to prove to them that our desire is to be together with our brothers in the Romanian Kingdom” (Stoica, 1926: 9).

Immediately after the interview, Lansing sent an angry telegram for further information to Andrews, who did not inform the State Department in advance about this mission: “The Romanian Commission, made up of Lucaciu, Moța, Stoica, has arrived. Letter of introduction of the letter of April no. 241 states that this travel commission is sent with the knowledge and sympathy of the Romanian government. They declare that they are entrusted with certain duties by their government. The department does not understand this discrepancy. The Commission states that a telegram should be sent to the Department containing complete information about their mission. The department has received nothing from you, except for the telegram requesting personalized privileges for these men. The department wishes to promptly telegraph the precise status of this commission. Are all subjects Romanian?” (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917: 357).

Andrews, who did not realize the obvious obligation of a diplomatic officer to inform his government, tried to retaliate by presenting to the mission staff their purpose, dismantling the ideal of Romanian unity. Only between 60 and 65% of the Transylvanian population were Romanians, he said, and of this number only half or a third favored the union. Then, citing an unofficial source, he stated that only a small part of the Transylvanians welcomed the invasion of Romania in 1916. With decisive

aplomb, he stated that a large majority of the Transylvanians in the United States were loyal to the Austro-Hungarian government and the emperor. The purpose of these missions was to correct this feeling: "On April 1 a note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that Father Lucaciu and two companions were not on official mission and that the mission of the American authorities was not requested, but that they went with the consent and sympathy of the Romanian government that would value all the facilities that can be granted. I gave Father Lucaciu a letter of presentation to the Secretary of State in strict accordance with the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their Romanian passports were ordinary, without mentioning any official quality. The Romanian Foreign Minister reaffirmed today that these men have the support of the Romanian government, but have no official status. The purpose of the visit was to make the Romanian cause known among the Americans" (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917: 409). For wickedness, prejudice and ignorance, Andrews' report is unique among the hundreds of such reports in the US Department of State's files. While personal bias was sometimes lacking, his reports always maintained an objective form, and they never turned to personal opinion.

The report of William H. Andrews, the Bucharest businessman said that members of the mission were Austro-Hungarian subjects, US President Wilson declined to meet with them, following the War Department rejecting the legion's request. Meanwhile, in August 1917, King Ferdinand of Romania sent a personal appeal to the President, Wilson's reply being a platonic one: "I received your message. The pain, suffering and the persecution of the Romanian people encourage the mercy and indignation of the civilized world" (Mamatey, 1957: 123). The political reaction of the American president was limited to an expression of the sympathy of the Romanian sufferings. The eccentric but courageous Queen Maria asked the permission of the State Department for an American propaganda tour to expose the suffering of the Romanian people before the American people and the government, but Lansing firmly rejected the suggestion (Lansing, 1917: 230, 243).

The words of Queen Mary are amazing in describing the situation in her country: "The queen of a small country! I want others to love her, so listen to a few words about Romania. I was once a stranger to this people; now I'm one of them. Their country is a country of plains, a country full of fruit, corn, deep forests, rocky mountains, rivers that, in the spring of the year, are full of turbulent sparkling waters. A country where the peasants work the scorching sun, a country untouched by the mess of manufacture, a country of extremes in which winters are frozen, and summers hot. Romania represents the bundle between east and west" (Marie Queen of Rumania, 1916: 5).

Thus, without another better option, the members of the mission remained in America and launched their own propaganda campaign. They were not immediately successful, their propaganda activities running out of results. Public meetings were held along the east coast, and materials related to Romania were provided for various newspapers in Boston, Cleveland, New York and Washington. The Romanian newspaper, *The Periscope*, was launched, and will be circulated in about 6,000 copies. The Romanian propaganda campaign reached its climax after the president reversed his policy towards the Habsburg problem (Devasia, 1970: 207).

The American decision makers were, as Andrews predicted, confused about Romanian expectations. They were willing to grant Romania a loan, as they did to Serbia, but unfortunately, this was delayed by the absence of a Romanian plenipotentiary in Washington to negotiate with Treasury officials and to attend the legal proceedings. But they were not prepared to assume the territorial claims of Romania to the detriment of Austro-Hungary, with which the United States was not at war.

The Transylvanian problem was one of the most complex in Europe. Even if Andrews had studied it on the spot, which did not happen, he would not have been able to present a completely objective report, since there were no objective criteria for the percentage approximation of the different ethnic components of Transylvania: Romanians, Hungarians, Szeklers, Saxons, Swabians, Ruthenians, as well as Jews and Armenians, and less of their feelings. The statistics of the Hungarian population were so unfair to the national minorities that they were worthless. In Hungary, free elections have never been organized to allow a free expression of the opinions of non-Hungarians. The extremely modest Romanian-language press in Transylvania (largely the church publications) was horrified by Hungarian censorship. As for the Transylvanian Romanians in the United States, there was no way to objectively establish their lives again, certainly not for Andrews in the distant Iași, whose data and figures were, in fact, false, without any real basis.

The priesthood has always been the most resistant element in the face of the Hungarian attacks, and the government will take measures to defeat it, following which each priest will have a Hungarian patriotic attitude, otherwise anti-Hungarian complaints will be addressed, and the priests in cause will be replaced with other believers in the system. The church, penetrated by the chauvinism of the Hungarian imperialist society, which wanted to stifle and drive away from the souls of the believers everything that can be Romanian: "Soon all these villages will be permanently separated from the trunk of our nation and will be part of the Hungarian nation. The Greek-Catholic church was thus given one of the strongest blows, a crack was made in the wall. From here on, it will gradually follow, gradually its unification" (Stoica, 2014: 159).

From the State Department, the Transylvanian mission went to the War Department to submit the project for the recruitment of the Transylvanian Legion. On July 6, 1917, after a long meeting with Newton Baker, the Minister of War, the Romanian diplomatic mission announces the plan for the formation of the Romanian unit in America, designed by Vasile Stoica himself: "1. A unit of Romanian Transylvanians and volunteers will be established, who are not US citizens falling under the provisions of the recruitment law; 2. The unit will be assigned to the US Army, named after the Romanian Battalion, the Romanian Regiment or the Romanian Brigade; 3. The officers will be American, or a number of Transylvanian officers may be required from the Romanian government, given that all Romanians in America are of Transylvania and Banat origin; 4. The non-commissioned officers will be Romanian, former graduates in the army have performed their military service; 5. The command language will be English, the instructional language as well, but the Romanian one will be used in case of need; 6. Equipment, living and transportation

expenses shall be borne by the United States Government; 7. An agreement will be sought with the Romanian state on the other details. The most important thing was that the voluntary unit formed by immigrants be recognized as a Romanian unit” (Stoica, 1926: 8).

After consulting the staff, he declined the offer on the grounds that the United States did not favor the organization of national units within the US military, because Americans hope the war will speed up the assimilation of different immigrant groups into one large American nation. The United States government, therefore, was determined to create a united American army with a pure American spirit. When Stoica challenged that not all Romanians living in the United States were American citizens and were eager to fight for the freedom of their native land, Baker replied that they cannot depart from the adopted rule, but do not rule out the possibility that at a later date, the government of the United States to consider this proposal. Meanwhile, Baker notices Stoica that he could help the Allied cause by encouraging Romanians to enlist in the US military. The draft of a Transylvanian legion was subsequently analyzed by Baker and even by the president, but was never carried out (Stannard, 1939: 222).

Finally, the war minister will answer that: “America cannot receive any unit of national specific character, because they want an army of American spirit” existing the tendency to Americanize the current inhabitants of the country and even if the formation of a legion of volunteers is not allowed, and those that have been formed are abolished (Iacoș, Achim, 1988: 408).

It was necessary to inform the American world about the realities of the Romanian people, but this was all the more annoying, since: “even the men at the forefront of political life hardly knew where Romania is located, nor did they know the problem of Transylvania and the ideal for which we were bleeding”. Vasile Lucaciu wanted “our mission to assert your role in forming a Romanian Legion to be made available to the Allies for whom we ask for your help.” His report provoked a slight emotion within the State Department, where it circulated widely, without contributing in any way to the Romanian cause. The Transylvanian problem was not taken into consideration until the last days of the war, long after the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav movements had been officially recognized and encouraged (Stoica, 1926: 10).

The refusal of the US authorities to the proposals of the Romanian authorities can be analyzed by preventing a precedent to be followed by other nationalities immigrated to the States, along with the attempts of the Antante states, who wanted to maintain the tense atmosphere of the Austro-Hungarian nationalities in order to determine it separates from Germany. The US government will restore its policy following the absolute defeats of the Dual Monarchy, when the destruction of the empire was imminent.

Finally, propaganda began in different cities, exposing the purpose pursued for the cause of the Romanian people. The most appropriate means of propaganda, however, was all journalism. Moța’ newspaper begins to reprint *Libertatea* and *Foarte interesantă* for 2 months with weekly publications. However, the US government did not allow the units formed on its territory to leave the front.

On July 3, 1917, General Hugh L. Scott, Chief of the US Army Staff and a member of the Red Mission to Russia, made a detour to Iasi, was received as a Messiah. And when he assured the Romanians in an address to Parliament that the United States would fight until the end of the conflict on their part and on the side of their allies, they had no doubt that America would save them. In charge of American business in Iasi, William H. Andrews, reported that: "Although Scott's general language was as unobtrusive as it could be in line with his goal of encouraging Romanians", the speech "had the effect to give them the idea that he promised the United States would give them everything they asked for". And he warned that "in the near future, it might cause the United States government to embarrass itself" (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917: 236).

General Scott's visit to Iași and the hopes of widespread aid from the United States raised morale in unoccupied Romania. But when no help came, many began to doubt the wisdom of remaining at war: "General Scott, accompanied by four officers from his staff, arrived at the official visit on July 3 in Iasi, leaving in the same night. Their visit was a great success and they received an appreciative reception from the Parliament of Romania and its Majesties: King and Queen. General Scott's speech to the Romanian Parliament was highly appreciated. He reaffirmed the America's intention to contribute, as far as possible, to the victory of the Allies, including the victory of Romania" (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917: 392).

On August 12, 1917, Vasile Stoica organized a conference at Carnegie Hall in New York, where Henry Franklin-Bouillon, Minister of Embassies and Missions of France, stated that he was in solidarity with the Romanian nation: "You have to rely more on American Romanians only on the Romanian government, who was far away and who does not have too flattering opinions" (Stoica, 1926: 15). This solemn meeting was presided over by Mayor of New York, at which point the Romanian issues and claims were exposed.

Through his speeches, Lucaciu was able to push a significant number of Romanians to join the US Army. Through a simple speech, but with patriotic emotion, the priest mobilized the Romanians to fight for the Romanian glia: "I am Lucaciu. I heard that I have here many brave ones to call on to defend the Great Romania!" (Bârlea, 2004: 173).

Disappointed by the democratic administration, the Romanian mission returned to the Republican opposition, appealing to Theodore Roosevelt. The former president warmly welcomed them and listened to their discontent. He himself had several reasons to oppose the Wilson administration, recently facing the president's refusal to lead a volunteer division in France. Roosevelt seemed well informed about the issues of nationality in the Habsburg Monarchy. He surprised Stoica by asking him what he proposed to do with the Saxons and Szeklers, if he had acquired Transylvania. He acknowledged that he had always believed in the civilization mission of the Habsburg Empire and its conservation needs, but acknowledged that an Austrophile policy was incompatible with America's stated support for national definition and promised to do everything in his power for the cause of oppressed nationalities oppressed nationalities.

It is probably not an unfair assumption that Roosevelt was less excited about the mission's wishes, as it represented excellent ammunition to defeat his rival at a sensitive point. Roosevelt has always shown that although he was willing to fight for democracy, he did not consider it an adequate cause for a declaration of war. He believed that the United States should have declared war since the sinking of Lusitania, along with the discontent with Germany (*New York Times*, 1917).

Roosevelt accused President Wilson and the administration of the Democratic Party of disrespect and lack of manhood, being sure that after the war all Romanian territories will unite with the Kingdom. Roosevelt's press campaign against Wilson sums up Wilson's reluctant policy toward the Habsburg Empire. When Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war on the monarchy, Roosevelt changed tactics and began to focus on the details: "The Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires must be shattered if we intend to make a democratic world" (Stout, 1921: 56).

On August 28, 1917, Vasile Stoica and Vasile Lucaciu had an hour-long meeting with the former President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, to support their activity, considering that the solidarity of American personalities with the Romanian national objective was very important. Meeting at the house of the former president of Oyster Bay, called Sagamore Hill, they were warmly welcomed, giving credit to the Romanian problem. After clarifying the real circumstances in the country, Theodore Roosevelt expressed his belief that Austria-Hungary it will not survive after the end of the war, and that the Romanians will achieve national unity, considering that Romania was a very important country in the war against the Central Empires. Vasile Stoica and Vasile Lucaciu saw the interview with Theodore Roosevelt as an important moment in their patriotic activity in the United States. The newspaper "La Roumanie" wrote that "Vasile Stoica's perseverance was very important for the success of the interview with former President Theodore Roosevelt" (*La Roumanie*, 1918).

The close connection that was formed between the former president and Vasile Stoica, was the most important reference for supporting the Romanian cause: "from then, until near his death, I corresponded with Theodore Roosevelt on the Romanian problem, providing him and receiving from his sympathetic responses" (Mureșanu, Vianu, 1974: 425). The former Republican president will use all the information he has received about oppressed people in public speeches, which will bring numerous criticisms of President Wilson.

On September 6, 1917, Roosevelt delivered a speech in New York, severely criticizing the administration for its lack of force and inconsistencies in its policy. In the second half of September, he toured with meetings in Kansas City, Minneapolis and Racine, where he constantly hit the subject: "America must prove President Wilson's words for democracy. For this reason, we must declare war against Austria and Turkey" (*New York Times*, 1917).

On September 19, 1917, Vasile Stoica invites Theodore Roosevelt to attend the US Ambulance Committee for Romania, which can be made quite clear by the latter, when a support was presided over in the USA, on December 9, 1917, the need to disappear of Austro-Hungary. Vasile Stoica wrote to Theodore Roosevelt: "Every word for care Your Excellency is pronounced, it is useful to us, it is the voice of the most important American authority in support of our people" (Watson, 1934: 508).

Therefore, it is planned to transport fifty Ford car ambulances to Romania, under the aegis of Lieutenant Beverly Miles, but they will be destined for Italy, due to the disturbances in Russia.

Through Charles Joseph Vopicka, the US Minister in Romania, the United States Government was called upon to grant Romania a loan of twenty million dollars for the withdrawal project in southern Russia. In October, the Treasury Department pledged to Romania a loan of five million dollars.

Even during the period of American neutrality, Vopicka, Czech by birth, showed a hostile attitude towards the Central Powers and a great dissatisfaction with his Austrian colleague and compatriot in Bucharest – Count Czernin. During the Romanian withdrawal from Wallachia, in December 1916, Vopicka remained in Bucharest and provoked agitation through his vehement protests against the German and Austrian robberies and excesses. The German government requested and obtained its recall in the United States in the state of collapse following the president's peace movements in December 1916 and January 1917, the State Department was inclined to remove him from his post, but after the break of diplomatic relations with Germany, changed his mind (*New York Times*, 1917).

When the war was imminent, Vopicka, the only official of the State Department, advised the president to declare war on Austria-Hungary and Germany at the same time, on the grounds that the Balkan allies and the Habsburg monarchy were waiting for US help. However, the president ignored this one dissenting voice in the unanimous chorus, exempting Austria-Hungary from the declaration of war on the grounds that it was friends with the United States and that, in any case, a declaration of war against it would aggravate it even worse the situation of the subjects (Charles J. Vopicka, 1920: 128). After declaring war, Vopicka was sent back to Iasi, where he arrived in September 1917 after a long journey through Japan, Siberia and Russia. In his new post, he fought bravely to convince Romania not to give up the Allied cause.

Despite some pretty explicit instructions, Vopicka continued to support the hope of American support for Romanians. He had the unbeatable faith of immigrants for all the small nations. Despite all the evidence, he refused to believe that the President really meant what he said in his messages. On how to execute his instructions, he reported: Brătianu and his successor General Alexandru Averescu claimed that "Romania had no use in continuing the fight because, according to the speeches of President and Lloyd George, even if the Allies win Romania does not have to obtain any additional territory" (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918: 757). Vopicka, offered Brătianu, a truly Byzantine diplomat, the subtleties of diplomacy. Brătianu glanced, but found nothing between the lines of the president's message to the King. It will be recalled that it guaranteed the territorial integrity of Romania, but not the national unification of Romania.

Prime Minister Brătianu, a realistic politician, did not expect miracles, but hoped for substantial American financial aid and public support for Romania's war objectives. He was responsible for leading the country into war with the Allies to win Transylvania. As Romania's position became more and more difficult, an agreement with the Central Powers was envisaged, while Romania still had an army and thus a bargaining power. They were about to leave Transylvania as a meaningless dream.

Brătianu hoped that the American support of Romania's claims would strengthen his weakened position and justify the continuation of the war by the Allies. He was not well informed about the American opinion, because Romania did not have a diplomatic representation in Washington but after the American declaration of war, he took immediate measures to send a representative to Washington, but due to the transport difficulties, the Romanian minister arrived in the United States in January 1918 (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918: 721).

The first Romanian legation in America arrived on January 1, 1918, in a time of pressure for the country. The members of the legation were Dr. Constantin Angelescu – minister, N.H. Lahovary – secretary, Al. Rubin – attached to a special mission, together with Major L. Teiușanu – military attached: “The new staff of the Romanian Legation under the leadership of the new minister, Dr. Constantin Angelescu, is composed of Mr. N.H. Lahovary, secretary; Commander Levius Teiușanu as military attaché, Lieutenant Vasile Stoica” (*The Washington Herald*, 1918: 7).

Thus, he was presented in America, the Prime Minister of Romania in Washington, Dr. Angelescu, official representative, who “succeeded by titanium work to produce a strong movement in American public opinion and Romania began to be sympathize, like Belgium and Serbia” (Popescu, 1940: 242).

Because the activity of the Romanian patriot in the United States was very important, the Romanian Minister of Washington, Dr. Constantin Angelescu, asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania that Vasile Stoica to continue his actions as a member of the Romanian Legion. As a result, on January 22, 1918, Vasile Stoica became a diplomat attached to the Romanian Legion in Washington, by order of the President of the Council of Ministers of Romania, Ion I.C. Brătianu. By the new appointment, the Romanian mission on the American land was taking shape: “by an order of Mr. Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu, I was called attached to the legation, where I continued my activity of informing the American world about the Romanian cause” (Stoica, 1926: 21).

On January 15, 1918, Dr. Constantin Angelescu, the Romanian Prime Minister accredited to Washington, asked the President to present his credentials. The speeches are generally based on the political statements of the intention to maintain mutually advantageous relationships, rather than on important policy statements. Angelescu, however, ventured to slip in his speech a discreet allusion “to the four millions of brothers across the mountains, have argued over the centuries that they are linked to Romania through solidarity of race and ideals” (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918: 736).

In the United States, Vasile Stoica gave lectures in Detroit, Cleveland, Trenton and Youngstown, where the Romanian community was large, approaching 150,000 people. He sensitized American public opinion on the national rights of Romanians, since Vasile Stoica gave lectures in Washington, Boston, Chicago, Manchester, Baltimore and Philadelphia. The Romanian patriot has published articles on the national goals of Romanians in the Washington Post, New York Times, Evening Sun, National, Periscope and Literary Digest newspapers.

The cities where the Romanian emigrants lived and worked represented the favorable frameworks for the conduct of the Romanian propaganda, for example at a

meeting in Indiana Harbor, the Romanian minister Constantin Angelescu replied to the press about the curiosity of Romania's entry into the war: "The fight for the unifying of the nation and the four millions to be denationalized are the necessary arguments" (Ion Munteanu, 1991: 77).

With the arrival of the Romanian Legation, led by the minister Angelescu, the demonstrations in favor of Romania intensify. The Orthodox parishes of Transylvanian emigrants performed an imposing manifestation, where in the presence of the Romanian Legations, the assembled parishes declared themselves united with the Metropolitan of Bucharest. The Romanian Orthodox Church in the United States is, as its name indicates, a congregation of Romanian-speaking residents, identified with the Orthodox Church. This congregation was established in 1910, having a church, built soon after, on Wilson Boulevard. The Rev. Ion Podea was the pastor of this church (Butler, 1921: 326).

On February 20/March 5, 1918, Romania was forced to conclude the peace preliminaries, and on May 7, the painful peace was signed in Bucharest, at which time Dr. Angelescu, together with Al. Rubin left America for Paris, after a few months of diplomatic activity, remaining N.H. Lahovari in charge of business under the Romanian law, totally deprived of financial means: "out of misery, our leaders at home understood too little the importance of propaganda abroad and more especially in the United States" (Stoica, 1926: 25). The resignation of Vasile Stoica from the Royal Legation of Romania in Washington came on July 3, 1918, justifying his act of not wanting to create dissatisfaction with the Bucharest government, which had already signed a separate peace. Romania's foreign minister approved his resignation; despite these events, Vasile Stoica has permanently maintained the cooperation with the members of the Romanian Legation.

Along with representations of 182 Romanian parishes and organizations, the largest Romanian congress is organized on July 5, 1918 in Youngstown, where the National League of Romanians from the USA will be established – patriotic organization of Romanians in America, at which time Vasile Stoica will collaborated with the members of the supply mission for Romania, approved by the United States Government, Ludovic Mrazec and Constantin Danielopol. Vasile Stoica was the president of this league. He sent the memoirs to sensitize the US authorities on the need to support Romania in its struggle for national unification.

On September 2, 1918, Vasile Stoica had a meeting with Colonel House, President Wilson's friend and advisor, at his summer residence in Magnolia – Massachusetts, when the Romanian cause was made known, the natural settlement by the colonel being the unification of the Romanians in a single country. But there is only one hesitation regarding the course of the minorities already existing in Transylvania: "I explained to him that under no circumstances will we follow the Hungarian policy towards minorities, but we will give them full church, school and even administrative autonomy, as this it will not be harmful to the unity of the state" (Stoica, 1926: 41).

On September 15, 1918, in the Carnegie Hall of New York, Vasile Stoica, together with Thomas Masaryk from Czechoslovakia, Hinko Hinkovici from Croatia and Ignacy Jan Paderewski from Poland, organized a meeting with representatives of

the Austrian-Hungarian people, at this meeting, David Frederic Allen, leader of the Republican Party organization in New York, also participated. Francis Lane, Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Joseph Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, Charles Elliot, President of Harvard University and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, sent telegrams expressing their support in the fight for the national liberation of oppressed nations. The organizers of this meeting forwarded to the President of the United States – Woodrow Wilson, a resolution calling for the elimination of Austro-Hungary and US support for the liberation of oppressed people.

Finally, the contacts reached to the highest level, including at the White House, following as on September 20, 1918, Vasile Stoica together with T.G. Masaryk, I.J. Paderewski and H. Hinkovici, in the company of the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the French sociologist Pierre de Lanux, are to be welcomed by the chief executive of Washington, none other than President Woodrow Wilson, presenting the sufferings, struggles, and aspirations of oppressed peoples (Buzatu, 2011: 24). The US president considered the disappearance of Austro-Hungary as “a historical necessity in agreement with our aspirations.”

The meeting with the US President has deeply marked the 29-year-old from Transylvania, who will consider him: “as one of the greatest heroes he has given him in the last half century, as a faithful, fanatic soldier of this ideal of brotherhood, of peace between people, for the ethical and economic progress of mankind, considering him an enlightenment and an apostle who remains for the future as one of the cleanest, highest and most idealized personalities in history” (Oprîș, 2008: 62).

On September 22, 1918, a remarkable meeting took place in the Carnegie Hall, of the nationalities that suffered under the oppressive rule of Germany and Austro-Hungary. Here were representatives of different racial groups: Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs, Poles and Romanians. Ignace Paderewski for the Poles, Thomas Masaryk for the Czechoslovaks, Vasile Stoica for the Romanians and Hinko Hinkovich for the Yugoslavs, were the main speakers of the afternoon. They all described the national hopes and aspirations of their people and expressed their faith in America and its allies. Paderewski paid an extraordinary tribute to the Czechoslovaks for their courage and skill. Each speaker admitted that all oppressed nations must live in harmony (*Daily Tribune*, 1918: 11).

On November 6, 1918, the United States Government promised that it would be fully granted to Romania in order to maintain its political and territorial rights, uniting with Transylvania: “The United States government will take constant care to see the future integration of Romania as a free and independent country” (*Associated Press*, 1918).

On November 27, 1918, to celebrate the independence of more than 4,000,000 Romanians from the Austro-Hungarian domination, a mass meeting was held in which 1000 members of the Romanian colony participated in the metropolitan hall, on Franklin Street. Captain Vasile Stoica, one of the signatories of the declaration of the independence of the nations of Central Europe, was the main speaker. His speech to favor the national cause of Romania and its tribute to the allied governments in the collapse of Germany and its allies was applauded. The Romanian and American flags were displayed, to the delight of the public. Some of those present at the meeting were

dressed in their national costumes. “The Star Spangled Banner” and Romanian songs were sung (*Los Angeles Herald*, 1918: 6).

In America, Vasile Stoica knows them and unites their efforts in a fruitful collaboration with Professor T.G. Masaryk, the future president of Czechoslovakia, with J.J. Paderewski, the future First President of the Polish Council reborn and with the old Croatian patriot Hincó Hincovici, uniting their voices in support of the cause of oppressed peoples and building on the American soil the European Union. On October 3, 1918, in Washington, Vasile Stoica and Dr. Nicolae Lupu were founding members of the Medio-European Democratic Union, a coordinating organization in the struggle for the national liberation of the people of Central and Eastern Europe. The member organizations of the Medio-European Democratic Union were: Polish National Council, National League of Romanians, Finnish League, Lithuanian National Council, Ukrainian Federation, Greek Association, Albanian National Association, and Italian Association. Because Vasile Stoica was a friend of American personalities, he was elected vice president of this union. The president of the Middle-European Democratic Union was Thomas Masaryk, and the director of this union was Professor Herbert Ad Miller of the University of Cincinnati.

During the war, the Wilson administration refused to deal with Romanian territorial aspirations for several reasons. Romanian-American propaganda efforts proved to be burdened by inefficient financial support from the Romanian government and existing pre-war relations: “anti-Semitism and tariff disputes with the US” (Glant, 1993: 40).

The so-called current Romanian anti-Semitism often led to diplomatic confrontations even before the war, the Americans also accused the Romanian government of unfair commercial practices, and Romania was regarded as much more backward than the territories it claimed (Mamatey, 1957: 124). The prestige of the Romanian representatives was destroyed by the fact that the Brătianu government searched French diplomatic support for the Transylvanian mission, as well as Andrews’ report that Vasile Stoica had an open cooperation with Theodore Roosevelt. Moreover, Wilson refused to consider secret war agreements, and Romania’s exit from the war was not accepted in Washington. Romania’s re-entry into the war against Hungary, the American recognition of the Romania Great program was finally recognized in Bucharest, but without territorial commitments (Spector, 1962: 18).

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THE IDEOLOGY OF THE NATIONAL RENAISSANCE FRONT IN PRO-CARLIST CONTEMPORARY PERCEPTIONS

Mihaela Ilie*

Abstract

The National Renaissance Front – the first Romanian single political party – played an important role within the authoritarian regime established by King Carol II on February 10th/11th, 1938. By establishing NRF, the Monarch wanted to own a political instrument that could mediate a relation with common people of Romania. The ideology of the new political party was not rigorously established; neither the official documents that created and organized the Front, nor the different representatives of the Carol's regime, who approached this topic, were capable of describing a coherent set of political ideas of the NRF.

This article aims to present the ideology of the Front in pro-carlist contemporaries' perceptions, as it was depicted in speeches and writings. The purpose of the paper is to complete the image of the NRF's ideology by putting together a part of the existing information on the main political ideas promoted by the royal political party.

Key words: *National Renaissance Front, ideology, King Carol II, authoritarian regime, pro-carlist contemporaries*

Introduction

The ideology of the National Renaissance Front – the first Romanian single political party – is a topic that was rarely discussed. There are very few papers referring to this issue, while the larger researches about NRF either did not directly referred to its ideology or mentioned it briefly (Turlea, 2006; Bruja, 2006; Müller, 2015: 216-228; Grecu, 2013).

In my opinion, two main factors could explain this attitude. First of all, the researcher is facing a lack of information regarding the NRF ideology in the contemporary documents that established, organized or reorganized this political party. That is the reason why the historian is somehow obliged to address to the speeches and writings offered by the representatives and supporters of the Front; but still, among those texts, the references to the NRF's ideology are deficient, focusing mainly on the practical aspects and less on political framework of the organization created by the King. The second reason that makes the approach harder is the fact that the information provided by contemporaries is not unitary and varies according to their position towards the authoritarian regime and, implicitly, regarding the National Renaissance Front.

Although the references to the ideology of the Front in the official papers are not very numerous, the first part of the article is devoted to these documents: the decree law establishing the National Renaissance Front, the Report of the Council of Ministers submitted one day before the formation of NRF, the Status of Organizing

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the Front, the NRF's Program Manifesto and the decree law for reorganizing the royal political party, the last one dating from January 1940. The second part tries to identify the ideological aspects of the party as they have been presented by one of the main supporters of the regime and implicitly of the Front – Armand Călinescu. This image will be completed by the regime supporters, who either devoted special texts to NRF or mentioned the single party in their own journals. The last part will include the analysis of the basic political ideas promoted by the Front.

It is important to mention that the paper does not include the transformation of the NRF into the Party of the Nation. In my opinion, the fact that the royal political party acquired in June 1940 a new name and, at least in theory, a rather new orientation and organization, requires a special approach for that period.

The National Renaissance Front ideology in official documents

The **decree law establishing NRF** had 8 articles and was published on December 16th, 1938; the 2nd article was the only one which referred to the ideology of the single political party. This article stated that: "This political organization aims to mobilize the national consciousness in order to take a solid and unitary Romanian action to defend and make the country prosper and to consolidate the state" (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 1/1939: 8).

The report of the Council of Ministers submitted a day before the establishment of the Front explained the necessity of NRF formation. Starting with the 4th article of the Constitution from February 1938, this document stated the need to create: "a new way of participation in leading, as well as a legal guide and a functioning status arising from the principles and norms that dominate the life of the State today" (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 1/ 1939: 9-10). In an avalanche of unstructured reasons, the report mentioned the purpose of creating NRF. According to that document, the aim of the Front was to represent "the unwavering connection between the Crown and the Country", "a political instrument", "the indestructible lever of consolidation and elevation of the State", "the shield of defence and conservation of the consciousness and strength of our nation", "the unique body, within which the parliamentary, administrative and professional settlements will emerge, pillars which will sustain the whole life of our State in the future" (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 1/ 1939: 9 -10).

Following the same manner as the decree law from December, **the Regulation law for the establishment of the NRF** from January 5th, 1939 – also in article 2 – pointed out that the Front "aims the prosperity of the Country by strengthening the national idea and the solidarity of its children, by strengthening the family as a social cell, by creating a spiritual life, by developing the Christian faith and the local culture, as well as the material prosperity, by the obligatory and honest work" (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 1/ 1939: 10-11). Towards the end of the regulation, summarizing the basic ideas of the new political party, its motto was specified: "the King and the Nation, the Work and the Faith".

The regulation for the organization and functioning of the National Guard of NRF from April 25th, 1939 (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 1/ 1939: 42-48) did nothing more than to resume *ad litteram* the political doctrine of the Front, as it appeared in the Regulations from January 1939.

The ***Program Manifesto of NRF*** from October 16th, 1939 tried to revitalize the single political party (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Ministerul Propagandei Naționale. Presa internă*, file no. 403/ 1939: 120-125) and, regarding its ideology the document mentioned that “the National Renaissance Front is at the same time a spiritual movement and a political body”, that had as a goal “the strengthening and raising of the Country”, and this ideal was to be achieved by “the hard, honest and organised work of its members and by their faith”. The manifesto also listed the principles of NRF that resumed and explained the basic political ideas of the Front. At the beginning, the document stated that “the King embodies and represents the State; He ensures the continuity of our public life and guides it. That is why it is a sacred duty for all of us to build a wall around His Majesty King Carol II, to entrust Him our faith, work and life” (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Ministerul Propagandei Naționale. Presa internă*, file no. 403/ 1939: 120).

The other principles of the Manifesto were referring to: the state; the strengthening of the national dignity and pride; the minorities and the Romanians abroad; the respect and protection of the family; the creation of a spiritual life through the development of the Christian faith and the local culture; the material prosperity by obligatory and honest work; a strong support for the elites; the strengthening of Romanian solidarity; the National Renaissance Front as an exponent of the citizens’ life (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Ministerul Propagandei Naționale. Presa internă*, file no. 403/ 1939: 120-125; see also: *Renașterea*, October 29th, 1939, no. 44: 3-4).

The decree law for reorganizing the National Renaissance Front, from January 20th, 1940, did not brought any changes regarding the political ideas of the Front. Still, the document underlined the importance of strengthening the monarchical cult and mentioned two other principles of the Front: the appreciation of social justice and the professional organization in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 2/ 1939-1940: 8-26).

The ideology of the National Renaissance Front in Armand Călinescu’s perception

King Carol II’s personal opinion could have been very important for understanding the political ideas of the Front. Unfortunately, the missing pages from the daily notes of King Carol II, from September 1938 to March 1939, makes it hard to recreate the perception that the Sovereign initially had regarding the establishment of NRF and, even more difficult, to accurately describe the Monarch’s opinion on the ideology of the Front.

One of the few indirect references regarding the Sovereign’s perception of the National Renaissance Front from December, 1938, is the one reported by Arthur

Buhman, the private secretary of the Monarch. He described in his writings a discussion that the Sovereign had with Colonel Constantin Filitti – a childhood friend of the King, who was part of his entourage. According to Buhman, during the discussion, which took place on December 16th, 1938, the King said: “I understood, for a long time, that noting good can be expected from the political parties. They work only in their own interest, for the satisfaction of personal ambitions that have nothing in common with the interests of the country [...] I start now with my own powers to create what they have refused and I hope I will succeed because I must succeed” (Buhman, 2006: 456).

On January 1st, 1939, during the celebration of the New Year, King Carol II indirectly described what NRF meant to him. Thus, in his speech, the Monarch did not explicitly refer to the single political party, he presented the new direction he wanted to give to the country during the year 1938; on that path NRF represented a very important step. The King mentioned that his main idea for 1938 was to save Romania by a *national renaissance* – “The Renaissance of Romania”, “the economic renaissance”, “the moral renaissance” (*Neamul Românesc* from January 4th, 1939: 1-2).

Therefore, in order to find an authorised voice that spoke about the ideology of the Front, the researcher had to look for other sources. Given on the one hand the close collaboration established between Carol II and Armand Călinescu and, on the other hand, the fact that Călinescu was requesting Sovereign’s consent on all official actions he was taken, one can conclude that Călinescu’s statements were in accordance with the opinion that the King himself had regarding the Front. Thus, I will begin presenting the perception of the pro-carlist contemporaries on the NRF’s ideology from the information provided by Armand Călinescu. Later on, this image will be supplemented by the opinions of other supporters of the authoritarian regime. From his position as one of the main representatives of the regime established by King Carol II in February 1938, Armand Călinescu can be seen as the legitimate voice to offer such explanations. Moreover, Călinescu had been one of the fervent supporters of establishing the single political organization (Călinescu, 1990: 400) and, at the same time, the one who had outlined the project of creating NRF and defined how it should be organized.

Some of the first references to the political orientation of the NRF were provided by Armand Călinescu in a radio speech at the beginning of 1939. It should be noted that the speech also represented the introduction of a brochure meant to popularize the royal political party (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 1/ 1939: 3-7; *România* from January 13th, 1939: 1, 5; see also Stanomir, 2003: 91-97).

In his speech, Armand Călinescu explained that the NRF was strictly a Romanian concept and the attempt to find common points with other foreign organizations was misguided. He underlined that the National Renaissance Front was meant to revitalize an old Romanian tradition – the tradition of “national unity”. Călinescu insisted on defining the NRF as a movement, stating that it was not a political party in the classical sense of the word (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 1/ 1939: 5). Moreover, in the initial draft regarding a future single political organization, presented to the King on October 20th, 1938, Călinescu

spoke about organising a popular movement similar to «Junimea» (Savu, 1976: 157-158). Moreover, Armand Călinescu insisted that, in addition to nationalism, the supremacy should prevail over the individual interests. He said that the NRF “seeks to restore the state to its rights, in its natural sense” and added that the state formerly “had to humbly bow to any selfish interest and any disorderly manifestation, under the pretext of individual freedom”. Călinescu concluded that according to NRF’s principles the individual must be subordinated to the state (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 1/ 1939: 6).

As main ideological directives of the new political organization, Armand Călinescu mentioned four pillars: the national idea, namely the strengthening and developing the nation; the family, which was seen as the most important social structure; the Christian faith – “NRF rests on the Christian faith; being especially a spiritual movement, it will give a moral meaning and value to life itself”; the labour – seen as a great honour (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 1/ 1939: 7).

The political ideas of the Front in the writings and speeches of the supporters of the royal political party

The writings and speeches of the supporters of the NRF did not bring new ideas to those mentioned above, their role being to complete the general image of the Front’s ideology. Their notes represent a development of the principles set forth by Armand Călinescu and sometimes an accentuation and even exaggeration of the almost messianic role played by the King and the political organization he created.

In this regard, **Theodor Vlădescu** underlined four elements that in his opinion consisted the starting point of the National Renaissance Front: the unbreakable connection between individual, crown and nation; the preservation of the Dacian origin for the Romanian people; the higher ethical sense of the Orthodox faith; the duty to the country (Vlădescu, 1939: 25-27, see also Bruja, 2006: 122).

Ștefan Morărescu Baldomir considered that the NRF was not a political party similar to the traditional ones and did not represent the interests of a social class or of certain citizens; he also explained that the Front was not a single political party serving either a state ideology or a racial ideology as is the case in Italy and Germany. Borrowing the ideas presented by the president of the Romanian Academy, Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, Morărescu Baldomir wrote that “the Front has no ideology other than that contained in the Carol II’s Constitution. The Front does not have its own ideology, in order to impose it to the politics of the Romanian State and the Nation, but it is itself an instrument in the service of both the State and the Roman Nation” (Morărescu Baldomir, 1939: 5). At the same time, the author mentioned that the purpose of the NRF was to create the legal means for achieving citizens’ duty in the best conditions (Morărescu Baldomir, 1939: 5).

In his book, *Contributions to a Specific Romanian Ideology*, **Marin Simionescu Râmnicănu** tried to explain the singularity of the political construction created by the King. For Simionescu Râmnicănu, the National Renaissance Front did not have a specific ideology. Moreover, he insisted that NRF did not need a precise doctrine because, in his opinion, this could have limited the actions taken by the party and

would have restricted the access to the Front for those with a different political orientation than that proposed by National Renaissance Front (Simionescu Râmnicăanu, 1939: 69).

However, Simionescu Râmnicăanu specified some new ideological interpretations proposed by NRF – “collectivism that replaced individualism” and accentuation of nationalism (Simionescu Râmnicăanu, 1939: 72-73). As the labour was one of the main ideas for NRF, Simionescu Râmnicăanu tried to connect it with corporatism. He further stated that “in Romania, the value of the corporate and cooperative organization had a strong importance because, for the first time, it succeeded to bring together both urban and rural population” (Simionescu Râmnicăanu, 1939: 205-206).

Cezar Petrescu, the editor in chief of the newspaper *România*, the official journal of the National Renaissance Front, was also on the list of those who characterized in hyperbolic words both the principles and the role that the King’s political organization was meant to play. His articles outlined an idyllic image of the NRF.

Another category that supported NRF and mentioned the ideas promoted by the royal political party, both in their speeches and writings, was composed of those who held various political positions under the new regime.

An important character from this group was the **Patriarch Miron Cristea**, who held the position of President of the Council of Ministers since the establishment of the authoritarian regime until his death, in March 1939. One year before, in March 1938, when the political parties were outlawed, he was the one who held the famous speech on the “hydra with 29 electoral heads” that had been destroyed. Therefore, it is easy to anticipate that the Patriarch’s view regarding the royal political organization was a positive one. Moreover, Miron Cristea actively participated in the propagation of NRF’s ideas, while urging the priests to join the Front. Regarding the political orientation of the NRF the Prime Minister stated: “In the new political order of the country, based on the Constitution of 1938, the clergy of the Romanian Orthodox Church [...] finds itself to the fortunated situation of working in Evangelical and peaceful spirit for the unity of all the Christian people [...]. This coagulation in the Single Front of National Renaissance gives the Church and all its servants the opportunity and freedom to collaborate for the future in the spirit of our Christian Church, for the Country, the Nation and the Throne” (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Miron Cristea*, file no. 19/ 1939: 120). The Patriarch – Prime Minister also stated that “the new authoritarian organization of the Romanian state abolished the parties from the political life. But no matter how authoritarian the leadership of the country is today, it is absolutely necessary for the Crown to have an organic and natural connection with the masses. For this purpose, «the Single Front of the National Renaissance» was created” (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Miron Cristea*, file no. 19/1939: 123).

On January 1st, 1939, during the celebration of the New Year held at the Royal Palace, the Patriarch Miron Cristea, addressed the Monarch by the following words: “from the large masses of the people, all the citizens should register to the «Single Front», a front of direct and enthusiastic work, under the motto «A faith and a will», written by Your Majesty and under the leadership of the King, determined to make his

country flourish and strong inside and respected abroad” (*Neamul Românesc* from January 4th, 1939: 3).

Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, the president of the Romanian Academy between 1938 and 1941, and the one who had led the initial group of the founding members of the Front, tried to explain the ideology of new royal political organization. At the beginning of 1939, during a conference, he stated that “the front does not have an ideology of its own to be achieved, with the intention of imposing it on the politics of the Romanian State and Nation, but it is an instrument in the service of both the State and the Romanian Nation” (Rădulescu Motru, 1939: 12). Rădulescu-Motru also spoke about the role of the Front in facilitating the implementation of the provisions of the 1938 Constitution. Regarding the comparison with other foreign political organizations, the president of the Romanian Academy stated that the NRF was not similar to the Italian fascist organization or to the German national socialist party, but found common ground between the Front and the National Union of Portugal. Rădulescu Motru ended his speech by explaining why the royal political organization, that the King wanted to be perceived as a popular movement, was imposed from the top of the Romanian leadership to its base (Rădulescu Motru, 1939: 11-13).

Petre Andrei, Minister of National Education (December 1938 – July 1940) indicated in a public speech held in Iasi, in May 1940, that the main features of the NRF ideology could be summarized in four words: nationalism, elites selection (“the secret of political leadership is the selection of the elite”), labour and monarchy (Strat, 1940: 138).

Starting with October 1939, **Victor Moldovan**, the General Secretary of the NRF, insisted in his speeches that the defining role of the Front was the fulfilment of Romanians’ wishes (Moldovan, 2016: 352); in his opinion “NRF was created in order to achieve the unification, and furthermore with the purpose of growth of our country both morally and materially” (Moldovan, 2016: 361). As the author himself mentioned, the central idea of his public presentations was the national solidarity (Moldovan, 2016: 349, 352, 374).

Among the supporters of the Front who have expressed their opinion on the NRF ideology and who had similar ideas to the ones presented above, one could mention Constantin C. Giurescu, Minister of the National Renaissance Front, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, president of the royal political party, Gheorghe Tătărescu, Prime Minister of the NRF’s Government between November 1939 and June 1940, Teofil Sidorovici, the leader of another organization supported by the Monarch – “Straja Țării” and General Petre Georgescu, the leader of the National Guard of the Front.

It should be noted that some politicians that were close to the King and officially supported the new political organization, left private notes in their journals that were different from their public speeches. Such a personality is **Constantin Argetoianu**. He was a fervent supporter of establishing a single political organization. In his public speeches, especially between September and November 1939 when he held the position of President of the Council of Ministers, Argetoianu followed the official direction of the regime (*Neamul Românesc*, from October 26th, 1939: 2). In his memoirs,

however, he frequently mentioned the lack of organization and the weak echo of the new political party and at the same time highlighted the opportunism of those who joined the Front: “NRF was not meant to play an important role in the leadership of the state, its main purpose was to create a new spirit and to achieve a true national rebirth. But who can still speak of moral and national flourish with crooks and bandits, known to everyone as such, in charge of the common wealth” (Argetoianu, 2003: 51). During a conversation with Armand Călinescu, Argetoianu underlined that the National Renaissance Front, failed to unify the whole public opinion and to represent a political and social renaissance; moreover, Constantin Argetoianu considered that the Front was “a dead organization and, consequently, useless “ (Argetoianu, 2003: 128).

A special case is represented by the historian **Nicolae Iorga**. Although holding the position of Royal Counsellor, he led a real campaign against NRF both by the articles published in *Neamul Românesc* (the newspaper he was leading) and as a professor at the University of Bucharest. Moreover, Iorga sent a letter to Armand Călinescu on the same day that NRF was established stating that: “I have lived to see the beginning of slavery” (Iorga, 2019: 120). However, the benevolent attitude of King Carol II had led to gradual change of Iorga’s perception regarding the National Renaissance Front (Iorga, 2019: 152; Carol II, 2003: 39). Furthermore, he became a member of the Front, a gesture which he explained to his students on June 20th, 1939: “I enrolled in NRF because I was personally invited by His Majesty, the King” (Țurlea, 2001: 84). Regarding the purpose of the Front, Iorga considered that the Front had been created as a recruitment office for nationalists, similar to “a gathering of notables, like it was in royal France in 1787” (Iorga, 2019: 167).

The opposition

Although this article refers to the ideology of NRF as it appears in the writings and speeches of the pro-carlist contemporaries, it is worth mentioning that, among the leaders and representatives of the traditional political parties, there were voices that strongly opposed the King, and later the new direction he wanted to impose by the authoritarian regime.

Thus, the opposition, that some of the former political leaders had expressed against King Carol II, and later regarding the regime established in February 1938, it was also manifested against the royal political party. Among the main contestants of the NRF were, as expected, the former leaders of the traditional political parties, namely, Iuliu Maniu – the president of the National Peasant Party – and Constantin I.C. Brătianu – the president of the National Liberal Party. Both the presidents of the two largest Romanian political parties, and a part of the members of the organizations they lead, harshly spoke about the Front and its political ideas.

The representatives of the Legionary Movement expressed the same attitude of rejection regarding NRF. Moreover, the intransigence they manifested against the royal political organisation was given by the fact that the NRF was set up less than three weeks after the shooting of their leader – Corneliu Zelea Codreanu.

After October 1939, when King Carol II launched a reconciliation policy, a change of attitude was registered among the legionaries; individually or in groups, the

legionaries began to join NRF. However, this attitude did not bring a change regarding their perception of the Front, as their enrolments in the NRF were only a facade; in fact, the members of the Legionary Movement kept their own political view.

An analysis of the National Renaissance Front's ideology and its impact

Analysing on the one hand the official documents that were the basis for establishing and the organizing NRF and on the other hand the statements of the supporters of the royal political party, it can be observed that the political ideas promoted by the Front were swinging between inconsistency and idealism. Moreover, the lack of a clear ideology and the confuse directions to follow led to a poor understanding of the purpose of NRF.

As it was previously stated, at the beginning, NRF was projected much more as a spiritual than a political movement; moreover, Călinescu had brought up "Junimea" as a possible model (Savu, 1976: 157-158). One of the dysfunctional aspects, to which the supporters of the regime tried to give a justification, was that they wanted to create a popular movement, but they wanted to be imposed from top to the bases, from the King to the common citizens (Rădulescu Motru, 1939: 11-13). Moreover, the political ideas promoted by the Front were also wrapped in concepts used by the authoritarian and dictatorial regimes at the time; among these, it can be identified the myth of the saviour (Millon-Delsol, 2002: 111-114, see also Grecu, 2013: 78). The King was thus presented as the saviour of the Nation and NRF as the only instrument by which salvation could be performed.

If one wants to find similarities with another organization, these should not be sought in political parties from other countries. In my opinion, what the King wanted, as opposed to what Armand Călinescu proposed and tried to initially organize, was a structure similar to the Legionary Movement. As is well known, the King was impressed by the devotion that the members of this movement had for their leader and for the legionary ideology and wished that a similar phenomenon would be created around him. There are many examples that support this hypothesis, one of them being the importance given by the Front to Orthodoxy.

As I tried to underline above, there was no unitary conception regarding the organization and purpose of NRF, the decision-makers being unclear in relation to what the Front represented – a spiritual movement, a political movement, an organization with corporate values, a political party; all these uncertainties were obviously reflected in the ideology of the party which proved to be vague and inconsistent.

In order to summarize this rather unclear image of the ideology that NRF representatives tried to promote, some basic elements could be identified: the nationalism with high patriotic values and an inclusion policy regarding the national minorities; the placing of both the State and the Monarchy in a higher position by promoting the so-called general interest instead of the individual one; the support for elites, especially for the young ones; the Christian Orthodox faith seen as a moral and spiritual guide; the labour, more precisely the material prosperity achieved through labour.

Conclusions

The lack of a coherent ideology of the National Renaissance Front can be explained by the inconsistent attitude of the Sovereign. As it is generally known, the King wanted an authoritarian regime, he wanted to hold the whole power in his hands; but in practice, regarding the internal affairs, he preferred to work with people that had democratic values, while abroad he sought the collaboration with western democracies, especially England and France.

In the same antagonistic way, King Carol II wanted an authoritarian regime with a single political party and an undisputed leader – the Monarch himself, but he wanted that construction to function as a popular movement; moreover, he aimed that the members of the royal political party to behave according to the political ideas imposed by the National Renaissance Front, but he also wanted them to act like that out of conviction.

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CONTRIBUTION OF MASTERS OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES OF THE KRASNOYARSK TERRITORY TO THE VICTORY OVER FASCIST GERMANY

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Abstract

The article considers the role and importance of masters of industrial enterprises of the Krasnoyarsk Territory in the process of converting civilian production to the production of military products, training and educating workers, organizing socialist competition during the Great Patriotic War and the victory of the USSR over fascist Germany (1941-1945). The growth in the number of engineering and technical workers at the enterprises of the region in connection with the evacuation from the western regions of the country and the training of personnel on the ground is analyzed. The role of masters in the reconstruction of technological processes, the introduction of a new organization of labor, and the increase in production productivity is noted.

Key words: *The Great Patriotic War, masters, Krasnoyarsk Territory, conversion, mobilization, socialist competition*

Introduction

The site master is the person who manages the production unit. Its functions include managing the site; performance of tasks in accordance with the standards; timely preparation of production; providing all necessary conditions for workers; records management; safety precautions. In the Charter of the master of the production site, the specialist under consideration is a person engaged in ensuring the implementation of the production plan, as well as using and developing various ways of managing, ensuring order in the team, production calculation, etc. During the Great Patriotic War, others, which were caused by wartime conditions, were added to generally accepted duties.

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The source base for studying the contribution of the masters of industry of the Krasnoyarsk Territory is quite extensive. The sources were documents of the State Archive of the Krasnoyarsk Territory (SAKT), analyzed the minutes of meetings of the Krasnoyarsk Territory Executive Committee, meetings of party-economic assets, reports of party committees of the plants of Krasmash, combine, Sibtyazhmash and other enterprises of the region; published collections of documents, economic statistics; materials of the newspaper Krasnoyarsk Worker and other periodicals, memoirs. The authors relied on the principles of a concrete historical approach, systematic and comprehensive, scientific and historical analysis of the processes of development of military production and the corresponding human factor in war (Svetlov et al., 2018: 87-106).

In the historiography of the Great Patriotic War, the role of masters of industrial production did not become a subject of study. Only in the works on the contribution of Soviet industry, engineering and technical intelligentsia to the Great Victory, researchers noted certain aspects of the work of masters (Akulov, 1967: 58-63; Dokuchaev, 1973: 184-190; Romanov and Savitsky, 2014: 12-25). In the monographs of Krasnoyarsk scientists N.V. Pakhomova and V.N. Shevchenko talks about the role of masters of industrial enterprises of the Krasnoyarsk Territory in the training of workers (Pakhomova, 2008: 85-91; Shevchenko, 2005: 47-54). However, the contribution of production masters was not limited to this. The craftsmen were closer to the workers, knew their needs, could more effectively influence the labor and patriotic steps of their collectives. Already in the prewar years, party and Soviet bodies paid attention to this category of production specialists, as extraordinary measures were taken to strengthen discipline in enterprises in which the masters of production had a special role. In the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On enhancing the role of craftsmen in heavy engineering plants" of May 27, 1940, the need was noted for "decisively strengthening" the authority of craftsmen in their production areas for more successful fulfillment of their duties (Chernenko and Smirtyukov, 1968: 36-41).

Therefore, the authors of the article analyze the contribution of the masters of industrial enterprises to the Great Victory not only to show their heroism, but for possible use today. Historical experience is a storehouse of methods and means of increasing the efficiency of the modern economy, mobilizing the civilian population. In modern conditions, when attention is paid to the development of the regional economy (Zhylankozova, 2018: 548-557; Akhmetshin *et al.*, 2018: 2309-2322), an in-depth study of local problems is important, which will allow more efficient use of the experience of previous generations.

The state of Workers by the Beginning of the War

By the beginning of the war, the USSR had a certain number of engineering and technical personnel, which also included masters. For the years 1928-1940, the number of engineers increased by 7.3 times and amounted to 932 thousand people, among them 295 thousand graduate engineers, 324 thousand technicians. There were 90 engineers and technicians per thousand workers. The average annual number of

engineering and technical workers in industry in 1940 reached 1 million. Practices among occupying engineering positions at industrial enterprises accounted for 47.3% (Savitsky, 2016: 110-117). Even higher was the proportion of practitioners among the masters of industrial enterprises. At the beginning of 1941, masters with higher education accounted for 3%, with a total secondary and primary – almost 88.8%. A significant part of them was made up of old production personnel in industry with more than 10 years of experience in their industry (35.7%), one third up to 5 years. Women among the masters accounted for 10.3% (The history of industrialization..., 1972: 7-12).

Siberian engineers were part of the Soviet engineering and technical intelligentsia. Training took place in seven universities and 31 technical schools. At the beginning of the war, about three thousand graduated engineers and technicians worked at the enterprises of the Krasnoyarsk Territory. There were 64 specialists per thousand workers. A significant part of the technical leaders, especially the lower level, were nominees. So at the beginning of 1941 at the Krasnashzavod out of 275 engineers and engineers only 63 people were with higher education, 170 – nominees (The shield and sword..., 2002: 51-56). Given that industrial production in Siberia had to start almost from scratch, and there were few of its own personnel, the presence of so many technical intelligentsias in the prewar years was a great achievement. The eastern regions of the USSR became the main military-technical base, the backbone of the military economy of the Soviet Union. Already in 1942, more than 80% of the production of aircraft, tanks, mortars and other military equipment was concentrated here (Brezhnev, 1976: 39-48).

In the conditions of World War II, the role of the engineering and technical intelligentsia, including masters, increased. This is due to a number of reasons, including the increase during the war years of the role of engineers as organizers and conductors of scientific and technological progress in production, and the military situation itself required the immediate implementation of scientific achievements. Only an organic relationship in the rear of science, technology, production could become decisive in the life and work of the front. In addition, in the interests of creating a coherent and rapidly growing military production, and the successful implementation of defense orders, it was necessary to technically competently organize the production process. For these purposes, engineers and technicians performed the functions of technical managers of military production, the organizer of the work of collectives (Kupatadze and Kizilöz, 2016: 69-77).

The increasing role of the technical intelligentsia of Siberia, including the Krasnoyarsk Territory, was also influenced by the fact that there were fewer specialists in industry here than in the central regions of the country. At the same time, they had to solve equally complex tasks of developing new technologies and new labor organization. The main newspaper of the USSR, Pravda, constantly emphasized the paramount importance of the scientific and technical management of military production. In a number of her editorials, she pointed out the need to do everything so that every engineer, technician, master could fully demonstrate his abilities, creative fire to provide the Red Army with everything necessary, directing all forces, knowledge, initiative to solve production problems, organize its uninterrupted work in

order to achieve victory over the enemy (Pravda, 1941a; Pravda, 1941b; Pravda, 1941c).

Of great importance for the mobilization of engineering and technical workers for the creation of coordinated military production were the decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, GKO, SNK of the USSR on improving the work of iron and steel enterprises, coal mines of Kuzbass adopted in the first year and a half of the war (Chernenko and Smirnyukov, 1968: 294-308). They identified the main measures for the preservation of qualified specialists: their redistribution between sectors in favor of defense enterprises, booking, etc. At the same time, a number of measures were outlined to improve the material and living conditions of technical specialists, increase wages, introduced premiums for the early completion of restoration work, and provided them with work rations.

Krasnoyarsk citizens learned about the beginning of the war on June 22, 1941 at 16 o'clock. Immediately at the enterprises and institutions, meetings of workers began, at which angry words were heard against the aggressor, the determination to fight until complete victory. At the shipyard, the master of the carpentry shop Mordasov at the rally expressed his desire to volunteer to go to the front. He said: "Our people will inflict a crushing blow to the enemy and prove their strength and stamina. Those remaining in the rear should exert all their strength and increase labor productivity" (Krasnoyarsk worker, 1941: 21-28). In total, during the years of the war, 35,343 Krasnoyarsk citizens submitted requests to be sent to the front (Filippov *et al.*, 2018: 397-405).

The Restructuring of Civilian Sectors of the Economy on Military Production

From the first days of the war, active agitation was carried out for increasing labor productivity. Employees of the enterprises assumed increased obligations from the first days of the war. Whereas before the outbreak of hostilities, labor productivity in the machine shop of the Krasnoyarsk Shipyard did not exceed 175%, in the first days of the war the change of the Dark Master performed tasks by 213%, and the master of Szabo – by 204%. The slogans with which the government of the country, the leadership of cities and enterprises are addressing the population, were aimed at the fastest transfer of enterprises to the production of military products, increasing their quality and volume. The Yenisei Pravda newspaper emphasized: "Victory is decided not only at the front, it is decided in the rear in factories." She urged to adopt the experience of the Yenisei sawmill, where "the masters are teaching the Stakhanov methods of labor in the forest industry" (Yenisei truth, 1941: 9-13).

For the restructuring of civilian sectors of the economy into military production, it was necessary to carry out a radical reconstruction of the technological process, introduce a new organization of labor, make more extensive use of production reserves, and find local materials and raw materials. Thus, the Krasnoyarsk Locomotive Repair Plant (LRP), along with the production of ordinary products, according to the Decree of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the order of the People's Commissar of Railways of September 27, 1941, switched to the production of 82-mm battalion mortars (BM-82), 122-mm fragmentation shell. In

addition to the release of weapons and ammunition, State Defense Committee (SDC) missions for the preparation of special trains – tank repair, sanitary, bath-laundry and road repair – were carried out here. But for this, there were not enough metal-cutting machines, materials, etc. The catastrophic situation was with electricity; the capacity of the factory CHP could not cope with the load.

He oldest master of the enterprise M.I. Chikirda suggested using a special trolley to remove the steam turbine cylinders. She drove up to the turbine, with the help of devices, the cylinders were removed by two workers instead of eight for repair. As a result, the efficiency of the power plant, and therefore the entire enterprise, has increased. This allowed the plant to manufacture 26 special defense trains over the plan for the first nine months of the war (Bykonya *et al.*, 2003: 128-137). There were no special bathtubs at the plant in which it was necessary to cool the armor plates with oil. A number of engineers, including craftsmen, received a proposal to use ordinary fuel barrels for this purpose. The introduction of the proposal allowed to increase the production of plates by 8 times. As a result, the plant produced 116 armor plates per day (Shevchenko, 2005: 74-80). On the initiative of the master of the electric welding workshop P. Osadchy, a carbide station was installed, having established the manufacture of previously imported carbide at the plant (Filippov *et al.*, 2018: 58-63). At the end of 1942, the military reconstruction of the Krasnoyarsk LRP was completely completed. By the beginning of 1943 there were already 20 workshops here, which made it possible to increase the output more than doubled from 1941. In total, during the war years, only special trains were produced at the LRP – 28.

Resolving Staff Shortages

In connection with mobilization to the front and a patriotic urge to defend the Fatherland, the problem of personnel, including masters, has become aggravated at enterprises of the region. In the Krasnoyarsk Territory, from June 22 to October 10, 1941, out of 12,646 industrial workers, 3,798 people were drafted into the army, in addition, 1,064 leading industrial workers (Puzevich and Volkova, 2012: 23-29). Party and Soviet bodies were looking for ways to mitigate this problem. One of the methods for solving it was the transfer of engineering from plant management to workshops. Thus, by November 1943, 36.3% of specialists worked in the plant management at Sibtyazhmash, and 63.7% worked in workshops. By January 1945, it was already 31.5% and 68.5% (SAKT. F. 1923). This process was also characteristic of other enterprises; as a result, one third of the specialists worked in plant management, 2/3 in workshops.

Among those who were transferred to the workshops were experienced engineers and technicians. In the workshops, they performed the functions of masters. Among them was N.I. Vasiliev, who worked in the planning department of Krasmach and went on to work as a foreman in the workshop in November 1942. Electrical engineer E.P. Filippov (Krasnoyarsk worker, 1942a: 8-11). In addition, retired specialists returned to production. So the shipyard went to work as a master D.I. Kozik, who had 45 years of work experience. He successfully ensured that tasks were completed on time (Patskevich, 1978: 94-105). In order to stimulate the return of old cadres, the government adopted the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

of July 28, 1941, "On the Retention of Pensions for Retirees Returning to Production" (Vlasov, 1942: 72-84).

Researchers studying the history of the working class during the war have noted a significant increase in the proportion of women in industrial workers. The replenishment of the ranks of engineers, including masters, from among women was insignificant. This is due to the fact that in the pre-war period, among the students of technical universities and vocational schools, men prevailed. Nominees, male practitioners, worked in the technical positions of the enterprises. In addition, enterprises in the heavy and defense sectors of the economy dominated in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, in which men were the majority of the work collective before the war. In the reports of the personnel department of the regional executive committee, replenishment of women in the composition of masters was noted on average from 16.8% in 1942 to 23.5% in 1944. It should be noted that the largest proportion of women among masters was in light industry enterprises. At the Spartak shoe factory, women predominated in the structure of the junior management team (about 80%) (SAKT. F.1386).

The problem of the cadres of production masters was also solved by the nomination of experienced workers to junior ITR positions. During the war years, nominees at the Krasnoyarsk Combine Plant averaged 61.2%, Sibtyazhmash – 71.3%, Krastyazhmash – 67.6%. The same situation was observed at other enterprises of the region (SAKT. F. P-26a). The nominees for the position of master became experienced workers who showed themselves to be good organizers and advanced workers. At the enterprises, the movements of "two hundred workers", "three hundred workers", "five hundred workers", front brigades, etc. were developed, the competitions among which helped the party, Soviet, trade union bodies to identify the most capable young people and increase their professional and social status. Thus, Bishutin, Matveev, Shandrov, Shmatkov, Shuvaev and others were transferred to the posts of masters and foremen. They established themselves as capable organizers of workers (SAKT. F. P-1474). At Krasnmash, 352 people became masters during the war years (The shield and sword..., 2002: 39-46).

A slightly different situation developed at the radio engineering plant, which was an experimental research enterprise that produced aircraft radio navigation equipment. In August 1941, 157 engineers and highly skilled workers arrived in Krasnoyarsk with a factory, among them there was not a single master. This team began to create the latest radio equipment on the premises of the Forest Engineering Institute – long-range car radio stations "Circle", radio "Mayak", radio beacons "Kolba", etc. It was made according to its own developed samples. Therefore, foremen from workshops and laboratories were nominated. By June 1945, there were already 40 of them. In terms of its development and contribution to military production, the plant has become one of the best factories in the electronics industry (SAKT. F. P-26b; Karlova, 2010: 18-26).

Creating a coherent military production has become possible not only through the restructuring of civilian enterprises. But also subject to the successful commissioning of factories, factories, and workshops relocated from the front line. The conditions of wartime required to restore and deploy the arrived equipment to its

full potential as soon as possible. Only on the right bank of the Yenisei in Krasnoyarsk, by November 1941, 25 evacuated plants were located. By this time, seven types of new defense products had been mastered, and another 8 types of weapons were under development (Voroshilova, 2010: 147-152). The development of new technological processes of production took place in the conditions of a sharp lack of not only skilled workers, but also craftsmen. The issues of the effective use of the cadres of technical specialists during the restoration did not leave the agenda of the meetings of the Party-Soviet and economic bodies.

Only in 1941, the questions of the location of evacuated enterprises, the solution of the personnel problem were discussed 23 times at joint meetings of the Krasnoyarsk regional party committee and regional executive committee (Kuznetsov, 1974: 63-69). They demanded that the workers, engineers, and craftsmen set up the technological process as soon as possible, it is better to use equipment, specialists, provide assistance in individual housing construction, for which the government allocated 100 million rubles in the first half of 1942 (Pravda, 1942). The Directorate, the party and trade union committees of the Krasny Profintern factory (Sibtyazhmash) held a series of meetings of production masters at which they carefully and personally examined the place of the craftsmen in the restoration of the factory's workshops and the establishment of military equipment production (SAKT. F. P-803). The master of the crane building workshop S.V. shared his experience in organizing the workplace. Golovlev, one of the first to arrive with evacuated equipment. This accelerated the assembly of steam locomotives of the Sergo Ordzhonikidze brand.

To participate in meetings of the regional and city party and business assets, where they considered the issues of the fastest recovery of evacuated enterprises, the masters of enterprises were widely involved. The region received 42 large enterprises from 20 western cities of the country. In order to start the production of military products, it was necessary to find local materials to replace severely deficient imported ones, effective forms of mobilizing workers for equipment installation, strengthen the economy, master production of new types of products, propagate the best practices. At a meeting in December 1941, it was proposed that the Krasny Profintern factory find a source material for the production of a front-line order. Many opinions were expressed, but the visiting experts did not know the resources of the territory well. The material was found by masters P. Kotikov and P. Pilyutin and the workers processed it in record time. The norm was fulfilled by 552%. This contributed to the implementation of the combat mission and the withdrawal of the plant from the breakthrough.

Training Workers during the War

The masters made a significant contribution during the war years to the training of workers. For example, in the industrial areas of Krasnoyarsk, 8 evacuated enterprises were located. The combined plant was assigned No. 4 and the name K.E. Voroshilov. Guns were the main, but not the only military products of the plant. It produced 52-M mortars, underwater mines, high-explosive and fragmentation bombs. Sometimes children had to collect these "toys". The fact is that more than 50% of the personnel replenishment of Krasnoyarsk fell on young people aged 13 to 22 years. Each master of

the plant was assigned 5-6 young workers. Senior master E.Ya. Zakharov taught 8-10 teenagers for whom he was both a mentor and a “father”. Subsequently, for the excellent work, he was awarded the honorary title “Honored Master of the Ministry”. Even the specialists who arrived with the evacuated enterprises could not solve the problem of the acute shortage of craftsmen, which in total was no more than 38% (Sineva, 2015: 32-37). But masters and skilled workers individually trained at least 85% of the workers’ enterprises (The shield and sword..., 2002: 11-16). Masters took care of their wards. I.A. Kochetygova, who during the war mastered the specialties of a turner, driller and milling machine operator, remembered how the master, seeing that she was simply falling from hunger, supplied her with two pieces of bread for three days. With this, he saved her life, and himself – from non-fulfillment of the task (Istratova, 2015: 362-368).

Masters were responsible for discipline in their area, it was controlled strictly military. Not allowed lateness and absenteeism. For 15 minutes late, it was a punishment – a deduction of twenty percent of earnings for six months. As P.E. Dmitrienko, who worked as an electrician in the Krasnash steel shop, recalled, there were times when a master stood up for a latecomer and fussed for him. But only one who worked well, did not commit violations, could count on this, and being late was an accidental misunderstanding (Anonymous, 1995: 21-26).

Thus, in the first period of the war, the masters of industry of the Krasnoyarsk Territory actively contributed to the restructuring of enterprises on a war footing and the restoration of evacuated factories in the region, the training of workers, and the transformation of the country into a single military camp. Since mid-1942, they faced the task of increasing the efficiency and steady growth of military production, the task of maximizing the growth of military output, primarily by improving the organization of labor, maximizing the use of available means of production, improving production equipment and technology, and deploying a struggle for the most complete use of reserves of growth of labor productivity. Of great importance was the participation of masters in the movement of rationalizers and inventors, in which they were both subject and object. That is, they themselves made proposals to improve the work of the workshop, enterprise, and facilitated the participation of their workers directly in this.

Masters of industrial enterprises of the region proposed measures to improve technological processes, ways to increase labor productivity and identify unused equipment. They carried out checks of the state of labor discipline and material and living conditions of work, helped to improve production processes, increase output with minimal labor and money. We searched for reserves of an organizational-technical nature and the introduction of a flow method. Instead of welding, riveting was used at the PVRZ at the initiative of the master Potylitsin, which made it possible for the mechanic Glushko to fulfill the norm by 543% (Krasnoyarsk worker, 1942b). Masters of production were constantly looking for better jobs and jobs, which led to savings and increased productivity. So at Krasnash master M.I. Kamyshev introduced the practice of a personal report of the worker for his work. This contributed to increasing personal responsibility for the implementation of factory tasks.

During the war years at the enterprises of the region, socialist competition among masters was widely developed. So, masters took an active part in this competition at the Krasmash plant. According to the results of December 1942, the rolling Red Banner was awarded to the team of the site of the senior master A. A. Denisov. Denisov was awarded a cash prize in the amount of 600 rubles, and for the award of distinguished work plots – 1000 rubles. The runner-up, master Makeev, received a cash prize of 400 rubles and 600 rubles for the best workers. The best masters were also awarded certificates of honor, coupons for industrial goods. Masters contributed to the Great Victory by participating in various forms of the patriotic movement. They were objects and subjects of the patriotic movement. Workshop masters were both participants and organizers of these folk initiatives. The most widespread was the movement to raise funds for the Defense Fund. So, with the active participation of the masters of Krasmash, the labor collective collected 1 million 100 thousand rubles for the construction of the tank column, for which the plant was awarded a telegram of thanks from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in early 1943 (Khazanov, 1990: 108-119).

Conclusions

Thus, the contribution of the masters of industrial enterprises of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, as well as of the whole country, to the Great Victory was significant. With their daily organizational work, active participation in the training of workers, the movement of inventors and rationalizers, and the organization of competition, they brought victory closer to the enemy. In difficult conditions of life and work, lack of personnel and hours of working hours, they quietly performed their feat to strengthen the state's defense shield for the benefit of ending the bloody war.

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THE STRUGGLE OF SOVIET REPRESSIVE AND PUNITIVE ORGANS AGAINST FORMER ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STRUCTURES IN UKRAINE (1944-1951)

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Abstract

The article is devoted to the disclosure of an unknown aspect – the work of the Soviet special services in the Romanian direction (1944-1951). The work in this field was to organize the identification of former employees of the Romanian special organs, agents and assistants who, after the retreat of the German-Romanian troops, escaped to the territory of Romania, and agents of the intelligence agencies of that state, which were transferred to the territory of the USSR before the German-Soviet war, and also left in the rear for reconnaissance and sabotage activities at the time of departure of the German-Romanian troops from Ukraine. The main role in this process was given to agents who implemented the most complex operational combinations of Soviet security forces. It has been established that the potentially dangerous Soviet system considered even those employees of the former Romanian special services who emigrated abroad so their search continued. In the first place, the cooperation of the security forces of the USSR and the Romanian People's Republic has been well established since the second half of the 1940's, leading to the effective search, development and arrest of former employees, agents and supporters of the Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies.

Key words: *the USSR, Romania, operational search activity, agents, special services*

Introduction

The work of special services has always attracted and will attract the attention of researchers and especially ordinary readers because of its secrecy. The question of the Romanian line of Soviet repressive and punitive bodies work after the end of the German-Soviet war remains poorly researched. In particular, the organization of work, the main forms and methods, the scale and effectiveness of the Romanian vector of the activities of Soviet security forces. Since a significant number of former agents, accomplices of the Romanian security forces remained on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, as well as a large number of people who served sentences for anti-Soviet activities, appeared guilty or legalized, or corresponded with their relatives abroad, they were subject to constant control. People who emigrated abroad were considered potentially dangerous and those from whom it was possible to receive a considerable amount of information. That is why the work of the Soviet authorities on the Romanian line extended to both Romania and countries with pro-communist regimes. In this context, the issue of realization of operational search and security

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measures by the Soviet authorities on the Romanian line in both the USSR and the territory of the Romanian People's Republic (hereinafter – RPR) remains relevant and not well-studied.

Analysis of recent research and publications

The problem of the Romanian direction of the Soviet repressive and punitive bodies' activities has not been properly studied in historiography. Separate functioning aspects of the Soviet bodies of state security during the Second World War were studied by V. Bykhov (Bykhov, 2000), D. Viedienieiev (Viedienieiev, 2011; Viedienieiev, 2014). Investigation of the operational search activity of the Soviet repressive and punitive bodies, various forms of using the agent and informational apparatus found its coverage in the general works of O. Bozhko, A. Chaikovskiy, A. Ivankov, D. Viedienieiev & O. Lysenko, T. Vronska & S. Liaskovska (Bozhko, 2001; Chaikovskiy, 2013; Ivankov, 2010; Viedienieiev, Lysenko, 2010; Vronska, Liaskovska, 2013). The operational search activity of some of the Ukrainian nationalists who were on the territory of the Romanian People's Republic was investigated by V. Ilnytskyi and V. Telvak (Ilnytskyi, Telvak, 2018).

Guidance of investigative activities

The Ukrainian SSR national security bodies organized their work on the Romanian line in the detection direction of the Romanian specialist bodies' former employees, agents and assistants who, after the retreat of the German-Romanian troops, escaped to the territory of Romania and agents of the Romanian intelligence agencies, which were transferred to the USSR territory before the German-Soviet war, as well as left behind in the rear for reconnaissance and sabotage activities at the time of the escape of German-Romanian troops from Ukraine.

The Soviet authorities, working on the detection, development and arrest of former employees, persons cooperating with the Romanian intelligence, took into account the agreements between the USSR and Romania on the transfer of all people who actively cooperated with the occupation administration. Accordingly, on the instructions of the People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR (NKGB), it was necessary to send an operational group to Romania for a period of 30 days in December 1944. It was faced with the task: 1) to detect and detain officials of the Romanian punitive organs operating in the temporarily occupied territory and carrying out repressive measures against Soviet citizens; 2) to establish and detain Soviet citizens who were active contributors to the Romanian-German invaders on the occupied territory (agents of intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, active supporters, traitors of the Soviet party's assets, etc.); 3) to appoint leaders of separate anti-Soviet organizations and groups operating in the occupied territory (SSA SSU, f. 11, case 370, v. 2, p. 101).

The mission of the operational team required preliminary preparatory work: 1) at all operational divisions of the 2nd department of the NKGB and other departments, it was collected data on individuals who had available material on their activities on the occupied territory with the estimated places of stay in Romania; 2) from the received materials selected persons who deserve priority operational attention and

withdrawal (the list of persons to be extracted separately was included in the plan); 3) the relevant documents for the entire composition of the task force were prepared, both for border crossing and for activities in the territory of Romania. The work of the operational group was carefully thought out, the plan was drawn up. The main points of arrival of the group were the cities of Galati and Braila, where the members of the group established contact with the relevant Soviet bodies stationed in these cities (commandant's office, "SMERSH" counterintelligence units, evacuation groups, forced evictions to Romania by Soviet citizens, etc.) (SSA SSU, f. 11, case 370, v. 2, p. 102). Through these structures, they clarified the situation and the possibility of addressing these issues to the relevant Romanian authorities. At the same time, due to the existing and newly appointed agency, measures to search those people who were interesting to the authorities in the cities were taken. The intelligence data was taken into account that the police authorities operating during the occupation period on the territory of Ukraine departed Romanian troops from retreat into various cities of Romania, and accordingly, in these cities with the task of finding out the further redeployment of these bodies and their individual workers, an operational group was evacuated. To activate and force the search of necessary individuals, route agents from local residents and persons who came from Ukraine were recruited and sent to various regions of Romania for search. In order to keep those arrested people waiting for a further transfer to the territory of Ukraine, the appropriate Soviet commandants' offices were used. The removal of suspects and the recruitment of search agents by the operational group were sanctioned without the consent of the center by the heads of the region of the NKGB of Ukraine (SSA SSU, f. 11, case 370, v. 2, p. 103). For the movement of the operational group and the stationing of detainees at the disposal of the operational group's head, one closed truck with an appropriate fuel reserve was allocated. For operational expenses (recruiting route and search agents, maintenance of detainees) and other needs, 15,000 rubles were allocated (SSA SSU, f. 11, case 370, v. 2, p. 104).

The work on the Romanian line on the territory of Ukraine was regulated by the order of the MGB (Ministry of State Security) of the USSR No. 0048. According to it, in the organization of counterintelligence work on the Romanian line of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, an attention was first of all drawn to the identification of the agents of the Anglo-American intelligence agencies, which used pre-war agency of Romania against the USSR. In practical work with the agency, active combined measures were taken to detect the operating agency, to intercept the channels of foreign intelligence communications. In order to intensify agency and operational work on the Romanian line, it was recommended: 1. To strengthen the work of detecting and analyzing the links between former "SSI" officials, Sigurants, sections of the 2-N Romanian General Staff, Gendarmerie and other Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, as well as foreign consulates and firms that were previously stationed on the territory of the Chernivtsi region. From this category of persons, it was recommended to recruit agents who would have had the opportunity to deeply develop this contingent, as well as which could be provided to intelligence centers. 2. To organize counterintelligence work among the members of the former political parties of Romania to identify channels of communication with radical groups

in Romania, the Anglo-American occupation zone of Germany or Austria. Among the authorities of the above parties, it was necessary to obtain an agent capable of detecting and actively developing persons suspected of belonging to Romanian agents and other foreign intelligence. 3. To create a qualified agent apparatus on the Romanian line, with the help of which to replenish and actively develop existing operational records. To recruit the necessary number of agents among immigrants who came from Romania, persons of Romanian nationality living on the territory of the region; with the help of this agent, to examine and test the basis for the identification of persons suspected of dealing with foreign intelligence. 4. Among the available operational records, to identify the most promising agent development for persons suspected of espionage and to develop a combination of measures to intercept channels of communication with foreign intelligence. 5. To collect the necessary number of route agents from the existing agent and through new recruits, who were rationally used in the regions, practicing their sending to the district bodies. 6. On the issues of operational accounting, which were under the control of the 2nd department of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, to fulfill previously developed plans and instructions. 7. Given that the existing base on the Romanian line could be a ground for Anglo-American intelligence, this focus was of particular importance with the allocation of skilled operational staff of the second department. 8. To strengthen assistance to peripheral district bodies on the Romanian line; because of this the department leadership departure to the periphery was more often practiced, providing them with practical assistance in the development and implementation of combined actions on specific cases (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 236-237; case 253, p. 33-34).

Numerous contacts of foreign consulates, various firms, which were stationed earlier on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, were taken into an active development (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 144). Particular attention was also paid to the identification and intensification of the development of individuals suspected of belonging to the re-entry operation and the establishment of illegal channels of relations with Romania (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 145). In particular, in the practical work of the Soviet security forces, the impressions of the detained former employees of the Romanian special organs were substantially assisted. For example, in his confessions, M. Kochubei-Arhyr named the agents and former intelligence officers who were in the service of English and French intelligence. Accordingly, the security forces began searching for these persons: they targeted special agents of the USSR on the agents and officials of the former Romanian intelligence agencies from the citizens of the USSR, which were in the evidence of M. Kochubei and, according to available information, were at that time in Romania or other countries with pro-communist regimes (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 371, p. 476). At the same time, the work was carried out to identify the links of these individuals on the territory of the USSR. And, depending on the data obtained on these people from abroad, measures to use their connections were developed in active counterintelligence combinations. At the same time, in each individual case, the issues of such individuals transfer to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR for the determination of their belonging to the British or French intelligence were carried out.

Practical implementation of the instructions

During the search of the “SSI” agents, security officers actively used their own agents, directing them to identify the family and other ties of wanted individuals, as well as to establish the most wanted “criminals”. Only the Romanian intelligence, counterintelligence and punitive organs were stationed in the occupied territory of the Ukrainian SSR. They did not have schools or courses where training was provided and skilled personnel were trained. In this regard, the Soviet authorities did not have a recognizable agent from this contingent, which complicated the work of the search. The basis for the increase in the number of search and detention cases for the agent of the Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, Ukrainian Ministry of State Security had available materials for persons involved in the agency of these bodies. In addition, agent materials and demonstrations of arrested and disassociated agents of Romanian intelligence were actively used. The agent informative apparatus, mainly, expanded at the expense of ex-fellow residents of official employees and active staff agents, as well as the staff of intelligence and counterintelligence agencies (employees of various institutions of invaders, technicians, etc.) (SSA SSU, f. 2, case 1632, p. 84, 87). In particular, as bases for the reversal of the counterintelligence work of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR organs on the Romanian line in Ukraine, mainly in its southern regions, it was stated: 49 Romanian citizens (Romanian students), 230 stateless persons, former Romanian citizens, approximately 13,000 individuals of Romanian nationality, which had families and other ties in Romania, 38,000 repatriated ones from Romania, 1,012 immigrants from Romania arrived to the USSR in order of option, 4,400 former members of various Romanian political parties. In addition, 5,400 Romanian accomplices and individuals suspected of having links to Romanian intelligence agencies were found and taken into account (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 95, p. 8).

Odessa region caused the most anxiety in the Romanian direction of work of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR. On its territory (as of July 10, 1949), there were 30 foreigners and stateless people from among the Romanians, a large number of returnees from Romania, more than 1,000 people, who maintained written communications with relatives and other persons living in Romania. In addition, various Romanian delegations visited Odessa, as one of the largest, industrial and cultural cities of Ukraine; 9 Romanian students studied in Odessa higher education institutions, and the Romanian demarcation commission of 43 people worked in the region for more than 3 months. A large number of foreign ships arrived in the seaport of Odessa, through which the crew members carried an illegal connection with the overseas. In addition, the Ukrainian MGB had a large number of pre-war archival materials on the activities of Romanian intelligence agencies in the region. Despite this, having such a broad base on the Romanian line, according to the republican leadership, it was noted that the counterintelligence work on the detection of Romanian specialist agents and other foreign intelligence operating through Romania by the 2nd department of the Ukrainian MGB was poorly organized. Since paying attention to the accumulation of operational records, at the same time, active agency activities were carried out by the 2nd department only on a case-by-case basis; the majority of case forms were carried out ineffectively (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 255, p. 125).

The security forces of the Ukrainian MGB of Odessa region on the Romanian line (on October 4, 1949) conducted: 6 agent cases for 22 persons, 481 form cases, 265 preliminary intelligence works, 43 accounting and supervision cases, 261 detention and investigation cases (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 255, p. 74). At the same time, 5 Romanian subjects, 12 stateless persons (former Romanians), 2,034 persons who had correspondence with Romania, and a small number of Soviet citizens repatriated from Romania in 1945-1946, were counted in the territory of Odessa region (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 255, p. 72-73). According to the cases in the proceedings of the Ukrainian MGB, there were 6 agent cases and 480 cases during the first half of 1949, 2 persons were arrested on the Romanian line. At the control of the 2nd department of the Ukrainian MGB, there were three cases – “Contact”, “Ochakovska”, and “Hrek”. At the same time since May 1946, the development of the case “Contact” was futile. Six repatriates were suspected of involvement in foreign intelligence agents (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 255, p. 126).

The situation in the Ukrainian MGB of Odessa region changed to some extent as of December 25, 1950. In particular, 789 people were trained on the “agents of the countries of the East, Europe and the White Guard units” line. There were: 7/23 persons for agent cases, 650 people for form cases, 116 – accounting and supervision cases (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 255, p. 167). According to the Romanian line: 3/1 agent cases, 531 form cases (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 255, p. 168). Accordingly, as of April 25, 1951, the Ukrainian MGB of Odessa region on this line they were developed: for agent cases – 3/9 people, 621 form cases, 116 for accounting and supervision cases (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 255, p. 130). According to the Romanian line: 2/6 agent cases, 538 form cases (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 255, p. 131). A similar report was drawn up on December 25, 1951. The Ukrainian MGB of Odessa region testifies to the monitoring of 762 people. Among them: 3/9 persons on agent cases, 633 form cases, 120 accounting and supervision cases (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 255, p. 171). According to the Romanian line: 2/6 agent cases, 547 form cases (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 255, p. 172).

From April to June 10, 1944, on suspicion of belonging to the Romanian counterintelligence agencies, participants were arrested in Odessa region: Sigurants in the region – 58, including Odessa – 43, respectively, the gendarmerie – 155/13, “SSI” – 18/14. Totally in the region – 231, including Odessa – 70. At the same time, 16 agents, 10 of which were recruited, were used for the search and detection of official employees, as well as their agents (SSA SSU, f. 11, case 370, v. 1, p. 47). After the liberation of Odessa and Odessa region from the German-Romanian troops, the NKGB of Ukraine detected and recorded: 95 official employees of “Vulturul”, “SSI” Center-3 and its subordinate residents, 27 personnel of these bodies (drivers, cleaners, dining staff etc.). Of the total number of detected and accounted official employees of the “SSI”, 17 people were arrested (4 of them by the NKGB authorities, 13 by “SMERSH” (out of which 5 were transferred to the NKGB bodies) (SSA SSU, f. 11, case 370, v. 1, p. 48).

From April 10 to September 6, 1945, the Ukrainian NKGB of Odessa region revealed 228 agents and informants of the Romanian “SSI” intelligence and counterintelligence agency. They were arrested: 72 by the NKGB bodies (in 1944 – 53 persons, 1945 – 19), 6 people by the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs

(NKVD), 29 by “SMERSH”, but still 121 were sought (SSA SSU, f. 11, case 370, v. 1, p. 52). Instead, by June 20, 1949, the Ukrainian MGB of Odessa region had detected 932 agents and informants of the Romanian “SSI” intelligence and counterintelligence agency (498 people in 1944, 110 in 1945, 61 in 1946, 30 in 1947, 24 in 1948, 6 in 1949) (SSA SSU, f. 2, case 1632, p. 75). At the same time, for the search of the agents of the Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies in Odessa region, the Soviet authorities used an agent and informational apparatus of 256 people (36 agents, 215 secret informants, and 5 residents) (SSA SSU, f. 2, case 1632, p. 84). From the moment of release of Odessa and Odessa region until September 15, 1945, the Ukrainian NKGB arrested: 36 official employees of Sigurants and police, 233 police officers (only in 1944), 169 Sigurants agents, and 128 police agents. They were arrested in 1945: 13 official Sigurants and police officers, 18 Sigurants agents, 9 police agents (SSA SSU, f. 11, case 370, v. 2, p. 108).

The intensive work was carried out by the Ukrainian MGB of Chernivtsi region to identify former members of the Romanian political parties. In particular, as of October 20, 1949, 1,728 former members of the pro-Fascist organization “Kuzi”, 937 liberals, 615 National Peasant’s Party members and 59 members of the National Renaissance Front (FRN) were counted (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 7, 99). This record increased as of May 20, 1950: 1,743 former members of the “Kuzi”, 951 liberals, 627 National Peasant’s Party members, and 56 members of the FRN. For the completeness of the operational basis of counterintelligence work on the lines of the 2nd division of the 2nd department of the Ukrainian MGB it was noted that in Chernivtsi region at that time (May 20, 1950) there lived 16 families of Chinese re-emigrants, 8 families of re-emigrants from France, 711 Ukrainians who arrived in order of resettlement from Romania, 89 former foreign nationals (stateless persons), 6 people were granted Soviet citizenship, one person – Hungarian, 4 individuals were visiting the Romanian embassy in Moscow and approximately 10,000 returnees from Romania and 20 returnees from Yugoslavia (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 99). In 1940 and 1944, a large number of anti-Soviet-minded people came from Chernivtsi region to Romania, leaving relatives in the territory with whom they continued to support legal and illegal written communications. In total, the law enforcement authorities accounted 5,522 persons (the same number remained until May 20, 1950), which had correspondence with Romania, as well as numerous written communications with other countries (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 7, 99).

As of November 24, 1950, there were 13,000 Romanians living in Chernivtsi region, more than 3,000 former members of various Romanian political parties, about 10,000 Romanians residing in Romania, 712 Ukrainians who came from Romania by option; it was found a large number of people who had correspondence with Romania. In the presence of such a base in the proceedings of the Ukrainian MGB there were only two agent cases and 183 form cases (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 234). At the same time, the agent apparatus of the Ukrainian MGB of Chernivtsi region, which was used in the work on Romanian, Polish lines, Chinese re-emigrants and former members of the Romanian political parties, consisted of 478 people. The Romanian line used 28 agents and 370 informants, regarding re-emigrants from China, re-emigrants from France and the Polish line they used 7 agents, and 30 informants to

monitor former members of the Romanian political parties 43 secret employees were used (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 11, 101, 234). At the same time in the proceedings of the Ukrainian MGB of Chernivtsi region (August 1950), there were 2 agent cases and 169 form cases. The Central Office considered the level of counterintelligence work of the Ukrainian MGB of Chernivtsi region to be inadequate on the Romanian line. They named, first of all, the weakness of the agent apparatus (28 agents and 379 informants) and the weak organization of its use (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 144).

Criticism from the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR was heard and the work was intensified. Therefore, 4 divisions of the 2nd department of the Ukrainian MGB in Chernivtsi region (October 1950) began to monitor: agents of the former Romanian intelligence (8 form cases, 4 accounting and supervisory cases, 4 preliminary intelligence works), agents of the former Romanian counterintelligence (4 form cases, 3 accounting and supervisory cases, 7 preliminary intelligence works), Japanese intelligence agents (1 form case), Chinese re-emigrants (6 form cases, 2 accounting and supervisory cases, 4 preliminary intelligence works), spies (2 form cases), 5 preliminary intelligence works), former members of the Polish Consulate (1 form case), former members of political parties, collaborators and traitors (43 form cases, 37 accounting and supervisory cases, 1 preliminary intelligence work). Thus, 65 form case, 37 accounting and supervision cases, and 1 preliminary intelligence work (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 185-186).

In the proceedings of the 1st department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (MVS of Ukraine) and MVS District Department of Chernivtsi region for foreign intelligence agents (as of September 25, 1951) there were 384 cases of prosecution, of them there were declared in the all-union search – 120 cases, local – 264 cases; of them in the Romanian line: 36 cases of prosecution, which were in the proceedings of the 1st department, 70 cases of prosecution, which were under investigation by the MVS District Department, 4 duplicates, 110 in total (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 385, p. 19).

As a result of carrying out operational search activity on the above-mentioned operational base study and the detection of an anti-Soviet element among it, from March 29, 1944 to May 20, 1950, the Ukrainian MGB arrested 833 people in Chernivtsi region, including: 64 Romanian intelligence agents, 3 Polish intelligence agents, 3 Japanese intelligence agents, 51 people for treacherous intentions, 95 for the illegal border crossing, 617 traitors, assistants, informants and other informers of Romanian punitive bodies. Among them, they were arrested between September 1949 and May 20, 1950 – 6 agents of Romanian intelligence, 3 agents of Japanese intelligence, 1 Chinese re-emigrant, 38 informants, accomplices and former members of the Romanian political party (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 100). Among them in 1950 2 agents of Japanese intelligence, 1 Chinese playmate, 3 Romanian intelligence agents, 16 informants, assistants and former members of Romanian political parties were arrested (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 100). As of May 20, 1950, there were 314 people on operational records of the 2nd department of the Ukrainian MGB and peripheral organs, which were monitored on suspicion of belonging to a foreign intelligence agency (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 100).

During 1949 – May 1950, officers of the 2nd division of 2 departments of the Ukrainian MGB discovered and processed trophy documents of the Romanian counterintelligence agencies in the regional state archives. In particular, the originals of the documents of the Romanian counterintelligence with the correspondence of the agent, which received remuneration for work, were discovered. In this way more than 700 people have been identified who collaborated with Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. Of them in 1949-1950 on the territory of Chernivtsi region, 47 persons were found and taken into an official examination, and 8 people were arrested (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 102).

In August 1950, it was recommended to replenish the agent apparatus by recruiting some authoritative figures of Romanian nationality, prominent members of the former Romanian political parties, settlers, and others. In practical work with the agent, active combined measures were taken to expose the operating agency, to intercept the channels of foreign intelligence communications, and to introduce the checked-up agent's intelligence to the centers. In the process of exploring the operational base, as well as developing existing accounts on the Romanian line, particular attention was paid to the work of members of former political parties, the identification of communication channels of such persons with anti-communist circles in Romania and in the Anglo-American occupation zone. Many contacts of foreign consulates and various companies, which were stationed earlier in Ukraine, were established and actively monitored. The active monitoring was carried out for the officers of the former Romanian army, especially those who returned from the Anglo-American zone of Germany (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 144).

The Republican leadership of the repressive and punitive organs was seriously disturbed by 123 families of immigrants with a population of 534 (adults from 16 years old and above – 300, children under 16 – 234) who arrived to Kherson region from Romania (on October 15, 1947). All the settlers were born in Romania, of which: 444 Russians, 89 Ukrainians, 1 Bulgarian. In particular, Lieutenant Colonel Kukes (July 1949), deputy head of the 3rd division of the 2nd department of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, wrote a report on the Romanian line in the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR of Kherson region, emphasizing that a significant number of returnees conducted correspondence with the inhabitants of Romania. At the same time, the “Bessarabians Society” operated in Kherson region before the German-Soviet war, which he believed was used by Romanian intelligence for anti-Soviet work. That's why Kukes stressed on the relevance of the Romanian line for the Ukrainian MGB of Kherson region and reproached to the absence of work. He emphasized that in operational proceedings on this line, only 5 form cases were considered in the Ukrainian MGB, the operational base was not studied, no data was collected on the activities of the “SSI”, “Vulturul” intelligence teams stationed in the territory of the region during the war, and the surnames of official staff of this body were not found out (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 253, p. 33-34).

On the Romanian line, intensive work continued in the Ukrainian MGB of Kharkiv region. Thus, according to the archival materials of the control and supervision proceedings in Kharkiv (as of May 5, 1947) and other districts of the region, 34 people were counted, including 13 Romanian defectors, 11 people were

shown as agents of the Romanian intelligence agencies, 4 former Trotskyites from Bessarabia, 2 Romanian subjects, 4 people without citizenship, former Romanian subjects. At the same time, according to operational records there were 2 form cases, 2 intelligence search cases. However, there was no operating agent. In addition, in the archive of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, there were duplicates of personal cases for 3 agents, which were sent to the territory of Bessarabia with special tasks. This situation gave grounds for the leadership of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR to conclude that there was no operational search activity on the Romanian line of the Ukrainian MGB of Kharkiv region (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 254, p. 23-24). Of course, criticism did not go in vain and as of December 1, 1953, in the MVS of Ukraine of Kharkiv region, there were 566 cases of investigation in the proceedings. Of them: in 1 department of the MVS of Ukraine – 479 cases, district bodies of the MVS – 87 cases. Among them there were on a Romanian line: in one department there were 3, in the district bodies – 1 (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 385, p. 175).

From March to August 1, 1944, 172 Romanian agents and active supporters were arrested in Mykolaiv region. Among them there were: 1 Romanian intelligence “Vulturul” agent, 22 gendarmerie agents and Sigurants, 1 Sigurants resident, 1 Deputy Head of the Gendarmerie Division, 35 Governor and Community Governors, 3 OUN members, 62 traitors, 27 traitors of the Motherland and assistants of the German-Romanian administration, 20 of another anti-Soviet element (SSA SSU, f. 11, case 370, v. 2, p. 68). As of October 1, 1944, with the help of the measures taken by the NKGB of Ukraine of Mykolaiv region, 36 persons from official employees and agents of the Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies were found and arrested (SSA SSU, f. 11, case 370, v. 2, p. 53). As a result of carrying out the operational search activities and investigative measures (as of April 12, 1947), the Ukrainian MGB revealed 37 official Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence officials and 48 agents of the Romanian “SSI” – “Vulturul” intelligence agency. One official officer and 14 agents were arrested. Another 70 people were wanted (SSA SSU, f. 2, case 1632, p. 155-155^{3B}; f. 11, case 370, v. 1, p. 151).

The work on the Romanian line at the Ukrainian MGB in Izmail region continued. Thus, as of February 1950, the operational base for this vector consisted of 12 form cases, 22 intelligence search cases, 1 accounting and supervisory case. As a result of these cases realization, 2 agents of Sigurants, 5 traitors were arrested (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 95, p. 57). Instead, in May and June 1950 in the Izmail region, 28 form cases, 17 accounting and supervisory cases, and 6 intelligence search cases were opened on the Romanian line. Two agents, 11 informants were recruited on this line. During this period, 45 agents of the former Romanian counterintelligence agencies, traitors and supporters of the Romanian administration, as well as members of Romanian political parties were arrested (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 95, p. 125).

Despite the productive work, at first glance, the top management of the MGB noted a poor work on the Romanian line and determined the main drawback: insufficient quantitative and unsatisfactory quality of the agent informational network. Since the existing agent and informational apparatus was not able to fully ensure the development of detected links of wanted individuals, that is why the task was to

obtain a prospective search agent in general, and the target agent to develop the links of wanted individuals (SSA SSU, f. 2, case 1632, p. 88).

Among the most prominent arrested former officials and agents of the Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence authorities, there were L. Perzh, Dobroshynskyi, Ostroviana, «Oroviana», Khiruvymov, Zelenyi-Zeliana, Zhan Hendel, Spyro Fotia, Sherstiuk (Aleksandrov); all of them were arrested and detained (SSA SSU, f. 2, case 1632, p. 75). In addition, the following people were arrested: the chief resident of the Center-3 of the “SSI” Demetriade (October 1948), the head of the “SSI” group for servicing the port of Odessa and its adjoining district Oleksandr Sherstiuk, “SSI” staff researcher Anton Fedorovych, Romanian intelligence agent Mykola Magelat, “SSI” agent Tamara Myropolska, “SSI” official officer Ion Mitulescu (SSA SSU, f. 2, case 1632, p. 77-84). So, on October 15, 1948, Leon Perzhu was arrested on Romanian territory and transferred to the USSR. During November 1941 – January 1942, he served as a chief of training unit of the 11th infantry regiment, 21st Romanian infantry division, and participated in battles against parts of the Soviet Army. In January 1942, L. Perzhu was sent from the army to the disposal of “SSI”, where he was trained in intelligence and counterintelligence work until April 1942. After passing the training course, L. Perzhu was appointed the head of the “SSI” Chernivtsi Center, whose work he managed until November 1942, and then transferred to the head of the “SSI” Odessa Center-3. L. Perzhu headed this Center in Odessa until April 1944. Being the head of the “SSI” Center-3, according to his personal orders, about 200 Soviet citizens were arrested, including 16 leading employees of Odessa underground Obkom of Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine (KP(B)U) and 2 Soviet intelligence officers (SSA SSU, f. 2, case 1632, p. 76).

The arrest of M. Halushkin was called as a special achievement by the Soviet armed forces. Thus, on May 26, 1953, Lieutenant General Milshtein, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, wrote to Lieutenant General P. Fedotov, the Deputy Head of the 1st Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, that in the 1920-1930's French intelligence led an active spy work against the USSR from the territory of the former Northern Bukovina. Basically, the French intelligence service against the USSR in northern Bukovina was headed by a representative of the French Consulate in Chernivtsi I. Honorat, who extracted intelligence information about the USSR through the Romanian intelligence apparatus. It was established that the direct organizer of the spy activity against the USSR during this period was an official employee of the Romanian intelligence “SSI” – Mykola Halushkin, who used the aliases Argyr, Kolesnykov, Kochubei, Ovsiienko and Volkhovskiy, and at the same time he was the assistant to I. Honorat on recruiting and sending agents to the territory of the USSR. According to the task of I. Honorat, M. Kochubei created a number of transshipment points in a number of settlements of Chernivtsi, Ternopil and Kamianets-Podilskyi regions (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 372, p. 90, 92). After the accession of Northern Bukovina to the Ukrainian SSR in 1940, the agent who was in contact with M. Halushkin was arrested and dispersed, however, due to the beginning of the German-Soviet war, much of it remained unidentified. For example, the MVS of Ukraine of Chernivtsi region identified more than 20 people who had ties with M. Halushkin in the past (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 372, p. 91).

More detailed biographical information about Captain M. Halushkin was obtained from the Soviet authorities from the testimony of arrested official employees and agents of the “SSI”. In particular, they learned that he was in the rank of ensign serving in the royal army. During the revolution, he emigrated to Romania, and then lived in the city of Chisinau, where he joined the Romanian authorities and was engaged in reconnaissance work against the USSR (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 372, p. 98). In 1941, M. Halushkin, together with a group of employees of the “SSI”, was sent to the front. During this period, he interrogated prisoners of war and transferred agents to the rear of the Soviet Army. M. Halushkin was appointed the Deputy Head of the counterintelligence agency “SSI” of the Center-3 in Odessa, and in this position he worked until the departure of the German-Romanian troops (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 372, p. 99).

Arrested official officer of the “SSI” Sherstiuk, testified against M. Halushkin, “...In the absence of Perzh (head of the Center-3), M. Halushkin headed the leadership of all the agency’s employees and was informed about all its work. In addition to the leadership of a group of employees, M. Halushkin had a resident and agent of Soviet citizens in the city. Very few people knew about his work, because he worked in secret and without assistants...” That is why most of the arrested official employees of the “SSI” could not name all the agents who were in contact with M. Halushkin. It was reliably found out that he was in touch with the agents of Pustovoitov (the Head of Odessa department of the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS)), Kozlovskiy (emissary of the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS)), Lisovskiy (the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)), etc., however, about the activities of anti-Soviet organizations “ROVS”, “NTS” and “OUN” M. Halushkin did not give any impressions and did not name participants who were familiar to him (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 372, p. 100). Before departure of the Romanian administration from Odessa, M. Halushkin prepared and left an agent on the liberated territory, which was not discovered by the Soviet security forces. Being on the territory of Romania after escaping from Odessa, he was also engaged in recruiting and sending agents to the territory of the USSR. In addition, the staff agents of the Romanian counterintelligence Kalynovskiy, Kramarenko and Burtyshev, who were arrested, accused M. Halushkin of being an agent of English intelligence. So, sentenced to the supreme measure of punishment, Kramarenko, on interrogation on June 12, 1945, testified, “... I had to have some frank conversations personally with Captain Argyr, in which he hinted me, in the language, so to say, of the intelligence, and he revealed that he (Argyr) was a coincidence person in Romanian intelligence and, approximately since 1925, was in the service of English intelligence ...” (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 372, p. 101). From these same sources, the Soviet security forces argued that during the occupation of Odessa there were English local population agents; their connection was made through a bunch of English intelligence that periodically visited Odessa.

In a separate search case of M. Halushkin (Kochubei-Argyr) (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 369, p. 369), a list of compromised people is provided. In particular, under the investigation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, he named 151 official officers and agents of former Romanian intelligence agencies, 16 English, 11 French and 3 Polish intelligence agencies. The counterintelligence agencies “SMERSH”, the

MVS of Ukraine of Odessa region, as well as other authorities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and public safety bodies of Romania specified the number of arrested people, mainly in the period from 1944 to 1950 – 44 individuals, 10 people were liquidated and died, 15 were previously declared wanted, 1 was found, 111 people were searched (among them – 70 official staff, who mostly fled abroad when the German-Romanian troops retreated from the territory of Ukraine) (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 370, p. 17; case 371, p. 314, 475). Some of the agents mentioned by the former Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies were arrested and sentenced, some of them continued to be monitored by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In order to detect and disclose the French and English intelligence agents who settled on the territory of Ukraine, they requested to detainee (July 5, 1951) M. Halushkin to the MVS of the Ukrainian SSR whether to authorize the sending to Romania of an operative officer of the MVS of the Ukrainian SSR for his thorough interrogation on important issues. However, as of May 22, 1953, the request was not satisfied (SSA SSU, f. 1, case. 372, p. 93, 102).

Work with detected documents

A separate direction on the Romanian line in the Ukrainian MGB areas was assigned to work with trophy documents. Thus, the Ukrainian MGB of Odessa region possessed a large number of trophy documents for former agents of the Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, accomplices, and others compromised by their ties with the German-Romanian administration (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 255, p. 72-73). The Soviet security forces captured the documentation of Odessa center of the Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agency “SSI”, the gendarmerie and the police, as well as the reports photocopy of the agents of these bodies and applications, which were sponsored by the inhabitants of Odessa. The materials immediately began to be processed and used during counterintelligence work on the Romanian line (documents of 500 sheets and 365 photocopies). After receiving these documents, it was recommended, first of all, to organize the registration of the persons who took them, to take measures for the identification of these persons in the territory of Odessa region, and those who were not identified, if there were serious compromising materials on them – to declare wanted. District departments of the MGB of Odessa considered it necessary to involve in the study of trophy documents and the identification of persons who were stated there. The trophy documents of the Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies could also be used as a basis for recruiting among the layers of the population necessary for the operational use (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 255, p. 37).

The agent cases, particularly important for operative use (for 1941-1944) were taken from Romanian Sigurants by the Soviet authorities. In addition, they specially compiled and quickly used the list of Ukrainians who went to Romania after the arrival of the Soviet administration to Bukovina and Bessarabia, the list of Ukrainian leaders who remained in Bukovina and Bessarabia, the list of Ukrainians who fled from the USSR to Germany, the list of Ukrainians who fled to Galicia, a list of Ukrainians convicted in Iasi, a list of Ukrainians from Bukovina and Bessarabia, transferred to the military court in Chernivtsi for nationalist propaganda, storage of

weapons and assemblies, documents of the Center-1 on the disclosure of the underground organizations of the OUN in the territory of Bukovina was called and developed by their personnel, a list of OUN leaders who lived in Bukovina during the Romanian occupation, lists of agents of the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of the enemy, members of anti-Soviet formations, “active traitors” and accomplices of the invaders who fled to the territory of Romania and Bulgaria (SSA SSU, f. 13, case 313, 87 p.; v. 2, 35 p.; v. 3, 87 p.; v. 4, 34 p.; v. 5, 34 p.; f. 2, case 142, 462 p.), persons who were reported to belong to an agent of the Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies (December 1950) (SSA SSU, f. 13, case 311, 21 p.), lists of convicted OUN members, the lists of OUN members who fled from the USSR to Germany, the lists of convicts sentenced by the Romanian Military Court in Chernivtsi, lists of leaders and trustees of the “Ukrainian National Party”, lists of Ukrainian nationalists who were in the sports associations “Zalizniak” and “Samostiunist”, the history of the nationalist movement deployment, the instructions for the organization of the Sigurants commissariats and police departments (SSA SSU, f. 11, case 1427, v. 1, 289 p.), the lists of persons associated with the Romanian intelligence agencies (according to the data of the 5th division of the 3rd department of the Ukrainian NKVD) (SSA SSU, f. 13, case 311, 21 p.; case 312, 149 p.), former members of the party and the Iron Guard (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 256, p. 158-161), prepared information and analytical reports on the emergence and functioning of the national-czarist party in Romania (SSA SSU, f. 11, case 370, p. 3-6), political parties and organizations that existed in Romania (SSA SSU, f. 11, case 370, v. 3, p. 7-6). In accordance with these documents, the Soviet repressive and punitive bodies conducted searches and monitoring of all persons mentioned in these lists.

In addition, it was compiled the collection on the materials of the 5th Special Squad of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR. The collection included persons who worked directly in the German intelligence agencies, their agents and the residence, transferred or prepared for transfer to the territory of the Ukrainian SSR and to Romania (SSA SSU, f. 13, case 308, p. 1).

In addition, operational lists of agents of former Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies operating on the territory of the USSR until 1941 were sent for operational use to the 2nd department of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR by the First Directorate of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (SSA SSU, f. 13, case 307, p. 1-17, 58-85, 86-88, 111-249; case 370, v. 1, p. 62-110). Separately, the lists of agents operating on the territory of Chernivtsi region, as well as the operational records of some of these agents, compiled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Romanian People's Republic, were compiled by the 2nd Head Office of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR (SSA SSU, f. 13, case 307, p. 18-22). While working on the Romanian line, law enforcement authorities made lists of persons who illegally crossed the state border from the USSR to Romania during the period of 1918-1941 (SSA SSU, f. 13, case 307, p. 30-57). Some cases were created with translations of the “SSI” original documents, which included, among other things, the financial statements of the residences, as well as the salary report of the resident agents (SSA SSU, f. 1, case 368, 320 p.).

On the basis of the collected documents, there were lists of all Romanians who committed crimes: shootings of Soviet citizens, atrocities, threats to the population, robbery, destruction, removal of equipment, valuables, products, animals to Romania, etc. These lists displayed the maximum of biographical information that they possessed, indicating the essence, time and place of the commission of crimes by each of them (SSA SSU, f. 13, case 306, v. 1, p. 1). Relevant certificates/lists were formed in Mykolaiv, Chernivtsi, Odessa, Vinnytsia, and Izmail regions (SSA SSU, f. 13, case 306, v. 1, p. 9-65; v. 3, 55 p.; v. 7, 55 p.; v. 2, 13 p.; v. 4, 21 p.; v. 5, 13 p.; v. 6, p. 21).

The conclusions

Thus, after the victory in the Second World War and the expulsion of the German and Romanian occupiers, one of the tasks facing the Soviet special organs was the Romanian vector: the work of detecting, tracing and arresting all those who worked and cooperated with the Romanian administration on the territory of Ukraine. At the same time, searches were carried out not only in the territory of the USSR, but also in all countries with pro-communist regimes. Of course, this direction of work succeeded to implement due to well-established cooperation between the security forces of the USSR and other countries, which was a success. The Soviet authorities were concerned not only with the cooperation of detected persons with the Romanian special authorities during the Second World War, but also the potential for their use by the intelligence agencies of England, France, and others. That is why the work of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR was based on the need to clear from Romanian agents, first of all, the territory of the southern regions of Ukraine, who during the occupation were part of Transnistria (Odessa, Mykolaiv, Izmail, Vinnytsia and part of Kherson regions) and to identify all official employees of the Romanian security forces. However, an important element of the implementation of this work was the comprehensive use of agents. And even despite the significant operational successes of the workers of the regional departments of the MDB, the republican leadership constantly condemned the weakness of work in this direction. Practically this work was implemented according to the worked out schemes: recruiting agents, forming agents and investigating cases, making directories with biographical information of agents, searches, arrests and interrogations.

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**UKRAINIAN EMIGRATION TO CANADA AT THE END
OF THE XIXTH AND BEGINNING OF THE XXTH CENTURY:
HISTORIOSOPHY ASPECT**

*Tetiana Tsybal**

Abstract

The article presents the results of the historical and philosophical researches of Ukrainian emigration to Western Canada. The character and features of the first emigration flows from Ukraine to Canada at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the conditions for the formation of the Ukrainian diaspora and its functions were analyzed. The Diaspora is seen as a way of being rootedness of an immigrant on a new cultural and historical basis. Significant contribution of Ukrainians to the socio-economic and cultural development of Canada was mentioned. The scientific novelty of the presented research is that the problem of emigration is considered in context of the author's concept of being rootedness of man, and also we have identified the general features of foreign Ukrainianness as a special socio-cultural phenomenon and determined the ontological status of each of the five waves of Ukrainian emigration.

Key words: *Canada, Ukrainian emigration, diaspora, being rootedness of man*

Introduction

One of the most actual problems of nowadays, which requires historiosophical rethinking, are those created by the freedom of human movement, specifically: migration, emigration, immigration and others which are related to them. It is known that migration exist if there is a person, they have different historical forms and different meanings at certain stages of the historical development of mankind. Today migration is a global phenomenon that plays a significant role in the system of external relations of states and in the internal system of most countries. That's why we name our time "flowing" (Z. Bauman) or "the century of migration" (M. Castells). General migration activity has several impacts in every country: some countries suffer from a huge number of immigrants who are trying to improve the level of their life at the expense of the country-recipient. Some of them – on the contrary – lose working resources, intellectual potential and get to the "demographical pit". From 1960 to 2005 the number of immigrants in the developed countries has grown from 3.4% to 10.3% (World Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision Population Database. August 11. Accessed: <http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=1>). Nowadays European countries suffer from migrants flow from Western countries and Africa which have very low adaptive capabilities and, as a result, complicate the general social situation.

For Ukraine, one of the richest countries in the world for natural resources, the aspect of loss of the main capital and the leading value – the indigenous population, Ukrainians. In the process of realization of this topic it is hard to separate the theoretical actuality from the political urgency. As today ethnic Ukrainians are divided

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in two parts: one half lives in the Motherland and the other (within different estimates, from 16 to 25 million) is located all over the world (Troshchinsky, 1999: 6).

Nevertheless, the problem of the migration of Ukrainians as well as the problem of migration in general, in many aspects is not developed. Especially it concerns the philosophical aspect of the mentioned problem. From the whole spectrum of the phenomenon of emigration, the law aspects are mostly observed by the domestic science in terms of the legal conditions of migrants' relocation, some of problems of resettlement, socio-economic condition of immigrants (mainly in America, in Canada), as well as the history and the attainments of the Ukrainian diaspora. The migration of the Ukrainians was studied by famous historians, such as: V. Klyuchevsky, M. Hrushevsky, V. Presnyakov, B. Lanovik, M. Trofyak, V. Idzio, V. Troshchinsky, A. Shevchenko and others. The social aspects of the problem are studied by M. Shulga, S. Pirozhkov, I. Prybitkova, O. Pryucka, and others. Among the most important the works of S. Narizhny, M. Marunchak, P. Kardash and S. Kot must be mentioned. Since 1991, the directory "Foreign Ukrainians", works by V. Yevtukh and O. Kovalchuk were published by the scientists of Canada and Ukraine. They were dedicated to Ukrainian migrants in Canada, etc. However, the major branches of science, including philosophy, have left the problem of migration with almost no attention.

That is the reason of the actuality of author's attempt of historical and philosophical comprehension of the phenomenon of emigration in general as well as the Ukrainian emigration to Canada (as one of the best examples).

The scientific novelty of the proposed approach lies in the studying of the Ukrainian emigration in the context of author's concepts of being rootedness of man. The last one is determined by us as "being for yourself" and the "culture of yourself" as the maximum fullness of man's being, self-actualization and self-realization of all its essence forces, possibilities, capabilities, contents of culture, targets and values, the horizon of the personal temporal space for the expression of existential of spirituality, creativity, freedom, sovereignty and responsibility (Tsymbal, 2005: 8). Apart of that, for the first time we've proposed the philosophical determination of "emigration", in which, ontological, existential, social and philosophical categorical essences mutually enforce and add each other, for example: a) emigration is an objectification of being's dis-rooting of a man, the attempt to overcome the gap between the actual local presence and the potential global being, between the absolute value of the personality and the loss of the sense of life; this is the understanding and realization of immanent-ontological ability for rootedness on the new cultural and historical grounds (by condition that's impossible or problematic on the Motherland); b) emigration – it's one of the form of expression of man's freedom, type of realization of the individual hypothesis of being and the personal project of life-setting; this is a process of temporal and local orientated self-realization of person as the destination to the desired and appropriate through the possible; c) emigration is a relocation of a person from one sociocultural continuum to another in order to improve the conditions of personal being and the deployment of the field for self-realization (Tsymbal, 2012: 10).

Ukrainian emigration, its periodization and reasons

Ukrainian emigration – is a very complex phenomenon, beginning from the problem of formulation of the concept itself. It can be considered as emigration from Ukraine or Ukrainian territories, regardless of the state affiliation in the past. After that we'll see completely different phenomena: legal regulation is completely different in Poland, Lithuania or Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russian Empire, which included Ukrainian territories. Nevertheless, considering the absence of the institute of the independent country we can affirm that Ukrainians have never had normal conditions of the realization on the free choice of settlement.

The definition of the beginning of the relocation of Ukrainians is also problematic from the Motherland to other countries. So undeniable is the historical evidence of the presence of Ukrainians, for example, in Moscovia, since the sixteenth century, when many famous Zaporozhian Cossacks moved with their families to protect themselves from persecutions of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (D. Vishnevetsky, S. Nalyvayko, etc.). From the seventeenth century resettlement becomes even more active: in 1618 P. Sahaidachny was in Moscow together with the Cossacks' corps, after which a part of the army was settled in the central provinces. In addition to military and political migrants, artisans and merchants were relocating as well. An important role in activating these processes played Pereyaslav Council, after which educated people with their families started to be invited to Moscovia. However, there were cases of coercion the resettlement of the captured Ukrainians after the failed attempt by Mazepa to get independence for Ukraine. This has become the cause of voluntary emigration of Ukrainians elder to Turkey, France, Sweden and Poland.

Yet, in our opinion, the right description of Ukrainian emigration to Moscovia at that time would be a "brain drain". It should be mentioned that even in the sixteenth century Ostrozka Academy was founded in Ukraine, later – Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, in addition, there were a lot of schools that worked according to the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy's program. Till the second half of the sixteenth century there were no educational institutions in Moscovia. That is why teachers, scientists among whom it's worth to remember S. Polotskii, great educator, poet, theatrical figure, a person who taught the children of tsar Mykhailo Romanov, as well as S. Yavorsky, L. Baranovsky, F. Prokopovich and others were invited from Kyiv to Moscow. The described tendencies are being kept as well in the future. But in nineteenth century, after the abolition of serfdom, the labor migration started to increase and the migration vector changed: from the central regions of Moscovia to Siberia Far East, Kazakhstan.

However, we believe that the actual mass emigration of Ukrainians begins with the end of the nineteenth century, and all previous phenomena, similar in essence to emigration, can be called protoemigration.

The history of massive Ukrainian emigration is divided on several steps and flows, each one of which has its own reasons and results, is characterized by specific forms, quantitative parameters, sociocultural concepts (at the same time individual emigration, in our opinion, has permanent nature). Traditionally, in the history of Ukrainian emigration there are four flows: the first one – from the end of the XIXth to the beginning of the XXth century (specifically at that period massive emigration to

Western Canada has started), the second one – the post revolution, the third one – the post-war, the fourth – modern emigration. We suppose that it would be logic to underline as a fourth emigrational flow the period of the end of the 60s till 70s (thaw period), and the modern emigration is the fifth flow. Surely, the fourth emigrational flow was not as massive as the previous ones or the last one, although it has a greatest impact on the development of the following political processes in the country.

The reasons of the Ukrainian emigration are traditionally caused by politics and economy. Nevertheless, the high emigrational potential of the Ukrainians is explained, in particular, of the specifics of mentality, such as: introspection of higher mental functions in the perception of the world, man's concentration on the facts and problems of internal, individual world; cordocentricity, which is shown in the sentimentalism, sensitivity, love to the nature, anthaeism, aesthetes of the folk life, predominance of emotional, sensual over the desire and intellect, moral over intellectual.

The first wave of Ukrainian emigration (the end of the XIXth – beginning of the XXth century)

In the formation of the first flow of the Ukrainian emigration, on our opinion, the main role was played by the unity of man with nature, as a deep connection between the person and the land (and specifically not with the Motherland, but with the feeding-land) and the desire of having own lands, manage them and get revenue and positive emotions.

It should be mentioned that during the last years of XVIII century, Ukrainian statehood was destroyed, and the Ukrainians of the Right Bank went to Russian Empire, Galician and Bukovina's inhabitants fell under Austrian domination. After Habsburg reforms the last one had several cultural and political freedoms, which Ukrainians in Russia did not have. During the XIX century several revolution changes took place in Europe, they were related to industrialization, urbanization and modernization. The path to these processes was opened to Ukrainians only when serfdom was abolished (in 1848 in Austria, in 1861 in Russia). Besides this, a powerful demographical explosion happened in the second part of the XIX century: the population of Ukraine grew for 72% which made the country the most inhabited part of Europe (Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies, 1993). On one hand, this means the increase of the level of life, but on the other hand – arise serious problem of the employment. Relying on the data of O. Subtelny, in the 90s of XIX century, 10.7 million of employable people were estimated in Ukraine, 2.3 million of whom were busy in the agricultural industry, as for the industrial sector, trade etc. – 1.1 million (Subtelny, O. 1992). The other 7.3 million were unemployed or working on part-time jobs, which led to the impoverishment of many Ukrainians. Besides this, in the 90s of the XIX century and at the beginning of the XX century Ukrainian villages suffer a few unfruitful years. Unemployed inhabitants of the villages suffer most.

Thereby, the lack of money for the existence, poverty, unemployment led to massive emigration of the inhabitants of Ukrainian villages at first to the West of the Russian Empire (Caucasus, Central Asia, Far East) and then – beyond the ocean. Emigration also led to the activities of transportation companies which advertised new

places for living and promised much advantaged conditions of work and living. Special agents spread information about the conditions of relocation and free providing of land plots, high level of salary on the industrial manufactures and in the agricultural sector. Such activity was caused by the fact, that for every adult emigrant the agent got 5 dollars, and for the child – 2 dollars.

The first Ukrainian emigrants in Canada

First Ukrainian settlers in Canada and Southern America got the status of colonists. They were called by locals exactly like this. Settlement of all Europeans (regardless of whether they came from a colonial state or not) were named colonies. Such names were also given to farms and parts of towns, namely every local settlement of immigrants. The concept “diaspora” was not in use that period but in fact, the union of Ukrainians on the Canadian lands had diaspora character.

Nowadays one of the most spread explanation of diaspora is “a permanent set of people of a single ethnic origin living in an outside ethnical environment outside of its historical homeland (or outside the range of settlement of its people)” (Toshchenko, Chaptykova, 1996: 33). Diaspora is considered as an ethnical group, which is trying to preserve the native language and the culture, support it, promote their development in conditions of being in another cultural space. Such culturally different group can be built only on the grounds of group solidarity to the Motherland, on the basis of tight collective connections.

Some reasons of the emigration can also be defined as a system forming factors for the diaspora. The representatives of such system, of the flow of “workers” of Ukrainian emigration do not tend to the active diaspora life, as political emigrants of the second and third flows of Ukrainian emigration have created a powerful diaspora in different countries of the world. Considering this, it can be affirmed that diaspora has, apart from ethno-cultural function, the functions such as ethno-political and ethno-ideological (resistance, service to the Motherland, struggle for its liberation and independence etc.). In this context diaspora is playing a role of the important economical and foreign policy source which is used by different countries during lately on purpose of creating new social, economic, political, cultural and other connections.

From the other side, the creation of different diasporas can be explained, using the heuristic potential of the concept “call to action – response” of A. Toynbee. On our opinion, diasporas arise as a response on calls to action on assimilation of the recipient country, which may have different intensity in a foreign cultural environment. Creations of new diasporas allow ethnos to support its own national identity on a certain level, originality, and, as a result, support the viability in conditions of immigration.

It should be mentioned, that unlike emigration, which means movement “from the native country” and immigration, which means movement “to the other country”, movement in space, with purpose of arrangement in the new country, diaspora means not relocation, departure or entry, but life in specific place (in good conditions – personally chosen). Moreover, we are talking about a normal life, complete, the life of a person, who wants to rootedness on the new ground. On our opinion, in the perspective in the countries of America and Europe, most diaspora groups will prevail

over metropolitan as nowadays such tendencies are observed and they are growing each year. You can even guess, that new trans local, digital and internet groups will eventually arise, and they won't have specific territorial anchor. But this is a case of future.

So, diaspora is one of the types of natural ethnos' existence, inseparable part of its historical development; it is a way of ethnos' viability conservation in conditions of emigration. But the main thing is that diasporas formations help immigrants to save the national identity, self-consciousness, communication circle, help staying in the sphere of native culture, so, this means – "in the house of being".

The first flow of the Ukrainian emigration has a character of a labor one. On one hand, this is because of economy difficulties of that historical period, on another hand – because of growth of utilitarianism.

In all the countries, where Ukrainians settled, basements of the future economical prosperity of the countries-recipients were made by their hands. Surely, the first settlers had to work hard, but migrants deliberately accepted such conditions. For example, the government of Canada has developed the program, according to which huge (by the standards of Ukraine) uncultivated fields were given to every Ukrainian. In return, a new owner had to build there a house, lead it and manage (plowing and sowing) 14 hectares of lands in three years. If the condition of the government was not followed, the person would lose the right to own the land.

The proposition to own the land and manage it the first Ukrainian emigrants took from a positive side, with enthusiasm, as it gave the possibility to work on the land, live the village life, live in a natural environment. And besides the fact, that working on the land was hard, it was desired. The biggest tragedy was the loss of the ground as a being soil under the feet. Moreover, the "attachment to the ground did not make from them (Ukrainians – T.T.) slaves, who hate the sources of their independence, but sovereign people, who felt the blessing of the fertile power of the ground, have accepted it and gained solid moral base for their existence" (Vassion, 1974: 39).

It should be mentioned, that Ukrainian emigrants of the first flow were mostly Galicians or Bukovinians that's why they were attracted by Western Canada with more woody lands of "parkland" where there are forests, fertile prairies and less fertile lands. During the first years of the XX century, Ukrainian settlements stretched on 2 thousand kilometers from the south-eastern parts of the Manitoba to the north-eastern Alberta. Till nowadays Ukrainians are still one of the most important cultural and economic elements on these lands.

The year of the massive Ukrainian immigration to Canada is considered to be 1891, when the Oregon steamship harbor in the port of Halifax on the Canadian coast of the Atlantic Ocean, where two Ukrainians arrived – Vasyl Yelnyak and Ivan Pilipov, Galician peasants from the village of Nebyliv (now Ivano-Frankivsk region). They were the first to officially register on Canadian land, and it is them who are counting the beginning of Ukrainian emigration to Canada.

The role of Professor Joseph Oleskov played an important role in agitating before moving to Canada, because it is his advice, set out in the pamphlets "About Free Lands", "About Immigration", in public lectures and in personal talks, encouraged many Ukrainians to move.

The first active flow of Ukrainian emigration lasts until 1914. During this time more than 180,000 Ukrainians settled over the ocean, mostly in the West Canada, where cheap labor was needed: loggers, miners, grain-growers. Of course, Ukrainians favored agricultural labor. However, for its start several tools, equipment, draft cattle were needed. That is why for some time in order to gain money for the start of the farming, emigrants applied for a dangerous work in mines or on the laying of railways.

Ukrainians were located very tight to each other that's why they had a chance to preserve the language, traditions and ceremonies. With nostalgia they called places of their settlements Sich, Kolomyia, Galicia and so on. In modern Canada in total there are about two hundred such titles. Also, first settlers built Greek Catholic and Orthodox Temples, reading rooms, peoples' houses, bilingual schools for children who operated until 1914.

In 1907, the first Ukrainian newspaper appeared in Canada, the "Red Flag", and since 1910, Ukrainian teachers began to publish the magazine "Ukrainian Voice", which is published today Winnipeg.

Describing Ukrainian emigration of the First flow to Western Canada, it is necessary to stop on several main moments.

Firstly, exactly Ukrainians came to be the most adapted to hard work on virgin lands of prairies, others, immigrants from Europe did not want to crush the woods and clearing lands for agricultural usage. Minister of Internal Affairs of Canada C. Sifton, one of the largest supporters of Ukrainian emigration to Canada, who sometimes met migrants by himself, mentioned, in 1928, that on mud lands of several districts, where not even one Canadian or British colonist settled down, Galicians settled. Specifically, in Western Canada, the lack of working hands felt for reclaiming wild lands, building, etc. In the 90s of XIX century – the most difficult period of familiarize of this territory – each year about 5 thousand Ukrainians came to Western Canada. Population of several Canadian towns was entirely Ukrainian (for example, Mynam, Redberry, Monder, Stuartborn). According to statistics of 1926, Ukrainian households of the first flow of emigration in three agricultural provinces were based for 3.4 million of acres of land with the average price for them about 500 million dollars. Totally, Ukrainians have explored 40% of wilderness in Western Canada.

Secondly, the main field of activity of Ukrainians was specifically agriculture, selective basis of worldwide known Canadian sorts of wheat became the grain, which was brought by Ukrainians from the Motherland. They crossed it with Canadian sorts and got a new one high-quality wheat, which ripped for 88 days, did not freeze and thus caused an economic boom in Canada at the end of the nineteenth century. Apart of this, the input of Ukrainians in the development of stockbreeding, specifically beekeeping, dairy cattle breeding, as well as the growing of fruits and vegetables (first in Manitoba and Alberta) is invaluable. About 80-85% of emigrants had their own farm households, therefore according to the results and the methods of work the last ones were considered as highly profitable. Products of Ukrainian manufacturers were high quality and got awards at exhibitions. For example, at the exhibition which took place in the city of Vonda in 1911, as main manufacturers there were two Ukrainians: Mykola Chorny and Mykhailo Luchyshyn. Not for nothing Ukrainians are named as

“excellent farmers”, “ideal householders” by the scientists of familiarization of Canada (Canadian Rusyn, 1911).

Thirdly, huge number of Ukrainian emigrants worked on the railway construction, which gave a possibility to get to the farthest places of Western Canada. On the verge of XIX-XX century, about 2 miles of railways were built each day in Canada. Therefore, as D. Hill mentions, “Ukrainians have assured the majority of the working force on railways” (Hill, 1967: 230).

Fourthly, precisely Ukrainians who made up most seasonal workers in forestry, in mines and on summer field works. Also, Ukrainian working force was used on the construction of Western Canadian bridges. Ukrainians built tram railways, sewerage, water supply, etc., i.e., they performed work which other European emigrants did not accept.

Therefore, considering an importance of developing the Western lands for the establishment and strengthening of the economic and socio-political grounds of Canadian statehood, we can state that the Ukrainians made a direct and significant contribution to the establishment and development of Canada.

The Ukrainian diaspora in Canada is one of the oldest, most organized Ukrainian communities in the world. Ukrainian Canadians took an important place in political, economic, cultural life of the country. Many people with Ukrainian roots are presented in the central government of Canada and in governing bodies in provinces.

Considering, that exactly the year of 189 is ranked as a year of the start of Ukrainian emigration to Canada, in 2011 a scalable project “The Historic Train of Ukrainian Pioneers” was embodied by the Embassy of Ukraine in Canada with the support of the Canadian-Ukrainian Parliamentary Friendship Group and Congress of Ukrainian Canadians. Train traveled the following way: Halifax – Montreal – Ottawa – Toronto – Winnipeg – Saskatoon – Edmonton. Cultural events with the participation of local Ukrainian communities and guests were held in these cities. One of such cultural events is the opening of the monument to Taras Shevchenko in Ottawa – the work by the world-renowned Canadian sculptor of Ukrainian origin Leo Mol (Leonid Molodozhanin).

Conclusions

During the process of studying different periods of Ukrainian migration we have discovered different, including from the philosophical point of view, general traits of foreign Ukrainians as a special socio-cultural phenomenon. This is, first of all, openness and tolerance to the cultures and nationalities of the recipient country, free cooperation with them; secondly, devotion to the national roots and hereditary connection between all waves of emigration in preserving and enriching traditions, faith, language, spirituality; thirdly of all, interconnection between Ukrainian diasporas in all the places in the world and the preservation of the sense of belonging to the Ukrainian national culture, sense of being a part to the processes of the creation of the culture on the Motherland.

Emigration of each period has its own special status: desire to the rootedness on the new grounds of the representatives of the first flow, situational character of the second, immanent-ontological character of the third, an escape to the freedom or

ethnic emigration of the fourth one and then again, the desire to the rootedness of the representatives of the fifth flow.

All the waves of Ukrainian emigration, especially the first three justify for leaving their homeland, relying on the conviction that it is impossible to preserve authentic Ukrainian culture in the metropolis, since it is captured by a Russian (or Polish, Austrian) enemy.

Today the Ukrainian of metropolises must realize that Ukrainian emigrants are not traitors but “agents of influence” of Ukraine in the world socio-economic and cultural space. In this regard, it is necessary to direct the cultural and educational work of educators and the media on the awareness of Ukrainians of the natural, economic and anthropological potential of their own country. After all, Ukraine holds the civilization achievements of the East and West, demonstrating tolerance and non-aggressiveness throughout history.

Being in the middle of crossroads of cultures, religions, civilizations hardened Ukrainians. Such historical collisions can withstand only a very strong nation, brave warriors, hardworking and talented farmers and artisans. Today, the Eurasian “historical crossroads” are reviving again, Ukraine, which opposes the eastern aggressor, once again becomes an outpost of Europe in opposition to the civilized world and the descendants of “Mongolian slavery” (Marx, 1960: 204-208), and therefore the value of Ukrainian culture, the Ukrainian people, in the definition of the human development vector is undergoing a new strengthening.

It is urgent to study the achievements of Ukrainians in the scientific technological fields and in culture through the creation of popular scientific programs, etc., since many inventions and discoveries of our compatriots become known under other names or are generally remain without authorship. In addition, we need to know that our emigrants are permanent donors of the world. It was Ukrainians who actually colonized wild Canada and the Far East at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries, and now work fruitfully in Europe, including building of the Pyrenees “desert”. Consequently, Ukrainians must declare themselves as one of the most talented and most productive people in the world, having consolidated for the sake of the overall socio-cultural and economic development of their homeland. In general, the issue of emigration of Ukrainians is characterized by a wealth of meanings and offers wide opportunities for further understanding in polydisciplinary scientific discourse.

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY TRANSFORMATIONS IN ROMANIA AFTER THE FALL OF COMMUNISM

*Alexandra Porumbescu**

Abstract

The international relations scene following the end of the Cold War suffered severe mutations, bringing former socialist states in the position of identifying and promoting their national interest in a new strategic environment. The main thesis of this paper is that, in order to observe and correctly evaluate the foreign policy options Romania has at this moment, it is important to understand the evolution of the international agenda following the transformations that occurred due to the fall of the communist regime. Our analysis will be structured on the four main areas of interest of Romanian foreign policy: NATO integration, integration into the European Union, regional cooperation and relations with the neighbouring states, and the strategic partnerships and special bilateral relations Romania is engaged in.

Key words: *foreign policy, Romania, diplomacy, European Union, NATO*

The context

The revolutionary wave that spread in Europe in 1989 was a historic moment, representative for the need of states to regain national sovereignty and for their determination to bring down a system that ruled over them almost half a century. There is a possible explanation for such a contagious outburst, one taken into consideration the fact that socialism entered the region from outside, being imposed by the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War. The result was a certain form of social and political change: a dependent evolution, to which a specific state ideology, state socialism, corresponded. Finally, the manifestation of political repression and economic stagnation have given rise to certain political cultures of the opposition, who could not appeal to socialism (an idea discredited by the system in which they existed), but which often took the form of democratic language, with reference to citizens' rights, with traces of resistance of nationalist type against the Soviet domination, as well as with an often conservative underground current, conservative, sometimes reliant on common shared values such as religion or ethnicity.

It is obvious that the fall of communism left behind a worn out system, with fragments that led to the isolation of international actors. The international system as it was seemed to be no longer compatible with the new world order, considering the new political alignments and regarding the old alliances that no longer existed. It was time for a new established in the international order, meant to ensure the security that was now threatened by the emergence of the new states looking for an international role to play.

Thus began the process of democratization of the newly emerged states. The reintroduction of the idea of democracy in societies marked by at least 50 years of

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communism was necessary; the gap between the political power and the population needed to be eliminated. The democratization process was yet as complex as was desirable. J. Rupnik creates a picture of the post-communist world “The post-totalitarian blues haunts the countries of the Other Europe. The euphoria of the fall of communism was followed by deceptions, social anomic, and sometimes even by the emergence of new dangers. The unity of the great democratic groups was broken, and the extent of the economic difficulties makes the political gains relative to the population. Instead of civil societies, a fragmented landscape consisting of corporations and oaths of community faith is discovered” (Rupnik, 1994: 37).

The states were euphoric following the fall of the regime, but soon they found themselves in an economic deadlock, a society fragmented and collide with the boundaries of the Western model, more precisely the limits of implementation its regime. The process would not be as smooth as the former communist states hoped.

In the years that followed the events of 1989, Romania, similarly to other states in Eastern Europe, was facing immense internal and external challenges. Thus, its foreign policy was subsequently contained by the conditions of the dramatic changes of ideological substance, resulting into a blend of both elements of continuity and profound change.

In this peculiar conditions, the Romanian diplomacy continued to promote the traditional principles and values that are specific to a responsible international actor – respecting independence, national territorial integrity and national sovereignty, cooperation based on mutual trust and respect, respecting the principles and norms of international law – both in the process of constantly consolidating and developing relations with neighboring states, as well as trying to become a significant member of international organizations and institutions. A great amount of effort in the matters of foreign policy was directed towards enforcing the principles that characterize the modern states: loyalty to the values of democracy and freedom, modernization of Romania in the interests of its citizens, promotion of the standards of democratic stability in the region – and, therefore, reoriented in order to reach new strategic goals.

One of the most significant consequences of the changes produced after 1989, in the field of foreign affairs, was the change of the decision-making system responsible for Romania’s international contacts, adopting a register specific to modern democracies. Thus, together with the head of state, various ministries and government agencies received a much more complex decision-making role and, as well as the Standing Committees of Parliament, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reorganized and was given a much broader mandate, not only for the representation and management of Romania’s foreign affairs, but also for planning and implementing strategies for action in the international environment. A decision-making unit dedicated to national security (Supreme Defense Council), as well as a number of departments of European integration within the executive structures, has emerged, a clear proof of a new, professional and democratic approach to Romanian foreign policy after 1989.

In his article entitled “The Lonely Superpower”, Samuel Huntington (1999) argues that, after the end of the Cold War, world politics has ... passed from the bipolar system of towards a unipolar period to give way to two uni-multipolar

decades, before entering, in the 21st century into a true multipolarism era. It is inevitable that we will not notice the tendency towards multipolarism is growing steadily since the end of the Cold War. Right after the fall of the USSR, the US remained the only world actor with the necessary authority to become a centre of world politics, but over time, states like Japan or Russia aspire to prove superiority and escalating the political stage.

Integration in the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The issues that regard national security and international stability are best handled, as history demonstrates, within an international system of states that allows members to provide each other with mutual assistance in the situation that they are facing any threats. As Romania's geo-strategic position is defined by its location on the European continent, cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance was a goal shared by all major domestic political forces, as well as by an overwhelming majority of the population. Following the fall of the communist regime, the accession procedure to the Euro-Atlantic security structures was initiated in 1990, with the request addressed by the Prime Minister, Petre Roman, and accepted by the NATO Secretary General regarding the accreditation of a permanent ambassador of our country to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The following years can be described as a period of joint efforts of the different institutions (Presidency, Government, Parliament) with foreign policy responsibilities to achieve this fundamental strategic objective. The result is that on January 26, 1994, Romania became the first post-communist state received in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program. Furthermore, the members of the Romanian diplomatic corps have made considerable efforts to convince Western partners of our state's ability to successfully cope with the full membership status of NATO.

The regional context created by the Kosovo crisis and the military intervention of the armed forces of the North-Atlantic Treaty in Yugoslavia represented an opportunity for Romania to provide concrete evidence of its willingness to join. This resulted in the decision issued in April 1999, at the NATO Summit in Washington (NATO, 1999), to make the Romanian airspace available for military operations, thus setting in motion the mechanism of individual preparation and evaluation for Romania and other candidate countries, a significant step in joining the Alliance.

Later on, following the attacks on September, 11th, 2001, the Romanian Parliament adopted two significant decisions for being a *de facto* NATO member: participation, together with the Alliance and by the American partner, in the war against international terrorism, using all means, including military ones, and increasing the Romanian contribution to NATO-led missions at that time (SFOR and KFOR).

In the new global context, Romania's efforts to accelerate the reform of its military capabilities, as well as the substantial contributions of the Romanian diplomacy (an example being the organization of NATO candidate countries' Spring in Bucharest in March 2002) successful when, in November 2002, at the NATO Summit in Prague, our country was invited to begin accession talks. Two years later, in 2004, after fulfilling all the technical standards and ratifying the accession protocols, Romania became a full member of the North Atlantic Alliance, representing one of

the greatest diplomatic achievements of the successive Romanian governments after 1989.

Once this strategic objective was reached, a decade and a half after the 1989 revolution, Romania's foreign policy, especially on the dimension of national security, acquired new instruments and devised new objectives in direct relation with its membership to NATO. Supporting the Alliance to respond effectively to new security threats, strengthening the transatlantic partnership, developing cooperation with the European Union and the United Nations, supporting NATO's transformation process and participating in Alliance operations and missions became Romania's declared and pursued goals after 2004.

A confirmation of the role played by Romania in the evolution of the North-Atlantic Alliance was also the organization of the NATO Summit in Bucharest on April 2-4, 2008, a major event not only in the history of Romanian foreign policy, but also of the Organization. For the first time, at the summit, a meeting of the states and organizations participating in the operation of the Alliance in Afghanistan was also held. The unprecedented organization of the great Summit in the history of the Alliance was, without doubt, an important success of the Romanian diplomacy in the first decade of the XXIst century.

Integration in the European Union

Reports on the first years after 1989 reveal the fact that a significant development gap between Romania and other former communist countries, such as Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia existed. The institutional reconstruction enforced by the Constitution of 1991 was shadowed by a slow economical development, specific for the transition from a centralized system towards free, open-market economy (Corpadean, 2017: 26).

Furthermore, the cultural gap between Western and Eastern Europe deepened throughout the years of communism, and newly emerged societies needed to face the attempt to regain cultural values but also to a rapid modernization to keep up with the real world. After the abrupt end of political and cultural isolation, the states needed to re-enter the "European game" as quickly as they could, but with other values. J. Rupnik manages to structure the process of European integration of these states in three phases: first is the euphoria of the return to the West, followed by the norms adopted for integration into the societies of the Union, and finally followed by the real European integration (Rupnik, 1994: 40).

The European Union has been the accelerating factor of change and transition to democracy when it decided to expand its borders, as well as its economic dimensions and opening up new markets. However, this process was not an easy one for the post-communist states who had only recently regained real national sovereignty and did not want to lose it, while the status of the European Union was, to them, an ambiguous one. In order to access the Union, the states needed to develop their political, legal and standards up to a point where they would be in accordance with the European norms. Thus, the states were put in front of the need to give up communist principles in order to normalize political standards and adhere to the classic European one, as well as to rise to new economic ones. They were obliged to comply with the

international norms of the main financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, EBRD). Furthermore, joining the European Union went hand in hand with membership of the North Atlantic Organization, which gave the democratization process a global dimension and facilitated the building of a democratic regime. Benevolence from the Western states in helping new emerging European societies, is to be assumed, derived from a feelings of remorse that dated back to the Yalta meeting, when the Eastern states were ceded to the USSR and Europe was divided in two (Claret, Sinescu, 2010: 84).

All in all, the fundamental objective of the Romanian foreign policy, after 1989, supported by all the political forces, followed by all the governments and wanted by the majority of the population, was the connection of Romania to the European space configured legally, economically, and institutionally through the phenomenon of European integration. The sources of Romania's efforts for European integration are found not only in the political-diplomatic area but, more deeply, at the level of the Romanian society, of the collective mind, where this objective was perceived as a natural reunion, after an imposed separation, with the European political, cultural and economic identity. Thus, after Romania joined the Council of Europe in October 1993, in February of the same year the Association Agreement of Romania with the European Union was signed, so that, in 1995, Romania could submit the formal application for EU accession. Romania's integration into an economic and political union, which is itself in a difficult process of defining its own institutional, procedural and legal elements, represented one of the most difficult and complex tasks for the post-December Romanian foreign policy.

The problem of accession to the European Union was that Romania did not progress very quickly, compared to other Central European countries. Together with Bulgaria he stayed behind in conclusion of negotiation chapters and reform of key institutions. Political corruption and weaknesses administrative made things more problematic, even if it was accepted clear direction by all social actors (Wallace, Pollack, Alasdair, 2015).

A brief chronology of the most important stages of the "road to Europe" would include, in addition to the events mentioned above, the decision of the Helsinki European Council, in December 1999, to open accession negotiations with Romania (together with six other candidate states). Afterwards followed the official launch of the accession negotiation process at the Romania-EU Intergovernmental Conference, in February 2000, establishing the accession schedule (next to Bulgaria) by the Brussels European Council in 2003 and observing it by completing the negotiations, in 2004, completed by the signing of the Accession Treaty, in 2005, and the effective accession to the European Union, on January 1, 2007.

The joint treaty of accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union was the result of a laborious process of negotiation of the 31 chapters, and its signing in Luxembourg, on April 25, 2005, can be considered the moment when, in fact, the difficult period of transition from communism to democracy of our country ended. At the same time, however, Romania's accession to the European Union, both in formal terms and in terms of content, represented a first step, but absolutely necessary, for full European integration. On the agenda of the Romanian foreign policy there is still

the need to adopt the single currency – the euro – as well as the accession to the Schengen Area. In addition, insufficient reforms in the field justice and home affairs have led the European Commission to develop a further instrument, and here we are talking about the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, to ensure that there is pressure continues for further reforms. Even if Romania became a full member, the Cooperation Mechanism and the verification raised doubts about its institutional capabilities and the political will to reform. However, Romania's fragile position in the EU is caused by other reasons. Together with Bulgaria, it is the country with the highest number of citizens moving to other Member States The European Union, the figures being about 2.5-3 million citizens.

However, as a member state of the European Union, Romania has been actively engaged in debating the major issues regarding the evolution of the Union and in the implementation, enlargement and deepening of the common policies, which practically means that the Romanian foreign policy has become truly European.

Regional cooperation and the relations with the neighbouring states

The current security environment in which Romania defends and promotes its strategic and security values, principles, interests and objectives is characterized by complexity and dynamism, as a result of the rethinking of the strategic and military position of some states, as well as of the political and economic inter-dependencies. In the context of pursuing these fundamental strategic objectives, Romania's foreign policy towards neighboring states, after 1989, focused on regulating diplomatic relations and developing previously opened cooperation axes, but also on reaching agreements, conventions, understandings and treaties in areas of common interest with the newly emerged countries following the breakup of Yugoslavia and the disappearance of the Soviet Union. Thus, in the period 1992-2006, by signing cooperation and good neighborly treaties, relations with Bulgaria, the successor states of the former Yugoslavia and Hungary were regulated.

The good neighbourhood policy promoted by the Romanian diplomacy was put in difficulty in the case of relations with its eastern neighbors, the litigious past and the regional convulsions generated by the dismantling of the Soviet Union. If, in April 1991, in a confusing international context, Romania signed with the Soviet Union a Treaty of mutual assistance and mutual aid (which, after only a few months, would disappear from the international scene), a gesture severely criticized by the national public opinion, the base treaty between the Romanian state and the Russian Federation has been delayed for more than a decade, in particular, because of the problem of denouncing the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and of the Romanian treasury issue, both representing historical disputes. Although these were not fully resolved, in July 2003, Romania accepted the signing of a political treaty in Moscow, regulating mutual relations.

In the case of Ukraine, although Romania was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of Kiev, in February 1992, territorial disputes (Snake Island) or different legislation regarding the rights of minorities complicated the regulation of diplomatic relations between the two states and the negotiations to sign of the basic treaty. In 1997, after Ukraine accepted Recommendation 1201, from

1993, of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and both states agreed to address the International Court in The Hague on the disputed territorial issues, the Treaty on relations with the Republic of Moldova was finalized and signed, establishing good neighborhood and cooperation.

The relations with the Republic of Moldova were also sinuous, depending on the nature of the political regime in Chisinau, the regional political context, but also on the proposed objectives and strategies employed by Romania. After the disappearance of the Soviet Union, in August 1991, Romania recognized the independence of the new state and, through different voices, an undeniable reality: the special character of this relationship, conferred by the language community, history, culture, traditions. The Romanian diplomacy, in the context created by the efforts of European integration and NATO accession, chose, in relation to the Republic of Moldova, a pragmatic strategy, wishing to build a substantial approximation of the two states within the framework offered by the political, economic and economic architecture provided by the Euro-Atlantic security system.

Regional cooperation was another important objective of the Romanian foreign policy, as an important component of the Romanian diplomacy. Within these regional initiatives, Romania actively promoted European and national policies, substantially contributing to the identification and implementation of regional projects.

Bilateral relations and strategic partnerships

The years that followed 1989 can be described, in terms of foreign policy and diplomacy, as years of promoting the national interest. Despite the fact that the communist regime provided restricted access to the study of international relations according to the scientific paradigms used in the western academia, after the change of the political regime, the Romanian diplomacy continued, on a larger scale and with a more precise substance, the development of special bilateral relations with certain states such as Hungary, Poland, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, China and the United States of America.

Regarding the latter case, a study regarding the strategic partnership with the United States issued in 2016 notes that “historically, the institutionalization of this special relationship is relevant considering that political and economic relations between the two states are relatively new and were developed only after the emergence of the Romanian modern state. Unlike relations with some Western European countries, which were developed during the Middle Ages, those between Romania and the United States were delayed, among others, by the geographic distance” (Niță, Stoian, Popescu, 2016: 5).

Starting with 1993, Romania was granted the “most favored nation” clause in its legal relationship with the United States (House of Representatives, 1996), which represented a great opportunity for development of bilateral economic relations, encouraging Romanian diplomacy to continue campaigning for closer collaboration with the United States, the main strategic actor worldwide.

Following this significant achievement, in July 1997, the United States President Bill Clinton visited Romania, and the Strategic Partnership between Romania and the United States of America was launched (US Department of State, 1997). Launching

the Partnership represented a remarkable success for the Romanian foreign policy, because it involved more than securing the national interests in the international arena, but also triggered the continuation of internal political, administrative, legal and economic reforms.

As we stated earlier, the events of September 11th, 2001, brought Romania closer to the US-led international coalition, in the fight against terrorism, in terms of active involvement with logistics and troops to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The development of the Romania-US international relationship also included the decisions of the Romanian authorities to sign with the United States first the Agreement on the activities of the United States forces stationed in the territory of Romania (2005) and then, in 2011, the Agreement on the location of the system defense against ballistic missiles.

Conclusions

The situation of modern international democracies is a case of creating a new institutional political system that is likely to coexist with the state system, but enabled to overcome the states in certain areas of activity, namely in the situations where the effects of said activities involve transnational or international consequences, or require regional or global initiatives in order to be effective or to gain democratic legitimacy (Archibugi, Held, Kohler, eds., 1998: 24). In other words, the world can be depicted as being built of “communities with overlapping destinies” whose organization needs to move beyond the simple coexistence of states (Lawson, 2010: 172).

It can be argued that, compared to the internal political debates, which are often unpredictable and more likely to arouse interest, foreign policy most often seems to be a matter where all political parties agree. At least starting with the second part of the 1990s, the whole national political class, as well as the media and public opinion seem to have agreed that integration in the European Union and in the North-Atlantic Treaty are the absolute priorities of Romanian foreign policy, regardless of the political party or coalition of parties that ruled at the moment.

The fall of communism brought with it the fall of the curtain between the former satellite states USSR and the rest of the world. States were forced to face realities after the exaltation of freedom from the past and the general state of post-communism has become a latent state, a state of disillusionment of a void what was required to be filled, as P. Michel says “an attempt to substitute a way to believe with another, from the political to the religious aspects, as a major vector of seduction” (Michel, 1995: 181). It is understandable the general state in which the states entered because the Communist ideology itself. After the fall of communism, Romania’s integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures became the main narrative and political strategy. There was an almost complete agreement between the elite and the population on these issues, but more than anything else, it was an indicator of the desire for independence from the Soviet Union and liberation from the communist regime. The United States and the partner countries of Europe were aware that they needed stability at the borders of this region in a completely unbalanced situation, accepting the support of Romania. The end of the road of accession to the European

Union of Romania, was accelerated by the situation in the former Yugoslavia, probed by the Kosovo war and bad events in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In terms of foreign policy, it seemed that “the newly sovereign nations in the East eagerly sought to establish new connections of all kinds to the Western economies. Such steps were welcomed, encouraged and reciprocated both by the United States and key countries in Western Europe” (Porumbescu, 2018: 79). Later on, after the events in the spring of 1999, when the centre-right wing supported Romania’s involvement in the NATO campaign in Kosovo, while the centre-left one argued for better relations with Serbia, along with respecting the international law principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in national issues, a sudden silence in the matters of foreign affairs was installed (Cioculescu, 2010: 101).

The first years after the events of 1989 were times when all the Romanian political efforts were directed towards transitioning from the communist to the democratic regime. Regarding the foreign affairs, Romania’s efforts were focused on building or rebuilding relationships with the Western democracies. In terms of political science, a dependent foreign policy can be described as, “a fairly high level of externally directed actions and transactions, characterized by high concentration towards another state or group of states”. Besides this, “essential economic, technical, communications and military requirements come from abroad, usually from a single country” (Holsti, 1982: 4).

To sum up, we can state that, despite the fact that the decision-makers in the matters of foreign policy in post-communist Romania had to face an international context with a dynamic that was very different from the previous period, national strategic objectives, from the national will were pursued consistently. Furthermore, it is important to highlight the fact that the successes of the Romanian diplomacy in promoting and securing national interests abroad were achieved through joint and often consensual efforts and initiatives of the leaders and internal political forces.

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THE PROBLEM OF A THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICAL REALISM IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA

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Abstract

The article is devoted to the peculiarities of the political realism theory in the foreign policy of Russia. The aim of the research is to compare the main trends observed in theories close to political realism with the actions of Russia in the world political arena. The preamble of the work presents the systematization of the main types of political realism (classical realism, defensive and offensive realism, neo-realism), in addition, the parameters of a new, non-research constructive realism.

The results of research of many scientists developing the theory of political realism are presented in the form of a table. In the main part of the study, using the method of structural and functional analysis, each part is considered within the framework of a system of stable foreign policy views of Russia. As a result, it is concluded what type of theory of political realism correspond to certain steps in the foreign policy of the country.

Key words: *the theory of political realism, the foreign policy of Russia, power potential, modern conflicts*

Introduction

Today, the theory of international relations occupies one of the main places in the structure of scientific research both in Western countries and in Russia. However, the principle of studying theories and paradigms of international relations in Russia differs significantly from the European and American approaches. First of all, this happens because most American theorists present international relations exclusively as part of the political science, while trying to bring to the fore the study of Aristotle, N. Machiavelli, T. Hobbes, D. Locke, I. Kant. Thus, according to the American researcher Stanley Hoffman, it was political philosophers who laid the Foundation of the theory of international relations, and historians such as Thucydides who “used one particular incident to describe the constant logic of behaviour” (Hoffman, 1977: 41-60).

The Russian view of the theory of international relations is broader, and international relations themselves are developing scientifically at the intersection of historical and political sectors. This is indicated by the names of departments and of

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individual directions in educational institutions: the Department of history and politics of Europe and America (MGIMO-University), Department of theory and history of international relations (RUDN-University), World politics and international relations (MSU). This raises the need to study individual theories in two dimensions: as a *scientific system* of ideas and principles, uniting the views of scientists-historians, political scientists, philosophers, who have a similar vision of the system of international relations and foreign policy of individual countries, as well as a *theoretical* understanding of the real foreign policy of the state, the theoretical implementation of practical value.

The modern foreign policy of Russia causes negative responses in any Western country. Many foreign policy strategies, foreign policy doctrines and security strategies of Europe and the United States declare the perception of Russia as a threat to stability and security. Thus, this perception was recorded in the White book of Germany in 2016, the Strategic review of the defence and national security of France in 2017, the US national security Strategy in 2017, the UK national security and defence Strategy. At the same time, each document identifies as the most acute problem, the high military potential of Russia, which can be used to ensure its national interests in certain regions of the world.

The same idea is reflected in the scientific research of Western countries. At the same time, the authors rarely manage to avoid bias in the study of the theoretical foundations of Russia's foreign policy. Most experts agree that Russia adheres to the ideas of the paradigm of political realism, but the extremely narrow interpretation of this theory (which is based primarily on the power principle of solving problems proposed by Hans Morgenthau in one of his books on the theory of international relations) allows researchers to create not scientific works, but materials aimed at identifying the shortcomings of the activities of one country and emphasize the advantages of a number of other countries based on liberal ideas. So, for example, in the work "Realism in Russian Foreign Policy: The Crimean Case" the author tries to prove that "Russia has never departed from the principles of political realism, remaining always a revanchist and revisionist «great power» that quickly redraws the borders in favour of its national interests with a unique sense of civilizational exclusivity and encouragement from the Russian people and the ruling elite" (Sumantra, 2014: 117).

Such comparisons of the theory of political realism with ideological trends suggest that in Western scientific literature there is difficult understanding of the role of political realism in the foreign policy of Russia. It is extremely important to analyse the existing types of political realism and identify the distinctive features inherent in the Russian foreign policy. It should be noted that this work does not set an ambitious goal to consider the foreign policy of Russia from the point of view of all existing theories. It is offered to reveal on separate historical and actual examples, what features of a paradigm of political realism and the separate theories connected with it prevail in the foreign policy of Russia.

Theoretical framework: types of political realism

The problem of the development of the existing paradigm of political realism arose after the original concept of Hans Morgenthau was revised by the followers of

his ideas. Morgenthau himself, as the founder of political realism, in the fundamental work "Politics among Nations" notes that "the primary place in international relations is given to the concept of power and, by having power, one country can conquer the world, and after the conquest to strengthen and maintain its power" (Morgenthau, 1970: 4-15). Thus, for political realism, the condition of achieving peace by military means, the orientation of the states towards military-technical development and, finally, war – are the only means of fighting for great power.

This, "zero-sum game" has been revised in other works by Hans Morgenthau (Morgenthau, 1970). He actively criticized the US war in Vietnam, saying that "the US made a moral, not a strategic mistake, starting military operations in Indochina" (Morgenthau, 1975: 508-516). In addition, the analysis of the correspondence of Hans Morgenthau and a large number of unpublished articles, the essence of which is reflected in the article "Realistic moral opposition to war: Hans J. Morgenthau and Vietnam" show that the well-known political realist does not depart in a direct sense from the idea of the dominance of military power in foreign policy, but proposes to consider military force as the basis for containing the political ambitions of rivals, and not as the basis for ensuring their national interests (Rafshoon, 2002: 55-77). The revision of Hans Morgenthau's views on military actions in Vietnam is an example of how one historical event can change the theoretical approach, and therefore Hoffman's opinion on the lack of the need to study the history of international relations to understand the theory wrongly.

The idea of revising the foundations of political realism found support from another researcher – J. Kennan: "the consequences of any military action for people and society are terrible. The most important basis of stability is the balance of power, which refers to the various means of containing conflicts" (Kennan, 1984: 55-59). Thus, even the classical understanding of political realism does not imply solving problems exclusively by military means.

The third classic of political realism can be considered Edward Carr, who actively criticized the idealism inherent in political realism. He proposed to replace "the idealistic concept of political realism based on the harmony of interests with the realistic idea of a conflict of interests" (Carr, 2001). Such a replacement, according to Carr, should lead to the fact that the world will cease to tear itself apart because of the special interests of different groups, and therefore the world order will be based not on the power of weapons, but on the power of morality. However, it is worth noting here that Carr does not offer his interpretation of political morality, but uses the ideas of T. Hobbes, who understood the spread of moral norms as a process of imposing on other countries, nations and the international community through the coercion of specific moral foundations formed by stronger groups of nations (Hobbes, 1994). As a result, it is also an attempt by the representative of political realism as a theory not based on the dominance of military force, but there is no guarantee that it will not have to be applied in the process of imposing an established system of morality.

Thus, we can draw an intermediate conclusion that the classical ideas of political realism are based not on the fact that the use of force is necessary in any critical situation in international relations, but on the need to preserve military potential in order to be able to use it to protect their interests. Some of the fundamentals of

political realism have been reviewed in the evolution of this theory and in the emergence of new directions, resulting in neorealism. To determine the types and criteria of the theory is to use the parameters proposed by G. Morgenthau in his studies of the six principles of political realism, as well As D. Kennan and E. Carr (Table 1).

Table 1

Criteria	Realism	Neorealism		Neoclassical realism	Constructive realism
		Defensive	Offensive (structural)		
Roots, the main idea (basic theory)	International relations are based on the nature of man, on the laws of human existence	The anarchic structure of international relations is determined by the presence of great powers. The anarchist structure of the international system encourages states to pursue a moderate and restrained policy in the name of security.	The anarchist structure is based on the desire for power and influence to achieve security through domination and hegemony.	The concept of “balance of power” (the quintessence of realism and defensive neorealism) with the addition of internal political variables to explain the behavior of the state.	The basis of international relations is the unpredictability of behavior that is influenced by ideology (in the meaning of the system of state ideas).
International relations system	The system of international relations is determined by the power ratio in the military, political and economic spheres.	The system of international relations can be bipolar and multipolar.			
			Separately, a balanced multipolar force distribution and an unbalanced multipolar one stands out.	The system of international relations is based on the struggle between egoistic groups (Alliances) in the conditions of lack of certainty in the international system.	The structural properties of the international system and the related problems of power are not significant.
Epistemology and Methodology	Inductive philosophical theory of the nature of politics	Deductive theory, comparative analysis of hypotheses using quantitative and qualitative research methods.		Deductive theory, comparative analysis of hypotheses by quantitative methods. Identification of a wide range of single and multiple variables – agent – based modeling.	Inductive theory based on the study of cultural identities. Go Qualitative analysis of measuring the role of ideology through the adoption of independent and dependent variables.
Interests	Power and the struggle for power,	Ensuring national (state) security.	Expansion in the name of universal security.	In the short term, anarchy gives states	The interests of states are different in the

	national interests.			considerable freedom in defining their security interests, and the relative distribution of power simply sets the parameters for a big strategy.	context of diverging public interests, while maintaining the need for power. Intersubjective understanding of national interests (not only material, but also ideological).
Relationships to military / conflict	Military force is necessary for the struggle for power. Military conflict is a natural consequence of different interests.	Possible interstate conflict is not denied, which is a stimulus for the expansion of military power (maximum security).	Military power is needed by states to prevent expansion and to respond to the state (maximum power and influence).	The state should always be ready for military action, both open and preventive.	Military power is the primary means by which states continue to exert pressure or restrain others from using force. However, military power is the force that can threaten the survival of the state.
The role of the state leader	The high degree of involvement of the leader in the process of making foreign policy decisions, the views of the leader are based on both national interests and personal preferences.	The state leader should be sufficiently involved in the process of ensuring state security. The leader must be a stronghold (a kind of security guarantee).	Leaders should strive to expand state power, not national.	The role of the leader is quite high, but not always positive. Leaders can't always adapt to the external environment, as well as effectively combine a two-tier strategy (foreign and domestic policies). The image of a leader is more important than his progressive steps in foreign policy.	Against the background of the important role of a leader, the role of other state representatives (diplomats) is growing.

The ratio of “morality and power”	It is necessary to erase tensions between politics and morality. Universal moral principles can't be applied to all countries. And in general, morality doesn't play a big role.	Neorealism is against the introduction of universal moral values. Responsibility for the moral side of power (moral obligations) assumes the subject (state or leader of the state). Morality in international relations is ensured by international ethics. The ethical importance of anarchy lies in the fact that it ensures openness and commitment to the uncertainty of the future of international relations.	Ethics and morality are the products of power and the material interests of countries (morality as a component of national strength).	An attempt to effectively combine political morality and the use of force, an attempt to explain the impossibility of the existence of one without the other. The moral is in the implementation of the norms and principles of behavior.
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Sources: <http://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-304>, accessed July 24, 2019

Consideration of the first of the two declared areas of political realism showed that despite of the presence of several coinciding provisions inherent in different types of realism (the main participants of international relations – the States, the structure of the international system is anarchic, based on the ideas of national interests and ideas of power), there are significant differences in some fundamental parameters for the theory of international relations. The greatest differences among the adherents of different types of political realism are the attitude to the formation of a new system of international relations, the goals (interests) of the parties in the process of forming this system, as well as the role of military force and a view of the conflict potential. Based on the data obtained, it is possible to present an analysis of the foreign policy of Russia, determined by certain qualitative parameters of the presented types of paradigm.

Correlation of the characteristics of the typology of realism with the foreign policy of Russia

Initially, the task of theorizing the real foreign policy of the country is quite difficult. The multi-vector nature of Russia's foreign policy does not allow us to consider its theoretical foundations solely from the point of view of one type of political realism. Despite this, certain characteristics of the different types of the paradigm are inherent in the steps that Russia is making in the global political arena. The analysis of the correlation of these steps with the selected criteria will give an answer to the question of what type of political realism Russia adheres to a greater extent.

The basic theoretical idea

According to the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of November 30, 2016, one of the fundamental goals is “to ensure the security of the country, its sovereignty and territorial integrity, strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions,” while at the same time Russia is ready to contribute to

“strengthening its position as one of the influential centres of the modern world” (Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации, 2016). Here it’s possible to see the concept of mainly defensive neo-realism and a number of features of offensive (except that there is no priority of the power solution of security problems). The anarchic structure of the international system in the context of the contradictions of the great powers inherent in neo-realism is reflected in Russia’s recognition of the existence of influential centres, one of which is itself.

This thesis is confirmed by statements at the highest level. The Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that the use of force is possible only with the permission of the UN Security Council. Given that Russia possesses one of the most destructive types of weapons – strategic nuclear weapons, the question of readiness to use this type of weapons remains open. In an interview with the American TV channel NBC, the Russian President noted that “there are only two reasons that can force Russia to resort to nuclear weapons – an attack on Russia with nuclear weapons or an attack using conventional types of weapons in a threat to the very existence of the state” (<https://www.nbcnews.com/video/confronting-putin-part-1-1182081091616>).

The real actions taken by Russia in the world political arena fully correspond to the conceptual framework and official statements of the head of state. An example is the events in Crimea, in which Russia used all its influence to avoid military actions and forcible coercion of the Peninsula’s citizens to adopt a system of values alien to them. According to the population census of 2014, presented by ROSSTAT, 67.90% of the population of the Republic of Crimea consider themselves Russian by nationality (http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/perepis_krim/tab-krim.htm). A referendum was held in which the will of the citizens was expressed in favour of joining the Peninsula to Russia. Military forces were introduced only for the sake of security, but not for the planting of individual will. This fits into the thesis put forward by defensive realism.

Russia’s interests and attitude to the power potential and modern conflicts

In the process of theoretical understanding of Russia’s foreign policy, the question of systematization of the state’s interests and attitude towards modern military conflicts represent priority areas for research. For starters, it is worth noting that the Russian Federation has the second largest military potential in the world (after the US). According to the international database Global Firepower, which represents the ranking of the strongest countries in the world based on the analysis of 55 indicators, the backlog of military-technical potential of Russia from the United States is gradually reduced (<https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>). The American portal of military-technical review Popular Mechanics has conducted in 2015 an independent study and made an attempt to simulate and predict the relationship of forces between Russia and the United States in the case of a new “cold war”. Comparative analysis of potentials showed that in the XXI century Russia has significantly advanced in the improvement of its types of weapons and “full parity is maintained only in the field of artillery” (<https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a15816/russia-us-weapons-comparison-new-cold-war/>). However, for a theoretical understanding of Russia’s attitude for building military-technical potential, it is necessary to study not so much the high dynamics of the development of Russian

weapons as the potential targets against which these weapons can be used. In the same article, the US Agency for Popular Mechanics in the framework of the comparison of the potential of rocket artillery it is stated that: “the United States has artillery rocket system M142 high mobility (HIMARS), which fires missiles with high accuracy. Russian system is equipped with a large number of rocket tubes that can shoot for a few seconds, they are less accurate, but have a greater range” (<https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a15816/russia-us-weapons-comparison-new-cold-war/>) Such indicators show that American systems are designed primarily for an attack, for targeted attacks on the military and civilian infrastructure of the affected territory and for the creation of relatively safe conditions for the presence of its military contingent providing artillery fire. Such a strategy fits into the expansionist aspirations of American policy outside its territory, as well as the artificial assignment of challenges and threats to the features inherent in the system of American values (in the understanding of supporters of constructive realism is the process of ideologization the foreign policy actions of the state).

In turn, the Russian nuclear artillery systems are aimed primarily at defence. High range combined with a large number of opportunities for simultaneous strikes will allow a more effectively repel of the attack on the border, with remote basing of the system itself. This suggests that Russia is aware of the potential threat posed by NATO member countries (the closest European countries of the Alliance), whose infrastructure is inexorably approaching the country's borders. Accordingly, new types of weapons are developed taking into account the need to protect Russia's physical borders and the understanding of the fact that a military conflict is not excluded (and NATO countries may not be parties to the conflict, as happened in 2008 with the Georgian-Ossetian war and in 2014 with the revolution in Ukraine). This is in line with the position of defensive neorealism as well as neoclassical realism.

The role of the state leader in shaping Russia's foreign policy

This issue is extremely relevant for the modern Western understanding of the shortcomings of Russian foreign policy. However, for Russia itself and its foreign policy interests, this is not a problem, on the contrary, in the conditions of not fully formed system of response to new challenges and threats, the ability to quickly make important decisions by the leader of the state is an important advantage over a multi-level mechanism of political decision-making.

Modern Russia has so far been ruled by only three Presidents: B.N. Yeltsin, V.V. Putin and D.A. Medvedev. The country has not yet accumulated enough experience for a comprehensive assessment of the Presidential institution in Russia, but we can already talk about a vivid manifestation of the features of classical political realism, as well as some features of defensive neo-realism. At the same time, it should be noted that both types are inherent only to the periods when Vladimir Putin was in power.

Russian and foreign researchers, as well as journalists, assess the influence of the Russian leader on the country's foreign policy, as being of great importance. Suffice it to say that one of the most popular American magazines Foreign Affairs regularly personifies the foreign policy of Russia. Thus, the name of the Russian President is found in 804 publications of the electronic version of the magazine, for comparison, the name of Angela Merkel is found in only 253 materials, and David Cameron in

123.(<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/search?q=Putin>) This indicates the popularity of the Russian leader. The high degree of influence on foreign policy is also indicated by international ratings and online surveys of the US and European population.

The image of Russia in the Western media is closely linked to the personality of the President. According to Sidelnikov, “the image of President Vladimir Putin plays a crucial role in shaping the image of Russia” (СИДЕЛЬНИКОВ, 2016: 217-225). This thesis confirms the media matrixes of the Western countries. In particular, for example, in the formation of the German media image of Russia in connection with the events of the Ukrainian crisis and the Syrian conflict, the highest index of aggressiveness (the quantitative ratio of negative and moderately negative publications with neutral in relation to the problem/country/personality of the head of state) was observed not in relation to Russia and its foreign policy, but against V. Putin (<https://riss.ru/analytics/29188/>).

As for the personal qualities of the President of Russia, it is worth noting that even anti-Russian studies, which regularly appear on various portals, recognize that “largely due to the strong-willed qualities of Putin, his determination, Russia has turned from a “fallen superpower” into a significant player, which is taken seriously” (Боџо, 2018: 43). There is a feeling that during the presidential terms of Vladimir Putin, Russia’s foreign policy gets a more concise character. A good example here is the comparison of the reactions of the two Russian heads of state: D.A. Medvedev on the Georgian-Ossetian conflict from 2008 and Vladimir Putin on the Ukrainian crisis and the Syrian conflict from 2012 and respectively 2014.

In 2008, there was a delay in the decision to assist South Ossetia in preventing the escalation of hostilities by Georgia. In the second case, it is obvious that operational decisions were made, though the difficult conditions of the beginning of the conflicts. In the case of Syria, Russia reacted in time to the willingness of Western partners to use force against the legitimate government, and in the case of Ukraine, the Russian state provided security for the citizens of the Crimean Peninsula. Also, Western researchers often compare V.V. Putin and B. Obama, arguing that the Assad regime survived due to indecision and delays on the part of the American President and the decisive actions of the Russian (we are talking about the fact that Obama long hesitated to use military force in Syria against Bashar al – Assad, and when the Western coalition suffered a number of failures-the responsibility for them was shifted to the US Congress) (Kessler, 2013).

In General, we can conclude that the question of the influence of the head of state on foreign policy in Russia, as in any other country, depends on the personal qualities of the person in power. The current head of state works mainly in line with the classical theory of political realism, maintaining a balance between national interests and personal views on the future of Russia. It is also clear that neoclassical realism, namely its defensive subtype, is reflected in the President’s willingness to take responsibility in the absence of political advantages from the decisions taken.

The ratio of “morality” and “power”

Ethics and morality, and even more so the balance of power and morality, in international relations, are those components that a priori cannot be universal. In this theory of political realism offers the most balanced approach to the interpretation of

the actions of countries on the world stage. Initially, realism is much more difficult from a moral point of view to justify the hypothesis that in human nature, which is guided by the country, there is a need for power and force. And they, in turn, are achieved through military-technical progress and participation in conflicts.

In order to explain the relationship between the concepts of “morality” and “power”, a separate trend emerged – moral realism, which is a meta-ethics, which interprets the moral motivation of countries in difficult conditions of power confrontation. However, there is an important problem in studying the moral aspects of realism. There is a high probability that instead of a theoretical understanding of the problem there will be a moral and ethical justification of illegal actions. Thus, for example, to justify the outbreak of hostilities in Afghanistan after the events of September 11, several scientific works were published (“Paradise and power” by Robert Kagan; “Surprise, security and the American experience” by John Lewis Gaddis, “Power, terror, peace and war” by Walter Russell Mead), in which, against the background of the idealization of American indigenous foreign policy foundations, the authors defiantly ignore the institutions that really have the right to resolve issues of war and peace and find moral justification for the decision on military intervention. All this, from the point of view of political realism, is leading to the “distortion of judgments, blind madness and destruction of Nations and entire civilizations” (Morgenthau, 1970).

Therefore, for political realism in General, as a paradigm of international relations, there is some “moral scepticism” based on the fact that “morality should be applied to people, not to states or individual institutions of power”(Kennan, 1985-1986: 207). Consequently, morality in international relations begins at the level of the individual and is therefore not universal.

However, in the absence of morality in the process of interaction in the world political arena, chaos will come, which can be left undesirable from a moral point of view in a way – by force. Therefore, the closest idea to the interpretation of morality for political realism is “state moralism”. It is based on “the need for States to comply with the rules of international conduct based on international law contained in specific doctrines, agreements (Röling, 1979: 227). The difference in the types of political realism begins at the stage of interpretation of the norms of international law, which today, despite the openness and accessibility remain not universal.

Ethics and morality in Russia’s foreign policy are based on several principles:

- Historical justice (historical truth).
- Respect for international law and prevention of the use of duality in the legal system in favour of the adoption of a single individual solution.
- Prevention of interference in the Internal Affairs of Russia (by any available means, including military).
- A balanced response to threats to Russia.
- Assistance (including military assistance) if necessary to protect the ethnically Russian (or other Slavic) people or when the official authorities apply for help to preserve statehood.

The first of these principles represents the key in terms of systematic levelling of the role of Russia (as well as the Russian Empire and the USSR) in the process of

preserving peace, order and stability of the system of international relations. The principle of preventing interference in the Internal Affairs of Russia is fixed in the conceptual documents and is regularly voiced by the President of Russia. These sources of realization suggest that the moral principles of Russia's foreign policy are generated through defensive neo-realism (unwillingness to agree with universal moral foundations and subject-oriented orientation).

As for the symmetrical response to challenges and threats, this principle is difficult to attribute to the classical understanding of moral norms and values. This theoretical postulate goes against the Christian understanding of morality: "whoever slaps you on your right cheek, turn the other also to him". Compliance with this commandment in foreign policy is impossible due to the fact that international relations are constantly in a state of a struggle of rationality, i.e. the benefit of each new step should be more than the losses that it can bring. Stephen Darvall holds the same moral view, arguing that "morality in international relations is a matter of equal responsibility (treat the other with the degree of respect you demand for yourself)" (Darvall, 2005). Russia is ready to take responsibility for the consequences of the actions it takes to protect its national interests, stability and security. For example, regular humanitarian assistance to Syria, the infrastructure of which is destroyed by air strikes of the Western coalition, as well as compliance with obligations under the allied agreements.

Conclusion

The analysis of the correlation of the selected characteristics of certain types of political realism with the foreign policy course of the Russian Federation revealed several trends: first, general foreign policy issues related to the criteria for determining the system of international relations, as well as the dynamics of approaches to its formation are in line with the classical ideas of the paradigm of political realism. Russia tends to view the foreign policy course as a set of political, military-technical, economic and socio-humanitarian aspects of interaction with other actors in world politics.

At least in the framework of the general approaches reflects the ideas of neoclassical realism and structural realism. This is due to the fact that the domestic political component is not reflected in the foreign policy course due to the high degree of public confidence in the government. It is also obvious that there is a process of reducing the level of Russia's confidence in various kinds of Alliances, due to the fact that the value of multilateral agreements is steadily falling.

As for the strategically important areas of regulation, the ideas of neo-realism, mainly of a defensive type, have more weight here. The idea is based on the use of force in exceptional cases of protection of national interests, the reflection of military intervention, as well as the creation of conditions of maximum security with an emphasis on a multi-level system of material and technical values.

Moral and ethical aspects of foreign policy have characteristic parameters of neorealism and neoclassical realism. Morality is a kind of component of the state power of Russia due to the fact that it does not allow in its behaviour violations of

established international norms and rules, and also does not allow itself to be manipulated by those ideas that are unacceptable to it.

As can be seen from the above study, in the foreign policy of Russia there are practically no features of constructive realism. At the level of General questions, this is due to the lack of ideology in the country, as well as to the prevention of imposing the will of strong powers on potentially weaker states. In addition, given that Russia is a powerful political and military-technical centre, it can potentially not share the idea of constructive realism to ignore the problems of the system of international relations. At the moment, a multipolar system based on a number of state actors is being formed, without which it will be impossible to make decisions on a regional and global scale. Over the past decade, Russia has actively moved towards becoming one of the centres of this system. Thus, the hierarchy of typical priority within the paradigm of political realism can be represented in the following way: Neorealism (defensive) – Realism – Neoclassical realism – Neorealism (offensive) – Constructive realism.

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STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF BEHAVIOUR OF SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS OF HISTORICAL TRAUMA

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Abstract

The aim of this article is a socio-philosophical generalisation of the leading strategies of behaviour of actors of historical trauma to achieve tolerant relations between social groups, societies and states. The basic methodological premise of the research is the thesis of the discursive nature of historical trauma, thus, the main method is the method of discourse analysis. These theoretical generalisations were made on the basis of comparative analysis of socio-political discourse of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Ukraine. A tangible place in this discourse belongs to the thematisation of the Holocaust, the Holodomor, Stalin's repression and the like. The authors came to the conclusion that it was necessary to differentiate the behaviour of subjects and objects of a historical trauma. If the first (subjects) choose denial of guilt, self-justification, awareness of responsibility, repentance as the main strategies of their behavior, the latter (objects) can choose strategies of oblivion (silence), manifestation, forgiveness. At the same time, the strategy of manifestation is divided into several tactics, among which the tactics of "telling the truth", "restoring justice", "revenge" and "justifying by the victims of the actions of their offenders" are described. The strategies of overcoming the historical trauma should contribute to the restoration of social and spiritual health of the society. The most effective strategies in this regard are repentance and forgiveness. At the same time, forgiveness is the prerogative of the victims just like repentance is the prerogative of the guilty.

Key words: *victims, repression, guilt, repentance, forgiveness*

Introduction

In XXI century, it is very difficult to find a people who has lived a flourishing and even life, full of ups and victories, a life devoid of terrible tragedies and cataclysms. Historical traumas caused by two world and numerous local wars, repression, deportations, "purges", conflicts and the like are known to almost every social community no matter if it is an ethnic group, a nation or another social group. The ruthless Moloch of history collected a bloody sacrifice from XX century the memory of which is still alive nowadays.

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In many countries of Central and Eastern Europe, historical traumas are a significant factor of the socio-cultural landscape, they affect the value orientation and spiritual atmosphere of the society as well as determine the vector of its political development. In some of them, it is even possible to notice an excessive enthusiasm for traumatic experience of the past, psycho-emotional concentration on the wounds inflicted on grandfathers and great-grandfathers, desire to restore justice, to return from oblivion the names of the victims, painful desire to change something, to correct in history, to live it again in the alternative way, albeit in the virtual state. According to Aleida Assmann, “the society is now going through a ‘post-traumatic era’ in which memorial practices are closely intertwined with memorial theories (Assmann, 2012: 61).

Tragic events in the history of Ukraine of XX century make themselves felt today. The consequences of historical trauma, in particular, the devastating famine of 1932-33, are inherited as behavioural patterns and survival algorithms. Among them O. Zinchenko singles out changes in childbearing behaviour (“one should not give birth to more children than one can feed»), limitation of life perspective (“There will be a day, there will be some food”), pessimism (“One should leave here because nothing good will be here”) and distrust of power, etc. (Zinchenko, 2018: 2). Today, there is a problem of transgenerational transmission of traumas to the younger generation that can have undesirable consequences.

The problem of historical trauma as a social phenomenon in modern humanitarianism has not yet obtained a single vision. The theoretical and methodological roots of the problem of collective trauma reach the second half of the XIX – early XX century and are based on the research works of F. Nietzsche, A. Eulenburg, J. Breuer, S. Freud, P. Janet and J.-M. Charcot, the concept itself appears in the book *Everything at One's Way* by K. Erikson which is dedicated to the catastrophic flood in West Virginia in 1972 (Zembylas & Bekerman, 2008: 141).

For today, there are two main approaches to studying a trauma as a collective phenomenon: psychological and sociological-oriented concepts. In the framework of the first approach, the injury is considered as individually experienced by a certain person. Its collective status is explained by the fact that traumatic experience concerns a large number of people. This approach makes it possible to understand that the collective trauma was in the past, the bearers of the trauma are witnesses and victims, but not the whole society. In the framework of this approach there is work O. Astashov, R. Kliuher, P. Konerton and L. Langer (Miller 2006: 15-16).

The sociological-oriented approach is presented in the research works of J. Alexander where is accentuated the process of trauma formation as a marker of identity for the society. This idea is developed by A. Kiuner, M. Brunner, P. Sztompka, O. Kamenskykh and O. Chupyra. The latter approach includes a popular nowadays postcolonial discourse in which a historical trauma is considered as a product of colonisation and cultural oppression of indigenous non-European peoples. Such understanding is presented in the research works of A. Assmann, P. Nora, J.-F. Lyotard, D. Chakrabarty, etc. However, Dipesh Chakrabarty insists on the need to distinguish between such concepts as “historical trauma” and “historical fact”. This reflects a conflict between two interested parties: on the one hand, a caste of

professional historians, and on the other hand, groups focused on a new politics of identity. So, historical traumas are the interaction of history and memory, but historians are annoyed by this combination because they consider it necessary to separate these two components in the name of historical justice and truth (Chakrabarty, 2000: 201).

In the book *The Long Shadow of the Past. Memorial Culture and Historical Policy* A. Assmann comes to the conclusion that the concept of “historical trauma” was introduced to demonstrate the importance of memory in overcoming the legacy left from colonialism and slave trade (Assmann, 2014: 72-73). T. Hundorova (2013) made an attempt to go beyond the Freudian psychoanalysis and present “decolonised theory of trauma” (Hundorova, 2013: 115).

In general, in the scientific literature there is an understanding of what is a historical trauma. The vast majority of publications are dedicated to applied aspects of post-traumatic syndrome (mental disorders, drug addiction, social maladjustment, marginalisation, etc.). At the same time, much less attention is paid to typical behavioral strategies to overcome the consequences of historical trauma – at the societal and individual levels.

So, the aim of our article is the socio-philosophical generalisation of the leading strategies and tactics of behaviour of each of the actors of a historical trauma in order to achieve tolerant relations between social groups, societies and states.

Materials and Methods

The basic methodological premise of our research is the thesis of the discursive nature of a historical trauma. Traditionally, a historical trauma is considered in two dimensions: 1) as specific negative events that happened in the real world and which are recognised by an individual and society as “traumatic”, they are experienced as “traumatic state” or “traumatic situation”; 2) as pathological consequences of these events which, by extrapolation to the past, are considered to be caused by an experienced trauma. Thus, a historical trauma is understood as both a traumatic event and the process of developing the memory of a trauma.

However, at the individual level, the trauma experienced by a person resembles an “unexploded ball in the human body” while at the societal level, a historical trauma tells on the descendants of the victims, that is, those who do not directly have a traumatic experience, but sincerely worry about the violation of the rights and dignity of their group. The information on the trauma is transmitted verbally, and the traumatising events themselves acquire symbolic meaning. It means that a historical trauma is presented to a researcher approximately like the literary text to a reader, literary critic or hermeneut.

“Socio-Cultural Reality is a Text” postmodern metaphor means that, first, sociocultural reality is a product of interaction of the immense variety of discursive practices, and second, this reality is the being that can be read, interpreted and understood. The attempt of descendants to feel what their predecessors really experienced is nothing but an attempt of symbolic deconstruction of history.

Unlike the facts about certain historical events reliably recorded in the archives, traumatic experience has a discursive nature, it is characterised by the presence of

generalisations and emotional connection with identity, it is a part of the historical narrative and requires social recognition. Therefore, a historical trauma is characterised by a dialogical element based on contractual principles.

Based on this, we believe that the most appropriate method of studying historical traumas and ways to overcome them is the method of discourse analysis. It is clear that in this context it is necessary “to move away” from narrowly linguistic interpretation of discourse, in particular, to its reducing to the procedure of content analysis. Reasoning on the sociocultural reality in all its totality, a discourse analyst asks himself: what is the meaning revealed to me in the sociocultural reality? What is its meaning? What does it mean? Trying to give an answer to the question of the discourse content, we have to answer him with the help of the other discourse that should serve as its meaning, and there is no other way to answer this question.

Thus, we consider discourse as verbally articulated form of objectification of the content of consciousness, and the method of discourse analysis used to describe the existing discursive practices of overcoming the consequences of historical traumas will allow to evaluate the effectiveness and prospectiveness of specific steps in this direction.

The theoretical generalisations given in this article were made on the basis of the comparative analysis of socio-political discourse of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Ukraine. A tangible place in this discourse belongs to the thematisation of the Holocaust, the Holodomor, Stalin’s repression and the like.


Results and Discussion

Moving on to the presentation of the results of our research, we should make a certain methodological remark regarding the understanding of the object and subject of a historical trauma. The subject is the one who causes a trauma, the object is the one who suffers from a trauma, namely, a victim. Overcoming the historical trauma and therefore, the moral improvement of the society, stipulates an effective social dialogue that leads to the recognition of the commission of injustice. At the same time, it is important that such a dialogue should be initiated by the perpetrators of a historical trauma, and they should confess their guilt within the confines of the repentance policy (Smoliar, 2009: 81-83).

The task of overcoming a historical trauma is much easier if the state has a clear policy of post-traumatic rehabilitation. But very often it happens that at the state level the very fact of traumatic impact is denied, and historians feel confused because of the lack of archives. In this case, it is more correct to speak not about a purposeful policy of overcoming negative experience, but about the leading strategies of post-traumatic behaviour of subjects and objects of historical traumas (Ohienko, 2013: 149-150).

In the result of the discourse analysis it was found that possible strategies of behaviour of subjects and objects of a historical trauma tended to such options (Table 1):

Table 1. Leading strategies of behaviour of subjects and objects of historical trauma

Historical trauma			
Subjects (violators)	Objects (victims)		
Denial of guilt	Oblivion (silence)		
Self-justification	Manifestation		
Awareness of responsibility	Restoration of justice	Thirst for revenge	Justification of abusers
			

Guilt denial

One of the most common strategies of behaviour of the subjects of a historical trauma is the complete denial of the act of committing a crime or one's own involvement in crimes. Denial is an attempt to replace the memory of complicity in a crime. Here again it is possible to observe the analogy with an individual trauma and with an understandable desire to forget, not to recognise and not to remember (Rosental, 2008: 52).

Thus, in particular, in the Soviet Union, the subject of the Holodomor belonged to the number of taboo topics. While in the West, scientists collected and analysed the testimony of victims who were lucky to survive, in the USSR one could not write or talk about it. The policy of silence lasted for decades. Even today, the Russian Federation denies the Holodomor as an act of conscious destruction of the Ukrainian people. The very fact of hunger is recognised, but its artificial nature is not. The argument in this regard is the reference to the victims of hunger in Volga Region, Kazakhstan, Kuban and the like. So to say, if the forced withdrawal of food concerned only the Ukrainians, how is it possible explain the famine outside Ukraine? The famine of 1932-33 is interpreted in Russia as an instrument of class struggle with the peasantry. Some authors are inclined to believe that the famine was an unplanned consequence of the kulak resistance to the policy of forced requisitions. By this logic, the explanation of the causes of famine due to the class struggle does not imply the existence of the other causes, including the purposeful genocide (Lopez, 2011: 303-305).

In the Soviet Union until the last days of its existence the scale of repression was also denied, including the era of pre-war Great Terror. The published figures of the shot and convicted shocked, prompting a conclusion on the anti-national nature of the Soviet power. After all, hundreds of thousands and millions of victims of Stalin Regime cannot be accounted for by any specific "affairs" against spies, saboteurs-engineers, doctors, military men and intellectuals (Manokha & Sobchuk, 2017: 161).

The prisoners of Nazi concentration camps were very oppressed by the idea that humanity would not know about the horrors they had to go through. Simon Wiesenthal, a researcher of the Holocaust, says in his book *Murderers Among Us* about the SS men that cynically stated, "No matter what way this war will end, we have already won; none of us will remain to testify, but even if someone survived, the

world would not believe him. Perhaps, there will be some doubts, discussions, research of historians, but there will be no certainty because by destroying you we eliminate the evidence. But even if some evidence is preserved, people will say that these facts are too savage to be true: they will talk about the fiction of the Soviet propaganda and they will believe us, but not you, and we will deny everything. It is we who will dictate the history of concentration camps” (Wiesenthal, 1967: 39-42).

Self-justification

Along with the strategy of denial, the subjects of historical traumas actively use the technics of self-justification, abrogating responsibility for the committed crimes. The most well-known formula which was adhered to by the Nazi military is “I was following the order” (Lawrence, 1991: 200). In this case, the criminal nature of the actions seems to be recognised by a subject, he does not justify the regime any more, but, at the same time, he explains his actions by the lack of alternatives and the inefficiency of the protest. In the system where every person reduced to the status of a “screw” of a giant social machine performed certain functions. The refusal to follow the order automatically led to the replacement of the rebel by another one, more obedient “screw”, and the inevitable punishment of the violator up to execution (Chechel & Konoplyov, 2013: 182). This is a convenient ethical position, resulting in the individual subject withering away in the collective subject-system.

But in addition to such a position of self-justification, among the executors of orders there was also confidence in the expediency of their own actions, their necessity and validity by the highest interests. The deportation of the Chechens and the Crimean Tatars was justified by their “treason” (the guilt of some collaborators is transferred to the whole nation). In the similar way the destroying and deportation of the Armenians and the Greeks become quite legitimate means for the Turkish officials and soldiers to fight with separatists and traitors in the conditions of war. A similar form of self-justification is the accusation from the side of the enemy, namely, the removal of any argument with the help of a universal rhetorical formula “but they...” (Kühner, 2007: 97).

Awareness of guilt and responsibility

Only a small number of perpetrators of criminal acts are able to realise their guilt and responsibility. A frank avowal of guilt is the first step towards repentance, that is, recognition and condemnation of the past and, at the same disengagement from it. According to Manfred Deselaers, an employee of the Center for Dialogue and Prayer in Auschwitz, “Nowadays, when the Germans come to visit Auschwitz, they do it not to commemorate the memory of their countrymen and stay loyal to them. On the contrary, they emphasise that they are not Nazis, they are other Germans, and if they came here to remember and honor someone, then only victims” (Wiesenthal, 1967: 58).

Repentance is the most effective form of memory on the part of those who are directly or indirectly responsible for the evil they have done.

Oblivion (silence)

Let us move on to possible strategies for mastering the historical traumas of the victims. As already mentioned, they act as objects of violent actions and in this state are often devoid of subjectivity unlike the other actors of the historical process. A person brought to the state of an animal is easier to control physically, it is easy to

break his will, nothing but the desire of his body is actualised and the activity of consciousness is dulled and directed to maintain the life of this body. So, the first fundamental condition which, actually, starts the process of overcoming a historical trauma is the elimination of the factors that make this trauma possible. It is necessary to ensure the reliable cessation of traumatic factors that involves the development of socio-political project which should eliminate forever the relevant situation and take under the society's control the post-traumatic adaptation of its victims (Kis, 2010: 85).

A sustainable reaction to the impersonal and inhuman conditions of existence is the silence of the victims of a historical trauma who prefer "to forget" about it. But the silence of a victim is not only a mental response, but also a conscious strategy of certain individual as well as the society as a whole, aimed at overcoming maladaptation and "turning the page" of his own life and search of further prospects.

According to L. Petranovskaya (Petranovskaya, 2018: 3), the dynamics of a historical psychological trauma implies consistent getting through stages of shock, denial, awareness and recovery. If at the stage of shock, the main goal of a person is elementary survival, at the stage of denial there arises the illusion of rehabilitation. "The function of this stage is a respite and a pause to accumulate the resources necessary to overcome a trauma. The safer are the circumstances in which a person proves to be after a trauma, and the greater is the internal resource, the shorter will be the stage of denial". L. Naidionova notes that in the Soviet Union after the Second World War the internal policy was actually aimed at blocking the reflexion of the event that led to the stage of denial (Naidionova, 2012: 49). In our opinion, the phenomenon of silence corresponds precisely to the stage of denial.

Leading tactics of manifestation

Those who cannot keep silent choose the opposite strategy for coping with a trauma, namely, manifestation as the desire to inform the world of the injustice and cruelty of crimes. Through the manifestation of a trauma, a person tries to regain a human face, clear the violated dignity and prove the systemic and mass character of the committed evil.

Depending on the individual psychosocial characteristics, the manifestation can occur in the form of 1) informing about the truth and justice, 2) calls for revenge and even 3) justification of the violators (Kiridon, 2016: 135).

The tactics of "informing the truth" is aimed at elimination of traumatic events from the "historical non-existence". Despite the desire of the authorities and direct perpetrators to classify the crimes, the victims who chose these tactics carefully collect the information, search for the other victims, visit the scenes and spread the obtained information by all available means. As a matter of fact, this tactic is the beginning of a trauma narrativization process (Edwards, 2010: 71).

According to L. Petranovska, the stage of awareness of a social trauma corresponds to it. This stage is characterised by "overflow" with feelings, the need to talk about them, the need to come back to the scene, to restore the details, completeness and brightness of memories, "re-experience", living out anger to violators, compensatory aggression and living out guilt and the transition from guilt to responsibility.

In the Soviet socio-political discourse, the transition from silence to the manifestation of trauma inflicted by war is associated with the release of *Cranes are Flying* Film in 1957 (Naidionova, 2012: 50). But the trauma inflicted by Stalin's internal repression has become the subject of manifestation since 1962 when A. Solzhenitsyn's novel *One Day from the life of Ivan Denisovich* was published in *Novyi Mir Magazine* (Baker & Gippenreiter, 1998: 205-207). The role of psychotherapists is thus taken over by people of art. Perhaps, it is because of this fact that the question of the responsibility of torturers and violators became more or less legitimate.

The opposite tactic to "informing the truth" tactic is a tactic of revenge where in the collective psyche arise a zoological reaction to the done evil. Chronologically, this tactic is close to the stage of shock. Talion's "eye for an eye" principle overshadows the moral stratification of civilisation (Briggs, 2016: 102). Of course, revenge is the same extreme too as a trauma itself, and the stronger is the latter, more overwhelming is a desire to revenge.

It should be recalled how, after the Second World War, there were massacres of the Germans, not only of the military or the Nazis, but also of civilians, including women and children. The feeling of collective guilt and collective responsibility of all Germans was cultivated. Let us recall about *Nokmim* (Revenge) Jewish movement chaired by Abba Kovner which aim was the destruction of 6 million (!) Germans, about concentration camp for the Nazis at the place of the "branch of Auschwitz" in Poland which was led by Solomon Morel and so on (Bar-On *et al.*, 1998: 327). "These were not "good" acts. It was revenge. Actually, we have lost the war. We lost six million Jews. And that one who did not see these places, concentration camps and crematoria will not understand what we did. Because we were weak, we had neither state, nor power, we took revenge. It was not a good act", recognises Haim Laskov, one of the participants of the underground movement (Kharlamov, 2016: 2).

It is clear that the ethical position of those who chose a revenge tactic is, frankly speaking, weak. The similar creates the similar, violence begets violence. In revenge, the victim is likened to the perpetrator, creating a new cycle of violence and, consequently, a new trauma (Antze & Lambek, 1996: 142).

Another tactic of trauma manifestation is the justification by the victims of the actions of their offenders – the tactic is paradoxical and extremely contradictory and to some extent similar to "Stockholm syndrome". Olexiy Kamenskykh gives the examples of memories of a boy from a dispossessed family who thanks the Soviet authorities for free clothes and bread provided to the orphanage; story by O. Losev *From Conversations in Belomorstroy* where prisoners "with a dialectical necessity" prove to one other the appropriateness of their own arrest and sacrificing their lives for the sake of building a new world; numerous appeals of the Volga Germans to the Administration of the Perm camps in 1941-42 with requests to send them to the front for the redemption of the guilt of belonging to the German people; and after all, "reversible neostalinism" the forms of which we see in modern Russia. In all these cases, we observe not only the manifestations of resignation (from Latin *resignatio* means "destruction"), but also taking one's own "guilt", inability to independently

dispose of one's own fate and solidarity of victims of violence with the violator (Kamenskykh, 2015: 78).

The effectiveness of the chosen tactic in the framework of the strategy of manifestation of a historical trauma is, of course, different. Obviously, the tactic of "Stockholm syndrome" is rather a psychopathology, and the tactic of revenge leads to the deadlock of cyclical violence. Only the first described tactic, namely, "informing the truth", can eventually lead to reconciliation, but anyway it does not guarantee automatic success.

Forgiveness

It is important to emphasise that forgiveness is the prerogative of the victims just like repentance is the prerogative of the guilty. Forgiveness as a strategy to overcome historical trauma requires a certain moral maturity and, in particular, a special level of development of mercy. Thus, V. Grossman recalls a Stalingrad woman who held out a loaf of bread to a German prisoner of war. But this situation deserves respect and honour than the situation when revenge outgrows all norms of humanity and a person turns into a beast (Kamenskykh, 2015: 92).

Most often, the culture of mercy is identified with religious education. The words of Christ "if anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to him the other cheek also" (Matthew 5: 39) in symbolic form express the commandment: to answer evil not with evil, but good," and the right to judge and punish should be left to the God. Therefore, it is no wonder that it is in religious communities that forgiveness and repentance are cultivated, and it is religious organisations that initiate appropriate social campaigns at the societal level.

But not only religious communities, but also secular society is gradually coming to the need to work out historical traumas. The strategy of "repentance and forgiveness", according to the periodization of L. Petranovska, is similar to the stage of recovery when a person says to himself "pain is enough" and "lets the historical event go" to the past. "A characteristic feature of this stage is the increase of consumption, the emphasis on the satisfaction of physical and material needs and switching to the topics of today. Compared to the past generation, lack of ideology, consumerism, and sexualization, which are inherent in the new generation, in a certain way indicate a stage of society's recovery from historical trauma" (Naidionova, 2012: 51).

The position of repentance and forgiveness is not only an indicator of a person's maturity, but also an indicator of the presence of self-reflection and consensus in the society as well as a marker of the democratic nature of the political system. "The historical gesture of German Chancellor Willy Brandt on December 7th, 1970 who knelt in front of the memorial to the victims of uprising in Warsaw ghetto was the most direct consequence of the rethinking of the Nazi past in Germany. Brandt came to power in the time of the protest movement in 1968 which in turn was the result of the processes of internal democratisation of West German society which was directly related to the re-evaluation of the past. As soon as the society's majority reached a consensus on this issue, it demanded a rethinking of relations with neighbours and led in the necessary way to Warsaw kneeling" (Epple, 2017: 3). A series of public apologies which happened after the mentioned act became a direct performative expression of the strategy of repentance. At the same time, it is still unknown who

needs such apologies more – the society to which the political leader addresses, or the society on whose behalf he speaks. Through its dependence on dialogical recognition, the strategy of overcoming historical trauma directly depends on the degree of guilt awareness. Trauma is a socio-ethical phenomenon which is at first sight ephemeral, but to overcome it, one should achieve and maintain social consensus.

Conclusion

Summing up the results of the above reasoning, we note that a historical trauma is a deep emotional and psychological impression caused by cruel forms of violence, the destruction of an established way of life as well as its negative impact on the psyche, behaviour, memory of individuals and social groups. The consequences of a historical trauma are so devastating that they destabilise the whole social system and affect all citizens and social communities.

First, this is a psychological problem and the consequences of post-traumatic syndrome that concern every person since a collective trauma is always experienced in the individual way. The metaphorical description of a trauma as an “unexploded bullet” best reflects its content. And this feeling of a foreign object is very difficult to express rationally, more irrational colours, such as tears, sadness and melancholy suit more.

Second, this is an ethical problem because a historical trauma requires a dialogue between violators and victims in which both sides recognise both a historical trauma and the traumatic past of this story. Repentance and forgiveness are the means to overcome a historical trauma. If historical images in the society are consigned to the “dustbin of history”, they are not analysed, then there is a chance of their displacement into the collective unconscious. In such circumstances, trauma “drags along” after the nation throughout its existence, forming a complex of inferiority within its citizens.

Third, this is an ideological problem and historical traumas become the background for the formation of new narratives, and this property cannot be ignored. Modern societies with great enthusiasm overcome the era of metanarratives, emphasising the harm they have done to the human community in the course of human existence, and, in particular, in the XX century. Overcoming large narratives, the society increasingly resorts to the creation of small narratives which also serve as a form of uniting the society. Politicians are looking for the “grains-events” around which it is possible to unite the society. Ernest Renan, a French scholar in his time, said that a historical trauma could unite the society even to greater extent than historical triumph.

However, in Ukraine, the process of creating new narratives takes place both within the framework of a psychological approach and through a socially-oriented understanding of a trauma. At first, at the level of psychological approach, they analyse the facts of traumatising of the society that lived out the victims and witnesses of a certain historical event, and then they move on to sociological one due to which the society’s mobilisation takes place around a trauma on the basis of a collective narrations which consist of individual stories. Since for a sociological approach it does not really matter if a trauma was in the past, it is enough that a group

of people considers a historical trauma real and identify themselves with its victims. The discourse of a historical trauma in modern Ukraine consists in the fact that identity is formed not so much around people who have experienced a trauma, but on the symbolic transmission of a trauma, namely, thanks to the films, literature and diaries of victims.

At the same time, excessive “relishing” the pain from the lived out traumas distracts the Ukrainians from actual problems, masking the mistakes and deliberate abuses of the authorities against their people. The described above strategies of behaviour of subjects (denial of guilt, self-justification, awareness of responsibility) and objects of a historical trauma (silence, manifestation – restoration of justice, thirst for revenge and “Stockholm syndrome”) are integrated, after all, on repentance and forgiveness. It goes without saying that every nation struggles for the restoration of historical justice that the perpetrators should be punished or at least they should apologise at the highest level. But the question arises: what should prevail in such a situation – historical justice or the formation of a new form of identity? Is not it better to focus on the forms of overcoming a historical trauma? No one denies that it is very important to understand the causes of a historical trauma and its consequences, but the most important thing is the movement of the society forward, not the focus on historical images, but the vision of the prospects for the society’s development. This is the way we usually overcome the traumas that fell on our fate. The main conclusion that can be made based on the analysis of socio-political discourses of post-traumatic societies is that we should take care of our people, their physical and spiritual health, well-being now, without postponing it for the future.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Ioan Pelivan, *Correspondență. Memorii* [Correspondence. Memories]. Ediție îngrijită, prefață și notă asupra ediției de Ion Constantin, Ion Negrei, Gheorghe Negru, Știința (Colecția *Pagini despre Basarabia*), Chișinău, 2019, 436 pp. ISBN 978-9975-85-180-0

Within collection *Pagini despre Basarabia* [Pages about Bessarabia], of the prestigious Publishing House *Știința* [Science], from Chișinău, a volume of remarkable scientific importance – and national-cultural significance, at the same time – has also emerged. The volume opens with *Ioan Pelivan, o conștiință românească exemplară* [Ioan Pelivan, An Exemplary Romanian Conscience] (pp. 3-9), and *Alcătuitorii* [Editors], *Notă asupra ediției* [Note on the Edition] (pp. 10-14).

The content itself forms it: *Correspondență* [Correspondence] (pp. 15-369), respectively *Scrisori expediate de Ioan Pelivan* [Letters sent by Ioan Pelivan] (pp. 16-78), *Scrisori adresate lui Ioan Pelivan* [Letters to Ioan Pelivan] (pp. 79-306), and *Scrisori colectate de Ioan Pelivan* [Letters collected by Ioan Pelivan] (pp. 307-369); II: *Memorii* [Memories] (pp. 370-434), with *Deșteptarea națională* [The National Awakening] (pp. 372-389), *Amintiri* [Memories] (pp. 390-417), and *Ion Incuț și Conferința de Pace de la Paris. Amintiri, observații și scrisori* [Ion Incuț and the Paris Peace Conference. Memories, Observations, and Letters] (pp. 418-434).

As the three editors show – remarkable modernist historians, exegetes of the life and activity of Ioan Pelivan (as well as of other national-cultural corife and militants from Moldavia beyond the Prut, under the domination of the Russian Empire – such as Pantelimon Halippa) –, this volume offers today's generations epistolary and memorial heritage legacy of “the eminent” militant for the emancipation of Bessarabia, politician and state man, Ioan Pelivan (1876-1954). The materials evoke the crucial events of the history of Bessarabia from 1900-1920, such as the national movement during the Russian revolutions of 1905-1907 and 1917, the union of Bessarabia with Romania in 1918, the defense of the interests of the Bessarabian Romanians and of Entire [*întregite*] Romania at the Peace Conference in Paris in the years 1919-1920.

The first compartment contains – and we will refer below to the details that the *Alcătuitorii* [Editors] make in the Note on the Edition – the correspondence of Ioan Pelivan with his former colleagues at the Theological Seminary in Chișinău (Nicolae Murea, Eugraf Ghidu), with the Bessarabian students studying at the University and the Veterinary Institute in the Estonian city of Dorpat [Tartu], reunited in a «Land» [*Pământeni*] of the Bessarabians (Vasile Oatul, Alexandru Oatul, Constantin Goian, Vasile Mahu, Nicolae Florov, Teodor Loghin, Pavel Grosu), with various personalities and political and cultural activists from Bessarabia (Ștefan Usinevici, Alexei Mateevici, Ștefan Ciobanu, Daniel Ciugureanu, Gurie Grosu, Vasile Bodî), Romania (Constantin Stere, Roman Stere, Gheorghe Madan, Teodor Porucic, Zamfir Arbore, Apostol Culea, Axentie Frunză, Dumitru Moruzi, Ștefan Stoica), Russian Empire (Nicolae Sigorski, Mihail Voznesenski, Lidia Grațianski, Boris Dorsynski, Boris Agrosev, Teodor Matușevski, Elena Tepan, Pavel Fabricini, Alexandra Smirnov, Maria Șehtman *et al.*). The volume also includes letters of some Romanian intellectuals from Bessarabia and Romania, signed by Pantelimon Halippa, Sergiu Cujbă, Nicolae Iorga, Constantin Stere, Emanuil Gavrilă, Mihai Vântu, Vasile Moraru, Vasile Florea, Ion Loghinescu, Ștefan Stoica, Gurie Grosănu, Vas *et al.*, collected by Ioan Pelivan. They complement, from a thematic point of view, the content of the correspondence they carry. A final set of letters is the correspondence of Ioan Pelivan, Romania's delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, held, for the most part, with Ion Incuț and Daniel Ciugureanu, Ministers of State Secretaries (without portfolios) in the Romanian Government (pp. 10-11).

In the beginning part of this precious volume, *Ioan Pelivan, An Exemplary Romanian Conscience*, the editors synthesize the personality of this artisan of the return of his native land, Bessarabia, within the framework of the Motherland (whose life ended tragically, in 1954, in the prison in which they were “housed”, since 1950, the emblematic dignitaries of Greater Romania): “He remained true to his political credo formulated from a very young age – national unity is the most conducive environment for the formation of a nation – and made every effort to achieve this goal. An eminent personality of the political and cultural life of Bessarabia, he left posterity a rich political and scientific work, unfortunately, completely unqualified”; and also shows further: “The correspondence, carried and assembled by Ioan Pelivan, is an important source for researching the history of Romanians in Bessarabia from the beginning of the 20th century, and for the years 1900-1906, given that no national newspaper was published in Bessarabia, its role *is invaluable* (our emphasis). The letters collected by Ioan Pelivan offer the perspective of entering into the «behind the scenes» of history, to follow the process of developing the modern Romanian identity with the cultural elite of Bessarabia from the beginning of the 20th century, to reflect on the ethnocultural relations between Romanians from Bessarabia and Romania, to the whole picture of the constitution of the press in Romanian language and of the national movement in 1905 and in the following years, which, finally, allows us to understand how the generation appeared and developed which, in 1918, contributed to the union of Bessarabia with Romania, and then – at the integration and consolidation of the former Tsarist Gubernia within the contemporary reunified [*reîntregit*] Romanian state” (p. 11). In February 1919, the Romanian Government empowers him to appear the interests of Bessarabia at the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920). During his stay in Paris, he edited the newspaper *La Bessarabie* and collaborated with the newspapers: *Le Temps*, *La Victoire*, *La Patrie*. In the works published and in the articles published in the press, the author, knowingly, based on historical documents, described objectively the abduction of Bessarabia, in 1812, by Tzarist Russia and its evolution within the Russian Empire, and, as an eyewitness, and an immediate participant in the event explained how the actions took place in the land between Prut and Dniester in 1917-1918. “Through his rich diplomatic and publicity activity, he sought to convince both the delegates to the Conference and the public opinion in the West that, from a historical, ethnic and national self-determination point of view, Bessarabia is eminently a Romanian province; he founded Romania’s rights over Bessarabia; he denied the insinuations and demolished the insinuations and lies of the enemies” (p. 8).

And because this year marks one hundred years since those events in Paris, and to which Ioan Pelivan, witnessed – but also a participant – to note here, one of his sayings in letters from a century ago: “Brethren [he addressed to Ion Inculeț and Daniel Ciugureanu], I am extraordinarily sorry that until now you have not sent me the books and minutes that I have requested so many times. Now I think some of my letters could have been lost. But at least one was received, because Inculeț writes about it, promising that it will do everything to send me what I asked. What does your silence mean, I understand nothing. I asked you to send me one-two newspapers from Chișinău to be aware of what is being done there, and nothing. I find out about the life of Bessarabia from the Transylvanian and Bukovina newspapers. Brătianu often asks me: «What’s going on in Bessarabia?», and I have to shrug. Our situation in general is as sad as possible. *The Allies treat us extraordinarily stupidly* (our emphasis). Among other things, I want to impose on us in Romania a national autonomy for minorities, which I do not admit for them. The official Torontal is not known, but he is determined to give it to the Serbs. Even with Bukovina we are not very well. At different points about her, as if deliberately avoiding the determination of her borders. At [the question of] Bessarabia has not yet arrived, but from now on I foresee different difficulties. Some English people say that a plebiscite is needed for Bessarabia. The Allies flirt with Admiral Kolceak, who sets as condition

sine qua non the restoration of the old Russian borders, except Poland and Finland. From Romania and Bessarabia English representatives receive very bad news about the Bessarabian administration. That really damages us. The Russians, with all their wickedness, are well organized and have many friends, The Russians, with all their wickedness, are well organized and have many friends, especially among the English. We, on the contrary. With printing and translations we are very poor. (...) The organization is bad or almost missing, because we are skinny or we have no money, while the Serbs and others carry great propaganda. During the war, no new favorable propaganda was made for Bessarabia. In contrast, the Russians and Jews in Switzerland, America, England, and here in France, through all the newspapers, most of which are Jewish, treated Bessarabia as occupied by the Romanian army, without its consent. Then, about the terror of the Romanian army and the administration, there was a unutterable jolt. We do not have among our Romanians personal friends with the representatives of Antante. There is Mr. Tache Ionescu, but he has a curious outfit. We are divided and the interests of the party prevail the common interest of the Country” (pp. 68-69).

And also a note from *memories*: “The appearance of the *Basarabia* Gazette on May 24, 1906, in the typography of Zaharov’s *Bessarabskaia jizn* Gazette. The only one in the group of young national democrats who stayed up all night at the birth of the newspaper, that is, at the exit of the first issue, it was I, who corrected it, who made one or two articles and who established the spelling with which it followed. the newspaper should be written, the characters (letters) being Russian. The unspoken joy, what I and my friends felt, and the national pride satisfied, at the exit of this first issue of *Basarabia*” (p. 377).

Stoica Lascu

Alexandru Ș. Bologa (Editor), *Dobrogea at 140 Years after its Union with the Romanian State. An Example of Contemporary West-Pontic Multiethnic Understanding* [Preface: Professor Valentin Ciorbea], Ex Ponto, Constanța, 2018, 332 pp.; ill., maps, tables. ISBN 978-606-598-700-5

Last year, at the 140th anniversary of Dobrudja’s Reintegration into the Romanian State (the territory between the Danube and the Sea was displaced by the Ottomans, at the beginning of the 15th century, from the frameworks of a Romanian state, the Wallachia led by Mircea the Elder [*cel Bătrân*] – or the Great [*cel Mare*], as it is called, and after the Romanian War of Independence (1877-1878) returned, in a favorable international context, to the Romanian State), the Dobrudjan scientist Alexandru Bologa, a well-known biologist and cultural man (born in Brașov – 1947, September 8 –, but with a professional career and family in Constanța), took the initiative to make a volume (initially intended for the intellectual media abroad) written, as such, in English. Finally, at the end of a laborious work of coordination, of insistence with various Dobrudjan intellectuals, with a certain scientific authority in the respective field of activity – has resulted a large volume, which honors not only the tenacious initiator, but also the ensemble of the Dobrudjan culture of today. The fact is all the more commendable, since the scientific, academic and cultural institutions, from the space between the Danube and the Sea, did not have – with rare and notable exceptions (in Tulcea, two volumes; in Constanța, one or two volumes) – such initiatives.

The volume contains 33 scientific and soul contributions, covering various topics from the past and present history of our Dobrudja; the authors are all Dobrudjans – native or adopted.

It is about – Alina Buzarna-Tihenea (Gălbează) and Constantin Jurcă, *Dobrogea – Spiritual Cohabitation* (pp. 25-32); Mirela Ștefănescu, *Mathematics in Dobrogea between 1878 and 2018* (pp. 33-40); Mihai Enescu, *Constanța Planetarium – 50 Years of Astronomy* (pp. 41-45); Ioan Bucșă, *A History of Climatological Research in Dobrogea* (pp. 47-53); Romeo Boșneagu, Emil Torică and

Vasile Torică, *A First Approach to the Impact of Global and Regional Geo-climate Changes in Sustainable Development of Dobrogea Region* (pp. 55-65); Anca Constantin, *The Waters of Dobrogea, a Continuous Scientific Challenge* (pp. 67-75); Stoica Lascu, *The Romanian Black Sea Seaside – Geographical, Historical and Bibliographical Background* (pp. 77-110); Emil Torică and Ion Marin, *The Evolution of the Romanian Seaside Landscape* (pp. 111-117); Constantin Chera, *Archaeology in Dobrogea – Highlights of Ancient Culture* (pp. 119-12); Puiu Hașotti, *Dobrogea: From the First Inhabitants to the Indo-Europeans* (pp. 123-125); Marian Zidaru, *Dobrogea – Where Orient and Occident Meets: From Ancient Times to Modern Times* (pp. 127-134); Lavinia Dumitrașcu, *The Romanian State and the Tatar and Turkish Ethnic Minorities of Constantza County – 1878-1922* (pp. 135-139); Floarea Bordânc, *Dobrogean Rural Economics Potential between Tradition and Modernity* (pp. 141-153); Aurel Lup, *An Agronomist Engineer in Socialist Multiethnic Dobrogea – Memories* (pp. 155-170); Carmen Irène Atanasiu, *The Romanian Maritime Merchant Fleet* (pp. 171-184); Andreea Atanasiu-Croitoru, *140 Years of the Romanian Military Fleet in Dobrogea* (pp. 185-190); Alexandru S. Bologa and Adrian Bavaru, *Quasiquicentennial Development of Marine Sciences in Romania and its Maritime Dobrogea* (pp. 191-205); Octavian Mircea Șelariu, *Cape Singol – The Bio-oceanographic Institute of Constantza, 1932 – In memoriam Grigore Antipa (1867-1944)* (pp. 207-210); Ionel Miron and Liviu-Dan Miron, *The Longest Stay in an Underwater Habitat (Europe)* (pp. 211-212); Carmen Irène Atanasiu, *The Romanian Naval League – 90 Years of Existence: An Association Dedicated to Promoting to Marine Traditions and Supporting Romania's Water Interests* (pp. 213-216); Diana Badiu, Tony L. Hangan, Raluca Melihov, Daniel O. Costea, *Medicine and Health in Dobrogea* (pp. 217-220); Vasile Sârbu, Raluca Melihov, Diana Badiu, *Professor Ion Cantacuzino and Dobrogea in the Romanian Reunification War (1914-1919)* (pp. 221-223); Alexandra Nicoleta Unc, Octavian D. Unc, *Aspects of the Interwar History of the Health Situation in Constantza County* (pp. 225-230); Carmen N. Niculescu, *A Guardian of the Public Health at the Romanian Border* (pp. 231-234); Lucian Dumitrache and Petrică Popov, *The Port of Sulina, Eastern European Seagate – Past and Present* (pp. 235-241); Nicolae Orac, *Constantza Shipyard – History File (1862-1892-2012)* (pp. 243-254); Radu Cornescu, *Constantza Casino* (pp. 255-262); Ana Maria Grănescu, Mihaela Pericleanu and Sever Suliman, *History of Science and Technique of Buildings – Expression of a Turkish-Tatar Civilization in Dobrogea* (pp. 263-278); Mihaela L. Sandu and Carmen E. Coca, *Interaction and Psychological Climate in Dobrogea* (279-283); Eugenia Văjâiac, *Education in Dobrogea* (pp. 285-292); Marian Moise, *Old Constantza – Schools, Art Groups, Publications* (pp. 293-302); Silvana Cojocărașu, *Mangalia, 100 Years Ago on the Black Sea – (Un)Forgotten Times* (pp. 303-324); Virgil Răzeșu, *The People of Dobrogea* (pp. 325-329).

In *Argument*, the editor the author motivates his praiseworthy, patriotic and scientific approach, and reveals the thematic content: “2018 marks for Romanians not only the Centenary of the Great Union from Alba Iulia, but also the fulfillment of 140 years from the union of Dobrogea with the Romanian State, following the Independence War of 1877-1878”, and cites several lines of the signatory of this presentation, “this year means in Constantza «The Great Sea, in the 7526th of the Glorification of the World, the 2018th since the birth of the Savior, ... the 600 since the death of Mircea the Great, the 159th since the foundation of the modern Romanian State, the 60th since the withdrawal of foreign troops». Over time various publications have shown the importance and value of the Dobrogean space as a whole, in many respects, targeting development in numerous areas of activity. Various, representative writings on Dobrogea that have appeared so far include extensive information on: geology and geographic location, archaeology and history, flora and fauna, agrarian and economic development social, political and religious life, ethnic minorities, scientific research, literature, linguistic and ethnography, architecture and art, museums, education, tourist sights, bibliographies, bibliographic dictionaries of personalities” (p. 17).

And Professor Valentin Ciorbea wrote, also, in *Preface*: “The most persuasive argument that Dobrogea developed and progressed within the state is the demographic increase. If in 1879 the mosaic of the Dobrogean communities comprised 106, 943 souls, at the beginning of

1913 there were 380,430 inhabitants. The Dobrogeans, regardless of ethnicity, Romanians, Turks, Tatars, Germans, Russians, Lipovans, Bulgarians, Jews, etc., enjoyed a state policy lacking xenophobic and assimilation elements; the state constantly supported the unimpeded practice of religion, culture, education in the native language, realities that have built the interethnic «Dobrogean model in the region» (p. 15).

Remarkable achievement (despite editorial inconsistencies – some materials are really scientific contributions, others, very short in scope, as *Index* leaves the impression of improvisations), the volume (very richly illustrated color) of a bunch of Dobrudian intellectuals of today deserves to be disseminated abroad (in cultural centers and embassies of Romania, public and university libraries) by the authorized institutions in our country (including those from Constanța and Tulcea counties – the two County Councils).

Stoica Lascu

Ion I. Solcanu, *Un erou din Războiul de Întregire a României: Regimentul 9 Vânători* [A Hero of the War for the Integration of Romania: The Hunters' 9th Regiment], Editura Junimea (Seria *Historia Magistra Vitae*), Iași, 2018, 380 pp.; ill., facs., maps, plans, sketches. ISBN 978-973-37-2182-6

Professor Ion I. Solcanu (born in Bogdănești/Suceava County – 1943, October 19) surprises his readers, with this new editorial appearance, circumstantial to modern times (he was known mostly as a very well-informed historian of Romanian medieval art; in recent years, however, his research has focused on modernity, including the history of some old Romanians territories in the borders of other states or of the Balkan Romanians)

It is about a famous Romanian regiment that fought “for *the Entire* [Integration] *Romania* [Întregirea României] a syntagme that, in our vision, better covers the historical reality than *Întregirea Neamului Românesc*, even in the title of *the Journal* we edited, knowing that, even after December 1, 1918, masses compact of Romanians remained outside the borders of the country” (pp. 9-10). The volume is structured in four parts, divided thematically into chapters – in turn, subsegmented –, preceded by *Instead of Preface*, and followed by *Instead of Conclusions*, *Annexes*, *List of figures and medallions*, *Selective Bibliography*, respectively *Index of Names*.

Part I: *Regimentul 9 Vânători pe fronturile Războiului pentru Întregirea României* [9th Regiment Hunters on the Fronts of the War for the Entire Romania] (pp. 17-198), respectively – chap. I: *Regimentul 9 Vânători pe frontul din Dobrogea: 15 august-6 noiembrie 1916* [The Hunters' 9th Regiment on the Dobrudja Front: August 15-November 6, 1916] (pp. 19-64); chap. II: *Regimentul 9 Vânători în bătălia pentru București: 18-30 noiembrie 1916* [The Hunters' 9th Regiment in the Battle for Bucharest: November 18-30, 1916] (pp. 65-97); chap. III: *În refacere și reorganizare la Bălteni-Râpi, Capul Rediului (Vaslui) și Iași, 14 decembrie 1916-7 iunie 1917* [In Restoration and Reorganization at Balteni-Râpi, Capul Rediului (Vaslui), and Iași, December 14, 1916-June 7, 1917] (pp. 98-114); chap. IV: *Regimentul 9 Vânători pe frontul de la Mărășești* [The Hunters' 9th Regiment on the Front of Mărășești] (pp. 115-154); chap. V: *Regimentul 9 Vânători pe frontul de la Muncelul și Poienile Popii: 8-25 august 1917* [The Hunters' 9th Regiment on the Front of Muncelul and Poienile Popii: 8-25 August, 1917] (pp. 155-165); chap. VI: *Regimentul 9 Vânători în refacere: 1 septembrie-16 decembrie 1917* [The Hunters' 9th Regiment in Recovery: September 1 to December 16, 1917] (pp. 166-180); chap. VII: *Misiune în județele Botoșani și Dorohoi: în apărarea populației civile de jafurile armatei ruse în retragere (16 decembrie 1917-23 februarie 1918)* [Mission in Botoșani and Dorohoi Counties: In Defense of the Civilian Population Against the Withdrawal of the Russian Army (December 16, 1917-February 23, 1918)] (pp. 181-191); chap. VIII: *De pază pe Nistru, noua și vechea graniță de est a Țării (12 aprilie-8 decembrie 1918)* [Guard on the Dniester, the New and Old Eastern Border of the Country (April 12-December 8, 1918)] (pp. 192-198).

Part II: *În apărarea Marii Uniri pe frontul din Transilvania și Ungaria: 30 ianuarie-10 octombrie 1919* [In Defense of the Great Union on the Frontier of Transylvania and Hungary: January 30-October 10, 1919] (pp. 199-219), respectively – chap. I: *Regimentul 9 Vânători pe frontul din Transilvania și Ungaria: 30 ianuarie-18 octombrie 1919* [The Hunters' 9th Regiment on the Transylvania and Hungary front: January 30-October 18, 1919] (pp. 201-219).

Part III: *Jertfa Regimentului 9 Vânători pe durata celor trei ani de front* [Sacrifice of the The Hunters' 9th Regiment During the Three Years in Front] (pp. 221-274), respectively – chap. I: *Ofițeri din Regimentul 9 Vânători morți, răniți și dispăruți pe câmpul de luptă* [Officers from The Hunters' 9th Regiment Dead, Wounded and Missing on the Battlefield] (pp. 223-254); chap. II: *Plutonieri, sergenți, caporali și soldați din Regimentul 9 Vânători morți, răniți și dispăruți pe câmpul de luptă* [Platoon commanders, Sergeants, Corporals, and Soldiers from the The Hunters' 9th Regiment Dead, Wounded and Missing Hunters on the Battlefield] (pp. 253-268); chap. III: *Minoritari etnici – ofițeri și soldați – din Regimentul 9 Vânători în Războiul de Întregire a României* [Ethnic Minorities – Officers and Soldiers – from the The Hunters' 9th Regiment in the War of the Integration of Romania] (pp. 269-274); chap. IV: *Portrete de eroi ai Regimentului 9 Vânători* [Hero Portraits of the The Hunters' 9th Regiment] (pp. 275-322).

Also, Annexes – Annex no. 1: *Convorbire "Huges" între generalii Constantin Prezan și Eremia Grigorescu* ["Huges" Talk between Generals Constantin Prezan and Eremia Grigorescu]; Annex no. 2: *Ordinul circular nr. 5424/2.XII.1917 și Instrucțiuni pentru executarea ordinelor nr. 5.424 și nr. 5.505 ale Marelui Cartier General* [The Circular Order no. 5,424 / 2.XII.1917 and Instructions for the Execution of Orders no. 5,424 and no. 5,505 of the Great Headquarters]; Annex no. 3: *Cuvântul colonelului I. Vieșanu de evocare a activității generalului Rasoviceanu Gh., rostit la 29 noiembrie 1936* [The Word of Colonel I. Vieșanu Evoking the Activity of General Rasoviceanu Gh., Spoken on November 29, 1936]; Annex no. 4: *Raportul din 13 iunie 1922, al colonelului Rasoviceanu Gh., comandantul Infanteriei Vânătorilor de Munte, către generalul Cristescu, șeful Marelui Stat Major* [The Report of June 13, 1922, of Colonel Rasoviceanu Gh., Commander of the Mountain Hunters Infantry, to General Cristescu, the Chief of the General Staff].

The well-known Romania historian shows that "Throughout the documentation needed to publish the journal *Operațiile și istoricul Regimentului 9 Vânători în Războiul pentru întregirea Neamului Românesc* [Operations and the History of the The Hunters' 9th Regiment in the War for the Integration of the Romanian Nation], with the over 1,000 typewritten pages of the manuscript and the hundreds of files from the Military Archives of Pitești, it was natural to approach me. it suffers from the characters of this elite body of the Romanian Army. And not only by the regimental commander – the Major, Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel Rasoviceanu –, a complex personality, but also by all the other officers, regardless of their ranks, platoon commanders, company or battalion. Moreover, I became familiar with the faces of sergeants, corporals or simple soldiers, who, following the example and exhortation of the superiors, threw themselves into the battle, aware that it may be their last engagement with the enemy. Thus, Sergeant Santei Constantin of Company 2, although the father of five children, who, along with their mother, were waiting for him at home, volunteered in an extremely dangerous night mission, for recognition, beyond the wire networks of the enemy, to provoke him with firearms and grenades, in order to unmask their positions. The mission ends it, but the next day, on October 6, 1916, he would fall on the edge of the trench, pierced by the enemy's bullets, encouraging his soldiers and platoon. The country would grant him, post-mortem, the rank of Platoon leader. And how not to approach it, the image of another hero, soldier Buzică Nicolae, from the 9th Hunters Regiment, decorated by three states – Romanian, with «*Virtutea Militară* [Military Virtue]» cl. the II; French, with «*Crucea de război* [War Cross]», and Russian, «*Crucea Sf. Gheorghe* [St. George's Cross]» – for his heroic deeds committed" (p. 324).

The author also points out that "The above examples contradict the political adversaries of our country, who argue, without foundation, that the Integration of Romania, with its

ancient territories – Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transylvania – inhabited for centuries in overwhelming proportion by Romanians, was the gift of the Great Powers at the Conference of Peace. Moreover, reading the *Operațiile și istoricul Regimentului 9 Vânători în Răsboiul pentru întregirea Neamului Românesc. 1916-1919* proves with great measure the falsity of such theses. The Romanian soldier on the front was aware of what he was fighting for. In the agenda no. 9 of August 22, 1916, of the commander of the Third Army, General Aslan, was explicitly told to the officers and troops of the Hunters' 9th Regiment, but also to the other units in his subordination that «our armies passed through Transylvania to complete our nation, and you will defend the country with faith and thus contribute to the Greater Romania».

Today's National Anthem, *Deșteaptă-te Române* [Wake up, Romanian!], has encouraged our army's soldiers in their fight with the enemy. In the attack of Hunters' 9th Regiment from Amzacea (September 8, 1916), in a moment of derangement of the troops, the band of the 40th Călugăreni Regiment, in the immediate vicinity, intonate *Wake up, Romanian!* Encouraged, the band resumes the attack and flees the enemy cavalry.

Recalling the impressive deeds of heroism and sacrifices of life and blood of the Hunters' 9th Regiment 100 years ago, through the pages of this monograph, is only a modest symbolic act of well-deserved tribute to all those who fought, suffered and suffered died for the defense of the ancestral land and for the Integration of Romania.

The Romanian people today are undoubtedly owed to the other Romanian people (our emphasis), who sleeps for a long time under the earth he worked and defended with the price of life, throughout his millenary existence" (pp. 324-325).

Through this large and detailed volume (it also contains numerous and relevant sketches, plans, tables, and photographs), a remarkable achievement in our historiography, Professor Ion I. Solcanu brings an emotional offering to the "hero" – one of the brave Romanian regiments in the field of battle for the recuperation of the alien territories into what was to materialized in 1918, within the new architecture of European states, of New Europe – *România Întregită*/Entire Romania, *recte*: Greater Romania/*România Mare*...

Stoica Lascu

Anatol Petrencu (redactor științific), Ion Niculiță, Ion Eremia, Ion Gumenăi, Gheorghe Palade, Ion Șișcanu, Anatol Țăranu, Vasile Șoimaru (imagini), O istorie a Basarabiei [A History of Bessarabia], Editura Serebia, Chișinău, 2015, 424 pp. ISBN 978-0075-128-45-2

The volume coordinated by the well-known historian Anatol Petrencu (born in Căușeni – 1954, May 22) represents the first attempt of the historians of the Republic of Moldova (*nota bene* – the honest Clio's servants which are not tributary to the so-called Moldovan identity and statehoods) to write a synthesis of history of Bessarabia; it's about some of the most authorized and famous historians from Chișinău – *Ion Niculiță* (born in Zărnerști/Cahul County – 1939, May 27), *Ion Eremia* (born in Ciuciuleni/Nisporeni County– 1954, November 1), *Ion Gumenăi*, *Gheorghe Palade* (born in Puhoi/Ialoveni County – 1950, September 6–+ May 4, 2016), *Ion Șișcanu* (born in Măcărești/Ungheni County – 1951, March 27), *Anatol Țăranu* (born in Chișinău – 1951, October 19); also – *Vasile Șoimaru* (born in Cornova/Ungheni County 1949, April 30). [The historians-editors Valentin Arapu, Anatol Petrencu, and Corneliu Ciucanu coordinated the ample volume (616 pp.) *In memoriam Gheorghe Palade (1950-2016)*, appeared in Chișinău in 2018.]

The motivation was clearly expressed by the one who was, in fact, the initiator of this patriotic and scientific project, of this first historiographic project in Republic of Moldova – by the most authorized and recognized specialists as such: the Bessarabian electronics engineer and lover of true history *Eugen Statnic*; he shows in an interview: "For the patriotic re-education

I initiated and supported materially the publication of many books for all libraries, schools, gyms, high schools in the Republic of Moldova. For example, *Istoria Chiliei și Cetății Albe*, by Nicolae Iorga, after 115 years since its first appearance; *O istorie a Basarabiei*, written by Chișinău teachers and historians; The lyrics of Alexe Mateevici; The Iconography of a Romanian village in Bugeac (Noul Caragaș, today in Ukraine); *Basarabia românească* by A.V. Boldur, a great historian; *Istoria integrală a Basarabiei*, by Professor Valeriu Dulgheru; *O universitate cât o viață*, written by the great historian Dimitrie Ursu from Cornova; *Basarabia. Populația, Istoria, Cultura*, by the Academician Ștefan Ciobanu from Talmaza, written in 1940 and republished in 1992, exhausted and reprinted with us 100 years after the great act of the Union in 1918, and other books for illuminating youth after 45 years of occupation. But the free distribution of thousands of books has proven to be harder than writing printing. And this is a sad reality of the Republic of Moldova today”.

(To remind the reader, in this context, that an initiative to write a history of Bessarabia, “from the beginning”, comes, in the mid-1990s, from a group of Bucharest historians, coordinated by Professor Ioan Scurtu – it is about a synthesis who knows three editions; the first, under the title of *Istoria Basarabiei de la începuturi până în 2003*, Editura Tempus, București, 1994 /410 pp./, has as authors Ioan Scurtu (coordinator), Dumitru Almaș, Armand Goșu, Ion Pavelescu, Gheorghe I. Ioniță; to the other two editions – ...*până la 1998* /380 pp./; ...*până la 2003* /608 pp./ –, the historians from Chișinău Ion Șișcanu, Nicolae Enciu, Gheorghe E. Cojocar are added. Also, it is worth mentioning the initiative to publish a synthesis on the same subject of the Professor from Chișinău Ion Țurcanu; appeared – so far, as far as I know, only the first volume – one year after the publication of the present synthesis under the title *Istoria Basarabiei*, vol. I: *Preludii. Din Paleolitic până la sfârșitul Antichității*, Știința, Chișinău, 2016 /868 pp + XXXII pl./.)

And all this distinguished Bessarabian patriot (on June 30, 2019 he turned 90 years old; after seven decades of staying abroad, he revisited, in 2014, the Homeland) concluded, at the beginning of the volume (*De ce trebuie scrisă O istorie a Basarabiei?* [Why Should a History of Bessarabia Be Written?], pp. 5-7): “Therefore, the History of Bessarabia should not remain an enigma for many people in Europe *but must be written by the historians of this Romanian land* (our emphasis) because they have the archives and the evidence, because they know better than any foreigner from the east or west, the villages, the valleys, their ponds and rivers, roads and creeks, their monasteries and churches. The historians of Bessarabia know the oral tradition and the legends, the archeology of their country, the Tyragean settlements, the Roman waves, the Dacians, the cave dwellings of the first Christians on the banks of the Dniester or the Răutului, the ancient cities of Chilia, the Cetatea Albă, Tighina, Soroca, and Hotin and the old ones for 25 generations with heroism on the Danube and the Dniester. They know of the sufferings of a hardworking, modest and honest people, but enslaved and impoverished, they are beating and beating for almost 200 years, dark years in the history of the nation. *This is why a history of Bessarabia must be written, really, again*” (p. 7).

The volume are seven chapters – Ion Niculiță, *Tracii septentrionali în sec. VII/VI-V î.Hr.* [Northern Thracians in the 7th/6th-5th Centuries BC] (pp. 22-83); Ion Eremia, *Basarabia din secolul al X-lea până la începutul secolului al XIX-lea* [Bessarabia from the 10th Century to the Beginning of the 19th Century] (pp. 84-148); Ion Gumenăi, *Basarabia sub dominația țaristă. Formele de protest împotriva anexării Basarabiei de către Imperiul Rus* [Bessarabia under Tsarist Domination. Forms of Protest Against the Annexation of Bessarabia by the Russian Empire] (pp. 149-193); Gheorghe Palade, *Basarabia în cadrul Statului Român întregit* [Bessarabia within the Entire Romanian State] (pp. 194-236); Anatol Petrencu, *Basarabia în anii celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial (1940-1944)* [Bessarabia in the Years of the Second World War (1940-1944)] (pp. 237-263); Ion Șișcanu, *Evoluția vieții politice în RSS Moldovenească* [The Evolution of Political Life in Moldovan SRR] (pp. 265-300); Anatol Țăranu, *Declarația e independentă. Apariția și afirmarea statului Republica*

Moldova [The Declaration is Independence. The Emergence and Affirmation of the State of the Republic of Moldova] (pp. 301-360); and also Vasile Șoimaru, *Basarabia istorică în imagini contemporane* [Historical Bessarabia in Contemporary Images] (pp. 361-392). Also – *Names Index* (pp. 400-411), *Geographic Index* (pp. 412-423), and *Selective Bibliography* (pp. 397-399): authors mentioned from the Republic of Moldova – Ion Buga, Alexandru Chiriac, Iurie Colesnic, Ion Eremia, Andrei Eșanu și Valentina Eșanu, Nicolae Dabija, Ion Gumenâi, Sergiu Matveev, Alexei Memei, Anton Moraru, Sergiu Musteață, Ion Negrei, Elena Negru, Gheorghe Negru, Ion Niculiță, Larisa Noroc, Gheorghe Palade, Pavel Parasca, Valeriu Pasat, Anatol Petrencu, Vlad Pohilă, Dinu Poștarencu, Eugen Statnic, Ion Șișcanu, Vasile Șoimaru, Valentin Tomuleț; and from Romania – Ion Agrigoroaiei, Gheorghe Buzatu, Boris Bușilă, Theodor Codreanu, Florin Constantiniu, Constantin Giurescu and Dinu C. Giurescu, Paul Goma, Paul Mihail and Zamfira Mihail, Ioan-Aurel Pop, Florin Rotaru, Ioan Scurtu, Dumitru Șandru, Alexandru Zub; along with the classics Zamfir Arbore, Alexandru Boldur, Gheorghe Brătianu, Petre Cazacu, Ștefan Ciobanu, George Ciorănescu, Onisifor Ghibu, Nicolae Iorga, Ion Nistor.

The well-know scholar Professor Andrei Eșanu (member of Academy of Sciences of Moldova) writes, at the beginning of the volume, a comprehensive synthesis of the history of Bessarabia *Sinusoida istorică a Basarabiei* [The Historical Sinusoidal of Bessarabia] (pp. 8-21): “Bessarabia as a historical province of the Romanian world is, like Bucovina, more recently, compared to the Walachia [*Tara Românească*], the Moldavia [*Tara Moldovei*], and Transylvania and so on. If Bukovina crystallized as a historical province after its annexation to the Habsburg Empire in 1775, then Bessarabia was formed by the breakdown of the body of the Moldova and the annexation to the Russian Empire of the space between the Dniester, Prut and the Black Sea following the Russian-Turkish War of 1806-1812” (p. 8). “The book you opened, dear reader, is the result of elaborations in which seven appreciated historians from Chișinău were involved. The work is intended to be a contribution to the vast work generically called the History of Romanians, with the emphasis on elucidating the truth about Bessarabia in the context of the developments which h have defined this Romanian land, respectively, this segment of Romanian [*românime*], from the old Antiquity and to the days our. We are dealing, in essence, with seven historical syntheses (in fact – in eight syntheses, with this relevant «historical sinusoidal» – our note), each author spreading a vision on the problem, taking into account the opinions of the forerunners, but sometimes using it for the first time, new ideas, hypotheses, details, testimonies, documents. The special merit of these materials is that *they demonstrate without denial the Romanian continuity of the territory between Prut and Dniester* (our emphasis), the resistance of the Romanian vein in the genes of a population exposed to heavy trials, great dangers, shaking dramas and tragedies, devastating cataclysms.

The authors of the new paper emphasize the historical truth, the indubitable argument, the documentary testimonies – these being so necessary in an atmosphere flooded with reluctance, «white spots», distortions, falsifications, but also ignorance” (p. 21).

And this achievement of the historical confreres from Chișinău has all the attributes for to be brought to the knowledge of the intellectual media from abroad (through English and Russian translation) – in a more amplified and illustred edition –, in the efforts for a more applied knowledge of the history of the space between Prut and Dniester.

Stoica Lascu

Petre Țurlea, *Români și unguri* [Romanians and Hungarians], Vol. I: 1918-1940; Vol. II: 1940-1945; Vol. III: 1945-2018, Editura Karta-Graphic, Ploiești, 2018, 518+548+584 pp.; ill., facs. ISBN 978-606-693-123-2; 978-606-693-123-9, 978-606-693-123-6

During the last three decades, Professor Petre Țurlea (born in Filipeștii de Pădure – 1947, June 17) proves to be one of the most prolific “writers” of Romanian History – not of mere

narrative expositions, with a certain degree of conformity, but of in-depth tomes, showing documentary evidence. And not only – the topics addressed are among those that elicit unequivocal appreciation, as they are expressed by the probative author, engaged in the fight for the triumph of historical truth, beyond the conjectural interests, of today, of some circles, from the country or from various parts of the world.

The issues covered in these three volumes are familiar to the author for many decades, who has made appear in recent years several works about her. Now, the reader is faced with a comprehensive historical picture, which comes to fill a void felt as such in our historiography. It is the merit of the author to have completed such an important thematic project, on which – as the author also revealed at one point – it was felt, as it were, an unjustified restraint, by many historians, confreres of his.

The volumes, all three, it bears the Țurlea brand – total documentation, clear, sober exposition, without stylistic flourishes, conclusions drawn, based on archival testimonies. Volumes I and II are chronologically subdivided – 1918-1920 (pp. 13-78), 1920-1938 (pp. 79-306), 1938-1940 (pp. 307-375), respectively 1940 (pp. 15-106), 1941-1943 (pp. 107-248), 1944-1945 pp. 249-380), and *Procesul* [The Trial] (pp. 381-390); in the third volume the chapters are thematic: *Revenirea Transilvaniei de nord-est în cadrul României* [The Return of Northeast Transylvania in Romania] (pp. 5-198), *Regiunea autonomă maghiară* the Magyar Autonomous Region (pp. 199-246), *Atitudini, stări de spirit și mentalul colectiv din regiunea autonomă maghiară* [Attitudes, Moods and the Collective Mind of the Magyar Autonomous Region (1952-1968)] (material signed by Claudia Țișe) (pp. 247-265), *România și Ungaria la sfârșitul perioadei comuniste* [Romania and Hungary at the End of the Communist Period (pp. 266-275)], *UDMR și societatea românească* [UDMR and the Romanian Society] (pp. 276-519).

Volumes I and III contain *Concluzii* [Conclusions] (pp. 376-384), respectively *O concluzie* [A Conclusion] (p. 521), and at the end of volume III the author includes a substantial *Argument* by Gheorghe Buzatu (pp. 581-582), dated *Iasi, September 4, 2012*, in which the lamented great historian of the Romanians – who left, through his disappearance, an empty place in our historiography – showed, among others: “*Români și unguri ...*, bringing together three of the successful books of the historian (*Ip și Trăznea. Atrocitățile maghiare și acțiunea diplomatică românească* [Ip and Trăznea. Magyar Atrocities and Romanian Diplomatic Action], 1996; *UDMR și societatea românească* [UDMR and Romanian Society], 2005; *Transilvania de Nord-Est, 1944-1952* [The North-East Transylvania, 1944-1952], 2005), thus selected on a common theme, the text being extended and the bibliography up to date, and the archival and the updated comments start from the urgent need, at present, as now, for the public opinion that some historical facts must «be illuminated. The relationship between Romanians and Hungarians – with the justly author’s appreciation – is today, in a dangerous evolution for the Romanian national state. Knowing its constants throughout the contemporary history, we know what we can expect in the future, remaining to take the necessary defense measures». The reader does not doubt that beyond a simple finding, we are confronted with a warning addressed to all those who, in order to act and react effectively to the Unforeseen, must know the facts / experience of the recent past.

And the historian, with good reason, considers «those at the forefront of Romania [who] should know History, not to repeat the mistakes of the past times», so saying being prepared at any time to categorically reject a new Viennese Diktat, with all his court of misfortunes and disastrous consequences in the short, medium or long term for the whole of Romania!” (p. 582).

Each volume has the accompanying *Notes*, rich, rigorous, with ample bibliographic references, professionally written (but, unfortunately, they are not positioned at the bottom of the page, which makes reading difficult), *Abbreviations* and *Index of persons*, respectively *Annexes* (the latter, at pp. 471-516, 462-545, respectively 545-579).

And every volume begins with *Motivare* [Motivation] (pp. 7-11), *O motivare* [A Motivation] (pp. 7-14), *Precizare* [Explanatory Note] (p. V), in which the author briefly puts his reader on the topic. Thus, in the *Motivation* in vol. I (pp. 7-11), he emphasizes that “*Romanians and Hungarians 1918-1940* will deal with the problem of Hungarian revisionism in Greater Romania as a priority. However, it does not intend to present at large the theoretical disputes between Romanians and Hungarians regarding the right of control over Transylvania. Nor are the trials between Romania and Hungary regarding the interpretation given to the governing acts in the province after Trianon – the most known being The Hungarians Optants’ Trial. Although, both the theoretical disputes and the respective processes are part of the revisionist action of Budapest – through them they want to demonstrate the historical non-completeness of the Romanian rule and, at the same time, of the inability of the Romanian State to establish an honest and efficient administration” (pp. 7-8).

Revealing what was written, the author shows the importance of the published archive documents, “However, a representation of as many archival documents as yet unpublished – which fully illustrate Hungarian revisionism in inter-war Romania, to indicate its intensity, the forms of manifestation, to indicate the acceptance of the revisionist policy of Budapest by the majority of Hungarians in Transylvania, of the special danger that revisionism represented for the very existence of Greater Romania – *it is necessary. This is the role of the present volume, mainly* (our emphasis); but presenting, even if briefly, the Hungarian revisionist propaganda and the trials initiated by Hungary of Romania” (pp. 8-9).

In *A Motivation* to Vol. II (pp. 7-14), a little more widely, the author also puts the reader in the knowledge of the problem synthesized with such clarity: “The relations between Romanians and Hungarians, in the years 1940-1945, have retained the characteristic of the interwar period: a permanent adversity: moreover, it became worse, following the territorial abduction of 1940.

The Romanians were outraged by the fact that they had been imposed – by Germany and Italy – in Vienna, the surrender of territories in which they were the only people of ethnogenesis. In addition, they always had over North-East Transylvania and an obvious demographic right. It was indicated by all the truly scientific works of the time” (p. 7) (and the relevant volume of Sabin Manuilă from 1940, *La carte ethnographique de Roumanie*, is given as an example): but they also had an absolute majority, in relation to all ethnic minorities in one place. Romania had not even lost this territory in battle, Hungary denying, with *conardice* (our emphasis), a direct confrontation, on the battlefield, convinced that it would not be able to face them. During the period of the Horthyst rule of North-East Transylvania, the adversity between the two peoples was accentuated also due to the anti-Romanian atrocities of the Hungarian administration, in which most of the Hungarians from the respective region participated. The recovery of the region kidnapped in 1940 was a major goal of the Romanian People throughout the Second World War, as was the recovery of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina” (pp. 7-8). And it also shows how “On the other side, the Hungarians were satisfied that they won, in 1940, half of Transylvania. But their *immeasurable pride* (our emphasis) did not reconcile with the idea that what they had won was only a gift from Berlin and Rome; they had not been able to defeat the Romanian Army. That is why they tried to create an aura of heroism for the Hungarian Army entering Northeast Transylvania” (p. 8).

Also here, Professor Țurlea develops, more broadly, a sketch of a historiographical essay regarding the issues in question; enumerating the authors – and the books –, the demanding and so documented historian expresses, without circumscription, the conviction that “It is, however, rather small, given the full opening of the archives, which has created major research possibilities. The reason for the existence of a certain restraint in approaching the subject is *the accusation of nationalism quickly thrown* (our emphasis) on those who approach the problem, either from the part directly interested in the ignorance of the truth, the Hungarian part, or from the

cosmopolitan Romanian intellectuals, *often without opera* (our emphasis), who want to cover up the criminal acts against the Romanian People, but supporting unfounded accusations against it. The retention of presenting the problem of North-East Transylvania is also found in what was to be the most important work of Romanian History for the period 1940-1947 – *Istoria Românilor* [History of Romanians], the treaty sponsored by the Romanian Academy, Volume IX, academic coordinator Dinu C. Giurescu, Edit. Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 2008: the presentation of the respective issue occupies only half a page, out of a volume of 1,213 pages; having many mistakes” (p. 13).

In the *Explanatory Note* in Vol. III (p. V), briefly, the forerunner and the attention – for the reader – author, tells him that “he will present, for the period 1945-2018, only some problems of the relations between them, the most important ones in the general evolution of these relations; the attempt by the Hungarians to maintain control of part of Transylvania and after the defeat of Hungary and Germany in World War II, an unsuccessful attempt; obtaining a privileged status of the Hungarians in Romania in relation to that of the Romanians, in exchange for supporting the Romanian Communist Party in its struggle for the seizure of political power, a successful attempt: the establishment of the Magyar Autonomous Region, with Stalin’s support; The evolution of the Magyar Autonomous Region, the relations between Romanians and Hungarians after 1989.

There are a number of other issues that need to be addressed.

Also, the non-conflictual relations between Romanians and Hungarians in the respective period remain to be treated, even if they were few in relation to those presented”.

There are precisions, so to speak, which, perhaps, hints to the reader that other writings will follow, materialized in new volume (s). Towards an even more complete fulfillment of some reconstructions from a recent history that a scientific personality, with unequivocal national-cultural attitudes, of the waist of Professor Petre Țurlea, can build them for the sake of progress and historical truth. And to the science of historians not only from our country, but also from (and not only) its confreres in European countries, or beyond the Ocean, interested in the very specific issue of the relations between the two peoples and countries. For which purpose, it falls to our cultural-scientific and academic authorities, empowered as such, to translate – as quickly as possible – into English and Hungarian the three volumes – or at least a synthesis of them.

Stoica Lascu

Victor Spinei, *The Editing of Historical Sources. The Hurmuzachi Collection of Documents*. Translated by Adrian Poruciu. Editarea izvoarelor istorice. Colecția de documente Hurmuzachi, Editura Academiei Române. Editura Istros a Muzeului Brăilei “Carol I”, București – Brăila, 2018 /368 pp.; ill. [English: pp. 5-164]/. ISBN 978-973-27-2896-1; ISBN 978-606-654-309-5

The present book represents what can be called a *case study* circumstantial to the history of Romanian historiography; it is an intellectual and professional conscience enterprise which is based on a vast erudition, a methodology in approaching the subject and in drawing conclusions that can only come from a personality that has proven so far a full scientific maturity. Indeed, the author, Professor Victor Spinei (born in Lozova/Bessarabia – 1943, October 26) is recognized, in the scientific world – from the country and abroad –, the professional competences that propelled him as a member of the Romanian Academy (and from last year – and vice-president).

It’s a volume – published in the Romanian and English languages, assembled together – with a special profile in our historiography, which depicts the substance of a fundamental national documentary corpus on the sources of Romanian history. It has the following content:

Introduction (p. 9); *Terminological aspects* (pp. 10-15); *Definitions of the concept of "source"* (pp. 16-39); *Parameters in the interpretations of sources* (pp. 40-56); *Insertions of sources in early historical literature* (pp. 57-62); *The great European collections of sources* (pp. 63-89); *The first attempts at editing sources in the Romanian space* (pp. 90-103); *Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki: biographical landmarks* (pp. 104-118); *The editorial revaluation of Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki's work* (pp. 119-131); *The volumes of the first series of the Hurmuzaki collection* (pp. 132-138); *Andrei Oțetea: biographical landmarks* (pp. 139-160), *The reactivation of the Hurmuzaki collection by Andrei Oțetea* (pp. 161-164); [Roumanian Version: *Editarea izvoarelor istorice. Colecția de documente Hurmuzaki* (pp. 165-320)]; *Index – Indice* (pp. 321-339); and *Illustrations* (pp. 340-365).

It is, as can be seen, about a volume with a special profile, with an architecture of the work with a pronounced technicality from a medieval historian accustomed to the rigor of research and the elaboration of a historiographic text; therefore, the author felt the need to explicitly, from the beginning, *Terminological aspects* and *Definitions of the concept of "source"*: "In course of time there were attempts at formulation of lapidary and synthetic definitions for the notion of «sources», in the historical sense, each of them aiming to display the essential traits of that notion. In our opinion, worthy of consideration are several definitions (formulated by some prestigious representatives of European – German, French, English, etc. – and American historiography), which stood out as both succinct and explicit, and which naturally enjoyed notoriety" (p. 16). The author's erudition is confirmed by the number and quality of the sources consulted, celebrities of world historiography from modern times as well – Johann Martin Chladni (Chladenius), Heinrich A. Erhard, Johann G. Droysen, Friedrich D.E. Schleiermacher, Ernst Bernheim, Leopold von Ranke, Aleksandr S. Lappo-Denilevskii, Charles-Victor Langlois, Charles Seignobos, Jacques Le Goff, Alfred Feder, Allen Johnson, Karl Jacob, Hans Quirin, Harm von Seggern, Leo Santifaller, Otto Stolz, Hans Nabholz, August Potthast, Hanns Leo Mikoletzky, Paul Kirn, Klaus Arnold, Renate Neumüllers-Klausner, Niels Freytag and Wolfgang Piereth, Hans-Erner Goetz, Gerhard Theuerkauf, Erwin Faber and Imanuel Geiss, Martha Howell and Walter Prevenier, Otto G. Oexle, Joachim Rohlfes, Christian Rohr, Ahasver von Brandt, Peter Hüttenberger, Peter Wolf, Martina Hartmann, Stefan Jordan, Michael Brauer, Henri-Irénée Marrou, Mireille Chazan, Léopold Genicot, Robin G. Collingwood; Marceli Handelsman, Stanislaw Kościolkowski, Gerard Labuda, Jerzy Topolski; O.N. Naumov; Oscar Handin, Ian W. Mabbett, Carol Berkin and Betty S. Anderson, Helen J. Poulton, and others. "The rather excessively numerous quotations given above – although not convergent in all points – are helpful in highlighting the importance of sources. Any writing that claims to be a historical work but ignores sources can only be classified as essay or fiction. As for ourselves, without overlooking the already quoted statements, we would propound a more definition: Historical sources represent the totality of information that regards the dimensions of human life in all its components and of natural environment within which human life develops" (p. 39).

Suggestive connotations are developed within what the author calls *Parameters in the interpretations of sources*: "The requirement of permanent resort to the substance of sources, doubled by the exploration of the latter with maximum minuteness has been obsessively emphasized by historiography everywhere, with a stress on the fact it is only by professional competence and talent that one can knit together sequences of dissimilar and often inexpressive realities provided by the sources. Without turning to good account sources of all categories, mere detection of them remains, to a great extent, useless. The ramifications of methodological practices that we meant to reevaluate sources have brought complex debates, which will certainly become more ample along the evolution of the domain" (p. 53).

The chapter dedicated to the editing of the great collections of historical sources is also substantial, the author's science of books saying also this time: the most well-known collections in the European space are listed, with much credence, the author concluding: "The

selective presentation of a main collections of European sources that refer in the Middle Ages and to the beginnings of modern times mirrors old scholarly traditions in countries with substantial achievements on the cultural plane, and it also mirrors the effervescence of the editorial projects that were meant to turn to account historical sources. The growing number of such projects depended on the gradual development of the professional historical writing in the nineteenth century, which became known as «century of nations», characterized by ardent aspirations for conspicuous national identity and unity, and by justified struggle for liberation from under the oppression of pluriethnic states and for independence” (p. 89).

After showing, in a particular thematic segment, that the editing of diplomatic acts did not have a very long tradition in the Romanian Principalities, “a fact that can be accounted for by their level of general development, which did not ensure adequate conditions for great achievements of many cultural and scientific domains”, it is stated that “It was only after the tenacious efforts of Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki [1812-1874], also supported by governmental and academic organs, that the required comprehensive collections of documentary sources regarding the history of the Romanian people began to materialize” (p. 93).

Although this Romanian patriot from Bukovina – territory of medieval Moldova annexed by the Habsburg Empire in 1775 –, a specialist in jurisprudence, had no history studies, he started to establish a vast corpus of historical sources (as they existed in other European countries) regarding the past to his nation, the Romanians: “His achievements, as many as there were, were certainly due to his gifts as a polyglot (since he is said to have been able to speak eight languages). Also, since he remained a bachelor, he could travel a lot and could stay far away from his homeland for longer times, thus being able to dedicate himself to his passion of investigating archives. In becoming aware of the sparseness of sources that referred to earlier periods in the history of the Romanians, Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki also realized that, without an invigorating flow of new information, the domain that had become so dear to him could not surpass the pioneering stage in which it lingered. Also in connection with that shortcoming, the national historiography of could not benefit from ample synthetic works that could chronologically cover the most important aspects of Romanian history” (p. 110).

In this fundamental documentary corpus, of European importance – a true national treasure of the Romanian civilization –, a number of 45 volumes appeared between 1876 and 1942, “which implied an average frequency of publication of approximately two volumes every third year, which is meritorious for a historiography without a long tradition and without any significant potential, human and material” (p. 131).

It is worth mentioning that, after the Second World War, this documentary corpus was resumed – due to the efforts of Professor Andrei Oțetea (1894-1977), member of the Romanian Academy, director of the Institute of History “Nicolae Iorga”; in the new series /*Serie nouă*/, with four volumes (1962-1974), under – now – the *Documente privind istoria României* (and not of *românilor*). *Colecția Eudoxiu de Hurmuzachi*. The reader must also know in this context, that in the year of the appearance of the paper presented here, its author, together with Professor Ionel Cădea, a corresponding member of the Romanian Academy, revived, the both as coordinators, the Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki Collection, Series 3 the; has appeared, for the moment, vol. I – *Documente privind istoria românilor. Colecția Eudoxiu Hurmuzachi*. Seria a 3-a [Coordonatori: Victor Spinei, Ionel Cădea]. Vol. I: *Legăția română la Petrograd (1914-1918). Documente. La Légation Roumaine à Pétrograd (1914-1918). Documents*. Éditeurs: Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, Eugen-Tudor Scîlîș (Academia Română), Editura Academiei, Editura Istros a Muzeului Brăilei “Carol”, București – Brăila, 2018 /522 pp.; ill./.

Stoica Lascu

A.U.C.H. Manuscript Submission

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Reference citations

I. Reference-List Entries for Periodicals (APA Style)

a. An Article in a Journal with continuous paging

Harrison, R.L., & Westwood, M.J. (2009). Preventing vicarious traumatization of mental health therapists: Identifying protective practices. *Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training*, 46, 203-219.

In-text citation (Harrison & Westwood, 2009)

b. An Article in a Journal with separate paging

Damean, S.L. (2013). The Royal Family of Romania and the National Reunification War. *Analele Universității din Craiova. Istorie*, 23(1), 43-50.

In-text citation (Damean, 2013: 50)

c. An article in a monthly magazine

Madu, C. (2010, March-April). A cure for crime. *Psychology Today*, 43(2), 12.

In-text citation (Madu, 2010: 12)

II. Reference-list entries for books and other separately published materials

a. A book by one author

Damean, S.L. (2004). *România și Congresul de Pace de la Berlin (1878)*. București: Mica Valahie.

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b. A book by two or more authors

Rosenthal, R., Rosnow, R.L., & Rubin, D.B. (2000). *Contrasts and effect sizes in behavioral research: A correlational approach*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

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Subsequent citations (Rosenthal et al., 2000: 232)

Scafes, C., Șerbănescu, H., Andonie, C., Scafes I. (2002). *Armata română în războiul de independență. 1877-1878*. București: Sigma.

First in-text citation (Scafes, Șerbănescu, & Andonie, 2002: 150)

Subsequent citations (Scafes et al., 2002: 151)

c. A book with no author named

The Blackwell dictionary of cognitive psychology. (1991). Oxford, England: Blackwell.

In-text citation (*The Blackwell dictionary*, 1991: 98)

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Sternberg, R.J. (1990). *Metaphors of the mind: Conceptions of the nature of intelligence*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

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Sternberg, R.J. (2007). *Wisdom, intelligence, and creativity synthesized*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

In-text citation

The 1990 book: (Sternberg, 1990: 45)

The first 2003 book: (Sternberg, 2003a: 23)

The second 2003 book: (Sternberg, 2003b: 25)

The 2007 book: (Sternberg, 2007: 139)

All four works in the same citation: (Sternberg, 1990, 2003a, 2003b, 2007)

Damean, S.L. (2004). *România și Congresul de Pace de la Berlin (1878)*. București: Mica Valahie.

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The 2004 book: (Damean, 2004: 77)

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e. Reference to a chapter in an edited book

Ghițulescu, M. (2014). Evoluția instituțiilor politice în timpul regimului comunist. În Damean, S.L. (coord.) *Evoluția instituțiilor politice ale statului român din 1859 până astăzi*. Târgoviște: Cetatea de Scaun.

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III. Archival Documents and Collections

a. Collection of letters from an archive

Benomar, Fr.M.C. (March 1875-December 1876). Legación en Berlin. Correspondencia confidencial y reservada con los Ministros de Estado. Cartas a los mismos (Tomo I, Signatura 9-32-7-7401). *Royal Academy of History*, Madrid, Spain.

In-text citation (Benomar, Fr.M.C., 1875-1876, Benomar, Fr.M.C. to F. Calderón Collantes, June 5, 1876)

b. Unpublished papers, lectures from an archive or personal collection

Suțu, C.N. (1863). *Propunerea lui C. Șuțu în numele lui D. Jose de Salamanca*. Fond Ministerul Lucrărilor Publice (dosar 100). National Historical Central Archives Service, Bucarest, Romania.

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Universidad Central (1868). *Espediente Vizanti y Basilio Andrés*. Universidades, Sección Filosofía y Letras (Signatura 6887, expediente 1). National Historical Archive, Madrid, Spain.

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In-text citation (Gullón E Iglesias, 1898)

IV. Reference to a web source

J.G. (2016, April 11). 7 Deadly Environmental Disasters. Retrieved April 25 2016, from <http://www.history.com/news/history-lists>

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