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COUNT A.P. BOBRINSKY (1826-1894),
THE THIRD MINISTER-REFORMER OF RAILWAY MANAGEMENT
IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Oleh Pylypchuk*, Oleh Strelko**

Abstract

The article highlights the activity of Aleksey Pavlovich Bobrinsky on the post of Minister of Ways of Communication, who is famous for his reform efforts in the sphere of railway transport and also in the construction of ports and water channels. It shows how knowledge and experience gained by A.P. Bobrinsky in England at the construction of channels and during his participation at international forums, were later successfully used in his practical activities in the Russian Empire. The analysis of sources allowed finding out that A.P. Bobrinsky took an active part in reforming a number of important issues of railways management like receiving concessions for the construction of railways, the process of setting up joint-stock railway societies, as well as the construction of waterways of the country through the direct implementation of dredging works and different hydrotechnical measures. It was found that the activity of Count Alexey Bobrinsky as the Minister of Ways of Communication had a significant influence on the processes of development of railway transport, ports and water channels of the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th century. Being a manager of the Ministry, A.P. Bobrinsky established the Interim Statistical Department, which resolved a long-standing and a very important issue of a clear and scientific organization of the procedure of collection, processing, verification and presentation of statistic data on the condition and operation of ways of communication, which were an extremely important matter for the further activity of the Ministry. His achievements include the beginning of the construction of the Maritime Canal from St. Petersburg to Kronstadt and the construction of the St. Petersburg and Kronstadt ports. A large amount of remedial works, for example, on the Neva river made it possible to increase its depth. That is why A.P. Bobrinsky, who was well versed in such experience, became a staunch supporter of using the technology of dredging works on navigable rivers and theoretically justified the possibility and feasibility of using dredgers to provide transit depths required for navigation. Thus, thanks to the actions of A.P. Bobrinsky, foreign experience was used by domestic railway engineers and specialists of water transport in the practical direction of their activity. It is shown that an authority of A.P. Bobrinsky as the Minister-Reformer in different activities was recognized not only by the Ministry of Ways of Communication of the Russian Empire but also among the international scientific and administrative communities.

Key words: A.P. Bobrinsky, railway transport, water transport, reforms, joint-stock railway societies, evangelical Christianity in Russia

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Introduction

On September 2, 1871, in connection with illness of V.A. Bobrinsky (1869-1871), the 2nd Minister of Ways of Communication of the Russian Empire, (Kislinsky, 1902: 89), as a manager of the Ministry, his cousin, Count Alexey Pavlovich Bobrinsky was appointed (Zenzinov, 1995: 48).

The genealogical tree of the Bobrinskys originates from the illegitimate son of Empress Catherine II, born from her lover Grigory Orlov (http://www.topauthor.ru/chto_sdelal_dlya_rossiyskoy_imperii_rod_dworyan_bobrinskih_3a95.html).

It is known (http://wikiredia.ru/wiki/Бобринский,_Алексей_Григорьевич), that Alexey Bobrinsky (Figure 1) was born on April 11, 1762, shortly before his mother ascended the throne. These data, according to (Bobrinsky, 1890: 507), are given in his own letter to Empress Catherine II dated April 2, 1781, which is held in the family archive of the Bobrinskys (Figure 2). In another letter of the same date (Bobrinsky, 1890: 508), the Empress presented the coat of arms (Figure 3) (https://gerbovnik.ru/arms/27.html) to Bobrinsky. Immediately after the birth, Catherine II gave her infant to Vasily Shkurin, her Grand-Maître de la Garde-Robe, in whose family Alexey Grigorovich was brought up until 1774 (http://wikiredia.ru/wiki/Бобринский,_Алексей_Григорьевич). In 1770, together with the sons of Shkurin, he was sent to study abroad, in a specially organized boarding school in Leipzig (De Ribas, 2007: 67). In 1774, he was returned to Russia and in 1775 on the order of the Empress he was taken and transferred to I.I. Betsko. At the same time, Catherine II decided to give a child, who had only the name Alexey Grigorovich, the surname Bobrinsky. The surname originated from the name of Bobriki village (Epiphany county of Tula Province (now a part of the territory of Bogoroditsk town)). The village was purchased from Ladyzhensky for material support of Bobrinsky yet in 1763 by the order of Catherine II (http://wikiredia.ru/wiki/Бобринский,_Алексей_Григорьевич).

Figure 1 – Count Alexey Bobrinsky (1762-1813) in the 1800s (http://wikiredia.ru/wiki/Бобринский,_Алексей_Григорьевич)
In 5 days after his uterine brother Pavel Petrovich ascended the throne, Alexey Bobrinsky was promoted to the rank of Major General, and on the same day, on November 12, 1796, he was raised to the Counts of the Russian Empire together with his recently born son Alexey (https://gerbovnik.ru/arms/27.html).

Figure 2 – Records about the noble family of Counts (Bobrinsky, 1890: 507, 508)

Figure 3 – Coat of Arms of Count Bobrinsky (https://gerbovnik.ru/arms/27.html)
On September 2, 1798, Alexey Bobrinsky retired from military service (http://wikiredia.ru/wiki/Бобринский_Алексей_Григорьевич). He moved to Tula Province, Bogoroditsk, where he lived most of the year and continued to visit St. Petersburg. Alexey Bobrinsky died of "paralysis" in 1813 (http://wikiredia.ru/wiki/%D0%A4%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB:Alexey_Bobrinsky1_.png).

The father of the future Minister of Ways of Communication, Pavel Bobrinsky (1801-1830), was the first lieutenant of the Guard (Figure 5) (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PAVEL_ALEKSEEVICH_BOBRINSKI_OI.jpg?uselang=ru) and the second of three sons of the founder of the family of Alexey Grigorievich Bobrinsky. At the age of 20, he married Julia Junosha-Belinskaya (1804-1892), a distant relative of the Polish King Stanislaw-Augustus Poniatowski) (https://www.geni.com/people/Алексей-Павлович-граф-Бобринский/600000011286318532). She was a widow of a Moscow millionaire Sobakin (https://www.proza.ru/2016/04/11/2130). And in 1825, even before the construction of the railway in Pavlovsk, by the highest mercy of Empress Maria Fedorovna, Pavel received a large area at the Konyushennaya Street in the quarter between Peschany and Vorobyiny lanes. After occupying the entire quarter, he built a cottage there, behind which a large garden was laid out down to Gospitalnaya Street. According to the memoirs of his contemporaries, it was at the cottage of Bobrinsky, where P.A. Vyazemsky, V.A. Zhukovsky and A.S. Pushkin stayed and drank tea (http://www.topauthor.ru/chto_sdelal_dlya_rossiyskoy_imperi_i_rod_dvoryan_bobrinskih_3a95.html).

At that cottage, on February 19, 1826, Alexey, the eldest son of P.A. Bobrinsky was borne. However (https://www.proza.ru/2016/04/11/2130), Pavel Bobrinsky, the first lieutenant of the Guard, turned to be a real philander, even with an explosive
behaviour. At the age of 29, he was killed in a duel in the Italian city of Florence (http://wikiredia.ru/wiki/Бобринский,_Алексей_Григорьевич).

The future minister was baptized on September 18, 1826 in the family estate in the Nikolskaya Church of the Iyevlevo village (Bogoroditsk county of Tula Province) (Bobrinsky, 1894a). In 1844, Alexey Bobrinsky graduated from the Alexander Lyceum in St. Petersburg (http://wikiredia.ru/wiki/Бобринский,_Алексей_Павлович).

After completing his studies at the Lyceum, he took service at the Department of Economic and Accountant Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire. In 1846 he left that position and settled in his estate in Bogoroditsk county of Tula Province. There he built a sugar mill in 1848-1851 and set up five farms for growing sugar beet. In 1847 he became the head of the nobility of the Bogoroditsk county (Bobrinsky, 1894b). From 1894 he was elected an honorary superintendent of the nobility in the in Bogoroditsk district college.

When the Crimean War of 1855-1856 began, he joined the army and became a Fliegel-Adjutant under Emperor Alexander II. He fulfilled his personal instructions (https://www.proza.ru/2016/04/11/2130). Throughout the war he served in the ranks of the Emperor’s Rifle Regiment. After the war he continued his military service and in 1868 he became a Major General of the suite of Emperor Alexander II. He was directly involved in his reforms. Thus, in August 1858, A.P. Bobrinsky advocated the project of peasants’ liberation, taking a stand for the need in transforming them into owners. In 1866, he developed and achieved the approval of the Charter of the “Society of Mutual Land Credit” for issuing loans secured by land (Malevanov, 2005: 626).
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Relationships with the tsar’s court, as well as friendship with A.O. Shuvalov, Chief of the Imperial Gendarmerie, facilitated the transition of A.P. Bobrinsky to state service. Already in 1869, he was appointed as a member of the Board of the Ministry of Ways of Communication (https://www.proza.ru/2016/04/11/2130). In January, 1870 he was sent to England to study the construction of railways. Upon his return from this trip, he became a member of the Committee for supervision over the construction of narrow-gauge railways and the issues of their service. At the same time he headed the Interim management for the construction of the state narrow-gauge line from the town Livny to the Orel-Gryazi railway (Zenzinov, 1995: 49).

In May 1871, A.P. Bobrinsky was appointed Deputy Minister of Ways of Communication (https://www.proza.ru/2016/04/11/2130), in September of the same year he was promoted to Head of the Ministry, and in April 1872 he became Minister of Ways of Communication (Klimenko, 2006).

The aim of the work is to determine the influence of the activity of Count Alexey Pavlovich Bobrinsky as the Minister of Ways of Communication on the processes of development of railway transport, ports and waterways of the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th century.

Figure 6 – The second Minister of Railway Transport of the Russian Empire – Vladimir A. Bobrinsky. Portrait (1872). Artist Ivan Kramskoi (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Бобринский,_Алексей_Павлович)

Research methods

During the preparation of the article, chronological, comparative methods of historical knowledge, classification, and systematization of historical sources and bibliographic material were used (Pylypchuk & Strelko, 2017; Pylypchuk & Strelko, 2018; Pylypchuk & Strelko, 2019; Strelko, Pylypchuk, Berdnichenko, Hurinchuk, Gamaliia & Sorochynska, 2019). The use of these methods and approaches to scientific research allowed to retrace the way of life and professional activity of A.P. Bobrinsky systematically and critically evaluate the sources used, highlight the
main points in the current state of studying the subject and the results of predecessors, specify the most promising directions of research, give a description of the previous works on this issue and clearly distinguish issues that have not yet been resolved.

**Results and Discussion**

In the first year of his activity on the post of Assistant Minister of Ways of Communication, A.P. Bobrinsky did not make any changes to the work of the Ministry. At the same time, the development of the country’s railway network continued. Thus, in 1872, 2171 versts of new railway lines (Skopinsko-Vyazemskaya, Morshansko-Syzranskaya, Rostovo-Vladikavkazskaya railways, etc.) were built. Aleksey Pavlovich was a supporter of the construction of railways at the state expense. He was also an opponent of lifetime guarantees on bonds of private railways. At the same time, he contributed to the extensive railway construction (Kislinsky, 1902: 69; Kishtymov, 2013: 47).

A.P. Bobrinsky was an active reformer of transport management. Thus, at the beginning of 1873 he gave a long address to Emperor Alexander II. That address was directed against the existing procedure of awarding concessions for the construction of new railways. Aleksey Pavlovich noted: “Under the existing procedure of awarding concessions, the Minister of Ways of Communication, electing a concessionaire at his discretion and agreeing with him on the cost of construction measured by versts, enjoys excessive powers and bears a great responsibility” (Zenzinov, 1995: 49). According to Alexey Pavlovich, they far exceed the rights and responsibilities authorized to ministers and it is impossible to control the appropriateness of the minister’s actions. As was noted by A.P. Bobrinsky, the exclusive powers of the Minister of Ways of Communication “have a very negative impact on activities of the entire Ministry” (Zenzinov, 1995: 49). In this case, the role of its employees grows in the eyes of the co-founders and it gives rise to “different treacherous actions aimed to induce subordinates of the Minister ... to his undercover mediation or assistance” (Zenzinov, 1995: 49). Aleksey Pavlovich emphasized that the existing systems of awarding concessions and their special attractiveness lead to the fact that “everyone, who looks for easy money and at least a little familiar with the state of affairs in the ministries or higher institutions, recognizes not only the opportunity, but even the right to be the founder of a joint-stock railway company” (Zenzinov, 1995: 49-50). According to the estimation of A.P. Bobrinsky, the actions of such founders were aimed at the appropriation of property of railway enterprises. To do that, such moneymakers spent almost nothing, seeking permission from the government to create a new joint-stock company, which was entrusted with the property of railway companies. Therefore, they declared a society established without actually establishing a new railway company and appropriated the railway enterprise owned by the society, themselves, having registered all or most of the shares in the name of themselves and their relatives, without paying them up. After that, the founders set up executive managements with people close to them and become completely uncontrolled disposers of the business, procuring capital on the negligent construction of railway lines, their poor maintenance and the excess of operating costs” (Zenzinov, 1995: 50).
A.P. Bobrinsky believed that “existence of many of our railway societies is imagined; their companies are fake; their managements are wrong; their shareholders are figureheads; their shares are not sold, and the Ministry of Ways of Communication is forced to remain a ruthless witness of actions, which are hidden behind legal forms but violate the aims of the government, an enterprise and the treasury... In order to avoid disclosure, which is detrimental for state lending of railway companies, the government is forced to seek out special means, which are very difficult for the state treasury and only help the founder to eliminate his illegal actions” (Zenzinov, 1995).

As the measures to improve railway construction, A.P. Bobrinsky proposed a return to the construction of railways at the costs of the state. He wrote: “the construction of state-owned railways, which is so successfully practiced in Germany, Belgium and some other countries, can undoubtedly be of such benefit to us as well” (Zenzinov, 1995: 50). To his opinion, such practice “is absolutely rational for the state, governmental and individual benefits” (Zenzinov, 1995: 50). Moreover, A.P. Bobrinsky did not exclude the construction of railways by private companies, but in such a way that “the government was concerned not about attracting the founders, but attracting shareholders” (Zenzinov, 1995: 50).

A.P. Bobrinsky developed the procedure for setting up railway societies. But his proposal was not supported by Finance Minister M.Kh. von Reutern. On March 30, 1873, Bobrinsky’s proposal received the support of Emperor Alexander II. According to the proposal, A.P. Bobrinsky planned to start construction of 14 railway lines in 1873 and submitted his plan to the Committee of Ministers. However, the discussion of that plan was postponed for different reasons. Only at the end of the year it was decided on setting up railway societies for the construction of four railway lines: Orenburg, Urals, Vistula River and Fastov in Ukraine. An application for shares of those companies was announced in March, 1874. However, the Minister of Ways of Communication A.P. Bobrinsky failed to stand upon his project, already approved by the Tsar. The right to apply for the shares of new railways was granted to the Minister of Ministers M.Kh. von Reutern. He submitted some amendments to the order of application, proposed by A.P. Bobrinsky. The latter again addressed himself to the emperor with a report on the inadmissibility of limiting the places of application for shares of railway societies to only two cities (St. Petersburg and Moscow) and to only one credit institution. A.P. Bobrynsky believed that this would be equivalent to restriction of competition and “…transferring railway companies back into the hands of speculators in future” (Zenzinov, 1995: 51).

Fears of A.P. Bobrinsky were confirmed – the real masters in the societies of the Orenburg, Fastov and Ural railways were “railway kings” Gubonin and Polyakov. The big capitalists, seeking to concentrate the issued shares in their hands and not knowing the terms of the allotment, raised capital from everywhere to apply for as many shares as possible, and in addition bought up shares at an inflated price. Thus, the purpose of A.P. Bobrinsky was not reached and the construction of new railways again fell under the individual responsibility of builders acting on behalf of joint stock companies.

According to the order of the emperor, approved on June 30, 1874, the Provision of the Committee of Ministers on setting up railway societies by public application for shares was considered to be inconvenient. The same concerned the construction of
railways by the government. That is why the Ministers of Railways and Finance were charged to find another method to build Donetsk (coal) and Melitopol railways. However, that provision was already drafted by the next Minister of Ways of Communication, admiral Posyet.

At the same time, in the process of development of railway network in accordance with the awarded concessions for construction and operation of individual railways, it became necessary to integrate the activities especially of those railways, which were joined in whole lines, cutting through vast expanses and connecting important trading points. The need in such integration led to the convention of a general congress of representatives of railway enterprises under the Ministry of Railways yet in 1869.

At that first general congress, a “direct”, i.e. continuous transportation of passengers on the united railways was started, and the railways were divided into groups and reloading stations were appointed for the continuous transportation of goods on railways operated by different companies. At the same time, for separate agreements between the railways of a one group, it was decided to convene separate congresses of representatives of the railways.

When managing the Ministry of Railways, A.P. Bobrinsky built 2505 versts of new railways; and by his predecessor V.A. Bobrinsky 5103 versts were built. Under the conditions of extension in the rail network and a gradual increase in traffic on all ways of communication and in order to properly handle the railway management, it became necessary to have a special institution within the Ministry of Railways, which would be responsible for registration of traffic and all sorts of circumstances with their distribution by known categories. For this purpose, A.P. Bobrinsky made a speech and insisted that within the Ministry the Interim Statistical Department should be established “for collection, verification and rational processing of statistical materials on all the issues related to furniture, improvement and operation of ways of communication of both rail, as well as water and road ways” (A brief outline of the development and activities of the Ministry of Railways over a hundred years of its existence (1798-1898), 1898: 154). On September 15, 1873, such a department was established. Thus, with the establishment of the Department, the Ministry of Ways of Communication resolved a long-standing and very important issue of a clear and scientific management of the issues of collection, processing, verification and presentation of statistic data on the condition and operation of ways of communication, which were extremely important for the further activity of the Department. That was the extent of changes made by Count A.P. Bobrinsky in the central institutions of the Ministry. The activity of the Ministry of Ways of Communication concerning the management of roadways during that period was limited to the transfer of roads to the subordination of zemstvos (institutions of local government set up during the great emancipation reform of 1861).

Regarding water communications, in addition to repair works and local improvements, that time was featured by beginning of the construction of the Maritime Canal from St. Petersburg to Kronstadt and the construction of the St. Petersburg and Kronstadt ports. On January 20, 1873 under the leadership of Count A.P. Bobrinsky the Special Committee was established at the Ministry, the
purpose of which was to discuss the construction of the Maritime Canal for passage of large-tonnage ships and development of infrastructure for the St. Petersburg and Kronstadt ports. But this is the issue of our next article.

Working at the Ministry of Ways of Communication, A.P. Bobrinsky did much to improve the railway management in Russia. He believed that railroads do not only drive the economic forces of the country but also bring people enlightenment and culture with them. To speed up this important matter, the railway workers themselves should be also taught in every possible way.

Under the “vertical power structure” and authoritarian governments, acting honestly is a rather dangerous strategy, that is, honesty becomes synonymous with disloyalty. Here is what K.A. Skalkovsky, a famous historian, archivist and statistician of the Russian empire of Polish descent said about the activity of A.P. Bobrinsky: «Count A.P. Bobrinsky intended to perform a radical transformation in the Ministry of Ways of Communication, but lack of familiarity with the specialty of his department, not a quite good selection of personnel and hastiness led to the result that most reforms failed, the Count raised up enemies and was forced to leave his post” (Skalkovsky, 1890: 280).

Figure 7 – A.P. Bobrinsky. Photo from the family archive of M.M. Bobrinsky (http://www.ng.ru/bogoslovie/2017-07-19/15_424_graf.html).

Here is how S. Yu. Witte wrote about this man (http://www.ng.ru/bogoslovie/2017-07-19/15_424_graf.html): “Count Alexey Bobrinsky was the Minister of Ways of Communication under Alexander II and served under his authority. He was a man of honour, but also with some oddity. For his honesty at the post of the Minister of Ways of Communication he went to gaupytvachta (military detention) for his refusal to assist Princess Dolgorukova (Yurievskaya) in her money frauds. After that he retired and no longer appeared in the capital”. The Princess was a favourite of the monarch.

A.P. Bobrinsky resigned on June 10, 1874, having served as a minister for about three years (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Бобринский_Алексей_Павлович).
During that time more than 2500 versts of railway tracks were built. They were all built by joint stock companies. The total length of railways in tsarist Russia amounted to more than 18 thousand versts. After resignation, A.P. Bobrinsky organized agricultural production in his estate with the use of free labour.

After his resignation, A.P. Bobrinsky settled in his estate in Bogoroditsk (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Вобринский,_Алексей_Павлович). In 1874, A.P. Bobrinsky met Lord G. Radstock, a British missionary. In the course of their communication A.P. Bobrinsky changed his skeptical attitude to religion. He took an active part in the work of the Society for Promotion of Spiritual and Moral Reading, founded by V.A. Pashkov, another follower of G. Radstock. Bobrinsky financially supported the publication and further distribution of the Bible, the Magazine “Russian Worker” and spiritual and moral literature of the Protestant brand in St. Petersburg and Tula Province. He also personally conducted religious and educational conversations (Randall, 2018; Batalden, 1994: 85; Savinsky, 1999: 151).


After the activity of the Society for Promotion of Spiritual and Moral Reading was outlawed and its participants (named “Pashkovtsy sect” by the authorities) began to be persecuted (https://www.geni.com/people/Алексей-Павлович-граф-Бобринский/6000000011286318532), A.P. Bobrinsky was forced to leave Russia. The Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists of Russia considers him along with G. Radstock, V.A. Pashkov and their adherents to be one of the founders of Evangelical Christianity in Russia (Randall, 2018; Savinsky, 1999: 151).

Figure 8 – Monument to Alexey Pavlovich Bobrinsky, Minister of Ways of Communication, at the Zhdanka Railway Station (Bogoroditsk, Russia) (https://deadokey.livejournal.com/442920.html)
A.P. Bobrinsky died from acute liver inflammation on October 8, 1894 (Bobrinsky, 1894a; Bobrinsky, 1894b) in France, in the city of Cannes, where he was buried.

Conclusions
The activity of Count Alexey Bobrinsky on the post of Minister of Ways of Communication had a significant influence on the processes of development of railway transport, ports and water channels of the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th century. He developed the procedure for setting up railway societies. Being a manager of the Ministry, A.P. Bobrinsky established the Interim Statistical Department, which resolved a long-standing and very important issue of a clear and scientific organization of the procedure of collection, processing, verification and presentation of statistic data on the condition and operation of ways of communication, which were an extremely important matter for the further activity of the Ministry. His achievements include the beginning of the construction of the Maritime Canal from St. Petersburg to Kronstadt and the construction of the St. Petersburg and Kronstadt ports.

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COMPONENTS OF THE MODERNIZATION OF DOBRUDJA WITHIN THE ROMANIAN STATE (1878-1916) (II)

Stoica Lascu*

Abstract

The study presents a synthesis of Dobrudja’s place and role in the overall development of modern Romania are outlined in direct relation to the historical necessity of the unitary evolution of the State, the advantage of the existence of a large maritime facade. The economic, social, cultural, urban, and political progress of Dobrudja in the period up to World War I – was possible as a result of the State’s constant concern for the modernization of the two counties between the Danube and the Black Sea. The state of development of the Dobrudja industry in the Modern Times reflects the social, mainly agricultural, structure of this Romanian space. The ethnic minorities benefited from a legal framework favorable, resulting in what is called the “Dobrudjan interethnic model”. In 1913 is the recovery of Southern Dobrudja, in the context of maintaining the balance of the Balkan territory and strengthening the Romanian border security.

Key words: Modern Dobrudja, “Dobrudjan interethnic model”, Minorities, Ion Bănescu, Constantin Sarry, Petru Vulcan

The Modernization of the Localities of Dobrudja. The Population

Changing the urban aspect of the localities is also another aspect of the progress, visible both in the two county residence cities – Tulcea and, more obviously, Constanța – as well as in the cities (which have recently been written as valuable monographs) – such as Sulina (Bondar, Dima, Iacovici Lungu, 2001; Manea, Ciocoiu, Costea, 2013), Hărșova, Mangalia (Lăpușan, Lăpușan, 2007), Techirghiol (Lăpușan, Lăpușan, 1999), Medgidia, and Cernavodă (Cârlescu, Colesniuc, 2014); Babadag, Măcin, Isaccea, and Sulina.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the City of Constanța (Lăpușan, Lăpușan, 1997; Păuleanu, 2005; Coman, Cheramidoglu, 2012) faced two “heavy issues”, namely the need to mitigate cosmopolitanism – in favor of accentuating the national character – and that of consolidating (recte – the banks of the city) and territorial expansion, appreciating, in 1897, by Petre Grigorescu – forestry agent of the State, with modern agrarian properties in the Tariverde area, owner-founder of the newspaper Constanța (father of the future Prefect, Mayor, and interwar Minister Horia P. Grigorescu; his house, near the building of the National College “Mihai Eminescu”, in the last years, has become almost a ruin; the initial PG still resist…) – that, “For 20 years, there are no 10 Romanian properties in the city”.

In the first decade and a half of the last century, however, a real change of the image of Constanța takes place through the elevation of new public buildings – The Prefecture, the Court, the Prefect’s Residence (will become, in fact, the Royal Residence), the City Hall, the Casino; as well as the cult – the “Carol I” Royal Mosque.

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the “Assumption of the Virgin” Church – some of which were challenged in terms of location, of solidity of the constructions, of generous/onerosous contracts or simply for political reasons. There is also an expansion of the city beyond the current blvd. Mamaia [former Regina Maria; Lenin], creating the so-called “Romanian district”, the work of the Mayor Ion Bănescu, “for which 15 years before, the struggle for its establishment had begun, without any of its predecessors being able to achieve it”.


And the prefects of Constanța County (Coman, Apostoleanu, 2011) – in number of not less 32!, were – Remus Opreanu (1878-1879, 1879-1881, 1882-1883), Luca Elefterescu (1879), Constantin Ciocârlan (1881-1882), D.S. Dan (1882), Grigore Grămatićescu (1882-1884), George Persiceanu (1884-1885), Emanoil Culoğlu (1885-1888), Constantin Poteea (1888), Alexandru Filipescu (1888), Ioan Barozzi (1888-1889), Gheorghe C. Aslan (1889), Scarlat Scheletti (1889-1891), Gheorghe Lățescu (1891), Iuliu Dunca (1891-1892), Nicolae Chirițescu (1892-1894), Emil Andreian (1894), Iorgu Istrate (1894-1895), Dumitru Iancovici (1895-1896), Dumitru Manolescu (1896), Dimitrie Quintescu (1896-1897, 1901-1902), Luca Ionescu (1897-1899), Gheorghe Cănănu (1899-1900), Dumitru State (1900-1901), Scarlat Vârnav (1902-1904, 1907-1909), Constantin Pariano (1904-1905, 1911-1912 [and in 1921-1922]), Mihail Capșa (1905-1907), Ioan T. Ghica (1909-1910), Constantin Irimescu (1912-1913), Nicolae Metaxa 81913-1914), Luca Oancea (1914), George Mumuianu (1914-1915), Nicolae T. Negulescu (1918-1919 [and in 1922-1925]).

Professor Ion Bănescu was appreciated at the time, and for good reason, as the most destitute Mayor of Constanța, although he occupied the capacity of mayor for a relatively short period: “As Mayor of Constanța, he did great things, which made him will make immortal among the citizens of this city. In two years of schooling, Ion Bănescu made so many improvements that he left his opponents in awe and asserted himself as the first mayor and best city parent in the entire country (our emphasis).

Bringing water to the city of Constanța, for which he fought successfully even in opposition, he finally realized it, just as he had designed it, the wonderful beach and the baths of Mamaia, so admired by the whole country and by foreigners, the building of the church from the top of the city, the Communal Casino, which he had designed and also as an imperative monument in the Romanian style, of the No. 2 Boys and Girls Schools, which today – he was writing at his death, in November 1909, the conservative-democratic newspaper (takist) «Vîtorul Dobrogei» – became the Gymnasium in the city, lighting the city with electricity, its sewerage, paving with asphalt and cubic stone of the lower part of the city, the public garden, the firemen’s barracks, the abbey commune, the Constanța-Technirghiou railway line, the Romanian district/area, for which 15 years before, the struggle for its establishment had begun without any of the
predictions, his treasures, etc., etc., all these great works of utility have placed Ion Bănescu in the true light of his unlimited power of work, intelligence and patriotism”.

The building became, over time, an emblem – next to the one of the City Hall, construction started, according to the plans of the architect Victor Ştefănescu (Cornescu, 2018), in 1911 and inaugurated in 1921 – of Constanţa (today, in the quasiruin) – The Casino – provoked controversy over the style at the time, its functionality and size.

The other symbol of the aestival Constanţa, Mamaia, would also be subject to the political imprecision, the interests of the group (Comănita Cica, 2005; Lăpuşan, Lăpuşan, Stănescu, 2006). The initiative to create the resort is, as I have shown above, Ion Bănescu – and it is quickly and in practice transposed by long defamatory campaigns by political opponents. In fact, writes Petru Vulcan in November 1905, “The towers of the pavilions and the station on that sandy tongue called Mamaia, which includes the most wonderful beach in the world (our emphasis), rises [in 1905] as in the world of fairy tales”; the opponents balance the expenses, “what are we going to pay for them, from our bags” and the great distance from the city (eight km): “But even though the Mamaia baths would have given us nothing – they were showing in October 1906, in an Appeal to voters, national-liberals – yet this is a loss and misfortune for us, by displacing the interests of the city and its inhabitants”. As a counterbalance, they propose that the future position of the city’s baths be located near the Independence Place, the beach to be defended by a future submersible dam, designed by engineer Anghel Saligny. With all the opposition, Mamaia Resort will experience a development – slow, along with it developing other localities, with a seasonal summer character, the tourism in the Black Sea taking more and more contour –, and the fame will spread, infirming the pessimism of the opponents to Ion Bănescu.

The City of Tulcea (Dima, 2015) did not know about the spectacular development of Constanţa, remaining a typical provincial town: “although it has [in 1898] a population of over 20,000 inhabitants, but because of the marginal population, mostly composed of workers and rural inhabitants, and the rest the sober and excessively economical population is very monotonous; as soon as it gets dark, no one leaves the house (our emphasis). In the summer, the world goes to listen to military music in the parking lot in front of the Administrative Palace, and when a group of artists pass by – it was recorded in the local newspaper «Istrul» at the beginning of 1898 –, unless the authorities intervene to sell the entrance tickets, the theater remains empty”. In fact, for more than three decades, after 1878, Tulcea’s urban landscape changed little, only after 1909, some changes were noted: “Well, nothing was done for schools, no more significant building, the High School, secondary, vocational school, primary schools, except for one, then the Court, the Peace Court, the Post Office and the Telegraph, the Hospital, all are by places abandoned by the Turks or by places found as God gave, with rents, but quite enormous. The non-illuminated city, and what is unimaginable, even criminal, is that it has no drinking water (our emphasis). The Turks, as they were Oriental, still had here in Tulcea a more or less good water system, which gave the inhabitants of this city filtered drinking water. However, the Romanian administration, from the pipelines that were for the supply and distribution of the filtered water during the Turkish times, made in
our time civilizations, lanterns, and the water is served by the God of the Danube in the most natural and cleanest way possible”.

The Tulcea’s mayors were even more numerous than those from Constanța (17), their respective position/dignity being of “remarkable” instability, as a duration for an appointment – Mihail Petrescu (1878-1879), Dumitrac/he Yeodorof (1879-1880), Anton Varna/ (1880-1881), Vasile Sotirescu (1882, 1891-1892), Alexandru Stoianovici ((1890-1891), Constantin I. Davidoglu (1894), Ştefan Borş (1894, 1906, 1911-1912) (Ciocoiu, 2012), Mircea Petrescu (1896), Ion Dinescu (1897-1899), Leonida Sterea (100), Gheorghe Cernescu (1901), Elefterie Nicoleseu (1901-1902, 1909-1910), Nicolae Comşa (1903-1904), Dumitru Mateescu-Buzău (1905), Sebastian Teodorescu (1908), Alexandru Calafeteanu (1913-1914), Grigore Panaitescu (1915-1918).

The prefects of the county (Baumann, Franga, Petrov, 2012) were not much less numerous, almost as much as in Constanța (29) (greater stability prevailing after 1902) – George M. Ghica (1878-1879), Ion Palade (1879-1881), Remus M. Oprenau (1881), Paul Stătescu (1881-1888, 1895), George Persiceanu (1888-1889), Constantin Merișescu (1889), Nicolae C. Bratu (1890-1891), Alexandru Blaramberg (1891), Gheorghe Aslan (1891), Vasile A. Forescu (1891-1893), Grigore Sturza (1893-1895), Constantin N. Toneanu (1895-1896), George Cernescu (1896), Alexandru M. Pencovici (1896-1897), Ioan Nenițescu (1897-1900, February 1901), Sebastian Moruzzi (1900), Nicolae Rosetti-Bălănescu (1900-1901), Ioan D. Andronescu (March 1900), Anastasescu Ştefan Magheru (1901), Ioan Bastache (1901-1902), George Clinceni (1902), Luca Ionescu (1902-1904), Dimitrie Hagi-Anton (1904-1907), Alexandru Bălteanu (1907-1908), Ion C. Atanasiu (1908-1910), Petre Th. Sfetescu (1910-1913), Constantin A. Stolojan (1914), Petre N. Slăvescu (1914-1915), George Şerban (1915-1918/1919).

The Tulcea Port City revival – among its representative figures/county (Hogea, 2000; Colcer, 2011; Frunte-Lătă, 2015) are teachers, lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, traders, and industrialists, as well as Enache Cardaș, Tudor Voicu, Alexandru Calafeteanu, N.S. Baboeanu-Droe, Ștefan Borș (Ciocoiu, 2012), Elefterie Niculescu, Dimitrie Melinescu, Nicolae Comșa, Gheorghe Șerban, T. Gherghiu, Ovid Buteanu, D. Timuș, Vasile Vârtolaș, Sebastian Teodorescu, Em. Bogatu, Grigore Musculiu, I. Mateescu, C. Crintea, Sandu Munteanu, Achille Dimitriu, Brutus Cotov, Gelescu D. Cialicof, A.M. Davidsohn, Nicolae Prodanof, Bechir Suleiman Sadicoglu, Hairi Omer, Minciu Marcof, Ivan Paciof, S.P. Maloschitschi, Hugă Friedman, N. Ghinsberg, dr. Bizamcr, Israel M. Neuman, C. Thaler, Diancu Stoianov, Stoian Crăste, Sava Doncef, Nicolae Penciu, Stoiciu Malce, I. Scultetly, Luca Moruzov, the families Sezonov, Avermide, Caravia, Licheardopol, Calcand, Vergos, Dendrino, Cuculi, Flamaropol, Antippa, Chiriaeide, and others – dates, it can be said, from September 1909, when, in the presence of Prime-Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu, the foundation stones were laid for the work to bring water, the building of the Palace of Justice and three premises for schools, an opportunity for the Prefect Ion C. Atanasiu to reveal the merit of P.N.L. in the modernization work of Tulcea: “As it is (leaving Tulcea – our note), it will suffice to mention only the fact that in 30 years of Romanian rule there were [only] two school premises in the city and four in the county. There – showed the Tulcea’s Prefect (former «generous» socialist), in September 1910, «at the banquet offered
by the City Hall to Mr. Ion I.C. Brătianu» – nothing was done. And this is one of the countless facts that prove the complete disinterest which was so fatal to Tulcea” (Lascu, 1999: 483).

Next to the urban localities, in the two counties of Dobrudja there will be developed an amount of rural settlements, with facilities of the small industry (mills, workshops, “factories” of gaseous water, brick, stone quarries), having cooperatives (of consumption or production), with schools, churches, town halls, popular banks.

In Constanța County there was a single rural locality with over 3,000 inhabitants (Anadalchioi – 3,571; it will become part of Constanța in the interwar period), another 9 had between 2,000 and 2,400 inhabitants (Almălău, Ciobanu, Gârliciu, Rasova, Topalu, Oltina, Satirșochi [Crucea], Oltina, Caramurat [Ferdinand I; Mihail Kogălniceanu]), the vast majority having between 1,000 and 2,000 inhabitants (the county was divided into 8 places, 7 urban communes, 82 rural communes, the latter consisting of 213 villages and 19 hamlets). In Tulcea County – the largest in the country, in 1913 there were 6 slabs, 7 urban communes, 60 rural communes, the latter consisting of 128 villages and 21 hamlets –, with settlements with more than 3,000 inhabitants: Sarichioi, Niculășel, Carcaliu, Cerna, Greci; between 2,000 and 3,000 inhabitants had Agighiol, Luncavița, Bașhișchi [Prințul Mihai; Nicolae Bălcescu], Jurilofca, Dăeni; the rest of the communes had less than 2,000 inhabitants.

Across the region, the numerical growth of the population was remarkable, as can be seen from the table below, Constanța County knowing, and from this point of view, a more accentuated development compared to Tulcea County.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Constanța County</th>
<th>Tulcea County</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>64,902</td>
<td>85,685</td>
<td>150,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>81,206</td>
<td>92,246</td>
<td>173,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>88,898</td>
<td>101,061</td>
<td>189,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>114,649</td>
<td>109,902</td>
<td>224,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>137,061</td>
<td>123,728</td>
<td>260,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>156,906</td>
<td>138,785</td>
<td>295,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>166,020</td>
<td>154,147</td>
<td>320,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>209,571</td>
<td>170,859</td>
<td>380,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>218,880</td>
<td>178,561</td>
<td>397,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>223,638</td>
<td>180,105</td>
<td>403,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>252,688</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reunion of Dobrudja in 1913, by recovering its South, the result of the Peace Treaty in Bucharest (28th July 28/10th August 1913), led to the population growth of the entire region; respectively, in 1914, Durostor County had 134,234 inhabitants, and Călăcra County 146,649 inhabitants – which led to a total of 678,324 inhabitants of the whole Dobrudja (as we can see, the population of Dobrogea Nouă [New Dobrudja] represented a significant numerical contribution – 41.4 %). The outbreak of the First World War will stop the demographic progress – in 1915, for each of the south-Dobrudjan counties, a numerical increase of about 3,000 inhabitants is recorded.
The Dobrudjan School and the Teacher – They Played a Decisive Role in the Process of Civilization of the Region, of National and Civic Awareness

From the first moment, in 1878, the chief concern of the prefects of the two counties was the opening of schools in a widowed region by a well-articulated school network, in accordance with the needs of society, of the individual and of the instructional-educational act. In addition to the rest of the country, in Dobrudja the school still had the purpose of “spreading the knowledge of our spirit, it is destined – the Prefect Remus N. Opreanu delivered in the Exposition of January 1881 – to serve as a common temple in which the different races of the county, in close contact with the first age, drinking at the same source of science, to learn to love, to form a deep conviction that all the inhabitants, sons and the same father, lived as brothers together, that the rights and duties for all are equal” (Lascu, 1999: 116).

Although they had an unenviable material state, the teacher was considered “the most important civilizing factor in a commune. From the teacher the most appropriate behavior is required, from him the wisest advice is expected, he is asked for book, work, devotion, in a word the teacher must be the only person who gives the true tone in a village” – was noted in the article Improving the fate of teachers in Dobrudja, hosted in the weekly newspaper Centrul Dobrogei, in July 1898. Indeed, apart from its strictly educational-instructive role, in the Chair, the teacher – together with the priest, region rising in every imposing locality Orthodox churches – it was at the origin of the villagers’ exhortation to book science, he organized various forms of cultural activities, as well as of the villagers’ exhortation to modern forms of social-economic progress – as were the popular banks or village cooperatives; the first “cooperative society of protection and milkshop from Dobrudja «The Twinning of the Ploughmen» [Înfrâţirea plugarilor]” was established in 1909 in the commune of Pisci, “thanks to the kindness of Mr. V.G. Toescu, the teacher-leader and other good people”, initiator who also pointed out, according to the Tulcea national-liberal newspaper of 10th May 1909, the significance of the event: “We would like this holiday, when sanctification and inauguration of the dairy will take place, be the day of true twinning of the plaintiffs and she will form the dawn of the new times and for this our Dobrudja” (Lascu, 1999: 438).

All the teachers from Dobrudja are urged to draw up the necessary and valuable monographs, “following a circular order of the Constanţa school reviewer” (Pop, 1983). In 1915, Petre Ştefănescu, Teacher in Dobromir village – the most laborious and talented teacher-publicist of the modern Dobrudja, the initiator, in 1906, of the village magazine Răvaşul nostru [Our Epistle] – plead with conviction, in the Dobrogea jună from the beginning of the year, on the national-historical significance of the composition of the Dobrudja monographs, the precious testimony, at the same time, for future generations: there are “so many issues and so many issues of vital interest for the culture of Dobrudja, questions and the problem whose disconnection remains to be given through monographs, made with great patience, encompassing the entire life, present and past, economic, national and historical, of the villages and towns of Dobrudja. Handsome hands, strong spirits, souls who can warm themselves to try to reconstruct, as rich and as close to the truth, the life of the village or city in which they carry their ephemeral existence, with all the warmth and all the vitality that they are
capable of priests, teachers, lawyers and teachers from Dobrudja, try to give the Romanian national culture of the land, which is hosting the most pretentious competition you are in a position to do” (Lascu, 1999: 712).

If in Tulcea there was a “Prince Carol” High School [*Liceul “Principele Carol”*] (established as a gymnasium in 1883, transformed into a high school in 1897, baptized in 1903) [today Colegiul Dobrogean “Spiru Haret”], Constanța did not enjoy a secondary school until much later, The “Mircea Vodă” Gymnasium (established as the Normal School in 1893 [today the National Pedagogical College “Constantin Brătescu”], under the leadership of Ion Bănescu) was transformed into the “Mircea cel Bătrân” High School only in 1911 (Faiter, 1996).

**Reinforcement of the Romanian Nationality in Dobrudja, Solidarity with all Romanians in the Provinces under Foreign Occupation**

In Dobrudja, one of the concerns of the county and local authorities, especially of the two county-resident cities, Constanța and Tulcea, of public opinion and its leaders was the strengthening of the share of Romanian nationality. In 1878, between the Danube and the Black Sea, many Romanians also lived alongside the allogeneic, (in cities the trade, especially was in their hands). Therefore, numerous articles advocating a policy of attracting as many Romanians as possible to Dobrudja will appear in the press – both from the rest of the country, as well as from Romanians living in Austro-Hungary (especially in Transylvania) or the Ottoman Empire (respectively, in Macedonia, Albania, Epirus, and Thessaly).

In the rural settlements, however, the presence of Romanians was much stronger. Apart from the villages inhabited by the Romanians and during the Ottoman period, the authorities allow the establishment of several thousand peasant families – but also teachers, priests, small traders –, who, as owners, will ensure the strength of the Dobrudjan Romanianism: “We, the Romanians, populated the vast deserts of Dobrudja, changed the face of this land, raised as much as we could the primitive level of agriculture – the «Santinela Dobrogei» newspaper in April 1894 showed – and developed the economic life under all the reports”.

The Modern Dobrudja is populated slowly by Romanians from all the historical provinces and territories inhabited by the brothers from the Balkans: “They gathered here, on this corner of the earth, attached to the [Royal] Crown of Romania – said, in Constanța, the political leader Take Ionescu, in 1908 – Romanians from everywhere. I see *mocans* coming from over the mountains, I see of those who with the ruler left [in 1878] Bessarabia, I see also a strong colony of Macedonians [*recte* – Aromanians] who brought here the skill to trade, unprepared work. All these, together with the natives and those who came from beyond the Danube, have completed the Romanian people here, an image of the whole Romanianis (our emphasis)” (Lascu, 1999: 412).

Indeed, the Transylvanian Romanians – the *Mocans* (Dumitrașcu [Gheorghe], 2009-2010; Lascu, 2018*), cattle breeders – will represent the precious strand of Romanianism in Dobrudja, they being attested, through the phenomenon of transhumanity, centuries before. “The evolution and spread of the villages in Dobrudja can be easily seen if we look at a Romanian household. She is the true mirror of these brave, hard-working, intelligent souls, with a well-defined future; and
he cannot – said in 1911 a publicist from Constanța, himself Romanian of Transylvanian origin – not to jump our hearts of joy when we sit and compare the small houses, with the windows of a palm, covered with earth, broken, of the old inhabitants, and the house proud, bright, tall, rich, cheerful, welcoming to the Transylvanians”. Ever since the establishment and the appropriation – or the purchase of agricultural land –, after 1878, the Mocans proved to be the most desirable cultivators of land, and they had, in fact, the largest and best cultivated properties (as can be seen). from a table above); the families Blebea, Oancea, Nistor, Popa, Moțoiu, Tomoșoiu, Gologan, Gurgu, Roșculeț, Mandai, Golea, and others (Lascu, 2018¹) – these are just a few of the pioneers of Romanianism in Dobrudja, to whom eternal gratitude is received from today’s generations.

Also among these young Romanian people were recruited, after 1900, the young people who will enter the whirlwind of the Dobrudjan political life: “It is a whole generation of people who are rising now – in 1905, the employee (secretary of the Constanța’ City Hall) born in Vaslui County, Ion Adam (well-known literary) (1875-1911), wrote –, the Romanian energy flows here in Dobrudja, vigorously and abundantly. It is the enriched Mocans and peasants (one of them, Ion Moțoiu, Mayor of Tașpunar commune, who will become his father-in-law – our note), who will all enter the political struggle tomorrow”.

In turn, the Balkan Romanians – the Aromanians or Macedo-Romanians and Meglenoromanians – will bring a vigorous breath to Dobrudja (Lascu, 2016), invigorating the economic life and giving a greater power to the cultural-national one. Certified in Dobrudja, sporadically, and during the Ottoman period, they will settle in a relatively small number – compared to the several thousand (18,000) families who were appropriated in the southern-Dobrudja counties during the inter-war period – after 1878, mainly as traders. Until the First World War, the existence of about 250-300 Aromanian families is documented in Constanța. In 1897, together with the Dobrudjans of Albanian origin, they laid the foundations of the Culture and Benefit Society of the Macedonian and Albanian Romanians “The Help” [Societatea de Cultură și Binefacere a Românilor Macedoneni și Albanezilor “Ajutorul”]. It was the initiative of the employee Petru Vulcan (on 23rd November 1992, the Dobrudjan Cultural-Historical Association “Romania de la Mare” [Asociația Cultural-Istorică Dobrogeană „România de la Mare"] unveiled a memorial plaque on the front of the house in Decebal Street no. 31, with the following content: În această casă a locuit, în perioada 1907-1922, funcţionarul român, născut în Macedonia, PETRU VULCAN (1869-1922), poet, romancier, publicist, animator al vieții culturale din Dobrogea [In this house lived, between 1907-1922, the Romanian employee, born in Macedonia, PETRU VULCAN (1869-1922), poet, novelist, publicist, animator of cultural life in Dobrudja]), who stated: “I am happy to see you gathered in such a large number [about 200 participants]; this proves to me – be said in the constitution meeting – that the Romanian-Macedonian and Albanian element in Dobrudja, self-conscious, aspires to a new life under the blissful and blessed sky of the Motherland [tării-mumne], tightening its ranks to become it strengthens even more than it is”.

For the first time, in Constanța the church service is celebrated in Romanian on 1st January 1882, until then it was held in Greek at the church of the Hellenic
Community (Metamorphosis Church [The Change to Face] built in 1867-1868). Until the First World War, several Orthodox churches were built in the cities of Constanța and Tulcea (Mănăstireanu, 2015), and a Cathedral at Constanța (Păuleanu, Coman, 2008), as well as beautiful religious buildings in each of the rural and urban areas.

In the context of illustrating and maintaining the idea of national solidarity, the need for greater national-state dignity is expressed in the process of attaining the national ideal and in our international relations: “And I have never lived with one thought, with one care and a fear: «What will Europe say? How will Europe judge us? Doesn't it still hold us as a savage, Europe?!» (...) But – the Tomitan publicist Mihail C. Mârcea wrote in the «Tribuna Dobrogei» newspaper in August 1907 – we stuck to the place, in our corner. All we are prone to do is pray the powers of Europe, in a voice torn by grief and mourning, touching, to intervene, not to leave our brothers, the gentle and innocent ones, prey to the dirty robbers. Europe, however, is first and foremost careless and in the end it just moves” (Lascu, 2019¹).

Regarding the reinforcement of Romanian presence in the Danube Delta, there were points of view pleading for establishing Romanian villages in the region. For this reason, Ioan Nenițescu (1854-1901), Prefect of Tulcea, carried on a positive policy in this direction – in 1911, the citizens of Tulcea erected a statue in his memory.

Meetings of Protest, subscribing lists, articles expressing Dobrudjans solidarity with the Romanians from Transylvania, Bukovina, Bessarabia, from Ottoman Macedonia, expressing the spirit of the entire Romanian nation, who had the same ideal: the ideal of creating the national unitary Romanian State – the Greater Romania. In 1906, thousands of Romanians from across the borders who had come to Bucharest on the occasion of the National Exhibition paid a visit to Constanța (and Mamaia), too, enjoying a festive welcome (Lascu, 1983, 1987, 1988; Dumitrașcu, Lascu, 1988).

The newspapers (Dobre, Stelian, 2018), namely Constanța, Gazeta Dobrogei, Santinela Dobrogei, Farul, Istrul, Dobrogea, Dobrogea jună (Culicea, Sin, David 2017), România Mare, Dobrogea nouă, etc. and magazines, such as: Ovidiu (Apostoleanu, Stelian, Dobre, 2019), Răzăușul nostru, România Mare (Lascu, 1989), etc. were to stand for reinforcement the Romanian nationality in Dobrudja, mainly in Constanța, characterized by a cosmopolitan life and, due to that fact relative fewer Romanians settled down here before 1900: “We certainly do know another face of Constanța” – was writing, in November 1905, Petru Vulcan. Not more than ten years have passed since the day we stepped for the first time in Tomis, the City of Ovidiu, looking around the place towered by his statue and trying to catch a Romanian word and we couldn’t hear not a single Romanian word, only people speaking every other language, as we said to ourselves with sadness: oh, dear! Where on earth are we now? In another part of Anatolia?! Indeed, there was our first impression. Landowners, merchants and shopkeepers and manufacturers, everyone in the «agora» were and still is a foreigner; I offer 1,000 lei to everyone who could show me a single Romanian grocerman in the entire Constanța. There were only few Romanian civil servants, because mainly the Greeks succeeded to take over the most important positions in management and administration. You could also see Romanians in uniform and that’s all”.

Another important moment is the apparition in Constanța of a magazine named România Mare [Greater Romania] (1913-1916) of a newspaper with the same name, in
1915 (then his name was changed into Dacia) – the first Romanian publications with the same symbolic name, of the modern renaissance of the Romanian nation (Lascu, 1989).

National Minorities (Turks and Tatars, Bulgarians, Russians, Greeks, Jews, Albanians, and others). Enjoyed a Legal Frame that Permitted Them to Develop Unhampered

These developed was according the Proclamation to Dobrudjans, issued by Prince Carol I, on the 14th of November 1878: “You, Moslem inhabitants, Romanian justice makes no difference when it comes to nation and religion. Your faith, your family will be protected as well as the Christians’ faith, their family. The affairs of your religion and of your family will be entrusted to their defense by the muftis and judges chosen from your nation and faith.

Christians and Moslems altogether, welcome the Romanian authorities with hope and trust; they are coming precisely to put end to the suffering you’ve been encountered, to heal the wounds made by the war, to protect you, your fortune and your legal rights, and also to help you to develop spiritually and materially”.

And in the well-known Proclamation to the Romanian Army (Given at Brăila, 14 of November 1878) of Prince Carol I – document designed, also, by the great statesman Mihail Kogălniceanu (1817-1891) (Vitcu, 2018) – among others: “Soldiers! In this new Romania you will find a population who in its majority is already Romanian. However, you will also find inhabitants of other origins and of other creeds. All of them, who become members of the Romanian state, have the same right to your protection and love!

Among them you will find Muslims, whose customs differ from ours, I particularly recommend you to observe their creed” (Rădulescu, Bitoleanu, 1984: 210).

Suggestive for what has been called the “Dobrudjan interethnic model”, respectively of the peaceful coexistence of the native, Romanian population, with different ethnicities (Rădulescu, Bitoleanu, 1984; Nicoară, 2006; Limona, 2007; Țighiliu, Cojoc, 2007; Coman, 2008; Lascu, 2014; Titov, 2015; Tușa, 2018¹) – Turks and Tatars, Bulgarians, Greeks (Baumann, 2005), Jews (Stan, 2005; Țighiliu, 2007; Dima, 2014), Russian-Lipovans (Filip, 2002, Emilian, 2019; Dobrinescu, 2019), Armenians (Tavitian, 2003, 2004), Germans, Albanians, and Italians (Știucă, 2006; Tomi, 2007; Moise, Mihalcea, 2008; Lascu, 2006), and others – established, over the centuries (and especially in the 19th century) in the space between the Danube and the Black Sea, there are the findings, from 1910, of the political and cultural man, the lawyer Ioan N. Roman (nicknamed by N. Iorga “the Patriarch” of Dobrudja): in addition to other advances reported in Dobrogea after 1878, “We have solved one of the most delicate problems, which honors the spirit of tolerance of our nation and its power of assimilation. In fact, in Dobrudja, we found people of particular race, language and religion, some of whom were expecting some hostile tendencies of Romanian domination. Well, we behaved in such a way towards them, respecting their language, habits and susceptibilities, that none of these pessimistic provisions happened. And it should be pointed out the finding that makes one of the authorized leaders of our public life that «the ethnic conglomerate that we found in Dobrudja at
our settlement melted in the heat of the same patriotic ideal», that «the old resentments have also lost their race hatred or hatred faith is extinguished», so that all the inhabitants of Dobrudja, regardless of origin or faith, «are loyal and devoted to the Throne, all worship and worship the Wise Master, who, through His virtues, has again bound the thread of Romanian life in this part of the country» and «there is no presumption, nor pride of the nation, when we affirm that we have made from a mixture of nations, a people that presents all the qualities of a moral relation and the expression of the same national consciences” (Lascu, 1999: 491).

In the years to come, the relationship established between the Romanian state and the Turko-Tatars (Nuredin, 2011; Lascu, 2009, 2013, 2014; Cupcea, 2015; Dumitrescu, 2015; Dumitrașcu [Gheorghe], Dumitrașcu, 2016²; Nicolae, Ciorbea, 2017) was one of the best possible and the Mosque King “Carol I”, erected on expenses of the Romanian State, is a proof of the kind of relationship (Păuleanu, Coman, 2010); “We, the Moslems from Dobrudja, loving sons of our Homeland, Romania, and faithful to our holy book, the Koran, that is teaching us that bard working, enlightening by education and honesty are the only means to prove ourselves worthy of the sacrifices that our country is doing for us continuously in this direction”, said, on the 24th of June, the Mufti of the Constanța County, on the occasion of setting the head stone for the mosque; the Moslem Seminary, some Turkish publications appearing here (Sadakat, Şark, Teşvik, Isak, Mektep ve aile), the advantages that Moslems enjoyed in society (high school education, the establishment of some specific unities in the Army, etc.) proved their civilized way to put up with the new national state environment.

The relations with the Bulgarian ethnic group were sometimes more delicate, the existence of chauvinists within it, influencing the relations of good Romanian-Bulgarian neighborhood; the authorities, as well as the public opinion – expressed through the press – have strong attitudes towards the attempts to undermine the authority of the Romanian State, specifying, each time, that “the Romanian governments have never made any difference in the population of Dobrudja. Always – wrote the Tulcea newspaper «Lupta», on 21st September 1909 –, all the inhabitants of Dobrudja enjoyed equal rights, were treated the same. And if it is true that in some respects Dobrudja suffered, all residents – regardless of origin – have experienced the same state of affairs, to the same extent” (Lascu, 2000).

The presence in Dobrudja of the Germans – established between 1841 and 1891 – proved to be extremely beneficial from the perspective of its modernization, whose inhabitants, less familiar with the rigorous habits of a competitive society, could find in their pragmatism remarkable models (Ciorbea, 2014). The journalist Constantin N. Sarry was to point out, at the time – in August 1910, in his newspaper – the significance of the presence of the Germans in Dobrudja: “The Mocans was not suitable to civilize Dobrudja – in the broad sense, which Kogălniceanu demanded. In this direction, the German was an invaluable element (our emphasis). Attracted directly or indirectly, in numerous colonies, through Russia and Germany, he came to Dobrudja, settled among the other nations – all backwards – and founded the households, which today are still far from being reached by his co-workers. The German in Dobrudja was a parable and an exhortation without peer (our emphasis)”. In their turn, the Dobrudjans of German
origin proved to be honest citizens of the Romanian State, often participating in Romanian national events, as it was in 1912, when – on the occasion of the Centenary of the Rapture of Bessarabia – they decided to raise their voices of reprobation and in A Minutes of 15th January 1912, a group of 12 leaders of the German Community record, on behalf of their countrymen: “We also express with the legitimate sons of the country the pain we feel for the loss of that glorious part of the country, which for good part we lived with love for several decades, until the last Russian infamy of 1878, when we retired to Dobrudja” (Lascu, 2006).

According to the last Census (of 20th October 2011) (Lascu, 2014), the situation by ethnicity of the population of Constanța County (total: 684,082 inhabitants) was as follows – 570,754 Romanians (83.4%); 20,826 Turks (3%) – 75% of the total Romania: 27,698 (6,525 in Constanța, 3,340 in Medgidia, 1,751 in Dobromir, 1,474 in Mangalia, 1,136 in Băneasa, 1,026 in Cobadin, 813 in Hârșova, 498 in Castelu, 460 in Cernavodă, 430 in Techirghiul, 348 in Ovidiu, etc); 19,601 Tatars (2.86%) – 96.6% of the total Romania: 20,282 (7,367 in Constanța, 3,211 in Medgidia, 1,183 in Mangalia, 673 in Techirghiul, 562 in Murfatlar, 447 Agigea, 427 Cobadin, 418 Ovidiu, etc.); 8,554 Roma (1.2 %); 3,568 Russian-Lipovans (0.5%) – 1,865 in Ghindărești, 601 in Constanța, 558 in Năvodari, 116 in Mangalia, 112 in Eforie, etc.; 503 Macedonians; 450 Hungarians; 266 Greeks; 263 Armenians; 143 Germans; 94 Ukrainians; 60 Jews; 60 Italians; 35 Bulgarians; 35 Csangos; 22 Poles; 10 Serbs; 8 Chinese; 4 Croats (654: other ethnicities). In Tulcea County (total: 213,083 inhabitants) there were – 180,496 Romanians (85%); 10,342 Russian-Lipovans (4.8%) – 44% of the total Romania: 23,487 (2,328 in Sarichioi, 2,068 in Carcaliu, 1,738 in Tulcea, 1,467 in Jurilofca, 1,253 in Slava Cercheză, 362 in Sulina, etc.); 3,423 Roma (1.6%) – 1,219 in Babadag, 953 in Tulcea, etc.; 1,674 Turks (0.8%) – 819 in Tulcea, 395 in Babadag; 1,181 Greeks (0.5%) – 35% of the total Romania: 3,381 (898 in Izvoarele); 1,083 Ukrainians (376 in Tulcea, 247 in Crișan, 91 in Murighiol, etc.); 119 Tatars (101 in Tulcea); 70 Hungarians; 59 Macedonians; 57 Italians; 23 Bulgarians; 23 Germans; 7 Jews; 4 Poles; 4 Serbs; 4 Slovaks.

The Monuments

They were not numerous in Constanța and Tulcea – in the context of the cultural-artistic activities in the Dobrudja area –, but representative for the history and the people of Dobrudja, the gratitude of the Dobrudjans materializing in the testimonies cast in bronze, in the overall development of the arts and in this Romanian space (Cruceru, 2002).

The first monumental ensemble to which the foundation stone is placed is the Commemorative Monument of Dobrudja, on 17th October 1879, on the occasion of the visit of A.S.R. Prince Carol I in Tulcea; later, the Tulcean Teacher Tudor Voicu, a “Dobrudjan of race”, born in Silistra (nephew of the Teacher-founder of Romanian schools Costache Petrescu) would write the breathtaking poem “At the Commemorative Monument of the eternal reunited of Dobrudja in Motherland” [La Monumentul Comemorativ al vecinicei realipiri a Dobrogei la „Patria Mumă”]: Towering is rising in the sky/ Of Dobrudja Monument/ And announcing in the distance/ That holy, sublime moment,/ When, through endless battles,/ It passed to the breast of mother/ of Dobrudja dear
earth, Where were and are Romanians/ Great sign of bravery!/ Down, your rock leg/ Grow deep in the Danube!/ Up, the Eagle of Romania/ And the brave eagle,/ Measuring the horizon of the plain,/ Standing guard at the border,/ To the neighboring sisters,/ You light the sweet hope/ In the great future,/ When it will be as it is appropriate:/ From the Tisza to the Sea,/ A whole country and a people!

Also in Tulcea will be revealed in 1904 the Statue of Mircea the Elder [cel Bătrân] (destroyed in the years of occupation of the Central Powers; in 1940 the Statue of King Ferdinand I, dislocated from the city of Ismail, in Bessarabia, was placed on the remaining pedestal – which is still visible today; the Statue of Mircea, is the work, from 1972, of the Dobrudjan sculptor Ion Jalea), as well as the Bust of Ion Neniţescu, the reveal (on 30th October 1911) of the latter constituting a tribute to the one who – the author of the poem Puilor de lei [Lion Cubs] –, as Prefect (1897-1900), it gave a decisive impetus to the Romanianism in this part of the country, contributing to the progress and civilization of the Northern-Dobrudjan county: “Honoring the memory of Ion Neniţescu – said the Conservative Mayor Ştefan Borş –, who sacrificed hismlef for the awakening of the nation in this part of the place, is an act of gratitude that proves the virtue of a people”.

The main monument of Constanţa, which will also become a symbol of the city, is the Statue of Ovidiu, the first monument erected in Dobrudja after 1878; the revelation takes place on 18th August 1887, the words spoken revealing, among other things, the Roman origin of our people: “This Statue is erected in the old Roman province, on the land that we, the descendants, have – said Remus N. Opreanu, the initiator of immortalization in Ovidiu’s bronze – and by historical law, from our parents. She will say a document in imperishable bronze, that Dobrudja was Roman; she will show everyone that we are here in the parental home (our emphasis); that we have conquered only what was ours”. In May 1894 the Monument of the French Soldiers, victims of cholera during the Crimean War (1855), is unveiled in the (old) Cemetery of the city.

Among the public and cultural personalities of the city (to be mentioned, among others – Mihail Coiciu (Lăpuşan, 2003), Ion Bănescu (Lascu, Vitanos, 1993), Virgil P. Andronescu, Ioan N. Roman, Petre Grigorescu, Ioan Berberianu (Dumitraşcu [Gheorghe], 2016), Petru Vulcan (Lascu, 1992; Coman, 2011; Apostoleanu, Stelian, Dobre, 2019), Scarlat Vârnava, Constantin Pariano (Dumitraşcu [Gheorghe], 2016¹), Nicolae T. Negulescu (Dumitraşcu [Gheorghe], 2015), Constantin N. Sâry (Lascu, 1992²), George D. Benderli, Ion Bentoiu (Cheramidoglu, 2014)², Marin Ionescu [-Dobrogianu] (Stelian, 2014), the Mayor Ion Bănescu had a bust, revealed in 1916, the attempt to lift the bust of the writer Ion Adam (former Secretary of the Constanţa City Hall) not materializing. In the spring of 1916, however, the Monument for the Commemoration of the Fallen Soldiers of the 1913 company was unveiled, “an art jeweler. Which, by the elegance and style of his conception – write in April 1916, a habitant of Constanţa under the pseudonym «Hiperion» –, sets you on the spot and you can only admire him”. (It was located in the square in front of the Tribunal, the occupants of 1916-1918 destroying it; in its place was placed, in 1932, the bust of the lawyer, politician and publicist Ioan N. Roman; since 1998, it was displaced in the square in front Constanţa County Library – which bears its name – the imposing socle is empty, guilty testimony to the size/intellectual power of today’s councils/tomitans...; it would
thunder, today, very well here the bust of King Carol I – as in the Tulcea City exists! – especially since in November 1914 the Commune Council of Constanța ruled in favor of erecting a monument to the Sovereign who had just given his final whereabouts.)

Two other projects were unsuccessful, in Constanța, for failure. Thus, the Dobrudja Commemorative Monument – for the lifting of which subscription lists was launched in 1880 (revitalized initiative in 1928) – will not be completed, although a happy site has been found. Neither the Monument of King Carol I – of which I spoke above – the initiative, proposed and adopted by the Communal Council in November 1914, will not be transposed in practice, with all the repeated, repeated, inter-war periods.

King Carol I had always showed a special predilection for Dobrudja (Dumitrașcu [Gheorghe, 2009]; Lascu, 2018²) – he had frequently made official visits and, after 1900, he visited Constanța almost every year: “Everybody knows that Carol I had a great love for Dobrudja and especially for Constanța, where, in the last period of his long lasting rule, he used to come frequently, almost every year, to rest after his tiresome activity. And he was right to have this inclination to this part of the country, because Dobrudja is the fruit of the first great national moment that united the dynasty to the Romanian nation – the War of Independence (our emphasis)”. In token of the respects paid for the Sovereign activity and for his personality, after death, the local representatives of Constanța decided to sign a decision regarding erecting King Carol I Memorial (the Memorial has never been completed) (Lascu, 2018).

The Circumstances and the Context of the Two Balkan Wars Permitted Romania to Recovery the southern of Dobrudja

Romania hadn’t been involved in the First Balkan War (1912-1913); Ion Bentoiu (1884-1950) Professor in Constanța, reporting on the spirit of society, of the authorities, wrote – on the 28th of October 1912 – about the role of Romania: “We are an important element of stability for preserving the peace and equilibrium in Europe, for this reason we should gladly accept the fact that our great neighbours acknowledged this role we are inlaying and we will be called to stand for our opinion that would indeed be taken into account.

Rectifying our national borders in the southern of Dobrudja, in order to have the opportunity to protect and peacefully possess this territory (our emphasis), our Bulgarian neighbours giving up for ever to this land, which is not their land, protecting our fellow countrymen from Macedonia these are the reparations we are entitled to and that we are going to ask for, taking into account the support of 400,000 bayonets, ready to serve their country!” For its part, the national-liberal official local journal pleaded in the same sense, when, a few days later, under the signature of a Romanian, he expressed unequivocally: “Our state and national interests impose the maintenance, in the Balkans, of a territorial balance (our emphasis), disturbed by current events. The too large territorial development of a state to the southern (refers to Bulgaria – our note) would become very worrying for us. Our patriotism, the constant care that the governments have had for increasing and securing our prestige, the high standards imposed for the development of our armed power, would be of no use, if a great Power extends to southern” (Lascu, 1999).
As it is known, in 1878, at the Peace Congress in Berlin, the southern part of Dobrudja – the so-called Quadrilateral – was torn from her body, being included in the newborn Autonomous Principality of Bulgaria. Following the war of 1877-1878, Romania is not granted the entire Dobrudja – the Petersburg wishing to punish the newly independent Romanian state, whose leaders had not accepted the validation of the abduction of the three South-Bessarabian counties by Tsar Alexander II. “If after the war of 1877 the peace talks had unfolded more favorably for us, the border of Dobrudja would have fallen much farther than the present one and would have had the quality of a natural border, passing for example over the balance of waters that dominate the valleys with bordered edges of Provadia and White Lom. We would have had – as explained later, with justification, Professor Constantin Brătescu (1882-1945), the Dobrogean born in the north of Tulcea County, in the pages of his prestigious publication «Analele Dobrogei» – the entire natural region of the Pre-Balkans Dobrogean, and as a population a very small number of Bulgarians, because the land was occupied by an almost compact mass of Turks, mostly willing to emigrate. We got, on the other hand, a border with inputs, a border of dispute (our emphasis) [sică] which, by its great proximity to the line of the Cara-Su Valley, could not guarantee neither the bridge from Cernavodă and the port of Constanța, created something later”.

In fact, the border was only 3 km from the town of Silistra.

This fortress – the ancient Durostorum – was through the decades up to the moment of Dobrudja’s Reintegration to the Romanian State, the spiritual centre of Romanian nationality, the spiritual centre of Romanians in Dobrudja. “Every member of Petrescu family was born and lived in this great Romanian fortress, the spiritual centre of Romanian culture in the right side of the Danube, where due to the efforts made by the tireless School-Master Constantin (Costache) Petrescu (1843-1893) – recalls, in January 1913, his brother, Simion Petrescu – there have been established all the Romanian schools from Turtucaia to Tulcea”.

Under the circumstances of the Balkan Wars, it was previsible that it would end by rectifying the national borders of the states in the region, the ideal of recovering the territory of southern Dobrudja became also a national and strategical necessity for Romania: “In the ruins washed along by the Danube, no coin with Bulgarian effigy could be found, so that they could have been entitled to have such claims (Bulgaria claimed the right over Silistra – our note) and if it weren’t to be for their unprecedented obstinacy, Bulgarians could accept the reality and restrain themselves forever from arguing with us about our legal claims.

If they are to persist with obstinacy that would never be for their benefit, because Dristor will be at least the key of the Romanian Danube will be our fortress surrounded by the waters flowing into the Danube, over which we are going to build a great bridge. Dristor should be a Romanian metropolis, and it would be so, because they, the Bulgarians, won’t be allowed to break our legal rights (our emphasis)” (Lascu, 1999).

After Bulgaria attached her former allies, the Second Balkan War was declared and the Romanian forces were mobilized (Coman, 2013). After the ostilities had been put on and to the Peace Treaty was concluded at Bucharest (28th July/10 August 1913). The positive results of the treaty were celebrated with joy by Dobrudjans; the city of Tulcea “had a festive air. Flags in the three national colours were put on every
building the entire population was animated by the vivid spirit. In the evening took place a great celebration – wrote the newspaper «Conservatorul Tulcei», in July 1913 –, in the end people went home carrying torches in their hand”. The fact that southern of Dobrudja was recovered was considered to be reparation to a historical injustice, the new citizens being requested to put up with the Romanian realities, in a civilized manner, to prove civic honesty: “Certainly, Romania would do her best so that her new citizens won’t regret their former rule. But it is no less true that these new citizens should prove them lives honest and willing to respect and obey the laws of the country, the country that would make no difference among her citizens, by protecting all of them.

The recovery of the southern of Dobrudja is accepted as the repair of a historical injustice, to the new citizens being asked to comply, civilized and with civic honesty, to the Romanian realities: “Of course, Romania will do everything that will be possible for its new fellow citizens to do not regret their former mastery. But, no less true, that they, too, are obliged to appear benevolent and sincerely to obey the laws of the homeland, which will be protected by them as well as by us.

Any act of disobedience to those laws, will be harshly repressed, but it must be known – wrote the magazine «România Mare», in November 1913 – one thing: This province under the Romanian scepter will not be temporary. It is forever linked to Romania, which in fact and law has been reunited (our emphasis)”. During the period until the entry of Romania into the First World War, in the summer of 1916, measures were taken to reintegrate the two south-Dobrudjan counties into the Romanian State (Negoiţă, 2008; Lascu, 2019).

(Unfortunately in an international context favorable to illegal territorial claims on the general frame of the political life weakness, undermined by petty politics – in September 1940 the southern of Dobrudja, the Durostor and Caliacra counties, was to be dislocated from Romania and ceded to Bulgaria; an exchange of population followed that moment, fact that explains the absence of Bulgarians in Dobrudja after the above mentioned moment.)

1916 – The Last Neutrality Year for Romania

Dobrudjans comments on the WW I taking into account the contradictions existing in the international relationships.

The public opinion stands for the Entente, blaming mainly Austro-Hungary for this conflict: “Seizing the opportunity that the countries in the Triple Entente aren’t ready yet and thinking that Europe, the great peace lover, would do nothing about it, Austro-Hungary, have proceeded to accomplish her plan.

Of course, it is the last book she plays, and if luck is not on her side, woe to her, then it will really be Finis Austriae (...). We, the Romanians, are for sure the most peaceful people we won’t ever raise the voice to disturb the silence with no reason. But everybody should know that the lion cubs have grown, they are strong enough to snarl to anyone who would bother their peace they were used to live in.

The lion does not know what defeat is, but he perishes rather than to live defeated.
If it is written for us to fight in the battles to come, we will do so, as we have always done, throughout centuries, starting with Traian and Decebal up to Carol the Great.

So be it known” (Lascu, 1999: 684).

In the context of probing or consolidating the state alliances, the visit paid by the tsar Nicholas II to the city of Constanța, on the 1st of June 1914, is of great importance (Dominte, 2010; Cheramidoglu, 2014¹). Accompanied by the imperial family, the tsar enjoyed a pompous reception at Constanța the local press representatives considering that the event was in fact the signal from Russia regarding the Romanian legal rights on the entire Dobrudja; “for us [the people of Dobrudja] the event represents nothing else but the shuttering of a reckless ideal that animated for a long time the Bulgarian population of Dobrudja, regarding the occupation of the ancient Dobrudja and also the new territories united which they considered to be just a transitory stage.

Setting his foot on the land of Romanian Dobrudja, the tszar over the Russian countries has confirmed once more his cabinet approvals in the question of Dobrudja”.

The public opinion in Dobrudja continued to stand for taking part in the war on the side of the Entente, for one single reason of achieve the national and territorial union: “Ask for this war necessary to your nation, ask for this war – it was written in an article published in the «România Mare», on the 12th of July 1915 – because he is the only fact that will be able to fulfill your aspirations, which will be able to achieve our much-nourished dream: a Greater Romania from the Dniester to the Tisza”.

Most of the articles referred to the need to recover the provinces abroad, the geopolitical context and the alliance systems, imposing, first, the recovery of Transylvania: “For the moment, without forgetting Bessarabia, we want and demand Transylvania. We ask our Transylvania – wrote Ion Borcea on 29th March 1915 –, the cradle of the lung that gave birth to the Romanian people. We ask Transylvania on the basis of great historical rights; we want Transylvania that it is more expensive to us than any other Romanian land”.

In the belief of the Dobrudjan patriots, the making of Greater Romania depended on the country’s participation in the great world confrontation, started in July 1914, which is why citizens were urged to support the war. The exit from neutrality was also demanded by other Constanța newspapers – România Mare (appeared in 1915, parallel to the magazine), Victoria, and Dacia. In the Liberalul Constanței, the PhD in Physical-Chemical Sciences Mircea I. Berberianu (officer who gave his life, along with many comrades, in the battles during the Great War) also expressed hope, on 7th June 1915 – in the newspaper of his father, the pharmacist Ion Berberianu, Liberalul Constanței – that The clock will ring, showing that in post-war Europe: “The fulfillment of all our national aspirations should group within the borders of a Greater Romania, the Carpathian lands between the Dniester and the Tisza”, should join the whole part of Bessarabia, should bring the Romanians over the Danube”.

In the months before the country entered the war, the young journalist from Constanța Vasile Canarache (1896-1969) (Lascu, 1987) – the future organizer, and Director in the ’50s-’60s of the last century, of the Dobrudjan Regional Museum – will
publish numerous articles and poems, requesting entry in war, considering the army to be the Holy Icon of the Country [Icoana sfântă a țării], as an article published in Victoria of 25th March 1916 was entitled: “Worship yourself, in front of the shining icons too holy, you humbly bow before her and whenever you have embodied it in every uniform of power, light your mind and say: here is the power of the country, the future and the happiness of the nation”.

In the spring and summer of 1916, they are pleading for reinforcement of the combatant value, considering that “the Army is the sacred image of the country”.

On the 15th of August, when it was decreed the general mobilization, Dacia – a newspaper appearing in Constanța –, published a stimulating appeal addressed to the population: “We are going to take part in a hard battle. It will be a great battle, but the greater is the battle – the greater our glory. Let’s have the faith our forefathers had in the War of Independence in ’77 and let’s shout:

Long live the Romanian Army!
Long live the «Greater Romania!»” (Lascu, 1999: 739).

Dobrudjan press kept up that confident spirit, believing in the final victory, during the campaign in August-September: “Be proud, citizens of Constanța! Your sons proved themselves worthy of their ancestor’s courage, showing the entire world that Dobrudjan is able to defend his land in the farthest part of the country and even to cross it over the borders.

Be ready of sacrifices and don’t forget that nothing should break your courage”.

... Unfortunately, the efforts to modernize Dobrudja will be stopped by the events of the First World War, the occupation of the Central Powers (1916-1918) – with all its devastating consequences for the population and public institutions, economic units, the public fund –, diverting a historical process whose partners, subjects and beneficiaries, regardless of ethnicity, were the people of the land between the Danube and the Black Sea.

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ILLUSIONS AND REALITIES:
THE FIRST STAGES OF ROMANIAN EMIGRATION
TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AT THE END OF THE 19TH CENTURY

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Abstract

The history of the industrial development of the United States of America is composed of
a series of gigantic leaps of prosperity, and the beginning of Romanian emigration is closely
linked to these industrial impulses, when the need for labor for hard work was felt, works that did
not require training special. In order to get the necessary labor at the lowest price, emigration
agencies and shipping companies have expanded their purpose of action in the East and South
of Europe. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 established the Dual Monarchy of
Austria-Hungary and together with the severe Magyarization policy reflected in the legislation
meant for the Romanians of Transylvania represents the beginning of the unsatisfactory national
manifestations. The hope of escaping the economic, political, social and depressive situation was
just the cause that pushed the Romanians to emigrate. The attractive force exerted by the
economic conditions in America, the positive influence of the trans-oceanic emigration beyond
the Atlantic, the penetration of the emigration agents in the consciousness of the Romanian
peasant, the easy earning of money to support the helpless families left in the country
represented the goals of Romanians immigration to the United States.

Key words: The United States of America, Austria-Hungary, Romanians, emigration, socioeconomic
status, accommodation

The Constitution of the United States begins: “We, the people of the United
States…” although America is not composed of a single group of people, but of a
multitude of ethnicities. Immigrants from Europe, Asia, Africa, Central and South
America have settled in North America to start a new life full of opportunities that
was not available in their homelands. Coming from many nations, they “have
counterfeited a nation and made their own land” (Time Special Issue, 1993: 9). Walt
Whitman saw America as a fusion process: “Here is not just a nation, but a nation full
of nations” (Diamond, 1988: 7).

In 1884, the Statue of Liberty was presented to the United States by the French
people as an expression of the friendship and ideal of freedom shared by both
countries. The statue, soon welcomed a great wave of new immigrants (Morrow, 1997:
11). Between 1880 and 1920, 20 million new immigrants came to the United States.
Approximately 80 million Americans, representing the United States resident
population in 1900 “were preparing their inheritance for new immigrants”

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More than one million immigrants arrived each year in the period between 1905-1914 (Katz, 1993: 6).

The existence of an agreement between the people and the U.S. government, underlining the freedom and equality of all people, leads to the fulfillment of happiness: The basis on which the United States has developed is the highest freedom, where the most holy and most intact treasure is freedom. If the government violates these rights, the people have the right to remove it and form a new government. The immigrant's entrance was blessed by the Statue of Liberty, on which it was written: “Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!” (The New Colossus)

Romanians appears sporadically in the United States in the eighteenth century. One of the first Romanian emigrants to America is known from some 1748 notes. He was a Catholic priest in Transylvania, called Samuel Damian, and left Transylvania with the intention of travelling around the world (Cernovodeanu, 1970: 50).

He arrived in Philadelphia, where Benjamin Franklin showed interest and sympathy for his skill and determination, warmly recommending his friend, Scottish physician John Lining of Charlestown, saying: “From England he came to Maryland, from there went to New England and returned to land in Philadelphia and North Carolina towards you. He thought he would use them on his travels to find out about electricity. I taught him how to use the tube, how to load the Leyda bottle and some other experiences. He wrote from Charlestown that he lived, 800 miles away, only from electricity, which meant for him food, drink and clothing” (Vitcu, 2000: 12).

During the gold rush of 1849, a new group of Romanian emigrants arrived in America, and many of them were distinguished during the civil war. The case of George Pomutz, a character with real features of a hero, with remarkable professional and moral merits, is enlightening in the sense of illustrating the destiny of the Romanian emigrant to America at the end of the nineteenth century. He started as a simple emigrant but managed to become a general in the U.S. Army and later an American diplomat in Russia, occasion with which he negotiated the purchase of Alaska. There is also evidence of other nineteen Romanian emigrants: Nicholas Dunca, a captain who was enrolled in the 19th Volunteer Regiment of New York, died in the battle of Cross Keyes, Virginia. He and Eugen Alcaz were Moldovans of origin and took part in the civil war (1861-1865) between the North and the South (Sasu, 1996: 38). The ethnicity of George Pomutz is debated by Romanians and Hungarians, although his life is actually quite well documented; it can be known that he was born on May 31, 1818 in Gyula, Békés County, but in an ethnic Romanian family (Vida, 2012: 282). In the Census of 1860 he gave his nationality as Hungarian in spite of the fact that officially it did not exist, and he might have as well indicated it as Romanian. However it may be, his memory is cherished by both Hungarians and Romanians, and this might promote historical accuracy (Bereny, 1998: 134).

The presence of several Romanians in the United States during the Civil War, and their assertion during the military events, such as Gheorghe Pomutz, Nicolae Dunca, Emanoil Boteanu, Eugen Alcaz, Ilarie Mitrea, Ion Cerg hedii, Ion Munteanu and Eugen Ghika will contribute to what the Americans call: “The Making of America” (Vâtcu,
The great boom of the U.S. industry and development led to the necessity of workforce that did not require any special training and involved services at a lower price. As a result, the emigration agencies appeared in the East of Europe, especially in Poland and Austria-Hungary. Although the promises of agents – who were trying to persuade the needy people to sign their contracts – did not correspond with reality, the proposals offered a last escape for Romanians, who “in their ancestral land they were neither allowed to live nor to die” (Druțu, 1922: 11).

The agents of the immigration companies have been sent to Eastern Europe, traveling from village to village doing propaganda. They attracted potential clients in the cities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, patrolling through public places, addressing to the young people and asking them if they were interested in going to America by offering them a free ship ticket. For each recruited emigrant, an agent earned about 20 Austrian crowns as a commission from the company. Some agencies came to the Transylvanian villages and offered well-paid jobs, as well as the trip to America. These agencies promised to the inhabitants a happy life they would live in America, convincing them to emigrate (Sasu, 1993: 24).

At the beginning of the 20th century, the trip to America was cheap and cost only $15, but the conditions were terrible. An U.S. government report of 1910 specified “the dirt and stench” calling the trip “almost impossible to endure.” An inspector of the U.S. Immigration Service, who crossed the Atlantic disguised as a peasant, reported: “Everything was dirty, sticky and disgusting to the touch. Every memory was unpleasant” (Katz, 1993: 6). The conditions of the trip were tough, and a very tough natural selection was to be made. There was a doctor on the ship, even for poor migrants, but being unable to communicate in English had prevented them from receiving proper medical assistance, and finally dramatic deaths occurred during the journey. Most of them were peasant or farmers who had lived in closed communities, and the crossing of an ocean, the struggle with violent death, the miserable conditions away from the church and the priest, were the marks of the horror for the Romanian emigrants. Taking advantage of the Romanian peasant’s misinformation, the agencies charged higher amounts for their tickets to the port they were going to board, so a Romanian paid 18 crowns for a third class ticket instead of 10 crowns as it cost in reality.

Once arrived in America, immigrants could always find a job for a salary that not only gave them the opportunity to live well, but also to save money, because the U.S. dollar was almost five times higher than the Austro-Hungarian crown. From these savings, immigrants could send money to their country of origin to improve the livelihood of those left behind, or later to buy some land. Many of those immigrants were citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, especially the young people who left their home to escape the “cătănie” - the compulsory military service. In fact, their strong desire was to escape the military service “slușba la împăratii” (Foaia poporului, 1912: 8) and to avoid enlisting especially during the period preceding the First World War; these representing some aspects that caused the young people to leave their country.

The American government began using Ellis Island as an immigration station in 1892. There, immigrants were waiting in long queues to be interrogated by government officials and examined by doctors. Only those in serious health conditions were sent to an examination center for their physical and mental condition. There were cases when
some of them were declared “unaccepted” and were applied an X-shaped sign with chalk on their back; some of them were re-examined while others were sent back home. Sometimes, whole families were separated. Illiterate, sick, delinquent, or those who did not have enough money were placed in detention until they had been admitted or rejected. On the island they were given food and access to baths. The new immigrants came from Italy, Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Bohemia, Slovakia, Croatia, Hungary, Greece, Syria, Spain and Portugal. The quarantine at Ellis Island could control up to 5,000 people a day. Between 1905 and 1914 there were processed more than 10,000 immigrants a day. Then followed the employment interview that took place with the help of a translator. The first question was: “How much money do you have?” being required to own at least $25. An interesting fact is that, since 1906, each emigrant received a pack of cigarettes from the American Tobacco Trust upon arriving on Ellis Island (Bayor, 2014: 168).

The immigrants from Romania to the United States of America belong to the so-called “new immigration” which contributed to the social structure of American life a variety of ethnic elements from Southeastern Europe. Springing from a country itself streaked with a variegated population, the stream of immigration from Romania has carried out of the cradle of the country not only people from its ethnic stock, but also the Romanian Jews, Turks, Germans, Bulgarians, etc., who formed one-eighth of the total population of the Old Kingdom of Romania (Rommenholler, 1926: 70).

New immigrants have often encountered difficulties in getting paid for skilled or unskilled work in America. For the first time, a worker born in America received $1 a day, immigrants from Italy 84 cents, 68 cents Hungarians, and those from eastern and southern Europe just 54 cents. The black men and women were paid even less. Most of them have left their homeland to escape of poverty or persecution. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 20th century, Russian Jews were subjected to pogroms. Almost 2 million Jews left Russia and Eastern Europe between 1892 and 1907, about 70% of whom came from Russia (Leinwand, 1995: 37).

Immigrants found living conditions in the United States only slightly better than they left behind. They lived in cramped apartments in the urban ghettos and were working in mining. Immigrants had mainly access to railroad, pavement and mining works. Those who came to America expecting rapid riches were disappointed and in their desire to save as much money as possible accepted any kind of living, the only condition being to cost as little as possible. Thus, the public health department had to intervene to stop these poor men from being piled 5 or 6 in a small room, often sleeping four in one bed. There were, of course, Romanians who owned their own home, but they are the ones who had a business or had a better paid job (Drutzu, 1922: 46).

The Romanian immigrants were willing to find jobs in mines and factories and to endure the crowded areas. More than 75 percent of them settled in large cities and neighborhoods with relatives and friends. “All my relatives and all my neighbors – in fact, everyone I knew” writes Marcus Ravage of Vaslui, Romania “have gone or are going to New York” (Katz, 1993: 7).

Americans believed that this kind of emigration falls into what they call the “wave of new emigration” (Easterlin, 1994: 478) that includes ethnic groups in the
East and Central Europe, such as: Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Hungarians, Russians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Romanians. This new wave has been distinguished since 1882 by what the American authorities called the “old emigration” in Western and Northern Europe, which reached its peak before the Civil War (Wittke, 1939: 437).

Between 1871 and 1880, eight men and three women emigrated from Romania. In the following decade, the number rises to 3,467 men and 2,881 women. Between 1891 and 1895, the number of migrants from Romania to America was 2,170 men and 1,848 women. Most of them were Jews. The number of 10,377 persons who immigrated to the United States in Romania by 1900 accounts for only 10% of the total number of emigrants arriving in the United States. American statistics ranked emigrants by race, but they considered Latin only Belgian, French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese. Romanians entered the same category as the Hungarians and Slavs forming a hybrid ethnic group. In U.S. statistics from 1880, Romania is transferred to the Balkan states, with 144,621 people for the period, while before that year no Romanian citizen was registered (Toma, 1998: 260).

The most accurate data on the emigration of Romanians to America can be found in the annual reports of the General Immigration Commission or in the data provided by the US censuses. Therefore, the report for the year 1881 shows for the first time the chapter “Immigration in Romania”. There are 1,186 immigrants, for 1890, in 1890 there were 16,359, and in 1900 there were 19,109 immigrants. These reports were based on the registers of ships arriving with emigrants in North American ports and most of the time these registers were not based on passports but on the identity card or largely on the basis of oral or written statements, made by passengers. Thus, on the basis of these identity certificates, issued by the Austro-Hungarian authorities, many Romanians born in Transylvania were registered as Hungarians, therefore they did not appear as Romanian citizens, or appeared only with their names in the documents. In 1920, following the 14th census in the US, 1,012,823 people said their last country of origin was Romania, of which only 71,805 declared their mother tongue was Romanian (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1922: 973).

The beginning of Romanian emigration to America is hard to establish. However, experts believe that this phenomenon began with the sustained emigration of Romanians in the Austro-Hungarian lands: Transylvania, Bucovina and Banat. The year of the beginning of this movement was established as 1895, although the U.S. authority’s statistics for 1891 already provided data on emigrations from the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the New World, but they indicated the country of origin and not the nationality. So for the year 1891 the following figures are shown: 30,442 in Austria and 56,003 in Hungary; Surely, Romanians are among these people but nationality was indicated only starting with 1898 (Radu Toma, 1998:40).

After 1895, the Romanian peasants began to appear more often, most of them being Transylvanian, although some were Macedonian Romanians from European Turkey, northern Greece and Albania, who spoke a dialect based on Romanian with Greek and Albanian additions (Thernstrom, Orlov, Handlin, 1980: 879). Starting with 1900, the Romanians in America have laid the foundations for a prosperous life and the first attempts to social, economic and church organization are registered (Podea, 1912, 4).
Between the years 1900-1913 many peasants left Transylvania, most of them coming from the counties of Târnava Mare – 20,535, Făgăraș -14,888, Sibiu – 14,245 (Maior, 1986. 25). Their economic adaptation to the American environment is of just as great interest as their social assimilation, because 89% of the Romanian immigrants belong to the class of farm laborers and only 0.4% to the professional class (Galitzí, 1929:13).

The striking feature in the distribution of the Romanians throughout the United States is their concentration in the cities. Despite the fact that 83.7% of the arriving Romanians are farm laborers or laborers belonging to the peasant class, only 9% of them have settled in the rural districts. The majority of them, 91%, are living in the cities. Their urban concentration has been less the result of their personal choice than the direct outcome of circumstances which forced them to break away from their traditional occupation and environment and to enter the industrial field (Galitzí, 1929: 62).

They have concentrated, however, in the middle Atlantic division, which has 54% of the entire immigrant population from Romania; the East North-Central Division with 28.5% and the west north-central with 7.0%. Twelve states alone have 91.4% of these immigrants: New York State leading the list with 39.0%, followed by Ohio with 12.7%, Pennsylvania with 10.9%, Michigan with 6.2%, Illinois with 6.1%, New Jersey with 4.4%, Indiana with 2.7%, California with 2.3%, Minnesota with 2.3%, North Dakota with 1.8%, Montana with 1.6%, Massachusetts with 1.4%; the remainder, 8.6%, being unequally distributed among the other thirty-six states. Three of these states, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania, have 53.6% of the total immigrant population from Romania. The majority of the Romanians have settled in the great industrial centers. Only 7% are in urban districts of 2,500 inhabitants or over; 18.3% are in cities of 25,000 inhabitants or over, and 74.7% live in twelve cities of 100,000 inhabitants or over. New York City leads with 38,139 immigrants from Romania, followed by Philadelphia with 5,645, Chicago with 5,137, Detroit with 4,468, Cleveland with 4,377, Pittsburgh with 1,493, Minneapolis with 1,484, Youngstown with 1,375, Newark with 1,307, St. Louis with 1,200, Los Angeles with 927, and San Francisco with 765 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1922: 730). According to the report of February 15, 1905, made by the American consul in Vienna – W.A. Rublle, only in 1904 the Romanians sent between 40-45 million dollars in Austro-Hungary, helping to increase the budget of the Empire (Boteni, 1980:150).

At the beginning of the 20th century, two-thirds of the Romanians who came to the United States returned home. With 1,000 dollars, the Romans could go home, buy a much-dreamed piece of land, build a stone house or start a craft shop. This generation was called “mia și drumul” (Andrica, 1977: 35).

The returns were particularly high after the First World War, when their provinces were incorporated into the Romanian Kingdom, and the post-war liberal government finally adopted the reform measures in 1921. However, in those years, a second wave of Romanians came to the United States and many rushed to reach the United States before the immigration restrictions had been enforced, the 1924 immigration act set an annual quota of only 603 Romanians (Ternstrom, Orlov, Handlin, 1980: 880).

A study by the University of Madison shows that only 3-5% of Romanian, Ruthenian, Croatian and Slovak emigrants was skilled in any job (Boteni, 1980:157). The emigration of Romanians to America was caused mainly by economic factors. The
peasantry, the main social class in Transylvania, was heavily differentiated, with statistics of 1895 recording 884,000 properties less than 50 hectares, and half of them were properties of less than 2 hectares. Their total surface area was 456,000 ha, so the average area of this property was 1 ha, a surface that hardly survives. It can be considered that in Transylvania there were 440,000 families of poor peasants, about 1,000,000 people having as their main source of income the work on the extensive properties of the Hungarian landowners. They formed the agricultural proletariat and made up the majority of the rural population. In principle, they could work only a few months a year on their estates, at a minimum price, while the rest of the year they had to fight for survivals. Despite the law of 1864, which abolished serfdom and, allowing the peasants to buy the land they worked on, aimed to create, as in France, a large class of small land owners, few had succeeded in realizing the economic independence which would have meant social freedom. Even when the law first went into effect and 1,600,000 hectares of land were distributed to 400,000 peasant families, the individual family holding did not exceed five hectares (Muzet, 1920: 211).

The causes underlying the emigration of the peasants from Transylvania are more complex. In addition to the psychological motives, influenced by social and economic circumstances, there is also to be considered the tense political situation in which they lived. Their homes were on the western slopes of the Carpathian Mountains, thus bringing them under the Austro-Hungarian rule. As subjects of the Dual Empire they were supposed to enjoy the privileges of freedom of religion and of language guaranteed by the Law of Nationality (Cabot, 1926:15). But as this law was never respected by the Hungarians, the fate of the Romanians, whose claims to an autonomous government under the direct rule of Austria Francis Joseph had disregarded by accepting the Ausgleich of 1867, was left to the discretion of the Magyar administration.

Free voting was not possible, because an armed force was used often in time of elections to aid the Magyar candidate and to eliminate the Romanians. Pushing the Magyarization policy, the Hungarian Government undertook to impose its language upon the Romanian schools, which up to 1905 had received no state subsidy, though there were almost 4,000,000 Romanian taxpayers. The law of Trefort in 1879 required the Romanian teachers to learn the Magyar language within six years in order to teach all the classes of the Romanian primary schools in Hungarian language. The Law of 1883 imposed the Hungarian language on the primary schools, even the kindergarten schools. These series of laws enacted by the Hungarian Diet contributed to exasperate the Romanians (Drăghicescu, 1918: 103-104).

The whole situation imposed by the Austro-Hungarian government is causing harsh living conditions: “This administration was so deprived of scruples and so abusive that the Romanians could stand it no longer and migrated in masses. Whole villages were turned into deserts. The population was forced to expatriate and went to the United States of America” (Drăghicescu, 1918: 171). The economic situation of the Transylvanian peasants was highly unsatisfactory. Political pressure, small wages and the general economic depression in Austria-Hungary kept it at a low level (Gonnard, 1908: 219). Romanians exchanged their personal experiences and their news from home; sung their doine (pastoral songs); expressed their longings for a
return home; confessed their successes or their failures and their hardships in their adaptation to the new environment.

Another reason for the emigration of the Romanians was the agrarian laws of Minister Darányi, affecting directly the sheep farmers, because “restrictions and prohibition were imposed on the lease of pastures in Romania. Sheep can cross the border, but they cannot be brought back home. Meat prices have risen, because this has reduced the amount of live commodity. Their sheep, were loaded on their trains and taken away” (Neamțu, 2002: 19).

Another issue of emigration was the social problems. This was known by American public opinion, through the article published by Professor George Dorsey, in the beginning of 1910, referring to his travels through Austria-Hungary. The author presented in an article the real situation in Transylvania, honoring on this occasion “the hard, but honest work of the Romanian peasants subjected to numerous persecutions and harassment by the Hungarian governors” (The Chicago Daily Tribune, 1910: 5). Another argument to illustrate the social factor of emigration was the frequent response that Transylvanian state officials offered the Romanians to their complaints: “If you do not like here, go to America or Walachia” (Șirianu, 1904: 309).

Finally, this wave of emigration occurred under the “burden of poverty and the oppression of foreign domination” explaining the high number of those who alienated the country, especially from Transylvania, Banat and Bucovina: “Many of us don’t come here in foreign countries for dear ones, but because the Hungarian oppression, we crash into the infected atmosphere of the Hungarian leadership, which rob the people by introducing laws that contradict our national interests” (Morușca, 1940: 64).

In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt appointed an Immigration Commission to study the issue. After three years and more than $1 million, the commission issued a 41-volume report that the new immigrants were “inferior to those who came earlier; the new immigrants did not assimilate well, that is, they did not become Americanized; and the presence of this large group of immigrants has led to a decrease in wages and employment opportunities for Native Americans” (Weisberger, 1994: 87).

As a result of mass emigration, a commission was set up in Budapest in 1907 to study emigration issues. In June there is an investigation initiated by the industrial society led by Fr. Chorin, which brings about the issue of emigration or “trade with people”. The result of the survey was to identify the causes of emigration: too high taxes, general dissatisfaction, lack of land, police apparatus that dominates the administration, Hungarian oppression, poor pay of the workers, great land ownership and the poor administration (Neamțu, 1995: 149).

Many migrants seem to be guided by an unusual feature of stability because newcomers in the two weeks of travel from Bremen to New York and predominantly from an agricultural environment tailored to the needs of an industrial society have found jobs in the coalfields of West Virginia, and then, as a result of America’s development, in Cleveland steel factories and Detroit factories, while others were hard working in mines (Cordasco, 1990: 632).

A significant number of emigrants have found work in the coal mines. Thus, Romanians, who worked the land with their oxen back home, came to America to toil in the mines, working hundreds of feet below the ground to unleash the foundation
of modern civilization: iron and coal. The Romanians have changed their hats for a mining casket with a small electric globe in front that illuminated their path through the deep corridors. The payment was usually delivered every week, or in some places every two weeks, amounting to $20-25 per week.

A common occupation of Romanians was in cigarette factories, different weavings, cardboard box machines or automated machines in different sections of large factories. Women generally earned between $10 and $18 a week. Under the patronage of various Orthodox or Greco-Catholic parishes, many economic, cultural, artistic societies have been established to perpetuate Romanian language and literature, traditions, folk dances, traditional songs. Among the established societies there were: Carpatina (2.XI.1902) Ohio; Vulturul (2.XI.1902) Pensylvania; Unirea Română (15.VII.1903) Youngstown; Societatea transilvană (10.XII.1905) in East Chicago; Steaua română (1905) from Indianapolis; Avram Iancu Society (1908) Ohio; Frații români (1908); Țara Oltului (1912) New Philadelphia; Societatea neamului românesc (1913) Ohio; Liga și ajutorul (1912); Uniunea și Liga Societăților Române de Ajutor și Cultură (1916). Without knowing the language, without a professional qualification in the profitable areas, support and initial knowledge of life in American, the Romanian emigrants sought to organize themselves, succeeding in time to set up their own mutual societies. On July 4, 1906, Ilie Martin Sălișteanul – from Săliștea Sibiului – established together with other leaders of the Romanian communities the Union of Romanian Societies of America, which later became the League of Romanian Societies of America. Until the outbreak of the First World War there were over 100 Romanian cultural societies in America (Netea, 1975: 259-260).

The Union supported its members in the event of illness, and in the event of a serious accident or death it paid the heirs of the member $700. Between 1910 and 1920, the Union paid insurance for nearly 200 cases in which, for various reasons, Romanian people died in the United States proving the seriousness of this organization (Drutzu, 1922: 53-54).

This was confirmed by Caterina Cerchez on a visit to the Romanian communities of the United States: “These societies, moreover, were intended to support national sentiment in addition to material aid purposes” (Stan, 2004: 94).

In 1902 the Romanian Orthodox parishes and parish schools began to be organized; The Carpathian societies of mutual benefits soon emerged, as did the Romanian clubs, the Romanian society union and the Romanian-American Association. They were economically successful. The Romanians started to move more easily than other new immigrants, not only from their homes, but also from one job to another. Most of the first generation of immigrants had unqualified jobs, only rarely semi-skilled and skilled jobs; and the second generation retained that status and was frequently in white and professional collar positions. Like other immigrants, the Romanians acquired property, but unlike other immigrants, they had a limited number of family members. While most immigrant families urged their children to drop out of school early and go to work, the Romanian immigrants had fewer children, giving them a good education. Nearly half of the children completed high school and continued a certain type of further education, 65% of the second generation and 90% of the third generation of immigrants married with non-Orthodox partners, usually
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Roman Catholics, which gave Romanians the chance to belong to a wider community. By encouraging education and by keeping small families, they pushed their children to middle-class status in America (Olson, 1994:134).

The first parish was that of St. Mary’s in Cleveland, organized in 1904 through its church was not built before 1908. Indiana Harbor claims the honor of being first to have built a church, having inaugurated St. George’s in 1907 (New York Times, 1928). At the end of 1926 there were thirty-four Romanians churches of the Greek Orthodox faith with a membership of 18,853, thirty-two of them being in urban territory with a membership of 18,436 (U.S Bureau of Census, Census of Religious Bodies, 1926: 23).

The oldest Romanian organizations in America are founded by Jewish-Romanian emigrants. The most important of these organizations is the “Union of Romanian Jews of America” based in New York. In this union, other Romanian societies are incorporated and the number of its members amounts to 12,000.

Besides these parochial schools there are a few independent institutions started under private initiative, either by individuals or clubs: The School of Woonsocket started in 1924 under the auspices of the Macedonian Club “Roumanian Youth” with an enrollment of twenty-seven school children, and The School “Principele Carol” in Cleveland founded on November 25, 1925 by Miss L. Cucui, and attended by 80 children (Glanz, 1976: 11).

Between 1880 and 1920, over two million Jews from Poland, Russia, Austro-Hungary, Romania, Galicia, Silesia, Bohemia and Slovakia immigrated to the United States. Of these, about 80% came from Russia and Poland occupied by the Russians. They found that going to the United States is difficult because of legal complications and the possibility of a long journey to reach the German ports. Although the proximity of the Black Sea ports could have attracted other Eastern European immigrants, the Jews, especially those in the age required to serve in the army, were unable to obtain Russian passports and tried to avoid the Romanian border on the way to Odessa. 90% of all Romanian emigrants from 1881 to 1920 were Jews, along with 60% of Galicians and 50% of Russians (Wong, 2009: 101-102).

The relations between the poor Jews and their richer counterparts were simultaneously symbiotic and tense. Although influential Jews provided financial assistance and jobs for new arrivals, living standards were low, comparable to what the Italians had endured. A 1908 survey found that more than 500,000 Jews were housed in the Lower East of New York apartment buildings, half of the apartment rooms were shared by 4 or 5 people. Most of the Jews living in such spaces paid a rent to a Jewish owner, and the vast majority of the 300,000 Jews worked in New York’s clothing industry, or in factories owned by Jewish sons in Eastern Europe. In addition, American Jews often did not agree with Eastern European citizens on political and religious issues, or with newcomers who were often socialists or Zionists. Despite these inconsistencies, both Jewish groups have found a unity in the fight against anti-Semitism that threatened to increase with Jewish immigration. Their concerted efforts to help less fortunate Jews abroad are also reflected in the amount of aid sent to Europe’s blood-stained Jews after World War I – over 60 million dollars (Daniels, 2002: 226).

Initially, American natives anticipated that the influx of Jewish immigrants would greatly contribute to raising an anti-Semitic sentiment in America. However, many of
the grievances brought against the Jews were caused by their origins. Belief in an international Jewish conspiracy has been fuelled by the decline of American farmer's prospects and the financial crisis of 1893-1894. Several Jewish immigrants in the mid-nineteenth century have come to occupy important positions in the financial sector, and controversies arose regarding the maintenance of the gold standard and associated deflationary pressures. Jews and financial manipulation have been inextricably linked to the minds of the Americans. Faced with these pressures and despite the differences between them, the old and new Jewish immigrants have succeeded in reconciling their beliefs and, ultimately, in achieving a greater degree of solidarity. Many of the needy Jews, in danger of being completely assimilated by a hostile majority, have experienced a revival of traditions and customs as they came from Eastern Europe (Gerald, 1992: 32).

The unprecedented rise in unemployment and the decline in living standards have prevented the emigration of new waves in the United States, as emigration overtook immigration in a few years. Almost a third of Poles, Slovaks and Croats and more than half of Greeks, Russians, Romanians and Bulgarians returned to Europe. However, this was largely due to the government that took steps to reduce immigration and keep jobs for its citizens. As those who entered the US were likely to be unable to find jobs, visas were denied to all, except for the richest immigrants, under the “LPC-likely to become a public charge” law established in 1882, as well and in the Immigration Act of 1917 (Kennedy, 1999: 163).

While these new immigrants founded their American roots, anti-immigration forces struggled to stop immigration. Opposition to the new wave of immigrants was based on economic factors and the notion that recent immigrants were somewhat inferior to those already living in the United States. Since the 1890s, trade union leaders, such as Samuel Gompers of the American Labor Federation, have called for the cessation of unrestricted immigration. Gompers, a Dutch-born Jew who migrated to the United States from England in 1863, complained that new immigrants were largely “a cheap and ignorant labor force that occupies jobs and reduces wages” (Weisberger, 1994: 86).

Eventually, many of the Romanian immigrant’s story remains unwritten or unknown. The fact that it has to be written is undoubtedly a vital concern for the image and identity of the Romanian-American community. For Americans of all ethnic backgrounds, there is a vital lesson to learn in examining the reason and how thousands of simple peasants have departed from their pastoral world and came to settle in America’s industrial cities. This was done not only for money and prosperity, but for the promise of self-improvement and freedom. Romanian emigrants stirred the thought of returning to the country. About one-third of them returned to their native country, the others gaining American citizenship and thus taking part in the formation of the Romanian community in the United States of America, absorbing the American sprawling industrial boom. The Romanians, like the other emigrants, supported the construction of roads, bridges, railways, skyscrapers, mines, smelters and steelwork, becoming a constituent part of the American people. Romanians ability to adapt to the new circumstances of American existence highlights a distinctive fact of their accommodation to a new democracy society, without losing its roots and Romanian heritage.
Appendix 1

Immigrant admitted by country of last residence, Romania 1881-1928
(U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Immigration, 1928: 102).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Romania Country of last residence and number of immigrants</th>
<th>Distribution of Immigrants by Races</th>
<th>Per cent Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Hebrews</td>
<td>Other Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881-1890</td>
<td>6,359</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>7,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-1896</td>
<td>4,643</td>
<td>2,716</td>
<td>67,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896-1900</td>
<td>8,063</td>
<td>2,737</td>
<td>9,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-1910</td>
<td>53,006</td>
<td>8,412</td>
<td>38,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1920</td>
<td>13,311</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>6,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1928</td>
<td>29,150</td>
<td>5,020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>149,641</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>132,897</td>
<td>15,304</td>
<td>125,524</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 2

Country of origin of the Romanians in the United States, by Mother Tongue 1905
(U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1922: 973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Total Romanian Population in the United States of America according to Mother Tongue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>71,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>10,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>7,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (Europe)</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (Asia Minor)</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Parentage</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>91,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign born</td>
<td>61,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native white of foreign born or mixed parentage</td>
<td>29,347</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 3

Romanian Immigrants admitted to the United States by country of last residence, 1899-1928
(U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1922: 76)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Country of last residence</th>
<th>Per cent distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899-1900</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-1910</td>
<td>82,210</td>
<td>7,715</td>
<td>16,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1920</td>
<td>54,978</td>
<td>2,757</td>
<td>47,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1924</td>
<td>10,569</td>
<td>5,412</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1928</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>149,826</td>
<td>15,304</td>
<td>124,637</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 4

Number of Romanian admittes – 14 years and over and per cent distribution of illiteracy
(Congress – 3rd Session, Emigration conditions, 1911: 83)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total Number of Romanians admitted 14 years and over</th>
<th>Romanians who could not read or write</th>
<th>Per cent Distribution</th>
<th>Romanian Jews settled in the United States – 1905</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>City Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899-1910</td>
<td>80,839</td>
<td>28,266</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1920</td>
<td>51,213</td>
<td>17,038</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1928</td>
<td>11,302</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Buffalo (N.Y.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Baltimore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Appendix 5
The lifestyle of Immigrants in the United States of America

Immigrants welcomed by the Statue of Liberty
(Morrow, 1997: 33)

Quarantine of Ellis Island in 1906
(Diamond, 1988: 35)

Immigrants found jobs in Pittsburgh’s coal mines
(Diamond, 1988: 47, 48)

Romanian shepherds from rural areas in America
(Katz, 1993: 26)

Wedding at Romanians in Cleveland, Ohio, 1905
(Diamond, 1988: 12, 13)

Romanians in Nebraska’s agricultural work
(Diamond, 1988: 14, 30)
References


The New Colossus is a sonnet that American poet Emma Lazarus (1849-1887) wrote in 1883 to raise money for the construction of the pedestal for the Statue of Liberty.


ROMANIA AND ITALY
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR:
FROM AN ALLIANCE TO ANOTHER (1914-1915)

Laura Oncescu*

Abstract

After the outbreak of the First World War, Italy and Romania have adopted position of neutrality. Given to the fact that the both states were linked to the Central Powers through the Alliance treaties, the interest of the Romanian and Italian governments, not to remain isolated in front of the pressures of Austro-Hungary and Germany was mutual. The declaration of the neutrality of Italy prompted the Romanian government to act the same. Thus, Romania declared its neutrality, on 21 July/3 August 1914. The common position of the two states, the Romanian-Italian collaboration from the period immediately following the declaration of neutrality, by concluding agreements, in September 1914 and February 1915, have postponing the signing of the Alliance treaties, by Italy (April 1915) and Romania (August 1916) with the Antanta and their war against the old ally, the Central Powers.

Key words: Romania, Italy, neutrality, alliance, special Mission

The crisis before the outbreak of the First World War (June-July 1914) found both Italy and Romania in similar positions, the attitude adopted by both states indicating that they had the tendency to proclaim neutrality in the event of a European conflagration (Oncescu, 2011: 118-119). Thus, although Romania and Italy were members of the Triple Alliance (The Central Powers) since 1883, they now manifest, in the aforementioned context and, especially, after their neutrality was proclaimed, on July 21/August 3, 1914 (Iordache, 1998: 99), the wish to get closer in order to close an alliance which had the purpose to determine the Triple Entente (Antanta) to support their national cause (Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 15).

The newspaper Universul, founded on August 20th 1884, by the Italian journalist Luigi Cazzavillan, awarded in its pages, a generous space for these events. Thus, in its number of September 25, 1914, it stated that the declarations of neutrality of Romania and Italy were not meant to show an attitude of passivity or abstention, but they constituted an action of postponement, necessary to prepare the war field and to solve the political and legal obstacles caused by the alliance of both states with the Central Powers (Universul, no. 254, September 25/1914: 1).

It is known the fact that after declaring its neutrality in the summer of 1914, both groups that were in conflict, The Central Powers and Antanta, put pressure on Romania, but also on Italy to join one or another in war. As I mentioned, after both states declared their neutrality, at the same day, on July 21st/August 3rd 1914, their governments had permanent consultations in order to obtain a much closer collaboration, an intensification of the diplomatic relationships being natural,

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especially that both states had legitimate territorial claims toward Austria-Hungary (Atanasiu and collaborators, vol. I, 1987: 105).

Under these circumstances, on July 30th/August 12th, 1914 Carlo Fasciotti, Italy’s plenipotentiary minister in Bucharest, informed, in Rome, the Marquis Antonio di San Giuliano, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy that an agreement between Romania and Italy on a common attitude in the future was very desirable (I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, vol I, 1954: 130-131; Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 15; Oncescu, 2011: 120).

In this respect, in order to find out the opinion of the Italian government, respectively of the Italian politicians, the Romanian government sent an unofficial mission to Rome. The delegation, that had the mission to get information, was formed by the director of the Romanian Academy, Professor Constantin Istrati and the director of the National Theatre, Gheorghe Diamandi, both liberal deputies in the Romanian Parliament. They had, at the beginning of September 1914, a series of meetings in the Italian capital with the Italian Prime Minister, Antonio Salandra and with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, the Marquis Antonio di San Giuliano, as well as with other personalities of the Italian political stage (Bușe, 2000: 239; Campus, 1980: 52; Iordache, 1998: 124-125). In fact, an Italian-Romanian agreement was being prepared in Rome and, as the Italian press mentioned, to which Gheorghe Diamandi had given an interview on September 5th/18th, the purpose of the visit of the two Romanian politicians was to establish for the future joint actions through mutual consultations. Diamandi also mentioned for the Italian press, being asked about the attitude of Romania, that it would follow the one of Italy, the interests between the two countries being identical at the respective time (Iordache, 1998: 125). In parallel with the discussion in Rome, in the capital of Romania, meetings between Carlo Fasciotti, plenipotentiary minister of Italy in Bucharest, Emil Porumbaru, Romanian minister of External Affairs and the prime minister of Romania, I.I.C. Brătianu (Bușe, 2000: 239; Campus, 1980: 52).

Based on these preliminary discussions, on September 10th/23th, 1914, I.I.C. Brătianu, and Carlo Fasciotti, signed the secret agreement between Romania and Italy. Through its four points, which marked an important stage in the relations between the two states, the Romanian and Italian governments committed themselves not to abandon the state of neutrality without an 8-day notice, to consult permanently for the purpose of examining the situation and, if it changes, to decide on new agreements regarding the attitude that the two states should follow, the commitment of the two states, given their traditional relationships and the analogy of their situation, to take the same concerted attitude to defend their interests in order to maintain neutrality as well as in the event of a mediation or inability to maintain neutrality due to a threat or injury of their interests, the two governments committing to keep the agreement secret (I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, vol I, 1954: 455-456; Atanasiu and collaborators, vol. I, 1987: 105-106; Iordache, 1998: 125; Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 16; The History of the Romanians, vol. VII, t. II, 2003: 407; Oncescu, 2011: 121; Dobre, 2016: 90; Dinu, 2016: 72).

The secret agreement signed between Romania and Italy had a real importance on an international level in the historical background that was created. Although Italy
breached from the very beginning the provisions of this agreement, by not informing Bucharest on the negotiations that it had with Antanta, the Italian diplomats wanted much closer relationships with Romania, especially that both countries had the same objective, that is the claim of some territories held by the Austria-Hungarian monarchy (Campus, 1980: 53; Oncescu, 2011: 121). Even though Italy, in its negotiations with Antanta, did not take into consideration the agreement concluded with Romania on September 10-23 1914 (Atanasiu and collaborators, vol. I, 1987: 106) “in fact it represented he opportunity for a real diplomatic cooperation, which was sustained by significant contacts at the level of the political class and it was accompanied by a large involvement of the public opinion of the two countries in order to create a mutual affinity without precedent in the relations between the two societies” (Dobre, 2016: 90-91).

But, just before the outbreak of the First World War and the conclusion of the Romanian-Italian agreement on September 11/23, in the spring of 1914, a commission formed by Colonel Vasile Rudeanu¹, the head of the High Directorate for Weapons of the Ministry of War and the Majors in the Section of artillery, Traian

¹ Vasile Rudeanu (1875-1965) was born on January 15th/27th, 1871 in Bucharest, being the son of Constantin Rudeanu (1843-1910) and Elena Fundățeanu (1850-1918). After his parents separated, he remained in the care of his mother. A moment that influenced him to pursue his military career was the War of Independence (1877-1878), following the example of his father, who was an officer in the Romanian army and who participated in the conflict on the Balkan peninsula where he distinguished himself by acts of heroism and courage. Thus, after attending the four high school classes in Bucharest, Vasile Rudeanu was admitted, in the year 1885, to the School of the Military Children of Craiova. Although he had a poor physical constitution and a poor state of health, he graduated from the Craiova school in 1889. In the same year he took his examination at the Bucharest School of Officers, and at its completion, in 1891 he was promoted to the rank of second lieutenant and he was assigned to the 2nd Artillery Regiment. He continued his studies in 1891-1892, in Bucharest, within the Artillery and Genius School, the Artillery section. Between 1892-1894 Vasile Rudeanu graduated abroad, being admitted to the School of Application and Genius in Brussels, counting among the graduates of the 56th promotion of the renowned Belgian school. Returned to the country, in 1894 he served in several artillery regiments, and starting with May 1897, due to his training and the recommendations of his superiors, he would work in the Central Administration of the Ministry of War. He would thus be in charge of a series of tasks becoming assistant and then head of the second office of the technical section within the 3 Artillery Division, from April 1906 leading the technical service of the Directorate. It was advanced, due to its qualities and the fulfilment of the tasks carried out with special accuracy, to the degree of captain, in 1900 and to the degree of major, in 1909. We mention here that since 1898 Vasile Rudeanu was commissioned with a series of missions abroad, all these missions being related to the endowment with armament and means of combat of the Romanian army. He was to be advanced to the rank of colonel in April 1914 and appointed as senior director of the Weaponry (Rudeanu, 2004: XIII-XVIII). “Thus behold the man whom, from the fall of 1914, soon after the start of the battles in the proximity of the Romanian borders, Ion I.C. Brătianu, the Prime Minister of the country, would send in the West to prepare the materials for the Romanian army. An excellent technician, but also an officer with the sense of political orientation, skilled negotiator, knower of several international languages, with relations and acquaintances in various military and industrial circles, would travel thousands of kilometres in an Europe in flames, meeting the standards of thrust that was given to him” (Rudeanu, 2004: XIX).
Pascal and Paul Cernovodeanu, was sent to Italy in order to become familiar with the new Italian field gun, but also to be informed about the production of the new metallurgical industry from Terni, a city near Rome, where they were carrying out real-time shooting maneuvers with the new field guns (Rudeanu, 2004: 51).

When he arrived in Rome, Rudeanu had a meeting with Count General Giovanni Cervi, the head inspector of the Italian Artillery, which was assigned to handle the Romanian delegation (Rudeanu, 2004: 51-52). During his visit in Italy, Vasile Rudeanu was informed about the progress made by Italy in developing the weapons and ammunition industry and he made a proposal to the war minister to acquire Italian field guns with afete biflèche, to be used in air defense (Rudeanu, 2004: 53).

In December 1914, in the context created by the international situation, the Romanian Prime Minister I.I.C. Brătianu, who was also a war minister, ordered Colonel Vasile Rudeanu to go back to Italy, on a special mission, to order weapons and ammunition from the Italian factories necessary for the Romanian army to enter the war and to cope with it (Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 16).

Before he left in Italy I.I.C. Brătianu, in some meetings that he held in November 1914 with Vasile Rudeanu (Rudeanu, 2004: 65-70), he asked the Colonel to inform king Victor Emmanuel III1 and the Italian Prime Minister, Antonio Salandra, that Romania wanted to second the Italian politics, entering with it in war, if the circumstances require it. Also, Brătianu insisted on the confidentiality of the information, mentioning that the entry of our country into war was conditioned by the acknowledgement of the national claims and the weapons, ammunition and war material offered by Italy (Rudeanu, 2004: 70-71; Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 16-17; Oncescu, 2011: 122-123).

Leaving for Rome, on December 20, 1914, together with Martha Bibescu and George Valentin Bibescu, whom he commissioned to supply the material for aeronautics, trucks and raw materials, Colonel Rudeanu first met with the Romanian Minister in Italy, Dimitrie Ghica, who briefly presented Italy’s foreign policy and the preparations it made to participate in the war, and then assured him of all his support (Rudeanu, 2004: 72).

The meeting with the King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel III, which lasted two hours, was both formal and sensitive. Colonel Rudeanu broadly expressed Romania’s wishes, in line with what he had discussed with the Romanian Prime Minister, and he was also pleasantly surprised to find out that the Italian sovereign had rich information about our artillery equipment, after Count General Cervi had previously informed him about his visit to Terni, in the spring of 1914. After Victor Emmanuel III mentioned that the entire Italian industry is concerned with his own weapons production, Colonel Rudeanu handed him the Romanian prime minister’s draft, on which I.I.C. Brătianu had noted the Romanian national claims and which he had entrusted him to give it to the king. Examining it carefully, the sovereign stated that “Aspirations of the Romanian people, indicated on this draft, are correct, legitimate and also some additions can be made” (Rudeanu, 2004: 73-74; Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 17-18).

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1 Victor Emmanuel III (1869-1947). King of Italy (1900-1946).
Then, revising all the injustices that the Romanian people had endured for centuries, the king of Italy highly appreciated the Romanians. At the end of the discussion, Victor Emmanuel III advised Colonel Rudeanu to obtain a meeting with General Alfredo Dall’Olio, the Director of Artillery and Ingenuity in the Italian War Ministry, who was responsible for the entire Italian weapons industry (Rudeanu, 2004: 74-75; Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 18; Oncescu, 2011: 123).

After he visited the king of Italy, while he was at the hotel, Colonel Rudeanu was awarded the decoration “Commodore of the Order of Saints Mauriciu and Lazarus”, a very important distinction for his military career (Rudeanu, 2004: 75).

The meeting with the Italian Prime Minister, Antonio Salandra, also offered Colonel Rudeanu the opportunity to understand that his mission in Italy was almost fulfilled. Thus, with a mandate from the Italian sovereign and the Italian Prime Minister, Vasile Rudeanu obtained the meeting with the Italian general. Kindly received, Dall’Olio confessed to him that the entire industry was working for the Italian army and still failed to correct these shortcomings, but taking into consideration the instructions he had received, he had previously approved 50 million infantry cartridge elements and one hundred thousand artillery projectiles and after that he had a meeting with the directors of the factories producing this type of armament, from Livorno and Turin (Rudeanu, 2004: 75-76; Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 18).

After meeting with the directors of the aforementioned factories and after drafting the contracts, Colonel Rudeanu, at Dall’Olio’s recommendation, also made contact with other weapons suppliers, concluding, in the end, 16 contracts, all approved by the Italian general. At the same time, Vasile Rudeanu was received by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonino. Displaying a severe, rigid figure with a cold look, speaking slowly and rarely, he said that he did not object to Italy helping the war preparations of the Romanian army. He also considered that the territorial claims of the Romanian Prime Minister, Ion I.C. Brătianu, are justified, although he said that there would be great difficulties regarding Banat and Bucovina (Rudeanu, 2004: 76-77; Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 18-19).

After the mission in Italy had been concluded, the Romanian Colonel went to France where he also hoped to obtain support to prepare the Romanian army for the war. During this time, Rudeanu had found out that Italy was ready to enter the war on Antanta’s side, and the Italian diplomacy wanted to hide this thing. Under these circumstances, he said: “We learned that Italy would soon enter the war on the side of the Triple Understanding, which the Italian diplomacy sought to hide, and it was of particular interest to the political leadership of our country that President Brătianu should know the truth. The King of Italy, President Salandra and Foreign Minister Sonino acknowledged that our national claims were justified and agreed that Italy would help prepare our army in other words, accepting the two conditions imposed by Brătianu for Romania to enter the war” (Rudeanu, 2004: 77).

Returning to the country, after completing the visit to Paris, Vasile Rudeanu went to the Romanian Prime Minister to present him the result of his mission: the conclusion of contracts in Italy, but also a convention made by France regarding the endowment of the Romanian army with ammunition and weapons produced by the French factories. I.I.C. Brătianu agreed with the convention requested by the French
government and authorized Rudeanu to sign it on behalf of the Romanian government. Regarding Italy, I.I.C. Brătianu expressed from the very beginning his concerns on two issues related to the foreign affairs: the first referred to Italy’s position (was it going to maintain its neutrality or it intended to enter the war together with the Central Powers?) and the second referred to Italy’s decision to enter the war with Antanta and, in this situation, an agreement with Romania was necessary, that is they entered at the same time in this conflict. Thus, Vasile Rudeanu was assigned to go once again in Italy and France. In Rome, Rudeanu was to meet the king and the Foreign Minister, Sonino, to ask them to support in London, Paris and Petrograd the Romanians’ territorial and national claims (Rudeanu, 2004: 83-84).

In this context, at the end of January 1915, Colonel Rudeanu left to Italy. At first, having only an audience and then a long meeting with king Victor Emmanuel III (Rudeanu, 2004: 84-88), he ensured his support after thoroughly analyzing what the Prime Minister wrote: “Communicate to Mr. Brătianu, that even if I were the only one who would do it, I will support Romania’s claims because they represent justice for a nation that suffered continuously and was always aggrieved and robbed” (Rudeanu, 2004: 88). Also, the Italian Foreign Minister, Sonino, after the meeting he had with the Romanian Colonel, he promised that he would make all efforts so that Italy supports our national interests (Rudeanu, 2004: 88).

The first mission of Colonel Rudeanu in Italy (December 1914-January 1915) made a good impression in the political circles in Rome, this is also due to the report that Major Luciano Ferigo, Italy’s military attaché in Bucharest, sent on 25 December 1914, in the Italian capital. In the report it was mentioned that the friendship relationships between the two countries became more and more obvious, and the visit of Colonel Rudeanu occasioned the conclusion of an important affair through which Italy was to transport wheat to Thessaloniki, passing through Romania, using the route Bucharest-Turnu Severin Prahovo-Zajecar-Paracin-Nis-Thessaloniki (Dinu, Bulei, 2006: 55-56). Information regarding the war materials acquired by Colonel Rudeanu following his missions in Italy and France can also be found in the report sent to Rome by Major Luciano Ferigo, on January 8, 1915. The Italian military attaché specifies, in the report, that Rudeanu was satisfied with the results of his mission and that when weapons and ammunition enter the country, Romania will be close to the limit that it wanted to reach in terms of weapons supply (Rudeanu, 2004: 59-60).

On January 24th/February 6, 1915, Romania and Italy signed a new agreement, with a validity of 4 months, which was intended to be, through its 5 articles, a mutual assistance pact. The agreement stipulated, in Article 1, that in the event of an Austro-Hungarian attack against one of the states, the two countries undertook to act together, in Article 2 it was provided that if there was a danger of aggression against one of the states, it would notify the other to agree the necessary measures. Article 3 stipulated that none of those established by the agreement of September 10th/23th, 1914, would change, article 4 stipulating that the duration of the agreement was four months from the date of its signature, and article five of the agreement provided, as the one on September 10th/23th 1914, its confidentiality (Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 19; Iordache, 1998: 125-126; The History of the Romanians, vol. VII,
“The conclusion of the agreements with Italy signified the gradual and definite separation of Romania from the Alliance of the Central Powers” (Iordache, 1998: 126).

The plenipotentiary minister of Italy in Bucharest, Carlo Fasciotti, sent, on April 17 1915, to the Italian foreign minister, Sidney Sonnino, a report in which, after he widely presented the political, economical and military situation in Romania (Dinu, Bulei, 2006: 76-81), he made a series of forecasts for the future of Romania and Italy in the context of war: “România hopes to obtain Transylvania, the largest part of Bucovina, Banat and Maramureş (...) so do the Italiens want to unite the mother-country Trentino, the Austrian Friuli, Istria and the seashore area of Dalmatia (...). Once Romania shall enter the war, Italy shall pass in the second line. The Romanian advance must be coordinated with the Russian one. The two armies must assist each other while we, 1500 or 2000 kilometers away, follow our destiny. France shall have to second our actions” (Dinu, Bulei, 2006: 82-83).

Making separate negotiations with Antanta, Italy concluded with its powers, on April 13/26 1915, the alliance treaty in London. In article 9 it was stated that in case of total or partial separation of Turkey, France, Great Britain and Russia assigned a part to Italy, according to its interests and as Italy had interests in the area of the Mediterranean Sea, respective Adalia area, it had the right to occupy this territory (Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 21).

Although the agreements concluded with Romania committed the state to communicate to the diplomatic circles in Bucharest its diplomatic decisions, Italy did not consider itself obliged to do so. The attitude of Rome infuriated the Romanian Prime Minister, who described it as “an unfriendly gesture” (Atanasiu and collaborators, vol. I, 1987: 106; Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 20).

Regarding this moment, the politician I.Gh. Duca would show in his memoirs that in the spring of 1915 there were signs showing the entry of Romania into war, I.I.C. Brătianu negotiating in this regard with Italy, on the one hand and with Antanta, on the other. Although the Romanian prime minister wanted an entry into war with Antanta at the same time as Italy and had supported it in the negotiations with Russia and England, and, through the agreements concluded, Italy had to inform Romania about the war with Antanta, he did not consider it necessary to inform them. In this context, I.Gh. Duca stated: “One day I learned that the Italians had an agreement with Entanta (Antanta n.n.), that it had acquired all hits territorial claims and that at the beginning of the month sit decided to take action. Italy had deceived us, therefore (...) probably said that, given that Romania and the other Habsburg monarchies would be fighting over the same prey, and that perhaps in the common interest, it would have to make some concessions, treating itself, all it can get would be for it alone. In such conditions, why bother to negotiate with Romania? After he arrives, he would stay in Bucharest and Romania would have no other solution (...) And so he did. After completing the forms with Entanta (Antanta n.n.) he returned to us and invited us to imitate it (...). Because, speaking of law, we had never considered our entry at the same time as that of Italy as a sine qua non condition of Romania’s intervention, Brătianu comforted himself otherwise quickly with Italy’s attitude towards us. On the other hand, we must not forget that on May 10, when the Italians declared war, things did not go well on the Russian front, a front that interested us more closely, so we
had reasons to consider Italy’s attitude towards Romania, more like a happy providence, than a national calamity” (Duca, 1981: 151-152).

Italy entered the war on May 24, 1915, but Romanian diplomacy, though cautious, continued to be concerned about Rome’s politics. For its part, Italy insisted that the governments of the countries of Antanta find a solution to the claims of the Romanian Prime Minister, but these were still uncompromising (Atanasiu and collaborators, vol. I, 1987: 106-107; Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 20).

The following negotiations that Romania had with Antanta were equally inconclusive, Brătianu refusing to engage the country when the Allies did not recognize his territorial claims. Colonel Luciano Ferigo informed his superiors, on June 22, 1915, about what determined I.I.C. Brătianu to delay the entry of his country into war: “we want to get out of the neutrality when Russia reconstitutes its own army, its own services and it shall be ready start an offensive action: a major Russian and Serbian activity would be enough to cover the mobilization of the Romanian army” (Dinu, Bulei, 2006: 115-116).

Carlo Fasciotti addressing to Antonio Salandra, the Italian Prime Minister, used the same terms. In his report from October 19/November 1 1915, he reproduced the discussion that Ferdinand I had with one of his interlocutors, occasion with which he declared that Romania, as a small and isolated state, had to take into consideration the evolution of the war and that it could not enter the great conflagration if Antanta does not “gather in this region forces that are at least equivalent with the ones of the Central Empires united with Turkey and Bulgaria” (Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 25-26). The military situation of Antanta in the summer and autumn of 1915 determined Russia and England to accept Romania’s requests if it committed itself to enter the war in five weeks (Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu, 1999: 23).

The common position of the two states at the beginning of the First World War, the Romanian-Italian collaboration from the period immediately following the declaration of neutrality by concluding agreements in September 1914 and February 1915, prompted the signing of the alliance treaties by Italy (April 1915) and Romania (August 1916) with Antanta and their entry into war against the previous ally, the Central Powers.

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Universul/The Universe, no. 254, September 25 1914.
The changes that followed the First World War and the political situation in Kosovo according to the Albanian press

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Abstract

The service that the Albanian press brought to people by publishing news, announcements, etc. was unmatched. The First World War also involved ethnic Albania almost on all sides. The Albanian press, which was mainly published in Albania in 1913 and abroad – in the USA, Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, Austria and Italy – was the only source of information for the Albanian people. For the period of time we are writing, through the press, people have gained knowledge about thinkers, the nation, the state, language, culture, religion, and scientific achievements in that country and in the world. A person through the press manages to eradicate illiteracy, manages to rise to freedom of expression and opinion, and to know its history. News and information published in the press of the time was very important. We have found that most of the press articles of that time were published without the author’s name. The news was published only in the name of the newsroom or with initials, the reason being the security of field correspondents reporting on daily events, which were a concern for what was happening daily in Albania, Kosovo, to the Albanian population in Macedonia and those who lived in Montenegro. The land that through the injustice of the Great Powers to the Albanian people is detached from the motherland of Albania by the decisions of the Berlin Congress of 1878, and the London Conference of 1913.

Key words: war, Kosovo, Albania, Serbia, press

The activity of the Albanian press in Kosovo between the two wars of 1918-1941 was almost impossible, as the Serbian power strictly prohibited the using of the Albanian language in places, squares, schools, much less to be written in Albanian. Publishing houses were missing and those who brought Albanian books from Albania were persecuted (Keçmezi-Basha, 2005: 256). The socio-political circumstances and changes brought about by World War I on Albanian land were evident, although political Albania was officially neutral, even defined by the Organic Statute approved in April 1914, (Milo, 2013: 240) for the purpose of preservation of its sovereignty. However, its territory was a war arena from October 1912, and continued throughout the Balkan wars. Almost destroyed by the Balkan wars Albania found it difficult to recover from the Declaration of Independence in November 1912 (Historia e popullit shqiptar, 2007: 73-74).

Albania’s political boundaries of 1913, set by the Conference of Ambassadors in London, left most of the ethnic Albanian territories out of national control as: Kosovo, Chameria, Macedonia and a part of Montenegro (Rizaj, 2011: 390-393). The

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Balkan wars were the most devastating and tragic for the Albanian people. During the years 1878-1912 over 130,000 Albanians were killed by Serbs in the province of Novi Pazar, Kosovo and the Reka of Dibra. During the World War I, if there were killed another 100,000 Albanians in Sandzak, Kosovo, Hoti and Gruda, (Shqipëri e Madhe, 5 nëntor 1929: 2) [These numbers may be high, but we always refer to the press of the time. V.K].

Based on a report sent to Rome by Archbishop Lazer Mjeda, quoted by Noel Malcolm in the book A Short History of Kosovo, it is reported that more than 25,000 Albanians were killed in Kosovo in 1913-1914. The Serbs entered into the Albanian houses, forced the men out, and executed them without trial or for any reason. The only fault those men had was that they belonged to the Albanian nation. The Serbian barbarians did not spare even the children in the cradle (Malcolm, 2001: 263-265). Seeing the claims of Austria, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia and Greece that all claimed to have Albania in their own dominion and all are against to each other, so the hope for Albania to exist as an independent is greater than what was thought. The Albanians are rightly demanding their rights as an independent nation, because Albania would not live as a state under whose protectorate it would be (Williams, 1999: 71).

During the Great War Albania, which allowed the expulsion of Serbs fleeing the Austro-German army, was properly paid for by Vojvod Dushman’s sons. Serbia, unhappy with Kosovo and the Albanian Dibra that had taken control of them, and now is seeking Shkodra. This was promised by Esat Pasha, who stated: “Albania consisted of Tirana, Elbasan, Durres and Berat, the other areas belonged to Serbia, Greece and Italy”. (Gjendja e Shqipërisë në Luftë të Ballkanit dhe të nesërmen e Luftës së Përgjithshme, 3 dhjetor 1923: 1). After many years and centuries of injustice to Albania, which is detached from its trunk Kosovo and Dibra washed with the blood of the innocent, the Serbian Army seeks Albanian blood by killing civilians from whatever the army was violating, which eventually sought to capture Shkodra (Mexi, 28 November 1921: 3). Albanians found it difficult to reorganize and establish a state with a chopped and disorganized population, however the first steps of a national organization had already been decided with the Istanbul Society and the Albanian League of Prizren, which may be easier to establish and maintain a national identity. (Skendo, April 1928: 201).

The Albanian state was not able to defend Kosovo because it had neither armies nor armaments. This weakness of Albania was exploited by the Serbs, so the Serbian forces willingly infringed on Albanian lands, committed genocide, (Dhama & Kurti, 1989: 76) massacring and burning whatever was above ground. In the newspaper Dielli (Meta, 2002: 29) published in Boston, February 6, 1914, no. 241, among the others, the newspaper reports that Serbian forces in Kalc burned about 30 houses and killed Bajram Rystemi and burned a Daveshene woman alive, and looted all the cattle. Even in the village of Slavic, Dardhe, Palaman, etc., they burned, killed, and looted everything that was Albanian (Barbarizmat serbe në Shqipëri, 6 Shkurt 1914: 1). The Albanian people browsing the national press, those who had access to newspapers, and that best understand the word Albanian, Freedom and Flag. For us, Albania is the homeland and geographical place where the Albanian people live today. The flag is
our symbol that unites all Albanian territories around it (Shqipni, Liri, Flamur, 28 Nanduer 1937: 669).

The Balkan wars and the First World War did not cross without consequences for Albania as a whole state, and especially for Albanian lands outside it. Albania’s neighbors, such as Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Italy, had open intentions towards conquering and annexing the rest of Albania, Serbia aimed the annexation of Kosovo and Shkodra (Rexha, 2011: 128-129) Greece at south of Albania, while Italy aimed at the Adriatic coast (Puto, 2009: 194). The Times of London also wrote about the events in Albania. The Times describes the territorial doings and claims of Greece and Serbia. (Ngjarjet e Shqipërisë dhe Time i Londonit, 14 tetor 1913: 2) The Serbs were determined to conquer Albanian lands at all costs even if all men, women and children have to be killed, only to realize their long-term plans for conquest and the possibility of access to the Adriatic. Through Shkodra it was easier to control the North and the line to the Adriatic. Pashiq government decides to help Esat Pasha to crush Albanian insurgents that Serbia saw as a threat to its plans, to create the conditions to occupy Central Albania and take control of the Port of Durres, which it once coveted (Çami, 1987: 557).

In an article of newspaper Dielli, dated 10 February 1914, no. 285, writes about Serbian crimes against Albanians when Serbian barbarians burned many villages (Dhama & Kurti, 1989: 25). In the village of Xhafere burned 15 houses; in Bregas burned 150 houses; there are only 5 people left in Mimche, all the others killed; 60 houses burned in Lojne village; in the village of Perbrek, 375 were killed, many of them ripped with bayonets; in the village of Seroje, 130 houses were burned and 52 men and 2 women killed; in Berdofce the whole village was burned, and the village of Novosela was completely burned. People managed to flee this village except for the wife of Islam Haxhiu with her 4 young sons and the whole family of Ramadan Yusuf, who were burned alive by throwing them into the fire (Barbarizmat serbe në Kosovë, 10 shkurt 1914: 1). Serbian crimes against Albanians were continuous and none of the Great Powers reacted to them, so the weakness of the Albanians and the not unification of the Great Powers was used by Serbia in the realization of the chauvinistic plan, especially against the Albanians in Kosovo and elsewhere outside Albania.

In the newspaper Besa Shqiptare, no. 36, dated September 5, 1914, writes about the grave political and economic events of Albania and especially of the Albanians in Kosovo: “Whose sons remained at the forefront of the fight against the Balkan conquerors”, but Albania’s neutrality in the Balkan wars is its greatest victory, as under these circumstances “Albania cannot protect its borders and much less to go beyond its borders to protect the Albanians of Kosovo and the Highlands” (Asnjansia e jonë, 5 shtator 1914: 2).

A report sent by the British sub-consulate from Bitola told the US Consulate in Thessaloniki about the obstacles that the Serbian government submitted to the operation of the US mission school. According to this report, Serbia is constantly persecuting all non-Serb educational institutions, especially Albanian schools. Serbs and the Serbian press spread the idea of creating a Greater Serbia, and they pursued
the most brutal way possible against non-Serb populations (Destani & Elsie, 2008: 462).

Newspaper *Besa Shqiptare*, dated January 13, 1915, no. 4, writes that the greatest danger to Albania was the entanglement of foreigners on Albanian soil and the claims of neighboring states to obtain as much Albanian land as possible. Europe, too, had agreed that Serbia and Greece would take as much as they could from Albania, and rather than defend themselves as a nation, we would extend our hand and assist our enemies in invading Albanian lands. The Greek easily penetrated Epirus, Serbia continued its oppression of thousands of Albanians from Sandzak, Kosovo and Macedonia, while Montenegro claimed Shkodra (Rreziku i Shqypnisë e ngatresat e t’huajve, 13 kallenduaer 1915: 1).

Upon the entry of Montenegrins into Shkodra, prominent national affairs activist Archbishop of Shkodra, Emzot Jak Serreggi, told Montenegrin officer Martinovic that was in charge of the Montenegrin army, “Until you come to me as a friend, welcome to the best of God, but you must know that i have my homeland over every friend”. On this occasion, he informs Montenegrin Martinovic that if he touches the Albanian people he would soon face the consequences (Emzot Jak Serreggi, 1922: 198).

In the *Besa Shqiptare* newspaper, January 23, 1915, no. 7, writes about some uprisings in Kosovo. After news from Kosovo, reported that Kosovars tired of Serbia’s repression have been forced to organize a self-defense insurgency, and it is being noticed that it is Albania’s weakness to help them (Pagja me Serbiin n’shpinë t’Shqypnisë?!, 23 kallenduer 1915: 24) For the time being, Albania cannot go beyond its borders as the international factor does not allow this. For those who want the good of Albania is the preservation and strengthening of the state of Albania, because it is the duty of the newly created state (Pagja me Serbiin n’shpinë t’Shqypnisë?!, 23 kallenduer 1915: 24). At that time, Albania was rescued by the Balkans with the help of the Great Powers, united, which saved Albania from a general war. The areas that the Ottoman Empire had left could occupy the Balkan states as there was no one to stop them, because the Great Powers were occupied with the general war and did not have much commitment to, how events were going on in the Balkans. The newspaper *Dielli* published in Boston, dated 22.2.1915, no. 405, wrote about events in Kosovo during World War I, “Although temporary attacks were made by Albanians in the border area, according to a telegraph from Nis, which was published in both European and American press, it was estimated that Albania had declared war on Serbia and that the Albanian army had allegedly attacked her territory”. (Lufta shqiptaro-serbe, 22 shkurt 1915: 2) This Serbian propaganda of false information announced in the foreign press was denied by the newspaper *Dielli*. According to the newspaper *Dielli* no war declaration was officially made by Albania, but the publication of this telegram was made to satisfy Serbian appetite. (Lufta shqiptaroserbe, 22 shkurt 1915: 2)

It is hard to believe that Albania can dominate the Balkan war scene based on its military capacity. The newspaper *Koha* published in Jemestovn, 25 February 1915, no. 6, inter alia states that, the barbaric and cruel rule of the Serbian government reached intolerance in those Albanian countries where was not even a single Serbian, the land that the London Conference gave to Serbia. This decision was one of the biggest
mistakes of the European Conference and the damage was at a time when the only uprising occurred in Kosovo, Debar, Ohrid and elsewhere (Lufta shqiptaro-serbe, 25 February 1915: 1-2).

In the spring of May 1915, the Serbian forces entered through Prizren, Dibra and Ohrid into central Albania, supported by the controversial Albanian leader Esat Pasha, while the Montenegrins entered Gusi and Gjakova in June 1915, almost all over the Dukagjini Plain. The Albanian warlords and Commander of the Mountains Isa Boletini, tired of the illness that had overwhelmed him, had stayed for several days on the Highland side of Gjakova, in the Krasniqi Province, after seeing the security situation, as this area was not safe to stay further, he was forced to withdraw to Shkodra with about 150 armed insurgents (Musaj, 2015: 198).

In the newspaper Koha, February 25, 1915, no. 6, writes that in addition to the bloody uprising that brought the destruction of Kosovo, Serbian barbarians left nothing to do, burning all the people, killing all Albanians, not sparing the babies in the cradle and even pregnant women. Every day since then we have heard of attempts by Serbs and Montenegrins to exterminate Albanians. This information came from Kosovo, which alarmed about what was happening daily in Kosovo (Lufta shqiptaro-serbe, 25 February 1915: 1-2). The newspaper Besa Shqiptare, published in Shkodra, dated January 23, 1915, no. 7, writes that after received the news, the Kosovars, tired of being forced out of Serbia, were forced to resist and attack the Serbs. (Kosovar me Serbinë, 23 Kallnduer 1915: 1). Also in this newspaper, January 30, 1915, no. 10, writes that Albania has no sign of a self-governing state other than Shkodra, so all Albanians must come together to protect their interests and national identity in Kosovo and other parts of Albania. (Lidhja Ballkanike dhe Shqipnia, 30 Kallnuer 1915: 36) Albanian efforts to safeguard the Albanian border have been identified in the Albanian press. In the Besa Shqiptare newspaper, 18 February 1915, no. 18, it is about armed resistance to Serbian forces in the districts of Ohrid, Dibra, Pogradec and Prizren. (Shqyptarët n’Prezrend, 18 Fruer 1915: 3). Besa Shqiptare, daily reports that Albanian insurgents forced the Serbs to leave the Kukes region and deported them to Prizren. This news was enjoyed by all Albanians, but fears prevailed that Serbs might commit crimes in retaliation for Albanians in Kosovo (Shqyptarët n’Prezrend, 18 Fruer 1915: 3). In another article the newspaper Besa Shqiptare, dated 25 February 1915, no. 21, writes: “From specific news we learn that Serbian soldiers did evil in the province of Prizren by burning some villages.” This information proves the fear that Albanians had of Serbian retaliation (Përpjekje Shqiptaro-Serbe, 25 Fruer 1915: 2).

From the events that took place in Kosovo, we note the article of the Boston Daily, Dielli, dated November 18, 1915, no. 519. A report by the German Minister of War on the developments of the war, dated 17 November 1915, Berlin, said: The German Ministry of War reported that the Austro-German Army was pursuing Serbs from Belgrade and advancing elsewhere towards Nis. The Serbs could not stop the advance of the Austro-German army. The Germans captured 2000 Serbs, 2 cannons and 1 machine gun, while the Bulgarians occupied Pristina. (Gjermanet zunë 2000 robër, 18 nëntor 1915: 1). Due to World War I, Kosovo and other Albanian-majority provinces had difficulty maintaining their national identity, having previously lost control of the territory they inhabited. In the First World War the intentions of the
Balkan states appeared. They all had the same purpose: Serbians the creation of a Greater Serbia; Greeks Greater Greece and Bulgarians Greater Bulgaria (Dugolli & Abdullah, 2014: 148).

With the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire, except of London Albania, unfortunately the rest of Albania remained under Serbian-Montenegrin control. Referring to the Albanian press, in the Besa Shqyptare newspaper, February 16, 1915, no. 17, it is reported that the Serbian government is fighting Kosovo Albanians that fate left them under Serbian rule. Under constant pressure from the Serbian army, some insurgents in Kosovo’s villages respond to Serbian forces with weapon. (Keqbanjme serbe, 16 fruer 1915: 3) It is surprising how the foreign press supported the crimes of the Serbian-Montenegrin army. The Albanian insurgents, in a small number and unorganized, nevertheless succeeded occasionally in defeating and pushing the Serbian army, but with much difficulty and loss. Even when some Serbian soldiers were captured by the insurgents, they disarmed and released, but the same thing did not happen when the Serbian army captured any insurgents. As soon as the Serbs captured the Albanian insurgents without any trial and hesitation, they decided to shoot them, and even the women and children were mercilessly killed, just because they were Albanian (Tucoviç, 1990: 204).

Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian attacks on one hand and the Bulgarian ones on the other, against Serbia were a hope for the Kosovo Albanian population and the surroundings of national freedom and unity. The losses that Serbia suffered in the Great War were a joy to the Albanians.

Dielli newspaper published in Boston, November 26, 1915, no. 525, wrote of the departure of the Serbian army and royal administration from Serbia to Albania. Paris November 25, 1915, the Serbian embassy announces that the Serbian government has removed from Prizren and from Prizren to continue working in Shkodra. “The Sun” newspaper published a telegram from Berlin saying that Serbian King Peter accepted an invitation from Montenegro’s King Nicholas to go to Cetinje and to govern Serbia from there. But this was impossible because the Austro-Hungarian forces could easily take Montenegro as well, so the Serbian governors decided to go to the French war fleet located in the south of Albania. (Qeveria serbe në Shkodër, 26 nëntor 1915: 1) The beginning of 1916 marks the great change in favor of the Albanians. It is the Austro-Hungarian army that has been able to withstand the invading Serbian-Montenegrin armies in Albania and Kosovo (Dervishi, 2006: 71). The newspaper Vëllazënjia, published in Vienna, January 12, 1916, no. 1, writes: “In the district of Peja and the Highlands of Shkodra, the Austro-Hungarian armies triumphantly expelled the Serbian-Montenegrin army. After a severe three-day war, the Austrian army took control Lovca, a mountain that was the target of Austro-Hungarian attacks. At that place they received 26 cannons and many other weapons left by the Serbian army (Gjendja mbëlamë të luftës, 12 kallënduer 1916: 2).

The Albanian press reported the release of Shkodra and the expulsion of the Serbian army from the Austro-Hungarian forces. The newspaper Vëllazënjia, published in Vienna, January 28, 1916, no. 2, writes The Kresnik town surrounded by mountains was liberated last night. The news of the liberation of Shkodra will awaken the joy and the cheer in every Albanian heart, because the liberation of Shkodra means more than
the liberation of a city, because the enemies who had decided to dismember Albania and exterminate the Albanian nation were crushed” (Ulirue Shkodra, 28 kallenduer 1916: 1). The Albanians, as a despised people by centuries-old conquerors, are finally seeing the light of freedom. With the entry of the Austro-Hungarian military forces into Albania, Middle Albania and Upper Albania were liberated. (Ulirue Shqypënija e epërme e mesmja prej anmiqësh. Durrësi u muarl, 2 mars 1916: 1) Austro-Hungarians put new order in Albania’s recovery efforts. The newspaper Vëllazënija, Vienna, March 2, 1916, no. 4, wrote that the people understood this favor as an opportunity for national unification of Albanians in a single state (Ulirue Shqypênija e epërme e mesmja prej anmiqësh. Durrësi u muarl, 2 mars 1916: 1).

Due to the Great War and the advances in this field, unfortunately the Albanian territories and especially Kosovo remained under occupation, divided into the Austro-Hungarian occupation zone and the Bulgarian zone under a territorial division convention signed on 6 September 1915 in Plese. From this partition, significant parts of the territory of Kosovo and Macedonia remained under Bulgarian rule. (Rushiti, 1986: 93) Austria-Hungary and Germany were obliged to give Bulgaria the eastern and southern part of Serbia, Macedonia, and most of Kosovo, (Rushiti, 1986: 93) but since these two warring states in the Balkans, Austria-Hungary as the most advanced state in respect of human rights, did not exert violence on Albanians. The people had an autonomy and space to act in the field of education and civil administration. (Rexha, 2011: 148) The Austro-Hungarians had a more favorable treatment of the Albanians than the Bulgarians (Kosova në vështrimin monografik, 2001: 228).

Dielli newspaper, Boston, Mass., Dated February 4, 1916, no. 582, gave the news of the partition of Serbia. In the article “European War” Austria declares the defeat of Serbia. It states that Serbia no longer lives as an independent state, that there is no Serbian army or administration within Serbia, that everyone have fled or had been captured. (Lufta evropiane, 4 shkurt 1916: 1) The Austro-Hungarian Army issued a decree of 8 points on 22 February 1916 stating that in these 8 points the Austro-Hungarians testified that they did not treat Albania as it had been treated by Serbia during the occupation. This decree stated: “We have not entered in Albania as enemies. The people here trust us, so we must use this faith to strengthen the Austro-Hungarian position in this country, respecting the habits of the inhabitants, and we must be an example as an army of a civilized state”. These statements urged the Albanian people to reorganize into administrative and civil service (Kocaqi, 2016: 141).

Through a circular by the Serbian Consul in Crete to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides information on Italian movements in Albania, the cooperation they have in coordinating their activities with Albanians against Greece in southern, Albania and Serbia in the north and east of Albania. (ASHAK, F. Jovan Jovanoviq Pizhon, K. 9, f. 666, dt. 13 tetor 1917) As contributors to Italy, this report stated that there are two key figures most influential on the Albanian people: Avni Bey and Mustafa Bey. Their co-operation with Italy disrupts Serbia’s plans, as Italy is advancing towards northern Albania. (ASHAK, F. Jovan Jovanoviq Pizhon, K. 9, f. 666, dt. 13 tetor 1917)

In a report sent by Ballukdzic to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 13 October 1917, it was stated that the Government of France agreed to give the Italians,
the governance of Korça and Pogradec, with the Italian occupation of these two Albanian centers, our interests are being affected. It is disturbing how our friends are collaborating with the Italian invaders to hand over Korça and Pogradec to Italy, cities that are of great interest to Serbia. If our army goes to war with the Italians, then we are not guilty, but French friends will be guilty (ASHAK, F. Jovan Jovanović Pizhon, K. 9, f. 666, dt. 13 tetor 1917).

During the occupation of Albania in the First World War Austria-Hungary has always looked at Albania with a positive eye, because there was a tolerance in the organization of civic life. In its favor, the Albanian people in Austro-Hungarian-dominated areas enjoyed national rights, tranquility, access to education, and sufficient security without any threat to the lives of the population. (Bajrami, 2018: 229) In occupied Albania, at the end of January 1917, Austria-Hungary proclaimed in Shkodra the Autonomy of the whole of Albania, establishing a military-civil administration with local officials, but led by Austrian leader A. Král. This man was entrusted with the leadership (administration of Albania), he appointed several directorates such as: Directorate of Finance, Directorate of Education and Directorate of Justice, directories that were vital for the beginning of institutional life within the Autonomy (Puto, 2009: 179).

The Austro-Hungarians called for the entire Autonomy of Shkodra, and they aimed to diminish Italian influence in Albania. In November 1917 they allowed the celebration of the anniversary of Albania’s Independence. (Historia e Popullit Shqiptar, 1965: 441) The benefit of Shkodra Autonomy was that within the Austro-Hungarian protectorate included Kosovo and some other Albanian areas. A total of 231 Albanian schools were opened by the Directorate of Education from 1916-1917, covering a large part of Kosovo, an area administered by Austria-Hungary (Arifi, 2017: 227).

Through the Autonomy of Albania, Austria-Hungary aimed to limit the further extension of Italy, which it saw as rival, but at the same time prevented the expansion of Bulgarian influence. As Bulgaria intended to reach the Adriatic Sea through Albania. Albania’s autonomy under the Austro-Hungarian Protectorate halted Bulgaria’s further expansion and limited Bulgarian influence only to agreed areas previously (Çami, 1987: 630). No one could imagine what an uneducated Albanian citizen looked like. Young people’s school will increase your sense of homeland, and will develop your conscience. Being free, they will enhance the national feeling, and through education children can become the masters of their own state. The works of today’s teachers will be harvested after 20-30 years, when these generations succeed in producing results. Opening of schools was welcomed with great joy all over Albania, because youth education is the foundation of the future state (Shkollat tona, 1922: 111).

The ideal of Albanian education and schools was a requirement in every country where the leaders of the nation joined. Hasan Prishtina raised the voice of the opening of Albanian schools in the Highlands, as residents are unable to educate their children, and where schools are missing, teachers and other infrastructure, “Education is the soul of a nation” (Hasan Prishtina-kërkesë Këshillit Kombëtar, 1921: 71).

Not much was heard of the Albanian nation until 1913, but Albanians were affirmed as a nation thanks to the publications of a group of foreign researchers who...
came to Albania, so these writers had a duty to call their countrymen friends of Albanian. These researchers were: Boppi; Hahn; Hecquardi; Mayeri; A. Herbert; Becker and Edith Durrham. (Shqypnia e miqt e saj, 1922: 127)

Albania’s borders are narrowing day by day, writes in Hylli i dritës, published in Shkodra, 1922, no. IV, it says that Montenegro had already achieved its objectives, but the Albanians did not agree with the changes made to their shoulders. The Highlanders of Hoti and Gruda sent a memorandum to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Washington, London, Paris and Rome, seeking support for the country’s Freedom (Malcia e Madhe për rreth çashtje të kufijëve, 1922: 145).

Albania’s Neighbors: Greece and Serbia tried to ruin Albania internally, and found an ambitious servant such as Esat Pasha. This man served the devil and their interests. He readily accepted that Serbia would take Shkodra to Drin, or Mati Coast, while Greece would accept Korça and Gjirokastra on the condition that he can be Prince in Central Albania. However, with his assassination, the betrayal disappeared. Albania’s Minister of Internal Affairs announced to deputies that Esat had concluded a treaty with the Serbs on the issue (Debat ne Këshillin Kombëtar në lidhje me qëllimet shoviniste serbo-greke të përkrahura nga Esat Pasha, 1921: 101-103).

Until the preservation of the Albanian national identity, the people succeeded thanks to their faith (Gjeçovi, 1933: 312) and their bravery. This epithet of social wealth as a national value made Albanian manhood known for its trust and retention, while bravery as epithet was given to the later Kresniks, who are the most deserving of preservation at any cost of the Albanian state and nation (Besa e trimnija shqiptare, 1922: 376).

Newspaper Drita, Gjirokastra, dated 28 November 1923, no. 148, writes about the Feast of November 28, arguing the merits of the people for the Albanian state. “The strength, the ideal, the energy, the vigilance and the high patriotism of the Albanian people overcame all the dangers surrounding the homeland, all the elements of Albanian individualism were established, the life and destiny of the Nation was secured.” The constitution of the Albanian state was achieved thanks to the sacrifice of the patriots, who never ceased to realize the goals of an independent state and political stability (28 Nëntor 1923, 28 vjeshtë e III-të 1923: 1).

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THE FAMINE OF 1932-1933 IN KAZAKHSTAN: GENOCIDE OR ETHNOCIDE?

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Abstract

The article aims to analyze information brought forward by Alikhan Bukeikhan exposes the inveracity of the Soviet statistics on population of the Kazakh people before and after the famine of 1932-1933. Leading approach to the study of this problem is the comparative method that has afforded revealing the true extent of the national disaster of, which reduced the population the Kazakh people from 7.2 million people to less than 2 million. This information possessed by the Kazakh national leader became accessible only recently. The materials of the paper imply the practical significance for the university teachers of the philological specializations.

Key words: Kazakhs nation, Stalin, Goloschekin, collectivization, repression

Introduction

The famine of 1932-1933 in Kazakhstan that happened because of collectivization and forced sedentarization is a tragic catastrophe that affected the rural population of the Kazakh territory. The society suffered massive violence, primarily due to the fragility of the economic and environmental bases as well as Joseph Stalin’s policies of radical state. The true number of victims remains unknown as it varies depending on the source. Moreover, the scientists are not able to indicate the accurate number of ‘direct victims of hunger’ from the overall loss of the Kazakh population as there were many of those who died while migrating to China and other countries.

To this day there exists no common opinion among the Kazakh historians and demographists, not only about the number of victims of the famine, but also about the population of Kazakhs before the man-made tragedy took place. It is important to emphasize that all contradictions concerning the relatively accurate number of victims of the national disaster occurred due to the lack of, or to be more precise – due to the
concealment of reliable statistical data about the actual population of Kazakhs prior to the famine. A considerable contribution to these contradictions is made most often intentionally by scientists from the neighboring Russia, who politicize the topic and attempt to refute the research of Kazakh historians and demographers of the 1990s and lower the number of Kazakhs who perished and those who migrated to neighboring countries due to hunger, relying only on the official statistical data of the Soviet government. For example, A.N. Alexeenko states, that “considering all possible corrections, the loss of the Kazakh population amounted to not more than 1,840 thousand people or 47.3% of the population of the ethnic group in 1930” (Vladimirov, 2000: 130). Thereby he expresses a disagreement with numbers declared to the public by a Kazakh demographer, M.B. Tatimov about 2,020 thousand dead and 616 thousand people who permanently migrated (1989: 67) and by a historian, Kh.M. Asylbekov about 2.5 million dead and 616 thousand people who permanently migrated (a total of: 3,116 thousand people) (1999: 46).

There are various research methods used in this article, which gave an objective image of the historical and political situation of Kazakhstan during 1932-1933. These methods consider the following thematic aspects as genocide and ethnocide of the Kazakhs. The study covers analysis of more than 3000 manuscripts and archive documents from:

- State Archive of Orenburg region (Russia), 1992.
- RGALI (Russian State Archive of Literature and History), 2016.
- RGVIA (Russian State Archive of Military History Archive), 2015.
- GARF (State Archive of Russian Federation), 2015-2016.
- RGASPI (Russian State Archive of Social and Political History), 2015-2016.

All selected materials in the study have been analyzed through general scientific and special historical methods as well as historic – retrospective, genetic and typological methods.

**Analysis of the Results and Calculations of the Kazakh Population before and after the Famine in 1932-1933**

It is no longer a secret that the USSR government intentionally lowered the losses of population due to famine, especially in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The actual indigenous population of Kazakhstan – i.e. the Kazakhs has been distorted prior to and after the famine – “asharshylyk” (“ашаршылық”) of 1932-1933. For example, after the census of 1937 J. Stalin found that the population suffered a decrease instead
of an increase. Expressing indignation and distrust towards the result of the census, Stalin ordered to classify the census data and declared all people who participated in its drafting, enemies of the state and ordered to have them shot. It is necessary to emphasize that all research on the history and consequences of the famine of 1932-1933 by Soviet as well as foreign scholars such as Robert Conquest, David Titievskiy, Martha Brill Olcott and others are based on the data from the official statistics from the Soviet period (Conquest, 1986:113; Olcott, 1981: 67).

Therefore, with regards to the official data, according to the National Population Census of the USSR of 1926, the number of Kazakhs amounted to 3,968,289 people, however, according to the census of 1939 – only 3,100,949 people (Mikhailovsky & Kvitkin, 1939: 26). Meanwhile, both Kazakh and Russian scientists continue to base their work on this data in their research and when determining the number of victims of the Kazakh famine – “asharshylyk” of 1932-1933, ignorant of or simply ignoring the data gathered by Kazakh national leaders who were mass repressed in the 1930s, the essays of whom, dedicated to this issue especially in the Kazakh language remained inaccessible to the scientific circle up until the beginning of the 90s of the previous century, as well as the statistical data of the February Revolution of 1917.

The invitation to join the Special Committee for Research of Soviet and Autonomous Republics of the Academy of Sciences of USSR as an expert on Kazakhstan (see Figure 1) in 1926 by the Presidium of the Academy, as well as his direct involvement as one of the leaders of the anthropological expedition of the AS of USSR which produced a study of the socio-economic state of the Aday Uyezd of Kazakhstan (modern Atyrau, West Kazakhstan and Mangistau regions) act as additional evidence of this fact. I shall only add that the leader of the Kazakh National Liberation Movement “Alash”, starting from 1897 thoroughly kept track of the dynamics of the growth and population of his people, periodically publishing his research and calculations in the said matter in the periodical print and scientific collections.

In order to confirm the unreliability (to put it mildly) of the official Soviet statistics, it is sufficient to see the results of the first general population census of the Russian Empire of 1897 (Troynitskiy, 1905: 155). In their research, the Kazakh national elite, particularly the leader of the Kazakh National Liberation Movement, the founder and head of the Kazakh National Territorial Autonomy Alash of 1917-1920, Alikhan Bukeikhan (Bukeykhanov) relied precisely on the results of the first census. Bukeykhan's research about the Kazakh population is of immense scientific value, first of all because he was an eyewitness and a direct participant of the first general population census of the Russian Empire of 1897 in the Kazakh steppe region.

Second of all, A.N. Bukeikhan having participated in the expedition of 1896-1901 organized by the Ministry of Agriculture and State Property of the Russian Empire and lead by F.A. Shcherbina, who was researching the Kazakh population and its households in 3 steppe regions of Kazakhstan (until 1917 known as Semipalatinsk – modern Pavlodar, West Kazakhstan and Karaganda, Akmolinsk – modern North Kazakhstan and Akmolinsk, as well as Turgay – modern Aktobe, Kustanay regions), as well as in the scientific expedition lead by S.P. Shvetsov in 1902-1903 for an economic
assessment of the regions of the Siberian railway, was rightly considered the best expert on Kazakhstan prior to and after the Revolution of 1917.

It is possible to contrast and compare the reliability and objectivity of not only the results of the All-Russian Census of 1897, 1926, 1937 and 1939, but the results and calculations of the Kazakh population made by scientists of the period before and after the February Revolution of 1917 as well, namely the modern Russian scientist, A.N. Alexeenko and the Kazakh leader of the beginning of the XX century, A.N. Bukeikhan. Thus, the population of people, who whose native language was Kazakh, according to the results of the first General Population Census of the Autocratic Russia of 1897 equaled to 4,080 thousand (Bukeikhan & Kostelianskiy, 1910:8). It is possible to compare the population of the people of Kazakhstan and Central Asia in 1897 and 2018, which would enable to determine the losses of the
Kazakh people due to famine of 1932-1933 (Table 1).

However, even this data about the Kazakh population proved to be not entirely objective. Since, as was emphasized in the statement of a group of Kazakh intelligentsia lead by Bukeikhan directed at the Kazakh population of the Turgay Region under the headline “To the Kazakh People!” (“Қазақ халқына!”), published in the June issue of 1917 of the “Qazaq” (“Қазақ”) newspaper concerning the coming population census, in the course of the first general census of 1897 and the repeated census of the population of the Kokshetau Uyezd in 1907-1910 years later, the Kazakh people concealed or understated the number of their children of pre-conscription and conscription age due to suspicion and fear that “the census is conducted for the purposes of revealing the number of Kazakh children for drafting them into service in the Russian Army” (Mikhailovsky & Kvitkin, 1928-1929: 14). A considerable number of Kazakh families simply migrated deep into the steppes to avoid the census.

Table 1: Comparative analysis of the population of the people of Kazakhstan and Central Asia in 1897 and 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>People of Kazakhstan and Central Asia</th>
<th>Population in 1897</th>
<th>Population in 2018</th>
<th>Growth in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>4 084 139</td>
<td>12 250 305</td>
<td>299.9% or x 2.9 more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>726 534</td>
<td>24 858 159</td>
<td>3421.5% or x 34.2 more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Kyrgyz</td>
<td>201 682</td>
<td>4 587 430</td>
<td>2274.5% or x 22.7 more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Turkmens</td>
<td>281 357 (according to data from 2010)</td>
<td>4 011 000</td>
<td>1425.6% or x 14.2 more</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Before, when the government was conducting the census,” the statement said, “Kazakhs showed distrust. They suspected that “if land and agricultural area is found to be in surplus, we shall lose our land” (Boekeikhanov, Baytursynov, & Dulatov, 1917: 84). They feared that “if they indicate the exact amount of cattle, the taxes and fees would rise”. They feared that the population census was conducted for the purpose of drafting our children into military service.” In short, Kazakhs equally believed, and not without reason, in both true and secret intentions of the previous government. However, that government is no more. The new government is of the people. To distrust the new government is to distrust yourself.

The concealment of the number of children during census for fear of drafting into the army, as before, will cause more harm than good. The Members of Parliament of each people in the Constitutional Convention will represent their people proportionally to their population. Therefore, if Kazakhs intentionally understate the actual value of the population of male and female genders, then the number of Members of Parliament will be smaller. To fear that Kazakhs will be forced to serve in the military and to understate the age of one’s children is foolish as
well. To act as before is unreasonable. No matter what kind of law is passed, the Kazakh people will have their Members of Parliament, who will pass them in cooperation with others, which would correspond with the interests of the people. If they were destined to serve in the military, the Kazakhs would not be able to escape it.

The Main Effects of Famine in 1932-1933 in Kazakhstan

Such a populous people as Kazakhs, existing under the yoke of one nation, cannot exist in secret. Let us not repeat old mistakes, let us step onto the righteous path, let us follow the current great changes, claim out share and rebuild our statehood. If we, the Kazakhs, do not achieve this, we shall be cursed by our future generations, the Kazakh national leaders called out in their statement to the citizens of Alash (Boekeikhanov et al., 1917: 1).

In turn, A. Bukeikhan in his historical essay “The Kazakhs” (in the original “The Kyrgyz”), published in 1910 in St. Petersburg as part of the collection “The Forms of National Movements in the Modern Nations,” calculated the increase in the population of Kazakhs in 1910 to 4,696,600 on the basis of the official results of this census (Bukeikhan, 2009: 7). It is important to note that, for greater accuracy of his calculations and in order to avoid suspicions of an intentional exaggeration of the actual number of his people, he based his calculations on the lowest possible coefficient of natural population growth, i.e. 1.55, whereas the growth coefficient of nomadic Kazakhs for example in the Turgay Region equaled to 2.5.

Considering these nuances, it may be safe to assume that in reality, in 1910 the population of Kazakhs considerably exceeded 5 million people. For example, Barlybek Syrttanuly (Syrtanov), one of the prominent leaders of the National Liberation Movement “Alash” of the early 20th century, an alumnus of the East Faculty of the Imperial St. Petersburg University (1894), the compiler of the “Regulations of the Country of the Kazakhs” – the draft of the first Kazakh constitution, compiled by him in St. Petersburg in June of 1911, stated, that the Kazakhs “reached 7 million” in population (Alashinsky, 1911: 35). Known in the Kazakh steppe region and Siberia, the author Anton Sorokin, in his article “Kyrgyzziy Zemli” (“Kazakhsyiye zemli”), published in issue No. 5 dated May 25, 1917 of the Omsk paper “Zemlya i Volyu” (publication of the Omsk Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionist Party), wrote about the fate of the “eight-million strong Kazakh nation” (Sorokin, 1917: 2-3). In the material of the “Second All-Kyrgyz and Third All- Bashkir Congresses,” published in the Orenburg paper “Yuzhnyi Ural” signed N. Ch., it was stated that the “total number of Kyrgyz is recognized as 6 ½ million” (Bukeikhan, 1917: 3).

However, the data presented by Bukeikhan in the note “Qazaq Qansha?” (lit. “How Many Kazakhs?”), published in 1924 in the paper “Yengbekshi Qazaq” (“Еңбекші қазақ,” lit. “The Working Kazakh” – the official party and state publication of the Kazakh ASSR, currently “Yegemen Qazaqstan” – the official paper of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan), is still the most reliable and objective: “In 1914 the total population of Russia equaled to 161 million 700 thousand people. How many Kazakhs were there that year? In 1896, and in 1907, i.e. ten years later, the Kazakhs of the Kokshetau Uyezd were counted twice. If one was
to compare these numbers, then it follows that the growth dynamics of the Kazakh people noticeably surpassed the worldwide dynamics. If each year three people are added to every two hundred Kazakhs on average, then towards the year 1914 the population of Kazakhs must have been 6 million 470 (!) people” (Bukeikhan, 1924: 3).

A simple comparison of this data with the official results of the population censuses of 1926 and 1939, as well as the calculations of Russian scholars, particularly A.N. Alexeenko invokes a complete perplexity. According to the results of the census of 1926 conducted 12 years after the census of 1914, throughout the whole territory of the USSR the Kazakh population due to some peculiar circumstances did not increase, but on the contrary, decreased and became even less than 4 million – 3,968,289 people, whereas according to natural growth dynamics of Kazakhs, this number should have exceeded 7 million. Even when taking casualties of the brutal quelling of the Kazakh uprising of 1916, the Civil War of 1917-1919, migration into the neighboring countries as well as the famine of 1921-1922 into consideration, the population of Kazakhs should have amounted to not fewer than 6.5-7 million. Where did the other 2-2.5 million disappear?

The Russian scholar Alexeenko does not especially trouble himself with searching for an answer to such a question. Instead, due to reasons only he understood, he distorted the already unreliable data of the 1926 census and diminished the population of Kazakhs from 3,968,289 to 3,718,000, i.e. by 250 thousand people. On top of that, Alexeenko, a modern apologist of the 1926-1939 censuses, probably intentionally erred in his calculations, applying the lowest coefficient of population growth per year to Kazakhs, expressed as 1.5. “In the pre-crisis year of 1930 the population of the Kazakh ethnic group” he states, “according to my calculations should have amounted to 3886 thousand (at the beginning of the year). The calculations were based on the following. The population of the ethnic group according to the data of the 1926 census (with all amendments) was determined to be 3,718 thousand people. Taking natural growth over the course of three years (4.5% between 1927-1929) into consideration, we get a total of 3886 thousand” (Mikhailovsky & Kvitkin, 1928-1929: 18).

Bukeikhan’s calculations above seem much more objective and realistic. It is necessary to stress, that the Kazakh leader published this note when he was in a forced exile in Moscow, precisely for the purpose of exposing the intentional distortion introduced by the communist regime of the USSR. According to his estimate, the natural increase of the Kazakh population during the course of 10 years, from the beginning of World War I, composed of 979 thousand people. However, during the same period, some factors negatively impacted first and foremost the population and growth of the natives, such as the cholera epidemic of 1917 in Turkestan, of 1921 in Kazakhstan and the famine of 1921-1922, all of which Bukeikhan included in his note.

Let us remind the reader that Kazakhstan was as a matter of fact, divided into the Kazakh (Kyrgyz) and Turkestan ASSRs until October 1924, where the epidemic, economic devastation, war and famine, as A. N. Bukeikhan stated in his note in “Yengbekshi Qazaq”, cancelled out the natural increase of the Kazakh population over the course of 10 years, or claimed the lives of 15 people out of every 20
households or 100 people. “Even if Kazaks, just as before, concealed the actual number of their household members and the statistician “erred” in his statistical report, the Kazakh population of Turkestan and Kazakhstan (excluding the Bukhara and Khiva Kazakhs) today amounts to no less than 6 million 470 thousand people” – Bukeikhan declared in 1924. It follows that the author was talking about the population of ethnic Kazakhs, populating the territory of the republic of the same name until 1925 (Figure 2). Together with the kinsmen from Bukhara and Khiva, the ethnic Kazakhs could have amounted to 7 million.

So what was the population of Kazakhs at the beginning of the famine of 1932, in order to determine the real number of victims? If proceeding from Bukeikhan’s estimate that the natural increase of Kazaks in the past 10 years until 1924 amounted to 979 thousand people with a total population of 6,470 million towards the beginning of World War I in 1914, then over the 8 years between 1924 and 1932, the natural increase should have amounted to 783 thousand people. Consequently, the native population of Kazakhstan, the Kazakh ethnic group on the eve of the famine of 1932 and only within the republic consisted of at least 7 million 250 thousand people.

Figure 2: Map of Kazakhstan between 1920-1929

Another fact that is important to emphasize is that 3 years prior to the famine in Kazakhstan, during the spring and summer of 1929, the most distinguished and most popular among the native people representatives of the national intelligentsia, mostly former leaders and members of the government of Alash-Orda lead by Akhmet Baitursynuly, more than 45 people in total, were arrested, a part of them were executed by shooting on the basis of falsified accusations, the rest were sentenced to serve long terms in GULAGs, far beyond the borders of the republic. At first Baitursynuly was sentenced to execution by shooting, however the sentence was replaced with exile in the Astrakhan Oblast. The former national leaders of Soviet Kazakhstan such as Smagul Saduakasuly (Sadvakasov), Nygmet Nurmakuly (Nurmakov), Sultanbek Khozhanuly (Khodzhanov) and others were recalled to
Moscow under different plausible pretexts. The Kazakh national leader Alikhan Bukeikhan was in Moscow under constant surveillance of the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU), where he was taken under escort in December 1922 (Figure 3).

It is essential to note, that in the period of famine in Kazakhstan during 1921-1922, it was precisely the Kazakh elite Alash, appearing in the Soviet print in 1930-1940 and archive documents of the Joint State Political Directorate – People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs – Committee for State Security (OGPU-NKVD-KGB) as “former Alashorda members” or “bourgeois nationalists,” succeeded in organizing effective aid to the famine-stricken population in all of the regions of the Republic (Mikhailovsky, & Kvitkin, 1928-1929: 257). The Former Alashorda members formed, speaking in modern terms, a non-governmental committee for aid to the starving population, with the national leader, the former prime minister of the Alash Autonomy, Alikhan Bukeikan as the honored chairman. Bukeikhan succeeded in organizing the collection and delivery of cattle to famine-stricken districts and regions of the country and thus averting mass mortality of the population, especially among Kazakhs.

Based on the above mentioned circumstances, an unambiguous conclusion can be derived, that the famine of 1932-1933 in Kazakhstan was carefully planned in the Kremlin beforehand and carried out by Filipp Goloshchekin, its deputy in Kazakhstan. Other local Kazakh officials were also reluctant to take responsibility for the catastrophe because of the fear to be punished by Moscow. They knew that the situation was turning into a disaster and believed that Moscow would blame Goloshchekin for it. Their main problem was that their position of a communist was more important for them than being a Kazakh. They adhered to communist party orders realizing the consequences their people would face. This fact is one of the reasons why people today forget Kazakh genocide since among modern Kazakh population there are many descendants of those who were actively following the communist ideas.

Figure 3: A.N. Bukeikhan in his communal apartment-room in Moscow, on the eve of his arrest and imprisonment at the Butyrka Prison. July, 1937
A more objective, if only approximate, number of victims of the famine of 1932-1933 can be determined by the “repressed census” of 1937, according to the official data of which – 4 years after the nation-wide disaster – the number of Kazakhs amounted to 2 million 181 thousand 520 people (Mikhailovsky & Kvitkin, 1937: 320). If the number of surviving Kazakhs is deduced from the total population of Kazakhs at the beginning of 1932 and exclude the average number of Kazakhs who migrated to the neighboring countries amounting to 1 million, then the most probable number of Kazakhs intentionally exterminated by famine is 4 million 68 thousand 480 people.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it remains to be added, that the Kazakh nation, having a population of more than 7 million people, being the 5th largest nation in the Russian Empire and USSR and the largest nation of all Central Asia until 1932, consisted of less than 2 million after 1933, forever losing more than 5 million and 68 thousand people, 4 million or 70% of the total population of which were physically exterminated, barely reaching 2 million 181 thousand 520 people in 1937. It is no longer important whether to label the so-called national policy of the Soviet rule in Kazakhstan, which placed Kazakhs on the verge of complete physical extermination on their indigenous lands – as genocide or ethnocide. This national disaster of the Kazakh nation is by far larger and more tragic than the Ukrainian “Holodomor,” which became an international term, accurately depicting the significance and scale of the tragedy of the Ukrainian nation. The national disaster in Kazakhstan of 1932-1933 is called “Ашаршылык” (“Asharshylyk”) and there is no other international term or concept, which accurately characterizes the tragedy that fell onto the long-suffering Kazakh nation. We assume that, famine of 1932-1933 in Kazakhstan is to be stated both as genocide and ethnocide of the Kazakh nation and to acquire an international nomination of “Asharshylyq”, which means destroying of Kazakh steppe people.
Abstract

The article succinctly illustrates the international situation in the summer of 1940 and the manner in which the Romanian diplomats related the events of the time, trying to maintain a balance between the main threats to Romania: Germany, Hungary and the Soviet Union. At the same time, the documents presented here (signed by V.V. Tilea and Radu Florescu) examine: the position of the Chamberlain Government regarding the military events in progress; the negotiations between England and Italy; the way in which the United States perceived the war in Europe; the Soviet Union’s intercessions in the Near East.

Key words: Romania, Germany, England, Viorel Virgil Tilea, Radu Florescu

In the first part of 1940, Romanian politicians – led by Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu (24th November 1939 – 4th July 1940) – struggled to avoid great territorial loss by renouncing prior international obligations but also through a foreign policy of “cooperation” with Germany (Istoria Românilor, 2003: 565-566). Thus, Carol II stated – following an audience he had granted to Dinu Brătianu (on 19th March 1940) – that he was “satisfied” with the country’s foreign policy and “intransigent in the matter regarding territorial cessation” (Grad, 1998: 20). As it was surrounded by hostile countries, such as the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria, countries with an equivocal position, Yugoslavia, or on the edge of resistance, Poland, Romania could not afford any type of action which would endanger its neutrality (Arhire, 2015: 82). That is why the Romanian diplomacy has supported projects which intended to establish a “block of neutral states” or a “Balkan block,” the purpose thus being pursued being a double one: on the one hand, the government in Bucharest wanted to convince Germany of the earnestness of its neutrality and, on the other hand, it was necessary to institute a barrier against the Soviet threat (Arhire, 2015: 85; Buzatu, 2003: 61-68).

Throughout the entire period – September 1939 – June 1940 – Romania’s foreign policy continued to pursue the preservation of a balance between the two main threats to its security: Germany and the Soviet Union. However, at a time when Hitler’s Germany was securing victories on the European fronts, the revisionist countries’ demands from Romania were becoming ever more overt, being encouraged and supported by Berlin, Rome and Moscow: in August 1939, Hungary obtained Germany’s approval to reject Romania’s proposal for the conclusion of a Romanian-Hungarian non-aggression pact; in January 1940 Italian-Hungarian talks were under way in Rome, during which Italy promised to support Hungarian claims on Romania;
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simultaneously, Molotov declared to a Hungarian diplomat in Moscow that the USSR considered the Hungarian claims on Romania were well-founded (Vlad, 2014: 159). Referring to the Hungarian-Italian talks, Romania’s minister plenipotentiary in London, V.V. Tilea emphasised the following: “I learnt from a very good source that during the meeting in Venice, Mr. Csàky began by asking Count Ciano to agree that Hungary together with Germany should launch an attack against us in the spring and that Count Ciano was forced to insist in order to convince him to abandon revisionist demands for the moment” (AMAE, fond 71/Anglia, vol. 8, f. 316). However, in the spring of 1940 there were “rumours” – as the military attaché in Rome considered them – “of an imminent occupation of the island of Corfu, which then is planned to extent to a wide-scope Italian-German and later German-Russian-Italian action with succeeding phases: the occupation of Greece; German-Hungarian-Italian action for the occupation and the division of Yugoslavia; a blockade of the Mediterranean and cessation of all Franco-English communication in this sea; German-Hungarian-Russian action to occupy Romania, simultaneous with a large scale Italian action in the Balkans and the Mediterranean” (Duțu, Nicolescu, Oșca, Nicolescu, 2002: 196).

However, Germany and Italy remained interested in maintaining peace in the Balkans, which determined Hungarian leaders to foreshare, until a more proper time, the accomplishment of their aggressive plans aimed at Romania. At that time people thought that diplomats could negotiate and reach an understanding to the benefit of European states. “As far as the East-European region is concerned – emphasised Radu Florescu, counsellor with the Romanian Legation in London – the situation of our country, together with that of our neighbours, was sketched for me by the Turkish ambassador here [Great Britain]. He refers to the old predilection of our politics to feel related to our smaller neighbours, some of them in the vicinity of great powers and he renews the recommendation that together we should form “a coherent block” which would help eliminate frictions inconsequential for the survival of nations (AMAE, fond 71/Anglia, vol. 8, ff. 329-330; Cîrstea, 2017: 21).

However, following the May-June 1940 campaign on the Western front, which led to France, Belgium and the Netherlands being put out of action, the Romanian leading circles’ hopes of success – through a policy of neutrality – in keeping out of the conflict and defending their territorial integrity against the threats posed by the eastern, western and southern neighbours ultimately collapsed (Simion, 1996: 149). Carol II spared no effort in gaining Hitler’s support in a desperate attempt to avert the territorial claims made by Hungary and Bulgaria: on 1st July the Romanian government relinquished the Franco-British guarantees of April 1939; on 4th July King Carol enforced a pro-German cabinet headed by Ion Gigurtu; on 11th July Romania withdrew from the League of Nations (Calafeteanu, 2003: 325). As a result, Carol II requested that Germany guarantee the existing frontiers of Romania and send a military mission to Bucharest, to establish close cooperation between the armies of the two countries; but on 15th July 1940 Hitler’s answer stated that he could only evaluate these requests after the settlement of the problems regarding the borders with Hungary and Bulgaria.

The year 1940 was meant to spell disaster for the Europe established through the Peace of Versailles: France was collapsing; Great Britain was under siege; Poland had
been divided between Germany and the USSR; Czechoslovakia had disappeared; Albania had been occupied by Italy; Austria had been annexed by Germany; the Baltic states had dissolved in the vastness of the Soviet colossus; Finland was defeated; and Romania was halved. The triumph of the Entente in the Great War (1914-1918) had been overthrown and claimed by Germany and the Soviet Union (Bold, Ciupercă, 2010: 229).

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The documents written by the two Romanian diplomats – Viorel Virgil Tilea and Radu Florescu – representatives of the Royal Legation of Romania in London, refer to the international situation in the first half of 1940. They investigate the following:

- the way in which the United States perceived the war in Europe and the fear that “after the war – if it is to be a long one – the social structure of the entire world may become Bolshevik, communism being the only social danger for the United States;”

- the negotiations between England and Italy, “the English being confident [...] that Il Duce will be swayed by a massive commercial and financial aid;”

- the intercessions made by the USSR in the Near East, by initiating “unfriendly action against Turkey and Iran;”

- the position of Chamberlain’s Government, which depended on the evolution of the “military situation and the results it will be able to secure;”

- the international situation in the first half of 1940, when “the British accept the sacrifices of war,” relying on the strength of their empire, which “consists in its unrivalled wealth, the refined quality of its industrial equipment, the size of the war and trade fleet and its conviction that today the British Empire represents, overall, one of the highest constructions that maintain individual and social education.”

Appendix 1

Royal Legation of Romania, London 23rd February 1940

Dear Minister,

I have the honour of submitting the annexed report no. 144/confidential of 22nd February c.y. regarding the international situation seen from London.

Please, accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

signed Minister V.V. Tilea

To His Excellency, Mister Grigore Gafencu
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest

Top secret
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT
No. 144 of 22nd February 1940

1. Mr. Sumner Welles’ tour. The reasons which determined President Roosevelt to send his closest collaborator in matters of foreign policy to the belligerent countries are numerous:

a) The disagreement between the opinions of the American ambassadors to Rome, Paris and London over the international situation.
b) The conviction that this war is not a financial opportunity for the United States, as it was hoped at the beginning, because England and France are not willing to spend more for purchases from the United States than they did in peace time and, if they proceeded to purchasing weapons, they abandoned acquisitions of cotton, tobacco, etc completely.

c) The fear, mainly expressed by Mr. Cordell Hull, that after the war – if it is to be a long one – the social structure of the entire world may become Bolshevik, communism being the only social danger for the United States.

d) The cultivation of a spirit of humanitarianism which must, nevertheless, be applied according to the real purpose of the mission, namely an internal policy concern, in order to prepare the path to a third presidential election.

The English official circles are rather bored with this trip and although they do not show it openly, in private conversations, nevertheless, they candidly say they understand the internal policy necessity for this visit, but they will not allow themselves to be drawn into peace treaties which would not guarantee a future peace according to the Anglo-French principles and aspirations.

What matters most is the signal given to the press from the Foreign Office, when the visit was announced, saying that Mr. Sumner Welles may expect a warm welcome as the President’s representative and shall receive all necessary information to allow the President to form a clear opinion about the situation in Europe. Mr. Cordell Hull’s announcement that peace talks commenced with certain parties that are still neutral has been regarded with interest.

The British and French governments explained clearly and abundantly the conditions under which they consider the end of the hostilities. They also showed the principles for which they fight “which, it is their conviction, are as dear to the American people as they are for the European democracies who took up arms to defend them.”

While this attitude refers to the present situation, as regards the future, both public and official opinion in England, and also France, as far as I am informed, are in favour of the theses that this is a European war and peace must be reached by the European states, consequently without the participation of the United States.

In support of this opinion comes the conclusive speech given on 14th February by Sir Edward Grigg, parliamentary undersecretary with the Minister of Information, who showed that the European Security Edifice (the League of Nations) was based on American participation and, if it failed, it is to be blamed on the withdrawal of this country, therefore this time European security must be built on European foundations.

I tried to find information about Mr. Welles’ personality from a close acquaintance of his and I discovered that he began his political career by unscrupulously defending American interests in Cuba, that he spoke unfavourably in public against England and France, and especially against the Munich Agreement and that in his soul he is a steadfast anti-Nazi. He passes for a well-balanced, reserved person and, for all the reasons mentioned above, American public opinion considers he lacks any pronounced bias against any one of the belligerent countries.

2. Finland. Today the press has published information about the war materiel which has already reached Finland, but nothing was said of the approximately 15000 Anglo-French volunteers who are on their way or the divisions being readied for dispatch. They are a Polish, a French and a Canadian division.

What is certain is that today the Anglo-French have adopted the Daladier point of view, meaning that they cannot allow the fall of Finland, since what is at stake is not only their prestige, but also a possibly determining factor in winning the present war. Therefore, I am convinced that what I have previously reported will be accomplished and in spring we shall see an Anglo-French expeditionary corps, fight alongside the Finns, even as volunteers.
The greatest difficulty is the attitude maintained by Sweden, who yielded under German threats and only allows the volunteers to pass in small clusters. That is the reason why supplying and transporting the volunteers will be done through Petsamo, as soon as it is possible.

3. Italy. What England aims in its economic and financial talks with Italy is to help this country with materials which can only be obtained from the British Empire and in this coal is of vital importance for the Italian industries, but only in return for a decrease in the transport of raw materials to Germany and in return for massive deliveries of armament for the allies. Everything has stopped at Il Duce, who is now apparently angry with the Anglo-French and is waiting to see the events that are unfolding in Finland or a potentially favourable moment to launch a peace proposal.

However, the English are calm and confident that eventually Il Duce’s collaborators and Italy’s needs will prevail and he will be swayed by a massive commercial and financial aid.

4. The Balkan Conference. At the beginning of the Balkan Conference, the English officials were sceptical and even doubtful not only of the result of the Conference, but also of the purpose pursued by the Balkan Conference. This feeling was strengthened by Hungary’s attempt (the Exchange Telegraph channel) to torpedo on the eve of the Conference meeting (of this and my counter action, I reported by telegraph).

Yet, following the arrival of all the reports from the Balkan states a belief was formed that the result of this conference is extremely satisfactory, the goals and principles whose achievement it pursued were not only understood, but also completely supported and it is hoped a first step was made towards assembling a Balkan Block. The result of the conference is attributed to Mr. Saracoğlu and Mr. Gafencu first and foremost, while information about Mr. Markovici’s attitude shows that he was, in fact, the only one who tried to hinder the success of the Conference.

5. Hungary. I learnt from a very good source that during the meeting in Venice, Mr. Csáky began by asking Count Ciano to agree that Hungary together with Germany should launch an attack against us in the spring and that Count Ciano was forced to insist in order to convince him to abandon revisionist demands for the moment. Indeed, the accuracy of this information is proven by the fury of the Hungarian press following the Balkan conference, and also by certain actions we were able to ascertain from the correspondent of an important newspaper in London, who, as a neutral citizen, was allowed to travel for several weeks in Germany and Hungary. Having just returned from Budapest, he told me he had spent more time with the Telekis (the Prime Minister) and the Csákys and had ample opportunity to speak to the two Hungarian leaders – and found in both of them a firm decision to raise the matter of the frontier revision in its entirety, which equals to the reannexation of the Ardeal region as soon as possible. The same gentleman, who bears a historic name, was entrusted by the British Legation in Budapest to wander through Subcarpathian Ruthenia and report on what he saw there. From what he told me, he met numerous young propagandists who were waiting for an improvement in the weather to enable them to cross into Romania covertly in order to stir irredentist feeling and possible acts of sabotage among the Hungarian minority.

Count Sigray, leader of the legitimists in Hungary, was in London last week. He predicted the return of the Habsburgs to the throne of Hungary, Austria and the Independent States of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia, and the information Your Excellency has sent – that Regent Horty had entrusted Sigray with a secret mission for Otto de Habsburg, to assure him that he was preparing his path – was confirmed by Sir George Franckenstein, former minister of Austria for 18 years here, in London and today one of the Austrian legitimists.

As far as I was able to ascertain, the Habsburgs’ action was irrevocably repudiated by official circles, both here and in Paris, which does not mean, however, that they do not have isolated and rather influent supporters – although maybe less so in England.
I add that all English centres are flooded with Hungarian propagandists, journalists, politicians and business men, all supporting similar ideas which emphasise the need for Hungarian revisionism and predicting everything, from the return to the frontiers of the Kingdom of Saint Stephen, to the autonomy of Transylvania, with a large range of intermediate solution.

I believe this is not only propaganda, but also exploratory action to see which idea is more acceptable to the Anglo-French public opinion.

It is useless to say that this Legation is following the Hungarian propaganda with the utmost attention and is rebutting it at every step, but I believe we will have to go on the offensive to avoid losing ground. I will relay a short memo on this matter in a few days as well.

6. The Czechs and the Poles. Despite all the attempts made by certain friends to ensure cooperation between Messrs. Beneš and Hodža, this prospect did not bring the expected results.

Mr. Beneš established the Czech National Committee without any prominent Slovak, while recently Mr. Hodža established in Paris the Czech National Council, to include Slovak autonomists. Mr. Beneš refused to discuss Slovakia’s future status as demanded by Mr. Hodža and the result is that today the two parties are on the verge of making a spectacle of themselves, sending censorious reports on each other to the English and the French officials.

The Poles are not faring any better. The removal of the collaborators of the former regime by the Sikorsky government (today President Mościcki’s son and his wife are virtually starving in London and are looking for any job, even as a driver or hired help) has created a powerful counteraction. Sikorsky and Benes seem to have agreed to support each other in the next peace conference, to secure the 1938 frontiers. A possible block made up of Poland, Bohemia and Slovakia is already under consideration.

At this point I insist on explaining an incident I had, which might have become rather unpleasant with certain Polish circles. There is now a magazine called Free Europe in London, supported by the Polish government and, through an English friend, I had found that the next issue was to include an article by a Hungarian in favour of ceding Transylvania and another article in favour of ceding Dobrogea.

I asked Mr. Dimăncescu to immediately meet the director of the magazine, who had an almost impudent answer, saying we have no right to interfere in his editorial policy and that he believed it was better to allow the interested circles the opportunity to examine the matter in his magazine, mentioning he will put the columns of this magazine at our disposal to argue the case with the authors of the revisionist articles.

I decided to call Ambassador Racinski on the telephone, and I asked him to stop the publication of the two articles, saying that I considered “the situation rather bizarre that Romanian territory should be claimed by a Hungarian and a Bulgarian in a Polish magazine.” He understood the situation and promised he would satisfy my demand. That remains to be seen and I will report whether he has kept his word.

You must be aware of information which can prove extremely valuable and which comes from the best Czechoslovakian source, that Germany has ordered from the Military Geographic Institute in Prague General Staff maps of Hungary and Transylvania, which were to be delivered on 15th March this year, and at the beginning of February it was ordered that they should be ready by the 15th of the current month.

7. Yugoslavia. On the mission of Meštrović’s close friend, Mr. Ćurčin, the director of the Nova Europa magazine in Belgrade and a friend of Dr. Macek’s and the result of this visit made at the request of Prince Regent Paul, accompanied by Mr. Pavle Ostrovich, I will report in detail in a few days, as today I need one more document.

8. Bulgaria. Official English circles expressed their conviction – after hesitating for a few days – that the change of the Kioseivanov government does not imply a change in the foreign
policy of our neighbour. However, there are certain circles within the Ministry of Information which claim that this change may be explained through German-Russian pressure, as they did not look favourably upon an agreement between the Balkan states.

My Bulgarian colleague said he had predicted this change, because Kioseivanov did not have a secure position in Parliament and he further predicts he will be appointed minister in Paris or London.

9. Action in the Near East. Today there is union of opinion, even among the Labourists, that Germany and the USSR form one single enemy, therefore the most vulnerable spot is searched for, where this adversary can be defeated; and the political and official world agrees that the partner in the East is easier to reach.

I do not want to disclose certain secrets, not even in these lines, but I can say that serious action in the Caucasus is closely studied and even planned.

This can be seen in what almost the entire press publishes here in capital letters, and in the suggestions made yesterday by the Foreign Office speaker, who said:

a) The USSR has initiated reprisals and oppression against the peoples in the Caucasus. (It is for the first time in 20 years that this subject reappears in the English press.)

b) The USSR has begun to manifest feelings and has initiated unfriendly action against Turkey and Iran.

c) The law allowing the Turkish government exceptional powers is inspired and motivated by the above mentioned facts.

Additional confirmation is the conclusion – last week – of an agreement with Iran, who is given credit for the purchase of weapons from England. I do not know the details of this agreement, as it is still being kept secret.

10. Anglo-French cooperation. What is of prime importance today, both for the development and the result of the war, and also for the future of Europe and of the whole world is a reinforcement of the cooperation between England and France. The British and the French Empires are today working towards a permanent economic and also military agreement between the two nations, which shall be the foundation of a larger European community after the end of this war.

I believe that I will shortly find interesting details and I will prepare a special report.

11. The domestic situation in England. The Chamberlain government has had and still has to face strong criticism over the organisation of the Ministries as well as the establishment of a Ministry of Economic Affairs.

Increasing criticism is voiced in the press as well, such as an editorial in the Times on 22nd February, which points at the need to have, even in times of war, not only yes-men in Parliament, but people who can truly provide constructive criticism and exert effective control over the Government.

However, all this criticism does not endanger the position of the Chamberlain government for the time being. Its position will depend on the evolution of the military situation and the results it will be able to secure.

What is very significant is the result of the partial elections of 11th February in Southwark, when only 24½% of voters participated in the elections. And from these votes, the pacifist candidate who participated under the slogan “stop the war” obtained barely 1%, which means 1550 votes.

Equally conclusive is the result of yesterday’s election in Silverton, where the Labour candidate obtained 14,343 votes, the communist (pacifist) 966, and the fascist (also pacifist) 151 votes. Overall, 3000 fewer votes that the votes expressed in 1935.

AMAE, fond 71/Anglia, vol. 8, ff. 311-322.
Minister Manoilescu,

At the moment when I take over the responsibility of running this Legation, in the incumbent’s absence, the European international policy as seen from here is on the verge of collapse which, as it happened so many times, may be the eve of a rebirth.

Catastrophic destructive forces have flattened enduring material barriers and secular human structures. Mechanic ingenuity and industrialism in its most acute form are taking revenge against those who failed to secure their natural and moral establishment.

Patriarchal peoples, still untouched by the vision of mechanics and machines are being dragged into the universal vortex.

Against this unprecedented catastrophe, material shelters are inefficacious as long as the political and legal ones lack any foundation.

At such times we may evaluate the international situation either according to material criteria, or moral criteria. Organisational forces, wherever we may find them, lead us to suspect that they match the evaluation criterion we formulate upon material things with the moral criterion. The power of the British Empire, which is undeniable, can be ascertained in these organisational forces. It can also be ascertained in the acquiescence with which the British accept the sacrifices imposed by war and the obstinacy of refusing to stand aside. Of course, its power also lies in its unrivalled wealth, the refined quality of its industrial equipment, the size of the war and trade fleet and its conviction that today the British Empire represents, overall, one of the highest constructions that maintain individual and social education.

Social conscience, in its Anglo-Saxon shape, is so familiar to the consciousness of each man, that the public here in its entirety considers it impossible for the world to change in a revolutionary manner. Revolutionary forces, as far as they may exist here, may lead to changes in leadership and methods, without producing, however, a deep social change or an upheaval.

The British Empire can grow poor, lose territories, relocate its headquarters or change its leadership, without any negative consequence on its beliefs and on the man-to-man rapport throughout the nation. The empire is in fact a very homogenous construction by virtue of race and education and at the same time a totalitarian corporation endowed with financial power.

The British construction has only one weakness: it is too extended in space – which can prove a strength – but is devoid of population in relation to the space, if we do not include the Indies, which have merely a superficial British character.

Given the well-known configuration of the Empire, in the present war conditions, ever since the continental assistance provided by the French army was lost, it can only fight with its traditional weapons: its islandness, the expanse of the seas, the strength of its navy and air force. The moral and commercial support provided by the United States also comes to its aid. These defensive war factors helped by the obstacle of the sea are believed to be able to transform the war England is fighting into a latent state whose solution is left to destiny.

Attempting to anticipate the path of destiny, the future plans which are being made here at the present moment are the following:

A broader social policy at a domestic level. It came to my notice that today workers specialised in aircraft construction are among the best paid people. They receive payment as high as an engineer or a high-ranking functionary in the same factory. However, this social justice does not preclude the respect due to private property, whether productive or non-productive, irrespective of whether property above a certain value is over-taxed, so that a privilege is turned into a burden.
It seems that capitalist financial mechanisms can be joined with the most severe social reform while the right to property, in spite of being maintained, becomes purely nominal and takes on the character of a function attending on the individual and the community. It seems therefore that in practice, in a country which very well equipped technically, financially and in its banking, it is possible to move from the acutest capitalism to the fullest socialism or even vice versa, without any upheaval.

The statutory rigorousness of the English society with its distinct external forms does not seem to differ that much from that of any other totalitarian state, nor does the physical education of its youth.

The social policy of the current government, falling deeper and deeper under the control of the Labour Party, is so dedicated to reform, that many claim it does not even desire the hostilities to cease until it has accomplished all the planned changes. It is a welcome opportunity for such accomplishment.

The conservatory elements of the last two decades are disappearing every day, banished by a generation which introduces a simpler and tougher life. Overall education does not suffer as a result. The transformation of the nation is amazing and is done without reluctance and without great persistence. This change is probably facilitated by the British character which is tolerant, loyal, but suspicious and vindictive when need be.

At a foreign level British policy has found its recipe for the moment in the defensive war associated with the naval action taken to prevent provisioning to the European countries which are currently under Anglo-Italian control. Britain hopes that this recipe will give rise to internal difficulties in those regions before Britain herself experiences the effects and difficulties of the German blockade. They are still bearable here. When such difficulties have appeared in the opposite camp, they trust their enemies’ point of view will be forced to converge to their own point of view.

It follows from advertisements and conversations that the German-English war is attrition warfare. The benefit of the final compromise will be harvested in peacetime when international commerce is revived. In the same train of thought, England may become the carrier of Europe for the next generations and thus restore her impoverished finances.

The English are only interested in the configuration of the European continent itself to the extent it matters for their own security or maybe out of a special predilection for a certain ethnical group. In case of a predilection for an ethnical group, I have noticed, among many groups here, an inclination for the German people and the northern races, considered similar by the Anglo-Saxon mentality.

From conversations with members of Parliament, business men or intellectuals, I have understood that England does not desire a serious weakening of Germany. It is an important fact that a nation is needed in Europe to balance Russia so that it does not become an overwhelming power.

From what I have heard, I also infer that without foreseeing the military and naval resolution of the war, English politics foresee the possibility of concluding a peace that would comprise the elements of a federative European balance, based on a constitution or several democratic constitutions.

The Swiss or the American models or that of any other federative construction would meet an approbatory echo among the public here.

The war issue is therefore becoming a matter of reorganisation, not one of conquest or frontier adjustment. People here realise very well that, given the extent of the destruction and dissolution, reconstruction can only occur by taking into account the true forces of reorganisation.
In a group of people who did not know each other, someone was asked what kind of strange war this was and they answered, “It is not a strange war, it is the completion of a revolution.”

It remains that this revolution, which removes customs barriers, to reorganise Europe on new bases.

In the absence of any possibility to foresee the turn of war, the active organisational forces with available energy are now mainly Great Britain with its financial system and Germany with its largely continental system and thus the salvation of Europe and culture on this land can only come from their association.

If we dare make a prophecy, the phases of the war will only be stages in achieving this ultimate goal.

As far as it concerns Eastern Europe and our country’s position, together with that of our neighbours, it was sketched for me by the Turkish ambassador here. Since I do not have the honour of being acquainted with Your Excellency’s point of view, I considered it would be interesting to communicate to the Ministry the conversation I had with Mr. Rüştü Aras, in my dispatch today. He refers to the old predilection of our politics to feel related to our smaller neighbours, some of them in the vicinity of great powers and he renews the recommendation that together we should form a coherent block which would help eliminate frictions inconsequential for the survival of nations.

It seems that on a theoretical level such a block could be organised to include all the Danube countries from Bratislava to the Aegean Sea, in which case our geographical position would be privileged, as we could form a node of passage between central Europe and the free seas, to the south. Such a block would have a guaranteed political existence, if neither Russia, nor Germany or Italy exhibited any intentions of exclusive hegemony towards this area and as a result we would separate them in the same way Switzerland separates France from Italy and Germany.

Since through the present war Germany has succeeded in securing access to the seas in the West, its interest in the East might develop towards cultivating peaceful commercial connections.

On these lines, instead of limiting the German economic lebensraum in a geographical direction with no opening, we have the possibility of extending it, connecting Central Europe and the Near East, for the benefit of our own nationality.

A few months ago I gave a conference with the same topic, whose text I shall dispatch to Your Excellency. I expounded the same theory, thus my convictions have not changed.

Please, accept, Your Excellency, assurances of my highest consideration,
Chargé d’Affaires
Radu Florescu

To His Excellency, Minister Mihail Manoilescu,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest

AMAE, fond 71/Anglia, vol. 8, ff. 325-330.

References


STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES OF ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BODIES IN TRANSNISTRIA (1941-1944) (BASED ON SSA SSU)

Vasyl Ilnytskyi*, Mykola Haliv**

Abstract

The article aims to elucidate the unknown aspect – the establishment, development and investigation of Soviet special services Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies acting in Bucovyna governorate, Transnistria (1941-1944). Due to newly discovered, recently secret materials of Branch State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine in Bukovyna governorate and Transnistria it was managed to establish the functioning of an inspectorate of safety (“Inspectorul de siguranță”), a police department (“Chestura Poliției/ Direcția poliției”), a Direcția Jandarmeriei (“Inspectoratul Jandarmeriei”), the Military Security Division of the Romanian Army (“ Siguranța”). On the basis of these documents administrative-territorial, internal organizational structure of Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence bodies were reconstructed, the main principles of operation and activities were highlighted. At the same time, it can be stated that Romanian law enforcement agencies carried out effective, coordinated (despite the fact that quite often the functions of these bodies were duplicated) intelligence and counterintelligence work on the territory of Bukovyna governorate and Transnistria.

Key words: USSR, Romania, SSI, gendarmerie, police

Introduction

The problem of the study of the history of special services of the USSR and other countries is marked by its multi-vector nature. This problem always attracted and will attract the attention of researchers and especially ordinary readers by its secrecy. The functioning of Romanian intelligence, counterintelligence services in Bukovyna governorate and Transnistria (1941-1944) remains poorly understood. The newly found documents of Soviet repressive-punitive bodies, which reveal the peculiarities of the structure, personnel, directions and forms of organization of the work of Romanian special bodies, shed the light on this problem significantly. It is on the basis of unknown and little known documents we consider it expedient to cover this issue.

Analysis of recent research and publications

A number of books and articles are dedicated to the question of the functioning of Soviet repressive-punitive bodies. In particular, some aspects of the functioning of Soviet state security organs during World War II were studied by V. Bykhov (Bykhov), 2000, D. Viedienieiev (Viedienieiev, 2011; Viedienieiev, 2014). The investigation of the

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issue of the operative-search activity of Soviet repressive-punitive bodies, various forms of the use of the agent-information apparatus was covered in the works of O. Bozhko (Bozhko, 2001), A. Chaikovskyi (Chaikovskyi, 2013), A. Ivankov (Ivankov, 2010), D. Viedenieiev & O. Lysenko (Viedenieiev, Lysenko, 2010; Viedenieiev, Lysenko, 2012), D. Vedeneyev (Viedenieiev, 2005) T. Vronksa & S. Liaskovska (Vronska, Liaskovska, 2013). Operational-search activity of former Ukrainian nationalists who were on the territory of Romanian People’s Republic were investigated by V. Ilnytskyi & V. Telvak (Ilnytskyi, Telvak, 2018), V. Ilnytskyi & M. Haliv (Ilnytskyi, Haliv, 2019). However, the practical development of the structure and personnel of Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence bodies in Transnistria and Bukovyna governorate by Soviet law-enforcement agencies has not found a comprehensive study in the historiography.

The Statement of the Basic Material

During World War II in Bucovyna governorate, Transnistria (Ukrainian lands between the Dniester and the Southern Bug, which cover the southern regions of Vinnytsia, western parts of Mykolaiv and Odesa regions and left-bank areas of the Moldavian SSR), and areas of movement of Romanian troops – Zaporizhia region, the areas in Crimea and Donbas where the centers of Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies were located, in particular: Inspectorate of Security (“Inspectoratul de siguranță”), the Police Department (“Chestura Poliției/ Direcția poliției”), the Gendarmerie Office (“Inspectoratul Jandarmeriei”), Romanian Intelligence Division 8th Infantry Division – Military Security Division (“Siguranța”) (Sectoral State Archive of Security Service of Ukraine (SSA SSU), fund 1, case 255, p. 72-73; f. 11, c. 370, volume 2, p. 36).

The military authority in Transnistria was exercised by the headquarters of the commander of the Romanian troops stationed in Odesa (Pushkinska St., 25). It was headed first by General Petre Dumitrescu, then by General Gheorghe Avramescu, and then by General Trincu. The Transnistria Civil Governance Department was set up in civil administration, initially located in Tiraspol and then in Odesa. The governor was subordinated to the commander of Romanian troops and practically put into effect all his orders. At the headquarters of Romanian army commander, there was a 2-department (bureau) in Transnistria, which headed all intelligence and counterintelligence work. The head of department 2 was Colonel P. Vasiliiu. The staff of Romanian Army Headquarters department 2 was formed with Romanian officers (who were fluent in Russian), as well as Bassarabians. The commander of the Romanian troops was subordinated to the praetor of the military command, Colonel M. Nikulescu. The military gendarmerie was subordinated to 2 division of the Romanian Army Headquarters (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 1-2).

“Serviciul Special de Informații” (SSI)

The main Romanian body conducting intelligence and counterintelligence activities against the Soviet Union during World War II was Main Directorate of “Special Information Service of the Council of Ministers of Romania” (hereinafter – SSI) (“Serviciul Special de Informații (SSI), Director-General – Eugen Cristescu (SSA
On the occupied territory, the so-called Transnistria and Northern Bukovyna, there were established three centers that were directly subordinate to the SSI Headquarters in Bucharest: 1. Center-1, in Chernivtsi, covered Northern Bukovyna with its activities. Until 1942 the head was Lieutenant Colonel Leon Pergu; 2. Center-2, in Kysyniv, worked in Moldova. The head of the Center – Major Balanescu; 3. Center-3 in Odesa. (Udelyni alley, 7), served the whole territory of Transnistria. Up to 1943 was headed by captain Nyshchanu (Neshtianu), and then Colonel Leon Pergu. Center-3 consisted of two divisions: a) intelligence, headed by Major Ion Kurerau and his deputy Captain M. Galushkin-Argyr, counter-intelligence by Dr. Putychu. The department selected and recruited agency to send to the rear of the Soviet troops; b) counterintelligence, supervised the groups that conducted counterintelligence work in the city and an external intelligence group (established in 1943, the head – Shyt). The head of the department – Dimitriade-Jikushor, his assistant – Drumes; c) the secretariat of the center, which in addition to performing the functions of the secretariat itself, kept records of the agency and the persons being developed. In addition, Center-3 in Transnistria had two sub-centers – in Tiraspol (the head – Major Philemon), in Mohyliv-Podilskyi (the head – Captain Zarian) and in towns, residencies that were subordinate or directly to Center-3 (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 68-69, 147-148, 188; f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 21, 32). The heads of such residencies were SSI officers. In Transnistria, residencies were established in each district center. Among these residencies, the Soviet security forces established several.

SSI residency in Goltiansk district (Pervomaisk), headed by Captain Mitulescu, his deputy – Bodrov (arrested) (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 71, 191; f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 33). According to other sources (certificate “On the Structure and Activity of the Romanian Intelligence and Counterintelligence Body SSI June 1947), this residence was headed by Anatoliy Nemoyanu, and his deputy was Viacheslav Bradu (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 189; f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 33). Until 1942, Baltic District (Balta) the residence was headed by A. Nemoyanu and then by Brado (Badko, Badeo). The head of the residence in Ananievskyi district (Ananiev) was Captain Dragomyr, and since 1943 Captain Zagadko (Zagalko). In Ochakiv district (Ochakiv city), the entire period of the occupation by SSI resident was locotenent Jean Handel. Until 1942, in Berezovskyi district (Berezivka), V. Popescu worked as a resident, and from 1942 to 1943 – locotenent Tilvan.

All these residences did their work under the guise of various technical and business offices (using various signboards). For example, in Balta the SSI residence operated under the sign of the technical office “Cancelaria Tehnică” (“Chancellor of the Technician”). The head of the residence, Anatoliy Nemoyanu, recommended himself as a senior engineer, and his deputy – Viacheslav Bradu (Badko, Badeo) – an engineer. The residence consisted of 4 persons: a head of the residence, his deputy, a radio operator and a driver of a car. At the disposal of the residence was a radio transceiver, which was installed in the attic of the premises where the residence of Anatoliy Nemoyanu was located (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 71, 189; f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 33). In Goltiansk district, the staff of the residency also encrypted their activities under the guise of engineers of various specialties. The head of the residence, Captain Mitulescu and other staff members, worked in the gendarmerie’s premises, while
Mitulescu also had his office in police prefecture where he recruited and received agency. The residence had a radio station whose radio operator was sublocotenent Brado (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 72, 190; f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 34).

In addition to these residencies that existed in district centers of Odesa region, in Odesa there were groups that served individual objects and cities. These groups were led by SSI officials, subordinate to the center. A detachment of locotenent Tivan's group (arrested) was assigned the sector that covered the catacombs of Odesa and the Great Fountain area. The duties of the group included exposing underground Soviet organizations and groups, identifying those hiding in the catacombs and settlements, identifying entrances and exits to the city's catacombs. Tilvan's group immured or undermined the entrances and exits to the catacombs, in order to destroy those members of underground groups that were hiding. In his subordinate Tilvan had two employees: Victor Teryzohlu and Boris Dzheorzhesku (Kyrylov). This group had a wide network of agents and informants. Fotia Spyro's (arrested) group service sector was the Opera House area of the city, adjacent to the theatre and around port and suburbs of the city Peresyp (intermediate railway station of Odesa railway). Fotia had agency in the Opera House and in the serviced areas of the city. He used the Labor Department to select agents and informants. Alexander Sherstiuk's group (Alexandrov), (arrested) served the port of Odesa, where they had a wide network of agents and informants. Parumbescu-Khachikov's group served the working districts of the city – Moldavanka and Slobidka. They used a wide network of agents from various sections of the population, massively using residential, administrative and janitorial staff. In 1943, Parumbescu was transferred to the SSI Investigative department, where he worked as an investigator and Parumbescu’s group ceased operations. Moldavanka and Slobidka, which he served, were transferred under the care of locotenent I. Drumes (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 70, 190-191; f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 22, 34). It was his group that in 1941 was created to develop guerrillas and underground groups. On March 20, 1944, upon the retreat of Romanian troops and after the departure of SSI Center-3 from Odesa, I. Drumes headed an operational group to close the existing cases, transfer some of them, together with the arrested, German counterintelligence agencies. In the same period, I. Drumes was involved in recruiting and leaving an agency to settle in the rear of the Soviet Union. During recruitment, agents were given significant sums of money and agreed the ways to transfer intelligence (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 74, 149-151, 188, 191, 194; f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 24, 34).

In Odesa, in Bebel st., 12 was housed the Bureau of Investigation SSI – Judicial Bureau (“Biroul juridic”). In operational terms, it was subordinate to SSI Center-3 and, at the same time, to the Administrative Bureau of SSI General Office. The head of Judicial Bureau initially was locotenent Dumitrescu, from March 1942 – Captain Sivulescu, and from September 1943 – prosecutor Ion Vladutsa. The chief investigator of Judicial Bureau was Hariton, who effectively oversaw all the work of SSI Investigative department.

“Serviciul Special de Informații” had its prison located in Bebel st., 13. SSI personnel wore military uniforms and periodically civilian clothes. There were no signage on the premises, and therefore the name SSI remained unknown to the locals.
“Serviciul Special de Informații” had separate groups that carried out agency work and inquiries on particularly important cases. In Romania, authorities allocated some SSI employees to work among Soviet citizens who were evacuated and those who lived in the cities of Romania. In particular, they recruited agency from among the evacuated Soviet citizens to send them to the USSR for work in the post-war period (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 192; f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 23, 35-36).

With the beginning of World War II Romanian intelligence closely cooperated with the German one. Verified agency was also sent to set up spy and sabotage residences on the territory of the USSR and re-establish contacts with the former agents who remained in Bessarabia and Bukovyna to coordinate its activities. Security officials noted that Romanian intelligence in conducting espionage work against the USSR until 1940 had a close relationship with English, French, and Polish intelligence. Particularly noteworthy there were strong contacts with the English body Secret Intelligence Service, which had its representatives in Bucharest: Horald Gibson, his assistants – Victor Bogomolets and Dmitryi Rostovskyi, who gave Romanians considerable money for intelligence actions (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 146). In addition, English intelligence not only enjoyed Romanian intelligence capabilities, but also widely practiced the recruitment of Romanian intelligence officials (there were 5 Secret Intelligence Service agents in Odesa SSI who provided the materials to English intelligence) (SSA SSU, f. 1, c. 256, p. 9). Romanian intelligence provided comprehensive assistance to British agency, supplying it with the necessary documents and provided opportunities for crossing the border into the USSR. In particular, according to the testimony of an arrested official of the Romanian intelligence agency, Mykola Galushkin (October 30, 1953), the security forces established that he had carried out active espionage work against the Soviet Union in conjunction with English, French and Polish intelligence for a long time. Via specially created checkpoints, he sent a spy agency to the territory of the USSR to collect spy evidence (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 371, p. 311). During the German-Soviet War, as an assistant of the Chief of the Odesa Center SSI No. 3, he carried out repression against Soviet citizens, and at the time of the escape of the Nazi invaders, recruited agency to leave it in the rear of the Soviet Army (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 371, p. 312-313).

The main tasks in the work of SSI bodies in the war period were: a) the acquisition and transfer of agents through the front line, for activities in the rear of the Soviet troops; b) counterintelligence work among the population, the emergence and liquidation of underground parties and komsomol organizations, guerrilla units, and residencies and agencies left by the Soviet intelligence agencies (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 52). The tactics of combating guerrilla movement and party underground were repeatedly changed by the SSI during the occupation period. In this regard, the structure of the SSI apparatus was restructured (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 192; f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 23, 35-36). During the first period of occupation, there was an intense struggle not only against identified or unknown underground organizations, but also against individuals suspected of conducting anti-Romanian agitation and propaganda against the occupiers, as well as communists who did not register. In the second period (late 1942), the SSI was tasked with combating underground organizations and
groups that had organized and developed certain anti-communist elements suspected of carrying out anti-Romanian work. At the same time, individuals suspected of anti-Romanian and anti-communist activities were taken on a card account, and their development began after receiving information about their ties with underground organizations and groups. The urgent task was to combat organized groups of Soviet underground members, not individuals suspected of anti-Romanian work. It was taken into account that this or that person had to make an attempt to contact with the underground organizations. That is why, prior to the receipt of materials about the relations of these persons with the underground – their development was not considered a priority. According to the existing orders of the occupation administration, all communists and komsomol residents who remained on the occupied territory were required to be registered in the bodies of sigurantsa. The registered communists were recorded in a special accounting book, which noted all the data, signs, fingerprints and the pictures were stickled on the page, the registration marks were made. In addition to the entry in the books, each of the registrants had a special case, which contained: a detailed questionnaire with photos and fingerprints, a leaflet about the turnout for registration and other documents related to the check of the registered. Similar cases were brought against the defectors, former servicemen who returned from captivity, and to all persons who arrived on the territory of Transnistria and other regions of the USSR. In cases of this category of persons, in addition to profiles, autobiographies and other documents stored subscription and guarantee of those, who guaranteed the reliability of the Romanian administration for registered (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 107v-108).

The fight against underground organizations was carried out, first of all, by examining the cases of each suspect individually, identifying and developing the relations of these persons with each other. For effective work, a file cabinet was created, its analysis and study was carried out. Only in the presence of data on the connection of individuals with other objects suspected of anti-communist activity, they began to be actively developed. For this goal, in 1943, SSI established an external oversight group to monitor individuals to identify their contacts with underground organizations and participants.

Since late 1942, the authorities carried SSI enhanced activities on the introduction of its agents in underground organizations and groups to provocations. Since then, SSI actively recruited identified members of underground organizations and groups and used them for counterintelligence purposes. Recruitment and use measures were carried out after careful preparation – a detainee was secretly detained, escorted in a car to SSI. After proper processing, they were recruited and released, tasked with developing existing organizational groups (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 194; f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 36). The tactics of Romanian counterintelligence work was not to touch the already known small organizations, while waiting to be established with the help of a large center.

Generally, to carry out the work to identify the guerrilla divisions, underground party and komsomol organizations left behind by the Soviet intelligence agencies, SSI officers created a mass agency apparatus. The agents were recruited out of the people dissatisfied with the Soviet government, anti-Soviet elements, especially from among
persons who were subjected to repression of the Soviet administration, former soldiers of the Soviet Army who were in military prison camps, officials created by the occupiers of various institutions, owners of restaurants, snack bars, photo studios, hairdressers, shops, kiosks, various workshops, traders, speculators, owners of private enterprises of workers of residential institutions, managers and janitors (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 53). Also the agents were from the participants of anti-Soviet organizations, which legally or illegally existed there during the occupation of the territory of Transnistria (“ROMU” (“Russian Overmilitary Union”), “PWUNG” (“People Working Union of a New Generation”), OUN (Organization of Ukrainian nationalists), the Moldovan community, etc.) (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 73).

After analyzing the information collected, security officials concluded that the main method of recruiting agents and especially informants was bribery: job placement, giving apartments, product supply, assistance in organizing trade, opening a variety of small-scale production, providing cash benefits (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 148). At the same time, in the agency and investigative work of the security guards, the methods of provocation and intimidation were widely used (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 53).

The source of the replenishment of the agent network was the persons on whom the compromised material was available. Physical exposure methods were used to interrogate them both for the purpose of obtaining candid evidences and for subsequent recruitment. SSI, in addition to the usual beatings, used “graceful” tortures – an “electric chair” and “aircraft” method (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 40).

SSI bodies used for counterintelligence purposes NKVD officers found on the occupied territory, and even after they received candid testimonies about their work in NKVD bodies, they were even involved in SSI work. Among such employees of SSI were Morozovskiy, Fedorovych and Molukalo, who handed the left in the rear of the residences Molodtsov-Badaev, Kuznetsov and others to Romanian counterintelligence. SSI bodies widely practiced re-recruiting of the members of guerrilla divisions and underground party organizations to use them in provocative work as a part of underground organizations. For example, SSI bodies recruited a former secretary of the underground Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Petrovskyi, a secretary of the underground RK CP(b)U of Odesa, Platov and Karachevtsev (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 72, 190, 195).

Bodies of SSI were in contact with other intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, sharing Romanian (police and siguranta) and German (gestapo “Abvershtelle of the South of Ukraine”, “AO-3”, “CD” and other) structures, the received materials about the activities of underground organizations, guerrilla divisions and their members in SSI (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 74, 149-151, 188, 194; f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 24). In addition, there was a representative of the department of General Staff of the Romanian troops, “Deleh Stat Major”. It was first led by Captain Paunescu, then Major Batezatu (arrested). The cooperation of these bodies took place at the level of transfer of detected Soviet paratroopers from SSI to “Deleh Stat Major” (the residence was located in Remisynnya st., 42). At the same time, this body, in parallel with and independently of SSI, was engaged in the detection and detention of Soviet intelligence agencies, guerrillas and underground organizations, carried out
counterintelligence activities to identify the enemy’s agency, with the purpose of recruiting, intercepting communication channels, etc.

“Vulturul”

To conduct intelligence work on the Eastern front and counterintelligence work in the areas of activity of the Romanian troops, a special department of the post front-line agency (“the first echelon of the agency”) was created called “Vulturul” (“Eagle”). This body was directly subordinated to SSI General Directorate in Bucharest. It consisted of analytical, agency-intelligence departments and a radio group. “Vulturul” advancing along the front accordingly stationed in Odesa, Mykolaiv, Mariupol, Taganrog, Simferopol, on the territories of Moldova and the North Caucasus. A head of Mykolaiv subcenter of “Vulturul” major Carlan, lived in the apartment Sevastopolska str., 7, where he received local residents (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 152-153). In addition, Soviet security officials found the secret apartments of “Vulturul” in Mykolaiv: Sevastopolska st., 9, Moscowska st., 57, Potemkinska st., 4, Spas’ka st., 13, Moscowska st., 42. “Vulturul” was headed by colonel of Romanian Army Vasile Palius-Ionescu, a deputy – colonel of the Romanian Army Ionovych, Staff Officer (associated with the POW camp) (SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 154), former military colonel of tsar army Olexiy Pavlov, a major of the Romanian army, Ion Kureraru, a lieutenant of the Romanian army, Victor Dobrosihtskiy (engaged in counterintelligence, recruited agency, took part in the arrests, served as a resident of the German counterintelligence agency “Abwershtelle of the South of Ukraine”) (SSA SSU, SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 155-155v; f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 151).

The employees of this department were engaged in collecting intelligence data on the units of the Soviet Army, by interrogating prisoners of war, directly in the foreground or detained in camps, defectors, conducted counterintelligence work in the rear of the capture of Soviet agents, found out the anti-Romanian elements. During the interrogation, agency was selected and recruited and, after preparing individually or in short-term courses, was thrown across the front line with intelligence tasks. Of particular importance was a specially created women’s network which was selected from among beautiful women – waitresses, shop-assistants, housewives and artists, actresses and other categories who took prominent position in society. In 1944, the agency was recruited by “Vulturul” to continue its activities in the rear of the Soviet troops. Setting the task – to conduct intelligence task, worked out the options for the transfer of collected materials, the agency was provided with considerable cash, documents to encrypt their activities (SSA SSU, SSA SSU, f. 2, c. 1632, p. 74, 149-151, 188, 194; f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 24). The Soviet security officers found a certain feature in Mykolaiv, having established that a group of agents – girls who were located in private apartments arrived there together with officials “Vulturul”. They were kept in a military unit under the guise of which “Vulturul” operated, but they did not appear in the premises, systematically visited places where people gathered – cinemas, theatres, market places (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 151).
**Direcția poliției**

Alongside the counterintelligence agencies that were subordinated to the 2 department of headquarters of the Romanian troops and the praetor of the military command, there was a police prefecture in Transnistria (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 4). It was a subordinate to the Transnistria governor’s civilian department and reported directly to the Directorate-General of Police at the Romanian Ministry of Internal Affairs, bypassing Romania’s Main Security Office. A prefect of Transnistria Police until August 1943 was a gendarmerie colonel Iulian Popovici, and from August–Mytrik, deputies: the operative part – Georgescu (a former lawyer) and administrative – Dr. Krehun. Police Prefecture existed in every district center, where ensured public order and struggle against political criminals. The prefecture had up to 35 employees. Among them: a chief (a chief of police prefecture), 4-5 commissioners, 20 agents (staff position), 5-8 assistant commissioners. The police’s task also included accounting and registration of the population, control of the operation of vehicles and the mobilization of funds. The prefecture of the police was divided into several departments or sections: 1. the section “zhudychar” (criminal), whose task was to conduct agential and search work on criminal elements; 2. section administrative – financed the police apparatus and resolved administrative issues (in addition, this section performed functions for requisition and accounting of means and transport in the population); 3. transport section (bureau of circulation) – supervised the motor transport and its operation; 4. section of procedures – performed the functions of handing out summonses for the export of people to the police and to the judicial authorities; 5. section of the city (team) – worked on the supervision of public order: owned a staff of townspeople who built their work in the neighborhoods; 6. section of authorization – was in charge of registration of all trade and commercial enterprises of individuals (issued a permit for opening of enterprises). In this case, all businessmen when receiving permits (or authorizations) were necessarily accepted by a chief of the police (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 94). All positions in the prefecture of the police were held exclusively by Romanians, and as an exception to the lower posts were allowed local residents, mainly Moldovans. In the periphery, mainly in cities and large town centers, the police prefecture had offices or commissariats, with a staff of up to 10-15 people. Transnistria Governorate Prefecture administered the District Police Prefectures (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 106).

Sigurantsa (secret police) was the Transnistria governorate police department, while operationally reporting to the Directorate-General of sigurantsa at the Romanian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Sigurantsa did a major job of identifying, developing and arresting all those who carried out anti-Romanian, revolutionary communist activities, and collected evidence about the political moods of the population. Only the sigurantsa was investigating political crimes. Like the prefecture of the police, the sigurantsa had so-called commissariats on the periphery, moreover, in the largest villages the sigurantsa consisted of sections with a staff of up to 10 people and a bureau with a staff of 5-7 people. The district security office had up to 15 employees in the state, who were assigned to the following positions: a chief of sigurantsa, 3 assistant commissioners, 10 agents. Sigurantsa included a network of agents – informants and secret agents. The informant agents represented a mass...
information network. Secret agents, as the most valuable, qualified agents, were recruited on compromising materials, from the members of anti-Romanian underground, pro-Soviet groups and organizations, as well as among the relatives of those repressed for anti-Romanian activity (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 94v).

The activity of the sigurantsa in Transnistria was led by Chief Commissioners: Radulescu (October – December 1941); Rezvan (January – June 1942), Nikulescu (June 1942 – April 1944) (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 38). The chiefs of the sigurantsa in Odesa – until April 1942 – Stavrat, then – Rezvan (Doctor of Law), in April – September 1943 Stefan Iwashko (a lawyer), and from September 1943 until April 10, 1944 – Octav Nikulescu (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 5). They all held the rank of commissioners. Assistants to a Chief of the sigurantsa at different times were: Geogryi Kardashev, Georgyi Drogash, Ion Kodra and Fundel. The Bureau of sigurantsa of Odesa Police Prefecture supervised the work of the Bureau of sigurantsa in the police districts. The chief of the bureau of sigurantsa was the deputy chief of the police district (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 6).

In Chernivtsi region, “the Inspectorate Security Center” (“Inspectoratul de Securitate”) was located in Chernivtsi (Decebal Street, 2, in the premises where regional UNDB worked in 1940-1941). It was headed by Colonel Romuluss Kozhukaru (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 2). “The Security Inspectorate” was the center of the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of Romanians on the occupied territory. The security officials noted that despite the fact that “the Security Inspectorate” was a part of Bukovyna Governorate’s Office for the rights of the department, in fact, it played a leading role in the system of all Romanian counterintelligence bodies operating in Chernivtsi region, influencing their work in Chernivtsi region and used them to carry out its activities. The Soviet security officers established that it consisted of departments / divisions, was built on a linear principle (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 3).

In the periphery, in particular, in the cities, as well as in large villages where there were district police or gendarmerie offices, there were “Security Committees” with a staff of 3-4 persons (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 3). In other settlements, “the Security Inspectorate” carried out its tasks through lower police offices and gendarmerie. According to indicative data, up to 100 operatives were employed directly in “Security Inspectorate”. The practical tasks of “Security Inspectorate” and its peripheral bodies included identifying: the political moods of all population groups in Bukovyna governorate; political and nationalist anti-Romanian residents, cease their activities; the agency, mainly the Soviet intelligence agencies and other states. In particular, in Kitsman “Security Commissariat”, Soviet security forces found the so-called “Information Plan for 1943 on the German Question”, which was essentially an instructive and programmatic document for the counterintelligence work of Romanian “Security Inspectorate” among German population (the plan itself consisted of 12 points) (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 4). “Security Inspectorate” carried out active agency, operative and investigative work, recruited agents both for work in Northern Bukovyna and for transfer to the Soviet territory occupied by the German army, conducted extensive counterintelligence work among Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish populations, provided arrests of anti-Romanian population, carried out the
cases of detainees (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 5). Along with counterintelligence, “Security Inspectorate” was engaged in identifying political moods and tendencies among the population of different nationalities, including Romanian, and carried out information and preventive work.

With the consent of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, sigurantsa in Transnistria selected informant agents (the post of an employee who had no special training) from the local residents who, after a special check, were enrolled in the staff (were paid from the budget of the governorate). Moreover, the remuneration of the informant agent was determined by his qualification and knowledge of languages. For example, with knowledge of Romanian and German, agents received a 30% premium on basic pay. The state agents were received weapon, certificates to carry it. (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 39).

The agents of sigurantsa worked mainly with a network of informants, as well as conducting searches, arrests, searches of persons, participated in interrogations of detainees. In addition, agents engaged in the “processing” of recruited persons. All the operational staff and investigators who carried out the agency work had in connection with the most valuable agency recruited for specific cases and lines of work (OUN, POVS, Poles, guerrillas). In the undergraduate work, it practiced making the network on a national basis, while using national committees of Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Moldavians.

City district offices built their grid mainly quarterly, bringing it into residences. Most of the managers, janitors, canteen workers were informants of sigurantsa, and house managers were personally responsible for timely information about the appearance of suspicious persons and the behavior of residents in the house. For example, all janitors received written instructions to detain communists, guerrillas, etc. (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 40).

While recruiting “Security Inspectorate” widely used provocation and intimidation. For example, in order to achieve its goal, “Security Inspectorate” arrested or detained people, charged them, in many cases, not justified or fabricated with the help of its agent, and then acted as a savior and with the consent of helping Romanian authorities, released the arrested person from custody. In the majority of cases the workers of “Security Inspectorate” took large bribes from recruited agents. Thus, the fact of recruitment was masked for the population, and the very agents told that they managed to free themselves due to a large sum of money, given to a lawyer or an employee of sigurantsa.

The recruitment of the agency by “Security Inspectorate” was made by subscription and assignment of the recruited alias. The main base for the recruitment of “Security Inspectorate”, as well as other Romanian counterintelligence agencies, was an anti-Soviet part of the local population: traders, merchants, business owners, and persons subjected to repression by the Soviet authorities in 1940-1941 (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 7-8).

The recruitment of agents was carried out in conspiratorial apartments and in the premises of sigurantsa only on the basis of compelling materials and confessions (a wife of a communist, a commander of the Red Army, a komsomol), most of the recruited were inclined to cooperate by providing them with financial assistance and
arranging for a well-paid job (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 41). Mostly informants were recruited directly by the staff of sigurantsa, and in some cases by residents. Meetings with the agents were carried out in the streets, restaurants, at the agent's office, in the premises of various establishments and in secret apartments (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 42).

The secret apartments were selected by the staff of sigurantsa, and after they were declared as fit, the residents were relocated. The apartment was occupied by a security officer under the guise of a civilian. The situation was similar with the houses – before occupying a house by SSI, the residents were warned that a military unit would take the house, so it had to be released. After taking the appropriate actions – telephone setup, furnishing, a group of SSI employees (5-6 people) (except service personnel consisting of Romanian soldiers) started to work. In Odesa, Soviet security officers found out 11 such houses (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 38). For conspiracy work, such apartments /houses (according to the evidences of the arrested employees) were serviced, furnished, created the look of residential. They often hosted parties, balls, etc. By 18.00 the servants were released and from 18.00 to 22.00 operational work was conducted. Employees who worked at a secret apartment came to it in civil clothes (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 1, p. 39).

However, there were drawbacks in their conspiracy. Thus, from the evidences of an arrested agent of sigurantsa Zombely, the Soviet security officers noted that when he visited a secret apartment he met in the corridor with the persons leaving. There were the cases when the agents received their residents and agents not in a secret apartments, but at their place of residence (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 43).

Instead, the residents received their agents mainly at the place of service. Particularly important was the remuneration of an agent. Money is released in the process of doing the development (for organization spending) and after closing the case (bonus). For each detected “criminal” agent was awarded a prize of 60 to 100 marks (one mark was equal to 10 Soviet rubles). Besides it was practiced to handout grocery cards and products. For example, only one of the city residences, which included 23 informants, at the end of 1943, it was given: 46 kg of sugar, 23 kg of candy, 12 kg of biscuit, 215 kg of flour, 23 kg of pasta, 46 kg of butter, 12 litres of spirits, 23 litres of vodka, 23 litres of liquor, 4600 cigarettes and 15 m³ of wood etc. (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 44).

In accordance with the administrative division of Transnistria, sigurantsa had departments in the district prefectures in Odesa, Tiraspol, Mohilev, Yampol, Tulchin, Ribnytsa, Dubossary, Golt, Berezivka, Ochakov, Ovidiopol, Balta, Ananiev (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 37). The sigurantsa at Odesa Prefecture of the police had: The Bureau of Information, which dealt with the agency work, had a number of residencies in Odesa and an investigative team that led the investigation into the cases of persons arrested by sigurantsa bodies. In Odesa, security officers found out 7 residencies of information bureaus, which had a mass information grid from various sections of the population. At each district police department there was a sigurantsa office, which carried out work directly under the direction of the sigurantsa department of Odesa Prefecture of Police (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 106v).
District Police Office and sigurantsa bureau built their net of agents mainly on a quarterly principle, reducing it to resedentures (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 107).

At the Office of sigurantsa of Prefecture of the Odesa Police there was a special intelligence team that led the investigation of important group cases. Initially, it was located Pushkinska st., 24, then Sofievskaya st., 11, later moved to Slobidka and was at the police station. The last location of the brigade – Perekopska peremoga st. (security officials suggested that frequent changes in its location were due to the cases in police areas). Commissioner Ivashko (prior to his appointment was a chief of sigurantsa), was a chef of the special intelligence team and his deputy – Vasil Georgiou. “Serviciul Special de Informații” spread impact on the work of sigurantsa. Particularly important cases sigurantsa transferred for further reference in “Serviciul Special de Informații” (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 6).

In the city and rural district direcția poliției, a bureau of sigurantsa was operating consisting of a commissioner, two of his assistants (one of whom was working on foreigners) and several agents. The peripheral bureau and the departments of sigurantsa in their work were subordinate to Transnistria sigurantsa and promptly used the local police and gendarmerie apparatus. In spite of the presence in the district departments of the bureau, the district departments of sigurantsa practiced conducting operational work in a village directly by employees of the department, who went to places under the guise of agricultural commanders, school inspectors, etc. These employees recruited and received agents in conspiratorial apartments that were run by them. The staff of sigurantsa, beginning with an agent (the initial position of the employee who received special training) to a chief inclusive were appointed by the Romanian Ministry of the Internal Affairs from Bucharest (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 38).

During the occupation of Chernivtsi region, a police department (“Chestura Poliției/ Direcția poliției”) of Bukovyna governorate (located Decebal st., 2) was stationed and operated simultaneously with “Security Inspectorate” in Chernivtsi. The regional police department had six police stations in Chernivtsi, in districts of the city and on the periphery district police departments. Within the regional police department there were departments: criminal investigation and passport (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 15). The functions of the police included: the protection of public order in cities, the protection of governmental institutions (Bukovyna governorate, military court and other most important institutions, including arrested and imprisoned); the struggle against criminals. In addition, police agencies, in conjunction with “Security Inspectorate”, were also engaged in counterintelligence work to identify political anti-Romanian elements.

The police authorities acted in a similar manner to “Security Inspectorate”, carrying out both agency and investigative work. In agency work, police agencies used simpler and less secretive forms and methods of work, such as: conducting recruiting work in office place; systematic conduct of meetings with the agent in the office area; involvement of its agent in the execution of the functions of police officers: participation in raids, searches, etc. These simplifications, of course, did not concern the entire agency, but only the inferior ones.
According to estimates, up to 100 employees were employed in the police department. There were 4 to 6 in districts departments and 5 to 8 in police stations. This number did not include watch staff, security, ordinary police, junior support staff. The activities of peripheral police bodies were under the complete control of “Security Inspectorate” (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 16). Soviet security officials found that police officers in Northern Bukovyna worked: chiefs of police department of Bukovyna governorate (until mid-1942) Olexandr Glogozhanu and Karl Aksman (from mid-1942 to March 1944), a secretary of police administration commissioner Jacoban, a head of the department that dealt with foreigners Emelian Boku, a head of the certification department of police Barbu Stonescu, an assistant of police commissioner, a rail transport supervisor Besplynyi, a police commissioner, a polish issue curator Petrasheascu, a commandant of police department Ionescu, a chief of the 2 police division of Chernivtsi Ionescu, a commissioner of police Kasnak, a commissioner of police Rokash, an assistant chief of Police Ioan Cristescu, a police commissioner Victor Concia, a police secretary Anna-Alma Schmidt, a chief of police of Sadgirsk district Georgyi Berenchanu, a deputy chief of police of Sadgirsk district Bocharskyi, a commandant of police of Sadgirsk district Tkachuk, an investigator of police of Sadgirsk district Bertel, a chief of police of Vashkivsk district Georgyi Filimon, a police chief of Storozhynets district Isar, a deputy chief of police of Storozhynets district, a commissioner, a chief of police of Hertsaiwskyi district Filimon Dardy, an assistant chief of police of Hertsaiwskyi district Georgyi Krutik, a secretary of Hertsaiwskyi district police Ivan Krutyn, a commander of Hertsaiwskyi district police Ivan Sandulyk. Soviet security officers found out and arrested 23 ordinary police officers and the police chief of a Jewish camp (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 17-19).

**Gendarmerie**

The gendarmerie was subordinated directly to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was an executive body for carrying out punitive measures related to the mass use of the armed forces, such as: suppression of uprisings, mass protests, escorting and protection of the arrested, for the protection of important industrial sites, premises of local authorities, bringing sentences in performance, etc. In addition, it conducted search and agent work to identify and arrest communists, Soviet-collective farm assets, Soviet guerrillas, paratroopers, and other anti-Romanian elements. Gendarmerie did not conduct an independent investigation and handed over the political prisoners to sigurantsa. Each gendarmerie post had a large number of secret agencies and so-called informant agents (agents recruited by gendarmerie bodies were usually tasked with identifying communists, Soviet assets, Ukrainian and Polish nationalists, etc.). The district gendarmerie had a brigade of 120 gendarmes. On the periphery, the district gendarmerie consisted of 8-10 sections with a staff of up to 15 people under the direction of a section chief. In its turn, these sections were combined into several (10-20) gendarmes posts (consisted of a chief of the post, his assistant, and 8-10 gendarmes). Gendarmerie posts were located in each locality. During the inspectorate of a military gendarmerie, as well as in the district praetors of the gendarmerie, there were premises for the arrested. Gendarmerie district crews used the premises of police districts. When inspecting a military gendarmerie, there were also gendarme legions.
created on the principle of military units. There were gendarmerie schools in gendarmerie districts, with up to 60 students exclusively Romanian and Moldovan (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 3, 95).

For example, at each police department in Odesa (inspectorate of military gendarmerie was located Derybasivska Street, 12), as well as in district centers, gendarmerie crews were established to manage the gendarme legions, to carry out field work and to perform special tasks of the government. Along with gendarme brigades, in each district center there were gendarme legions created on the principle of military units. A chief of a brigade and legion was a gendarme officer, usually in the rank of captain or major, with several junior officers in charge of his assignment. A chief of the brigade supervised the gendarme sections available at the district centers, and a chief of the section supervised the work of gendarme posts at the village governments.

Gendarmerie ordinary staff – 3-year conscript soldiers with 2 years spent in a regiment or legion and only 3rd year serving in gendarmerie posts, the number of which was determined by a chief, depending on the territory, population and importance of the point (proximity to the border, the presence of guerrillas, etc.) (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 48-49).

The gendarmerie inspectorate (Inspectoratul de Jandarmerie) of Bukovyna governorate located in Chernivtsi (Ștefan cel Mare Street, 9). Gendarmerie Colonel headed this body I.T. Petruk (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 19). “Gendarmerie Inspectorate” was subordinated to the General Gendarmerie Office in Bucharest, which was a part of Romanian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Structurally, a gendarmerie consisted of general, regional, district departments, subdistrict departments, gendarmerie divisions, points (posts). Gendarmerie sub-district offices were located in the largest districts of Chernivtsi region in each major settlement – a gendarmerie post, which depended on the size and significance of settlements. In other small settlements periodically there were 1-2 ordinary gendarmes. For example, there were 5 gendarmerie posts in Glubotsk district, with 35 employees, of whom 21 were ordinary gendarmes; in Sadgirsk district there were 11 gendarmerie posts with a staff of about 60 employees; in Hertsaiv district – 2 gendarmerie posts with 13 employees; there were 5 gendarmerie posts in the Storozhynets district; in Vashkiv district there was a subdivision gendarmerie department and 8 gendarmerie posts, each with 6 to 12 official employees (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 20).

The daily practical work of Romanian gendarmerie authorities was in close contact with the activities of the police and “Security Inspectorate” under the control of the latter. The dependence of the gendarmerie apparatus on the bodies of “Security Inspectorate” was particularly evident in the structure of the lower peripheral organs. Gendarme posts located in the countryside were subordinated to gendarme sub-district department. The latter was headed by a gendarme chief. But, as a rule, all work of gendarmerie posts and district office was coordinated by a commissioner of “Security Inspectorate”, who was in such subdistrict department (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 21). All events were reported by a gendarme post to the nearest gendarmerie office and at the same time to a gendarmerie district office: special events by telegraph, telephone, courier and all in writing. A district gendarmerie, in its turn, submitted reports: about all the events to a prosecutor and prefect of the district, at the same
time to a district police department; special events – a regional gendarmerie and gendarmerie headquarters – daily; about the events related to the guerrilla actions – to a chief of the local garrison; about the events related to national defense and national security, when the involvement of the armed forces was necessary – a command of a division. On similar issues, a regional gendarmerie department reported accordingly to a regional police department, to a command on the matters that required the intervention of the armed forces, and about all important events – gendarmerie headquarters with the results of the first investigative measures. The latter, in their turn, reported daily to the Directorate General of Police, the Ministry of the Interior, and about the events related to national defense and national security – at the same time as the aforementioned bodies – to the General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces.

It should be noted that in the countryside, only gendarmerie carried out repressive measures against Romanian opponents, while in the cities these functions were performed by the police and “Security Inspectorate”. The working methods of the gendarmerie bodies were similar to those of the police. They conducted both agent and investigative work. Subdistrict offices and gendarme posts were not involved in the investigation. They, as well as the district gendarmerie offices, were confined only to the pre-screening of detainees, who were then transferred to “Security Inspectorate”, the criminal police or the military commandant, respectively (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 22).

The practical work of chiefs of gendarme brigades and posts was built according to the following algorithm. In the case a political perpetrator being discovered, a chief of the post reported to the team and after the arrival of an officer of sigitantana or an officer of the gendarme team – handed over the case. Heads of posts conducted operational work, recruited agents, in most cases bringing them to residencies on a territorial basis – a resident for each village administration. In the recruitment process, the village government and police officers were widely used, recruiting them as residents (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 50). Thus, in July 1944, Soviet enforcement agencies in Odesa region liquidated the gendarmerie residences in the villages of Kohanovka and Shymkovo of Troitsk district, in the village of Belyaevka, Belyaevka district, in the village of Suha Balka, Mostovskyi district, in the village Kryve Ozero of Kryvoohersk district. Four residents, 12 informants were arrested and identified at these residences. As the result of the residence of the village of Kohanivka, 30 people were repressed by the gendarmerie. According to the residence of Shimkovo village, a guerrilla group (15 people) of Novoselovka village was liquidated. Party underground was exposed by the resident of Belyaevka village – 20 people were repressed. The partisan department was exposed by the residence of Suha Balka village – 30 people were repressed (SSA SSU, f. 11, c. 370, v. 2, p. 50-51).

The conclusions

Consequently, with the completion of World War II the Soviet security organs’ work did not diminish. First and foremost goal was to clarify the structure, staff of Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence bodies, identify their agents. The task was to clear from the Romanian secret service, primarily the southern regions of
Ukraine, which during the occupation were a part of “Transnistria” (Odesa, Mykolaiv, Izmail, Vinnytsia and a part of Kherson region) and Bukovyna governorate, find out all official employees of Romanian law enforcement agencies, to search and arrest all persons who worked and cooperated with the Romanian administration in Ukraine. Soviet power authorities worried not only because of past cooperation of these people with special Romanian authorities during the Second World War, but the potential opportunity of their use by intelligence agencies of Britain, France and others.

Due to newly discovered, recently secret materials of Branch State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine in Bukovyna governorate and Transnistria it was managed to establish the functioning of an inspectorate of safety (“Inspectorul de siguranță”), a police department (“Chestura Poliției/ Direcția poliției”), a Direcția Jandarmeriei (“Inspectoratul Jandarmeriei”), the Military Security Division of the Romanian Army (“Siguranță”). On the basis of these documents administrative-territorial, internal organizational structure of Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence bodies were reconstructed, the main principles of operation and activities were highlighted. At the same time, it can be stated that Romanian law enforcement agencies carried out effective, coordinated (despite the fact that quite often the functions of these bodies were duplicated) intelligence and counterintelligence work on the territory of Bukovyna governorate and Transnistria.

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HISTORY OF GERMAN DIASPORA IN KAZAKHSTAN (XIX-XXI)


Abstract

This scientific research paper informs the history and destiny of German Diaspora in Kazakhstan. For example, the paper considers the data about Germans' settlement in the territory of Kazakhstan, their placement and participation in the work, and the deportation of Germans to Kazakhstan in 1941 during the Soviet Union, their placement in the regions, because of difficult historical background in the XIX century during the Russian Empire, their deportation to Kazakhstan because of collapse of Volga Autonomy, their labour in the development of the republic’s industry and the development of the virgin lands, and later the Germans’ rights to the labour during the 1950s and details of their migration to Germany. Moreover, the paper demonstrates, the existence of the German Diaspora in the Republic of Kazakhstan in the XXI century, their activities for the development of the republic establishment, foundation and functioning of the Republican Association of Germans “Revival”, their political stability and interethnic harmony with the people of Kazakhstan, population, location and ethnicity in the country and the activities of well-known celebrities.

Key words: German autonomy, migration, immigration, deportation, repression, rehabilitation

Introduction

Representatives of the German nationality came to Kazakhstan on several waves of migration in the XIX-XX centuries. The first wave was realized during the reign of the Russian Empire. The second one the German Autonomy during the Soviet Union on the Volga coast was abolished and the Germans were deported to Kazakhstan. In the Soviet Union, representatives of different nationalities persecuted in Kazakhstan as a result of various campaigns and formed a multinational population. The migration movement was directly linked to the policy of the Soviet state. There were many ethnic groups, social groups, and people of all aging nations. Almost all of them were
harassed by the totalitarian regime and their legal conditions were damaged (Khamzin et al., 2016a: 835-841; Khamzin et al., 2016b: 5237-5249).

The relocation of people that have to migrate began to be taken into control. The places where they were evacuated were set up in strict accordance with the Government’s instructions and were subjected to strict control. In places of residence, it was very difficult to punish those who were unwilling to leave the place of their residence in opposition to the law. Persons who were detained by such acts were restricted to their freedom until 20 years. Also, severe penalties and measures have been applied to those who have left without parental care and those who helped them. It was decided to limit their freedom to at least 5 years.

Currently, the Germans live as citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan. They live in peace with representatives of other nationalities as one of the 140 ethnic groups in the country. The Germans are helping many citizens who have improved ties between Kazakhstan and Germany and who want to return to their homeland. For example, the Republican Association of Germans “Revival” has been working successfully.

In the ethnocultural center “Revival” in order to teach German children to the German language and traditions “Sunday schools” exist. In the Republic of Kazakhstan there are many German state figures such as Gerold Belger, who is known all over the world as a writer, the chairman of the Republican Association of Germans “Revival”, the state and public figure Alexander Dederer. In Kazakhstan, in the population census in 1897 there were – 2613, in 1989 – 957 518 and in 2015 – 181958 Germans.

Materials and Methods

In order to write the research paper, the data from the documents of the State Archives of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (AP RK), the National Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the State Archives of the North Kazakhstan Region (SANKR), the State Archives of Kostanay Region (SAKR) and the state Archive of the Socio-Political History of the Turkestan Region (SASPHTR) documents were used. Moreover, and the analysis of foreign and domestic research studies have been analyzed and references to them were made.

Theoretical, objective, historical comparative analysis and historical sequence methods were used mainly on the theory and methodology of scientific research. Each topic has its own research methodology. Clearly, the history of the German Diaspora living in Kazakhstan, which is a subject of research, has a connection with the history of international class states. It is crucial to write historic insights into the relationships and the future of the nations living in the world.

Theoretical and methodological view of the topic is of particular relevance to scientific literature and historical archive data on the history of the German Diaspora. For example, a historical and demographic study of the fate and history of the German Diaspora in the Republic of Kazakhstan as a subject of special research is required.

The authors V.D. Kurganskaya and V.Yu. Dunayev studied German Diaspora history in Kazakhstan in the direction of theory-methodology study based on sociological studies. Comparing the German Diaspora’s relative compatibility with
other ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, the Germans have shown that they live in the poly
ethnic society and they are respected by other ethnic groups, they are tolerant and
don't feel any defect (Kurganskaya & Dunayev, 2013: 63). It means that Germans are
one of the ethnicities forming part of the population of the republic.

Russian scientists P.I. Kosov and A.B. Berendeyeva divided into several
categories of migration in their work titled “Fundamentals of Demography”. In
particular, they wrote that in international migration, Diaspora, which resides in one
state and their return to their historical homeland is called “migration” (Kosov &
Brendeeva, 2010: 173-177). Uzbek scientist R.H. Murtazaeva said in her research on
interethnic relations: “In any multi-ethnic state there is a need to promote interethnic
cooperation to ensure interethnic accord and stability. Then, as a democratic state, it is
necessary to preserve the traditions of different ethnos representatives and to create
conditions for the protection of public order in connection with preservation of
public stability. Only on this case tolerance will be established and there will be peace
and stability among the Diasporas” (Murtazaeva, 2010: 3).

Representative of the German nationality, historian V. Kriger in his work “The
Rhine-Volga-Irtysh: from the History of Germans of Central Asia,” gave information
about the history and emigration of the German diaspora. He emphasized that there
are serious problems with the German diaspora moving from Kazakhstan to
Germany. For example, they say that Germans have some difficulties when they move
to their historical homeland in adopting the following situations: immigrants living at a
certain address, who received social assistance; participation in the German language
courses and learning the language; living in a special camp for study; housing, medical
care and re-training of qualifications to a new society (Kriger, 2006: 231-234). So, we
can observe that Kazakhstani people cannot adapt to Germany at once, and that they
go through such processes as diasporas.

Results and Discussion

Germans are one of the peoples of Europe. In the middle of the XVIII century
100 thousand Germans lived in Russia. Many of them settled in Saratov and Samara
provinces. In the 70s of the XIX century, pressure and restrictions on the German
population started. The first arrival of the Germans to Kazakhstan was in the XVIII
century as part of military units. Most of them were Germans from the Baltic land.
For example, in the territory of Kazakhstan Turkestan General Governor
K.P. Kauffman, Governor-General of Turgay region L.F. Ballusek, Dala General
Governor M.A. Taube served as representatives of German nationality. The Germans
were the initiators of studying the history, ethnography of the people in Kazakhstan.
There were also doctors, teachers, and engineers from German nationalities. They
were basically in border fortifications. For example, they settled in Omsk,
Petropavlovsk, Semipalatinsk, Ust-Kamenogorsk and other places. The kingdom of
the Russian Empire in the 1897 census identified 2613 Germans in Kazakhstan.

During the First World War and the February Revolution of 1917, the Germans
of Russia created the “Provisional Committee”. In 1918 they published the German
Autonomy on the Povolzhya. Then, in 1924, the German autonomous republic of the
Volga coast was established. The autonomous center was Engels (formerly Perovsk).
Among those living there were Germans – 67%, Russians – 21%, Ukrainians – 9%, and minorities – 3%. The Pavolzhya Germans established trade relations with Germany (Kabuldinov, 2007: 117-118). In 1941, by the instruction I.V. Stalin and L.P. Beria the Presidium of the Supreme of Soviet Union made a decision on the relocation of the Pavolzhya Germans. As a result of this decree, the German autonomy along the Volga River was destroyed and their lands were turned over to Saratov and Stalingrad regions (Aldazhumánov, 1998: 193). All those who were deported from the affected Germans in each of Kazakhstan’s provinces were 420,000 during the war.

Beria L.P. and Molotov V.M. came to Pavolzhya German autonomy, in July 1941, and made the conclusion to deport the whole population. The Germans, who lived in Crimea’s autonomy, were also deported. Some of them were deported in June 1941, together with Greeks, Armenians and Bulgarians. At the end of the year the number of deportees from this country was 62,000 (Bugái, 1991: 174). Stalin’s sentence as tragic events of history has continued. This was a clear indication that nationalism in the conditions of the totalitarian system did not comply with any law. As a result of this policy, the people of the 30s of XX century sought to consolidate their human resources and to increase their labour force for the sake of prosperity of industrial production and the development of industrial property (Buribayev & Khamzina, 2019: 110-124). The Soviets who deported peoples during the Soviet-German war in 1941, the totalitarian system gained a special “experience”. For example, on August 28, 1941, the Supreme of the Soviet Union issued a decree dissolving the Autonomous Republic of Germans living along the Pavolzhya River and deporting Germans there (Kozhakhánova, 2000: 14).

Starting from August 1941, the Germans in Pavolzhya have been driven to Siberia, Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In 1939 census data showed that there were 1427222 Germans in the Soviet Union, 700231 people in Russia, 8448 in Ukraine, 23113 in Azerbaijan, 8426 in Kyrgyzstan, 20527 in Georgia, 433 in Armenia, 92 thousand people in Kazakhstan. By the government plan to deport Germans it was announced as 4,000,000. The placement of soviet Germans was mainly carried out in 12 regions: Almaty, Akmola, Aktobe, East Kazakhstan, Zhambyl and North Kazakhstan. Thus, by the end of 1941, Germans in Kazakhstan had a population of 200,000 (Hasanayev, 1998: 30). Therefore, Germans moved to Kazakhstan by twist of fate.

On August 28, 1941, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme of the Soviet Union No. 21-160 “On the relocation of Germans from the Pavolzhya area” was issued. There are dozens, hundreds, and thousands of diversioned spies in the Germans who live in the Pavolzhya area, who have been charged with explosions in the Volga District by obtaining a mark from Hitler. Moreover, there were not any reports that there were spies and diversions from Germany, and residents were accused of hiding spies in the area from the Soviet government and the Soviet people. It was said that in the event of war, under the guise of sabotage, the Soviet government would need to carry out massive punishments, which would have an unusually mass character on the land of the Pavolzhya in accordance with the law. Therefore, the Presidium of the Supreme of the Soviet Union decided to assist the
Government in transferring German residents of Povolzhya to Novosibirsk, Omsk, the Altai Territory, Kazakhstan and other neighboring countries with the aim of preventing bloodshed (Bugai, 1991: 144-145).

Before the planned action by the Office of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it was instructed to inform the center of the total number of inhabitants of the Povolzhya region of German autonomy. Such information was given to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union. According to the MIA at that time, their number was 374225 and most of them were children and elderly people. On preliminary information the necessary measures have been taken. For this purpose: mobile teams, drivers and others have been prepared. According to Serov’s letter to Beria on 20 September 1941, 438280 Germans have been deported (AP RK. Fund-708. Series-5. File-143: 115).

In September 1941 the Germans were evacuated from Don, North Caucasus, Dagestan ASSR, Kalmyk, Kabardino-Balkar, North Ossetin and Chechen-Ingush ASSR. At the end of this year 99 900 Germans were deported from the Stavropol and Krasnodar regions to the east (AP RK. Fund-708. Series-5. File-53: 68-71). The persecution of Soviet Germans continued on 3 October 1941. This time, representatives of the German nationality were relocated to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, 47 thousand of them were resettled in 10 regions of Kazakhstan. By the end of 1941, the number of deported Germans reached 200,000. On November, 21 of that year, by Decree № 280 of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union, during two weeks 1677 families were evacuated from the Kuibyshev region, and from November 3 to November 10, 6,000 Germans were expelled from Kazakhstan from the Kalmykian ASSR (AP RK. Fund-708. Series-1. File-3: 111-113).

On October 28, 1941, it was reported that the operation of settling of the Germans from the Autonomous Republic was very successful. In fact, it took a long time and had many problems. They were allowed to carry only a few things with them. Therefore, most of the migrants were not ready, and they suffered material losses in the new situation. Many of them were unable to cope with the difficult situation and died in new settlements. Information on their large losses was provided by G. Wormsbekher that only one person from a large group survived.

According to the first plan of deportation of Germans in Kazakhstan, 32,000 Germans were deployed in EKR: 17,000 from Povolzhya, 3,000 from the Stalin Region of the Ukrainian SSR, 2,000 from the Armenian and Azerbaijan SSR, and 10,000 from the Krasnodar Territory. The deportation of the Germans to the regions was subject to changes in the deployment plan; however, all the information was not properly implemented. Germans evacuated from the Povolzhya are planned to be located in 7 districts of EKO. Kirov and Ulan – 2000, Buturma through Semey station – 500, Zhuryan – 2300, Bolshenanarim – 2200, Kurchum – 1500, Samar – 2000. By the end of 1941 28 thousand people moved to East Kazakhstan region. They came basically in two queues. In the middle of September, 15331 people came from the city of Stalingrad, the Stalingrad region and Astrakhan. The second wave was relocated from October 12 to November. 28029 Germans were evacuated to East Kazakhstan region.
At that time, Kazakhstan was not prepared to meet them properly, to settle in the regions and districts. There were no special cars to carry. People could not reach collective farms and state farms at evacuation stations, and they were very tired. After the resettlement operation, it was discovered that the majority of Germans were the district of Shemonaikha. There were 992 Germans in 230 families. At the end of October, 1941 in Zyryanovsky district – 2367 Germans settled. Meanwhile, more than 1,800 Germans were evacuated from the Stalingrad region in 542 families. There were 839 families and 2942 people in the Kurchum district. There is one issue. He was a member of some nationalities, depending on his family relationship were registered with the Germans. Among those Germans who moved to Kazakhstan were Ukrainians, Azerbaijans, Russians and other married couples (Kurmanova, 2005: 185-193).

From the North Caucasus to the east 198097 Germans were relocated, 6180 of them were placed in the Almaty region. Later, the number of Germans in that region was 9,000. In the East Kazakhstan region there were 22,195 Germans. In 1941 the chairman of North Kazakhstan regional executive committee V. Gruzintsev The GeorgIan government has informed the distribution of 79,000,000 Germans by districts. According to this data Aurttau 6000, Kokshetau 5000, Krasnoarmeyskiy 5000, Chkalovsky 6000, Kyzylyu 6000, Bulayev 7000, Halden 4000, Soviet 6000, Priishimsky – 6000, Leninsky – 4000, October – 6000, Presnovsky – 6000, Mamlyutsky – 4000, and Sokolovsky – 2000 people settled (SANKR. Fund-1189, Series-27, File-15: 26).

Having moved people have had many difficulties. For example, food, clothing, footwear, and housing were not comfortable. Pratia agencies, authorities, and local people have been helping them as far as feasible. The places where they were located were extremely difficult to deal with. They had no right to leave. For example, the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union “On the criminal liability for the escape of refugees from remote areas of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War” dated November 28, 1948, states: “During the Great Patriotic War the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union obliged to the districts set by the Kalmykia, the Germans, the Crimean Tatars as constantly living, they did not specify the duration of stay”. As it is indicated in the Order of the Ministry of State Security No. 00776 of October 25, 1951, the Council of the Soviet Union will remain forever in the place of residence as a result of the relocation of the High Council Presidium dated October 9, 1951, that German, Chechen, Kalmyk, Karachay, Turkish, Greek, and Crimean Tatars, as well as the exploitation of the offenders will remain open until completion of the construction and subsequently for other such works.

Officials have been dealing with the massacre of victims of Stalin massacre (terrorism) since 1953 737182 people were acquitted during that period. However, this process has been slow and the justification has been pursued solely on the basis of personal complaints of innocent victims and their relatives. During the totalitarian system, political repressions did not go through any republics, any separate people. The fate of individuals who had been subjected to violent repression in those years was only in the second half of the 50th. In March, 1953 the social and political situation that followed after Stalin’s death began to accuse Stalin’s self-denial and
massive justification of victims of political repression. At that time, the fate of mass displaced peoples also changed.

On July 5, 1954, the Central Committee of the Union decided to “abolish some restrictions on the legal status of the migrants” and on June 29, 1955, resolutions “On the promotion of massive propaganda among special migrants”. After receiving such restrictions 4149 people left Akmola region. That is, they were executed by the totalitarian regime of the Soviet system and under the strict control of the detainees’ return to their homelands, and they were driven in outer migration.

On December 13, 1955, Germans and their families were granted legal liberty. In the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union on 28 April 1956, Kalmyk, the Crimean Tatars, deported to a special settlement, abolished the legal restrictions imposed on Turks and their families. Similarly, on March 27, 1956, special decrees were passed on the removal of strict restrictions on the former Greek, Bulgarian, Armenian and their families. Only those who have been forced to flee their homes after having issued such legal force have freed their liberty. After that, attention was paid to the lives of those who were deported, and their living conditions began to improve. In 1955-1956, legitimate legal restrictions were lifted and representatives of the Chechen, Ingush, Balkar, Karachai, Kalmyk people returned to the former autonomous republics and regions had the opportunity to return to their historic habitats. However even those people were reluctant to restore their right to return to their historic homeland, it did not work out, and Germans, Crimean Tatars and the Turks were not allowed to leave.

On November 30, 1956, the Central Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan issued an order to take part in the implementation of the resolution issued on November 24 by the decision of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union. It also says that it is necessary to assist Kalmyk, Karachai, Balkar, Chechen and Ingush people to restore autonomy (Kozhahkanova, 2000: 13-18). That is why the fate and history of the migrated people were connected with the land of Kazakhstan. They have once seen cruel conditions, such as the cold of winter and the abusive sight of the hunger. Their generation, their descendants suffered a great deal of fate. Even at the time of the Khrushchev Scenario, the leaders of the Soviet Union, as well as the two-sided national policy of the totalitarian system. For example, if a number of people were permitted to return to their historical homeland, they would not allow the rest of the nations.

This situation was a grave mistake that the totalitarian system used to implement the national policy. But the ambitious spirit of the representatives of other nationalities, who came to the Kazakh land and lived in their second home, prevented them from falling. They were distinguished by their love. In the development of the country’s industry, they worked in all spheres. Thus, the people of the Soviet system were subjected to changes in the national composition of the demographic situation in Kazakhstan. At the same time, the demographic development process had its own place (AP RK. Fund-708. Series-31, File-1597: 15).

In 1991, the Republic of Kazakhstan began to form as a separate state after independence. There were also representatives of a number of Germans who worked for the development and formation of the republic. For example, in the South
Kazakhstan region in Shymkent on April 3, 1991 the center of “Revival” was established. The Center points out that the representatives of the national minorities should be educated in cultural and educational activities in their program and charter (SASPHTR. Fund-184, Series-9, File-59: 29-33). The chairman of Germans Association of the USSR H. Driller sent a letter President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev on the issues considered in the Republican center of the Germans “Revival”, which was held on August 17-18, 1991 in Almaty. They asked the President to support the cultural and enlightenment conditions of Germans living in Kazakhstan. As president, we know your right viewpoint in ethnicity policy, and we ask your permission to open cultural centers in the regions (AP RK. Fund-5-H, Series-1, File-1212: 8-9).

On November 24, 1992 in connection with the 1-st anniversary of Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan the Forum of the people of Kazakhstan was held. The President N.A. Nazarbayev and chairmen of ethnic and cultural centers of different nationalities gave a speech. The forum was about the unity and peace of the people of the republic (AP RK. Fund-5-H, Series-1, File-1390: 1-2). 347 people took part in the session of the center “Revival”, which was held in Shymkent in 1993 in South Kazakhstan region. There was a meeting to determine 20 candidates for the 3rd Congress of the Germans of the USSR. Following the results of the meeting, the chairman of the center “Revival” of the South Kazakhstan region V.A. Tsihler signed this paper (SASPHTR. Fund-184, Series-9, File-62: 11-12).

Looking at the documents stored in the archives of the Kostanay region, located in the northern part of Kazakhstan, in 1994, the chairman of the “German Council in Kazakhstan” A.F. Dederer sent a letter to the President of Republic of Kazakhstan on behalf of all the Germans in the Republic of Kazakhstan. In his letter he thanked the Germans for their support. Many Germans living in Kazakhstan say they want to go to Germany, and few among them want to move to Russia. In general, the Germans through the centers of “Revival” teach German language and carry out cultural and educational activities. In addition, the Government has requested permission from the German government for the opening of a German bank, which will cost $1.5 million for the opening of the German bank, and it will serve to solve the problems of the Germans in the future (SАKR. Fund-917, Series-3, File-30: 49-53).

In 1995, the editorial staff of the Deutsche Welle Zeitung newspaper wrote a letter to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev. The letter informed that the 30th anniversary of the newspaper will be celebrated. The newspaper also provides a series of articles on inter-ethnic relations and its contribution to the regulation of inter-ethnic relations (AP RK. Fund-5-H, Series 1, File-1908: 29-32). In connection with the preservation of inter-ethnic accord and stability in the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1995, Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (APK) was opened by Nazarbayev’s initiative and decree. This institution became an advisory body under the President of Kazakhstan. It is a unique body that does not have analogues in the world countries, combining 140 ethnic groups in the republic and trying to live in peace and harmony (Vishnichenko, 2016: 81).

In 1997, the center of representatives of the Germans “Revival” in Kostanai region reported that it has been 2 years since Germans were teaching and learning
German. The chairman of the regional center “Revival” V. Bader reported that in this area, 1200 people have been trained in language courses and the language is taught at schools (SAKR Fund-917, Series-1, File-22: 8). 216 courses were organized in Kostanay region in 1998. In addition, 3 Sunday schools were engaged in teaching German language and the youth club “Phoenix” worked on teaching German language and propagandizing traditions. Then there is a council of businessmen at this center. They have agreed to provide timely financial assistance and support (SAKR Fund-917, Series-3, File-71: 8-9).

According to information of Chairman of the Association of Germans “Revival”, who wrote to the Government of Kazakhstan in 2000 Germans are leaving Kazakhstan. 94% of them said they were ready to emigrate to Germany. The reason is that they have relatives and decided to go to Germany, for the future of their youth, a country with high living standards. 88% of people who left the country during 1994-1999 were Germans (NA RK. Fund-53, Series-1, File-40: 196-198). Herald Belger born in Povolzhya in 1934, was famous among Germans in Kazakhstan. When deporting Germans to Kazakhstan in 1941, he moved to North Kazakhstan with his family at the age of seven. He graduated from the Kazakh Philology Faculty of the Kazakh Pedagogical Institute in Almaty. In 1994 he was elected to the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR. Famous writer Gerold Belger became Kazakhstan’s laureate of Peace and Accord Award. Many of his works were published in Kazakhstan.

State and public figure of Kazakhstan Alexander Dederer served as Chairman of the Association of Public Associations of Germans “Revival”, established in Kazakhstan. He was first elected chairman of the public association “Revival” in Kostanai region, which was first established in 1989. Later, on November 28, 1992, at the 1st National Congress of Germans in Kazakhstan, he was elected as the Chairman of the Republican Council of the German Senate, due to his well-publicized public service. Then, in 1996, Alexander Dederer was elected as Chairman of the Association of German Public Associations in Kazakhstan (Muntaniol, 2009: 14-57; Levyk, 2012: 113-117).

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

There are 140 ethnos representatives in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Most of them are moved to Kazakhstan during the history and migration processes. The German diaspora also lives in the country with various ethnos representatives. They basically came in two stages. The first was during the reign of the Russian Empire during XIX century and the second was during the Soviet era deportation and virginity. The Germans, deported to the territory of Kazakhstan, were supported by the Kazakh people in difficult times. They let them live in their homes. Kazakhs also helped them with a shortage of food. Thus, they made it possible for them to survive. The Germans in Kazakhstan were involved in development of the state industry, virgin cultivation, working in farms, collective farms and state farms.

In the mid-1950s, after the German restrictions were lifted, they moved to Russia and Germany. But most of them stayed in Kazakhstan. Later in 1991, the Republic of Kazakhstan gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Most Germans started moving to Germany. They set up a German center “Revival” in
Kazakhstan, engaged in cultural and educational work. That is, the representatives of the German diaspora have come to terms with the future of the future Homeland to Germany. Nowadays there is a German diaspora living in Kazakhstan. But they still live, not 1 million, but 179 thousand people. Migration processes are still ongoing. The German diaspora living in the Republic of Kazakhstan has a distinctive feature. They know Russian and Kazakh. There are also very business people, they are businessmen, engineers, technicians, writers and public figures. The Germans’ relocation of historical homeland to Germany is a legal phenomenon. After all, with the history of destiny, they have come to wave several migrations. The history of the German Diaspora has not been fully explored yet. Therefore, we propose the following work to be done in the future: First, the implementation of a research project financed at the state level between Kazakhstan and Germany to study the history of Germans in Kazakhstan; Second, is to write monographs and articles in Kazakh, Russian, German and English in connection with the history of the German diaspora; Third, opening special centers to help Germans living in Kazakhstan to return historical homeland to Germany; Fourth, assisting the Germans in rebuilding the center to support their German language learning and culture.

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THE GEOSTRATEGIC AND ECONOMY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

Moussa II Lissou*

Abstract

The Gulf of Guinea’s (GoG) tremendous potential is creating investment opportunities for the region. Some of its resources, such as oil, minerals, natural gas and fishing among others, continue to attract significant investment. Nevertheless, these natural endowment of the (GoG) has been plagued with numerous challenges which unless they are tackled and dealt with, the exploitation of these resources would never be of any significant development to the zone’s economy. Some of these challenges affecting the zone include piracy, maritime raids, weak maritime policies, poor governance among others. Although some have been taken at national, regional, inter-regional and global levels such as formation of cooperatives among member states and the deployment of water armies to water bodies to combat these acts, much is still expected to be done given that these alone have proven to be insufficient in handling the challenges. This partly explained by the fact that, most of these criminal acts are believed to be caused by nationals who feel cheated by their home government as they fail to give their own share of the benefits from the exploitations of these resources, and so as a means to by pass the exploiters and get their share, they turn to criminal acts as they consider the only means possible to get their own benefits. Therefore to solve the criminal acts in this zone which has made it to be attributed the name “Danger Zone” and promote profitable economic activities, the exploiters should consider sharing the benefits to concern the entire population instead of limiting it to some particular classes of people.

Key words: Geostrategic, Economy, Gulf, Guinea

Introduction

The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) refers to the North-eastern most part of the tropical Atlantic Ocean between Cape Lopez in Gabon, North and west in Gabon, North and west to Cape Three points in the western region of Ghana. The intersection of the equator and prime meridian is in the gulf. Among the many rivers which drain in the gulf are the Niger and Volta. The Niger River in particular deposited sediments out to the sea over millions of years which became crude oil. The gulf encompasses a large number of countries from West and Central Africa including Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Togo, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. The ecosystem of the region is a source of global interest with resources such as oil, natural gas, mineral deposits among others. The geostrategic nature of the gulf cutting across many countries and their water bodies, has led to a massive growth in economic activities though plagued with challenges (Damian, 2005: 5). Some of such activities includes oil exploitation, natural gas exploitation, mining, agriculture, fishing.

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tourism among others. These economic activities though serve as a medium of livelihood to the populations of this zone, has over the years been faced with many challenges which now known as the new danger zone. However, some measures have been undertaken to combat the challenges. The preceding paragraphs would throw more line on the above outlined facts.

Economic activities in the gulf of Guinea

As a result of the geostrategic nature of the GoG, it has led to the attraction and establishment of many different economic activities such oil and natural gas exploitation, mining, fishing, agriculture, tourism just to name a few.

Oil and natural gas exploitation

Oil and natural gas exploitation over the years, has stood as the most developed economic activities that have flourished in the GoG as a result of the presence of natural resources. The gulf is estimated to contain about 50.4 billion of barrels of proven reserves and produces about 5.4 million barrels oil per day (Onuoha, 2003: 372). Among the major oil producing countries in the gulf are Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Republic of Congo and Gabon. Since Chad’s oil is connected to Cameroon, analysts are wont to add Chad as a player to the region. In December (2010), Ghana joined the League of oil producers in the region, when it commenced the production of oil from its jubilee field, located some 60km offshore. At the shore, of Sierra Leone also, an oil field “Venus” stocking around 200 million barrels was discovered in (2009). There is also a recent report of new discoveries off Liberia, further raising optimism for other countries of the region yet to discover oil in their territory. Thus by (2020), oil in the gulf is expected to surpass the total production of the Persian Gulf nations with 25 percent of the global production as compared to 22 percent from the Persian gulf (Paterson, 2007: 28). Its low-sulphur oil and proximity to Europe and the United States further raises its strategic importance in global energy supply. The U.S. currently obtained about 15 percent of its oil import from the gulf and this is expected to increase to about 25 percent in the nearest future. This region has the fastest rate of discovering new reserves in the world. The discovery ratio for oil wells in the US for instance is normally about 10 percent in West Africa; the same ratio has been almost 60 percent (Dietrich, 2004: 28). These huge deposits have greatly attracted economic activities to develop so as to enable the exploitation of the oil. The US and Europe who pay more interest to this zone is partly explained by the fact that, they want to diversify their sources of energy supply so as to reduce the risks associated with high dependence on middle Eastern oil which is even plagued with lots of terrorist attacks (Damian, 2005: 5). In order to better exploit these oil deposits, the US is expected to invest more than 10 billion a year in the region over the next ten years in oil activities and implement a training framework for African Peace Keeping Forces and discrete political intervention. This is to establish peaceful environment for more economic activities.

Another important economic activity that has developed in the gulf is natural gas exploitation. Oil and natural gas exploitation go hand in hand. Africa accounts for about 8 percent of the world’s proven reserves of natural gas of which one quarter is located in the GoG (Damian, 2005: 6). Nigeria is by far, the leading gas
producer and holds the largest gas reserves in Sub Saharan Africa. It is also an important exporter of liquefied natural gas, second only to Algeria in Africa. Another country in the gulf with non negligible gas reserves include, in descending order; Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. These natural gas potentials have increased the interest of the world’s major energy consumer. For instance, the US faces a potential shortage of these resources since reserves have steadily increased in the past years, reaching their lowest levels in (2003) (Mane, 2005: 7). This encourages them to import foreign natural gas which is generally considered cheaper and more accessible, than to pursue domestic exploration and production, which they have nearly abandoned. This explains why the US Agency for International Development (USAID), is providing assistance in the design and implementation of the regional regulatory framework aimed at controlling the exploration of natural gases as well as the generation of electricity in Nigeria and Ghana. In the same line, the US export and Import bank has financed an off and onshore natural gas pipeline, – the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP), which is 1000 km long and is intended to transport natural gas from Nigeria to Benin, Togo and Ghana. This pipeline is estimated to stimulate growth in the four countries concerned. Equatorial Guinea on its part now benefit from a new gas plant that will allow the country to increase gas parts each year by reducing flaring through reinjection and transformation of gas to liquefied natural gas. As for Angola, Chevron Texaco has recently awarded a contract to Paragon engineering services to lessen natural flaring at its Tukula, Wamba, Numbi and Malongo field. In addition, Sonagol-Angola’s oil and gas company is also developing a project in collaboration with Chevron Texaco to convert natural gas to liquefied natural gas for export by using associated gas from offshore oil field. These two economic activities as seen above serve as the two most important economic activities that have developed in the gulf of Guinea resulting from geostrategic nature as already explained above.

**Mining and other riches**

The GoG apart being endowed with oil and natural gas deposits, it is equally enriched by mineral deposits that have been exploited by individuals, states and companies for their economic development. Similarly, the water bodies of the zone have given birth to many fish types which are exploited by fishermen for both local and foreign consumption.

Concerning mining, the DRC is the second largest producer of diamond as well as columbine-tantalite, a key raw material used in cellular phones, satellites and telecommunication equipment. The DRC is also the only country in Africa with extended reserves of cobalt, copper and uranium. Other countries such as Angola, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia are also major producers of gold and diamond. The Congo Basin on its part possesses the globe’s second largest reserves of rainforest and a diverse and colourful habitat. It is also home to one of the most powerful rivers in the world-the Congo River, whose power plant provides electricity to countries as far off as Egypt to North Africa and South Africa in the South (Mane, 2005: 9). As regard agricultural commodities, Ivory Coast is the world’s largest producer of cocoa and the second largest producer of coffee. When civil conflict erupted in this country in
September (2002), world price of cocoa skyrocketed to a 20 years high. In Cameroon, agriculture remains a decisive sector for the economy because it employs about 80 percent of the active population and accounts for more than 40 percent of the country’s export revenue.

In the case of fishing, there has been the practice of fishing in the gulf. This is owed to the fact that different species of fish such as lobsters, shark, crabs, cephalopods, bivalves, gastropods and other bonny fishes are found in the water bodies of this zone. These species have been hunted for different purposes even leading to the formation of committees such as the Fisheries Committee for West Central Gulf of Guinea. These committees lay down modalities so as to enable the sustainable exploitation of these fishes. Of recent, in recognition of (2016) as a year of Human Rights by the African Union, a workshop on women’s rights and fisheries Reforms was held in Nouakchott-Mauritania. It was scheduled from March 06, (2016) and initiated by AU’s Inter African Bureau for animals’ resources conjointly with the African Confederation of Artisanal. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) ten years trend [1990-2000] showed a catch of 950,000 tons in (1990) and 900,000 tons in 2000 with a marked decline to 700,000 in (1994). In the tourism sector, the geographical position of most of these countries offers some of the most attractive beaches and leisure destinations. Senegal is the closest country to the Western hemisphere and has become a preferred destination for tourists from Western Europe and the Americans. The eastern part of the DRC is home to some of the most reserved natural part in the world, where diverse animals still live in the world.

The above-analysed economic activities add more impetus to show that, a lot of economic development has been established in the gulf of Guinea thanks to its strategic location ranging from mining, fishing, agriculture, tourism among others. Despite the numerous resources, the countries of the gulf Guinea continue to face low growth and poverty. This results from many challenges, which stand as obstacles to economic development such as piracy, maritime raids, poor governance and weak maritime policies among others. Some of the most affecting challenges distorting economic activities in the gulf have been piracy and maritime raids which have become so rampant making the zone to be referred to as the danger zone. Concerning piracy, there has been increasing rates of piracy rates in the gulf not only threatening peace and security but also affects economic activities in the region. This involves targeting lucrative cargo such as oil on board the ships. Between (2007) and (2010), there were an estimated 150 cases of

Problems affecting economic activities in the Gulf of Guinea

Despite the numerous resources, the countries of the gulf Guinea continue to face low growth and poverty. This results from many challenges, which stand as obstacles to economic development such as piracy, maritime raids, poor governance and weak maritime policies among others.

Piracy and Maritime Raids

Some of the most affecting challenges distorting economic activities in the gulf have been piracy and maritime raids which have become so rampant making the zone to be referred to as the danger zone. Concerning piracy, there has been increasing rates of piracy rates in the gulf not only threatening peace and security but also affects economic activities in the region. This involves targeting lucrative cargo such as oil on board the ships. Between (2007) and (2010), there were an estimated 150 cases of

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1 Today, the Gulf of Guinea region is simultaneously the major source of revenue for the development of the states of the region and a big source of economic opportunity for the partners conducting industrial activities. The region covers an extension of more than six thousand kilometres, starting from the Senegal River along the border between the Republic of Senegal and the Republic of Mauritania up to the Cunene River on the border between the Republic of Angola and the Republic of Namibia. The challenges caused by Gulf of Guinea tension, however, are not limited to this region.
maritime piracy to the east of the Nigerian Delta, mainly off the Cameroon coast (Ebude, 2009: 48). While between (2010) and (2015), incidence of piracy reported to the International Maritime had risen from 45 to 64. This includes oil bunkering, robbery at sea, hostage taking, human and drug trafficking, terrorism and corruption¹. For instance in early (2011), several years after maritime crime began to increase in the eastern gulf, pirate attack picked off the coast of Benin, Nigeria’s western neighbour. Pirates attacked frequently for several months attracted by the large number of tankers and able to exploit the weakness of Benin’s navy. In successful hijacking operations, they forced the crew to sail away from the point of attack and stole fuel worth between two million and six million. This trend has continued to increase off the coast of Ivory Coast, Nigeria and the DRC.

Looking at maritime raids, the years (2008) and (2009) were notable for the intensification of bank robbery in Cameroon and a spectacular attack on the east Guinea presidential resident at Malabo by sea borne arm groups. The bank robbery in Cameroon started in September (2008) in the coastal town of Limbe organized like a military operation and involving dozens of attackers equipped with heavy weapons, leaving a dozen people dead. In October (2008), a failed bank robbery in Kribi was followed by the arrest of Cameroonian attackers. In March (2011), ten people including nine pirates were killed in a clash between pirates and BIR after a bank robbery in a bank in Douala-Cameroon. The confrontation took place at sea near an oil production zone off Bakassi. In February (2009), Equatorial Guinea experienced its first large scale attack. About fifty arm men on speed board led a raid against the presidential palace in Malabo on Bioko Island. At first, these attacks were reported as coup from political opposition but were later shifted to say they were Cameroonian because the attackers were reportedly wearing Cameroon army uniform. However, in August (2010), four people were sentenced including former members of security force for their role in the February (2009) attack.

The above are a few examples of the many pirates and maritime raids challenging economic activities and security in the Gulf of Guinea that it is possible to plan a large scale attack against any of the region’s country as the security services noted the existence of seaborne armed groups able to act along the whole length of the gulf.

¹ Piracy attacks (and armed robbery at sea) in the Gulf of Guinea comprised a fifth of all recorded maritime incidents globally in 2013. These figures represent only a fraction of the actual attacks in the region as ship owners and governments downplay incidents to avoid increased shipping costs or a reputation for insecurity. Incidents reported to the International Maritime Bureau indicate that the affected area is substantial. Anchorages and approaches to the ports of Bonny and Lagos (Nigeria), Cotonou (Benin), Lomé (Togo), Tema (Ghana), and Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) are particularly vulnerable with large numbers of merchant ships often loitering in these areas. In the busy port of Lagos, hundreds of vessels loiter for days along the roadsteads (calm areas of water near harbors where ships can anchor) due to the limited capacity of West and Central African ports for offloading. Control measures in the approaches to these ports remain weak. The beaching of 25 ships on the Lagos coast following a rough, 2-hour storm in 2010 revealed that many vessels in harbors are unmanned and unmonitored. The then Director-General of the Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) suggested that such boats may also serve as hideouts and blinds for pirates and robbers.
**Poor governance and weak maritime policies**

It is worth noting that, the challenges affecting economic activities in the Gulf of Guinea are not only piracy and maritime raids but also other challenges such poor governance and weak maritime policies.

With regard to poor governance in maritime economic activities, it has given rise to a host of illicit practices within the oil, shipping and fishing industries both on and off shore. At sea, a thriving cash-based black market has grown that radiates from Nigeria into the rest of the GoG. The large quantity of cash lures thieves while the presence of unscrupulous buyers makes it relatively easy for thieves to sell stolen goods. Corruption in the Nigerian maritime administration navy and law enforcement agencies undermine their already limited capacity to counter violent crimes. While thieves target licit and illicit operators alike, criminal practices within these three industries—oil and gas, shipping and fishing, significantly increases both incentives and opportunities for piracy. The theft or bunkering of crude oil from pipeline crisscrossing the Niger Delta and its transport and sale to buyers waiting in tankers offshore has become a large scale business. In February (2012), Shell estimated companies were losing 150,000 bpd (African Report, 2012: 6). While some stolen crude is refined illegally in Nigeria, most is exported. Once at sea, the oil may be traded and transferred to other tankers before being taken to other West African countries where there are refineries—Ghana, Cameroon and Ivory Coast in particular—not leaving out other parts of the world such as India, Far East. Profits from exporting oil illegally are used by criminal gang to lunch pirate attack on other vessels. Closely related to this, is the fact that the government allows too much access to foreign countries at the detriment of the local population.

Concerning weak maritime policies, for a long time, the GoG States have neglected to exercise authority over their territorial waters because they perceived insecurity as a land-based phenomenon. Their security policies only included the sea as it was relevant to specific border disputes such as that of Bakassi between Cameroon and Nigeria. Most of these states only observed their sea from the shore. This was also due to the failure to demarcate maritime borders in the gulf in line with the Montego Bay Convention (African Report, 2012: 7). Until the end of the (1990) s, very few maritime borders between coastal states in the gulf had been demarcated except between Cameroon and Nigeria because of the dispute over Bakassi. Although the attitude of states towards their territorial waters has changed since the recent discovery of oil, few of the have allocated substantial resources to formulating maritime policies. Apart from port infrastructure, which is a source of tax revenue, the merchant and military navies remain underdeveloped and usually symbolic. It is this vacuum that attracts pirates to fill who are more accustomed to being at sea than the navies of coastal states. Equally, a lack of uniform maritime policies only leads to more problems as well as the diversity and differences in financial resources available to countries. This causes imbalance in naval capacity of the GoG states, thus a hindrance to economic activities over the zone.

With the prevalence of the above challenges such as poor governance and weak maritime policies, it is a clear indication that these lapses only invite more problems.
such as attracting pirates and arm robbers who distort economic activities in the region.

**Attempted solutions to challenges in economic activities in the Gulf of Guinea**

Given the complexity of national, regional, continental and global sources and ramifications of maritime insecurity facing the gulf today, lasting solutions if ever would only be found by understanding, mobilizing and harmonizing actions at different levels. This could be done at national, regional, inter regional as well as global levels as it’s already the case.

**National and regional levels**

By national and regional levels, we mean to look at some of the measures already taken by individual countries as well as regional bodies of the gulf as a response to the many challenges affecting economic activities in the zone.

Concerning the national levels, it was already noted that countries were generally weak in their capacity to exercise effective control over their coastal and deep offshore territories. This has often led to pirates and maritime raids. However, some of the reasons usually explained for these acts are for the fact that, the benefits of exploitation of the natural resources such as oil, gas among others along the zone are limited in most cases only to particular groups of people such as the states and the privileged (Mvomo Charles, 2013: 23). This therefore means that the local population are excluded from these benefits and so in a bit to get a share of their country’s resources, turn to piracy and maritime raids. In a bit to handle this problem, the government of Cameroon deployed heavy arm navies in its water bodies particularly in the Bakassi area. For instance, it was thanks to the presence of Cameroon heavy navy in its waters that helped to stop the attempted robbery attacks on a bank in Limbe in October (2008).This example has been followed by many other individual countries such as Equatorial Guinea leading to the arrest of the robbers who robbed the presidency in (2010). Looking at the regional levels, countries within the zone have begun to mobilize themselves to ameliorate or avert the risks. Regional Organizations have lunched specific operations and are formulating strategies to improve security. The states most affected aim to build navies and increase resources for coastal policing in the hope of deterring criminals. At this level, within the framework of its peace and security policies, the Economic Community of East African States has created a regional maritime security centre and organized joint training exercises. However, states do not find it straightforward to organize joint funding or coordinate their efforts, maritime policies are embryonic and symbolic and states are unable to maintain a continuous presence at sea. In the case of Economic Community of West African States, maritime cooperation is still in its infancy and is hampered by political tensions and distrust of neighbouring states towards Nigeria, with long-drawn insurgency activities in the Niger Delta (Mvomo Charles, 2013: 24).

The challenges affecting economic activities in the gulf has made states concerned to devise strategies at various levels. In order to better handle this, measures have been established beginning first at national levels especially as they face different challenges at different periods.
Inter-regional and Global Levels

Given that the national and regional measures taken still proved insufficient, regional and global measures have therefore been implemented as a means to complement the measures already taken at the above mentioned levels. The many criminal acts in the gulf have prompted the governments of the zone to come together and establish inter-regional measures to overcome them. For instance, from June 24-25 (2013), a summit was held in Yaoundé-Cameroon which brought representatives from ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission together to draft a code of conduct concerning the prevention of piracy, armed robbery against ships and illicit maritime activity, now signed by 22 states. Influenced by these preventions agreements, the gulf new code of conduct calls on signatories to share and report relevant information, interdict vessels suspected of engaging in illegal activities, ensure those committing such acts are apprehended and prosecuted, and facilitates the care and repatriation of seafarers subject to illegal activity. Also, as was done in Singapore, the west and Central African leaders aim to build a Regional Maritime Security Center, based in Cameroon, which will facilitate information sharing among governments. The centre, it is hoped will address the massive under-reporting of pirate attacks that occurs in the gulf and provide a collective response to the danger. Gulf of Guinea must press for dynamic cooperation between ECCAS and ECOWAS. This would allow regional patrols to exercise the right of pursuit beyond maritime borders. However, inter-regional discussions have only just begun and political tensions hamper efforts to promote practical cooperation.

Globally, Western powers, US, China, India and South Africa with economic interest in the region are providing financial support and security expertise to assist local initiatives. The US for instance is expected to invest about 10 billion a year in the region over the next ten years in oil activities, oceanic research in the deep sea waters of Equatorial Guinea and Angola, the restoration and preservation of the forest of Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, DRC, Cameroon and CAR, the implementation of a training framework for African peace keeping; and discrete political interventions (Damian, 2005: 5). Added to this, has been the involvement of the UN with some measures to assist the initiatives of states as they fight the challenges of the zone. The UN Security Council within a space of four months, passed two Resolutions (2018) (October 2011) and (2039) (February 2012) both calling for greater regional action in response to the growing menace of piracy.

After haven seen the measures taken by the inter-regional and the global world, it is therefore clear to say that, for the challenges affecting economic activities in the gulf to be completely cleared off, these two actors as already seen would be of great help to the gulf of Guinea countries.

Conclusion

The Gulf of Guinea is undoubtedly emerging as an important element of the global economy with Equatorial Guinea as the fast rising country economically. Natural resources and the geostrategic nature remains the main advantage of the region. This geostrategic nature has led to the development of economic activities such as oil and natural gas exploitation, mining, fishing, agriculture, tourism among
others. However, because of many challenges such as piracy, maritime raids, poor governance and weak maritime policies just to name a few, these economic activities have not been fully exploited given that these challenges distort their smooth functioning. Some measures however have been established ranging from individual, to regional, to inter-regional and the global levels to overcome these challenges. Given that this zone has proven to be a zone which can sustain heavy economic development not only to the zone but also to the whole continent, better and sustainable measures should be employed so as to guarantee this development. This can be done by keeping out the foreign countries such as the US, France, China among others from the gulf. This is because most of the exploitations of this zone is shipped to these countries leaving the locals of this zone with very little which even explains one of the reasons why the local population in a bit to get a share of the resources, turn to piracy and other criminal acts as a means to get their own share.

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BOOK REVIEWS


Last year, at the celebration of the achievement of the national-territorial unity of the Romanian State – in a favorable context of the evolution of European history –, the Romanian historians made numerous volumes appear (including studies collections), some festive, but most representing original contributions to the knowledge of the modern history of our people (I think a review of the main ones, in order to be brought to the knowledge of Clio’s servants from abroad, is necessary).

As is the present book, due to a prolific, multi-thematic and original historian – Professor Radu Ștefan Vergatti (born in Bucharest – 1937, December 10), a recognized specialist, originally, in Medieval history, author and of several works of Modern and Contemporary history.

This biographical volume this biographical volume, dedicated to a great personality of our nation, is segmented into five chapters, thematically subdivided – chap. I: Izvoare învolburate [Intricate Springs] (pp. 27-49); chap. II: Început de viaţă [Beginning of Life] (pp. 50-96); chap. III: Profesorul [The Professor] pp. 97-171); chap. IV: După Unire: în şi pentru Basarabia (pp. 172-218); chap. V: Din Basarabia în România Mare [From Bessarabia to Greater Romania] (pp. 219-289); also Bibliografie (pp. 291-302), and a very useful Index of Names of Persons and Places (303-317).

They are preceded by În loc de Cuvânt înainte... [Instead of the Foreword...]: Profesor universitar Adrian Năstase președintele Fundațiile Europene Titulescu. Prefață [Foreword]: Ion I. Solcanu Președinte al Secțiiei de Științe Istorice și Arheologice a Academiei Oamenilor de Știință din România, and Câteva cuvinte scrise de Victor-Dorian Mancaș, nepot al profesorului Ştefan Ciobanu [Some Words Written by Victor-Dorian Mancaș, Nephew of Professor Ştefan Ciobanu] (pp. 15-16).

The former Romanian prime minister – a true intellectual with solid and well-assimilated historical reading – testifies that he has known “for a long time Radu Ștefan Vergatti, Professor and researcher obstinate in integrating the Romanian problems in the universal history”, while also specifying: “In the following volume, Professor Radu Ștefan Vergatti, author of 37 books, with a teaching and scientific career of over 50 years, coordinator of about 40 doctoral theses, has managed to shed light on a useful and first monograph (our emphasis) about the academic Professor Ştefan Ciobanu (1883-1950)”; and specifying, knowingly (he’s one of coordinators of precious album Descriptio Bessarabiae. Bessarabia in Five Centuries of Cartography, with 124 maps, published in 2017 /328 pp./ – our note): “This book is part of the very current theme of the study of the evolution of Romanians in the territory known as Bessarabia” (p. 11). And Professor Ion I. Solcanu also highlights the significance of the original contributions represented by this volume: “writing the first monograph (our emphasis) dedicated to the academician Ştefan Ciobanu, who is at the forefront of the intellectual fighters for independence and union with the Kingdom of Romania”, “honoring one of the event’s makers 100 years ago”, “the book is at least as important, because the author gives us his own vision on the place and the period of the tumultuous life of the child, student, student, Professor, scholar, husband, and parent of the one who was Ştefan Ciobanu” (p. 18).

In the last paragraph of the paper (pp. 288-289), the author hopes that his scientific endeavor will be accepted as such: “I hope, as any historian and writer, that the previous ranks have so much grace, through the information contained in them, they will interest on the
one hand the specialists, on the other the cultural people and not only. I would be extremely happy if this book were printed in sufficient copies to circulate and not lie somewhere on the shelves of a library, like a manuscript” (pp. 288-289) – certified testimony: Bucureşti, 15 aprilie 2018. We do not know in how many copies this valuable and unique scientific book could have been printed, but it is undoubtedly appropriate to have it distributed as widely as possible, everywhere where Romanians live, and, of course, first of all in the Republic of Moldova – his baştina [the native], as it is said in the trans-Prutean Romanian idiom.

Here’s a short snippet (from Prolegomene, pp. 21-26): “In this realm – scientifically – Ştefan Ciobanu went his first struggles for the revival and imposition of the national conscience of the Bessarabian Romanians. It is interesting and significant for the Romanian ethnic movement in Bessarabia that the intellectuals from the rural area, among the so-called «Kulaks» [culaci], were in the forefront. With all the efforts of Russification, the Tsarist authorities have failed to suppress the voice of the Romanian blood. More than a century after the invasion of Bessarabia by Tsarist Empire, in that region were young Romanian intellectuals of high standing. They strongly demanded through the media of semi-legal character, through speeches, through poems and songs, through secret societies, through sermons spoken in Romanian in churches to reach independence and unity with Romania. The perseverance of these young people from the rich blanket of the rural world, which gave them economic strength and independence, shows the Romanians’ resilience and fighting ability. They formed the active group of the Romanian nucleus in Bessarabia (our emphasis), which resisted and amplified, despite the terror, the Russification and even the population exchanges – either through deportations from Bessarabia or through the bringing of other nations, by other ethnic groups, on the lands of the Bessarabians.

Bright figures of the Bessarabian national revival movement were Ioan Pelivan, Pantelimon Halippa, Vasile Stroescu, Daniel Ciugureanu, Gherman Pântea, and others. Some of them were evoked with art and seriousness in several monographs. Now, with those mentioned, I mention Professor Ştefan Ciobanu. Although he learned as a brilliant student and student in Russian schools, he never forgot that he was Romanian. He said it out loud, obstinately, he affirmed it through his works and imposed himself in the fight for the union of the native land with the Kingdom of Romania” (pp. 23-24).

And another – “Of course, this situation which prevented him from working as a teacher in the field he had served all his life, the physical and mental anguish he had been subjected to during the interrogations by the Soviet officers, caused Ştefan Ciobanu a cerebral congestion. It seems that the main cause that triggered this distressing disease, decisive for the end of the teacher’s life, was the way in which the «discussions» took place, or rather the interrogations with the Soviet officers and those from the former Safety [Siguranța], transformed after 1948 into State Security [Securitatea Statului]. During these interrogations, Professor Ştefan Ciobanu, who was not very solid and had suffered a series of mental anguish in the last few years, was hit in the head, which caused his brain congestion. According to the testimony of the family, since the fall of 1948 he stayed in bed, complaining of terrible headaches. On February 28, 1950, he died at home (it is assumed that he would have lived, more than sure that he would have shared the tragic fate of other Romanian personalities of Bessarabian origin, arrested by the authorities in the so-called «the night of dignitaries» /May 6, 1950/ – our note). He was buried in the Resurrection Cemetery [Cimitirul ‘Reînvierea’] in Bucharest. At the funeral, many acquaintances came, although the authorities tried to stop this manifestation of admiration and veneration towards Professor Ştefan Ciobanu” (pp. 286-287).

Stoica Lascu

The sumptuous photo-album, made under exceptional graphic conditions, is the result of the combination of the enthusiasm and passion for History and ethno-historical memorial heritage of two well-known intellectuals from Tomis – Professor Valentin Ciorbea, the Dobrudjan historian (born in Intergalde/Alba County – 1946, October 12), who no longer needs presentation, and Gabriel-Octavian Nicolae (former navy officer, then consultant and financial manager, born in Râfov/Prahova County – 1957, December 10) – well-known philatelist and collector. So, two race intellectuals who are at the origin of this extremely rich album dedicated to the Turkish and Tatar ethnicities, the Muslim community in our country. Written in three languages, the intention of the authors – and of those who contributed, financially, to his appearance – is to make known in the wide world the memorial-historical image of the Turks and Tatars in Romania (practically, from Dobroda; but also, nota bene, from Ada-Kaleh Island), as well as it was immortalized in postcards in the first half of the last century.

The album is prefaced (Cuvânt înainte/Ön söz/ Foreword) by Osman Karay Ertaş (Ambassador of the Turkish Republic to Bucharest), Hacı Ahmed Dastan (coordinator of Programs Coordination Office in Bucharest – TIKA), and Fedbi Osman respectively (President of the Turkish Democratic Union of Romania).

The first writes that “Our Turkish and Tartar [Sic!] compatriots, the living elements of our common history with Romania, constitute a solid and lasting friendship bridge between our countries. The exemplary self-confident mand inclose attitude adopted by the Romanian authorities towards our compatriots is highly commendable. The historical postcards presented in this album are sending powerful messages, which are difficult to translate into words, about the rich cultural history of the existence of the Turkish-Tatar Muslim community in Romania” (pp. 6-7). Second, that “By publishing the album on “The Muslim Community of Romania in Illustrated Postcards’ we wanted to have an insight into the history of the Ruekish-Tatar compatriots in Romania. Postcards can be interpreted differently by each viewer, but I am certain we will all experience the same feelings during this incursion” (p. 10). And third: “This work is of historical value became it brings to the readers’ attention the image of the Turkish community in Dobrogea, as well as that of the Ada Kaleh Island as it was at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. This album proposes a journey through time, an insight into our history on these lands through images of historical monuments of high value for our community, from Royal Mosque ‘Charles I’, one o the most impressive architectural monuments in Constanţa, presented under construction or during the prayer service, to postcards representing Muslim believers dressed in traditional costumes or celebrating religious feasts” (pp. 13-14).

The inserted images are positioned thematically like this – Places of worship, mosques (pp. 41-69); Constitutional rights (pp. 71-77); School activity (pp. 79-89); The right to self-organization (pp. 91-107); People and clothes (pp. 109-161); Celebrations and feasts (pp. 163-167); Preoccupations and professions (pp. 169-181); Ada-Kaleh (pp. 183-211).

Professor Valentin Ciorbea shows, in the ethno-historical synthesis Witness to an old civilization in Romania (pp. 18-39), that „after the takeover of the “entire” Dobrudja (everywhere, in English transliteration the spelling Dobrogea is preserved) by the troops of Sultan Bayazed II (1418-1512), the Ottoman administration set for the new province a major
geopolitical role, both economically and militarily supported through a policy of settlement of Turkish people and in time here “was created a unique blending of material and spiritual life that linked closely the Muslim community to the Ottoman civilization (...) [and] with the growth of the population, mosques and medrese, tekkе or zaviye, hammams (baths) were built, religious orders, called tarikat were organized” (p. 21); then, the author shows that the evolution of the Muslim community in Dobrudja, “as well as that of the Romanians, the native population, known in the early centuries of the first millennium as dacien, of the Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Ragusans, Bulgarians, and German settled in Dobrogea under the agreement of the Ottoman administration started being severely affected in the late 18th century by the Russo-Turkish wars, subsequently circumscribed to «the Eastern question»” (p. 22). And after 1878, when Dobrudja was “united” – as the author says – with Romania, for the Muslim community in the new province of Romania “the moment represented a phase of evolution based on modern constitutional rights, stimulating conditions to return to their homes, financial support and tax exemptions. The Turks and Tatars lived, worked and preserved their material and spiritual culture of Oriental influence, leading their lives together in a creative manner with the other ethnicities between the Danube the Danube and the Black Sea, contributing greatly to the creation of the interethnic Dobrogean pattern, based on respect for culture, religion and transitions” (p. 26).

Significant scientific and typographic achievement, this album – which every Muslim family in our country should have in possession, and which should be spread in as many Muslim circles and communities around the world – is also constituted, and in a testimony of the intellectual and psychosocial valences of the Romanian society, yesterday and today, as her whole.

Stoica Lascu


In the area of the Brăila County was one of the most representative Romanian monasteries, with the Dedication “The Nativity of John the Baptist” [Hramul “Nașterea Sfântului Ioan Botezătorul”], founded by the great Voivode Matei Basarab (1632-1654). Since 1976, Măxineni has become an archaeological research site, carried out by a group of archaeologists from “Carol I” Brăila Museum, led by the Professor Ionel Cândea (born in Măcin – 1949, February 25), corresponding member of Romanian Academy. Thus, after several years of archaeological research, the restorations and erection of buildings, today it is transformed into a remarkable orthodox architectural ensemble and recollection of soul.

This volume – a sumptuous intellectual achievement, and no less typographic, contains 288 pages very rich and suggestive illustrated (with 234 of color photographs, 8 facs., and plans) – in thus composed: Ofrandă de la Dunărea de Jos în anul centenar al făuritorilor Marii Uniri [Offering from the Lower Danube in the Centenary Year of the Makers of the Great Union] (pp. 9-11) (author: † Archbishop Casian); [History] (pp. 14-79) (author: Prof. Ionel Cândea) – with thematic segmentations: Cadrul fizic și geographic, Data zidirii mănăstirii, Măxinenii între citeriile lui Matei Basarab, Domeniul și privilegiile mănăstirii, Cercetările arheologice, Stratigrafia general, Cercetările arheologice în interiorul bisericii, Aspecte cultural, Biblioteca mănăstirii, Concluzii [Physical and Geographical Framework, The Date of the Monastery Building, The Măxineni Monastery Between the Foundations of Matei Basarab, The Domain and the Privileges of the Monastery, Archaeological Researches, General Stratigraphy, Archaeological Researches Inside the
Analele Universității din Craiova. Istorie, Anul XXV, Nr. 1(37)/2020


As shown in a brief Abstract (unfortunately, this remarkable tom does not even have an English version, so useful for knowing, by foreign intellectual media, the historical dimension of the Orthodox and secular Romanian spirituality) – also found in French and, note bene, the Greek language –, “Situated in the Bărăgan field, at Buzău and Siret Rivers’ confluence, in a region apparently disadvantaged, both by sunburn and the lack of natural resources and without spectacular landforms, the Voivodal Monastery in Măxineni has been standing as a «gardian» for about four centuries. Built in 1636-1637, Măxineni is one of the most beautiful and imposing buildings of the pious ruler [domnitor, voievod] Matei Basarab [1632-1654], who was rightly considered «the greatest church founder of the Romanian nation» (Constantin C. Giurescu [Romanian historian: 1901-1977]). Besides the spiritual and cultural importance, it was an outlook, too, being situated in a «good and strong place» near the border with Moldova and in the neighborhood of Braila kazal. From the beginning, being endowed by the Ruler, with liberties (the right to set up and use), estates/domains (forest, pood, pieces of inherited lands, vineyards and hay fields), and privileges (tax exemptions and benefits from the regional customs), so the monastery everything was necessary to ensure the inhabitants’ livelihood, but also for its continuity and stability as a lordly residence of a strategic importance. Thus, the freedom of the monastery will be reconfirmed by almost all the voivodes who succeeded to Matei Basarab, Mihnea III Radu [1658-1859], Şerban Cantacuzino [1678-1688], Constantin Brâncoveanu [1688-1714], Grigore II Ghica [1688-1714], Mihnea III Radu [1658-1859], Şerban Cantacuzino [1678-1688], Constantin Brâncoveanu [1688-1714], Mihnea III Radu [1658-1859], Şerban Cantacuzino [1678-1688], Constantin Brâncoveanu [1688-1714], Mihnea III Radu [1658-1859], Şerban Cantacuzino [1678-1688], Constantin Brâncoveanu [1688-1714], Mihnea III Radu [1658-1859], Şerban Cantacuzino [1678-1688], Constantin Brâncoveanu [1688-1714])” (p. 270).

In Foreword, the archbishop of the Lower Danube shows, among others, that “this volume shows us the restoration of the monument church, the house of the fortress and the premises of the Măxineni Monastery, all from the time of Matei Basarab. Thus, it is given to the lovers of our national heritage an important document for the affirmation of the right faith, for highlighting the originating cult of culture, language and education, but also a strong historical testimony regarding the role of this monastery in defending the highest ideals of the Romanian people.

In Măxineni, the train walls of the holy place are extended by those of the fortress of defense, thus uniting the two arms of our identity, the cross and the sword (our emphasis) as the voivodes, the swordsmen, the monks, the priests of myrrh and the faithful people have taught us, over time” (p. 9).

Professor Cândea shown us – pointing out that Constantin C. Giurescu has shown since 1946 that “the winner from Nânișor and Finta is the most important church founder of our people” – that the Voivode Matei Basarab “understood very well that the Wallachia [Țara
Românească] does not have what it was based on the border, where the Turks had managed to make ends of the bridge on the left bank of the Danube: Turnu, Giurgiu, and especially Brăila, all three fortresses, were under their control. In this situation, not to mention many other aspects of political and social internal order, the external conditioning, the fortified monasteries played an important role in the defense of the country, in achieving a coherent system of minimum security under the conditions in which the the Turks categorically forbade our rulers to build cities either on the outskirts of the country or inside it (our emphasis)” (p. 27).

The paper shows that the restoration works of the monastery, started in the 70s of the last century, were accelerated after 1990, “with the blessing of the Hierarch of the place, His Eminence Archbishop Casian – then the Auxiliary Bishop pf the Lower Danube Diocese, who re-established here, the ritual life of the monk, appointing as an abbot the well-known acchimandite Simeon Ovezea, a confessor of faith in the communist prison. After more than 70 years, on 24-th June, 1990, the First Divine Liturgy took place” (p. 271).

At the end of this exceptional photo-documentary album, the Father Gelu Arion concludes that “the monumental ensemble of Măxineni Monastery, today releases once lost beauty, of one of the representative foundations of Matei Basarab Voivode –ensemble of a rare and exemplary beauty, not only architecturally, but above all, spiritually, an exceptional achievement that invites to a perpetual admiration, and, at the same time, gives us a lesson of faithfulness, godliness and artistic gernius our forefathers” (p. 273).


The 13 studies were presented at the scientific session held in November 2018 at the Vrancei Museum in Focșani – a true pole of contemporary historical research and ideas in Romania for the last three decades; is a new Horia Dumitrescu brand – the 30 year manager of the institution –, through his efforts, his devotion and his passion for revealing the constants of our national history.

It’s about – Ioan Scurtu, Generația Marii Uniri din 1918 – Elite și mase [The Generation of the Great Union of 1918 – Elites and Masses] (pp. 7-24); Corneliu-Mihail Lungu, Contribuția lui Iancu Flandor la Unirea Bucovinei cu Țara [Iancu Flandor’s Contribution to the Union of Bucovina with the Country] (pp. 25-28); Jipa Rotaru, Un fruntaș al Elitelor politice românești în slujba Marii Uniri – Alexandru Marghiloman [A Leader of the Romanian Political Elite in the Service of the Great Union – Alexandru Marghiloman] (pp. 29-47); Gheorghe Onişoru, Un plan pentru România Mare [A Plan for Greater Romania] (pp. 48-76); Petre Țurlea, Unirea Basarabiei cu România în corespondența primită de Nicolae Iorga [The Union of Bessarabia with Romania in the Correspondence Received by Nicolae Iorga] (pp. 77-82); Florian Bichir, Făuritori ai României Mari în temnițele bolșevice. Cazul Ion Flueraș [Creators of Greater Romania in Bolshevik Prisons. The case of Ion Flueraș] (pp. 83-91); Adrian Stroea, Generalul Gheorghe Rasoviceanu, un uitat artizan al Întregirii României [General Gheorghe Rasoviceanu, A Forgotten Artisan of the Entire Romania] (pp. 92-101); Gavriil Preda, Mitropolitul Pimen Georgescu – Mitropolitul războiului și al Întregirii Neamului [Metropolitan Pimen Georgescu – The Metropolitan of War and /Romania/ Nation Integration] (pp. 102-119); Luminița Giurgiu, Teodora Giurgiu, Ministerii de Război ai anului 1918 – Martori ai înfăptuirii României Mari [War Ministers of 1918 – Witnesses of the
Making of Greater Romania (pp. 120-129); Dan Prisăcaru, Ion Nistor – Apostol al românilor bucovineni și cititor al Unirii din 15/28 noiembrie 2018 /Sic!/ [Ion Nistor – Apostle of the Romanians of Bucovina and Founder of the Union of November 15/28, 1918] (pp. 130-149); Ion Stănel, Charles J. Vopicka – Un susținător al Întregirii României [Charles J. Vopicka – A Supporter of the Entire Romania] (pp. 150-158); Ionel Ștefan Alexandru, Un luptător pentru Marea Unire – Leonte Moldovan. Cum a devenit ziua Marii Uniri – 1 Decembrie – Ziua Națională a României [A Fighter for the Great Union – Leonte Moldovan. How the day of the Great Union became – December 1 – National Day of Romania] (pp. 158-183); Horia Dumitrescu, Sever Bocu și lupta sa pentru integrarea Benetului istoric [Sever Bocu and his Struggle for the Integrity of the Historical Banat] (pp. 184-220).

The well-known historian Ioan Scurtu opens the volume with a relevant thematic synthesis, focusing on the problematic of the session: “In the century of nationalities (1820-1920), the Romanians went through four distinct historical stages: the Revolution of 1848-1849, the Union of the Principalities – 1859, the conquest of the State Independence of Romania – 1877-1878, the War of Integration and the Great Union 1916-1918. In all these stages, exceptional political, cultural and military personalities were noted, who directed and stimulated the process of modernizing the society, opening the way for the Romanian people to ascend further on the scale of history. At the same time, the great mass of the population was the one who sustained these achievements, ensuring the foundation on which modern Romania got up” (p. 7). Several personalities are listed, and with quotes from the speeches and writings of King Ferdinand I, Ion I.C. Brătianu, Barbu Ștefănescu-Delavrancea, Take Ionescu, Alexandru Marghiloman, Vasile Lucaciu, Octavian Goga, Vasile Stoica, Iancu Flondor, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, Gheorghe Pop de Băsești, concluding: “The elites, i.e. the political leaders, knew how to capitalize on the international conjuncture created by the collapse of the two empires – Russian and Habsburg and to take the decisions that ensured the achievement of the Great Union of 1918” (p. 16). In the second part of his paper, the author highlights the decisive role of the masses: “In their turn, the masses have made a striking contribution to the realization of the great national ideal” (p. 16).

In his short, but dense and explicit material, Professor Corneliu-Mihail Lungu brings to the attention of those present at the session the role played by one of the Unirii artisan, the Romanian patriot from Bucovina Iancu Flondor, concluding (not without a note of bitterness): “Thus the great Romanian contributed to the Entire Romania and to the accomplishment of other great historical acts. Too bad that history didn’t reward him as it should!” (p. 28)

Professor Onişoru’s study is, in fact, a welcome synthesis – that is why the title may mislead the reader – on the stages that formed the process of achieving the Great Union of 1918, which “was the result of centuries of accumulation, but also a consequence of the First World War” (p. 49). At the end of the part regarding the Union with Bessarabia, the author circumcises the international conjuncture and some specificities showing, among others: “The union was realized at a time when Romania was practically reduced to Moldova, and the Bolshevik and anarchist agitations themselves endangered the order in state. Also, the civil war in Ukraine, with changing fate, raised problems at the eastern border of Romania. Everything will be clarified only after Ukraine joined Russia on December 30, 1920. Particularly interesting is the fact that Bessarabia was under the powerful influence of the socialist revolution in Russia which, at first, supported generous ideas regarding the organization of society but also national rights. Therefore, issues such as land reform or universal suffrage were already considered between Prut and Dniester as rights won. Interesting from this point of view is also the fact that in the summer of 1918, even worked on a draft Constitution of Bessarabia (our emphasis). After Bucovina and Transylvania returned, in turn, to Romania, on December 11, 1918, by royal decree, the General Commissariat of Bukovina was abolished” (p. 61).
No less interesting and up-to-date is the paper of Professor Jipa Rotaru, referring to a great personality of modern Romania, blasphemed and blamed for a long time (both in the inter-war period and in the post-war period) – the politician and prime minister during the time of the Union of Bessarabia with Motherland: „At the passing of a century from that government [March-October 1918] of the assumed sacrifice, we can say that Alexandru Marghiloman and his executive have achieved the objective of defending the Romanian State, its ruling dynasty and the national army. The price paid by the great statesman from Buzău was extremely high. Slandered, permanently hit by his political opponents, immediately after 1919, he managed, through his conduct, standing firm in his convictions and his deep love for his homeland, to send over generations a clean Romanian model, of European invoice, which supports on the historical reality of the facts” (p. 44). Therefore, is showing that “The Centenary of the Great Union, can also bring about the elimination of the completely unmerited ostracization of a first-rate personality of Romania who has knowingly sacrificed his political life and career: Alexandru Marghiloman” (p. 46). The author concludes “These «living» books (the author refers to the volumes under the title Note politice, published in 1927– our note) are a terrible recourse to posterity that can give Alexandru Marghiloman the measure of its true value, so that today’s Romanians will not repeat the mistakes of the past, in which those interested, ignored or mediocre, to continue to ostracize a great Romanian hero without arguments – Alexandru Marghiloman” (p. 47).

In his material, Professor of History (from Brăila) Ionel Ștefan Alexandru adds, finally, timely reminder in the year of the Centenary of the Great Union – from the time when he was part of the first post-1989 Parliament, in the summer of 1990 –, having the initiative of the election, according to his own testimony, of December 1, 1918 as the National Day of Romania: “I had the honor of being a senator in this Parliament and also the happiness of being the main initiator of the draft law that decided that December 1 would become the National Day of Romania. The event took place on July 24, 1990, when talking to Senator Moiș Văsălie and other colleagues, we showed that we are going on a parliamentary holiday and we are still with the national day of August 23, established by the communist regime, and therefore I propose as a historian to decide that the new national day be December 1, in memory of the day of the Unification of all Romanians in 1918 according to the Resolution of the Great National Assembly in Alba Iulia” (p. 180).

The last volume work belongs to the coordinator. By carefully reading the text, the reader becomes aware of Romanian Sever Bocu’s role (1874-1924) – native from a locality in Banat, within the Austro-Hungarian Empire – in defending the integrity of “his” Banat, in the dispute with the Government of Serbia, in a complicated international context, which would have to be taken into account by the people as well Romanian politicians; the author points out, moreover, that “The ardor with which Bocu maintained the rights of the Romanians on the historical Banat led to the sacrifice of his friendship with Take Ionescu and Octavian Goga, to which they had linked him until then ideals and a long collaboration. Take Ionescu once said: «Dear Bocu, I admire you suffering and torturing yourself as banal as Goga, which is not in your opinion» (p. 218). Almost two thirds of the work is represented by the notes, respectively the biographies of some personalities, some very well known, mentioned in the actual content of the work – Septimiu Albini, Ioan Russu-Sirianu, Gheorghe Pop de Băsești, Ion Montani, Ioan Suciu, Nicolae Filipescu, Onisifor Ghibu, Emanoil Mihăescu Porumbaru, Vasile Lucaciu, Octavian Goga, Ion I. Nistor, Aurel Popa, Zaharia Bărsan, Ghiță Popp, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Alexandru C. Constantinescu, Vladimir Kirilovici Vinnicenko, Mihail Sergyevivei Khrushchev, Simon Octavian Tăslăianu, Ioan Mețianu, Victor Deleu, Mihai Popovici, Alexandru Lapedatu, Emmanuel de Martonne, Guglielmo Ferrero – which makes the pursuit of the main narrative difficult. (In fact, this very rich documented study, proper to the author’s historical writing, could have the title as well, according to the content, Personalities.
of the Great Union. Case Study: Sever Bocu.) We also note one of the many documentary attestations that characterize the personality of this great Romanian patriot: “When, in 1919, he returned to Banat (after two years spent in Paris, in promoting the Romanian cause among the public opinion at the Peace Conference – our note), the state his soulmate made him note: «From Paris I was returning home to my mutilated Banat, like a soldier returning from a battle, demoralized and defeated. My excitement was great, to see my restricted homeland again” (p. 219).

Let us show, in context, that this valuable and relevant volume – that is, the scientific manifestation as such – would have had to gain, in the national dimensioning of the stated problem, if there had been materialism regarding the “elites” and “the masses” of the whole the Romanian national – territorial area – and also from Bessarabia, and from Transylvania, and from Maramureş, and from Oltenia, and from Dobrudja or from various areas of the Old Kingdom…

Stoica Lascu

Revista de istorie a Moldovei [Chişinău], Number 1-2 (117-118), January-June 2019, 198 pp; Number 3-4 (119-120), July-December 2019, 176 pp. ISSN 1857-2022

In the historical landscape of today’s Republic of Moldova, the most representative publication for the scientific dimension of Moldovan Historiography is, without a doubt, the magazine published by the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences. It appears, four times per year, since 1990 – until last year, 120 numbers appeared. Currently, it is headed by four of the most valuable servants of historical writing in Chişinău – Gheorghe Cojocaru (Editor-in-Chief), Nicolae Enciu (Deputy Editor-in-Chief), Constantin Ungureanu (Secretary), Ion Negrei (Editor). Of the 14 members of the Editorial Board (from the Republic of Moldova – Nicolae Chiciu, Demir Dragnev /Corresponding Member of Academy of Sciences of Moldova/, Acad. Andrei Eşanu, Ion Şişcanu, Gheorghe Negru, Igor Şarov, Anatol Ţăranu, Ion Varta; from France – Stella Ghervas; from Russia – Victor Işcenko; Italy – Paolo Malanima), three are from Romania – the well-known professors Gheorghe Cliveti, Ovidiu Cristea, and Acad. Ioan Aurel Pop (President of Romanian Academy).

The pages of this publication reflect the whole of Moldovan istoriography, since 1990 – the most representative historians (in particular, members of the Institute of History), including Romania (but also from Russia or other countries) are present; it is a mirror of the thematic concerns – most of the studies are devoted to the history of the space of the Republic of Moldova, from the Middle Ages, the modern and contemporary periods (for the illustration of the themes and authors, see – Constantin Ungureanu, Vera Bostan, Sumarul [the Contents] Revistei de istorie No. 1-100, in No. 4/100, 2014, pp. 83-139). It is worth noting the superior scientific quality of the studies (all have specialized references), the consistency of the reviews (which are not of complexity), the relevance of signalling the manifestations of a scientific character. We exemplify with a fragment from the review of the well-known historian Valentin Tomuleţ, who, among others, explicitly, referring to volume of the late Maria Danilov – Carte şi cenzură în Basarabia [Book and Censorship in Bessarabia] (1812-1917) –, that “attests the author’s scientific seriousness, being an additional proof that the rush in scientific investigations is not capable of bringing clarity and clarity in studying the major issues related to a topic that is extremely difficult to research, such as the history of books and censorship in Bessarabia under Tsarist domination. The work is conceived and written in an academic way. The rich and quite convincing factological material sheds light on a page unknown to the reader from the Republic of Moldova.

We have referred, briefly, only to the main aspects exposed in the work of Maria Danilov. I did not proceed to a content critique, as it should from the simple consideration that I presented the
main objections and suggestions during the discussions at the meeting of the Scientific Seminar at the Institute of History, where the work was discussed (our emphasis), and which the author took into account when editing the monograph. For this reason, we have stopped only to reveal, characterize, and appreciate the content of the paper and only a few suggestions for those who will continue the research of the subject. We are convinced that some content considerations and statements will appear in the historical literature. Beyond any critical observation, in the end, a conclusion is required: the work of Maria Danilov is undoubtedly a successful conclusion of the results of thorough research and of real scientific value” (p. 166).

Here is the content (only the studies) of the volumes for 2019.

*Numbers 1-2 (117-118), January-June 2019:*

Andrei Eșanu, *Valentina Eșanu, Filip Moldoveanul (?-1554), primul tipograf de limbă română* [Filip Moldoveanul (?-1554), the First Romanian Language Printer] (pp. 5-25); Alina Florea, *Sursele documentare din Țara Moldovei despre boltei (sec. al XVII-lea – înc. sec. al XIX-lea)* [Documentary Sources from Moldavia About the Bachelors (17th Century – Beginning of the 19th Century)] (pp. 26-31); Valentin Tomuleţ, *Aspecte comparative ale evoluției Basarabiei și Novorosiei. Primirea generală asupra situației demografice, sociale și economice (anii ’30-’50 ai secolului al XIX-lea)* [Comparative Aspects of the Evolution of Bessarabia and Novorosiai. Overview of the Demographic, Social and Economic Situation (1830’s-1850’s)] (pp. 32-52); Andrei Emiliuc, *Lacurile sărate și extracția sării în Basarabia* [Salt Lakes and Salt Extraction in Bessarabia] (1812-1850) (pp. 53-76); Elena Frumosu (Darii), *Rolul spitelilor genealogice pentru confirmarea statutului social privilegiat în Basarabia în primele decenii după anexare* [The Role of Genealogical Trees for the Confirmation of Privileged Social Status in Bessarabia in the First Decades after Annexation] (pp. 77-84); Dinu Poștarenco, *Îndemnul la unitate națională a românilor publicat în paginile presei ruse din Basarabia* [Call for the National Unity of the Romanians Published on the Pages of the Official Press Organ of the Russian Administration in Bessarabia (1860)] (pp. 85-89); Radu Carp, *Domnia lui Alexandru Ioan Cuza și dificila naștere a regimului parlamentar în Principatele Române* [The Reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza and the Difficult Birth of the Parliamentary Regime in the Romanian Principalities] (pp. 90-94); Ion Șișcanu, Daniela Șișcanu, *Estonia în cadrul relațiilor URSS cu țările limitrofe* [Estonia in the USSR Relations with the Neighboring Countries] (pp. 95-113); Ludmila Chiciuc, *Reflecția activității Institutului Social Român din Basarabia* [Reflection of the Activity of the Romanian Social Institute in Bessarabia in the Periodical of the Institution] (1934-1940) (pp. 115-135); Bruno Venditto, *Immacolata Caruso, Human Mobility and Development, A Theoretical Framework: Female Migration in Moldova* (pp. 136-157); Eugen-Tudor Selîfos, *Prussia și Unirea Principatelor Române în rapoartele ministrului plenipotențiar al Franței la Berlin, Leonel de Moustier (1857-1858). Documentar* [Prussia and the Union of the Romanian Principalities in the Reports of the Plenipotentiary Minister of France in Berlin, Leonel de Moustier] (1857-1858) (pp. 158-167); Gheorghe Cojocaru, *Cheștința Basarabiei. Negocierile lui D.N. Ciototi cu reprezentanții sovietici.* Documentar [The Matter of Bessarabia. Negotiations of D.N. Ciotori with Soviet Reprezentatives] (pp. 168-175); Silvia Corlăteanu-Granciuc, George Enache, Constantin N. Tomescu, *profesor universitar și secretar al Mitropolei Basarabiei în perioada interbelică. Schiță de portret Constantin N. Tomescu, University Professor and Secretary of the Bessarabian Metropolitan Community during the Interwar Period. Portrait Sketch* (pp. 176-183).

*Numbers 3-4 (119-120), July-December 2019:*

Ion Chirtoagă, *Întârîrea ofomanilor la Gurile Dunării și pe cursul inferior al Nistrului* [Strengthening the Ottomans to the Motions of Danube and the Lower Court of Domain] (1484-1590) (pp. 5-27); Constantin Ungureanu, *Locuitorii ținutului Orhei, în anul 1820 [The Inhabitants of Orhei Land in 1820]* (pp. 28-57); Octavian Țicu, *Basarabia între cele două uniri: instituirea administrației românești în Basarabia și dificultățile reîntregirii (27 martie – 27 noiembrie 1918)* [Bessarabia between the Two Unions: the Establishment of the Romanian Administration in Bessarabia and the Difficulties of Reunification (March 27 – November 27, 1918)] (pp. 58-74);

**Ion Chirtoagă:** During the period between 1484 and 1590 the Ottoman Porte occupied Chilia, Cetatea Albă (1484) and Tighina (1538), establishing in them Turkish garrisons, while in their subordinate kadiate – paramilitary formations made of Turks and several dozen Tartar families brought from the Balkans. The territories between Chilia and the Cetatea Albă kadiates on the Black Sea coast, and that located near the Dniester (between Cetatea Albă and Tighina constituencies) continued to be under the authority of the Moldavian authorities, but their surface was reducing. In 1512, Selim I’s vakuf was created on the lower courses of Kogylnic and Sarata Rivers, and around 1585 the northern border of Cetatea Albă constituency near Palanca Ianâk Hisar was transferred to the north of the Purcari village. (…) However, the plain south of Codri, later named Bugeac, continued to be under the authority of the Land of Moldavia Therefore, it is wrong to suppose that in 1538 times by 1568, the Ottomans would have occupied the Bugeacul” (pp. 5, 27).

**Constantin Ungureanu:** “In 1820, Orhei land comprised 358 localities (5 fairs, 285 villages, 24 free settlements, 18 slums, 10 estates, 6 hermitages, 6 post offices, 3 mills and a hau). According to our calculations, in 1820, the localities in Orhei land were populated by 102,884 people, including 58,506 men and only 44,378 women. 87,699 (85.2%) Moldovans, 7,959 (7.7%) Ukrainians, 2,843 (2.8%) Gypsies, 2,530 (2.5%) Jews, 280 Russians and 80 Lipovans, 306 Armenians, 233 Serbs, 159 Greeks, 92 Bulgarians, 85 Poles, but also 618 persons of other social categories, for which ethnicity was not indicated, lived at that time in Orhei Land (p. 28).

**Octavian Țîcu:** “The integration of Bessarabia in Greater Romania was not at all idyllic and harmonious, as it tries to be insinuated and idealized in Romanian historiography on both sides of the Prut River. On the contrary, this process was full of asperities and difficulties, and the period between March 27, when the conditional Union was voted, and November 27, 1918, when Bessarabia apparently gave up these conditions, shows us more manifestations of these animosities. Regretfully, researchers rarely concerned themselves with this period when Bessarabia and the Old Kingdom laid the foundations of the Romanian unitary state, the burden of research falling on the period after the Union’s achievement on 1 December 1918, and the history of that period, sometimes due to convenience (or inconvenience) is overlooked. In order to present the process of integration of Bessarabia into the Romanian state and not to leave roomă for speculations and tendentious interpretations related to the nature of this reunification, we intend in the article to describe the introduction of the Romanian political, administrative and military institutions in Bessarabia after March 27, 1918 and the first steps of reunification achieved (…). The second, to put all the effort and do everything possible the target to gain the respect and sympathy of the Bessarabian population. If the first one objective has been a constant concern of the Romanian governments throughout the interwar period, with multiple complications and deformations about which it was written out of abundance (and often biased), then the second was, at large part, ignored.
or treated superficially. Increased attention in the administration of Basarabia, the prevention of abuses and corruption or their punishment it would have certainly reduced and prevented the anti-Romanian predispositions, not only of minorities, easing this the relationship of the province with the Romanian state, what was seen evident immediately after the Union” (pp. 58, 74).

Mihai Țurcanu: “If the U.S. would have had no special interests of another nature badly, the recognition of Bessarabia as an inseparable part of Romania would not have in this part any opposition. These interests must be seen in close connection with the desire of the Americans not to allow the territorial dismemberment of the old multinational Russia, similar in this respect, but also in other respects, with their country. This attitude was dictated by an eminently political calculation and strategically: the U.S. they needed a great force in Europe that, when requested, would be willing to oppose the hegemonic tendencies of the great powers in this part of the world and in Asia. American documents also point to the fact that sometimes Wilson and the people in his administration questioned the correctness and legitimacy of the Country Counsel’s [Sfatul Țării] vote, but from the same sources it was clear that this was a secondary fact that had no other calling than to claim the role of argument for to not recognize the Union. Thus, as a result of the aforementioned considerations, although all the other Great Powers recognized Romania’s rights over Bessarabia, signing on October 28, 1920, together with the Romanian Government, the Treaty validating the vote of the Sfatul Țării of March 27, 1918, the United States considered that they had no basis to change their position” (p. 85).

Elena Negru: “For the first time after a period of 45 years of Soviet domination the Moldovan idiom was taken under the protection of the state, being granted the status of a state language. At the same time he was given the natural appearance – the Latin spelling and he was acknowledged his identity with the Romanian language. In retrospect, the language laws of August 31 and September 1, 1989, meant the victory of the national forces, which after a year and some confrontations with the PCM leadership and with the opponents of the national revival, managed to translate their cultural claims into reality” (p. 135).

A. Stikalin: “With the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev and his team in 1985 the Soviet leadership launched a revision of the principles of its policy [“Brezhnev doctrine”] towards the allied countries. The thesis of the unacceptability of the former methods of bloc politics was first voiced at the Politburo in summer of 1986. In December 1989, after the velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leadership officially announced a revision of its attitude to the suppression of the Prague Spring” (p. 136).

At the end of these brief notes, it is worth pointing out that the major themes of Moldavian historiography to be better known by the international academic circles; respectively, that a Moldavian Historiographic Journal/Yearbook (in English) should also be published within the Institute of History, reflecting the rich editorial output of the scientists from Chișinău (and in which the reviews section should be massively represented).

Stoica Lascu

Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists. Series on History and Archaeology, Volume 10, Number 1, 2018, 120 pp; Number 2, 2018, 144 pp. ISSN Print 2066-8597; ISSN Online 2067-5682

Since 2009, this publication that appears in Bucharest, represents one of the most professionally written history magazines in Romania (two numbers a year – and in 2011, 3 numbers each, respectively in 2012, 2013, 4 numbers each). History materials of the members of the Section History and Archaeology (but also of other Clio’s servants) are published, in
English and French (and in recent years, parallel text and in Romanian) – materials that make a
good dissemination of the results of our historiography around the world today.

Here are the published materials – in general, each occurrence is focused on a particular
topic (to which is added the Reviews section).

Vol. 10, no. 1 / 2018 of Annals Series on History and Archaeology Corneliu-Mihail Lungu, The
Return of Bessarabia within the Boundaries of the Country – Internal and External Conditions. / Condiţii
interne și externe ale revenirii Basarabiei în botezale fărăii (pp. 5-10, 11-16); Jipa Rotaru, March 27, 1918,
The Union of Bessarabia with Romania. The First Link in the Making of the Greater Romania. / 27 Martie
1918, Unirea Basarabiei cu țara, prima verigă în înființuirea României Mari (pp. 17-31, 32-46); Mihai
D. Drecin, The Romanian Press in Interwar Oradea on the 1917-1919. Events as Foundation for the
Creation./ Presa românească din Oradea interbelică despre evenimentele din 1917-1919 ca fundamente (pp.
47-57, 58-67); Ion Zainea, The Great Battles on the Eastern Front in the Summer of 1917, in the
Comments of the Hungarian Press in Oradea./ Marile bătălii de pe Frontul de Est, din vara anului 1917, în
comentariile presei maghiare (pp. 68-79, 80--88). Respectively – Recenzi (Reviews) (pp. 91-96), and
Rapoarte personale (Personal Reports) (pp. 99-120).

Professor Corneliu-Mihail Lungu (born in Răsuceni/Giurgiu County – 1943, November
9) concludes in his material that “The Act passed on March 27, 1918 and the return of
Bessarabia in the natural borders of the Mother Country were made under particularly difficult
internal and international conditions. All this was possible and was due to the will of the
Moldavian Romanians, because after more than a century of Tsarist rule they did not forget
their origin, language, traditions, culture and identity, which have not been received as a gift
from the great powers, nor have they been acquired through one’s generosity. It is true, as
noted in the above-mentioned paper (1918 la Români. Documente externe (1916
-1918), vol. II,
Bucureşti, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1983), that both «the World War and the
Russian Revolution have awakened the consciousness of the popular masses». But more
remarkable is that the idea of autonomy, of national liberty, of self-determination, «did not
belong to some improvised propagandists and circulated as revolutionary and national
formulas in the mentality of the subjugated peoples. National consciousness preexisted in
Bessarabia even before World War I was in a latent state» (Dumitru Th. Pârvu, Problema
Basarabiei în lumina principiilor actelor juridice internaționale, București, Editura Bibliotecii
Metropolitane, 2013). These facts are demonstrated by one of the conclusions that have been
stated in the monumental History of Bessarabia by Ion Nistor, who appreciated that the return
of Bessarabia to Motherland was voted for and achieved by the Bessarabian peasantry through
its leaders and rulers. And this is a giant step in the development of national consciousness”
(p. 10).

Also, Professor Rotaru Jipa (born in Perișoru/Ialomița – 1941, April 28) shows that “The
Revolutionary-National Movement in Bessarabia in the years 1917-1918, which culminated in
the return of the Romanian land between the Pruth and Dniester, self-embedded in the Tsarist
Empire more than 100 years ago, during the First World War, in close connection with the
Russian revolution that broke out in the spring of 1917, but also with the extensive upheavals
in the struggle for self-determination of the oppressed peoples of the three empires: Tsarist,
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman. The goals, the stages, the committed institutions, the leading
figures, the achievements, and the failures of nearly two years that ended in the unification of
Bessarabia, are the main concern of our research. The development of the Bessarabian national
movement from a romantic stage since the beginning of the Russian Revolution (February 27,
1917) to the convening of the first Congress of the Central Committee of Bessarabia (June
1917), at a stage of revolutionary realism opened by the Military Congress which put in front
of the Bessarabian Romanian society the task of establishing the Country Council and the
national army (October 20, 1917), when all the efforts were made to coagulate in order to
achieve autonomy, independence, and then the unification of Bessarabia with the country (March 27, 1918)” (p. 17).

And Professor Mihai D. Drecin (born in Arad – 1944, November 11) points out that “Its pages (of the Romanian press in the interwar Oradea – our note) would periodically host articles on the commemoration of events and personalities in the 1917-1919s, seen as foundations for the creation of Great Romania. These are moments of both general, national importance (the battles of Mărăști, Mărășești, Oituz; December 1, 1918; King Ferdinand; Generals Alexandru Averescu, Traian Moșoiu, Henri M. Berthelot, Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu) and local one, considered true bricks laid at the foundation of the preparation and realization of Great Romania: 150 years since the establishment of the Greek Catholic Episcopacy of Oradea (1777), 100 years since the founding of the Romanian High School in Beiuș (1828), 10 years since the Declaration of Self-Determination of the Romanian People of Oradea (1918), the commemoration of the atrocities committed against Romanians by the Hungarian army in 1918-1919 (1928, 1929, 1932, 1937). The national and local events and the personalities involved between 1917-1919 in the complex process of creating the Completed Romania were quite often remembered in the Romanian press in Oradea. The articles were permeated by truth and patriotism expressed in dignified and civilized terms, of an European type, without offending the majority of non-Romanians in Oradea at that time. This way, in addition to conferences and performances with national touches, it tried to maintain an optimistic energy for the future of Romanians, in a Europe in which the intensity of the irredentism and revisionism was growing. The neighbouring Hungary stood out by such a policy, whose echoes became visible even in the Hungarian and Hungarian culture, Jewish communities in Oradea and Transylvania” (p. 57).

Professor Ion I. Solcanu, among others, shows: we can state “that, based on the documents of the time and the military reports of the 9th Division units, sent to the Supreme Headquarters, that the Romanian troops’ mission to protect the civilians from the plunders and abuses of the Russian troops retreating to Russia, to ease their passage through the former counties of Botoșani and Dorohoi, to maintain security and order, was fulfilled, despite the numerous and tremendous difficulties posed by the huge number of the Russian convoys; by the failure to respect the imposed timetables and routes, the Russians being on a constant search for food for their troops as well as for the tens of thousands of horses; by the plunders committed by day or by night; by the deplorable state of the roads which meant that the deployment of the platoons, companies and regiments with the accompanying war equipment and ammunition had to be done with inhuman effort. The refusal to accept the disarmament operation was mainly due to the Bolshevik propaganda, encouraged directly from Petrograd by Praporshchik Kriленко, appointed Generalissimo by Lenin” (pp. 22-23).

More young scientists Adrian Vițălaru (born in Botoșani – 1981, August 26) and Adrian-Bogdan Ceobanu (born in Bucecea/Botoșani – 1985, April 24), showing “The Romanian
historiography comprises numerous papers and studies exploring the Romanian-Russian military cooperation between 1916 and 1918. However, these historiographical analyses failed to provide a homogenous image of the military relations between the two states for the given period of time. One of the topics worth a more thorough investigation is the unravelling of the Romanian-Russian military alliance at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918” (p. 42), the two historians from Iaşi “Relying on all the accessible publications, the press, and particularly the research carried out in the Military Archives in Piteşti, we set out to bring to light the less known events from the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918, which unfolded in harsh conditions for the Romanian state in general, and for the Romanian army in particular. We intend to analyse the retreat of the partially bolshevised Russian army from the Romanian territory, focusing on the manner in which the Romanian political and military leaders dealt with this complicated relation with the Russian army. We are intent on revealing some less known aspects of the abuse carried out by the Russian army on our territory” (p. 43).

Also, Professor Radu-Ştefan Vergatti, the well-known medievalist – and not only – Romanian, writes in his paper highlights “that the prince of Wallachia Radu I – Negru Vodă (1377-1383) had two wives, namely Ana and Calinichia. His second wife Calinichia was the mother of the voivode Mirea the Great (Mirea the Elder). Calinichia was mentioned in the documents papers as the lady of the country and mother of voivode Mirea cel Mare, not of his brother the voivode Dan I, respectively grandmother of the voivode Vlad Dracul and great-grandmother of the voivode Radu the Frumos. The term «lady» (doamna) was used in the Middle Ages exclusively for the voivode’s official wife. Given the properties donated by her to the monasteries, one can say that he came from a Romanian great boyar family of Oltenia. So while both Mirea’s parents were Romanian, the voivode was also Romanian, among other achievements being the creator of several cities, such as Târgoviște, Pitești, Râmnicu-Valcea, Giurgiu” (p. 129).
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