

CONTENTS

Porfirio Sanz Camañes, <i>FOREIGN POLICY, STATE SECRETS AND PROPAGANDA IN THE THE SPANISH ARMADA AND POSTARMADA YEARS (1580-1604)</i>	7
Bogdan Ilie Cocieru, <i>WWI. THE FORGOTTEN FRONT OF MOLDOVA: BROSTENI-TRANSYLVANIA-BUKOVINA</i>	17
Eduard V. Kostiaev, Viktoria V. Kiryushkina, Daria N. Kovaleva, Iuliia M. Bystrova, Galina V. Lobacheva, <i>PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE IN 1914 – FEBRUARY 1917: VIEWS OF THE MENSHEVIK-INTERNATIONALISTS</i>	45
Mykhailo Kostiv, Tetiana Soproniuk, <i>THE IMAGE OF “KURKUL” IN THE COMMUNIST PRESS OF UKRAINIAN SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLIC OF THE 1920S AND 1930S</i>	57
Narcisa Maria Mitu, <i>JEWS MERCHANTS IN CRAIOVA IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD (II)</i>	67
Félicité Paho Nya, <i>TRADE UNION ADMINISTRATION IN FRENCH CAMEROON: A DEMOCRACY OF DECEIT AND AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE EXPRESSION OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE FREEDOMS OF WORKERS (1944-1960)</i>	77
Arian Janova, Selim Bezera, Mentor Hasan, <i>IMPACT OF THE MINERS STRIKE ON THE MASSIFICATION OF CIVIL RESISTANCE IN KOSOVO</i>	87
Artan Reshani, <i>THE US POLITICAL PERSISTENCE FOR NATO MILITARY ACTIONS IN KOSOVO</i>	95
Natalia V. Ivkina, Marina A. Shpakovskaya, Andreea Gavrilă, <i>THE ROLE OF NATO IN ENSURING EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE VIEW OF GERMAN THINK TANKS RESEARCH</i>	105
Carmen de la Calle Maldonado, Susana Miró López, Cristina Ruiz-Alberdi Fernández, <i>WOMEN'S ROLE IN THE SOCIAL ACTION OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH</i>	117

**FOREIGN POLICY, STATE SECRETS AND PROPAGANDA
IN THE THE SPANISH ARMADA AND POSTARMADA YEARS (1580-1604)**

*Porfirio Sanz Camañes**

Abstract

The rivalry between England and Spain during the Philip II and Elisabeth I governments with the Dutch Revolt from 1568 and the Portugal annexation in 1580 led to a inevitable war. The political and religious troubles, on the one side, and the anglo-spanish economic conflicts, on the other side, were increasing as from 1570 while the Channel of la Mancha waters, the North Sea and the Atlantic mercantile routes were in serious risk for Spain. In 1585 Elisabeth I approved the Nonsuch Declaration directed to prevent any sort of Spanish intervention at the English Court, interested in all kind of conspirations to knock down the English Crown and to help the rebels in Ireland. From that moment, rumours about war spread around the embassies in Spain and England and the intelligence system was clearly organized in London and Madrid to take any political decision in foreign policy. During these years of rivalry, propaganda played an essential role between the positions of both monarchs and especially during the Spanish Armada and Postarmada years. With the Treaty of London in 1604, a new era in Anglo-Spanish political and economic relations was open

Key words: *Foreign Policy, state secrets, propaganda, Spanish Armada, 1580-1604*

This paper is focused in two central objectives. First, to explore the rivalry between England and Spain during the Philip II and Elizabeth I governments, and especially from 1580's to 1604, when the treaty of London was signed. During this period the political and religious troubles, on the one side, and the Anglo-Spanish economic conflicts, on the other side, were increasing as from 1570 while the Channel of la Mancha waters, the North Sea and the Atlantic mercantile routes were in serious risk for Spain (Sanz, 2005a: 557-592). Second, the battle of the propaganda and the creation of an image of the enemy during the years of the anglo-spanish rivalry was clearly won by the English Monarchy (Maltby, 1971). After the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the perceptions of the Spanish Decline and the end of the XVI Century were very close connected with the prestige and reputation of Spain as a military power.

The foreign policy directed by Philip II, King of Spain (1556-1598), based on the defense of Catholicism and the preservation of an extraordinary territorial heritage, had left important military fronts open on the turbulent European scene¹. The costing of an aggressive intervention in different conflicts and wars, was supported by the American resources (Hamilton, 1975). This policy worked while the military power was sustained thanks to the financial resources (Thompson, 1981). Fiscal pressures on Castile and over the rest of his kingdoms –such as Flanders, Aragon and Italy– provoked some revolts (Stradling, 1989: 253-275). Royal authority was questioned in Flanders as from 1566,

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¹ An important point of view, can be seen in: G. Parker (1984), H. Kamen (1997), J. Lynch (1997), M. Fernández Álvarez (1998); and J.H. Elliott (2001).

where the Calvinist doctrines spread too fast (Geyl, 1935; Parker, 1982: 115-145; Fernández Álvarez, 1984: 56-62; 1986: 7-15; Van Gelderen, 1992; Israel, 1997; Echevarria, 1998). Lastly in Aragon, where the regional laws and privileges, called *fueros*, use to defend their traditions and were against the absolute power found through Antonio Pérez affair, a way for its reformation (Marañón, 1969; Mignet, 1983; Alvar Ezquerro, 1986).

Anglo-Spanish rivalry was increased after Mary Tudor's death, in 1558, and the English began to interfere in the Spanish colonies in America (Fernández Álvarez, 1998: 515-540). The suspicious plots to dethrone Elizabeth I and Spain's support of the Irish Catholics were arguments used by London in facing up to England's secret collaboration in the Netherlands, which led to discouragement in the court of Madrid (García Hernán, 2000: 49-50). In fact, the network of spies organized by Bernardino de Mendoza between England, France and Flanders, based as much on resident agents as on traveling emissaries, enabled him to obtain information favorable to the interests of Philip II. What Philippine diplomacy could not stop was that both Guerau de Spés and Mendoza, Spanish diplomats, were thrown out of England for their conspiratorial activities (Dean, 1996: 63-70).

With these antecedents it is not strange that following years of mounting tension, the progression of the conflict in Flanders, with the advance of Farnese in the summer of 1585, conquering Antwerp and Brussels, ended up hastening the situation (Sanz, 2005a: 564-566). The fall of Antwerp, the "Jerusalem" of some chroniclers of the era, together with the vanishing from the political scene of two dangerous rivals like William of Orange, assassinated by Baltasar Gérard, and the duke of Anjou, made it very clear to Elizabeth I that England's security was in danger, as was translated in a rough session in the House of Commons agreeing upon English military intervention in favor of the Dutch rebels (CSPF, 1585-1586: 332).

Anglo-Spanish relations, deeply shaken during the governments of Philip II of Spain and Queen Elizabeth I of England, found new ways to understanding from their irreconcilable positions in the generational takeover in the courts of both countries. Spain's largest-scale military intervention in Flanders and the defense of its rights to the throne in Portugal, whose kingdom was annexed to the Spanish monarchy in 1580, ended up arousing London's fears before the appearance of a new Empire whose dimensions in geography, politics and economics in fact supposed, according to some protestant chronicles of the era, a threat to peace and stability in the world (Sanz, 2005a: 562). A *Black Legend*² began to be fostered which already had a legion of followers in the Isles (Sanz, 2012: 81-90).

² The *Black Legend* or *Leyenda Negra* refers to a style of historical writing or propaganda that demonizes the Conquerors and in particular the Spanish Empire in an attempt to incite political animosity against Spain. Anti-Spanish propaganda and anti-Spanish sentiment appeared in different parts of Europe as the Spanish Empire grew, especially during the 16th century when Spain was at its height of political power, by propagandists from rival European powers, such as the Protestant countries of England and the Netherlands, as a means to morally disqualify the country and its people. The Black Legend particularly exaggerates the extent of the activities of the Spanish Inquisition or the bad treatment of American indigenous subjects in the territories of the Spanish Empire, thanks to the writings of the Dominican Friar Bartolomé de Las Casas, particularly his "Brevisima relación de la destrucción de las Indias" (1552). The term was initially

Elizabethan England, through her *Declaration*, went from secret military and financial collaboration to direct intervention, sanctioning the military alliance between the Dutch rebels and the English with the Treaty of Nonsuch, signed in August 1585 (Sanz, 2012: 52-58). With the treaty not only was England's position in Europe made clear, but it also reproduced the conflict in America at other levels.

The ideological or religious differences started to become irreconcilable and be above the traditional interests which both countries had in common. On both sides the opponent was religiously disparaged. The Philippine policy deployed and upheld in the political-strategic, ideological and economic fields, translated into the *inalienable* nature of the patrimonial lands, dynastic-religious reasons and the monopoly of sailing to the West Indies, was going to be more and more questioned in the northwest Atlantic by Elizabeth I's England (Fernández Álvarez, 1995: 244).

The growing antagonism between both countries seemed to be leading said relations to an imminent clash, as the preparation of an Armada by Spain ended up confirming. The disaster of the *Spanish Invincible Fleet* or *Armada Invencible*, as was disclosed in the circles in London, came about due to several causes, although there were those, especially in England, who did not take long to explain the defeat in religious terms. Where was the God who supported Spain's arms to fight against heresy? How was the catholic Philip II repaid for his pious, exemplary conduct? (Cabot, 1998: 171).

Another important chapter on Anglo-Spanish political relations was the propaganda that arose before and after the disaster of the Spanish Armada. Before the disaster, between 1585 and 1588, Philip II of Spain was preparing a fleet, the Spanish Armada, to invade England. His plan was for the fleet of 130 ships, carrying 30,000 sailors and soldiers, to sail up the English Channel and reach the Low Countries where the Spanish army was waiting to board and attack England. The main objectives were not to conquest England but to remove the protestant Queen Elizabeth from the throne and restore the Catholic religion in England. Nobody could believe what the English propaganda says that the King of Spain pretended an annexation of the island country as a colony into the powerful realm of Hapsburg Spain (Maltby, 1971: 59-62). The king of Spain was interested, in first place, in keeping the English away from Spanish affairs and the English cessation of military activities in support of the Dutch rebels. In second place, the Spanish wanted that the English privateers³ not to interfere with the Spain's gold and silver treasure transportation in the waters of the Caribbean and the Atlantic. On the other side, the preparation of the Armada in Spain was no surprise⁴ and the English known about it for several years therefore they could make their own preparations to face the invasion (Herrera Oria, 1946). The English government had been building new ships, forts and warning beacons. Besides, they made efforts to

coined by Julián Juderías in 1914 in his book *La leyenda negra y la verdad histórica* ("The Black Legend and Historical Truth"). A more pro-Spanish historiographical school emerged as a reaction, especially within Spain, but also in the Americas. A different style which describes events of Spanish colonization in an idealized manner has been referred to the opposite as the "White legend" or *Leyenda Blanca*.

³ London, Southampton, Dorset, Devon y Cornwall, Bristol y Bridgewater were the more important harbours of the English privateering.

⁴ The letters in relation to the gestation of the Spanish Armada can be followed through the correspondence collected by Enrique Herrera Oria.

disrupt the Spanish preparations in 1587 with the attack to the Spanish fleet in Cadiz harbour by Francis Drake.

It's true that the defeat, I prefer to insist in "disaster" of the Spanish Armada was one of the most famous events in European history. The Spanish Monarchy, Catholic, was the most powerful country in the world, due to the vast territories of land with the Spanish-Portuguese Empire around the world. On the opposite, England, a small country, protestant, with little wealth and apparently isolated from the continent with many difficulties to resist the attack of the King Philip II armies. In other words, as in the biblical history David vs. Goliath. An unequal fight of these features attracted the attention of all European countries, most of them interested in the events of the English Channel and specially the Pope of Rome, Sixtus V, according to some, one of the promoters of the Spanish Army (Gómez-Centurión, 1988b: 48-50). Certainly, if the English realm could return to the Catholic faith Sixtus could demanded that the church's properties and rights, alienated since the time of Henry VIII, should be restored.

An image fostered by some Italian and Spanish libelists, at the same time defenders of Spanish values and Philippine politics. Tomás Campanella devotes many of the pages of his *De Monarchia Hispanica* to deal with the causes intervening in the constitution and ascent of a monarchy, the factors contributing to its strength or weakness and the orientation of Spain's foreign policy. His work, however, went largely unnoticed in Spain although paradoxically it was widely read elsewhere in Europe, yet another of those contradictions which could not hinder the intentional spreading of certain clichés and images about Don Quixote's Spain (Sanz, 2005b: 291-313). At any rate, the words devoted to the English and their nation in *Monarchia* are clearly influenced by this wave of opinion, which had fostered differences between both countries: "*The Englishman is the least inclined to universal monarchy; however, he greatly harms the Spaniard who so pretends. Elizabeth of England provided an example of it, favoring corruption in both's possessions, in Belgium against the catholic king, in France against the very Christian king and helping the heretics with advice and material support, since the island has plenty of ships and soldiers who seize everything Spain has in the north, and scamper to the New World...*" (Campanella, 1601: 189-190). Later on, the Calabrian thinker pointed out the substantial differences between both countries, paying attention to two fundamental criteria: religion and dynasty (Campanella, 1601: 191).

The events and the disaster of the Spanish Armada are well known (Gómez-Centurión, 1988a). Even we should recognize that the Spanish Armada was only one battle (1588) in a long war (1585-1604), English propaganda contributed to create false myths⁵, among them that Spain was eclipsed as a great power and English victory was decisive for the future of the islands. According to this opinion the defeat of the Spanish Armada was the beginning of England's control of the seas and the foreign policy of Philip II was weaker. Many of British historian has said that after the Spanish Armada's failure to invade England, the Spaniards were never able to successfully land troops on English soil. This is another false fact. During the 1590's there were new attempts (in 1596 and in 1597) from the Spanish court to land in the British Isles and intervene in its politics (O'Donnell, 1993: 7).

⁵ About these false myths, see: "Top 10 myths and muddles about the Spanish Armada, history's most confused and misunderstood battle," by Wes Ulm, Harvard University personal website, URL: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ulm/history/sp_armada.htm, © 2004.

The international situation favored the possibility of Irish military operation in a definitive way since 1600. The misrule introduced by the English on the island and the religious changes of the Queen, delegitimized England, which had lost its right, based on a papal concession, to its dominion of Ireland, putting the island on the brink of destruction (Silke, 1970: 67). The Irish resistance relied on various plans of support from Spain to try to strike England through Ireland, such as the failure of Kinsale in 1601 (Recio, 2002).

The debacle of the Spanish Armada was not at all decisive and Spain recovered quickly with the shipbuilding of a series of galleons, called the *Apostles*. Spain's post-Armada navy was retooled and expanded, and Spain ruled the Seas for most of the 1600s. Furthermore, Sir Francis Drake, one of the most famous England privateering pirates, was killed in a disastrous raid against Spanish America in 1595 in front of Portobelo fortress in Panamá (Andrews, 1966: 33 and 124).

The years following the Armada or the period called "post-armada" (Rodríguez Salgado, 1993: 7-49), from 1589 to 1603, were used to prepare new military strategies for the defense of Spain's geopolitical and economic interests on three levels: on the one hand, with the design of a plan for the defense of the American Atlantic; likewise, encouraging the Armadas policy, contemplating new attacks on England (Stradling, 1992: 34-36); and lastly, taking steps to activate Spanish privateering, practiced from the bases in the north of Spain or from Dunkirk, in Flanders (Bordejé, 1992: 191-196). Indeed, decades of falling-out and confrontation in the fields of Holland and in American waters had fostered the ill will between both nations –according to some observers of the era– (CSPV, 1617-1619: 421-422) creating stereotypes and clichés which damaged the other's image and encouraged rivalries between strong enemies (Wright, 1951; 1959; Hakluyt, 1903-1905). The opinions about Spain making their way around England were not much better. Religion and politics acted, as dangerous ingredients in any conflict or discussion of identities (Dadson, 2004: 129-139). The royal divorce between Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon had supposed the separation of the Church of England from Rome's control, establishing itself as the head of the new Anglican Church. The religious differences between Catholics and Protestants which were to divide Europe in the 16th century would end up turning England and Spain into leaders of two irreconcilable positions. The anti-Spanish feelings amidst the English people were again stirred up with the marriage between Prince Philip and Queen Mary, who earned the unpopularity of the English for being believed to have opened the doors to the Spaniards' administrative and repressive machinery in the country, the Holy Office included.

This policy of intentions was not free from another policy of appeasement, as can be deduced from the correspondence between both courts in the late 1590s. Beginning in October 1599, the year following Philip II's death, the first English-Spanish contacts began to be established in order to deal with the matter of peace with England (Sanz, 2005a: 579). According to a report entitled "Apuntamientos para la Paz con Inglaterra" ("Notes for Peace with England"), delivered to Philip III and dated January 8th, 1600, the Spanish monarch was advised by some catholic sectors in Ireland and England to be wary of any peace offering on behalf of Queen Elizabeth (AGS, Leg. 2.512: docs. 88 and 89). It is not less true that the Spanish theologians who were favorable to the agreement, confronted with discordant opposing voices, hoped that an alliance with England would open the way to drawing England nearer to catholic theses, at a time when libelous anti-papal, anti-Spanish propaganda speedily made its way around the

turbulent triangle shaped by London, The Hague and Paris. As the report pointed out, the aim should be “for the peace to be useful at present for his Majesty and for his friends; and pull out the roots of war” (AGS, Leg. 2.512: docs. 88 and 89).

Lasting peace had to have the support of the English catholics, whose situation subjected to the puritanical repression of parliament was more and more delicate, and they only aspired for the susceptible generational takeover in the English court, given Queen Elizabeth I's illness, to enable them to face the future with greater hopes. “The more it was in benefit of the catholics in England, the longer peace would last”. Experience proved that dealings with heretics could not be trusted, either: “The heretics are crafty, and in many respects it is good for them to hold talks of peace with Spain, although they have no desire to ever reach it...” (AGS, Leg. 2.512: docs. 88 and 89).

England had stood out, especially after the defeat of the Armada, for the budding activity of its privateering in waters of Spanish jurisdiction, in Europe and in America. English attempts to destabilize the Portuguese empire had materialized in 1591 with the capture of Santa Elena in the Atlantic, the plundering of Espíritu Santo and some strongholds along the Brazilian coast. Brazil would suffer a new attack by England with the pillage of Pernambuco in 1595 (Sanz, 2005a: 575). The activities carried out by privateers of the likes of Hawkins, Raleigh and Drake would be occupied later on by other figures such as Sir William Monson, Sir Robert Mansell and Sir Richard Leveson (Andrews, 1966: 237). This series of interventions by English privateers in Spain's area of influence interrupted Spanish colonial trade and tacitly questioned Spain's imperial supremacy (Fernández Álvarez, 1998: 610-620).

The initiation of conversations in Boulogne, where the possibility of reaching an English-Spanish agreement was discussed, encouraged the emissaries from Spain, England and the archdukes. However, the contacts, for the time being, ignored the thorniest matters – possession of fortified cities by the Queen, free trade, and navigation through the English Channel – in order to focus on questions of priority. Spain upheld the consideration of the Dutch as rebels and its trade monopoly according to papal grants. English support of the Dutch rebels had to cease immediately while from Spain the English-Dutch trade rivalries had to attempt to be exploited which had come from time ago and continued to be buried due to the Spanish-Dutch conflict.

England, for its part, was not willing to accept pressure from Spain, and even less so in the new times when its privateering traffic was so well-established in those domains. In late July 1600, the lack of agreements on these terms led to the withdrawal of English emissaries called to London. The decree by Elizabeth I to create the English East India Company and the trade block of the Spanish monarchy in Europe and overseas put a definitive end to any hint of reaching an accord between both States. The last of the parliaments convened by Queen Elizabeth, in 1601, obtained the political backing for her measures and, following the granting of certain privileges to its members, the approval of a new tax consisting of four subsidies to confront the costly war with Spain (Hartley, 1992: 40-55).

At the end of the 16th century England and Spain had a difficult economic situation. Between 1594 and 1602, Robert Cecil, England Secreraty of State, calculated that the wars in Ireland, the Netherlands, and aid to the King of France, taken together, had amounted nearly £3,000,000 in debt and had sold offices and crown lands to avoid slipping further (Sanz, 2002: 30). The shortage of English public funds in the early

seventeenth century was due to the royal system of tax collection, which was in a need of reform, and to escalating government spending to which James had added certain court extravagances (Tallet, 1992). On the other side, Spain's Philip II had declared several bankruptcies in parallel (Sanz, 2002: 30-31). Furthermore, the disappearance of Philip II from the political scene and the ascent to the throne of his son, as well as the generational takeover in England, with the rise to power of James I, created a more acceptable diplomatic climate to reach peace, as both courts knew. With this aim, making his way to London via Brussels was Juan de Tassis, Earl of Villamediana. Upon his arrival in the Flemish capital in the early summer of 1603, he stated his first impressions of the political situation in James Stuart's England. Among the secret instructions he carried with him to bring both countries nearer to the signing of peace, "in peace talks ahead", the difficulties Paris posed to any treaty had to be overcome⁶.

Lastly, by virtue of the Treaty of London, in the political-military sphere, England and Spain renounced striking up alliances or militarily or financially supporting any campaign in favor of "enemies, opponents or rebels of the other party". This clause was aimed at removing any possibility of cooperation in war between the English and the Dutch, as the treaty said: "directly or indirectly, by sea, by land, and fresh waters" (Treaty of London, 1604: Chapter 4, 250). Moreover, England's strategic position, especially in the English Channel and the North Sea, was key to the security of Flanders, besides assuring the protection of its ships at English ports. It was moreover hoped that the treaty would make it possible for the way to be opened to a military understanding by means of the recruitment of troops, especially Irish, English and Scottish Catholics. In exchange, a proportion of the silver Spain was to send to pay for Flanders' Armada through the *English Road* would remain in England (Reeve, 1989: 249-259). A military assistance also coded in England's desire to rekindle the old English-Spanish project to throw the Muslim pirates out of the Mediterranean. It was also to be expected that with the deterioration in English-Dutch relations, cracks were opened in the bosom of Protestantism, between countries with evident disagreements in the trade sphere. As if that weren't enough, the diplomatic isolation of the United Provinces had to allow the concentration of greater military resources in the wars of Flanders, forget the costly policy of armadas and develop the sea routes between Spain and the Netherlands in a climate of stability and security (Sanz, 2005a: 581).

With the Treaty of London in 1604 (Abreu y Bertodano, 1989), a new era of peace and stability in Anglo-Spanish political and economic relations was open⁷.

⁶ Likewise, the hardest stumbling blocks for a peace treaty to materialize continued to focus on the same matters: religious questions, matters of a political-military nature and trade matters.

⁷ However, English-Spanish relations in the first half of the 17th century, especially after the establishment of a new framework of understanding, with the peace treaty of London and its ratification in Valladolid, aimed to draw wills closer and create a climate of cooperation which would forget the quarrels of the past. When the questions relative to the negotiation of the wedding, which ended up being frustrated, were joined by the ordeal of the Palatinate, at least in appearance, relations with James I seriously deteriorated, and new rumors of war began to be heard.

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WWI. THE FORGOTTEN FRONT OF MOLDOVA: BROSTENI-TRANSYLVANIA-BUKOVINA

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Abstract

This scientific paper focuses on the lesser-known events that occurred during the First World War in the northern part of Romania – the Royal Domain of Brosteni, located on the border with Bukovina and Transylvania. This research looks at both diplomatic actions and military operations involving both combatants. The author focuses on the role of Russian armies in northern Romania and their interactions with Romanian troops, as well as the implications of the Bucharest Peace Treaty for the configuration of the Romanian-Austro-Hungarian border.

Key words: *Brosteni, Bukovina, Transylvania, WWI*

Introduction

World War I profoundly marked the fate of humanity, highlighting how the strategic and political mistakes of some decision-makers can result in tens of millions of human casualties and enormous damage to the world's economies. The decision taken by the leadership of the Kingdom of Romania to remain neutral postponed the involvement of the Romanian society in the Great Conflict for two years, but the Romanian communities of Bukovina, Transylvania, and Bessarabia were involved in the war ever since its earliest days.

Although the historiography of the First World War is extremely rich, with tens of thousands of studies published worldwide, there are relatively few works on this topic. Among the relevant studies, we must note, first of all, the four volumes signed by General Gheorghe Dabija, *The Romanian Army in the World War (1916-1918)*, published in 1928-1937, which add to the analysis of Romania's involvement in the war a series of particularly useful graphic representations (sketches) (Dabija, vol. I-IV, 1928-1937). Under the coordination of the Historical Service within the Ministry of National Defense, a monumental work was published between 1934 and 1946 that capitalizes on multiple documentary sources from both combatants (*Romania*, vol. I-IV, 1934-1946). Important contributions concerning the analysis of the evolution of Romania and Bukovina in the years 1914-1919 and the effects of military operations on Romanian society can be found in the studies published by numerous Romanian and foreign authors. Thus, Constantin Kiritescu, in the two volumes of the *History of the war for the integration of Romania* (Kiritescu, vol. I-II, 1989), addresses in detail through a synthesis work addressed especially to young people almost all the important aspects regarding the participation of the combatant forces and the involvement of Romanians in the territories adjacent to the former Kingdom. In addition, the military historian Alexandru

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Ioanițiu, former professor at the Higher School of War, wrote a solid historical-military study (Ioanițiu, vol. I-II, 1928) on Romania's participation during 1916-1918 in the Great War. For those interested in the annexes and sketches detailing the participation of various Romanian, Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian units in the armed conflict, these are extremely useful. Historian Teodor Bălan published based on documents identified in the Chernivtsi archives and testimonies published in various periodicals, the first research (Bălan, 1929) on the impact of the war on Bukovina, presenting in detail the Russian invasions and damage caused by combat armies to infrastructure and society in the easternmost province of Austria-Hungary. The military historians Nicolae Ciobanu and Mihai Șerban elaborated a detailed study, with a series of precise coordinates in time and space, about the offensive operations of the Northern Army in the autumn of 1916 (Ciobanu & Șerban, 2011: 269-279). Maksim Victorovici Osikin prepared a study that presents the Romanian-Russian collaboration on logistics during the First World War (Osikin, 2018: 108-127). The implications of the Russian-German relations on Romania in the years 1914-1920 have been thoroughly discussed by researcher Adrian Pop (Pop, 2018: 92-107). Gavriil Preda published a study in the same collective volume detailing a sequence of several Romanian-Russian relations during the First World War: command relations (Preda, 2018: 185-198). Among the works published in English, the one in 2013 by Michael B. Barrett, *Prelude to Blitzkrieg. The 1916 Austro-German campaign in Romania* (Barrett, 2013), is worth mentioning. It distinctly approaches the subject of the Moldova front, but without exploiting graphic elements and the details of operations centered on the Brosteni-Transylvania-Bukovina border area. The military historian Petru Otu, president of the Romanian Commission for Military History, published the most recent synthesis on the role Romania played and the objectives it pursued during the years of the Great Conflict. During 2016-2017, he published four volumes in the series *Romania in the First World War* (Otu, vol. I-IV, 2017) which enlarged upon the situation in Romania before, during, and after the end of the hostilities.

Among the sources considered, the memoirs or notes of some contemporaries of the events under examination must be mentioned. Thus, Alexandru Vasiliu describes the events of the autumn of 1916 as a furrier in the 4th Battalion, 56th Infantry Regiment (Vasiliu, 1978). Gheorghe Teodorescu Kirileanu, born in Brosteni, refers to the events during 1915-1918 as a clerk at the royal chancellery (Bostan, 2013). Alex Dăscălescu discusses the events of the autumn of 1916 as a reserve lieutenant in the 1st Battalion, 56th Infantry Regiment (Vartic, 2017: 27-42). Ioan Balan recalls the events of the autumn of 1916 as a second lieutenant in the 2nd Battalion, 56th Infantry Regiment (Otu, 2018: 42-71). The memoirs of Erast Tarangul, professor of administrative law at the Universities of Chernivtsi, Iasi, and Cluj, introduce readers to the atmosphere of Bukovina at the end of 1918 (Bruja & Nastasă-Kovács, 2016).

Although thousands of specialized studies have been published, especially on the centenary of the outbreak and end of the Great War, certain pages on the events of that period have remained obscure. This article aims at presenting the way the events took place in a mountainous region of unique characteristics. Geographically, the Royal Domain of Brosteni bordered both Bukovina and Transylvania at the beginning of the First World War. Not coincidentally, the Austro-Hungarian counter-offensive was

reported on Romanian territory in this junction area of the Romanian-Russian allied troops, towards Saru Dornei-Neagra Sarului-Paltinis, from the first day when Romanian troops were engaged in combat, August 28, 1916.

This paper follows both the diplomatic actions and the military operations that affected the northern part of the country, focusing on the Brosteni-Transylvania-Bukovina border area, during the years of the First World War. To broaden the knowledge about the Great Conflict, the research will reflect on the detailed study of military events, economic activities to secure war operations and the implications of the Peace Treaty of Bucharest, the Bolshevik revolution and the end of the war – the defeat of the central powers.

Brosteni area, geodemographic information

According to the 1872 data, Suceava County was divided into four divisions, including the Plasa (Plaiul) Muntele, with 13 municipalities (Malini, Gainesti, Farcasa, Sabasa, Borca, Madei, Brosteni, Crucea, Dorna-Giosani, Dorna-Gura Negrii, Neagra Sarului, Saru-Dornei, Paltinis) with the sub-prefecture at Brosteni (Frunzescu, 1872: 45-63). The analysis of *the Map of the Royal Estate Brosteni-Suceava, provisional edition 1895, General Staff - Section III*, (see Annex 2) shows that the administrative center of the Royal Domain of Brosteni was located at its southeastern end.

Bistrita valley, where 8 of the 13 municipalities of the Plasa (Plaiul) Muntele were located, forms a gorge nearly 120 kilometers long from Vatra Dornei to Piatra Neamt. The gorge is even longer towards the Vatra Dornei - Brosteni road, through the valley of the Neagra-Brosteni River. Bistrita River is bordered, south of Vatra Dornei and up to Bicaz, to the left side by the Rarau-Giumalau mountains and the Stanisoara Mountains, and the right side by the Bistrita and Ceahlau mountains.

Brosteni, probably the most important locality of Plasa Muntele, had come under the administration of Prince Carol on the eve of conquering the country's independence. On October 7, 1876, the boyar Alexandru (Alec)u Bals, a large landowner in Moldavia, proposed to the Prince the sale of his estate in Brosteni due to serious financial problems. After the ruler accepted the proposal, the transaction was signed in April 1877, when political tensions between Russia and the Ottoman Porte were about to explode. The acquisition value of the Brosteni Estate (a large area on the Bistrita valley, consisting of eight villages (Istrati, 2013: 50-51)) was agreed upon for an amount of 2 million francs. Given the financial crisis the country was going through, the amount was to be paid as follows: half a million was to be paid immediately by the Bank of Romania, a second half-million was to be paid after a year, and one million was pledged to the Rural Credit Bank (Neagoe, 1994: 18-19, 61, 78, 110-116).

Demographically, according to the data provided by the general census of the Romanian population of 1899, the following municipalities with a larger number of inhabitants were found in Plasa Muntele: Malini (6,317 people), Brosteni (3,099 people) and Saru -Dornei (2,422 people) (Colescu, 1905: 440).

Regarding the communication network, the municipality of Brosteni did not have a functional road link until the end of the 70s of the 19th century, and the inhabitants went to fairs (Targu Neamt, Falticeni, and Piatra Neamt) crossing the fields and mountain ridges (Popovici & Kirileanu, 1906: 46-47). By the mid-1980s, the road from

Falticeni to Brosteni reached Negrisoara valley and continued as a difficult road to the border with Austria-Hungary (Gura Negrei-Dorna).

From Brosteni to the border with Transylvania and Bukovina, communications bypassed the entire mountain range between Bistrita de sus, the rivers Neagra and Neagra de Sus. This route could be turned into a road, as it was the only route less difficult to get to the border and cross Bukovina and Transylvania from the Bistrita valley (Crăinicianu, 1894: 135).

On the eve of the First World War, Brosteni was connected by county and national roads to Falticeni (over the Stanisoara mountain, through Malini), to Piatra-Neamt (Bistrita valley) and Targu Neamt (over the Petru-Voda mountain). A county road connected Brosteni to Sarul Dornei in the Kingdom and Vatra Dornei in Bukovina, through the valleys of the Neagra and Negrisoara rivers. A difficult and poorly maintained municipal road linked Brosteni to the villages of Holda and Crucea; even more difficult roads connected Crucea to Cojoci and Chiril (on the Bistrita valley) and from Crucea through Bada to Dorna (on the Barnarelului valley) (Popovici & Kirileanu, 1906: 47). *The Roadmap* published in 1898 (*Communication Routes*, 1898), Annex 1, shows that the Royal Domain of Brosteni was crossed by an unpaved national road over the Stanisoara-Bistrita valleys-Neagra Brosteni-Negrisoara mountains, to the border, but also by a neighboring unpaved road from Borca to Rarau, with an extension to the border, from Crucea on the valley of Barnarelului.

The most important route in Bukovina near the region of Brosteni was the “Carpathian route” which started from Sniatin in the north, passed through Chernivtsi -Siret - Suceava - Gura Humorului – Campulung - Vatra Dornei - Poiana Stampei, then through the Bargau pass to Transylvania. Another important communication route was the “Belgian route” which detaches from the “Carpathian route”, going up the Bistrita valley to Carlibaba and passing through the Stiol pass to Maramures (Grigorovitz, 1908: 31). The “Belgian route” had been designed by military engineers of the Austrian government for strategic reasons to provide an easier connection between Galicia and Transylvania (Grigorovitz, 1908: 70).

If the border of the Royal Domain of Brosteni with Transylvania (in the Bistrita Mountains) was small and inaccessible, numerous border-crossing points crisscrossed the border with Bukovina (in the Rarau-Giumalau and Stanisoara Mountains). The means of communication in Romania, which proved to be of great importance in the equation of the First World War, are:

➤ the Falticeni-Dorna national road, Brosteni-Darmoxa-Panaci-Gura Negrei sector, with an extension by a municipal road to Poiana Vinului, which served the Romanian attack on Transylvania;

➤ the neighboring road Dorna - Gura Negrei - Bada - Barnarel - Crucea - Brosteni that served the Austro-Hungarian attack from Bukovina.

The important locations in the movements of troops and ammunition were Darmoxa (on the Negrisoara valley), Vacaria Regelui (on the Neagra-Brosteni valley, at the confluence of Negrisoara and Neagra Brosteni), and Crucea (on the Bistrita valley, at the confluence of Barnarel with Bistrita).

Diplomatic actions and military operations of impact on the northern part of Romania

The Crown Council led by King Carol I took place on August 3, 1914, starting at 17.00, in the music hall of the Peles Castle in Sinaia. The press release sent after this historic meeting was very short. After listing the participants, it stated that it was decided almost unanimously that "Romania should take all measures to guard the country's borders" (Otu, 2017: 51-54).

In the autumn of 1914, the Romanian government concluded a secret agreement with Russia, committing to benevolent neutrality. Russia pledged to ensure Romania's territorial integrity and the right to annex, when appropriate, the Romanian territories of Austria-Hungary, except for Bukovina and Banat, on which Russia stated certain reservations (Ioanițiu, vol. I, 1928: 7). The Russian side accepted, in a slightly modified form, the two conditions set by Ion I. C. Brătianu: guarantee of territorial integrity of the Romanian state and observance of the ethnographic principle in delimiting the future border in Bukovina. On October 1, 1914, the Romanian-Russian secret agreement was concluded. It took the form of an exchange of notes between Sergei Sazonov [Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire] and Constantin Diamandy [Romanian Minister in St. Petersburg], then signed in Bucharest by Ion I. C. Brătianu [prime minister] and Stanislaw Poklevski-Koziell [plenipotentiary minister of the Russian Empire in Romania].

Russia entered World War I with a large army. Millions of soldiers were massed on Russia's Western Front against Germany and Austria-Hungary (Bălan, 1929: 16-17). The outbreak of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary turned Bukovina into a battlefield and brought battles close to Romania's borders, including the mountainous area that is the subject of this research.

In the first days of January 1915, Tsarist troops entered Campulung Moldovenesc (Bălan, 1929: 24), while several Russian military units, coming through Lucina Pass, occupied Carlibaba, sending patrols to the village of Ciocanesti. Heavy battles took place in the Fluturica and Tatarca mountains (Bălan, 1929: 30).

In February 1915, the Austro-Hungarian army positioned in the Vatra-Dornei sector began the offensive operations. The Russians failed to provide serious resistance; therefore, the Austrian troops shortly reached the Bessarabian border (Bălan, 1929: 31). In mid-May 1915, the Russian army relaunched the offensive operations, succeeded in crossing the Dniester, and reoccupied the territory of Bukovina located between the Prut and the Dniester (Bălan, 1929: 32). In June 1915, the Austro-Hungarian army succeeded in reoccupying northern Bukovina by establishing the front at the borders of Bessarabia, where it remained unchanged for a year (Bălan, 1929: 33).

In May 1915, the Austro-German armies launched offensive operations on the Eastern Front. The Russian front is torn between Tarnov and Gorlice and Galicia is liberated. In July, the Mackensen Army Group, continuing its operations between the Bug and the Vistula, advanced deep into Russian territory and pushed the front onto the Dunaburg-Pinsc-Dubno-Tarnopol line (Ioanițiu, vol. I, 1928: 8). In the context of the fierce battles on the Eastern Front, Germany and Austria-Hungary sought solutions to attract Romania to their side to prevent Romania from approaching the Entente powers. Thus, a meeting was held at the Austrian-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

from June 5 to 8, 1915, on potential territorial concessions in favor of the Kingdom of Romania. Three options were discussed, including the surrender of the whole territory of Bukovina, a province part of Austria, and the granting of small concessions on the status of Romanians in Transylvania, subject to a process of forced denationalization by the Budapest authorities (Otu, 2017: 10).

On the other hand, Russia, mandated by the Entente, negotiated with the Romanian authorities to drop neutrality and go to war against the Central Powers. Under these conditions, on November 16, 1915, the Operations Office of the General Headquarters sent the Romanian Prime Minister a note on the military situation of the belligerents at the end of October 1915. The document called for the support of about half a million Russian soldiers to act on the right flank of the Romanian troops to be operating in Transylvania if they wanted the intervention of the Romanian army to have a real chance of success. During the negotiations, the Russian side gave formal assurances that it will support the operation of the Romanian troops, without establishing exactly the number of forces it will make available. The Romanian side did not insist either, perhaps because the Russians made certain concessions on the issue of Bukovina (Otu, 2017: 121).

On August 27, 1915, the Ministry of War in Romania took the measures agreed in the Crown Council of August 3, 1914, to cover the border between Brosteni, in the north of the country, and Varciorova, in the south. The border segment was divided into three large sectors, corresponding to the three armies that were to be created during the mobilization (Otu, 2017: 10).

In the first days of September 1915, the cover groups were mostly on the mountainous border, along the main invasion routes in Transylvania, to be fully mobilized, concentrated, and ready to take action two days before the declaration of war. The units sent to cover the border had mobilization forces, some since January, and others since April 1915 (Romania, vol. I, 1934: p. 100, 150).

As the signs of Romania's entry into the war became increasingly evident, a General Headquarters of Austro-Hungarian armies was created in Transylvania, under the command of Colonel-General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf (1852–1925), in charge of an army corps covering the area of operations stretching from the Danube border with Hungary to the Russian front in Bukovina. Von Hötzendorf's main objective was to discourage or delay a Romanian invasion along the Transylvanian border. If the Russians or Romanians had severed the ties between the two Austrian armies in Transylvania, this would have affected the entire southeastern front. The vulnerable point between the Austro-Hungarian armies operating beyond the Carpathians was near the town of Deda, at the western extremity of the Calimani Mountains (Barrett, 2013: 4, 5, 54).

Meanwhile, military events were in full swing near neutral Romania. On June 18, 1916, the Russians launched a new offensive operation in Bukovina and the imperial authorities were forced to leave the city of Chernivtsi in a hurry. Following pressure from the Tsarist troops, the Austrian army withdrew, Mount Mestecanis becoming the line that separated the fighting forces (Bălan, 1929: 33). The third Russian occupation of Bukovina lasted until November 1917 (Purici, 2020: 16).

In the summer of 1916, a larger Cossack unit reportedly crossed the Rarau and Giumalau mountains on horseback, reaching Mount Barnarel, near Vatra Dornei. A German division stopped the Cossacks' advance to the top of the mountain and, after heavy fighting, rejected the Russian assault. Following the victory of the German division, the Germans would have named Mount Barnarel as Bayernberg, the mountain of the Bavarians (Bruja & Nastasă-Kovács, 2016: 38).

The course of military events on the two major fronts of the First World War made it easier for the parties involved in the negotiations to reach an acceptable outcome for the Kingdom of Romania and the Allied Powers. The military leadership was forced to revise the Romanian army's war plans, as they were designed if Romania was a member of the alliance of Central Powers. The Romanian army's new plan of operations, long debated within the General Staff, was finalized at the beginning of August 1916, being adapted to the provisions of the future military convention. The plan named the "Z" Hypothesis called for action on two fronts: offensive to the north and west and defensive to the south in the first ten days. After the first decade of Romania's involvement in the war, the offensive operation on the southern front was to begin, the advance of Romanian troops having a limited objective - the conquest of the Ruse-Varna line. Three armies (I, II, IV) of the four that were formed during the mobilization were deployed on the Carpathian front, i.e. 65% of the total operative forces. The Fourth Army, also called the "Northern" army, was deployed to the Carpathian line between Vatra Dornei and the Oituz valley, under the command of General Constantin Prezan (Otu, 2017: 132-133).

The 4th or the Northern Army, composed of 7th and 8th Divisions, reinforced to the right with the 14th Division and to the left with the 2nd Cavalry Division, had the mission of crossing the Moldavian Carpathians along the border and advance to Transylvania, from East to West (Kiritescu, 1989: 252).

The offensive operation began with the cover troops "opening" the passes, on the evening of August 27, 1916, at 21.00, with the mission to occupy enemy positions located about 15 km beyond the "border" between Moldavia and Transylvania (<https://www.clujarm.ro/prezentare/prez.html>).

The 56th Infantry Regiment-Bistrita Group-14th Infantry Division, which operated mainly in the studied area, was created on April 1, 1914, by the High Decree no. 1444 from the same date. The regiment received the flag on May 10, 1914. It consisted of three battalions and a machine gun company. It included the territory of the Suceava Recruitment Circle with the recruitment office in Falticeni (Otu, 2018: 42). The 56th Infantry Regiment was created by transforming the reserve battalion of the 16th Regiment "Suceava" existing since 1877, headquartered in Falticeni since April 15, 1899 (Vartic, 2017: 28).

During the first stage (August 28 - September 2, 1916), the cover groups launched the offensive operations on the night of August 27 to 28, 1916. The forces of the 14th Infantry Division and the covering groups simultaneously started the operation, rejected the enemy from the mountain passes, penetrating their lines lengthwise. The "Bistrita" group advanced in several directions to the Bistrita Mountains, arriving on August 28 on the Bilbor - Batca Arsurilor line, taking measures

to ensure the junction of the Northern Army with the 9th Russian Army (Ciobanu & Șerban, 2011: 271).

Until September 2, "Bistrita", "Bistricioara" and "Bicaz" groups opened the passes and reached the Calimanel peak - Bilbor locality position, immediately west of Borsec, the confluence of Putna valley with Putna Puturoasa. Simultaneously with the successes achieved by the three cover groups of the 14th Infantry Division, the movement of reserves from the Bistrita valley to the areas of operations began (Ciobanu & Șerban, 2011: 272).

Coordination of operations with the 9th Russian Army led by General Letschitzki was needed during the Northern Army's advance to the west. (Dabija, vol. II, 1928: 267). The Southern Group of the 9th Russian Army, according to General Alexeiev's orders, had to advance in the direction of Carlibaba-Sighet. Alexeiev estimated that if "the 9th Russian Army occupies the Sighet-Bistrita area, then the success of the Romanian Army operations in Transylvania will be assured" (Dabija, vol. II, 1928: 267-268). The Russian command agreed to carry out an offensive operation with only the left wing, in agreement with the Romanian Northern Army, attacking the Giumalau-Valea Putnei front (located in Bukovina), and units of the Romanian 14th Division were to cooperate in this operation. However, the Russian forces ahead of Vatra Dornei ceded, and the Austro-Hungarian troops advanced in the Bistrita valley, occupying several villages; a detachment of the 14th Romanian Division intervened and drove the Austro-Hungarian forces north, but not across the border, as the left part of the 9th Russian Army remained in place (Dabija, vol. II, 1928: 268).

Due to the inertia of the Russians, the connection between the Romanian and Russian armies could not be achieved. From the very first days, the enemy troops that formed the right wing of the Austro-Hungarian front began the offensive operations in Suceava County. The imperial troops occupied the western corner of the county, penetrating through the Neagra Sarului and Calimanel valleys and occupying the villages of Panaci, Saru Dornei, and Neagra Sarului, stopping on the Paltiniș, Calimanel, and Barnar heights. The inhabitants of the villages in this region came to know the adversity of war from day one (Kiritescu, 1989: 253). Eloquent images about these dramatic events were captured by the photographic service of the Austro-Hungarian army in the Neagra Sarului area of the autumn-winter of 1916 (Annex 3).

The second stage of the offensive operations (September 3 - 11, 1916) started after a short operative break (Ciobanu & Șerban, 2011: 275). To ensure the right flank, Major General Constantin Prezan, commander of the Northern Army, established on September 10 the "Colonel Constantin Colori" Detachment consisting of the 85th Infantry Regiment (4 battalions) and three artillery batteries, with the mission to block possible enemy attempts to penetrate the lines towards Bilbor, respectively towards Brosteni (Ciobanu & Șerban, 2011: 276). On September 10, 1916, "Bistrita" detachment under the command of Colonel Colori executed the order to advance in the Paltinis area-the origin of Barnar-Darmoxa-Bilbor and to push back the Austro-Hungarian troops that had advanced through Vatra Dornei (due to the abandon of the Russian troops) and occupied Neagra Sarului, Panaci and Sarul Dornei (Dabija, vol. II, 1928: 275).

The third stage (September 11–26, 1916) included the efforts of the military command to consolidate the right flank of the Northern Army and achieve good cooperation with the 9th Russian Army. At the same time, the military leadership sought to develop the offensive with the left forces of the army, to shorten the front and establish a connection with the Romanian 2nd Army. On September 27, the advance of the 14th Infantry Division was stopped by the order of the commander of the Northern Army. The Division was to organize the defense on the position reached (Ciobanu & Șerban, 2011: 275-277).

During this stage, the infantry divisions of the first echelon carried out the main combat actions. The forces of the 14th Infantry Division, organized in the "Colonel Colori" Detachment and the "Caliman" Detachment (also established on September 10, to occupy a position on Mount Calimani, to counteract the enemy's actions from Bilbor and Toplita), forced the Austro-Hungarian troops back from the Neagra Sarului area (see Annex 3) towards Negrii hill and Pietrosul Calimani peak (2,100 m) (Ciobanu & Șerban, 2011: 277).

On September 12, 1916, the Romanian Command issued operative order no. 4, which provided: "The situation on the southern front requires that for the time being the armies on the northern and northwestern fronts remain defensive. For this defense to be as strong as possible, it is necessary to shorten the current front and make a closer connection between the 1st, 2nd and Northern Armies. " (Dabijah, vol. II, 1928: 279).

General Coanda, who was at the Russian General Headquarters, reported on September 13, 1916, to the Romanian General Headquarters that in four days Brusilov's Army would begin the general attack (Dabija, vol. II, 1928: 288). General Letschitzki's 9th Russian Army completely ceased fighting and confined itself to occupying the dominant heights on the Carlibaba-Vatra Dornei road. Practically, starting with August 28, 1916, the left of the 9th Russian Army remained still at Carlibaba, where it should have started the attack (Dabija, vol. II, 1928: 288).

The offensive that the Russian party agreed to execute began on September 13, 1916, but the three-month bloody fighting in Bukovina weakened the troops. Meanwhile, a new army of German divisions was formed in the mountains of Bukovina, under the command of General von Conta (Kiritescu, vol. I, 1989: 255).

The offensive and defensive movements of the "Bistrita" and "Caliman" (part of the "Bistrita" group) detachments through Brosteni is illustrated in Annexes 4 and 5, extracted from the sketches of the *Operations of the Romanian Second Army and the Northern Army from 08.14.1916 [08.27.1916] to 09.17.1916. [09.30.1916]* and the *Operations of the Romanian Second Army and the Northern Army from 09.17.1916 [09.30.1916] to 10.1.1916 [10.14.1916]*, elaborated by General GA Dabija in the interwar period.

Interaction of the "Bistrita" group with the Russian and Austro-German troops

At the start of hostilities in August 1916, the 14th Infantry Division was organized into three groups: "Bistrita", "Bistricioara" and "Bicaz". The 56th Suceava Infantry Regiment and the 54th Roman Infantry Regiment constituted the 28th Infantry Brigade in the structure of the 14th Infantry Division (Vartic, 2017: 28). The 56th Regiment, with four battalions and a machine gun company, was part of the "Bistrita" group. This

group had the mission to advance and take control of the communicating routes leading to Bilbor-Toplita and Tulghes (Otu, 2018: 42-43).

The General Staff had decided that the primary objectives beyond the border of the "Bistrita" Group were to reach the heights west and south of Bilbor. A battalion had to occupy the heights between the Barnarel valley and the Brosteni-Sarul Dornei road to protect the rear of the attack (Romania, vol. I, 1934: 183). The "Bistrita" group (5 battalions and 3 batteries) crossed the border in three directions:

- Battalion I/56 advanced over the summit of Alunis and arrived at dawn on 08/28/1916 in front of the village of Bilbor;
- Battalion IV/16 with a machine gun company and Battalion II/56, gathered on the Budacu peak, crossed the border advancing through Tiblesul Mic, occupying Batca Arsurilor in the morning of 08. 28.1916;
- Battalion III/56 with a 63 mm mountain battery crossed the border over Steja mountain and advanced over Lupului Mountain and arrived in the morning of 08.28.1916 at Batca Arsurilor;
- Battalion IV/56 was positioned in security service between Mount Barnar – and Brosteni – Dorna road, each with a company at Gura Barnarului and Paltinisului Peak, and the rest of the battalion at Vacaria Regelui (Romania, vol. I, 1934: 185).

Reports that the Austro-Hungarian troops entered the valleys of Neagra Șarului and Calimanel, threatening the right flank of the 14th Division, attracted until August 31 in the Catrinari region the following Romanian forces: 3 battalions (II/56, IV/56 and 1/54) and 2 divisions (120 mm and 87 mm); 2 other battalions (II/54, III/54) of the division reserve were moved north (Romania, vol. I, 1934: 188).

On August 27, 1916, the 2nd Battalion of the 56th Regiment moved to Brosteni, where it arrived at around 4 p.m. During this time, the regiment had moved from Neagra Brosteni valley towards the Laptaria Statului [Vacaria Regelui], about 20 km from Brosteni, then on Negrisoara, at the foot of the Budacu Mountain. In the early hours of August 28, 1916, in front of the forest canton located at the Negrisoara inflow to Neagra Brosteni, a convoy of Hungarian prisoners passed towards Poiana Vinului from a Hungarian picket from the Neagra-Brosteni valley. The 2nd Battalion climbed Mount Budacu and crossed the border to Transylvania. The 1st Battalion passed through Poiana Vinului, directly towards Bilbor. From the top of Budacu peak, one could see about 5 km the border with Transylvania, which passed through the top of the Tibles Mountain. The attack continued in a northwestern direction towards the village of Bilbor (Otu, 2018: 46-47).

After making contact with the 1st Battalion in the Bilbor village area, the 2nd Battalion was ordered to retreat from Budacu Peak towards Vacaria Regelui, providing escort to approximately 64 Hungarian prisoners. Later, on August 31, 1916, at around 6.30 a.m., the 2nd Battalion moved to the village of Paltinis, upstream on the Neagra-Brosteni valley, at about 12 km from the Vacaria Regelui. On September 6, 1916, a platoon of riders with spears and large hats (Cossacks) was seen in the village of Paltinis, who were supposed to make contact with the Romanian army (Otu, 2018: 48).

The information on the Austro-Hungarian troops obtained during the battles of September 3-4 showed that in the South Vatra Dornei area (Gura Negrii village - elevation 1620 Gura Haitei) there were three cavalry regiments, partly dismounted, with patrols in Neagra Sarului. On the heights of 5-6 km North-West Neagra Sarului (Buza Serbii - Gura Haitei) works were executed for trenches. Artillery in position at Lucaciul Munceilor (6 km West Neagra Sarului). The enemy aviation carried out numerous reconnaissances towards Bicaz - Piatra Neamt, launching bombs in the Bicaz area (Romania, vol. I, 1934: 256-257).

On the morning of September 5, the extreme left of the 9th Russian Army (1st Cossack Division) approached Vatra Dornei, in the Rusca - Gura Negrii - Cozanesti sector (Romania, vol. I, 1934: 257). The right-side security of the 14th Division and the connection with the Russian troops attacking in the Vatra Dornei area were executed by the IV/56 Battalion and an 87 mm battery in the sector of Originea Barnarului (Sarului Peak) - Calimanel mountain - Paltinis peak. Battalion I/56 was stationed at Bilbor (Romania, vol. I, 1934: 263).

The detachment under the command of Colonel Colori, commander of the 4th Mixed Brigade, had the mission "to prevent enemy incursions into the northwestern region of Moldova and oppose at all costs any operations that the enemy would try to the South and South-West, towards Brosteni and Bilbor" (Romania, vol. I, 1934: 353). The detachment was to join, by the morning of September 12, the three battalions and all artillery in the region between Paltinis-Originea Barnarului-Darmoxa and 1 battalion in reserve, towards Bilbor. On September 13, the Northern Army Command informed that more enemy troops had arrived at Vatra Dornei and the right of the 14th Division should be better secured: "To cover the right flank of the Division, it is better to soon occupy with a detachment a position on the Calimanului Mountain at the Retitis peak (2021) and Petrosul (2102). The [Caliman] detachment will establish the connection with the Colori Detachment (Bistrita) and will have the mission to oppose, at any cost, any possible attacks directed by the enemy from Caliman towards Bilbor or Toplita." (Romania, vol. I, 1934: 353-354).

The Romanian troops have reached a critical situation at the border with Bukovina (see Annex 8, *Secret operation order no. 8*, issued by the operations Office within the General Staff). Once again, one must note, as the commander of the Northern Army acknowledged, that there was a lack of "common plan of cooperation with the Russian army against Vatra Dornei" (Romania, vol. I, 1934: 405-406).

Around September 16, 1916, while moving a series of ammunition for the infantry and artillery troops from Tulghes to Paltinis, the Romanian army came to fight fierce battles at the Pietrele Rosii in the Calimani Mountains and shoot artillery fire to Vatra Dornei, in Bukovina (Vasilu, 1978: 34).

On behalf of the Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Army, General Coanda, located in Stavka [Headquarters of the Russian Imperial Army], addressed the Russian allies, on September 24, 1916, a memorandum which requested, among other things: "to make possible in the future the cooperation of the Romanian Northern Army with the Russian Southern Army and, in order to remove the danger of separation of these two armies by an attack made from Dorna-Vatra to Brosteni and Bistrita valley, which would endanger both armies, it is indispensable that the Dorna-Vatra area,

Bistrita Transilvana, Bestretza, is in the possession of the Russian-Romanian armies as soon as possible and this even during this month... ” (*Romania*, vol. II documents-annexes, 1936: 306-307). The response of the Russian Chief of Staff, registered no sooner than October 10, mentioned, among other things: “We cannot under any circumstance replace the entire front of the Prezan army. Such an expansion of the front is not in our power. Our left flank cannot be further south of the Brosteni-Olah Toplicza-Szasz Regen line.” (*Romania*, vol. II documents-annexes, 1936: 324).

As the operations of the “Bistrita” and “Caliman” detachments during 14-23 September did not bring significant tactical success, the commander of the 14th division decided to attack the 16th Brigade of Landsturm from the Mureș gorge on September 25, to get rid of the enemy ahead, and "prevent him from sending more aid to Mount Caliman". (*Romania*, vol. I, 1934: 360). However, due to the overall situation of Romanian troops' actions, the 14th Infantry Division's offensive was called off on September 27, 1916, by order of the headquarters. (Otu, 2018: 43).

In this context, it should be noted that in early September the Russians attacked the Austrian 7th Army and the Southern German Army in northeast Transylvania, from Bukovina. The Southern Army founded by the Germans a year earlier to back up the Austrians was a common army with more Austrian than German divisions (Barrett, 2013: 211).

The Russian attacks on the two German-Austrian armies were the last sparks of the great Brusilov offensive, which began in June. By mid-October, the Russians were no longer a major factor in the German-Austrian attack on the Carpathian passes in Transylvania. An intelligence report from the Austrian 7th Army confirmed that the Russians were exhausted, suffered heavy losses, had no reserves, and showed no signs of readiness for another major offensive, but they were working to improve their positions (Barrett, 2013: 212).

On October 8, 1916, the German Supreme Command, in agreement with the Austro-Hungarian one, issued an operational command establishing that the German 9th Army and the Austro-Hungarian First Army were to closely monitor retreating Romanian troops to occupy the passes. The Romanian General Headquarters tried to strengthen the defense in the Carpathians to protect the national territory and create the conditions to resume the offensive operations. The Romanian troops formed a circular arc on the mountain line, from Saru Dornei, where the Russian 9th Army was connected, to the Danube. The Northern Army had four divisions in the Eastern Carpathians, up to the Oituzului Valley (inclusive), one of which (the 8th Infantry Division) in reserve in the region of Piatra Neamt (Otu, 2017: 46).

In the meantime, the commander of the Northern Army informed the "Bistrita" detachment that, on the night of October 9-10, it was to be replaced by Russian troops. The detachment had to withdraw to Paltinis, leaving only two battalions and an 87 mm battery in the Vatra Dornei region to cover the territory and prevent enemy incursions towards Paltinis and Brosteni (*Romania*, vol. II, 1936: 738).

Later, on October 12, the General Staff of the 14th Division from Tulghes issued an extensive order for the infantry, artillery and service regiments: “Bistrita Group, formed by the 85th Infantry Regiment, 120 mm howitzer batteries, an 87 mm battery and the 6th mountain battery with the services currently attached to it

under the orders of Colonel Colori must cover the full sector between Paltiniș and P. Stejarul. The coverage would include works of reinforcement and destruction carried out on the Paltinis-Borca route and works of destruction of all paths and roads coming from the enemy towards us, in the sector above. The purpose of the last is to prevent the enemy from penetrating the defense organized on the Paltinis-Brosteni-Borca route. The purpose of the reinforcements and destruction that will be carried out on this last route is to prevent the enemy from advancing on it in order to crush the resistance for which the division is responsible in the Bistricioara and Bicaz sector, in case of a possible invasion of the enemy in the country.” (*Romania*, vol. II, annexed documents, 1936: 273).

It was not until October 13 that the Russian army responded to the call of the Romanian army on September 24 by General Letschitzki. He ordered the XXXVI and III cavalry corps to replace the troops of the Northern Romanian army on the Vatra Dornei-Toplita front and The Siberian IV Corps to concentrate in the region of Piatra-Neamt. These three bodies could stop a possible Austro-German attack at the junction between the two allied armies (Russian Ninth Army and Romanian Northern Army). The III Cavalry Corps was ordered to take measures to cover the Brosteni – Falticeni route (*Romania*, vol. II, 1936: 873-874).

The "Bistrita" detachment, under the command of Colonel Colori, was on October 13, 1916, in the region of Paltinis-Darmoxa with a battalion of the 85th Infantry Regiment. Taking into account the general situation of the Romanian armies and in particular of the Northern army, three Russian army corps were sent to the region Piatra Neamt-Bacau (Dabija, 1928: 325).

By October 14, 1916, almost all units of the Northern Army were at their border positions. The attack of the German-Austrian troops was to proceed as follows: the 11th Austro-Hungarian Corps was to attack in the region of Saru Dornei-Brosteni and fight with the troops of Letschitzky's army on the left flank and with the troops of the "Bistrita" Detachment, Colonel Colori. For better coordination, this detachment was placed under the direct orders of the 9th Russian Army. In fact, on October 18, 1916, the entire Romanian 14th Division was operatively attached to the Russian 9th Army (Kiritescu, 1989: 398).

On October 14 and 16, the XI Austro-Hungarian Corps, pivoting on the left wing in the Mestecanis-Vatra Dornei area, managed to advance with the right flank 24 km to the area Catrinar-Glodul-Gura Glodului, entering Negrisoara Valleys and Neagra stream and thus approaching at 15 km to Brosteni. The XXI Austro-Hungarian Corps at the right of the XI Corps, in front of the 14th Division, had also tried to penetrate mainly through Tulghes-Bistricioara village, but unsuccessfully (*Romania*, vol. III, 1940: 51 -52).

Given future operations and to strengthen as much as possible the southern wing of the Russian army at the junction with the Romanian northern army, the group of forces of the 9th Russian army underwent several changes between 14 and 18 October in the area studied, as follows:

- The 10th Cavalry Division covered the Dorna Vatra-Brosteni route, occupying positions on the heights: north at Catrinar- at Catrinar - Glodului hill (elevation

1308) - Piciorul Darmoxa (elevation 1461) - Pietrele Albe mountain (elevation 1420) - Ciubuc mountain (elevation 1428) - elevation 1154;

➤ The Don Cossack Division further southeast, defended the heights Muncelul (elevation 1691) – Steja Mountain (elevation 1610) - Piatra Lupului (elevation 1413).

These divisions, which had been in reserve until early October, were hurriedly dispatched to the Brosteni - Sabasa region with the mission of covering the Vatra Dornei - Brosteni - Falticeni route, which was almost completely open to the Austro-Hungarian invasion due to the gap created between the interior wings of the 9th Russian Army and the Northern Romanian Army. (*Romania*, vol. III, 1940: 175-177).

The evolution of the front and border in the Brosteni-Transylvania-Bukovina region, November 1916-November 1918

The Russians shifted their center of gravity from Galicia and Bukovina to Romania near the end of October 1916, intending to relieve some of the pressure on the Romanians. (Barrett, 2013: 225- 227). When the Romanians withdrew from Transylvania to return to the borders, the advantage quickly shifted to their side once they arrived in the Eastern Carpathians. They are no longer retreating, but rather enjoying the security of the many formidable positions they established along the border before the start of the war. What began as a war of movement rapidly turned into battles of position, resulting in significant physical and logistical costs. (Barrett, 2013: 236).

The troops of the 14th Romanian Division withdrew from the border area of Brosteni-Transylvania-Bukovina toward the end of October and the beginning of November 1916. Instead, Russian troops are occupying the front in the context of the German-Austrian offensive. (see Annexes 6 and 7).

On December 5, 1916, the 4th (Northern) Army was dissolved to strengthen the Carpathian front south of Bacau. (<https://www.clujarm.ro/prezentare/prez.html>).

At the end of the 1916 campaign, Russian armies IV, VI, VIII, and IX, and the Romanian First Army defended the Romanian front. The part between the east of Vatra Dornei and Slanic valley was under the control of the Russian 9th Army (Otu, 2017: 64). Seen through the evolution of situations on the front lines, the Romanian-Russian command cooperation during the 1916 campaign shows a clear gap between intention and concrete action on the part of the Russian ally. It should be noted that the restoration of the Romanian army took place under the protection of the four Russian armies (armies IV, VI, VIII, and IX) which, in winter and spring 1917, defended the Bukovina front to the Danube, and the divisions of the Second Romanian Army defended the Focsani-Oituz sector (Preda, 2018: 192, 194).

One of the major issues in December 1916, when the front line in Romania had not yet been secured and the Russians had not yet organized the army's rear, was troop logistical support. However, in the autumn of 1916, the provision of food for both Romanian and Russian troops fighting in Romania was a top priority for the Romanian side. Russian involvement in supply was ongoing and became possible after the establishment of the front position in early 1917. (Osikin, 2018: 119).

In May 1917, the vast majority of Russian troops stationed in the Bistrita valley (in the area of Hangu commune-Neamt County) refused to fight and demanded peace, prompting Romanian troops to fill the gaps left by them. (Bostan, 2013: 292). In June

1917, a part of the Russian troops stationed in Romania had expelled their officers and formed “Soviets”, with leaders chosen from among the soldiers (Bostan, 2013: 297).

The front ran in a straight line through the center of Bukovina, from Brosteni on the Bistrita River to Mamornita east of Chernivtsi, in the area studied in the first days of August 1917. After the last setbacks in Galicia and Bukovina, disgruntled Russian troops abandoned the front lines. As a result, the Romanian army's right wing was once again in jeopardy. It was forced to halt offensive operations in Marasti and dispatch troops to Bukovina. (Bălan, 1929: 42).

On December 5, 1917, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires began peace negotiations. They first concluded a 10-day armistice. Romania, surrounded, was forced to call a cease-fire, evacuating the territory of Bukovina. (Bălan, 1929: 44).

On December 9, 1917, the armistice was signed in Focsani. The document contained 19 articles and called for the two parties to end their hostilities. It was the first stage at the end of the war between Romania and the Central Powers, which would be followed by two more - the preliminary peace of Buftea (March 5, 1918) and the peace of Bucharest (May 7, 1918). (Otu, 2017: 13).

The agreements reached between Romania and the Central Powers had a significant impact on the region under consideration. Already in April 1918, plans were underway for the evacuation of the Crown Estate of Malini, with the Royal Domain of Brosteni becoming “abroad” territory under German-Austrian control. (Bostan, 2013: 320).

The peace treaty signed in Bucharest on May 7, 1918, between Romania and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey) recorded the modification of the border with Austria-Hungary, giving it complete control of the Carpathians passes. The most affected area was along the border of the counties of Suceava and Neamt, in the towns of Brosteni (including Crucea)-Borca-Malini. In practice, the new border in this area followed the route Bicaz-Tasca-Durau-Grinties-Farcasa (Borca)-Bivolul Peak (Stanisoara Mountains)-Paiseni (Malini)-Cornu Luncii.

The Treaty of Bucharest, signed on May 7, 1918, was ratified by the Romanian Parliament, but King Ferdinand I did not promulgate it. According to Article XI of the Treaty, "Romania agrees that its border shall be rectified in favor of Austria-Hungary in such a way that the new border, drawn in red on the adjacent map, will run in the future as follows (Peace Treaty, May 7, 1918: 10): (...) cutting the exploitation railway from Valea Bicazului at the eastern exit of Tasca, to the east of point 1245, to the west of point 932, around the trigonometric point 1904, Toca (2 km north-east of the highest point), above the letter S in the word Schitul Durau (Ducan), to the West of point 1080, cutting the road from Valea Bistricioarei, over the letter G in the word Grintiesul, then to the East over point 1143 (Frasin), 1021, over the letter C in the word Farcașa, to the East of the trigonometric points 1086, point 1150, the trigonometric point 1534 (Mt. Bivol), point 1276, point 1208, 973, 1010, 862, here turning north-east to 2 km south of Paiseni, over the letter N in the word Paiseni, over the letter O in the word Moldava, over the letter L in the word Kornoluncze (Cornu-Luncii), over the eastern edge of Rotopanesti locality and over the southern edge of Mihaiesti ... ”(*Peace Treaty*, May 7, 1918: 15). The magnitude of territorial changes in the Brosteni-Bukovina-Transylvania border area is highlighted through a red circle in Annex 9. One can easily observe that

the studied area represented the largest and most compact surface detached from the Romanian territory. While the royal family was isolated in Bicz, the new border with the Austro-Hungarian Empire imposed on the Bistrita valley had moved from Gura Negrei (municipality of Dorna, Romania) - Vatra Dornei (town, in Bukovina) to Farcasa, approximately 50 km from Bicz.

It is worth noting that the royal family would retreat to the Crown Estate of Bicz from July 6, 1918, until the end of the war. Thus, after the government and the royal family left Bucharest at the end of November 1916 and retired to Iasi, the situation created by the sudden development of the Bolshevik revolution prompted the government to propose to the royal family that they withdraw temporarily, until the end of the war, for security reasons, at the residence of the Crown Estate of Bicz (Ion and collaborators, vol. I, 2019: 343-344).

The Rethondes-Compiègne armistice between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed on November 11, 1918, was the most significant event that brought the war to an end. It was divided into several sections and contained important provisions. Part "B" referred to the Eastern Front and called for the immediate evacuation of occupied territories, including Romanian territory, by German troops; the renunciation of the Treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk, as well as all complementary treaties and conventions; free access of the Allies in all the territories of the east of the European continent for the supply of the population. (Otu, 2017: 88-89)

On November 6 and 7, 1918, units of the decomposed Austro-Hungarian army were retreating to Transylvania in the Moldova valley, in the Bukovina-Campulung Moldovenesc area. The Romanian army entered Campulung Moldovenesc on November 7, 1918. (Bruja & Nastasă-Kovács, 2016: 40).

The most important task after Romania re-entered the war was to cross the Carpathians with Romanian troops and establish control of the territories west of the mountain range to the Mureș River, as stipulated by the Belgrade Convention (Otu, 2017: 97).

On November 14, 1918, General Prezan ordered the 7th Infantry Division, commanded by General Traian Mosoiu, to accelerate mobilization so that the division could be sent to the Mures valley, and, until then, to create an avant-garde at Piatra Neamt, from where they would advance as quickly as possible in Transylvania. The journey to the destination was made through the valley of Bistrita-between Bicz and Brosteni, on the routes Piatra Neamt-Prisecani-Borsec-Toplita-Ditrau, respectively Asau-Palanca-Miercurea Ciuc (Otu, 2017: 98-99). The 7th Infantry Division advanced units crossed the border into the Prisecani-Tulghes area on November 24, 1918, and established control in the Toplita-Ditrau area until November 28, 1918. (Otu, 2017: 100).

Conclusions

If Austria-Hungary was willing to make some territorial concessions to Romania in the summer of 1915, by the Peace Treaty signed on May 7, 1918, in Bucharest, Bukovina had expanded from the south of Dorna to near Bicaz, encompassing the entire Royal Domain of Brosteni, Crown Estate of Malini, Crown Estate of Borca, and Crown Estate of Sabasa-Farcasa, all of which were then part of the county of Suceava.

Romania's entry into the First World War, on the night of August 27-28, 1916, meant for the studied area that the group "Bistrita" advanced through Brosteni to Transylvania in three directions reaching Bilbor-Toplita-Tulghes, later the Calimani Mountains. However, on the same day, the last Dorna yeomen from the villages of Saru Dornei-Neagra Sarului-Panaci-Coverca-Paltinis-Dragoiasa, were forced to take refuge to Brosteni-Borca-Malini. Worse, on August 28, 1916, the Royal Domain of Brosteni was on the verge of being occupied by Austro-Hungarian troops, who had begun to operate from Bukovina, over the Badei peak, on the Barnar Valley. The most serious shortcomings in planning and coordination with Russian troops in Bukovina were revealed during the third stage of Romanian offensive operations, which took place in the Bistricioara-Vatra Dornei sector at the end of September-beginning of October. If the 9th Russian army was stationed on the Romanian front between Vatra Dornei and the Slanic valley in early 1917, the evacuation of the Crown Estate of Malini was planned for April 1918, as the Royal Domain de Brosteni was already "abroad," under the control of the Central Powers. At the time of the signing of the Bucharest Peace, the military border over the Bistrita Valley was already established in Borca, and in the summer of 1918, the Royal Family of Romania settled at the Crown Estate of Bicaz, for strategic reasons.

With a few exceptions in the autumn of 1917, the Romanian state de facto lost control of the Bistrita valley, upstream from Borca, between November 1916 and November 1918.

Given the intense movements of Romanian-Russian and Austro-Hungarian-German troops during World War I in the Brosteni-Bukovina-Transylvania region, but also the natural setting of the Bistrita valley, which is framed to the south by Vatra Dornei and up to Bicaz, on the left side by the Rarau-Giumalau mountains and the Stanisoara mountains, and on the right side by the Bistrita and Ceahlau mountains, the data gathered in this study could be used to design circuits that attract adventure tourism enthusiasts in the Eastern Carpathians who are passionate about the region's past or the history of the First World War.

Annex 2. Map of the Royal Estate Brosteni-Suceava (1895)



Source: A. Popovici and Gh. T. Kirileanu, *Description of the Royal Estate of Brosteni, Suceava County*, Bucharest, "Carol Göbl" Institute of Graphic Arts, 1906, Map of the estate

Annex 3. Neagra Sarului, autumn-winter 1916



Neagra Sarului, evacuated civilian population, 1916


Source: www.bildarchivaustria.at/Pages/ImageDetail.aspx?p_iBildID=15452106



Neagra Sarului, collective catholic prayer, December 1916


Source: www.bildarchivaustria.at/Pages/ImageDetail.aspx?p_iBildID=15452085

Annex 4. Northern Army operations from 27.08.1916 to 30.09.1916
- extract with the area of operations of the "Bistrita" Group



Source: G. A. Dabija, *The Romanian Army in the World War (1916-1918)*, Volume II, Bucharest, Ig. Hertz Publishing House, 1928, p. 568


Annex 5. Operations of the Northern Army from 30.09.1916 to 14.10.1916
- extract with the area of operations of the "Bistrita" Group




Source: G. A. Dabija, *The Romanian Army in the World War (1916-1918)*, Volume II, Bucharest, Ig. Hertz Publishing House, 1928, p. 569

Annex 6. Battles on the front lines of the Northern Army, the Second Army, and the Olt Corps in October 1916

- extract with the area of operations of the "Bistrita" Group



Annex 7. German offensive in November 1916-Rupture of the Romanian front at Jiu-Invasion of Oltenia
- extract from the area of operations of the Russian Ninth Army



Source: Alexandru Ioanițiu, *The Romanian War (1916-1918)*, Vol. II, Bucharest, "Genius" Printing House, 1928, p. 196

Annex 8. OPERATION ORDER No. 8 for the "Bistrita" Detachment

GENERAL STAFF

Operations Office

SECRET


Bacau, 10 September 1916

1. More enemy forces were reported in the Vatra Dornei region. Part of these forces advanced and occupied the localities of Sarul Dornei, Neagra Sarului, and Panaci.
 2. To push back the enemy troops that crossed our territory and to cover the operations undertaken by the 14th division, to the west, the division will constitute a detachment consisting of:
 - a) 85th Infantry Regiment (4 battalions);
 - b) 1 battery of 87, which is currently in Paltinis;
 - c) The howitzer division of the 24th Artillery Regiment.
 3. The commander of the detachment will be Colonel Colori, the current commander of the 4th Mixed Brigade.
 4. On the morning of August 30 [September 12], the detachment should be in the region indicated below and ready to face any situation.
 5. The detachment's mission is, *for the time being, only defensive*, seeking to prevent the enemy's incursions into the northwestern region of Moldova and opposing at all costs any operations that the enemy would attempt south and southwest, in the directions of Brosteni and Bilbor.
- To accomplish this twofold mission, the detachment will be grouped as follows:
- a) 3 battalions with all artillery in the region between Paltinis, Originea Barnarului, Darmoxa.
 - b) 1 battalion in reserve to Bilbor
- From the region indicated in point a) above, the detachment commander will seek, on the one hand, to push back, - across the border - the enemy troops which have occupied Neagra Sarului, Panaci, and Sarul Dornei; and on the other hand, it will be able to oppose any attack directed by the enemy towards Brosteni, Bilbor or Toplita.
6. *Until the final establishment of a joint plan of cooperation with the Russian army against Vatra Dornei, the "Bistrita" Detachment will not cross the border.*
- In case, until the establishment of this plan, the Russians ask for our help, the detachment will only assume a threatening attitude and will intervene with its artillery, to immobilize the enemy's forces and facilitate the Russian attack.
7. The restocking of the "Bistrita" Detachment will be done according to the instructions...
 8. Evacuations will take place in Brosteni.
 9. The detachment will report directly to the 14th Division.

Commander of the Northern Army,
Deputy Major General *Prezan*⁸

⁸ *Romania in the World War: 1916-1919*, Volume I, Documents-Annexes, Bucharest, Official Gazette and State Printing Offices, National Printing House, 1934, pp. 405-406.

**Annex 9. Territorial dynamics after the Peace of Bucharest
(April 24 / May 7, 1918)**



Territorial Atlas of Romania, Territorial Dynamics after the Peace of Bucharest
(April 24 / May 7, 1918)

Source: [www.mic.ro/ documente/atlas/index.htm](http://www.mic.ro/documente/atlas/index.htm)

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**PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE IN 1914 – FEBRUARY 1917:
VIEWS OF THE MENSHEVIK-INTERNATIONALISTS**

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Abstract

In the modern world, there are many wars of various origins – from economic to interethnic and inter-confessional. This means that humanity has not yet developed effective methods to prevent and combat them. In this regard, the authors, relying mainly on archival sources of pre-revolutionary origin, including little-known ones, consider it very relevant to study the historical experience of the attitude of the Mensheviks-internationalists to the First World War, who proposed specific ways to end it through organised pressure of the international proletariat on the ruling elite of the warring blocs of states in terms to coerce them to sign peace. The sources involved are mainly pre-revolutionary evidence on the history of the activities of the Menshevism internationalist-pacifist movement, contained in official documents, archival materials, memoirs, works of prominent figures of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), as well as scientific publications of domestic and foreign experts on the history of Russian social democracy. The solution of research problems is based on the principle of historicism. The anti-militarist views of the Menshevik internationalists are viewed as a consequence of specific socio-historical conditions, in the formation of which both events on the fronts of the First World War and the positions of domestic and foreign representatives of the international proletariat towards it played an important role.

Key words: *October Revolution, Russia, social democracy, world conflict, internationalist-pacifist direction*

Introduction

For many decades in Soviet historiography, the Mensheviks were characterised as representatives of the opportunist trend hostile to the Bolsheviks in Russian Social Democracy. This position, among other things, derived from the definition of the “Short Course” of the history of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the pages of which contained sophisticated criticism against the Mensheviks “centrists” (Yu.O. Martov and others), they were called because of their attitude to the First World

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War, social-chauvinists, contemptible lackeys of tsarism and the imperialist bourgeoisie, who betrayed the proletariat and tried not to interfere with their imperialist government to wage the war (Gabrys-Sławińska, 2020: 124). This assessment of the position of the Mensheviks-“centrists” concerning the world conflict determined the analysis of this issue in Soviet historiography up to the 80s (Cigliano, 2018: 173). In the 90s of the last century and the beginning of this century, the Russian historiography of the problem was supplemented by a number of works that characterised the anti-war platforms of the Menshevik leaders. Thus, in the articles of G.Z. Ioffe and S.V. Tyutyukin, as well as the monographs of I.Kh. Urilov on Martov, his position is characterised as revolutionary-internationalist and anti-defensive (Ioffe, 1991: 29), and in the article by P.Yu. Savelyev and S.V. Tyutyukin (1995), a fair addition was made to this, that internationalism in it was combined with revolutionary pacifism.

This topic has received some attention in foreign historiography. Thus, the work of the Israeli historian I. Getzler contains a deep analysis of the position taken by Yu.O. Martov. The author paid the greatest attention to the presentation of the essence of the disagreements between Martov and Lenin, which, in his opinion, consisted in their use of different tactics and methods of implementing the principles of internationalism and aversion to war (Getzler, 1997: 388). It should be noted that the views of the Menshevik internationalists on the problems of war and peace in 1914 – February 1917, both in domestic and foreign historiography, were given in passing, within the study of broader historical problems. Hence the purpose of the article is to create a special study devoted to a comprehensive and objective presentation of the essence of the attitude of Yu.O. Martov and other leaders of the internationalist-pacifist trend in Menshevism to the First World War in the period from its beginning to the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia.

The most striking personification of the revolutionary pacifist trend in the Menshevik emigration was Yuliy Osipovich Martov (Zederbaum), who lived during the war first in France and then in Switzerland. On October 3, 1914, he published an article “Peace!” in the Parisian social-democratic newspaper “Voice”, the main idea of which was “an early end to the war and... a radical step towards disarmament”: “I think these are the days,” the sister of Martov Lydia recalled, - genuine internationalism and the consciousness ripened to ... never die out that only an independent policy of the working class can save the world from wars...” (Ussier, 2019: 117).

At the beginning of the world conflict, Yu.O. Martov and his associates admitted the possibility of jointly conducting anti-militarist agitation with their old opponents, the Bolsheviks. On December 12-17, 1914, a meeting of Menshevik leaders was held in Zurich to discuss issues related to the course of the war. The meeting was of a private character: “But in view of the great influence that Martov has on the members of his faction,” was noted in an undercover report from Paris to the director of the Police Department of December 23, 1914, “... there is no doubt that ... the results of the meeting will have a strong influence on further activities of the entire Menshevik trend and ... even the entire Russian Social Democratic Party” (SARF. F. 10003. Op. 1. Steering wheel. 351. Maps. 59).

The purpose of the article is to analyse the views of the Menshevik internationalists on the events taking place in Russia in 1914-1917.

Analysis of the views of the Menshevik internationalists on the issue of those who were responsible for the war

Noting the obvious overkill in the agent's conclusion that the opinion of Yu.O. Martova could become the opinion of the entire RSDLP, it is worth considering what was discussed at the meeting. Martov said that "his views on the war and the tasks ... of the party at the present moment and in the future ... coincide with the views of Lenin and that ... the moment has come ... when ... unification in the Russian party is possible and necessary" (SARF. F. 10003. Op. 1. Steering wheel. 351. Maps. 59). He also pointed out that the Second International, which failed to prevent the outbreak of a world war, "outlived itself" and in order to restore international solidarity of the proletariat in the anti-war struggle, it was necessary to create a "new international" by convening a "general international congress of social democracy" (SARF. F. 10003. Op. 1. Steering wheel. 351. Maps. 59). Yu.O. Martov's ideas about the necessity to create a new International echoed similar plan of the non-factional Social Democrat L.D. Trotsky (Bronstein) and the leader of the Bolsheviks V.I. Lenin (Ulyanov). However, if the Third International of the latter was conceived as the International of the revolution for the sake of turning the imperialist war into a civil war, then Martov's new International was primarily the unification of socialist forces for the sake of a more effective and universal struggle for peace.

At the Zurich meeting, Yu.O. Martov took over the task of sending the "necessary party man" to Russia in order to raise the issue of a similar merger in Russia, while negotiating "on unification with the Leninist faction here abroad". At the planned international socialist congress, it was decided to raise the issue "of a radical change in the principled attitude of social democracy to war and to militarism in the sense of completely denying the latter, and to come out with the slogan denying the defence of the "fatherland" that does not exist for the working class at all. The only and common fatherland for the proletariat of all countries, – was proclaimed at the meeting, – is the class interests of the workers of all nationalities" (SARF. F. 10003. Op. 1. Steering wheel. 351. Maps. 59).

A significant difference between the internationalist-pacifist trend in Menshevism and the "defensive" trend was the views of the representatives of the pacifists on the question of which side's triumph in the world war was more in the interests of international socialism. If the representatives of defence preferred the Entente in this respect, then, for example, a member of the Abroad Secretariat of the Organising Committee (ASOC) of the RSDLP A.S. Martynov (Picker) in December 1914 expressed the opinion that if Germany won a victory, it would mean "the enslavement of Belgium and the Balkan Slavs, the reduction of England and France to the level of vassal states, the transformation ... of Russia ... into Muscovy." Martynov also saw no more cheerful prospects in the event of the triumph of the "imperialists of the other side": "This would mean not only the disintegration of the rotten Habsburg Monarchy," he wrote, "but ... the reduction of Germany itself to the state of dismemberment and economic powerlessness in which it was before the wars of 1866 and 1871 ... In Russia ... the alliance between the bureaucracy and ... the bourgeoisie based on joint embezzlement would be strengthened... ". One who knows that the time of progressive wars has passed for the European powers, Martynov pointed out, "cannot say: I wish victory to one side or the other" (SARF. F. 10003. Op. 1. Steering wheel. 369. Maps. 62).

In the draft platform “Proletariat and War”, submitted by the ASOC of the RSDLP on April 1916 as theses about the war at the international socialist conference in Kintala, its authors concluded that none of the warring coalitions embodied historical progress: “As far as the proletariat, – it was emphasised in the document, – cannot base its hopes on the resolution of this conflict ... through the victory of more ... democratic countries like England and France, moreover ... united with the most reactionary of the European states – Russia. In any case, the attitude of the proletariat to this war should be determined by its ... the main trends – imperialist on the part of both coalitions, and not by thoughts about the relatively less reactionary character of one of them” (RSASPH. F. 451. Op. 1.D. 107. L. 1). Blaming both coalitions for a conflict, the ASOC of the RSDLP did not make an exception for Russia, which distinguished its members from the leader of the pro-defensive Menshevik A.N. Potresov, who believed that the tsarist government “did not want war ...” (RSASPH. F. 449. Op. 1.D. 22. L. 3). In a letter from the ASOC “to comrades in Russia” dated August 21, 1915, it was indicated that the “main crime” of the government was that “by means of a conquest policy, it dragged Russia into a world war ...” (Hasegawa, 2018: 117).

P.B. Axelrod, who was considered “the founder and leader of Menshevism”, had a different view on the question of the perpetrators of the war (Zhuang, 2018: 528). Axelrod always noted the difference “between the German aggressor and Belgium and France bleeding under its blows” (Chatterje-Doody & Gillespie, 2020: 310), therefore during the course of the war he demonstrated pronounced “pro-French and pro-Belgian sympathies” (Arnason, 2018: 131). At the beginning of the war, when the Russian army took Lemberg, P.B. Axelrod told the Bundist Litvak: “I know that the population of Lemberg will suffer, and the Russian people will not get any easier from this, and yet: Germany is gaining so many victories, let some balance be at least by the time of peace negotiations. ... You know, somewhere in the depths of our souls, we all are nationalists” (Shub, 1969: 65).

Yu.O. Martov and his associates were not strangers to the idea of organising a revolution in warring Russia to win in the struggle against world imperialism. Thus, in a letter sent from a distant Zurich in August 1915 by the ASOC RSDLP “to comrades in Russia” it was stated that the wealthy classes of the country, like the tsarist government, were “imbued with imperialist desires of conquest ...”. Martov and Co. saw the way out of this situation in organising the revolution: “... German imperialism,” the letter emphasised, “cannot be stopped ... by force of arms ... Force alone can block its path ... to further trampling on ... defeated Russia. This is the strength of *the people's revolution*.” “Its sounds, – the authors of the letter were convinced, – will awaken ... the will to fight in the proletariat and other countries, will cause the desire to break the alliance with the imperialist governments...”. Therefore, in Russia, the members of the Legislative Assembly of the ASOC RSDLP urged, let the people “rise in order ... to destroy the stronghold of world reaction – tsarism ...”. Only by striving to overthrow it, Russian democracy “will help to ensure that this war ends without ... alienation of the regions from Russia, the population of which does not wish it, without indemnities that would ruin the country for a long time, without trampling Poland, Belgium and Serbia by the victors” (Hasegawa, 2018: 136).

In December 1915, the non-factional Social Democrat G.A. Aleksinsky argued that in the letter of the ASOC RSDLP “to comrades in Russia” the workers were indoctrinated with the idea of “non-resistance to the German army”, and characterised the course of Yu.O. Martov as “defeatist” (Foglesong, 2018: 963). A similar opinion was expressed in a summary of the activities of the RSDLP in the second half of 1915 – January 1916, compiled according to the data of police and government officials. Its author concluded that almost all Social Democrats “took the standpoint of... ‘hidden defeatism’... requiring immediate ‘peace without annexations and indemnities’, which, in fact, in the current situation in the theatre of operations, comes down to the idea of ending the war with the recognition of Russia's defeat” (RSMHA. F. 13251. Op. 11.D. 56. L. 11 ob.8). However, the characteristics of Martov and Co., as obvious defeatists, do not quite correspond to the objective historical truth. They rejected the tactics of defeatism: “We do not adhere and should not adhere, – Yu.O. Martov wrote in December 1914, – to the point of view of the profitability of defeat for Russia, ... because ... even in relation to Russia, Germany and Austria are not bearers of historically progressive principles in this war” (Hasegawa, 2018: 138).

The idea inherent in the definitions of the Martovites as “hidden defeatists” should not be completely ignored, for Yu.O. Martov admitted at the end of 1915 that “the political struggle during the war... inevitably undermines the cause of national defence...”. He also admitted that it never occurred to him to invent such a revolution, which “would not mean undermining... the military organisation of the country that is ... weakening the capacity for state defence” (Martov, 2000: 18). Such views of Martov, if they were practically accepted by the population of Russia and its army, could well indirectly contribute to the military defeats of the state.

However, it should be admitted that at that time they had very few opportunities to exert far abroad influence on the views of broad strata of the population of warring Russia. For example, here is what Yu.O. Martov wrote on March 10, 1916, to the deputies of the Menshevik faction of the State Duma, including the reason for the delay his arrival to Russia: “Previously, there was no way to send. Absolute lack of money. ... The debt is already 70 roubles. Send at least 100 roubles. Absolute obscurity, O[rganizational] C[ommittee] agrees with fr[action] or ... whatever position it takes” (SARF. F. 1463. Op. 1.D. 239. L. 2). When reading this, a natural question arises – what kind of influence of Martov and his colleagues had on the population of the country and even on their party associates if they did not even have money to send a letter to Russia? And they did not know what position was then held by the OC of the RSDLP, whose Abroad Secretariat was the quintet of P.B. Axelrod, I.S. Astrov (Povesa), Yu.O. Martov, A.S. Martynov and S.Yu. Semkovsky (Bronstein).

Activity of the Mensheviks-"Martovites" abroad

Indicative in this respect is the observation set out in the undercover report from Paris to the director of the Police Department on July 2, 1915 about the activities of the Mensheviks-“Martovites” abroad: “... a characteristic feature of this Russian revolutionary movement in Switzerland is that the active members are only the party leaders, and the mediocre masses are waiting for military events ... and events from the social-democratic upper circles ... The small location of this Russian colony and the

even more limited number of persons on whom decisions, agreements, congresses, etc. depend, create a narrow and conspiratorial nature of all actions of the latter” (SARF. F. 10003. Op. 1. Steering wheel. 342. Maps. 58).

According to the same intelligence report, in June 1915 a private meeting of Russian social democrats of the “anti-defensive” direction was held in Switzerland, at which plans for organising their conference and further conducting international socialist agitation in favour of peace were discussed: The draft of the convocation of the Russian Social Democrats, standing on the basis of “internationalism” originated simultaneously in different persons ... The soul of this project was Semkovsky ... He ... took up the implementation of this project ... It was especially difficult to persuade Lenin, but he, in the end, agreed to participate ... only for informational purposes” (SARF. F. 10003. Op. 1. Steering wheel. 342. Maps. 58).

By June 7, 1915, P. Axelrod and S. Semkovsky, the Bundist V. Kosovsky, the representative of the PSP-Levitsa F. Kohn, and others had gathered in Bern: “Lenin did not appear,” the report said, “but the day before he... had stated, that the participation of the Bolsheviks ... is possible only if the conference adopts the resolutions proposed by Lenin.” Then, at a private meeting, Axelrod, Semkovsky and others decided to announce to him that “the meeting is ... preliminary in nature ... and that the only mandatory points for all participants can only be: the fight against social patriotism and agitation for peace” (SARF. F. 10003. Op. 1. Steering wheel. 342. Maps. 58).

Several days passed, the Bundists left the conference, pledging to return as soon as an answer came from Lenin, but it was not received. Then Axelrod, Semkovsky, the Bundist Peisakh-Liebman, and others gathered in the Swiss Thun, where they made the following decisions: “a)... try to held the meeting as soon as possible; b) at the conference, make it binding on resolutions on the struggle against chauvinist trends among the Social Democrats and agitation for peace; ... d) try to convene an international socialist conference, communicate with the German “opposition”, Swiss Social Democrats and some others for this purpose ...” (SARF. F. 10003. Op. 1. Steering wheel. 342. Maps. 58).

The conference held in 1915 in Zimmerwald, Switzerland, attended by 38 representatives of Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Romania, France, Switzerland and Sweden, became an international meeting of socialists-“anti-defenders”. They rejected the idea of “national defence”, “war to victory” and insisted on an immediate end to the conflict by concluding a peace without annexations and indemnities. Departing from Bern to Zimmerwald on four wagonettes, the delegates joked that “half a century after the foundation... of the International it was possible to seat all internationalists on four carts” (Trotsky, 1990: 156).

A report on the state of affairs in Russia was made at the conference by P.B. Axelrod. He argued that the majority of Russian Social Democracy since the beginning of the war “remained faithful to internationalism”, and there was “a very small share” of nationalists in the party (Axelrod, 1917: 121). The conference adopted a manifesto “To the Proletarians of Europe”, in the drafting of which L.D. Trotsky participated. Speaking about its goals, the authors of the document emphasised: “... we who ... stand on the basis of ... the international solidarity of the proletariat and on the basis of the class struggle, we have gathered in order ... to call on the working class to remember its duty to itself and to start fight for peace”. This is a struggle, the manifesto said, for a

peace without annexations and indemnities: "The occupation of entire countries or their individual parts should not lead to forced annexation. No annexations, no open, no hidden, no forcible economic annexation ... The self-determination of nations should be the unwavering basis of national relations" (Hasegawa, 2018: 166).

The Zimmerwald Conference and its manifesto content caused controversial assessments in socialist circles. The decisions of the conference were severely criticised by the "pro-defence" socialists. Menshevik N.I. Iordansky argued that the Zimmerwald conference "was not an expression of international aspirations ... of the proletariat, but, on the contrary, an uprising against these aspirations," and that "anarchist ideas triumphed there." Not far from the truth was the Belgian socialist Emile Vandervelde, who emphasised that the agitation of the "weak minorities" that met in Zimmerwald "cannot bring any other results than weakening national self-defence in France and Belgium ..." (Jordanian, 1916: 203).

Likewise, the recipes for the restoration of the International wrote out in Zimmerwald were not accepted by everyone. Thus, the pro-defence Marxist A.I. Lyubimov supposed that for this the emergence of a revolutionary movement in the rear of the German revolution army was necessary: "Until this happens, – he argued, – ... attempts to restore the International will remain in vain ...". The task of the socialists, who sought to renew the broken ties between the proletariat of the warring countries, "now, like at the beginning of the war ... should be to awaken the consciousness of the German workers and their leaders that the French, Belgian, Russian and other socialists were forced to resort to the protection of their countries, – Lyubimov stressed, – Only such a consciousness can ... unite the proletariat of the whole ... world in ... a close alliance ..." (Lyubimov, 1916).

Many pro-Entente socialists argued that the Kaiser's government was behind the organisers of the Zimmerwald Conference. While the allies were defeated at the front, Germany and Austria-Hungary captured Belgium, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Serbia, part of France, and Montenegro. In such a situation, Germany wanted to quickly conclude a peace that would mean its victory. Austria-Hungary was also interested in concluding peace, since the war could not but strengthen the national claims on the part of its Slavic peoples, who threatened the preservation of the empire. Therefore, Germany and its allies could not help but sympathise with such a movement, which aimed to force the Entente to conclude peace with them.

Lenin's supporters Ya. Ganetsky and Kh. Rakovsky were already accused of relationships with the German Social-Democrat and former Russian Menshevik A.L. Parvus (Gelfand), and, therefore, with the German government, for cooperation with which he went during the war. Menshevik D. Shub called K. Radek, Lenin, Ganetsky and Rakovsky, who were campaigning for Russia's defeat in the war, one of the main organisers and behind-the-scenes "masters" of Zimmerwald, believing that it was not surprising that the overwhelming majority of the then leaders of international socialism reacted sharply negatively to the Zimmerwald Conference and its decisions (Shub, 1969: 87). But the magazine A.L. Parvus "Die Glocke" ("The Bell") welcomed, it reported on October 1915 that the conference in Zimmerwald "deserves every attention as the first successful attempt to connect the broken threads of the proletarian International" (Shub, 1969: 88).

In contrast to their critics, the participants in the Zimmerwald Conference highly appreciated its results. Thus, the author of the draft conference manifesto L.D. Trotsky (1990: 162) believed that it “gave a great impetus to the development of the anti-war movement in different countries”. More restrained was the assessment of Yu.O. Martov: “In Zimmerwald, – he wrote in 1922 in his article “Problems of the International”, – we made the first attempts to pave the way for the revival of international social democracy, for its healing from the ulcers ... of nationalism ... while preserving ... Marxist traditions. We were defeated: the revolt of the masses against the reactionary perversion of the Social Democracy followed not the Zimmerwald direction, but the Bolshevik” (De Moraes, 2018: 386).

P.B. Axelrod regarded the Zimmerwald Conference as “a preliminary ... step towards an international agreement ... of the proletariat on a common campaign for peace”, which “must be followed by further ... steps” (RSASPH. F. 361. Op. 1.D. 30. L. 15). Based on this understanding of the significance of the conference, at the end of it he proposed a plan for “organising an international campaign against the war.” Its content is found in Axelrod's letter to the Menshevik Y. Larin (Lurie) of November 1, 1915. For the organisation of the international movement in favour of peace, he wrote, a broader than that presented in Zimmerwald “organizational basis for the leading centre of this movement” is needed. Such a base and such an authoritative centre could be created by a conference prepared and convened by the joint efforts of “the leading party centres of neutral countries and prominent figures of the internationalist opposition of the belligerent countries, with the active participation of the International Bureau and the International Socialist Commission.” Therefore, Axelrod pointed out, “our Russian comrades must ... present to the International Socialist Commission a demand to direct all their efforts to work on preparing the soonest possible convocation of a new ... wider conference in this way ...” (RSASPH. F. 361. Op. 1.D. 30. L. 15).

Wide international agitation for peace, which, according to Pavel Borisovich, would have developed based on an agreement between the workers' parties at such an extended conference, would have forced those in power to hesitate in their defensive policy: “Rumours about such a truly great ... event would penetrate both the trenches and this fact alone, – he thought, – could not but fill with alarming fears... those who are leading... the international massacre.” Axelrod saw the immediate goal and task that “we must set ourselves and our class-conscious proletariat” in “linking our ‘national’ cause of struggle against the old regime in the name of democracy with the struggle for peace, organised and waged jointly ... based on common agreements with the workers' parties of all countries”. Specifically, the advanced Russian workers, he proposed “to act as initiators ... in the struggle to reach this agreement with the help of an international congress (or first a broad conference). In other words: “I propose them, – Axelrod specified, – to lead a vigorous campaign on their native soil in the name of an international agreement on agitation for peace to have an organised impact on the international public opinion of the socialist workers and their leaders in Western countries in favour of the soonest possible convocation of international congress” (RSASPH. F. 361. Op. 1.D. 30. L. 15).

To ensure the representative composition of the conference, a lot of work was done, which is found in the aforementioned letter from Yu.O. Martov to the Menshevik members of the Duma. It reported that in February 1916, “the Berne international commission tried to convene a meeting of the so-called ‘extended commission’”, which, according to its plan, was to include 3 representatives from each of the nations (from Russia, one from the Organizing Committee (OC), The Central Committee and s[ocialists-] r[evolutioners]), however, “passport obstacles did not allow the French, the British ... and the Dutch to appear. In addition to the Russians and Poles, only representatives of the German opposition, the Italian Party and the Confederation of Labour, the Swiss, Bulgarian, Romanian and Portuguese parties and Norwegian youth appeared. In view of this, it was decided to recognise the meeting as a private meeting and to limit its work to the necessary minimum” (SARF. F. 1463. Op. 1.D. 239. L. 1).

Despite the status of a private conference, its participants heard a report, during the discussion of which it turned out that “the Marxist opposition formed in Austria” did not formally join it, for “... it demands that Kautsky and Haase be involved in the case ...”. Although both of them energetically supported the opposition within the SDPG at the time, they were not formally part of its organisation. After that, Yu. Martov, P. Lapinsky and the Balkan participants in the meeting began to insist with particular vigour that the Berne Commission “must make every effort to ensure that Kautsky and Haase participate at the next conference.” Then Lenin and Radek “with the inevitable Zinoviev” filed a protest, demanding that Kautsky and Haase would not be invited as “patriots and pacifists”, but in response the majority of the meeting spoke in favour of their invitation (SARF. F. 1463. Op. 1.D. 239. L. 1).

Documents, adopted at the Kintal conference (one of editors was Yu.O. Martov), in which almost all members of the ASOC RSDLP except I.S. Astrov participated, were more radical than the Zimmerwald Manifesto. However, the main slogans of the internationalist pacifists of Europe, included in the resolution “The attitude of the proletariat to the question of peace”, remained unchanged – an immediate end to the war and the beginning of negotiations for a peace without annexations and indemnities. (<https://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/zimmerwald/index.htm>). For the promotion of these slogans, the delegates of the Zimmerwald and Kintal conferences were criticised by G.V. Plekhanov, who called them “pseudo-internationalists” and not without reason stated that “untimely propagandising for peace,” they “are rendering a service to militarism.” Plekhanov was also right when he wrote that “the good intentions expressed by the Zimmerwald-Kintals in their resolutions testify only to their passion for calligraphy” (Plekhanov, 1917: 96).

The proposal by P.B. Axelrod after the Kintal Conference, on the need to convene the International Socialist Bureau (ISB) of the Second International. In a letter of October 6, 1916, he informed Yu. Larin, “... I still stand for the question of organising an international ... campaign in favour of convening an ISB ... to discuss ... a plan for an international struggle in the centre of agitation and organisational work towards peace” (Rodgers, 2020: 429). Axelrod noted with regret that the pioneering role of Russian workers in this matter was out of the question. However, for them “there is still a rather honourable mission – to come up with ... an initiative in the field of ... summing up and bringing to a logical end that internationalist movement, the main stage of which was

Zimmerwald and Kintal.” To achieve this goal, it is necessary, he believed, that three elements combine their efforts: “... 1) opposition minorities in Germany, France and England; 2) the Berne International Committee as ... the centre of more decisive, most active groups and opposition parties of all the belligerent countries; 3) parties and party centres of neutral countries” (RSASPH. F. 361. Op. 1.D. 30. L. 15).

However, K.-Ya. Branting argued that as long as the point of view of the majority of the Social Democratic Party prevails in Germany, the convening of the Bureau ... cannot bring any results. The positions of the socialists of the warring countries are too opposite. I hope that time and events will create a psychological opportunity for international communication. In the meantime, we can only prepare this communication, dispelling the imperialist fog ...” (Jordanian, 1916: 176). E. Vandervelde spoke even more clearly: “... the convocation of the entire international bureau is not yet possible. It seems to me that it would be even morally difficult to be present at the meetings of the leaders when the proletariat is sitting in the trenches and dying on the battlefield. We need to wait and fight ...” (Jordanian, 1916: 176-177). Such a reaction of the leaders of the international socialist movement to Axelrod's proposal is one of the confirmations of its untimeliness.

Conclusions

Representatives of the internationalist-pacifist trend in the domestic social democracy did everything in their power and the possibilities of political emigrants in 1914 – February 1917 to end the world massacre as soon as possible by stopping it immediately and concluding a general, just democratic peace without annexations and indemnities based on respect for the right to free self-determination by combining the efforts of both Russian and European anti-militarists to make an appropriate decision at an international socialist conference that could influence the aggressive plans of the imperialist governments of both coalitions that were hostile during the First World War.

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THE IMAGE OF “KURKUL” IN THE COMMUNIST PRESS OF UKRAINIAN SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLIC OF THE 1920S AND 1930S

Mykhailo Kostiv, Tetiana Soproniuk***

Abstract

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the problem of “destruction of kurkul (kulak) as a class” was of key significance for communist totalitarian regime ideology in the USSR. The processes connected with dekulakization were particularly cruel in the Ukrainian SSR, which was characterized by powerful national liberation movement and predisposition to individual agriculture. An important component of these processes was propagandistic support of repressive policy of the regime, especially through the printed press as the most accessible mass media type at the time. Due to the periodicals, the image of kurkul as an “enemy of the people” and a “wrecker” was shaped. In the article, the authors’ aim was to study the publications in central and local Soviet newspapers and define specific features of functioning of propaganda in the USSR. Archival materials and testimonies of direct victims and eyewitnesses of dekulakization were used, too. Analysis and comparison of sources of different kinds revealed the real situation at the time. Finally, shaping the enemy image by the communist propaganda led to the dehumanization of society and justified the murder of millions of people.

Key words: *kulaks, propaganda, repressions, totalitarianism, Holodomor, communism*

One of the most common propagandistic methods of communist totalitarian regime was cultivating hatred towards individuals, social groups and foreign states that were considered hostile and/or harmful. Enemy image was actively developed in mass consciousness through media and direct agitation. To mark the enemies, the Bolshevik propaganda used special words such as “nepman”, “bourgeois nationalist”, “counter-revolutionary element”, etc. Among them, the concept of “kurkul” is of particular interest since it have been changing its sense depending on political and ideological needs of authorities.

Nowadays it is important to re-think this ideological cliché and deconstruct its meanings. For example, Polish researcher M. Glowinski studied the political language of communist Poland and called it “newspeak” (following G. Orwell’s term). He noticed, “The meaning [of the word – Aut.] is subordinate to the judgement; sometimes it does not matter what the word means, but what is important is which qualifiers are associated with it (good / bad, our / alien, forward / backward, etc.) (Glowinski, 2009: 12–13). The same can be stated about the word “kurkul”; in fact, it lost its primary meanings. In Soviet press, the image of “kurkul” (both textual and visual) became the marker of negative political and human features and was object of evolved hatred.

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¹ Russian equivalent of the word “kurkul” is “kulak”, and it appears in English-language sources more often. Both terms were used in Ukrainian documents, printed publications of the late 1920s – early 1930s, since Russian language was dominant in these spheres, and influenced Ukrainian vocabulary. In this article, the authors used Ukrainian term.

The term “kurkul” widely spread in Ukrainian language in connection with Bolshevik occupation of Ukraine and active implementation of Bolshevik policies. Despite this word emerged long before, it did not have negative connotation and meant “a person who came from another region and settled for permanent residence” (Hrinchenko B., 1907: 330). In particular, by this word the inhabitants of towns mocked the Cossacks who came to urban areas and stayed there.

In the communist press of the middle 1920s, there was a live discussion towards defining “kurkuls” and distinguishing them from “seredniaks” (middle-wealth farmers) and the poor. It began with the article in *Bednota* newspaper in 1925, where the statistician Smerdov proposed “material”, e.g. statistical criteria for determining “kulaks”. Due to new economic policy (so-called nep), which allowed basic entrepreneurship and introduced some elements of market economics, the legal ways of enrichment appeared in the USSR in the early 1920s. However, the ideology was still criticizing wealthy people, and that is why it was important to differentiate “fair” and “unfair” wealth.

The analyzed problem was also discussed at All-Ukrainian party conference on the work in the villages, which was held in December 1924. I. Klymenko, people’s commissar of land affairs, stressed in his report, “Locally, the deplorable mistakes happen quite often, when seredniaks are considered kurkuls. One must pay attention to what they were before the revolution. /.../ and when the farmer has not been exploiting someone else’s labor for all this time and improved his farm on his own, got cattle and farming tools, can we call him a kurkul? On the contrary, our task is to make all farmers like that. Kurkul is the one who is into usury, who suppresses his neighbor, who exploits farmhands, and collects his capital on this basis” (*Selianska Pravda*, 5–6 December 1924). Although such definition did not directly limit the potential prosperity of villagers, it implied a certain restraint, as there was a maximal possible level of richness one is capable of reaching without using hired labor.

S. Pylypenko, famous writer and editor of one of the most popular Ukrainian-language newspapers for farmers, noted, “The word ‘kurkul’ has become derogative, like ‘bourgeois’. The rich do not like it. They know that in the Soviet Union kurkul is defective citizen, that there is no way for him to get into the soviet government; not only does not he have different privileges, but also he is oppressed like no one else in the country. Kurkul does not want to be called like this; he is ashamed of his ‘kurkulism’” (*Selianska Pravda*, 6–7 February 1925). The fact of being “kurkul” may have caused political persecutions and problems with exercising basic civil rights (for example, getting education, employment, etc.), and that is why many tried to avoid being called this way. The state a-priori was suspicious to “kurkuls” and even members of their families.

Critical point of the discussion was that “kulaks” should have been defined not in accordance with their wealth, but depending on the ways and methods they gained it. For example, “One can consider kurkuls those who somehow exploit retarded farms, e.g. get rich at the expense of the poverty, ignorance and disorganization of the villagers, and go against the socialism building in the country” (*Radianske selo*, 27 January 1925). In other words, “It happens that if one judges depending on cows and horses, the same farmer can be considered seredniak or even poor in one place and kurkul in the other”

(*Zirka*, 23 February 1925). Then the author cites I. Klymenko, “I think that kurkul is a farmer who has many farming tools, employs farmhands, exploits them, and exploits farmers on the basis of rental, extortions and serfdom. The second kind of kurkul is characterized by the fact that he keeps his farm, but at the same time, he has a mill, millstones and so on. There is also a third type of kurkul, who is into trade and surcharging” (*Zirka*, 23 February 1925). As we can see, this definition of “kurkul” is more complicated; it requires deep investigation into the person’s income source.

In addition, professor Ye. Stashevskiy criticized the statistical approach as the only way to define this social stratum and proposed to range the criteria depending on the region, “/.../ in each locality (okruha, raion), there will be external signs of wealth, which are impossible to be reached without using hired labor, without squeezing the sweat out the hireling, and without exploitation of poor farmers, which is now illegal” (*Bilshovyk* (Kyiv), 29 October 1924).

Moreover, the disputants noted that kurkuls’ farms should be taken as an example of agriculture. “One must not brand hard-working seredniak a kurkul, but learn from him how to keep farm, and involve him into public life” (*Radianske selo*, 27 January 1925). In Soviet terms, involvement in public life meant loyalty to the authorities and supporting the policies they were introducing.

To uphold their arguments, the participants of the discussion appealed to V. Lenin’s works as the most authoritative source. Nevertheless, he still did not designate strict differentiation between three groups of villagers (kurkuls in the citation given by I. Chornobyl were understood as “the rich peasants who exploit the labor of others, either hiring them for work, or lending money at interest, and so forth. This group supports the landowners and capitalists, the enemies of the Soviet power” (Lenin, 1918: 501), but the definition of seredniaks was even less distinct, as follows, “They are not enemies of the Soviet power. They can be its friends; we are working for this, and will bring it about” (Lenin, 1918: 501)). I. Chornobyl, having referred to V. Lenin, proposed to take into account the details of each case and even “allowed” seredniaks to use hired labor when it was necessary, “However, it is always necessary to be careful while solving this question locally. One cannot judge on cows and horses. In some cases, one can’t judge on hired labor, too, when this employed worker is not exploited, and there are such circumstances on the farm that it needs a hired worker (the farmer is ill, they have small children, etc.)” (*Zirka*, 23 February 1925). The situation given in the citation was impossible in the early 1930s.

Admittedly, political meaning of “kurkul” was implied even in V. Lenin’s words mentioned above. “Seredniaks” were “not the enemies of the Soviet power”. Subsequently, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, those who did not endorse communist ideas could not belong to “seredniaks” regardless of how much or how little property they owned. Similarly, the political connotation can be found in I. Klymenko’s report, where he emphasizes the need to inquiry the social status (and, therefore, political loyalty) of the person before the revolution.

This discussion was happening at different levels – in the press, among the authorities, and in the villages, where such distinction was critical, as it was literally defining a person’s future. Nonetheless, simple, logical and recognizable markers of “kurkul” still were not identified, which sometimes led to conflicts.

Significantly, all the authors of above-mentioned articles in Ukrainian newspapers dealing with the definition of “kurkuls” were repressed later. For example, S. Pylypenko was shot in 1934 (after an accusation of “apologetic attitude to bourgeois-nationalist elements” (Polianska, & Manova, 2016: 25)). Professor Ye. Stashevskiy was arrested once in 1930 (in famous “Union for Liberation of Ukraine” case) and later in 1938 on charges of being “an agent of foreign intelligence, member of counter-revolutionary organization”, and killed by the investigator during the interrogation (Rublov, 2012: 841). I. Klymenko, cited by I. Chornobyl, in 1937 was alleged of ordering to poison the grain and shot right after the court hearing (Hrinchenko V., 2007: 75). I. Chornobyl himself (real name Ivan Tkachuk) was sentenced to five years of imprisonment in 1934 in the case of “Ukrainian Military Organization”. He escaped from labor camp in 1936, but was caught and got three extra years. I. Tkachuk managed to survive his whole imprisonment term, returned to Ukraine and died in 1948 (Musiienko, 1991: 425). The policy of the regime changed, and everyone who stepped away from “general party line” was potentially an “enemy of the people”. Those who were able to express their ideas in relative freedom of the middle 1920s, in a few years could become the regime victims.

Also, in the middle 1920s, the authorities developed a special system of taxation of kurkuls’ farms, which in the early 1930s became especially strict. Under the pretext of taxation and fines, the authorized people often confiscated property and food products. The most horrible manifestation of this process was the Holodomor of 1932 and 1933, when the repressive methods trained on “kurkuls” were used against Ukrainian nation as a whole.

Already in the early 1920s, the word “kurkul” was associated with those who resist to the Bolshevik regime. In the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (Ukrainian SSR) it had national and political meaning – “kurkuls” were often mentioned together with priests, supporters of Ukrainian National Republic, Directorate, S. Petliura or any other anti-Bolshevik formation as the biggest enemies and threat to the new way of life. For example, the review of political and economic state of the USSR (June 1923) stated, “The farmers, under the influence of intensified agitation of Petliura supporters, kurkuls and clergy, are rich soil for banditism, and Petliura supporters await for their participation in the rebel after the harvesting” (Kapustian, 2003: 24).

Due to the propaganda in press, radio and cinematography, a negative, “misanthropic” image of kurkul was shaped. Ukrainian historian O. Hanzha stresses, “when the economic course changed in the late 1920s, the concept of ‘kulak’ finally lost its social and economic meaning and turned into political weapon of the regime’s struggle against farmers (Hanzha, 2000: 13). Along with this term, the word “hlytai” (“covetous”), more common to Ukrainian language, was frequently used. At the end of the 1920s, the term “kurkul” became widespread and one of the most significant terms of the time.

For example, in the report of Izium Okruha Executive Committee of Ukrainian Central Executive Committee “On the course of grain procurements and the policy of ‘attack onto the kurkul’ after the 15th Conference of Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)” (CSAPOU, fund 1, inventory 5, file 385, sheet 12), the words “rich” and “kurkul” part of the village are often used together. In this document from Kharkiv region, “kurkuls” are the richest inhabitants of the village, but punitive authorities pay

special attention to their political views. All anti-Soviet activities in the village are attributed exclusively to the “kurkuls”. The document includes the facts that show both economic and political motives of rejection of the regime. The direct speech of one of the “kurkul” is given, “Soviet authorities are suffocating us. To what time will it be this way? We have just paid the tax, and now we have to pay self-taxation. To get rid of Soviet power, we have to organize green bands. No matter if I die, but my sons will take the revenge for me, the time will come, and the sun will rise above my gateway” (Kapustian, 2003: 24).

Another farmer cited in the mentioned document notices a clear national component in the troubles connected with the repressions against the Ukrainian farmers, “Moscow plunders Ukraine. Katsaps² came here, and they are suffocating khokhols³. But the peasant waits for some time, and when he rebels, the life immediately becomes better. Now it is time to expel communists. They live well, they have clothes and shoes, but the peasant does not have even skin, he is naked and barefoot” (Kapustian, 2003: 24).

In order to develop the enemy image, communist press described “kurkuls” as “bandits” and dangerous criminals. While telling about the cases of murder of local Bolshevik activists, the correspondents stressed the cruelty and malice of rebels (“By thug attacks, arsons, shootings, they disturb the peaceful creative work of the poor and middle-wealth farmers” (*Radianske zhhyttia*, 23 November 1929)). The concept of “kurkul terror” became particularly active in the late 1920s. Newspapers published numerous articles on attacks against selkors (farmers’ correspondents)⁴ (*Radianske zhhyttia*, 5 October 1929) and local activists (*Radianske zhhyttia*, 12 October 1929), murders, arsons of their houses (*Radianske zhhyttia*, 12 October 1929), threats, etc.

As a result, kurkuls were seen as brutal people by default. For instance, “Boiko is pidkurkulnyk⁵, and his wife in kurkul’s daughter [she had nothing to do with the murder referred to in the article – Authors]. As criminal and pidkurkulnyk, he can easily kill a man, but in this case one must think that this assault was made on the instructions of certain kurkuls, who must be identified” (*Radianske zhhyttia*, 24 October 1929).

The press also emphasized their anti-Soviet sentiments and explained their hatred by the first wave of forced dekulakization Soviet authorities conducted right after they seized the power, “Lukash Danylo Prokop hates the Soviet power with all his soul. He harbors a grudge against it, because it took eight desiatynas of land from him and left only ten and a half” (*Radianske zhhyttia*, 5–7 November 1929).

² Katsap is a derogative word for “Russian”.

³ Khokhol is a derogative word for “Ukrainian”.

⁴ Selkors were freelance correspondents of the communist newspapers and magazines. In 1920–1930s, the campaign of involving the freelance correspondents to the work of the press was promoted in the USSR. The regime used selkors as informants and activists; for example, they “denounced kurkuls and wreckers” and participated in brigades which confiscated food products from Ukrainian farmers in 1932 and 1933.

⁵ Pidkurkulnyk is one of the clichés of communist propaganda. This word usually meant poor and middle-wealth farmers who, under the influence of “kurkul agitation” harmed “socialist improvements”. This cliché could be used against anyone who resisted to the regime even a little bit. Main difference of pidkurkulnyk from kurkul was the absence of economic implication.

Communist propaganda actively developed the concept of “kurkul terror”, which was in fact active resistance of population to the communist totalitarian regime, struggle of people for their economic and political rights. Its victims were usually activists somehow involved in confiscation of bread and other repressions. The resistance also took on an armed character. In 1930 only, according to GPU documents, more than 4,000 uprisings took place in the Ukrainian SSR, in which about a million people participated (Zinchenko, 2011: 287). The resistance, however, continued until the Holodomor reached its peak.

As an opposition to kurkul terror, the newspapers praised hard selfless work and support of the authorities' ideas. “Neither shots nor fires will prevent the poor and seredniaks from performing grain procurement plans with even greater ardor” (*Radianske zhytia*, 12 October 1929). By “performing the plans” authorities meant at least two things – working on the fields and mass grain requisitions.

Also, the regime in all possible ways supported those who were the victims of “kurkul terror”. In one of okruha newspapers, the extract from the resolution of Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR “on aid to those who suffered from hlytais' violence” released in connection with the increasing number of attacks during late 1920s and early 1930s. In particular, the families of the killed and maimed activists were granted a pension, in case of murder the widow and children were exempted from taxes for 5 years, compensation was also given for the damaged or destroyed property of the activists (*Radianske zhytia*, 23 November 1929).

While creating the image of “peaceful productive work” of poor farmers and workers, the regime openly recognized the fact of severe repressions towards “kurkuls”. For instance, “A range of court hearings conducted by the justice bodies in Romny district, exclusion of kurkul element, directing the repression of the kurkuls' sabotage – all this gave its results” (*Radianske zhytia*, 23 November 1929). Under such circumstances, the repressive system was becoming more and more harsh, “Today, more than ever, when class enemy mobilizes its forces, court, investigative and militsiya bodies face the question of revision of their work methods, of their improvement in order to form a steel pressure in the name of revolutionary justice” (*Radianske zhytia*, 23 November 1929). Similarly, in propagandistic article referring to employees of punitive and repressive bodies of Romny okruha, the instructions are given to actively use deportations, “In organizational order, urgently, it is necessary to remove from the district everything that does not want to go hand in hand with the Soviet government” (*Radianske zhytia*, 23 November 1929). Another newspaper headline called on, “In class struggle for bread – no mercy to the enemies. We must resolutely and in time unmask different attempts of hlytais to thwart our plans” (*Radianske zhytia*, 24 October 1929).

The regime severely punished the participants of the uprisings; in particular, the highest measure – execution – was frequently used. Such facts were published in the press, often with detailed information about punishments (they meant to threaten the population). For example, when the farmers prepared the attack against local activist, because “he insisted on repressive measures against those who maliciously refused to hand over the bread” (*Radianske zhytia*, 16 November 1929), the newspaper article wrote, “The participation of Serhii Sencha, Baliura and Lesyk in the terror was approved. The first two were sentenced to death. Lesyk got six years and four months

in Bupr⁶. Sencha Fedot as socially dangerous person is sentenced to exile outside Romny region with a ban on living in neighboring districts for 4 years. All the property of the first three, in accordance with the court decision, was confiscated.” (*Radianske zhyttia*, 16 November 1929) In one of the next issues, the materials about the shooting of “kurkuls’ murmidon” Ivan Boiko were given. To emphasize the cruelty of this farmer, the correspondent hyperbolized, “... for him, for a glass of vodka from the hands of the kurkuls’ hands, to take the life of any activist is nothing” (*Radianske zhyttia*, 23 November 1929).

The direct speech of kurkuls was sometimes given in printed publications. It the only way the real sentiments in the villages were expressed in the newspapers. One of the articles cites a farmer, “We do not agree with the policy of Soviet authorities and will not give it any bread”, “beat the communists, they are our enemies!” (*Radianske selo*, 16 November 1929). Another example of real situation presented as “kurkul agitation” was published in Mena district newspaper, “We have bread for ourselves only; there is nothing to give to the state; we will divide the bread the same way we did last year” (*Kolbosna pratsia*, 25 August 1932). Significantly, these words belong to a former collective farm head, who was later considered “pidkurkulnyk”. A letter of collective farm member from Yablunivka village, which was printed in Pryluky local newspaper, also tells about “kurkul agitation” conducted by those farmers who “sabotage the grain procurements” by saying, “the more will we postpone the harvesting, the more bread will we eat and the less will we give to the state” (*Pravda Pryluchchyny*, 21 November 1932). Such actions were a form of passive resistance to the impossible grain requisition plans and active repressions.

In contrast to the dangerous image of kurkul, the media also cultivated the opposite vision, when kurkuls were seen as miserable and fraudulent. In order to emphasize this derision, newspaper correspondents often used diminutives from the words “kurkul”, “bread”, “land”, and “money”. Visual images (caricatures) performed similar function – kurkuls were usually portrayed as ridiculous fat men with sacks full of grain.

Such image was supported by the articles about “kurkuls’ pits” full of grain. The media cultivated the idea that these farmers did have wheat, but were just hiding it (“...kurkul Vasyl Ivanenko was going to carry his bread somewhere at night, but he was caught and forced to give it to the common storage place” (*Radianske zhyttia*, 9 November 1929); “Kurkuls avoid to hand over. For example, kurkul Musienko was taxed for 50 items of food crops, but he did not hand them over until people came to him to describe his property. And then, in five hours, he found the bread which was not described – he hid it somewhere” (*Radianske zhyttia*, 9 November 1929). Images of such pits for hiding grain were common for caricatures of the early 1930s.

One more means for creating the humiliating image of wealthy farmers was using the phrase “capitalist leftovers – nepman and kurkul” (*Radianske zhyttia*, 23 November 1929). Nepman was a derogatory term used towards entrepreneurs who became rich during nep due to trading operations. As nep policy was folded, these people were seen as anachronism that will soon disappear due to development of socialism. The same

⁶ Bupr means “house of forced labor”.

fate communist ideologists prepared for rich farmers. Such mottos totally corresponded with general Bolshevik idea of “destroying the old world in order to build a new one”.

Another element of the past which needed to be destroyed was church and religion. The priests and believers were the objects of criticism and often appeared together with kurkuls in periodicals' headlines and caricatures. “Kurkul, priest and sectarian conduct frantic agitation against collectivization,” (*Radianske zhyttia*, 30 December 1929) one of the articles stated. At the same time, similar vocabulary was used to describe confronting phenomenon – the movement of “militant atheists”, whose activities were often destructive and even aggressive. In general, one can distinguish “positive” and “negative”, “fair” and “unfair” aggression in communist propaganda, and the difference between them was the loyalty to the regime.

Another example of contradiction in kurkul image can be illustrated by such citations, “Kurkul himself never speaks frankly and in public against collectives. They use their supporters and especially carefully gather these supporters among the poor” (*Radianske zhyttia*, 26 October 1929) and “In Kachanove of Petrivskyi district, there is even a whole group of kurkuls that sends its liars to the collective in order to destroy it from the inside” (*Radianske zhyttia*, 26 October 1929). In other words, in these articles kurkuls' actions are directly the opposite to the concept of “kurkul terror”.

In order to destroy kurkuls as a class, in late 1920s the authorities started the process of dekulakization, which was closely connected with collectivization. The communist regime saw the initiative owners as a threat to building a system of collective farms. In order to continuously collectivize and suppress the resistance, the poorer strata of the Ukrainian village were relied on. By granting tax privileges to the poorest villages, the regime tried to provoke a conflict inside of Ukrainian population. However, this policy was not always successful for the Bolsheviks. The so-called “seredniaks” and the “poor” often supported the “kulaks” and opposed collectivization (“It is also necessary to stress the fact that in many places there was an opposite phenomenon, when the poor were passive towards the measures of Soviet authorities, and in some settlements, they were at the tail-end of the wealthy stratum, which can be explained mostly by the weak work of some organizations of the Committees of Poor Peasants and incomplete coverage of the poor in the village. Surprisingly enough, we have to admit that the number of dissatisfaction and anti-Soviet manifestations among the poor stratum, mainly on the part of the pidkurkulnyks, has increased in connection with the campaigns we conduct” (CSAPOU, fund 1, inventory 5, file 385, sheet 14).

However, in spite of all the efforts of Bolshevik propaganda, the communist totalitarian regime managed to drive the entire Ukrainian population into collective farms system only through the use of violence and formation of a state of constant fear among the peasantry, the culmination of which was the mass starvation of deaths in 1932 and 1933.

It is also important to note that in order to deepen the division in the social structure of the village, communist regime was separating kurkuls from other groups of people. Anyone who tried to show any signs of compassion to them was proclaimed their “collaborator”. For example, the newspaper correspondent called on to bring to justice the representatives of Poor Peasants' Committees who took into account the appeals of kurkuls about the impossibility of performing the grain requisitions and

supported them (*Radianske zhyttia*, 23 November 1929). Any connection with kurkuls, even in the household, was the reason for persecution (*Radianske zhyttia*, 23 November 1929). Such situation led to full social isolation of kurkuls and ban on any economic and everyday contacts with them.

Moreover, official documents declare the fact that kurkuls wrote “letters of confession” to the newspapers, where they announce their wish to enter a collective farm, “I hand my threshing machine over to the Shevchenko artel and call on all hlytais of Chernihiv region to follow my example” (CSAPOU, fund 27, inventory 11, file 1557, sheet 109). Such process was sometimes called “self-dekulakization”.

One more way the image of kurkul was shaped in the periodicals were the letters and announcements of people that renounced their relationships with their parents and other family members who were kurkuls. Such publications appeared almost in every issue; on one hand, this shows how often such cases actually happened, and on the other hand, it was an effective method to show obsolescence of kurkul stratum. However, these confessions were not always true and sincere. In the materials of the oral history project of the US Commission on the Ukraine Famine, one of the Holodomor eyewitnesses, who became the orthodox priest in emigration, told that “Many had to renounce their parents publicly, through press, they wrote such appeals, ‘I am so and so, I publicly denounce my father as he is priest.’ /.../ Yes, it was constrainedly. The families were ok with this because every, every family was interested in their children to study, get education and have easier life. /.../ This concerned not only the priests, but also the children of landlords and children of kurkuls, who had to do so.” (Mace, & Heretz, 1990: 398).

Therefore, Soviet propaganda created two images of kurkul, which contradicted each other. On one hand, they were represented as pitiful and contemptible; on the other hand, they constituted a serious danger to the regime and needed to be destroyed. Propagandistic campaign was aimed at shaping negative depiction of kurkul and justifying the mass repressions of population by class struggle. Hate speech and demonization of all those who disagreed with the regime’s actions became normal language of the press. While in the middle 1920s there were some attempts to discuss who is a kurkul and whether a person who managed to harvest a rich crop and accumulate some financial funds for buying better agricultural equipment should be considered kurkul, in the late 1920s such discussion was impossible. Any word on the defense of kurkuls was treated as anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Economic factor became less important, and key role belonged to the loyalty to the authorities. This can be approved by the fact that in the late 1920s the category of “pidkurkulnyks” emerged. In this case, the regime recognized that the repressions against people making even minimal resistance was not connected with amount of their property, since this category could include even the poorest individual farmers, daysmen and even people who were forced to join collective farm, but were thinking and openly speaking that the plans of the regime were not connected with improving of farmers’ and workers’ lives. In the early 1930, due to its frequently use in the press, the concept of kurkul finally rooted in everyday vocabulary and became one of key words connected with the destruction of Ukrainian village.

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JEWES MERCHANTS IN CRAIOVA IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD (II)

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Abstract

Jewish Emancipation, defining their legal status and granting their political equality represented one of the main problems which, starting with the second half of the 19th century and until mid of the 20th century, caused a powerful outburst of anti-Semitic attitudes of all kinds. The first clear anti-Semitic abuses took place during the governances of Tatarescu (January, 1939 –December, 1937) and of Goga-Cuza (29th of December, 1937 – 10th of February, 1938) and were encouraged by the administrative measures issued by the Romanian authorities. They continued during the royal dictatorship (10th of February, 1938 – 5th of September, 1940) and escalated when the Legionnaires and Ion Antonescu started their dictatorship. In Craiova, the Jewish firms were forced to close their businesses. The law no. 641 from 19th of December 1944 for repeal of anti-Semite legal measures, by art. 14 restore the circumstances, thus the trading or industry firms radiated as provided or as a consequence of some measures in effect, could be re-enrolled at request.

Key words: *Craiova, Jews, entrepreneur, interwar period, economic evolution*

On *Buzesti Street*, at no. 11, it was registered at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Registry, the Israeli **Marcu Moscovici**'s firm to whom, in 1919, Dolj Court gave him Romanian citizenship. He began his commercial activity on his own at 16th of July 1921 when he set up the firm "La Satisfacere", having as object of activity trading with "manufacture and trinkets en detail". The firm operated until 10th of January 1941, the owner being threaten with arresting and closing the shop if he wouldn't sign the firm's radiation. It was re-registered three years later, according to art. 14 from the Decree-law no. 641/1944 published in Official Monitor no. 294 from 19th of December, 1944. The capital invested in 1944 was 1.500.000 lei and two years later have reached to 2.000.000 lei. At 25th of August 1948 the firm was radiated at the merchant's request (Mitu, 2018: 83-84).

On *Kogalniceanu Street* (no. 5), **Rosenfeld Jacques** registered the commerce: "manufacture and gallantry en gross and en detail and dealership of textile articles". The firm debuted at 1st of April 1914, on Unirii Street using the logo "Firma Select". In 1919 he added "import and export, selling and buying en gross manufacture articles" practiced in his commercial agency placed in Sabinelor Street, no. 10. The documents stated that in October, 1938 the firm performed only "commerce of manufacture and en detail gallantry". Radiated in 9th of January, 1948 it was taken over by Tanasescu Nicolae who appropriated the logo "Select". The firm was re-registered in 1945 for the same commerce which practiced then engross and it was radiated at 9th of April, 1949 (SJAN D, fond CCIC, FI, f. 617/1931, not numbered).

On *Lipscani Street* there were registered the stores: "La Million", "Trianon", "Coroana", "La leul frican", "La mielul alb" etc. "La Million" it was the store from

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“lipscani” that belonged to the associates, Osias Nachmanson and Solomon Rottenberg, that constituted the social firm ***Osias Nachtmanon & Solomon Rottenberg S.I.N.C.*** The office was registered in the building no. 8. The two merchants set up the firm at 17th of June 1910. In order to open the manufacture store, the associates have deposited a capital of 10.000 lei which, in 1931, have got to 1.200.000 lei. At 11th of August 1931 have opened a branch on the same Street in the building no. 10 for commerce of “clothing for women and kids”. As identifier they used the logo “Rona”. The firm was radiated in 18th of June 1935 because each partner had used another firm. Solomon Rottenberg had affirm registered on his wife’s name since 15th of October 1932 and Osias Nachmansohn with his son since 23th of January 1935. The new association ***“Osias Nachmanson & Son” S.I.N.C.*** continued to develop their commercial activity at the same address. The new firm, in which were invested 250.000 lei known as the “Lion” continued the commerce to which was added manufacture and gallantry. It was radiated at 31th of January 1941, the owners being forced to turn in the store to Vasile Diaconu, who took over the asset and the rent. The firm was re-established on ***Willy Nachmanson (Nachman)’s*** name in 1944 at the same address, for the commerce with “fabrics, whites and knitting” and it was radiated in the second part of the year 1946, for health reasons. The trading in its actual form continued for a short period of time (29th of September 1947), by Osias Nachmansohn who took the only employer of the firm (Mitu, 2019b: 106-107).

In the neighbourhood, at no. 10, there was “Trianon Store” where they were practicing trading with: “manufacture, gallantry and clothing” belonging to ***Rothemberg S. Bertha*** (12th of October 1932 – 28th of January 1941; 18th of January 1945 – 14th of February 1949). From the owner’s deposition it turns out that being threaten with arresting and closing her store, she had to sign the radiation application. The firm was re-registered based on the law no. 641/1944 without logo, with the same commerce and for a while it operated on Carol Bld. no. 50 and then on Lipscani Street. In 1946, revising the firm they stated a capital of 5.000.000 lei. In November, 1947, the owner narrow down the activity continuing to perform only manufacture commerce having two employees for that. In 1941, the store was taken over by the Society in partnership ***Constantin Dascalu and Ilie Porumbă*** who, at 26th of April 1945, returned the logo “Trianon” to the firm (Mitu, 2019b: 107-108).

Another store “with manufacture objects, gallantry and trinkets” merchandised en gross and endetail was managed by ***Nachman Dererea*** from 12th of February 1920. The store with the logo “La leul african” was in the building no. 42. Coming out of the association with Avram Brannstain (1917-1920) he registered his own firm. In 1932, Nachman Dererea was also dealing with “trinkets import” (beads, laces and cotton, safety pins fringe of thread, cotton broidery) from countries like Italy, Austria, Germany, Swiss, Czechoslovakia. In 1946, reviewing the firms had a capital of 1.000.000 lei. In October, 1947, took place a restriction of the commercial activity, continuing by carrying only “commerce with gallantry, trinkets and partly manufacture” en detail. In 1948 the store being seized by the city hall organs, it was needed to move the office on the same Street, at no. 33. The firm, radiated at 9th of January, 1941, was re-registered in 1945 and radiated on 15th July 1948, registered on ***I. Ion Iosif*** name who took the commerce fund and the office (Mitu, 2019b: 111-112).

Another Jew firm that operated on this Street is the social firm “**Israel & Jacob Baruch**” preceded by the logo “*Leon I. Barauch and Brother Successors*” **SINC**, with identification logo “La Mielul alb”. The association of Israel Baruch and his nephew Iacob Leon, the son of his former business partner, Leon Baruh, deceased at 12th October, 1933, was registered at the Registry of Commerce at 6th of October, 1933. This partnership is a sequel of the social firm **Leon I. Baruh and brother SINC** (Tache Ionescu Street at no. 53 with a subscribed capital of 2.002.481,25 lei) with a considerable age in the trading from Craiova (31st of May 1916 – October, 1933). The newly set up firm has taken over the asset and liability of the dissolved firm and continued to practice the same commerce: “manufacture and trinkets” which, from October, 1939, is exercised en gross and en detail, at the same office from Lipscani Street no. 53 (the former 67). According to the contract of association signed at 6th of October 1933, the firm had an unlimited length. The capital with which was constituted of 500.000 lei will reach in few years at 1.872.770 lei (April, 1940). The firm was radiated at 25th of September 1941, the entire fund of commerce being sold to Ioan C. Parvulescu, according to the approval of national Economy Ministry. Israel Iacob Baruch declared that by the exerted trading they were classified among the substance merchants of the town: “I embrace a good reputation and trading along with my nephew Iacob Leon Barauch, by its age was necessary in Craiova”. At 14th of October 1944, the firm with the logo “Mielul Alb” was reopened on **Baruch I. Iacob (Jak)** on Copertari Street at no. 28 and thereafter at no. 37. The trading with “Textiles and threads en gross and en detail” with a capital of 5.000.000 lei it worked until 1945, being closed for reasons of health (Mitu, 2019b: 113).

In the immobile personal property, situated on the same Street, at no. 63, developed its activity also the firm “**Efraim Eschenasy Sons, S.I.N.C.**” whose logo “At Filip’s” (1st of Sept. 1933 – 7th of July 1941). The two associates, Albert and Morytz, by the new firm continued to perform commerce of “manufacture and smithy”, prior practiced at the same address by their father through the firm **Efraim A. Eschenasy** (1900 – 3rd of October 1933). In the new firm it was invested a capital of 300.000 lei. Retreating from the association, at 9th of October 1933, Efraim A. Eschenasy gave out and sold to his children Albert and Morytz E. Eschenasy, the entire fund of commerce and the manufacture store at the price of 430.000 lei. In October, 1939, Morytz E. Eschenasy announced that “manufacture commerce (threads of cotton of all kinds) and smithy” that he had organized “on separate sections and separate personnel” was performed en gross and en detail. The circumstances repeated on 7th of July 1941 when the trading fund is sold to Petre Georgescu. From the documents we find out that the firm was radiated at 12th of September 1941 (Mitu, 2019b: 114-115). In October, 1944, **Albert E. Eskenasy** returned to business premises with a store of “manufacture and cottons engross and en detail as well as import for those”, assigning a capital of 1.000.000 lei. The office was established in the immobile private property from Mantuleasa Street, at no. 4, moved subsequently on Buzesti Street, at no. 23 (January, 1945). In October, 1945 opened a branch on Buzesti no. 23, for “commercial agency and warehouse o manufacture consignment and draper” under the leadership of Lazar Aladjem. During the revision of the capital (May, 1946), it is concluded that trading was performed on Lipscani Street, at no. 63, and had a capital of 8.500.000 lei. The firm

having three employees was radiated in March, 1948 (SJAN D, fond CCIC, FI, f. 5247/1944, ff. 1-58).

The Greek **Sabetay S. Sabetay** was also engaged in “trading manufacture products, gallantry, odds and ends, clothing and footwear” (3rd of November 1932 – 1935). After three years of activity, on Lipscani Street (no. 64) he moved his office on Emil Garleanu, at no. 7, where it remained active until 23rd of January 1941, when he radiated the firm (Mitu, 2019b: 115).

Solomon Elias Segal has been operating on “Corona” basis (radiated in 1948). The trading performed was: “drapers, tailoring furnishings and others related”. The firm started its activity at 1st of October 1923, on Madona Dudu Street, and at 27th of April 1929, he relocated the headquarter on Lipscani (no. 20). Since December 1940 he limits trading to retaining only “draper and tailoring furnishings”. In 1935 he opened a branch on Unirii Street (no. 53), identified as “Boston”. Radiated at 9th of January 1941, the firm was re-registered at 20th of February 1945. Onwards 11th of February 1946 the premises from Unirii Street turns into the head office and the one from Lipscani Street grows subsidiary. Since October, 1945, the retailer expanded his business by adding “manufacture and gallantry” however in February, 1946 he decided to give up trading by “others related to draper’s and tailoring furnishings, gallantry and wholesale trade”. The capital invested in 1945 amounted to 3.000.000 lei and at 1st of June 1948 – 150.000 lei. The firm from Unirii Street closed at 3rd of January, 1949 and in Lipscani Street, eight months earlier (Mitu, 2019b: 108-109).

A longest running activity was registered by **Abraham I. Medina and Brother Partnership** crested “Medina Bazaar”. It belonged to Abraham and Aron I. Medina brothes. It was established at 1st of November, 1919, on Unirii Street, at no. 60 with a capital of 500.000 lei. The activity domain registered since the establishment was “manufacture, gallantry, trinkets and second-hand furniture”. In the same year they opened a store on Elca Street, at no. 13 where traded only antique furniture. The store had the crest “At Luca’s” and it was radiate din 1931. In 1941 one of the owners declared: “We have ceased any trade activity” (SJAN D, fond CCIC, FS, f. 62/1931, ff. 1, 5).

Of the Jewish shop owners whose central object of trading activity constituted in footwear, we indicate **Grünberg Marinel** who owned “Opincaria Bourul” on Buzesti Street no. 8, a crest replaced in 1938 by “Caurom”. The debut of the operation was registered at 5th of February 1934. In March, 1938 was hereby amended the company’s name being **Grünberg Marinel Maier**. It was radiated at 9th of January 1941 and re-registered at 9th of November 1944 (SJAN D, fond CCIC, FI, f. 2538/1934, ff. 1-13).

In his own property on the same Street, situated at no. 61 he developed its activity the firm the individual firm established by the Polish with Jewish rooted, **Josef S. Gelerther** (6th of November 1934 – 11th of June 1946). The object of activity, listed in the business register was “cereal trade, commercial agency and commission with representative offices of textiles, socks and rubber footwear”. Within the period he worked with others representative firms from the country: “Rocca” – the sock factory from Timisoara; “Industria Textila” from Lugoj and “Quadrat” – a rubber footwear from Bucuresti (5297/1945, ff. 1-18). Radiated in 1941, it was re-registered at 12th of March, 1945 for the same trade: “commercial agency and errand to knitting, manufacture and wholesale rubber footwear” and radiated in June, 1946, to have a

partnership with Leon Schwartz and Mayer Eschenasy. The association founded at 1st of May 1945 called **Leon Schwartz, Mayer Eschenasy et Iosif Gelerter, SINC**, with the logo “CAUTEX”, having the headquarter in I.C. Bratianu, at no. 15. The object of activity of this firm was “manufacture, textiles, knitting, rubber footwear and hardware items in bulk”. For well-functioning, the associates Schwartz and Eschenasy deposited into the firm’s account 1.200.000 lei each and Gelerther - 600.000 lei. The retiring from association of two partners (1948) resulted in taking over the asset and liability of the firm by Mayer Eschenasy (Ghionea, 2018: 363).

The footwear store “La pielea verde” whose owner was **Jacob H. Cohen** there was on *Madona Dudu Street* (no. 41, then no. 11). The debut of his activity was registered in 1903, in Buzesti Street (no. 10), then he moved on Madona Dudu Street. At 1st of October 1934, he added to his activity trading with “trinkets”. The firm was radiated at 9th of January, 1941 (Mitu, 2020: 169).

For 27 years (12th of February 1914 – 9th of January 1941), **Moritz Moise Grimberg** practiced trading with “leather goods and cobbler shop (wooden nails, pins Wagner nails, flower nails, horseshoe, quads of steel, thread for cobbler shop, thread, needles for cobbler’s machine, laces for shoes and boots, buckles, etc.) on *Lipsani Street* at no. 41. His store was identified under the crest “Ucenicul Vienez”. The firm re-established in October, 1944 was radiated in December, 1948 (Mitu, 2019b: 111).

Iaschinger Arnold owned on *Carol Boulevard* into the commercial space at no. 2 an office of “car commercial agency and accessories and some farm and industrial tools, radios and thrift stores”. After three years of activity (2nd of April, 1937 – December, 1941) the firm was radiated off-site on the ground that at the check-up of some representatives of Chamber of Commerce, “the store was closed and the owner had moved without mention it as required by law”. In 1942, the records indicates Arnold Iaschinger as “commissioner”, buying and selling old tires and renting properties. He resumed his work at 2nd of November, 1944, on Eusebiu Caragea Street, at no. 8, having as object of activity “trading and industry of starch and its derivatives” hiring Nicolae Socolov as expert, for whom he registered in April, 1945 brands of factories “URSUL” and “RENI”. In December, 1944, he expanded his activity adding “carriage of passengers and goods animal-powered and mechanical and also selling tires”, activity carried out at the branch from Cuza Voda Street (no. 43). In March, 1945 he moved the office on Fratii Golesti Street, at no. 114, where he was active two and a half year. The firm was radiated in January 1948 (SJAN D, fond CCIC, FI, f. 3712/1937, ff. 1-8).

A long-standing activity also had **Simion Morgenstern & Isak Aderca** firm whose crest was “La Luceafarul”. Recorded in the social firms registred in 1911, he had registered as object of activity: “sewing machines, bikes, safes, piccolos and accessories”. The agreement with a validity for ten years has been extended in November, 1921, when the two associates expanded their business adding a related branch; “manufacture, cottons and trinkets”. Right from the beginning the firm had its office at the residence of the two associates from Buzesti Street, at no. 11. The subscribed capital was 100.000 lei. In 1931, the year of registration at The Trade Register, the commercial activity decreased to: manufacture commerce and sewing machine accessories”. The association dissolved at 1st of February 1932, when Isak Aderca retreated (SJAN D, fond CCIC, FS, f. 25/1931, ff. 1-4).

Hodar Naftali, whose firm was identified with the crest “Electromecanica”, handled commerce: “with agriculture machinery and electro-electrical”. The office was on *Kogalniceanu Street*, at no. 10. The firm was set up at 7th of June 1925. At 7th of December 1940, he moved the office on the same street, at no. 3 when he gave up trading agriculture machinery. The firm was radiated at 31st of January 1941 and reregistered at 21st of January 1947, with a capital of 300.000 lei. At 9th of December 1947, he took the crest “Electro-tehnica” (SJAN D, fond CCIC, FI, f. 1190/1931, ff. 1-4).

Hechter Berta owned a store of “colonials, manufacture and trinkets” in Elca Market at no. 7 (former 6). The commercial activity started at 17th of June 1920 was interrupted at 9th of January 1941, the firm being re-registered at 3rd of January 1945, in order to be radiated for good at 20th of October 1948. In 1946, the firm capital was 700.000 lei (SJAN D, fond CCIC, FI, f. 403/1931, not numbered).

Haim Salom was the owner of “La ruleta” store on Unirii Street (no. 53). His commerce began in August, 1923, including “trinkets and hats, gallantry and perfumery”. At 12th of August 1930, he set up a branch on the same Street, at no. 72, with a different crest, “N. Karber&CvS.A. Periamoș”. The two stores have functioned until 1932 when the business is passed to his wife (15th of June), **Salom Haim Constanta**. Appointed administrator he held complete power in running commerce reduced to “trinkets and gallantry”. After 18 years of activity, at 10th of January 1941, the owner was forced to close the trade. In its place activated “Derby” store, the branch of Ioan Diamandopol. The firm was re-registered at 5th of June 1946, and radiated in March, 1949, according to the approval of Ministry of Commerce no. 3031 from 4th of March 1949. On the occasion of revising the firms from 1946, Constanta Salom testified that they invested a capital of 8.000.000 lei (Mitu, 2019a: 390-391).

On the same Street, at the property no. 72, it was registered in 1931 “Continental Perfumery” that belonged to **Bril Albert**. The firm dated since 1920 and dealt with selling a wide range of products: “perfumery, toiletries, tapers, band-aids, hygiene item, gallantries etc en gross and en retail”. In December 1940 he gave up gallantry and en gross commerce and he moved the office from Madona Dudu street, no. 8, in Unirii Street, at no. 107, 2nd floor. Due to the measures taken by legionary regime against Jews, in January, 1941, Bril Albert was compelled to ask for de-registration of the firm, his store being taken over, at 19th of March 1941, by Alexandru D. Botila, using the same crest. The firm was re-registered at the Chamber of Commerce, at 6th of August 1945, without crest. In 1947 the capital of the firm was 200.000 lei (Mitu, 2019a: 392).

Avram I. Levy was the owner of “La Speranta” store from Marseu Market, no. 139 where they used to sell: “house wares, glassware, trinkets, gallantry, smithy and colonials” (1925 – 9th of January 1941). At 14th of December 1940, he reduced the range of selling goods to house wares and smithy. Alschech David was “representative for trade” and he had an office on Edgar Quinet Street, at no. 7, and Kogalniceanu, no. 13 (10th of September 1920 – at 9th of January 1941) (SJAN D, fond CCIC, FI, f. 159/1931, ff. 1-11).

Basa Bem Avram the former official was registered as starting with 3rd of August 1932, with an “exchange buying and selling effects of State” on *Unirii Street* (no. 23). At 9th of November 1932, he moved the office at no. 75, adding to his commerce “state lottery tickets selling”. According to achieve information, in September, 1933, he

increased the capital from 50.000 lei to 200.000 lei and, an year later, to 500.000 lei. At 1st of April 1934, he divided his activity, keeping at this address “selling the State lottery tickets” and “buying and selling State effects” have moved to no. 88, on the same Street. The firm ceased its activity at 1st of April 1941. The same sources reveal the fact that, in January, 1943, in the property from no. 88, it operated the **Popular Credit House and Bassa S.N.C.** that, in January 18, the Board of Governors applied his sanction of dissolution and liquidation for the fact that he committed irregularities from the provisions of art. 30, para. 4 and 5 and art. 61, para. 1 from the law for organization and regulation of bank trading (Mitu, 2019a: 385).

There were identified in the interwar period some shops that belonged to the Jew entrepreneurs. On *Madona Dudu Street* there was Braier M. Nachman's shop of male tailoring “Croitoria Braier” (at no. 15). **Braier M. Nachman** began his activity at 1st of April 1933 and it was radiated at 9th of January 1941, and re-registered at 8th of June 1945, at the same address with the same crest. In 1946, when it was reviewed, the tradesman stated that he invested a capital of 100.000 lei (Mitu, 2020:168).

Ignatz Rubin had a shop of brushes and rollers since 7th of July, 1915, on *Buzesti Street* (at no. 25, previously 23). His son, Alexandru Rubin, was the firm's proxy. There was also a branch in Horia Street, at no. 12, within the store from where there were merchandized en gross and retailed the products of the factory. The owner's passing ended a 22 years career the firm being radiated at 18 of February 1937 (981/1931, ff. 1-8). His activity is continued by his sons, David, Alexandru and Sami, who registered at the Registry of Commerce the social firm **Ignatz Rubin Fii, SINC** at the same address without branch. According to the association contract signed at 17th of February 1937, the object of activity was: “brushes, paintbrushes and rollers factory, and disposal of products” having office on Principele Nicolae Street, at no. 51. The capital of the firm was 60.000 lei, equally deposited. Radiated at 9th of January 1941, the constituents of the firm Ignatz Ruben Fii willingly handed over the factory and the store to Haret Vladescu but they agreed that David Rubin would run the factory on a procure basis which is why the new owner stated that Romanization wasn't accomplished. David Rubin's attempt to reopen the store and the shop through the request addressed to the Management Committee of Commerce and Industry Chamber Craiova, at 21 of June 1941, has been without any success even though the provisions of art. 7, para. b, from the Decree-Law with no. 3825, from 12th of November, 1940, mentioned the fact that “Invalids of was with Jewish origins do not benefit from the provisions of the decree-law above mentioned concerning Romanization of the staff from civil and commercial companies”. Rubin brothers were being sued on the ground that after 1941 they worked within the shop without owning a firm. In turn, outraged, they claimed that their firm had been coerced radiated, disregarding the fact that Sami and David Rubin were former officers in the army and both of them were disabled in war.

In August, 1948, the associates changed the name from *Brushes, paintbrushes, rollers factory and disposal of products* in the *Disposal of products from the brushes, paintbrushes and rollers shop*. Within the shop whose leadership recurred to David Ignatz Rubin for which he hold craftsman card since 17th of March, 1934, where there were working three skilled workers. For carrying out the activity in brushes industry, every associate had to obtain craftsman card: Alexandru (1st of January 1938) and Sami (22nd of December 1939).

During revising from 1946, the owners mentioned the fact they increase the capital from 60.000 lei to 500.000 lei (SJAN D, fond CCIC, FS, f. 600/1937, ff. 1-60; f. 601/1937, 11).

Krivopisk Olga owned in her turn a “shop of lamb skin” products processed and sell by him. The firm began its activity at 5th of June, 1931, on Matei Basarab Street, at no. 11. At 20th of January, 1934 he moved his office on Lahovari Street, at no. 67 (65) then on General Haralambie (no. 8); on Doamnei Street (no. 61) passing through Tabaci Street no. 28 (28th of April 1939 – 1st of October 1939) and on I.C. Bratianu, at no. 104 (1st of October 1939). Once with moving the office in 1934 he extended the commerce by adding new linked branches: “grocery, trinklets and gallantry”. In September, 1937, he registered as identifier the crest “La Pincu” and a new domain of activity: “trading animal hair and all sorts of animal skins”. At 8th of January 1941, he decided to practice only “trading with skins of different wild and domestic animals” and a day later due to the pressure against merchants by legionary leadership from the Chamber of Commerce, the firm was radiated (SJAN D, fond CCIC, FI, f. 43/1931, ff. 1-41).

Lechner I Simion was the shop owner of a “tinkering” set up at 5th of May, 1899. It had its debut on Elca Street, at no. 18 (1899-1912), then he moved on Justitiei Street (1912-1931), Lipscani street, at no. 13 (1931 – 12th of December 1940) and on Madona Street, at no. 6 (12th of December 1940 – 9th of January 1941, 17th of November 1944 – 17th of June 1947). In 1905, he opened a branch on Justitiei Street, at no. 7, for trading “military equipment”. Four decades later (1946) the firm was registered with a capital of 500.000 lei. The passing of the owner enforced the deregistration at 17 of June, his activity being registered on his son’s name **Moise Lechner** (Mitu, 2019b:108).

Grunberg Oscar was the owner of “Select” barbershop on *Madona Dudu Street*, at no. 12 (27th of July 1926 – 31st of January 1941) (Mitu, 2020:168).

Grains trade was practiced by the Jews Max Haidusca and Klein brothers. **Maidusca Max** began trading with “cereals in commission” at 8th of October, 1921, using over time by Hermine Neuman (since 1924) and Max Newman (since 1926) and in 28th of March 1930, he authorized his brother, Victor Haidusca, to represent him within company. The company had its office in several places: Sf. Dumitru Street, at no. 8 (1921 – 20th of December, 1932), Unirii Street, at no. 110 and 93 (20th of December 1932 – 30th of October 1935; 25th of May 1937 – 2nd of October 1938), Kogalniceanu Street, at no. 3 (30th of October 1935 – 25th of May 1937). At 15th of October 1935, he opened a branch at Corabia for “buying and selling cereals”, managed by Alexandru Ceanovici. The firm was radiated at 2nd of October, 1938, not before building up the social firm **Max Haidusca & Co** (16th of April) having office at the same address from Unirii Street. The two associates, Max Haidusca and Neumann Maximilian, continued commerce “with cereals and export on its own and with commission” until September 1940, when the association fell apart by Hermine Neuman renounced, Max Haidusca requested the transition of the firm in the registry of individual firms (17th of September). There were registered branches in several localities of Dolj County: Calafat, Cetate, Rast, Bechet. The individual firm and the only branch remained, the one from Calafat, were radiated by default at 20th of March 1941, re-registered in October 1944 (Bucovat Street no. 31) and then radiated again in 1946 (Mitu, 2019a:384).

The same domain of activity there was also provided by **“Fratii Klein” S.I.N.C.** on *Kogalniceanu Street*, at no. 6 (11th of February 1924 – 28th of November 1947). The two associates there were the Hungarian brothers Armand and Gabriel Klein. The Society was set up at 11th of February 1924 for trading of “cereals and derivatives on its own and in commission”, with a capital of 100.000 lei. It was radiated in 1941 due to the order of Ministry of National Economy that forbidden trading with cereals of every cereal merchants who didn't owned the authorization of central grain (the order with number 17.775 from 16th of May, 1941). Through the order with no. 89954/943 this commerce had been forbidden especially to Jews, meaning the grain merchants had to be recommended by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry that was instructed not to recommend in any case the Jew merchants. It was re-registered at 27th of April 1945 on the same Street, at no. 5, in the upstairs place and radiated by default, at 28th of November 1947 due to inactivity (S.JAN D, fond CCIC, FS, f. 41/1931, ff. 1-12).

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**TRADE UNION ADMINISTRATION IN FRENCH CAMEROON:
A DEMOCRACY OF DECEIT AND AN IMPEDIMENT
TO THE EXPRESSION OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE
FREEDOMS OF WORKERS (1944-1960)**

*Félicité Pabo Nya**

Abstract

Freedom of association is at the heart of the fundamental rights of employees. It is a collective freedom that aims at defending the professional interests of workers, particularly the improvement of their living conditions. This freedom of association was promoted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), mainly on the basis of Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise in the aftermath of the Second World War in 1948. It was both individual and collective. However, the application of this international convention was marked by suspicion and ambiguity in French Cameroon. In fact, since 1944, when trade union freedom was granted in Cameroon, France dragged on and resisted the obligation to insert the provisions of these conventions in the regulatory texts that were to govern the labour code in Cameroon during the period of mandate and then trusteeship. The appropriation and implementation of Convention No. 87 on freedom of association was painful because France's excessive colonial ambitions in Cameroon had blinded it to the extent that it had ignored the principles of application of Conventions No. 87. This study gives a succinct account of a painful sequence in the history of trade unionism in Cameroon under French administration, drawing on primary and secondary sources. It shows that the regulatory texts adopted by France in relation to the principles of ILO Convention No. 87 gave the impression of a deceptive democracy, but in reality, it was an infringement of the expression of individual and collective freedoms of workers.

Key words: *Freedom of association, ILO, Cameroon - France - Freedoms - Colonisation*

Introduction

The frantic search for alternatives to the workers' protection crisis in the labour world in general and in Cameroon in particular has led to the promotion of new paradigms on the protection and exercise of freedom of association. Thus, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), a specialised UN body in labour matters, has set up conventions and recommendations for member states in order to compensate for the hypertrophy of a central authority that has become a serious obstacle to social progress. These Conventions and Recommendations were essential means of protecting workers worldwide. Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 specifically addressed one area, namely freedom of association. This is defined as Legal or regulatory situations in which the individual is recognised as having the right to act without constraint within the limits set by the positive law in force and possibly determined under the control of the judge... this right is protected by legal action, essentially by the implementation of the control of legality (Colliard, 1972: 25).

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The central argument developed through this text is the flouting of the expression of freedom of association contained in Convention No. 87 in Cameroon and its impact on the labour movement. Thus, the ultimate contradiction between the regulatory texts adapted by France in the colonial context and the application of these texts on the ground rendered the freedom of workers and employers to join a trade union of their choice or to remain outside any trade union as well as the right of trade unions to form "without prior authorization" and to operate freely. The question that arises is: what were the ulterior motives of the French colonial project with regard to the implementation of these ILO conventions in the labour movement in Cameroon? To answer this question, it would be wise to first present the legal status of Cameroon during the colonial period and the implementation of these ILO conventions by France in the labour movement in Cameroon.

Brief historical overview of the legal status of Cameroon during the colonial period and the implementation of the freedom of association advocated by Convention No. 87

The legal status of Cameroon during the colonial period.

Cameroon was a country conquered by the French armies. Indeed, the First World War had ended with the defeat of Germany and its allies. The clauses of the peace treaty had been dictated to them by the victors at the Versailles Conference on 23 June 1919. Germany's failure in colonial matters had resulted in the loss of its colonies. In view of this situation, the American President Wilson proposed the internationalisation of the former German colonies, including Cameroon, but the British and French wanted their outright annexation. In order to find a common ground, the South African General Hans Smuts had proposed a new system, namely the international mandate. On 6 May 1919, the Supreme Council, composed of France, England and Japan, determined several types of mandate, namely the A, B and C mandates. Cameroon was part of the B mandate. The pacts of the League of Nations taken up by the London text of 20 July 1922 defined the missions of the mandatary, these powers were not to consider the mandates they managed as an integral part of their national heritage, because from the international point of view these territories, like Cameroon, were distinct personalities, recognised by an international act. Its political incapacity was only temporary, since theoretically the territories under mandate were destined to become independent one day. In conclusion, it is clear from the texts of the SDN pact that:

- The mandate is free of charge. In principle, the trustee must not derive any personal economic benefit from the management of the mandate;
- It is provisional because, in theory, the mandatary must progressively lead the sub-mandate countries towards the capacity to administer themselves;
- Finally, the mandate has a moral purpose, its mission is to ensure the well-being of the populations of the sub-mandate countries (Oyono, 1985: 15).

The League of Nations was the supreme authority of the sub-mandate countries. It therefore set itself the task of ensuring the strict and sound application of this educational and moral policy. It had set up a permanent commission to examine the annual reports drawn up by the proxy powers on their proxy administration. In theory, the SDN supervised the adoption and domestication of the Mandatory Powers. After the failure of the League of Nations, the United Nations came into being in 1945 and

the two proxy powers continued to administer their respective parts of Cameroon, now reporting to the UN. What was Cameroon's position in relation to the ILO?

Cameroon did not have a direct relationship with the ILO. France was responsible for the international relations of Cameroon under its mandate and then its trusteeship. Moreover, the ILO had taken into account the existence of dependent territories, and had inserted in its constitution article 35 which stipulated that:

Member States undertake to apply the Conventions which they have ratified in accordance with the provisions of this Convention to the non-self-governing territories for whose international relations they are responsible, including all trust territories for which they are the administering authority (Article 35 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation).

France, being a member of the ILO, had therefore ratified the fundamental ILO conventions on freedom of association on behalf of Cameroon. France was obliged to apply its provisions. The pressure of the ILO on colonial powers like France was growing. In one of its notes, it stated:

- To apply the conventions to which they have acceded ... to those of their colonies or possessions and to those of their protectorates which are not fully self-governing, subject to the following reservations
- That the Convention shall not be rendered inapplicable by local conditions;
- That such modifications as may be necessary to adapt the conventions to local conditions may be made therein (Article 35 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation).

How will France implement Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association in Cameroon?

The implementation of Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association in Cameroon during the colonial period

Trade union freedom is at the heart of the fundamental rights of employees, it is a freedom of creation and exercise of trade union activity which aims at defending the professional interests of workers, especially the improvement of their living conditions. This freedom of association is promoted by the ILO mainly through its fundamental standards, specifically Conventions No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise of 1948. However, since 1944, when trade union freedom was granted in Cameroon (Eyinga: 1985), respect for this dual aspect has been problematic. On the basis of the above reservations, France dragged its feet and resisted the obligation to insert the provisions of these conventions into the regulatory texts that were to govern labour in Cameroon during the period of its mandate and then of trusteeship. The appropriation and implementation of Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association was painful because France's ambitions in Cameroon had blinded it to the extent that it had knowingly ignored the principles of Conventions No. 87. Thus, there was resistance to accession and difficulties in adapting the individual and collective aspect of freedom of association. During this colonial period, the regulatory texts adopted by France in relation to the principles of Convention No. 87 gave a slight hint of the principles of the Convention, but this slight appearance disappeared in practice.

Therefore, what were the contradictions and their consequences observed at the level of the dual aspect of freedom of association in Cameroon?

Respect for the individual aspect of trade union freedom: a Trompe-oeil in trade union governance in the French administration in Cameroon

Freedom to join a trade union of one's choice

The individual aspect of freedom of association contained in Article 2 of Convention No. 87 is the right to join or not to join. In doing so, joining a trade union means making the choice not to be alone within the company, to act collectively to have one's rights respected. The decision to join a trade union takes the form of a voluntary contribution (Keser, Rulliére and Villeval, 2004: 81). Thus, members of a profession are not obliged to join a union (Gonidec, 1958: 179). Unionism is a faculty and not an obligation. However, the right to join or not to join a union must be protected against the union, the employer and the state. Thus, the blacklisting used against an employer who hires non-unionised workers or against a worker who refuses to join a union is illegal and would be contrary to Convention No. 87. In referring to the words "organisations of their choice" in Convention No. 87, the ILO takes into account the fact that in a number of countries there are several trade union offers from which the individuals concerned can choose (ILO, 1985: 48). The choice of those concerned may be for professional, religious or even political reasons. It is therefore incompatible with the principles contained in Convention No. 87 if an individual is denied the possibility of choosing between different organisations, since the legislation allows only one organisation to exist in his or her occupational branch.

There is a glimmer of light in Article 8 of the Decree of 7 August 1944 and in the 1952 Code. In this code, precisely in article 4 paragraph 2, it is stated that "any worker or employer may join a trade union. He may not join or form a union". Is this freedom respected on the ground? What were the consequences of this on the evolution of trade unionism?

Very apparent restrictions

During the colonial period, several trade unions existed. The freedom to choose one's trade union is clearly visible in this existence. However, this possibility of freely choosing one's union was not fully respected because of the reluctance of the French colonists, who were the main beneficiaries of the colonial order, but who were hostile to anything that might call this order into question (Eyinga, 1985: 71). Thus, the freedom to join a union of one's choice ... 'was flouted'. The *tâcherons*, for example, did not have the possibility of joining a union, they were not keen on unions, because the precariousness of their jobs forced them to be cautious (Kaptué, 1988: 512). In order to keep their jobs, they were obliged to submit to the torments of their employers. Also, the colonial authority hunted down those who joined the CGT rather than the CFTC, the CGTFO or the USAC. This was already contrary to the provisions of Convention No. 87, which granted the freedom to choose the trade union to which one would like to belong. The exercise of trade union freedom was hermetically sealed off from Cameroonians, who had a semblance of right in the texts but which disappeared in practice. The incident that occurred in public works during the colonial period is significant in this sense.

In fact, at the Public Works Department, an incident took place between the 'writer' Pierre Mvondo and the storekeeper Rosier. Intendant Rosier deliberately accused Pierre Mvondo of being a trade unionist. The person concerned informed his superior of his right to belong or not to a workers' corporation, as required by the principles of ILO Convention

No. 87, which refers to the freedom to join or not to join a trade union (National Archives of Yaoundé, Rozier-Mvondo case). This frustration against trade unionists prevailed in all regions of the country. Similarly, the auxiliary nurse, Thomas Manga Sama, on duty at the Fouban dispensary, was a victim of the injustices of the Doctor-Lieutenant Pérot, who was in charge of this health centre. The Cameroonian agent was rather repressed for his trade union membership by his boss who openly declared: "You became trade unionists to make the colonists leave Cameroon. And I, who am the chief doctor of the Bamoun region, can dismiss you for service reasons, even the most minor ones (...) before leaving Cameroon" (National Archives of Yaoundé, APA, 11025, CGT trade unions, Union des syndicats du Cameroun, 1945-1948).

This was in line with the words of the Minister of Colonies, Leger, who stated in one of his letters that: "the collective education of the people did not yet allow for complete freedom of association" (ANY, APA, 11027, Syndicats, CGT, union des syndicats du Cameroun; correspondances, complaints, claims; electoral issues, trip to Douala by MM. It therefore seemed appropriate to limit the right to form unions to farmers only (Kaptué, 1988: 403). At the time, there was a wide gap between theory and practice, between the content of the texts and their application on the ground. And the right to join the union of one's choice was difficult. By the same token, Christian union members were frustrated. The Apostolic Vicar of Yaoundé was the first to condemn this "organisation of Satan which camouflages itself under the mask of a trade union" (Eyinga, 1985: 72). From that moment on, the priests used their ministry to demonise the enterprise led by the CGT, which was also considered to be the "supplier of international communism". A fierce battle was waged against the believing union members. Fabien Okah, president of the "Cercle catholique des évolués" and of "Action Catholique au Cameroun", an active member of the Yaoundé Regional Union in 1945, gave a speech on 1 May 1945, in the name of the Yaoundé Regional Union. Two days later, he was challenged by the Vicar General, Father Hurstel, in the following terms: "It is a shame that a great man like Fabien Okah presides over communist festivals and makes speeches there" (ANY, APA, 11025, Syndicats CGT, Union des syndicats du Cameroun, 1945-1948).

Faced with the harassment of the colonial authorities and pressure from 'God', represented by the church, Okah abandoned the USCC and took over the leadership of the Christian unions (Eyinga, 1985: 73). Here, freedom of choice was no longer respected. As early as 1946, the Catholic Church conducted its hostility towards the Cameroonian CGT through the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC) headed by De Gaillande. A French national, he was in charge of the Catholic Social Secretariat in Douala. His organisation's main role was to counteract the CGT and, secondarily, to look after the interests of the workers. Father Carret, the parish priest of Kribi, under the threat of losing their jobs, ordered the monitors of the Mission School to leave the USCC after one year of militancy for the CFTC (ANY, APA, 11025, Syndicats CGT, Union des syndicats du Cameroun, 1945-1948). This was contrary to the freedom to join or not to join advocated by Conventions No. 87 on freedom of association.

What about the collective aspect of trade union freedom?

On the constitution of trade unions "without prior authorisation" and the free functioning of trade unions: a real gap between the regulatory texts adopted in Cameroon by France and their application on the ground.

The constitution of trade unions "without prior authorization"

The constitution of trade unions is a collective aspect of trade union freedom. This aspect was noted in Convention No. 87 which constituted a fundamental text for the international protection of trade union freedom. This Convention lays down the substantive rules of general application, and these rules have long since been elaborated in more detail by the ILO supervisory bodies in this area. It deals with the right of employers and workers to form trade unions without authorisation or formality. The State must refrain from interfering in its functioning because the trade union is a private grouping that can determine itself independently. Thus, the trade union movement is autonomous from the State, on the sole condition that it respects its laws.

If we take for example the right of workers and employers to form trade unions "without prior authorisation", we can see that in the decree of 7 August 1944 which authorises trade union freedom in Cameroon and the 1952 code, these provisions appear in the background. The decree of 7 August 1944 states: "Workers and employers, without distinction of any kind, shall have the right, without prior authorisation, to form organisations, as well as the right to join such organisations..." (Article 2 of Convention No. 87).

The principle here is the freedom to form or establish trade unions (Gonidec, 1958: 184). Thus, persons exercising the same profession, similar trades or related professions contributing to the establishment of specific products or the same liberal profession may freely form trade unions (Article 2 of the Decree of 7 August 1944). This means that the public authority must intervene as little as possible in the creation of these unions. Similarly, in the 1952 Code, this principle of Convention No. 87 is referred to in Title II of the Code in its Article 4 entitled "Formation and constitution of trade unions". This article states: "Persons exercising the same profession, similar trades or related professions contributing to the production of specific products, or the same liberal profession may freely form a professional union".

However, there are considerable restrictions on the adaptation and implementation of this principle on the ground. Even though France will allow the creation of trade unions for both workers and civil servants, this was a deceptive appearance as the respect of this right on the ground was contrary to Convention 87. In an attempt to comply with the principle of the constitution of trade unions "without prior authorisation", the colonial authority allowed the creation of many trade unions.

It was an apparent outburst because trade unionists were blocked from exercising this right recognised by Convention No. 87. A multitude of trade unions were formed, but in reality measures were taken by the French colonists to annihilate the legal exercise of these unions, and to circumvent the effective application of this principle of Convention No. 87. It was not enough to create trade unions or to authorise their establishment, it was also necessary to respect the independence of these unions for their best expression as required by the Convention.

Moreover, the texts authorising the creation of trade unions contained numerous restrictions. The Decree of 7 August 1944 subjects the formation of professional unions to certain conditions, such as

- Their purpose was to study and defend the economic, industrial, commercial and agricultural interests of a profession or group of professions;
- They had to be French subjects or protégés, at least 21 years old;
- They must never have been convicted of a criminal offence or have been convicted of an offence involving loss of civic rights;
- Each year, before the last day of February, the financial statement and balance sheet of each trade union should be presented to the public prosecutor.

These various legal provisions already trampled on the ILO Convention on Freedom of Association on several points.

Article (1) of the decree specified that the object of professional unions was "exclusively" the study and defence of economic, industrial, commercial and agricultural interests (Gonidec, 1958: 184). It is therefore understandable that trade unions were governed by the principle of speciality and could not encroach on the domain of other types of associations or groupings. In particular, they could not defend the political interests of their members without interfering with political parties. In fact, while the object of a trade union cannot be political, it cannot be prohibited from acting as a political pressure group. By specifying quite clearly the object of trade unions by the use of the superlative "exclusively", and especially by prohibiting them from all other activities, the promoters of the decree run the risk of interference by the public authorities. This is condemned by article 3, paragraph 2, of Convention No. 87, which stipulates that: "the public authorities shall refrain from any intervention likely to limit this right or to impede its lawful exercise". However, the colonial authority allowed the unions to form, only to limit their scope of action later. What about the free functioning of trade unions?

The free functioning of trade unions

Still in the collective aspect of the convention, the free functioning of trade unions also emerges. This principle refers to the drawing up of trade union statutes, the free election of trade union representatives, the organisation of trade union management and the formulation of their programme of action. Article 3 of Convention No. 87 states: "Workers' and employers' organisations shall have the right to draw up their statutes and rules, to elect their representatives freely, to organise their management and activities and to formulate their programme of action". Thus, Article 5 of the CTOM allows this notion of the free functioning of trade union organisations contained in Article 3 of the Convention to be reflected in the texts. This article states:

The founders of any professional trade union must deposit the statutes and the names of those who, in any capacity, are responsible for its administration or management. This deposit shall take place at the town hall or at the headquarters of the administrative district where the trade union is established, and a copy of the statutes shall be sent to the labour and social law inspector and to the public prosecutor of the jurisdiction. Amendments to the statutes and changes in the composition of the management or administration of the trade union shall be brought to the attention of the same authorities under the same conditions.

This apparent glimmering of the principles of Convention No. 87 remained at the level of the texts because in the field it was quite the opposite. By illustrating this with the free election of trade union leaders, it was possible to observe a restriction of the principle of the free functioning of trade unions. It was clear from the texts that workers' and employers' organisations had the right to freely elect their representatives. In practice, however, this autonomy of professional organisations could also be challenged

by direct or indirect intervention by the public authorities in the election of trade union leaders. This could take one of the following forms:

- control of electoral operations
- approval of election results
- restriction on the exercise of trade union leadership functions.

When the colonial authority considers literacy as a criterion for election to the position of trade union leader. This corroborates the Commission's view that this criterion was incompatible with the fundamental Convention (ILO, 2012: 45). According to the provisions of the regulatory texts applied in Cameroon during the colonial period, especially the Decree of 7 August 1944, it reads:

"The members of any professional union charged with the administration or management of that union must:

Know how to speak, read and write French fluently and hold at least a certificate of primary and elementary studies or an equivalent certificate issued under the conditions laid down by order of the general government in council with the government or by order of the governor in council;

To have at least the quality of French subject or protégé and, as far as French citizens are concerned, to enjoy their civil rights.

However, this requirement was a serious handicap in underdeveloped countries such as Cameroon during the colonial period, where union leaders from the ranks were rare, less literate and inexperienced. The above conditions required of trade union leaders were contrary to the spirit of the Freedom of Association Convention. It excluded indigenous people from union leadership a priori (Kaptué, 1985: 225). One gets the impression that France, as the author of the decree, was seeking to confiscate the trade union movement for its own benefit and that of its local agents. When the conditions for being a trade union leader are already limited or determined, for example "to be French subjects or protégés", this ignores the existence of Article 2 of Convention No. 87, which states from the outset: "Workers and employers without distinction of any kind...". Similarly, with the CTOM, the violation through the texts in relation to trade union freedom remains perceptible. Nevertheless, it also takes up the delimitation of the object of trade unions. Article 6 of the CTOM, which requires trade union leaders to be "citizens of the French union", also violates Article 2 of the Convention.

During the colonial period, the CGT, which had been set up by leaders such as Gaston Donnat, was impoverished in terms of men and materials by various means and strategies. The public authorities did not hesitate to intervene in order to limit trade union rights or to hinder their legal exercise. A former trade unionist, Marcus Tsama, describes the pressure exerted on him and his comrades by the head of their company in the context of the election of their trade union representative:

I remember that a number of my comrades and I were summoned to the office of Mr Lebeault, the head of our logging company. He spoke to us brutally, putting us on notice to join the CGTFO immediately or to leave his company. We pointed out to him that the FO was a union for civil servants and that we were not civil servants. He said that it didn't matter, that besides, our affiliation to this central union would only last for the time of an election, after which we could go back to our CGT... He distributed CGTFO cards to us free of charge and registered us. All our candidates for the post of

staff delegate were presented under the CGTFO label. They were all elected. But a week later, no one was talking about the FO in the company anymore (Kaptué, 1988: 546).

Through the words of this trade unionist, we can see that the employers created yellow unions in order to confuse the elections of trade union representatives within the companies. Here, the employers chose instead of the trade unionists.

Similarly, the union leaders were victims of several adversities that were already contrary to the principle of the convention that would require the protection of union leaders. The union leader Jaques Ngom himself explained his case in the offices of the head of the Region: "This senior official with a thousand functions subjected me to unheard-of moral pressure, calling me a strike fomenter and a spirit agitator..." (ANY, 1AG 365/E, Election of staff delegates, 1954). (ANY, 1AG 365/E, Election of staff representatives, 1954). The regional chiefs used to affect the union leaders to destabilise their movement. In the Sanaga Maritime, the regional chief, named Lélong, had assigned Um Nyobé and Siegfried Tonyé, all civil and financial services clerks in this region. The former was transferred from Edéa to Ngaoundéré while the latter from Edéa to Mbalmayo. These two people were punished because they had dared to introduce trade unionism in Dizangué, a region controlled by the director of the rubber company, the Frenchman Henri Chamaulte. They were abruptly separated from their militants (Okala Okala, 1996: 60). In 1955 in Fouban, Um Nyobé was simply beaten up like a common thug and only saved himself by taking refuge under a bed (Kaptue, 1988).

During this period the trade union leader was a wolf to be hunted. He was seen as a destabilising element in the colonial order. After the riots of 22 May 1955, 48 arrests were made. Among these arrested leaders was the trade unionist Jacques Ngom. He was a clerk in the civil and financial services of Batouri. He was not authorised by the colonial administration to attend the meetings of the executive committee of the USCC, which were to be held in Douala from 23 to 24 March 1946. The chief of the Lom et Kadéi region, Ladurantie, had not given him permission. Thus, the trade union leaders were restricted in their action by the French colonial administration. This was already contrary to the principle of protection and free functioning of trade union leaders laid down by the ILO. The free election of trade union leaders was flouted by the colonial administration and the employers. In this perspective, we can parody Ngom Jacques who states: "the first manoeuvre consisted in creating chameleon unions in the companies with the active help of the employers, in order to try to oust the CGT unions which courageously defended the interests of the workers". This way of acting was contrary to the principle of free functioning which stipulated that the election of workers' representatives, whether within or outside the company, must not suffer from any control or shenanigans on the part of the public authorities and the employers.

Similarly, European leaders who helped the Cameroonians in setting up the trade union movement were also sanctioned by the French colonial administration. Gaston Donat, the first Secretary of the USCC, suffered the same fate. And yet the guarantees provided by the convention showed the protection of workers.

All these violations were observed during the colonial period. The oppression of the state power was very great. The colonial administration used not only oppression but also intimidation. It was in this context that it sometimes arrested trade union members or representatives. Thus, colonialist brutality and repression had practically ousted all trade unionists from their fundamental rights, including the freedom to exercise the functions of a trade union leader.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, France, one of the proxy powers of Cameroon, did not fail to flout the principles of ILO Convention No. 87 which it had itself signed on behalf of Cameroon. There was a great contradiction between the content of the regulatory texts which contained an apparent glimmer of the principles of Convention No. 87 and their application on the ground. The freedom to join a trade union of one's choice, to form trade unions "without prior authorisation" and to operate freely was only a lure that disrupted the whole process of implementing the trade union movement in Cameroon.

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IMPACT OF THE MINERS STRIKE ON THE MASSIFICATION OF CIVIL RESISTANCE IN KOSOVO

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Abstract

The socio-political and economic circumstances in Kosovo in the late 1980s were extremely unfavorable for the people of Kosovo, political organizations, the media, unions and Albanian-language schools. As a result of such a situation, Kosovo Albanians were seeing ways of organizing to oppose the Yugoslav regime of the time, advancing their rights, and resolving their political status, in the absence of which they were feeling discriminated in all segments of life. In the context of these movements in Kosovo, the organization of the Miners' Strike was of vital importance, in order to raise awareness of the situation which until then had met with deaf ears both within Yugoslavia and in the International Community. The Trepca Miners' Strike had an impact both inside and outside Kosovo.

Key words: *Miners' strike, Kosovo, Politics, Yugoslavia, Regime*

Introduction

In 1980s while Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was declining there were continuing efforts to preserve and consolidate Yugoslavia it, giving various political and legal connotations. Therefore, constitutional changes desired by Serbia in the late of 1980s were summed up in the restriction or abolition of the autonomy of the autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. This demand was expressed in June 1988 through protests organized by Serbian nationalists in Belgrade and other cities who demanded to change the constitutional position of the provinces. Through numerous so-called Serb solidarity rallies*, television programs and written and electronic media, the slogan became known: "Serbs lost in peace, what they gained in the war" (Meta et al., 2008: 371). But the entity that was intended to be subjugated at all costs was Kosovo. This was the most difficult part to accomplish because the Serbs were a minority and the Albanian majority was expected to protest and react harshly against that plan. In the end of 1988 as a result of violent protests, a number of Albanian party officials were forced to resign. In protest against the departure of the Kosovo Albanian political leadership, the Trepca's miners organized their anger march from Mitrovica to Pristina, where hundreds of Albanian students and pupils

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* Nga muaji qershor deri në tetor të vitit 1988 kanë marrë pjesë në mitingje të ndryshme në Beograd dhe në qytetet e tjera të Serbisë 3 milionë qytetarë.

joined (Vickers, 2008: 331). Through the Miners' March on November 17 1988, where were thousands of miners and citizens, they expressed revolt against the dire political situation in Kosovo (Haziri, 2017: 105). We learn about the miners' march from the researcher Denisa Kosotovicova, who writes "In November 1988, about 2,000 miners from Trepça undertook a peaceful march over 50 km to the Kosovo capital, Pristina, to protect Kosovar communist leaders who had opposed Serbian constitutional changes. The five-day peaceful protest of the miners, supported by 100,000 Albanians throughout Kosovo, was ignored and the mentioned officials were replaced by loyal Albanians" (Kosotovicova, 1996: 21, cituar sipas: Gashi, 2012: 63-64). It should be noted that the goals and demands of the miners were presented to senior political leaders in Kosovo, such as the chairwoman of the Provincial Committee of the Communist League of Kosovo Kaçusha Jashari, the chairman of the State Presidency of Kosovo, Remzi Kolgeci, etc. The above-mentioned politicians, through phone calls and other forms, demanded the miners not to go in Prishtina, so they tried to stop the march, but without success. Around 3,000 miners from all Kosovo mines gathered at the Sports Hall in Pristina, demanding the Kosovo leadership to be there, in order to explain why Albanians are being discriminated. The miners also demanded an end to Serbia's campaign against Kosovo and tendencies for abolition its autonomy (Haziri, 2017: 105).

Thus, in January 1989, under Milosevic's directive, a new leadership was established in the political and institutional structure, where the most important one was Rrahman Morina. The new leadership was first sabotaged by the miners of Trepça who on February 20, 1989 started the hunger strike. After them, all companies in Kosovo stopped working (Gjeloshi, 1997: 78). Serbia wanted to reformulate its position in relation to the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Therefore, Serbia intervened in the amendment of the Constitution of Serbia and of course in the amendment of the 1974 Constitution of Kosovo, on the grounds that Serbia should exercise power in its entire "territory" (Gashi, 2012: 62). Thus, on February 23, 1989, the Serbian Parliament approved 40 Serbian draft amendments, including amendment 47, which provided the change of the Constitution of Serbia without the approval of the autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina), (Meta, et al., 2008: 371).

But, against this goal, the Albanians have opposed in various forms since 1988 and one of the strongest objection was that of the miners' strikes. Thus, the first gathering of miners, attended by about 2500 workers, took place on the premises of the Stan-Tërg mine, on February 4, 1989. The importance of this rally is evidenced by the participation of the highest structures of Kosovo, such as Rrahman Morina, who held the post of chairman of the Provincial Council of the Communist League of Kosovo. The miners, among other things, openly spoke out against the Serbian draft amendments submitted for discussion, as they did not harmonize with the Federal Constitution of 1974 (Lalaj, 2008: 788).

The above-mentioned rally on February 4 was a precursor to a radical event that the Albanian strikers of the Trepça mine intended to undertake. Thus, in order to oppose the political developments in Kosovo, in particular the abolition of the Autonomy of Kosovo, on February 20, 1989, demonstrations of Albanians began against the abolition of the autonomy of the Socialist Autonomous Province of

Kosovo from the Socialist Republic of Serbia. The miners of the Trepça industrial complex in Mitrovica led the demonstrations (Musliu, 2018: 525). But, on February 20, the miners took another very bold step, where about 1300 to 1350 miners of Trepça¹, were trapped in some horizons of the Mine in Stantërg. This high act of self-sacrifice caused a comprehensive solidarity of workers and students, so thousands of miners from other mines were locked in their galleries in solidarity with the miners of Trepça, thus turning Trepça and Mitrovica into a hotbed of resistance of Albanians to the Yugoslav government (Gashi, 2012: 64). The miners' strike in the Stantërg ore mine (February 20-28, 1989) was held for at least two reasons: first, because the Albanians were against the constitutional changes, because through them the status of Kosovo's autonomy was removed, and, second, due to the reaction to the so-called Serb solidarity rallies, where weapons were demanded to fight against the Albanians (Lalaj, 2008: 787). But another equally important reason for the development of the miners' strike was the way of expressing dissatisfaction with the general situation in Kosovo, which was characterized by Serbia's violence and terror against the Albanian population in Kosovo and the inability of the Kosovo leadership to oppose Belgrade's anti-Albanian policy (Musliu, 2018: 525).

The miners went on a hunger strike, following the principle "one for all, all for one" and declaring that they would not interrupt it without meeting the 10 requirements, which were: 1. Not to affect the basic principles of the 1974 Constitution; 2. Take responsibility for the proposers of the draft law on early retirement of education workers; 3. Irrevocable resignations of Rrahman Morina, Husamedin Azemi and Ali Shukriu; (Rilindja, 1989: 1-3) 4. Among them are Stipe Shuvari, Slobodan Milosevic and a representative of all the committees of the Socialist Republic and the Provincial Committee of the Communist League of Vojvodina; 5. To appoint the organizers of the mass rally of miners in November of last year. If there are any then the organizers are us; 6. To be given an answer as to why Azem Vlasi, Kaqusha Jashari and Svetislav Dollahevevi were fired from their positions without base assessments; 7. They demanded that the leaders of Kosovo would be chosen by the people of Kosovo, namely the working class of Kosovo and not the bureaucracy of other republics; 8. They demanded that the Kosovo issue to be discussed at the UN Security Council; 9. End Milosevic's chauvinist and hegemonic policy towards the Kosovo Albanian people; 10. We inform the provincial, republican and federal structures, but also the whole public that until our demands are met, we do not intend to leave the horizons of Stan Tërg's ore cavity. (Mehmeti, 2015: 12-13; Abrashi, Kavaja, në: Zenelaj, 2011: 219). The miners' demands were supported by workers of all Kosovo enterprises, intellectuals and the entire Albanian people of Kosovo. Also, 1500 Albanian students of the University of Prishtina showed solidarity with the miners of Trepça, while on February 24 it is said that about 40,000 Albanians demonstrated in solidarity and support of the demands of the miners of Trepça (Zenelaj, 2011: 182-183).

Their main demand was the resignation of the political leadership of Kosovo. In order to defend the autonomy of Kosovo and its constitutional position, the Kosovo

¹ There are sources which say that about 1500 workers went on hunger strike in the deep galleries of the Stantërg Mine. See in: Musliu, *"Greva e minatorëve të Trepçës"* 525.

Albanian intellectuals on February 21, 1989, on the second day of the strike, presented to the local and foreign public an open letter entitled *The Appeal of the 215 Kosovo Albanian intellectuals*, through the which expressed full support for the demands of the striking miners. The appeal addressed to the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the general public in Yugoslavia, among other things, states: "We appeal to the Assembly of Serbia to approve only the part of the amendments, which has nothing to do with changing relations between Serbia and autonomous provinces ... The eventual change of the constitutional position of Kosovo would cause the Albanians the objective feeling that something is being taken from them, which in fact belonged to them originally" (Ukaj, 2010: 493).

The highest political representatives in Pristina and Belgrade, started talks with the strikers, because the power structures at all levels were alarmed when they realized the seriousness and determination of the miners and the Albanian population as a whole. After the meetings of Kosovo political leaders with the miners, such as the chairman of the Presidency of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, Remzi Kolgeci, which resulted without any agreement, Stipe Shuvar, chairman of the Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, talked to the strikers on February 24. The discussion between them was successful, because Shuvar gave the strikers two promises, which were included in their demands: 1. He assured them that the Constitution of Kosovo would not be changed and that it would be a constitutive element of the Yugoslav federation and 2. Promised to them that the officials apostrophized by the miners would resign. To be more convincing, the miners were introduced in writing to the resignations of three leaders: Ali Shukriu, Rrahman Morina and Husamedin Azemi.² But, this was a political game, enough to deceive the strikers, because some of the political representatives of Kosovo resigned, who after the end of the strike withdrew their resignations. Believing in Stipe Schuvar's promises and the resignations presented, the workers stopped the strike and withdrew from the stand on February 28, 1989 (Rilindja, 1989: 1).

From the local press we learn that the first miners who started to come out of the underground galleries of the mine in Stantërg were: Hasan Sadiku, Abit Ibishi, Veli Fejzullahu and Rasim Salihu, all from the ninth horizon (Rilindja, 1989: 1).

The miners' strike ended with the hospitalization of 180 miners and the manipulation of the resignation of three Kosovo political officials (Musliu, 2018: 525). So their resignation was a manipulation of Belgrade politics, led by Milosevic, because as soon as it came out of the slum, the Serbian UDB began arresting the strikers and their leaders. Kosovo communist politician Azem Vllasi arrested along with three strike leaders and 15 miners (Gashi, 2012: 62; Mehmeti, 2015: 14). Politicians like Rrahman Morina and Ali Shukria remained in their posts. Moreover, on the same day, the SFRY presidency in Belgrade decided on "special measures in Kosovo", while the next day Serbian-Yugoslav army tanks arrived in Kosovo (Lalaj, 2008: 788).

But, official Tirana was not fully aware of the progress of the miners' strike in Stan Tërg, because at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Party, on February 28, 1989, until the strike had ended on this day, in Tirana they were still talking about the

² In fact, only Husamedin Azemi had irrevocably resigned.

mistakes of Serbian diplomacy in not accepting the only condition of the strikers: the resignation of the main leaders. In fact, the strikers were forced to minimize their demands, seeing that the Belgrade government would make no attempt to find a solution. Albanian diplomatic documents say that when they asked the strikers to leave the galleries, they demanded only the fulfillment of one condition: the resignation of the main leader. In fact, the condition set by the strikers was not harmful for either the federation or Serbia, because it was about the dismissal of the leaders of their province, who were Albanians. But the Yugoslav diplomacy, respectively the Serbian diplomacy made the mistake of not accepting the fulfillment of the only condition to end the strike, thus making a big mistake in defending the Kosovo Albanian leaders, who were fired, because they were pro-Serbs and thus their collaborators (AQSH, F. 14/APou, V. 1989, D. 27: 70). But, regardless of this, official Tirana has reacted to the strike of the miners of Trepça. We learn the official attitude of Albania towards the strike of the miners of Trepça, first of all from the diplomatic documents of the Albanian state. Thus, in a meeting of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party, which took place on February 28, 1989, it was discussed a lot about the strike of the miners of Trepça, about which Ramiz Ali, among others, said: "The Trepça miners' strike was a high act of sacrifice. It clearly reflected the determination, unity and patriotism of the people of Kosovo" (AQSH, F. 14/APou, V. 1989, D. 27: 66).

Further in this document it is stated that the miners of Stari Tërgut were so determined in their rightful demands that they even agreed to die in the galleries of the Trepça Mine. With this stance, Kosovo Albanians proved that they already had in hand a program of war and resistance against the Serbs. Moreover, the strike of the miners of Trepça proved before the local and international opinion that the Albanians were fighting to achieve some objectives such as: 1. protection of national and democratic rights; 2. Against submission to Serbia; 3. That in the governing bodies of the Province (Kosovo A.J.) worthy people are elected to protect the interests of the Albanian nation (AQSH, F. 14/APou, V. 1989, D. 27: 66).

Further, Ramiz Alia stated that the strike of the miners of Trepça best proved the thesis that our Party has repeatedly emphasized that Kosovo is a test bank for Serbs. If Serbs triumph in Kosovo, they will continue revenge against the northern Yugoslav republics. They understood this danger, so they came out openly in defense of Kosovo. The current situation gave a very strong political argument to Kosovo Albanians. They strengthened the conviction that their issue is not isolated, therefore does not violate the constitution of the Yugoslav community. Regarding the attitude of the Albanian state, Ramiz Alia stated that: "The attitude of our Party and Government towards the just war of our Kosovar brothers has gained popularity in the world. Everyone is seeing every day more and more clearly that it is not Albania that 'encourages Kosovars to destabilize Yugoslavia' or that 'has aggressive intentions towards it'. Nobody believes these theses anymore. We have maintained a very correct position and have expressed in a timely manner our view on the Kosovo problem. Even the statement of ATA (Albanian Telegraphic Agency A.J.) that was published the day before yesterday responds to the political moment (AQSH, F. 14/APou, V. 1989, D. 27: 67).

For Albanian politicians, Yugoslavia made a tactical mistake when declaring that if the miners' demands were accepted, it would be a great loss for them. According to

Ramiz Alia, politics is not done by guesswork, but it requires strong logic and foresight. Apparently, the Serbs did not fully predict the whereabouts of the Trepça miners.

Official Belgrade had a completely different position, blaming Tirana in every issue related to Kosovo. Thus, for the Serbian-Yugoslav diplomacy, every effort of the Albanians in Yugoslavia, to advance the constitutional changes until the realization of the Republic of Kosovo, which were especially emphasized during the demonstrations of 1968, 1981 and 1989, was conceived, encouraged and organized by Albania. Even the demonstrations of Albanians in 1988 and 1989, according to Yugoslav diplomacy, were instigated by Albania, as the mother state of Albanians. Thus, in an extraordinary meeting of the Yugoslav Parliament in Belgrade, the representative of the Yugoslav Presidency, Lazar Mojsov, made a harsh criticism towards the neighboring state, namely Albania. According to him, which was based on evidence (documents), the leaders of demonstrations and riots in Kosovo are closely linked to Albania's secret security and are preparing an armed uprising... " (Zenelaj, 2011: 206). Belgrade's reaction to official Tirana for its alleged attacks on Yugoslavia is reflected in an article in the Pristina daily "Rilindja". Thus, at the press conference in Belgrade, the Federal Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Ivo Vajgël, among other things, said: "Official Albania and the organizations of Albanian emigrants, some of whom have a physiognomy that has nothing to do with progress "with great commitment they are initiating the issue of the position of the Albanian nationality in Yugoslavia" (Rilindja, 1989: 2). In fact, the miners' strike in Trepça and the demands of the Albanians were supported by official Tirana, but there is no evidence that it encouraged or organized demonstrations or the miners' strike. The strike of the Trepça Miners, along with Albania and the international factor, was also supported by Slovenia, which was a republic within the Yugoslav Federation. We learn her position from the Austrian newspaper "Kleine Zeitung", in which on March 1, 1989 the article was written: "Slovenians in the Kosovo conflict - against Serbs and pro-Albanians". This article, among others, states that in Slovenia the following have joined: the Slovenian Church, independent associations and the League of Communists of Slovenia, who have collected about 450 signatures³ in support of the rights of Kosovo Albanians, thus demanding the lifting of the status of emergency and the resolution of the conflict with the Albanians in a peaceful way and not militarily and police (Zenelaj, 2011: 185-186, 189). Furthermore, the leader of the Communist Reform Party of Slovenia, Milan Kucan, and the President of Slovenia, Jooze Smole, have stated: "We Slovenes are a small people and that is why our solidarity with the endangered minorities is close to them... Albanians in the conflict "They have to do with big Serb tendencies," said the Slovenian leadership (Zenelaj, 2011: 195). Slovenia's official support shows quite well the lack of unification of the political spectrum in Yugoslavia and the weeping of Belgrade's Serbian hegemonic policy with the policies of other republics, in particular those of Slovenia and Croatia, which fought the tendency of Serbian domination over the entire region. of Yugoslavia and at all state levels.

The miners' strike in Trepça has been covered by foreign media, both electronic and print. Thus, in the Austrian newspaper "Kleine Zeitung" of February 22, 1989, an

³ Within ten days, the declaration of solidarity with Kosovo was signed by about 460,000 Slovenes in Slovenia.

article was written dedicated to this strike entitled "Kosovo Albanians strike against Serbian claims. In this article, among other things, it is written: "Behind the scenes of this strike of Kosovo Albanian workers is the obstruction and stopping of Serbia's intentions to change the constitutional position of Kosovo" (Zenelaj, 2011: 181-182).

In conclusion, we can say that the miners 'march in November 1988 in the direction of Prishtina and the miners' strike of the Stan Tërgu mine "Trepça" in February 1989 prove that the miners were put at the forefront of the active resistance of Albanians throughout their territories in Yugoslavia. Their resistance was nationwide, due to the fact that they were supported by all Kosovo Albanians, directly and indirectly. The importance of the miners' strike lies in raising awareness of the Kosovo issue, not only within Yugoslavia, but also around the world. Scholar Ibrahim Gashi defines the Trepça Miners' Movement as follows: "It was not a spontaneous attempt to avoid conflict, but a well-organized movement to respond to the conflict" (Gashi, 2012: 66)

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THE US POLITICAL PERSISTENCE FOR NATO MILITARY ACTIONS IN KOSOVO

*Artan Reshani**

Abstract

The beginning of 90s marks backing point in the history of Eastern European peoples in general, and those of Balkans in particular. The fall of communism and the installation of democracy, however fragile it was, reopened ethnic unsolved issues which were imposed by the communism policy and ideology. In the following years, to avoid the failure, the Kosovo Albanians, as a discriminating population, moved towards a strategy of a more active action. The foundation of the Kosovo Liberation Army and its first armed actions facing with the military and police forces violation of the Yugoslavian Federation, created a determining effect, that of international community attention for Kosovo. This paper work highlights proven confirmation of the United States key role determination to move forward and actualize quickly NATO operation intervention in Kosovo.

Key words: *American policy, war in Kosovo, Agreement, peace, NATO intervention*

The Kosovo Albanian people remaining in Yugoslavia during the 1990s fought for their rights, which were guaranteed by international acts, just like the other people of the world. During these years, the Serbian regime violated every fundamental human right in Kosovo (Judah 2002: 113). Milosevic's policy of discrimination and oppression of Albanians did not stop, and Albanians continued to oppose with peaceful means, as the only surviving option, and this "peaceful strategy was somewhat self-imposed as a better way and that was the most pragmatic response and effective against Serbian aggressive plans" (Clark, 2000: 66).

However, the vast majority of the population began to lose patience with a peaceful solution for Kosovo, after a relatively short time, because violence, killings and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo were happening unhindered. The increase of violence and Serbian state repression, as well as the pronounced indifference of the international community made the situation in Kosovo further aggravated, creating the premises of war outbreak. In these circumstances in Kosovo was raised the need for the Kosovo Liberation Army to appear on the scene, with military counterattacks (1998-1999) which gave new dimensions to the political currents in the country. This exit changed the political course in Kosovo.

The Albanian people in Kosovo were organized into a necessary military force, with the will of the people themselves, to face the Serbian military and police forces, to enjoy their rights like all other people, which was intended liberation from centuries-old Serbian captivity (Tepshi 1999: 49-50). So, the circumstances created in Kosovo led to the necessity of creating the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), when the Albanian people had lost all hope for a peaceful solution and a brighter future. The KLA was the people of Kosovo themselves, men and women who had been fired, expelled from schools and persecuted, tortured and, unable to cope with all this, had now taken up weapons for

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the protection of the country (Gashi 2012: 16). The Kosovo Liberation Army made history with an armed struggle for freedom and independence, to which the people gave strong support (Arifi-Bakalli 2011: 121).

In early January 1998, in the Drenica region, Serbian Special Forces aimed to intimidate the Albanian population in Kosovo. This was not enough for Serbia to intimidate the Albanian population in Kosovo, but it also brought in civilian and paramilitary armed groups at the same time (The Kosovo Report 2000: 68). With the increase of Serb forces in Kosovo, it became clear that a bloody war was imminent. On one side were the Serb forces, and on the other the KLA was preparing to fight them, increasing its numbers every day. As the outbreak of war in Kosovo was on the verge of it, the United States of America took the initiative through the well-known American diplomat, Robert Gelbard, who was the US special envoy for the former Yugoslavia. Regarding the ongoing violence in Kosovo, Gelbard told a news conference that the United States was concerned about the violence in Kosovo and called on the parties to reduce tensions (U.S. Department of State Archive, Document, February 22, 1999). His peaceful call to avoid armed conflict failed on 27 February 1998. On this date, heavily armed Yugoslav military forces attacked the village of Likoshan with tanks and helicopters from the air, killing four Yugoslav police officers and a great number of other Albanians. Robert Gelbard, the US president's special envoy for the Balkans, on March 4 in Washington expressed deep concern about the escalation of violence in Kosovo, saying: "The US remains ready to intervene militarily if deemed necessary." He further stressed that the US is ready to use all appropriate means at its disposal to resolve the Kosovo issue with Milosevic (Koha Ditore, March 5, 1998).

Following these military actions in Likoshan, Serbian forces launched other military attacks against the Jashari family in Prekaz, Drenica, where on March 5th they surrounded the houses of the Jashari family in Prekaz, using heavy artillery against them and killing and massacring 58 people, including the Legendary Commander Adem Jashari, "thus making him a martyr and making him a martyr of the KLA" (The Kosovo Report 2000: 68).

The assassination of the Jashari family in Prekaz sparked a backlash from US envoy Gelbard, who met with President Milosevic in Belgrade, reminded him of former President Bush's "Christmas warning" and told him that the United States would use force if Serbia wants to solve the Kosovo problem by force" (Malnar 2015: 152). Even the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, after the event in the Jashari family expressed her reaction, calling on President Milosevic, on behalf of all members of the Contact Group, saying: "The situation in Kosovo is very miserable today. There is no dialogue. President Milosevic has escaped his promises to us and to the Albanian population. Instead, Serbian security forces have launched a campaign of indiscriminate violence that has claimed the lives of many innocent people. Once again, President Milosevic is playing with fire. Once again, he has tried to solve his problems not with the force of argument, but with the argument of brute force" (U.S. Department of State Archive Document, 5 March, 1998).

Even the Contact Group, in its meeting held on March 25th, 1998, "insists on an urgent start that the process of unconditional dialogue with the leadership of Kosovo Albanians should begin, including the levels of the federal government of the republic,

and neither side should try to determine the results. The Contact Group insists that President Milosevic implements the unconditional dialogue process and assumes political responsibility to ensure that Belgrade engages in serious negotiations on Kosovo's statute "(Contact Group Statement on Kosovo-Bonn, 25 March 1998).

Following Secretary Albright's response and the Contact Group's discussions on the steps to be taken by the parties to reach an agreement to end further violence, US Envoy Ambassador Gelbard and British diplomat Jeremy Greenstock held a meeting on March 26 with President Rugova and his political group. In this meeting with the Americans and the British, discussions took place on ending the war and starting talks with the Serbs (Shala 2012: 47). On this occasion, Robert Gelbard, insisted that the government of Yugoslavia and Dr. Ibrahim Rugova to start the process of serious dialogue regarding the status of Kosovo and said that "we are prepared to help facilitate the dialogue and help both parties come together so that talks can begin on an immediate basis (US Department of State Archive Document, March 26, 1998).

The situation in Kosovo became very serious during the spring and for Milosevic this time seemed to be the green light to repress violence and killings there, as he had not received the proper military warning from NATO about what was happening. (Albright 2003: 447).

The escalation of the war took place mainly in May and June 1998. In these battles, the Serbian military police forces killed about 180 Albanians in Deçan, Skenderaj, Rahovec, Drenas, etc., and thousands of civilians were forcibly displaced from their homes and this continued to be the case, increased every day (Shabani 2014: 402). The Secretary of State had also reacted by making it clear to Milosevic about the military action she had taken in Kosovo during these months. At the meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels, she said that "the announcement of preparations for eventual military intervention in Kosovo should be a very clear message to the President of the FRY Slobodan Milosevic, that his behavior is unacceptable." Further, the Secretary of State had said: "Our goal from there (in Kosovo) is to ensure a ceasefire that would provide real conditions for the continuation of the dialogue" (Koha Ditore, 11 June 1998).

US insists on air strikes on Yugoslavia (Serbia)

The development of the war in Kosovo, where the Serbian police and paramilitary forces under the leadership of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, not only fought the KLA, but also launched fierce offensives against innocent and defenseless civilians, which had expressed great concern in the international community and especially in American politics. This war situation was the biggest concern in the US government, to which it had reacted strongly and that it was of the opinion that a solution to the war in Kosovo by diplomatic means could hardly be achieved, which was confirmed a few months later with the intervention of its military. The National Security Council, in its meeting on August 6th, had concluded that it was important to re-establish credibility for the possibility of NATO using military force. For a possibility of using force, the assistance of other Alliance states was first sought for a threat of use of military force even without the need for a resolution by the UN Security Council (NSC), Washington (Document No. 20688, August 6th, 1998)

To prevent further war in Kosovo and stop the Serbian offensive, the White House had begun to consider air intervention with military strikes by NATO allies. US President Bill Clinton himself had said that we would intervene militarily if Milosevic did not stop the war in Kosovo. This attitude of the American president is evidenced in a White House document dated August 6, 1998, from where he had a telephone conversation with the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. This conversation was dedicated only to the situation and the state of war in Kosovo. Clinton tells Prime Minister Blair: "I called on you to talk about Kosovo. It is getting worse there. The headlines say that Milosevic is preferring a military solution. Serbian military forces are not only fighting Albanian militants, but are engaging in a systematic campaign against the civilian population." In the ongoing conversation, he asks the British Prime Minister that measures should be taken before the situation worsens, saying: "I think we are close to a major humanitarian catastrophe." US President Clinton further told the British Prime Minister that we should stop Milosevic and that he should think twice. "We must continue the plan we have begun, identify the forces and make some form of ultimatum that will force him to end his campaign and restore Kosovo's autonomy" (Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair, Document: no. 5628. August, 6, 1998, 4:46 pm- 5:06 pm EDT Oval Office)

From this White House archival source document that dealt with the important conversation about Kosovo between the American President and the British Prime Minister, we highlight the idea as early as August 1998 to insist on NATO attacks against Serbian military and police targets in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. While at the meeting held on September 9, the KSC agreed that the US should move towards a plan to use military force against Yugoslav President Milosevic to force him to stop the violence and the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. (NSC Document, No. 20750. September 4, 1998).

As we said above, President Bill Clinton's idea of air intervention and agreeing in the KSC to take concrete steps on the use of military force prompted the president's cabinet to act on the preparation of a memorandum on air strikes. In the White House office in September, the president's cabinet, led by Samuel Berger, who was a national security adviser and aide to the president, prepared a memorandum for President Clinton on preparations for planning an ultimatum for military intervention with air strikes in Kosovo, which Clinton had requested in a telephone conversation with Tony Blair a month ago. The White House memorandum of September 24, 1998, presented to the US president, calls for NATO to issue an ultimatum, urging Milosevic to take concrete steps to resolve the humanitarian and political crisis, or to face it with a military response (Memorandum for the President, From: Samuel Berger. Kosovo: Preparing for an Ultimatum, Document No. 519, September 24, 1998).

The effort of American policy through the preparation of this ultimatum gives the full meaning of unstinting commitment to the issue of Kosovo, as well as the utmost seriousness to resolve it. Although this ultimatum carried with it costs and risks, both political and military, of which the Americans were very aware, they still did not stop and insisted on stopping the war in Kosovo and reaching an agreement. After reaching the agreement, the US planned a NATO military involvement with about 36,000 troops, including the 8,000 troops that the US had in Albania. This, however, required a great deal of commitment and determination both within the states and outside them for this

ultimatum to succeed. US President Bill Clinton supported and approved this memorandum for his cabinet to start preparing the ultimatum by the US, that NATO through the threat of military intervention from the air, the Yugoslav President to agree on a diplomatic solution to ending the conflict in Kosovo, or on the other hand will face military intervention by the US. (Ibid).

The US political insistence on intervening in Yugoslavia resulted in the first part of October, when it was determined to use military force if Milosevic did not move from his position to stop violence in Kosovo. This is evidenced by the KSC in the meeting held on October 12, in which it was decided that the White House should seek the issuance of the decision by NATO on the "Activation Order", in order for the US together with NATO to use military force to move politics in Belgrade towards resolving the crisis caused by Milosevic in Kosovo (NSC, Document, no. 20887, October 12, 1998).

Seeing this determination by the US and NATO, Yugoslav leader Milosevic avoided attacks by agreeing to reach an agreement with Holbrooke on October 13, who had been negotiating for several days with Milosevic. With the consent of US envoy Holbrooke, Yugoslav leader Milosevic had accepted US and NATO demands. The Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement provided for NATO control of airspace as well as the arrival of the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo to prevent hostilities in the country (Adopted by the Security Council at its 3937th meeting, on 24 October 1998).

But this agreement reached did not last very long either in terms of implementation or its duration, where the Serbian side had started again with killings and massacres of the civilian population in Kosovo in mid-January 1999, the military and Serbian police forces carried out the heaviest massacre since the beginning of the war in Kosovo in the village of Reçak in Shtime. After this event, US policy was persistent to end the solution of the crisis in Kosovo by military use, if the solution by diplomatic means fails, the KSC on January 20 agreed to act with air strikes (NSC, Document, no. 0359, January 20, 1999).

But now, in early February, US diplomacy had given the parties to the military conflict the opportunity to resolve the crisis through diplomatic means, which was expected to be achieved through the Rambouillet Conference. Despite the talks in Rambouillet, US policy was determined that if Belgrade did not agree to an agreement from these talks, it would face air strikes, which the US had been insisting on for several months (NSC, Document, nr.1060, February 15, 1999)

Following the Rambouillet negotiations, the Kosovar delegation agreed to sign the agreement in Paris, while the Serbian delegation was not expected to do so. Noting that the Serbian side is not yielding results to sign the agreement in Paris, the KSC on March 13 agreed that if this delegation withdraws from these agreement talks, NATO should be ready to act against the FRY (NSC, Document, No. 1839, March 13, 1999). While at the meeting held on March 15, the KSC had discussed plans for military intervention prepared by NATO to launch air strikes, and the council had demanded that the attacks and offensives that would be taken by Serbian forces should be taken into account in Kosovo as well as Serbian reactions to NATO (NSC, Document No. 1840, March 15, 1999). Following the refusal of the Serbian side to sign the Rambouillet Agreement on March 18, which ended the war in Kosovo through diplomatic means, the KSC, urged the US government to notify NATO to Milosevic that it will take military action

immediately. (NSC, Document No. 1944, March 18, 1999). Following Milosevic's rejection of Kosovo's Yugoslav policy of achieving peace in Kosovo, US President Bill Clinton demonstrated the determination of the White House, which convened a meeting on March 20 with staff leading its political and military administration to discuss military options in Kosovo which was planned by the North Atlantic Alliance. This meeting held in the Office of the President aimed at analyzing the phases of air strikes, which is evidenced in a White House document, for discussion at this meeting, presented by Samuel Berger, National Security Adviser and head of the auxiliary office of President Bill Clinton, that in this meeting were examined the details of military planning that NATO had done, "under the leadership of the North Atlantic Council, by the Supreme Command of the Alliance for Europe that had conducted a first phase air operation, designed as Operation "Allied Forces", to respond to developments in Kosovo. The initial package of air strikes ("Phase I") focuses mainly on the integrated air defense system of the FRY, in Serbia-Montenegro. The operation would include air-to-air and naval-launched missiles, as well as manned aircraft, with the U.S. providing just over half that included the B-2 and F117. The North Atlantic Council has delegated the authority to execute this initial package to Secretary-General Solana, subject to consultations with the Allies" (The White House, Washington, Document No. 1975, March 20, 1999. Meeting on Kosovo military options).

While discussing the stages that were drafted in the document drafted by the KSAE, we note a request from the US for two alternatives to attacks: "Option A aims to respond to the aggression of renewed violence against Kosovo Albanians, with primary focus on military and police units directly related to aggression. Option B is intended to respond to Serb attacks on NATO forces in Macedonia, Bosnia or other neighboring countries." U.S. National Guard General Hugh Shelton spoke briefly about the numbers and types of targets associated with these two options. (Ibid) In his brief speech, General Shelton details the initial attacks related to system attacks. Montenegro, of which President Djukanovic was well informed, about option A, while option B could carry risks on its own due to the civilian casualties that could be suffered from these attacks, which states: "The first phase of the attacks, which included the integration of Montenegro's air defense system as necessary, was announced to President Djukanovic. While option B can also bring undesirable victims to Kosovo, for which you can ask me if there are any steps that can be taken to reduce the number of victims. At the same meeting, at the end of the discussions, President Clinton and his staff agreed on air intervention over Yugoslavia and approved the decision that they could intervene militarily together with NATO. This decision, which was taken for both options, could be executed within 48 hours" (Ibid).

Discussions about the decision taken at this meeting turned out to be accurate after these hours, because the attacks started exactly according to this decision by the White House. The purpose of the military intervention from the air, US President Bill Clinton, justifies the continued brutality of the Serb forces in Kosovo led by Milosevic and that he did not agree to sign the agreement, which would end the war there. After President Clinton with other political and military actors in his office on March 20 in the White House had decided to conduct air operations in the stages planned by the US where NATO was to undertake these air strikes, as a decision of taken by the White House,

President Clinton spoke to the leaders of the most powerful member states of the NATO alliance even during telephone conversations. This was noted during a conversation with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, telling him that our diplomatic efforts did not convince Milosevic to stop the violence and genocide of the people in Kosovo, who gave no readiness for negotiations for a peaceful solution to Ambassador Holbrooke. Milosevic continues the violence, ignoring any international presence there, thus becoming threatening, and does not mind that his goal is to “remove the chains for the greatest violence in Kosovo.” Of course, the phrase “remove the chains for the greatest violence in Kosovo” by Bill Clinton meant that Milosevic was left free to do whatever he wanted to a completely defenseless population. The German Chancellor also feared such a situation, which President Clinton had analyzed quite well during the conversation with him. And for this President Clinton responds to the German Chancellor by saying that “I am ready to fully support NATO” (The White House Washington, Document: no. 2100. Telcon with Chancellor Schroeder, March, 23, 1999, 4:57 - 5:09 pm EST. The Oval Office).

After talks with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, US President Bill Clinton did not stop talking from the White House to convince other European leaders, NATO allies, he also called French President Jacques Chirac, to make it clear that the US, together with NATO, is now ready to intervene, and without any hesitation the French President Chirac, fully supports the US President for his insistence on intervening militarily with NATO in Kosovo and Yugoslavia saying “We fully agree with the decision taken by NATO” (The White House Washington, Document: no. 2100. Telcon with French President Chirac, March, 23, 1999, 5:24 - 5:37 pm EST. The Oval Office).

In talks with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac, President Clinton received the full support of the two leaders, who had followed the situation in Kosovo with increasing attention. President Clinton had also called the Italian Prime Minister D'Alema, to support the NATO intervention, telling him that there is no other solution than military intervention against Serbian targets in Kosovo. “I feel that we have no choice but to move forward with NATO action. I intend to support it and hope that we can all do it together” (The White House Washington, Document: no. 2100. Telcon with Prime Minister D'Alema, March 23, 1999, 5:44 - 5:49 pm EST. The Oval Office). But D'Alema's stance is not recorded in this document, and we cannot understand any of his responses to President Bill Clinton's stance. After these talks, through phone calls with European leaders, the final stance of US policy to intervene militarily with NATO from the air is given by the president of the White House himself that he is ready to act and that “the United States and NATO- they are now prepared to act militarily” (President Bill Clinton: A commitment to ending the conflict in Kosovo, March 23, 1999).

The British government, and in particular the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who was a strong supporter of the only way to stop Milosevic's itinerary, had also expressed a strong supportive and determined role in the US policy of intervention to the Kosovo Albanian people was the military intervention of the NATO alliance, despite the reluctance of some of its member states (Blair 2011: 275). But President Clinton's determination that NATO military intervention should be inevitable in stopping the war in Kosovo, and his political determination to stop the war in Kosovo

resulted in the launch of airstrikes on targets of Serbian military and police forces in Kosovo and Yugoslavia, March 24, 1999 (Clinton 2004: 714). Regarding this decision, President Bill Clinton addressed the American people on March 24, 1999 from the White House. In this speech, he gave a very real and detailed description of the situation in Kosovo, saying: "My American compatriots, today our Armed Forces joined our NATO allies in air strikes against Serbian forces responsible for brutality in Kosovo. We have acted decisively (solution) for several reasons. We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a growing military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war; to scatter dust in the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results. And we act to stay united with our allies for peace. By acting now, we are upholding our values, defending our interests and advancing the cause of peace" (President Clinton: Address to the Nation, Washington, DC, March 24, 1999).

The political and military support of the United States and their determination to continue the attacks until the victory of NATO, forced the Yugoslav leader, Slobodan Milosevic, to lead to the complete capitulation of Yugoslavia. This capitulation was signed by the Serbian military side and the General of NATO forces in Macedonia, the British Mike Jackson, in Kumanovo on June 9, 1999 (Serbs Sign; 3,600 U.S. Troops Poised for Kosovo Duty, Washington, June 9, 1999)

The 78-day air strike campaign achieved the political and military objectives of the US and NATO. On achieving the US political and military objectives in Kosovo and after the cessation of NATO airstrikes, US President Clinton announced the American people with a speech of thanksgiving and reporting: "I can report to the American people that we have achieved a victory for a more secure world, for our democratic values and for a stronger America." In this keynote address to his people, President Clinton expressed deep gratitude and appreciation to the US military and NATO allies for their unstoppable contribution during the three months of alliance airstrikes to military intervention in Kosovo, saying "I want to express my deep gratitude to the men and women of our armed forces and those of our allies. Day after day, night after night they flew risking their lives to attack their targets and avoid civilian casualties when they were shot in populated areas. I urge every American to join me in saying, Thank you, you have made us very proud."

Once again, President Clinton demonstrated the determination of the United States and its allies to end the airstrikes campaign, justifying and arguing it, adding: "We have sent a message of determination and hope to all the world. Think of all the millions of innocent people who died in this bloody century because democracies reacted too late to evil and aggression" (Address to the nation by the President The Oval Office June 11, 1999).

Conclusion

The KLA's insistence on resisting a completely unequal war and the unreasonable scale of violence perpetrated by Serbian police and military authorities against the civilian population prompted the international community in the second half of 1998 to modify its position on Kosovo. Here the driving force and most active was American politics and diplomacy.

The expansion of territories under KLA control and against the Serbian offensive of August 1998, which was accompanied by the displacement of large numbers of civilians from their settlements, prompted the international community to commit to a ceasefire as a precondition for activities to find of a peaceful solution. On October 13, 1998, an agreement was signed where the Serbian police and army would return to pre-war levels, an OSCE verification mission would be established in Kosovo, and NATO would bomb Yugoslavia within 96 hours if the agreement was not implemented. The situation on the ground showed no signs of improvement, and even the armed confrontation continued despite the presence of the OSCE Verification Mission.

With the beginning of the deteriorating situation in Kosovo, especially after the Recak Massacre (January 1999), American policy, which had closely followed the situation there, played a key role in preparing concrete steps towards an action strategy. As the intensity of the conflict increased, US policy realized that Milosevic did not want a peaceful solution to end the violence in Kosovo.

By carefully analyzing the official US policy, articulated and well-coordinated between the White House, the State Department and the National Security Council, we can conclude that from the beginning of August 1998, in addition to diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution, Washington, seeing the superiority on the front and the stubbornness of the Serbian leadership led by Milosevic, had begun to consider the option of military intervention as the only option to avoid the humanitarian catastrophe that could happen at any moment in Kosovo. Analyzing the contribution of American politics and diplomacy, we conclude that the idea of NATO intervention and its intervention in Kosovo, owes exclusively to American politics.

Also, based on the documents, information and materials cited during the drafting of this paper, we can conclude that the entire NATO military intervention operation in Kosovo was such a difficult and complex undertaking, as in the plan to achieve a political inter-alliance consensus, as well as in terms of military coordination and implementation. Without any doubt we can conclude that it was so difficult that without the very serious engagement of politics and diplomacy its beginning would have been quite unimaginable and without the broad and leading role of the American military force within the command and operating contingents, its full success would have been unattainable.

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Gazetat Shtypi ditor:

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THE ROLE OF NATO IN ENSURING EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE VIEW OF GERMAN THINK TANKS RESEARCH

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Abstract

The international analysis carried out in the first two decades after the fall of communism brings us new information regarding the evolution of the influence of NATO on European security and politics. This article aims to analyze the role of NATO in ensuring European security seen through the research of the most significant German think tanks.

It is important to underline the fact that the concept of "security" is not unanimously understood by the international environment. After the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations, various structures engaged in the study of international relations set themselves the goal of identifying the signs of a newly emerging system and offering their assessments to the actions of the main actors trying to participate in its formation. The USA set the course for the construction of a unipolar international system, which would be guided by the USA. This approach is most often observed in the studies of American experts on global security problems. (Michta, 2014:36-54)

Keywords: *USA, NATO, EU, European security, international relations, Germany, think tank*

Introduction

The United States represented the idea of global security as the security of all mankind and saw itself as the main actor in ensuring it. Academic experts have found the information in the US think tanks to support this affirmation. In particular, the RAND Corporation who proposed to build global security based on only two actors: the UN and NATO. (<https://www.rand.org/topics/global-security.html>)

But, Russia, as the legal successor of the Soviet Union, having a place among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and also possessing the strategic potential of nuclear weapons, could not agree with the American approach to building a new security system. It insisted that all issues on the global agenda should be resolved in the UN Security Council, and not taken individually by the members of the North Atlantic Alliance under the leadership of the United States.

Russian experts such as V.M. Kulagin, support global security as a form of protection from threats to key values (from the individual to the entire world community). Similar features can be traced in the works of prominent Russian experts on international security. For example, I.S. Ivanov notes that the protracted and uncontrollable nature of the new context of international security is not well suited for

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resolving crises, so problems can only be solved on a collective basis. (http://globalaffairs.ru/number/n_447) But the most balanced position of the Russian scientific community was presented by A.D. Bogaturov, who defined modern global security as two intertwined processes: firstly, the growing importance of global problems, which leads to an understanding of the need to establish uniform rules, and, secondly, the observed process of harmonizing relations between countries, which leads to insufficient efficiency of interaction. (<http://intertrends.ru/userfiles/img/files/Bogaturov-25.pdf>)

In the West, it is believed that the main document defining the most important problems of European security is the 2016 EU Global Strategy. (<http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/file/814/download?token=I-Kb0OrS>) Among the main priorities in the document are: "deepening relations within the framework of security and defense, (implementation of the European action plan in the field of defense, EU-NATO Joint Declarations), creating a more flexible and unified Union, updating existing strategies and preparing new ones, strengthening public diplomacy". (Ibid.)

The emergence of the new EU strategy was accompanied by several important studies in think tanks around the world. In 2016, Russian authors N. K. Arbatova and A. M. Kokeeva, published a large analytical report called "The EU Global Security Strategy 2016: Analytical report. (https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/publ/-2017/2017_013.pdf) A distinctive feature of the report is that the new global strategy of the EU is not only analyzed, but the main advantages and disadvantages for each of the interested EU countries are defined. Also, within the framework of research at IMEMO RAS, a multi-level system of security and peacebuilding is being studied. (Боркунова, 2017:9-27)

German think tanks dealing with European security issues have been actively involved in the process of evaluating the new Strategy and offered several recommendations and forecasts. The Science and Politics Foundation (SWP) sees the main drawback of the Strategy as the fact that it does not take into account the interests of the EU itself, because "the difficult task was to take into account a large number of national interests of EU countries". (https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2016C38_bdk.pdf) Also, according to the Fund's researcher, the central theme of the Strategy is the issue of "sustainable development", which is determined by the ability to respond to harm and disasters, as well as the ability to form resilience standards, which the EU cannot yet demonstrate". (Ibid.)

The Science and Policy Foundation considers that the EU should get rid of large and ambitious plans for the unity of the Union and proposes to strengthen the potential of individual nation-states (especially in those that do not yet have clear plans for ensuring security), and only then to consolidate efforts within the EU. The German think tank justifies its point of view by the fact that the EU countries cannot agree even on the main problems of politics and security. This was demonstrated by the refusal to adopt the European Constitution and its replacement by the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the failure of subsequent attempts to deepen integration.

The German Society for Foreign Policy (DGAP) views the Global Strategy as timely EU assistance in the face of disintegration (Brexit). At the same time, DGAP suggests focusing on the interests of European citizens: "While the EU documents mainly describe strategic prospects aimed at a 'better world', the Global Strategy should

be a simple but clear message to EU citizens, that it primarily concerns the protection of human potential. Against the backdrop of the recent terrorist attacks on European soil in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Rouen, and Ansbach, this is the most important message for Europeans". (<http://reconnecting-europe.boellblog.org/fi-les/2016/07/going-global-targeting-the-home-front.pdf>)

Of particular interest is the opinion of, Frederica Mogirini, on the successes and failures of the implementation of the new Strategy, who affirmed that "we have worked to invest in existing dialogue initiatives, as well as to create new prospects for young and active people to have the opportunity to participate in political life and looking for new channels for such participation. A new Young Med Voices Plus initiative has been launched. Such an initiative can also help create a network of opinion leaders focused on deepening integration within the EU". (http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/full_brochure_year_1.pdf) The EU leadership is ready to allow active citizens to take part in the formation of the new contours of the EU, which will contribute to the strengthening of European security. This step will also help to reduce the number of Euro skeptics among the younger generation of Europeans.

To understand the origins of the global Strategy, as well as to identify the cause-and-effect relationships of the main problems of European security, it is necessary to turn to the origins of its formation. The historical context of the formation of European security is complex and contradictory. This is because it is not only in the hands of national states but also in the hands of regional military-political organizations. After World War II, European infrastructure was destroyed and both political and financial assistance was required. It was rendered by the United States, which proposed first to restore the destroyed Western European political system and then to create a common security zone. In this regard, at the present stage, it is difficult to fully separate the concepts of "Europeanism" and "Euro-Atlanticism".

The main approaches to the formation of the Atlantic vector of European security and to the problem of US participation in ensuring European security began to take shape back in the middle of the 20th century. In the Western bibliography, the conceptual side of the European security problem is presented quite widely, and many European and American researchers give different points of view regarding this issue. It is worth noting the fact that the majority of European states, although they are members of the European Union, have different assessments of the problem of the security of their region, and often adhere to different positions. The approaches of European countries and the United States are also different from each other.

The French researcher N. Koenig, divided the concept of European security into 3 areas: Europeanism, Atlanticism, and Euro-Atlanticism. At the same time, the author of the study claims that each state adheres to a clearly defined line in its foreign policy: France is an adherent of Europeanism and in many respects opposes its position to American views; Great Britain supports the concept of Atlanticism, which allows us to call it the closest ally of the United States in Europe; Germany adheres to the concept of Euro-Atlanticism, but at the same time tries to create a certain balance in relations with the United States and European states. (Koenig, 2016:42) The positions of German think tanks reflect the approaches to understanding the development of the European security system and the peculiarities of the influence of the Atlantic vector on it.

In the analysis of the foundations of European security, European think tanks occupy an important place. (Борзова, 2011:5-14) This applies, in particular, to German think tanks, although the number of German narrowly specialized centers dealing with this problem is relatively small. The German Society for Foreign Policy (DGAP), is actively studying the influence of the Atlantic vector of foreign policy on European security. Transatlantic relations occupy an important place in the research of this analytical center, more than 350 publications on this topic are available on its portal.

The surge in publication activity was observed already at the beginning of the 21st century, namely from September 2001. This is due to the events of September 11 and the revision of the approaches of European countries to the activities of the United States and NATO. According to experts from the German Society for Foreign Policy (DGAP), the events of September 11 showed the weakness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Also in 2002, the German Foreign Policy Society issued a report that stated that the United States and European countries have different understandings of the Atlantic vector of ensuring European security, and, consequently, of transatlantic relations in general. On the one hand, there is a certain common understanding of transatlantic cooperation, and the United States and European countries highly value each other, however, on the other hand, after the disappearance of the main danger - the USSR, several contradictions arose associated with "different ideas of countries about the main challenges and threats, the problem of division of global leadership, different approaches to the level of defense spending, views on conflicts". (<https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/article/getfullpdf/11256>)

Experts of the German Society for Foreign Policy came to the conclusion that European countries themselves have not decided which vector of ensuring security is acceptable to them. That is, it is not relationships that are built to develop transnational security, but security is needed to build relationships. This is the main difference in the vision of Euro-Atlantic security between the American and European approaches at the beginning of the 21st century.

In 2002, an important event for NATO and, as it later became clear, for the EU, happened - the creation of the NATO rapid reaction force. (-URL: https://jfcbs.nato.int/systems/file_download.ashx?pg=247&ver=8) German think tanks reacted differently to this initiative. In particular, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation did not express confidence in the US initiative to create a rapid reaction force. The Fund predicted in advance that the NATO summit in Prague (which will talk about the rapid reaction force) will contribute to the implementation of two trends: first, an increase in financial costs, and, second, an increase in the importance of some countries. "Now the country's role in NATO will be determined by their military power". (http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_1441-544-1-30.pdf?070807105017) For Germany, this was an evident problem because the country has a weak military power.

But the Foundation's fears did not affect the military potential of Germany in any way; there was neither a build-up of military-technical forces nor an increase in military spending. According to statistics from the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, since 2002 Germany has spent 1.2% to 1.4% of GDP on the military sector. (https://www.sipri.org/sites/de_fault/files/milex-share-of-gdp.pdf) This trend

continues to this day. Consequently, the Foundation's warnings were not heeded.

Unlike the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Science and Policy Foundation had a different approach to this new situation, shortly before the NATO summit in Prague, it issued a report in which it perceived the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force as a "friendly gesture" by the United States to European countries in the context of the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan and invited the EU countries to take an active part in its formation. (https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/aktuell2002_52_etl_ks.pdf) It was assumed that it was through participation in the rapid reaction force, as well as through a common risk for the transatlantic partnership, that the EU countries would be able to increase their influence in NATO. A similar position was shared by the Hesse Foundation for the Study of Peace and Conflict, as well as the Center for European Legal Policy at the University of Bremen. European countries adhered to the position of those centers that recommended taking an active part in the formation of NATO's rapid reaction forces. In particular, Germany, who provided NATO with about 1,200 naval, and air force personnel, as well as 6 Tornado aircraft to suppress enemy air defense forces. (<http://www.dw.com/ru/немецкий-вклад-в-силы-быстрого-реагирования-нато/a-950874>).

Also, according to the NATO Response Force (NRF) Newsletter, from 2003 to 2017 Germany, along with the UK, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain were the most active participants in the expansion of the NATO Rapid Reaction Force. (<http://1gnc.org/the-nato-response-force>)

In 2003, the main storyline of the problem of the development of the transatlantic dialogue was the invasion of Iraq. The US position is reflected in an article by the American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski published on the portal of the German Foreign Policy Society (DGAP). In the article titled "Europeans to Iraq!" the author examined the approaches of the United States and Europe to the main postulates that cause contradictions: the terrorist threat, the problem of leadership, and the situation in the Middle East and concluded that "only the United States can solve the Middle East problem (by repeating in Iraq the model formed in Afghanistan), and European countries can only help physically; in the fight against terrorism it is necessary to combine efforts; and finally, European security must be viewed in the context of NATO (and EU enlargement must be symmetrical to NATO enlargement)". (<https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/article/getFullPDF/9570>)

The German Foreign Policy Society reacted extremely negatively to the US attempts to involve NATO forces in the invasion of Iraq. Several important statements were made, which subsequently influenced the German decisions on this problem. The center's research suggested that "Germany and other European countries should be ready to support the position of France and Russia, which also do not share the US approach to the military solution of all problems in Iraq". (<https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/article/getfullpdf/9600>)

There is an assumption that by 2003 Germany had already clearly formed an understanding of the political imbalance: Germany stands out within the Atlantic vector of European security only because it has a significant military deficit and inadequate defense spending. (<https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/article/getFull-PDF/9600>) In

order not to aggravate this situation, Gerhard Schroeder, German Chancellor, openly spoke out in favor of refusing to send troops to Iraq.

The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, just before the March 2003 EU Council meeting, released a report on the impact of the Iraq war on transatlantic relations. As a compromise between supporters and opponents of the participation of European forces in Iraq, the Fund invites the EU countries to unite around all UN decisions, including those related to the military, economic and humanitarian mission of Western countries concerning Iraq. (<http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.1643>) This strategy would have helped to avoid fragmentation in the relations of the NATO member states, and, it would have allowed interested EU countries to take part in the settlement of the war in Iraq. The official position of the EU is reflected in the presidential communiqué of the EU Council dated March 20-21, 2003. It states that the EU countries should contribute to the solution of the conflict, mainly relying on the mechanisms of the UN, CFSP, and ESDP, and not on any other alliances. (<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20858/75136.pdf>) As you can see, the ideas of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation were reflected in the final decision of the EU.

A similar position on the problem of the invasion of Iraq was held by the Science and Policy Foundation (SWP). However, unlike the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, SWP believes that Germany and European countries have defended their right not to take a direct part in the events in Iraq, but they cannot avoid the consequences of American policy for transatlantic relations. And even though NATO did not officially take part in the invasion of Iraq, "the Iraqi problems plunged the transatlantic relationship into one of the worst crises". (https://www.swp-berlin.org/file-admin/contents/products/zeitschriftenschau/zs_2003_06_sicher.pdf)

The 2006 Riga NATO summit summed up the activities of the Alliance in 2002-2005, and outlined new prospects, which, although they did not change the US approach to European countries, showed that patient waiting will lead to a positive effect from using the Atlantic vector of European security. In the scientific literature, the 2006 NATO summit in Riga is not viewed as particularly important, because not a single important initiative was put forward for the Alliance itself. On the meeting of the heads of state of the Alliance, US President George W. Bush visited the University of Latvia in Riga, where he made a speech on the future of European countries in NATO. Historically, it is in the academic environment of universities that Western leaders make important statements. In his speech, Bush appealed with facts showing "the importance of the goals and objectives of the Alliance, its effectiveness in Iraq and Afghanistan, called for new members to join NATO, and listed the merits of the Balkan countries and CEE countries", however, he never mentioned a single country in Western Europe. (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/76986.htm>)

Instead, he noted that "unlike 1949, when NATO faced the Soviet threat, it is now transforming from a strategic Alliance focused on the defense of Europe into a special alliance ready to deploy forces outside Europe in defense of freedom. This is a vital mission." From this, it followed that the new NATO is aimed not so much at ensuring the security of its member states as at expanding its sphere of influence.

Also, European (primarily German) wariness was caused by one of the non-military decisions of the NATO member countries related to the Russia-NATO

dialogue. In the declaration of the Riga Summit, the problem is designated as "an issue of energetic security": "The leaders of the Alliance countries indicated a desire to analyze NATO's capabilities, which can be focused on protecting infrastructure and sea routes for providing energy resources". ([https:// www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006-/p06-150e.htm](https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006-/p06-150e.htm)) That is, on the one hand, NATO shows that it is not going to interfere in European affairs on the import of energy resources, but, on the other hand, considering the issue of safe transportation in the context of the Russian agenda, it shows that sooner or later, the energy factor, as well as many other elements of European security will depend on the Alliance.

German think tanks view NATO intervention in European energy issues as a new threat to European security. The expansion of the non-military component of the Alliance's activities will lead to a decrease in the European interests and an increase in the influence of the Atlantic vector. In this regard, the centers suggest a more careful approach to the issue of expanding the scope of NATO's activities in Europe. For example, the German Foreign Policy Society has tried to soften its rhetoric about NATO and transatlantic security, hinting that there will be no return to the old realities of European-American relations. But after the war in Iraq, the United States changed its approach to Atlantic security from purely national to multilateral, which relies on the "coalition of the willing". (<https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/article/get-FullPDF/11808>) It is also confirmed that Europe is dependent on the United States and it will be difficult for it to be on an equal footing with the US for a long time.

Since the 2004 NATO eastward expansion, German think tanks have responded in different ways. In particular, regarding the three waves of NATO expansion to the East (2004 - Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia joined, 2009 - Albania and Croatia and 2017 - Montenegro) they proposed various projects to solve the problem of the fragmented positions of European countries.

Immediately after the final decision to include new members in NATO in 2004, the Science and Policy Foundation released the New NATO report on the long-term prospects for enlargement. The report traces a line aimed generally at a positive assessment of the expansion, "the most important contribution of which will be the creation of high-quality military infrastructure on the territory of the new member states, and in the long term, these countries will also make a military contribution that will change the Alliance". (https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/aktuell2004_16_hft_ks.pdf)

In the context of the 2004 enlargement, when the Social Democrat Gerhard Schroeder was Chancellor of Germany, the position of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation is of great interest. Like the Science and Politics Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation was skeptical about the prospect of Bulgaria and Romania (who were pursuing to become EU members) joining NATO. The Baltic countries have openly stated that after joining NATO they will make efforts to become EU members. This fact caused some concern among the Foundation since its researchers believed that "Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will, together with Poland and other Eastern European states, strengthen the "Atlantic" vector in the EU, promoting the interests of the Alliance rather than the Union. (<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/02614.pdf>)

To prevent this from happening, Germany began to actively involve the Baltic countries to ensure that they share the idea of balance between the European and Atlantic security. As a result, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have embarked on a course towards the development of Euro-Atlantic security, skillfully realizing their interests both in NATO and in the EU. In the context of the further expansion of NATO, this position of the Baltic countries was beneficial to Germany.

The next expansion took place in 2009 when Albania and Croatia joined NATO. Since 2005, the German Chancellor has been A. Merkel, leader of the CDU party. After analyzing the prospects for Albania's accession to NATO, and subsequently, to the EU, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation concluded that "NATO's expansion should not be impeded, but this should not become a reason for the country's accession to the EU". (http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_13462-544-1-30.pdf?08041-6153827) As in the case with the previous stage of the Alliance's expansion, the German center saw a threat in the fact that having entered NATO, Albania would apply for membership to the EU, which was not ready to accept another country that was not able to carry out the necessary economic reforms. The Fund's forecast came true because in 2009 Albania applied to join the European Union.

The second expansion of NATO to the East was supposed to happen by adding to the Alliance of two more states - Georgia and Ukraine. An open position on the prospects of the two post-Soviet countries joining NATO was expressed by the Atlantic-community analytical center, created in 2007 and not yet widely recognized. According to the center, the expansion of NATO to the post-Soviet countries is not in the interests of Europe: "the main interest of the EU in the expansion of NATO is to create a stable European security order, to prevent confrontation with Russia. Therefore, from the point of view of Germany and other European states, Ukraine and Georgia should not join the Alliance". (http://www.atlantic-community.org/index.php/Open_Think_Tank_Article/Germany%27s_Interests_in_Future_NATO_Enlargement) The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Science and Politics Foundation, and the German Foreign Policy Society had similar positions. Neither Ukraine nor Georgia, in their opinion, have any prospects of positively influencing transatlantic security.

German Chancellor A. Merkel, as well as Foreign Minister F.W. Steinmeier, shares the position of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and believes that the US plans to add Georgia and Ukraine to NATO should be rejected. (<http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/erweiterung-merkel-gegen-nato-plaene-der-usa/138-5188.html>)

In 2017, NATO added Montenegro. This action was seen as timely by German think tanks. According to the Science and Politics Foundation, the United States has long (after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001) wanted to withdraw from military peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and now does not consider the Balkans an important NATO stronghold, and analysis shows that the Balkans can represent both political and economic interest. (https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/con-tents/products/research_papers/-2017RP01_kim.pdf) It can be assumed that the EU is proposed, if not to take NATO's place in the region, then to intensify efforts to strengthen the European, not the Atlantic, vector in the foreign policy of the countries. Through NATO, it will be easier for

Montenegro to achieve the necessary political and economic conditions through which it can join the EU. The fact that Europe considers Montenegro as a promising member of the Union is evidenced by the accelerated process of negotiations on the possibility of Montenegro's accession to the EU.

Since 2011, a series of changes begins in the Atlantic sector of Europe's foreign policy and security. First, at the end of 2011-2012, the approach of US President Barack Obama to the prospects of US influence on European security began to appear more clearly. It became obvious that Barack Obama intends to cooperate more closely with European countries to ensure security, and this only means that the United States was going to increase its influence in the region. This idea remained until the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, where Barack Obama assessed this increased influence. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation was one of the first to notice this trend, even before the official confirmation of the policy of closer cooperation between the United States and European countries in the framework of transatlantic relations.

By 2012, almost all the subjects of research of the German think tanks are reflected in the earlier periods of transatlantic relations. One topic is relatively new and has to do with spy scandals in US-European relations. According to most German think tanks, they negatively affected the level of trust within the Euro-Atlantic partnership.

Since 2014, DGAP has published over 20 major policy analyzes of American espionage on NATO partners. According to the center, the approaches of the US and European countries to this problem are so different that in case a new scandal occurs, this may lead to an even greater cooling of European-American relations. The difference is that the US believed that espionage was justified by its desire to ensure European security and allows the special services to cooperate on an ongoing basis, while Europe perceived this as interference in the internal affairs of countries.

The German Foreign Policy Society also drew attention to the fact that it was Germany that became the main target for American espionage. The threat is posed by two components of espionage: "first, the NSA's massive technical oversight activities that go far beyond targeting individual suspects and rely on aggregating as much data as possible; secondly, "classic" espionage based on technical means or human sources." The spy scandals reached the peak of tension in 2015. It has been repeatedly suggested that European countries should think about how much they need an Atlantic vector of foreign policy and security if it works against them. However, this rhetoric did not last long; in 2016 it changed to a more neutral one.

In general, we can say that the Atlantic vector of European security occupies one of the most important places in the studies of German think tanks. Along with an analysis of NATO activities, the process of changing NATO's influence on the European agenda is examined. Analysis of the research centers showed that the EU countries, members of NATO, expected more radical changes in the activities of the Alliance and an increase in the role of the European component in transatlantic relations. However, these expectations are exceeded by the interests of the United States, which has the strongest influence within NATO. Therefore, the centers see their mission in finding some kind of compromise in Euro-American relations within the framework of the transatlantic partnership. The basis of this compromise is the search for common challenges and threats. According to most think tanks, consolidation within the North Atlantic Alliance was significantly higher when the Soviet threat

existed. And new threats (terrorism, drug trafficking, regional conflicts, nuclear and simple weapons) should become the basis for further cooperation.

The expansion of the geographical borders of NATO and the non-military component of the Alliance's activities is assessed quite negatively by the research centers of Germany. This is because the EU does not share the US idea of the synchronous expansion of NATO and the EU. The synchronous expansion gives impetus to strengthening the Atlantic vector of European security, which, according to the centers, is a latent threat. To neutralize the consequences of enlargement, it is proposed: on the one hand, to support the US initiatives to create joint projects within the framework of NATO, and, on the other, to intensify the use of situations in which NATO functions were replaced by those of the EU. Thus, the approaches of the German centers to the Atlantic vector of European foreign policy and security can be characterized as cautious and balanced. In the absence of proposals for cardinal changes in attitudes towards NATO, there is an obvious bias towards deepening the internal European component of foreign policy and security.

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WOMEN'S ROLE IN THE SOCIAL ACTION OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

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Abstract

This study proposes a look at the role of women in the social action of the Catholic Church from an approach to her Social Doctrine, a recognition of women founders of welfare congregations and two intellectuals socially committed to their time (Concepción Arenal and Edith Stein). Finally, we recover the concept of social conscience in the 21st century, from the gospel message and the participation of women in the Church, posed as solidarity in a care economy.

Key words: *women, social action, Catholic Church, ethics of care, social conscience*

Introduction

By relating the concepts of "women, social action and Church we discover that the meaning of each one of them, converges in the way of living and thinking of women who have found Someone who has taken them in and who turns them into women that welcome other people, in whom they discover the face of God.

To consider the role of women and their social action in this third decade of the 21st century is a complex issue¹, in which, as was the case at the beginning of the 20th century, it is difficult to avoid a personal position and commitment. The words of the Catholic feminist Maria de Echarri, spoken more than a hundred years ago, serve as an example:

Up to now we were easily forgiven by the feminists for taking action, because, as a rule, our actions were beneficial, and our visits to the sick, to asylums, to St. Vincent's conferences, etc., did not bother them or overshadow them but, even though there was a writer who, in a recent lecture at the conference at the Athenaeum said that "we did it all for the sake of vainglory and to get some money", they did not feel at all inclined to imitate the example of those who went into the most infectious slums in the name of Christian charity. But lo and behold, to their neutral feminist proclamations, when they are not absolutely secular, claiming improvements for women, it occurs to Catholics to answer by accepting within the banner of the Catholic

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¹ By social conscience we understand the capacity that we human beings have to perceive, recognise and understand the problems and needs of people in our community. The connotation of a Marxist echo that had its meaning in the 20th century, it is being generalised as solidarity in the 21st century.

Church, those improvements, at least, some of them, those admissible ones, those that are not exaggerated so that cannot be accepted. Ah, then the feminists began to be indignant, and they, who brand us as intransigent, allowed themselves to deny us almost, almost the right to act outside a radius of action that is purely beneficial! (Echarri, 1919: 32-35).

Christian social thought has to free itself from the prejudices of political ideologies that have occurred throughout the 20th century, from a confrontational vision between capitalism and communism. At present, the dilemma between radical liberalism and Statism is overcome by the need for new proposals that assume the common good of humanity, especially in the situation of crisis and global uncertainty in which we live today, in which technological advances coexist with the impotence of governments to control the COVID-19 pandemic.

Reviewing the history of the Church we find, from its beginnings, the communion of goods in the first Christians and the figures of deaconesses at the service of the community, such as Phoebe or Saint Apollonia; the medieval saints who dedicated themselves to looking after the poor and the sick, as well as the religious congregations of women who have been founded on the vocation to educate and on the dedication to the disadvantaged, the elderly or the sick, and who have been a fundamental part of Christian life.

It was in the 19th century, after the Industrial Revolution, when the concern aroused by the ideals of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the Liberal Revolutions in Europe and America, social conscience¹ was challenged by the hardships of the working class that arose in the marginal areas of the cities. This brought about a change in mentality: from charity and beneficence to the idea of social justice and the consideration of laws as rules promulgated for the common good, guarantors of respect for human dignity.

Charity is the master route of the Social Doctrine of the Church. All the responsibilities and commitments outlined by this doctrine come from charity which, according to Jesus' teaching, is the synthesis of the entire Law (cf. Mt 22:36-40). It gives real substance to the personal relationship with God and with one's neighbour; it is not only the principle of micro-relationships, as in friendships, the family, the small group, but also of macro-relationships, such as social, economic and political relationships (Benedict XVI, Encyclical *Caritas in Veritate*, 2009, n. 2.)

At the beginning of 2021, the exceptional nature of the health alert is extended indefinitely. In addition to the suffering caused by the loss of loved ones or by the after-effects of the disease in some cases, are added the economic crisis and its devastating consequences for many people. Entire families become part of the vulnerable population, they are at risk of social exclusion and unexpectedly find themselves on the poverty line.

The governments of the State and the Autonomous Communities establish lockdown rules and mobility restrictions, and insist on the application of prevention measures such as the use of masks, hand washing and safety distance. A large number of professionals from various sectors such as health, do their work commendably in the front line in the fight against the pandemic, while the service sector, tourism and trade suffers bankruptcies and job losses, the administration and many companies are adapting giving increasing weight to online work.

Numerous public and private institutions, military and civilian, municipalities, neighbourhood associations, media, NGOs... undertake and support social action projects. Many people collaborate voluntarily in the collection and distribution of food for soup kitchens or in the search for housing and employment through associations such as Caritas, which has seen an increase of 57% in the number of requests for assistance to people and families without resources (Paniagua, 2020).

Social and labour exclusion, food, hygiene, housing and health care needs are many of the problems left behind by the economic crisis. Some of these situations are accentuated with particular suffering to intolerable levels in vulnerable groups such as children or the elderly who live alone. Civil society is mobilizing to seek solutions from different types of institutions in our country. Rosa Coscolla and Rafael Ruiz de Gauna (2014) describe the confluence of different social agents that collaborate in social assistance, often voluntarily and silently. From the convictions of those responsible for each body or entity, the aim is to deal with the needs of the people and also to make a commitment to social transformation and the denunciation of unjust situations.

It is possibly from the social entities of the Church that some of the closest and most immediate responses are being offered to maintain the foundations of this system that is cracking. (...) The social action of entities linked to the Church is very diverse, depending on the group or institution that promotes it, the degree of professionalism they have or the type of services and people they work with. These vary from small groups of volunteers in the parish environment (distribution of clothes, food...), to large institutions in which there are groups that are integrated. Caritas could be a well-known example. While many entities build community with very excluded groups: mentally ill, homeless, prostitution, terminal illnesses... (Coscolla & Ruiz de Gauna, 2014).

Volunteers play a key role, not only because of their dedication and effective action, but also because they establish a relationship of commitment that supports the possibilities of the other. The presence of women in social action volunteering is very significant. The data on society's involvement in the pandemic has grown significantly in the last year, and women continue to outnumber men.²

² <https://www.epdata.es/datos/voluntariado-datos-estadisticas/226>.

El número de voluntarios aumenta en España

Hoy son un 6,7% más que en 2018



Hay más mujeres que hombres

Representan...



Fuente: Plataforma del Voluntariado de España

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In the so-called "Welfare State", citizens should have their basic needs covered according to their fundamental rights to housing, education or health care. This model seeks a balance between the resources managed by public administrations and private initiative, which in turn receive subsidies following the principle of subsidiarity. But the question of whose responsibility it is to alleviate the limitations and shortcomings of those who suffer in a system in crisis, aggravates political and social tensions. The right to free public health care or to a quality school is, in practice, a matter whose management is hindered by the profit motive of some companies that can offer services at low costs, to the detriment of workers and the quality of the service. Controversy is rife and volunteering can even become a source of conflict when it comes into competition with workers in a sector affected by its activity.

The principle of subsidiarity³ has its most distant history in Aristotle's thought on the relationship between government and freedom. The Catholic Social Teaching (hereinafter, CST), in Pius XI's *Quadragesimo anno*, establishes according to this principle that what each person can do on their own initiative and with their own strength, should not be subtracted from or attributed to society and that what the lower entities can carry out and conduct in an adequate way, should not be absorbed by higher entities, because all social activity by nature is subsidiary.

Donations of inheritances and subscriptions are important for the support of social action projects, which can be sustained over time, without exempting the State from providing the necessary assistance to citizens.

It may be thought that these organisations and entities with their intervention replace and weaken the Welfare State, but in reality they seek complementarity with public resources and networking with other public, social initiative or even commercial agents (Coscolla & Ruiz de Gauna, 2014).

³ <https://www.expansion.com/diccionario-juridico/principio-de-subsidiariedad.html>.

The entities of social action that have arisen around the Church place their emphasis on the dignity of the person and on acting from proximity. Faced with the question of what their task is and how to carry it out, civil society, the administrations and the Church itself have to reflect and collaborate on the basis of mutual recognition.

The pandemic crisis that erupted at the beginning of 2020 in the entire world, is added to chronic situations of suffering and social injustice such as loneliness, especially of the elderly, mental illness, addictions, violence, human trafficking, hunger, wars and economic development at the cost of environmental destruction... all of them are scourges to which we have not responded or paid enough attention on an ongoing basis, in a world increasingly connected by technology and at the same time, insensitive to the suffering of others.

This panorama of uncertainty and lack of hope takes place in an environment of polarised ideological and social tensions. The media, economic and political powers exert pressure and shape an ideology of moral assumptions validated in the normalisation of their use. We arrive at the approval of laws that reflect a hierarchy of values⁴ which reflect a hierarchy of values in dispute with Christian humanism.

In this context, we try to offer a look at women as protagonists in the social action of the Church, referring to different documents of the CST and reviewing the figures of outstanding women in the experience of charity, understood not as compensation for the scruples of a society that perpetuates unjust inequalities, but as a commitment of one's whole life in defence of human dignity, which the Church recognises in the love for all people, whatever their condition.

The social action of the church

Charity is not to be a means of what today is considered proselytism. Love is gratuitous; it is not practised to obtain other objectives. But this does not mean that charitable action should, so to speak, leave God and Christ aside. The whole human being is always at stake. Often the deepest root of suffering is precisely the absence of God. Whoever exercises charity in the name of the Church will never try to impose the faith of the Church on others. They are aware that love, in its purity and gratuitousness, is the best witness to the God in whom we believe and who urges us to love. The Christian knows when it is time to speak about God and when it is opportune to be silent about Him, letting only love speak. They know that God is love (1 Jn 4:8) and that he manifests himself just at the moments when he does nothing more than love (Benedict XVI, 2005).

Jubany (2018) highlights several documents of the ecclesiastical Magisterium that are a guide for carrying out the Church's social action.

The first is the "Tarraconensis Provincial Council", held in Catalonia in 1995. In its chapter "Caring for the poorest and most marginalised" believers are exhorted to ensure that there is no separation between the Christian message and specific actions. It reminds all those who participate in the Eucharist that they will not do so with dignity if there is no solidarity with the poorest and if they do not share their goods.

⁴ Organic Law 3/2007, of 22 March, for the effective equality of women and men; Law 2/2016, of 29 March, on Gender Identity and Expression and Social Equality and Non-Discrimination of the Region of Madrid; Euthanasia Law passed in Congress in December 2020.

Furthermore the Pastoral Instruction of the Spanish Episcopal Conference, "The Church, Servant of the Poor" of 2015, offers valuable reflections on the feminisation of poverty, highlighting the increase in the number of women affected by economic hardship. Some of them are even victims of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation, particularly foreigners, deceived in their country of origin with false offers of work and exploited here in conditions similar to slavery. It also points out the need to increase prevention measures and legal protection, but above all, to promote better education and a culture of life that leads to the recognition and respect for the equal dignity of women.

New forms of poverty are emerging in the context of the technological society, with the overwhelming increase of addictions (to online games, pornography, the use of mobile phones and social networks), loneliness and mental illness.

The Archbishopric of Barcelona published some guidelines in 2018 and proposals for a pastoral conversion, with the title "Sortim!", Let's go out!", in which a series of recommendations for social action were given. There were six proposals to implement: 1) to discover through the eyes of Jesus the poverty that surrounds us and the causes that provoke it; 2) to develop solidarity programmes; 3) attention to unemployment and job insecurity; 4) to intensify the work already being done for refugees and migrants; 5) to take care of experiences of fragility (illness, loneliness, marginalisation, disability); 6) to go towards a poor Church.

Among the Church's institutions dedicated to social action, Caritas is the best known. Religious orders are also present in all the fields of the so-called "Fourth World", caring for people living in poverty or marginalisation, who live in the First World and live with material and/or spiritual poverty.

St. John Chrysostom recalls this vigorously: "Not to make the poor share in one's own goods is to rob them and take away their lives. What we have are not our goods, but theirs" as the Catechism says in number 2446 (Laz. 1,6).

The Church proclaims the Gospel to the poor and the suffering

The laws of social life are illuminated by Christian revelation. The truth of man is revealed in his dignity by his vocation to communion with others, to justice and peace.

In economic and social matters, the Church's mission is different from that of the political authorities and is concerned with the ordering of the common good to the ultimate Good. It inspires just attitudes in the use of goods and in socio-economic relations, but the Catechism goes so far as to make explicit the rejection of the atheistic and totalitarian ideologies associated with communism and socialism in modern times, as well as extreme individualism and the absolute primacy of the law of the market over human labour in capitalism (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1992, no. 2425). It seems impossible that social peace can be resolved in a dilemma of political ideologies.

The CST was created as an evangelical response to the plight of the workers in the 19th century after the Industrial Revolution. It has a permanent value that is articulated in response to History, with the assistance of the Holy Spirit and is rooted in an ever-living tradition. It proposes principles, criteria and guidelines for action and states that any system in which social relations are determined entirely by economic factors is contrary to human nature. Greed is the cause of many conflicts. Any practice that

reduces people to a means of profit turns money into an idol and contributes to the spread of atheism. It is necessary to promote a regulation of the economy that, on the one hand, is not completely centralised, nor does it depend solely on the free market.

The tradition of the Church recognises the very face of Jesus in the poor. The beatitudes place at the heart of the Gospel the promise of salvation to all who suffer hunger, pain, loneliness and any kind of poverty. The works of mercy (clothing the naked, visiting the sick and the imprisoned, burying the dead, sheltering the homeless, assisting the poor) are a witness to charity and a duty of justice.

In spite of the failings of many of us in the Church who live attached to material things, the Gospel is explicit: "Whoever has two coats, let him share them with those who have none" (Lk 11:41).

The Church throughout its history has worked to care for the disadvantaged. The one who gives receives much more than the one who is assisted. St Lawrence the Martyr, when the prefect of Rome demanded the riches of the Church, presented the poor of his community as his only riches. Over the past two centuries, the social advancement of people has been based on education as the engine that drives the development and empowerment of individuals, communities and countries.

From its origins, the Church has had the care of the poor as its mission. This is recounted in the Acts of the Apostles. St. Luke describes the characteristics of the first Christian communities: communication of goods, austerity and attention to the needs of each person. St. Paul also reminds us of the need to work so that no one lives at the expense of others (1 Thess 4:11-12). The poor are central to the Gospel: at the end of life we will be tested for love.

As the parable of the poor Lazarus tells, he, covered with sores, begs at the door of a rich man who feasts without attending to him. When Lazarus died, he was taken by the angels to heaven and the rich man suffered torments without being able to cross the abyss that separated them and that he himself had opened by his indifference to the suffering (Lk 16:19-31).

In this way Jesus denounced what often happens, also in these times: the poor are invisible to the vast majority.

Charity and/or solidarity?

In our days, the dialogue of Christians with many citizens, associations and institutions of all kinds, who collaborate for greater social justice and for the dignity of all people, shows that an ever greater part of the population does not know what the Church is.

Christians are faced with the need to make themselves known in environments for which, over the last decades, the Church is seen by many with prejudices, as a hierarchical, patriarchal, sexist, retrograde institution and on the margins of the progress of society, when not, suspected of being attached to old privileges, oppressive and corrupt, especially at times when the media have uncovered scandals about the abuse of minors. However, despite this distorted image of the Church, society in general has great confidence in its educational and welfare work.

The work of the Church extends to the liturgical, evangelizing, cultural, educational, and charitable spheres. The evolution of the

Church's social and assistance centres has increased by 71% in the last 9 years, which means a total of 9,119 centres in operation for social assistance: hospitals, clinics, homes for the elderly, poverty alleviation centres, orphanages, day-care centres, centres for drug addicts, centres for victims of gender-based violence... (Caritas.Boletín Por tantos).

The expression to give alms, even if it is a work of mercy, is a formula that has fallen into disuse as it is tinged with a hint of inequality, which reinforces the perception of inability and lack of autonomy of the recipient. For this reason, we more frequently use the word donation instead of alms and the term solidarity, which expresses empathy towards the person who receives the help, instead of charity.

"(...) the principle that today we call solidarity ... Leo XIII enunciated it several times under the name of "friendship"...; by Pius XI it is designated by the no less significant expression "social charity", while Paul VI, broadening the concept, in accordance with the current and multiple dimensions of the social question, spoke of "civilisation of love".¹⁹³ John Paul II highlighted how the social teaching of the Church advances in the area of reciprocity between God and man: To recognise God in each person and each person in God is the condition for authentic human development. The articulate and profound analysis of the "res novae", and especially of the great change of 1989, with the fall of the Soviet system, shows an appreciation for democracy and for the free economy, within the framework of an indispensable solidarity (Pontifical Council, 2004, no. 103).

The word solidarity is one of the most used terms in all fields. It is fashionable. The debate is whether it is better to be supportive or charitable. We can see that those who defend the goodness of solidarity do so because they understand that the relationship between the one who shows solidarity and the one who receives the solidarity action is established on a horizontal plane; while when speaking of charity, they interpret that the charitable person is placed in a position of superiority with respect to the one who receives the help, and nothing could be further from the authentic meaning of charity, because caritas is love.

In the last decades of the 20th century, the CST incorporated solidarity as a fundamental category of social morality, thanks to St John Paul II. Solidarity was created within the secular matrix of the social movements of modernity (as the secularised version of fraternity) and, therefore, with its back to the ecclesiastical moral doctrine, sometimes even against it. Gradually, however, it was taken up by the Church's Magisterium, to the point of becoming an inescapable concept of reference in Catholic social morality. John Paul II introduced solidarity among the list of Christian virtues, linked it to social justice (and both in terms of the growing interdependence between people and peoples, a key that points in the direction of the awareness of the world as a global village), and relates it to charity (Martínez, 2006).

Solidarity is a firm and persevering determination to work for the common good, which created the conviction that we are all responsible for social justice. If we refer to solidarity in these terms, we are doing nothing other than basing its definition on what it means to be charitable. There is no point in debating whether the relationship is on a horizontal or vertical plane. No charitable or solidarity action between individuals should be based on these value criteria. There is no basis for these actions other than human dignity. A dignity inherent in every man that cannot be questioned.

If for some, the term charity may suggest an idea of superiority of one over the other, it is due to a misinterpretation of the term. Charity implies loving the other unconditionally. Perhaps this way of understanding love is not the result of a secularised humanism, but of the Gospel that teaches the possibility of loving in this way in Christ. Thus, charity establishes the informative principles of solidarity. Only from love, the ultimate act of human freedom, do we understand the constant striving for the common good, which is not possible as long as there is some social, material, physical, psychological or spiritual suffering (De la Calle Maldonado, 2016).

The Witness and Teaching of the Bishop of Rome: Pope Francis

In the history of the Church, the witness of charity of Christians has followed the message of Jesus. It has been in the last two centuries when charity has evolved towards the idea of social justice and working to denounce the structural causes that provoke poverty.

Pope Francis had a motto in his pontificate that is fully identified with charity and service to the poor. In his *Evangelii Gaudium* he referred to the homeless, drug addicts, refugees, indigenous peoples, the elderly, migrants... the "discarded". For Francis charity cannot be understood as charity or paternalism. The poor are for us the face of Christ (Jubany, 2018).

Francis also mentioned the people who are subjected to different types of exploitation by the mafias, in a clandestine factory, in the prostitution network, in organised begging, in irregular work. He especially referred to women who suffer situations of abuse and violence, who are often less able to defend their rights. Also the unborn children, the most defenseless of all.

The great risk of today's world, with its multiple and overwhelming offer of consumption, is an individualistic sadness that springs from a comfortable and greedy heart, from the unhealthy search for superficial pleasures, from an isolated conscience (...) I invite every Christian, in whatever place and situation he finds himself, to renew right now his personal encounter with Jesus Christ or, at least, to make the decision to let himself be found by Him, to try to do so every day without rest. There is no reason for anyone to think that this invitation is not for him, because "no one is excluded from the joy brought by the Lord" (Francis, 2013, no. 2).

The feminine disposition

St. John Paul II uses this term for the first time in the apostolic letter "Mulieris Dignitatem," and in subsequent texts he has tried to clarify what it means. We could define the feminine disposition as the set of specifically feminine gifts- understanding, objectivity of judgement, compassion, tenderness, welcome and tenderness that are manifested in all peoples (Vivas, 2003). These can be a manifestation of the Spirit, a gift from God, and they do not occur only in women. The feminine disposition is the condition for a profound transformation of today's civilisation. The Pope pointed out on more than one occasion that there are systems that nourish structures of sin, of death, and that structures of life are needed. The feminine disposition would carry this fecundity that engenders life and that would make the system of death explode. It manifests itself in a series of gifts that women have, who embody them in the normality of everyday life.

One of the criticisms made of St. John Paul II after "Mulieris Dignitatem" was that it seemed that the feminine disposition excluded rationality in favour of compassion and sensitivity. The Polish Pope made it very clear that the feminine disposition is not a contribution exclusively for women but for all humanity. Pius XII already said that woman was the image of God and not just a companion (partner) of man. And St. John XXIII made a very good contribution by noting the incorporation of women into the public sphere as a sign of the times.

John Paul II's passion for women is certainly linked to his predilection for Mary. Let us not forget his childhood, with the absence of his mother, who died when he was a child. What the Pope says about the woman he speaks looking at Mary. His pontifical emblem itself is a Marian motto: "Totus Tuus". For him, Mary is the woman who perfectly embodies the feminine disposition. He sees in her "the" woman, and his feminine discourse emerges from this point of view. There are two significant statements of his. One, the one that reminds us that woman is part of the living structure of Christianity. The second is that womanhood belongs to the constitutive heritage of humanity and of the Church herself.

Women: identity and difference

Nowadays we are immersed in a current of thought that tends more and more to deny the difference between men and women, or to pose the difference from the point of view of confrontation. We are all called to surrender, we carry it in our hearts and our bodies express it, but how do we surrender? as we are, as men and as women.

The human person can exist in only one mode: as a man or as a woman. This shows the contingency of the human being, that is to say, it cannot be everything, if it is a woman it cannot be a man and if it is a man it cannot be a woman at the same time (no matter how much the liquid culture of Post-modernity pretends the opposite and proposes sexuality as an option to choose and to build according to each one). God thought of the creation of the person as man and woman to reflect His image (which is love and communion).⁵

⁵ Part of this content is taken from Socla, A. HOMBRE-MUJER. El misterio nupcial. Pontifical Lateran University, 1998-2000.

Sexual difference is where the *imago dei* resides, as Trinitarian analogy and openness to communion. Our sexed being indicates that we are originally made in correlation with another. The other presents himself to me as identical (in his being a person) and at the same time, because of his sexuality, radically another with the connotations that this implies at all levels. We are created within a constitutive polarity (it is not accidental). In order to be able to say "I" in a complete way I have to be able to refer to another.

The term "sex" refers to the different, the difference. A difference that does not break the unity of the nature belonging to each of the two, but always emerges within it.

The category "other" is broader than the category "other sex". But the original elemental experience of otherness is presented through sexual otherness.

In *Mulieris Dignitatem*, St. John Paul II wanted to deepen the fundamental anthropological truths of man and woman: in the equal dignity and unity of the two; in the deep-rooted and profound diversity between the feminine and the masculine and in their vocation to reciprocity, complementarity, collaboration and communion (CF. N 6).

This dual unity of man and woman is based on the foundation of the dignity of every person, created in the image and likeness of God, "who created them male and female" (Gen. 1:27), avoiding both an indistinct uniformity and a static and impoverishing equality and an abysmal and conflicting difference (St. John Paul II, *Letter to Women*, 8).

This difference can be an opportunity to meet the other or an excuse to confront the other. It is true, we are different and sometimes it is difficult to meet. But, paradoxically, we attract each other, we need each other. It seems absurd that we seek unity and at the same time do not know the way to achieve it. More than absurd, is actually the consequence of sin, which pits us against each other in the so-called "war of the sexes".

When one knows oneself and recognises the richness of diversity, one also realises one's absolute dependence on God (one cannot be absolutely everything if it is not with another, rather if it is not with the Other). In femininity and masculinity is incorporated the filiation, the dependence of the human being on his Creator. Recognising our own limit, we open ourselves to God. Masculinity and femininity reveal the sign of the difference by which God manifests his otherness.⁶ Difference is necessary just as identity is necessary; both are dimensions of love between people. But they occur especially in male-female love. They are identical because they come from God, their body reveals it to them through which they relate to creation, but they are above creation; that loneliness that they feel opens them to transcendence and one opens to the other, because they are different from the rest of creation. They call for unity.

They are different; each one expresses that dignity and value in a different way. That difference makes them aware that they both need each other and realise that they do not have in themselves what they need to be happy. They are interdependent. They move towards each other to advance together towards a common horizon. Sexual difference is a call, written on our bodies, to love.

⁶ All these references are taken from Campbell, C.C. *Mis hermanas las santas*. Ed. Rialp, Madrid 2016.

In God the masculine and the feminine find their synthesis, therefore man and woman reach their fullness by remaining in relationship with God and they must look towards Him in order to remain together and be complete.

In that sense, conjugal prayer (in which husband and wife pray aloud together) is a precious space for sharing and discovering the difference between spouses. They learn from each other to pray with the nuances of the other sex, with another sensibility, with another heart (male or female), both seeking the same thing: The fullness and a true encounter of love (with God and with each other) but each one lives it and expresses it in a different way.

Women founders and philosophers

The search for women's identity and the recognition of their dignity, equal in rights to men, in the last decades has produced a vertiginous turn in the review of women's history, in the vindication of their contributions in all the fields of knowledge, science, art and in history itself.

The appreciation of the role of women in social assistance and any other manifestation of a charitable nature has traditionally been linked to the institutions of the Church, and one can find figures of great women who have been agents of true social transformation looking at the world from the faith, with the eyes of the heart and dedicating their lives to those who suffer.

The light of faith does not lead us to forget the sufferings of the world. How many men and women of faith have received the light of suffering people! St. Francis of Assisi of the leper, Mother Teresa of Calcutta, of her poor: They have captured the mystery hidden in them. In approaching them, they have not removed all their sufferings, nor have they been able to give a full account of all the evils that afflict them. The light of faith does not dispel all our darkness, but, like a lamp, it guides our steps in the night, and this is enough for us to walk. To the man who suffers, God does not give him a reasoning that explains everything, but responds with a presence that accompanies him, with a story of good that joins every story of suffering to open in it a glimmer of light (Francis, 2013, no. 57).

Santiago Cantera (2016) makes a historical overview of the social action of the Church in which the committed presence of women is recognised, from the primitive communities, at the side of the Early Fathers, in the fraternities, hospital orders and medieval confraternities, in the service of the Beguines (women of common life without vows) or in all the religious orders, which in later centuries have followed the call to charity.

These are a sample of some women, mostly saints, who consecrated their lives to prayer and assistance to the poor:

St Elizabeth of Hungary(1207-1231) queen and benefactress of the needy, **St Catherine of Siena**(1347-1380) doctor of the Church; **St Rose of Lima**(1586-1617) first woman canonised in America, servant of Jesus in the poor, main patroness of the New World, the Philippines and the West Indies; **St Louise Marillac**(1591-1660), wife and mother, founder of the Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul, caring for the sick,

orphans, the elderly, the insane; **St Jeanne Jugan**(1792-1879), French, began her vocation as the founder of the Little Sisters of the Poor entrusted entirely to Providence, leaving her own bed to an old blind and paralysed woman, picked up by her from the street on a winter's night, begging from door to door for alms to cover her daily needs; **St Maria Micaela of the Blessed Sacrament**(1809-1865) Founder of the Adorers, Slaves of the Blessed Sacrament and of Charity, with a contemplative dimension projected in her apostolate for the liberation of women marginalised by prostitution and other forms of social exclusion; **St Soledad Torres Acosta** (1826-1887) Founder of the Handmaids of Mary, a congregation for the poor and sick; **St Bonifacia Rodríguez de Castro**(1837-1905) nun from Charra, as a young cordwainer, promoter of workshops for the promotion of women, canonised by Benedict XVI, founder of the Congregation of the Servants of St. Joseph and chosen as patron saint of women workers, she dedicated her life to the service of working women and to the protection of young girls in distress; **St Teresa of Jesus Jornet and Ibars**(1843-1897) Catalan, a teacher who lived a long time of search in different congregations and founded the Little Sisters of the Elderly Forsaken in Barbastro, canonised by Paul VI in 1974, was proclaimed patron saint of the elderly by John Paul II; **Blessed Jeanne Marie**(1862-1916) who entered the Marian Slavery of St. Louis Marie Grignon de Monfort affirming that it is the easiest, shortest, perfect and surest way to reach union with Jesus Christ, took care of the women factory workers in Valencia, whose motto for her beatification by John Paul II in 2003 was "an event of God for the working world"; **St Nazaria Ignatia**(1889-1943 Argentina) being a Little Sister, she felt new calls from the Lord to a missionary life, dedicated to evangelising the poor and above all to work for the union and extension of the Church in America, interested in the workers' movements, the suffragette demands and incipient feminism. Her congregation received final approval on 9 June 1947 as the Crusader Missionary Sisters of the Church; **St Teresa of Calcutta**(1910-1996), benefactress of humanity, founder of the Missionaries of Charity, who, responding to the thirst of Jesus, are recognised by their sari, serving the poorest of the poor in India and throughout the world.

We now turn our gaze to two women from our most recent history: Both are seekers of truth and their lives are traversed by their commitment to reality, from thought and action, each in a different vocation.

Concepción Arenal(1820-1893)

Galician writer, journalist and prison inspector in the 19th century. A woman of intellectual and philanthropic restlessness open to many fields, she was sadly marked by the loss of her father in childhood, in painfully unjust circumstances, due to his political ideology. Concepción lived her youth in opposition to the role of a woman busy preparing herself for a marriage interested in social position.

Progressive for the conservatives, reactionary for the liberals, she entered university dressed as a man, a heterodox Catholic within the officialdom of the Church, Concepción Arenal always renounced all political militancy.

She fought from her Christian convictions for a more just society, when liberal ideals were considered in part a threat to the Church. She takes the dimension of human fraternity from Christianity. The sign of Christianity is fraternity and charity understood as empathy with the other. She was one of the forerunners of feminism and pioneer

promoter of social work in Spain, she collaborated with the Institución Libre de Enseñanza. She worked tirelessly in defence of women's rights, for their access to higher education and participation in positions of responsibility.

She succeeded in improving penitential institutions by ensuring a more dignified treatment of women in prisons that could favour their social reintegration. "Condemn the crime, but pity the criminal" is one of his most quoted thoughts.

She collaborated with her friend the violinist Jesús de Monasterio in the creation of the feminine branch of the charitable societies called Conferencias de San Vicente de Paúl and wrote among many other works her Treatise on the Visitor of the Poor, Papers on the Education of the Woman of the Future, Charity, Philanthropy and Charity and the Basis for Prison Reform, which were approved by the Cortes.

Concepción was trying to put into practice what she defended in her writings. Her reflections on the reality of poverty surprised many.

The poor man, we say, is untruthful, careless, unpredictable, and ungrateful. If instead of saying "the poor" we were to say "poverty" we would be more accurate and less aggressive, because the evils that are in things make us think of great means to avoid them and command tolerance.

Among her works, the Manual of the Visitor of the Poor stands out. The book opens with the question of what pain is. For this thinker, life was a school of suffering in which one must acquire strength. She empathised with the pain of others and made it her own. In her thinking she started from philosophy and then moved on to practical matters, because she wanted to have an impact on society. She is one of the first builders of what we know as civil society.

On her return to Madrid Concepción met Juana de Vega, widow of Spoz y Mina, to whom she had dedicated her essay on charity. She became her friend and protector and would help her to develop her charity projects. They would support a complete charity project in this more inclusive sense.

In 1864 she was nominated visitor of prisons in La Coruña, she had the opportunity to channel her reformist will but she did not last long in the post, which was eliminated in the summer of 1865. Concepción Arenal then published "Letters to delinquents" where she defended that most crimes are committed out of ignorance or poor education of sensitivity and that it is essential to ensure that prisoners can then return and reintegrate into society.

Well, if someone is in jail it is because they have committed a crime and so they deserve punishment. Very well, but that this punishment has an objective, which is to reintegrate the person, to return them to society in better conditions than when they entered prison. Either the prison has that objective or it serves no purpose at all.⁷

⁷ RNE Documentos. Concepción Arenal, una reformista entre la ciencia y la fe.

The last years of her life were rather bitter, because she felt misunderstood by the official sectors of Spanish society. She was better understood abroad, where she was appreciated like some people of the Instituto Libre de Enseñanza.

Concepción continued to work all her life to raise the cultural level of women, faithful to her belief that the education of women is as important or more important than that of men, because only by opening homes to a true education of women will it be possible to influence society and achieve true development:

"We call charity that which is nothing more than justice. To give it one name or another is not indifferent, justice obliges, charity does not" said this intellectual, in clear harmony with the CST, "To satisfy above all the demands of justice, so that what is already owed as a matter of justice is not offered as charity" (2446, AA8) and with St. Gregory the Great, in reminding us that when we give to the poor what they need, we give back to them what is theirs, we fulfil a duty of justice (Past. 3:21, in Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1992, no. 2446).

Edith Stein(1891-1942)

The German philosopher and Catholic saint, St. Teresa Benedicta of the Cross, known as Edith Stein (1891-1942) wrote, "The Lectures on Women", where she developed the gift that women possess for the care and assistance work.

Stein always fought for women to have access to the professional and cultural world because she knew that it was a wealth that society was missing and not only that, but also because, "she believed that women who have not developed their capacities in knowledge and creativity throughout their lives, when they have had to continue alone due to widowhood or separation, have had many difficulties" (Ruiz-Alberdi, 2012).

For Edith Stein the First World War was, in a certain way, the discovery of women in nursing. She drew attention to the enormous courage and role that women took on in assisting the many wounded on both sides. She herself worked as a nurse during the war and when the war ended and she returned to college, she wrote:

The nations of Europe, which in the World War have fought each other to the death, have all collapsed together...and only all together can make possible a movement to lift them up. This requires the cooperation of women, both through good electoral practice and through accepting and holding public office.

This philosopher always showed Mary, the Mother of Jesus Christ, as the best role model for women, who had a hard and difficult life and was able to lead a contemplative life, married and widowed. Widowhood came to her very young with all that she was going to experience in the Passion of the Lord, and she endured it alone, without the support that Joseph would have been for her. This model for women means that, in any place, situation or state, a woman can lead an interior life full of fruitfulness towards others. This characteristic of the feminine disposition is the basis to understand the presence of women in the Church, for that, Edith Stein began by explaining how the human being lives her relationship with God and for that she went to the Genesis: The original nature that manifests itself in the mission that God gives to man and woman.

The fact that the tempter approached the woman first could mean that he could find easier access to her, not because the woman would have moved more easily towards evil (they were both still free from an inclination to evil), but because what was proposed to her was of greater importance to her in itself. It must be accepted that, from the outset, her life was to be more strongly affected by that which had to do with the generation and education of her offspring (Stein, 1998).

To which she adds with great hope: "Just as temptation came first to a woman, so the proclamation of God's grace comes first to a woman, and here as there, the yes that comes from the mouth of a woman decides the destiny of all humanity" (Stein, 1998).

Edith asks herself what motherhood means for a woman, to which she answers that she is made to protect, take care of, guard, teach and nurture, but not only her family circle, but also all the people around her (Stein, 1998).

In 1930, Stein realised that women's lives were beginning to change and so she envisioned a full and dedicated life. At the Science Institute in Münster she spoke about the mission of the Catholic university:

The task of many women today is to lead a solitary life in the world. Whether they are in the profession only because they are forced to do it to earn their living, or because, for lack of anything better, they wish to fill their lives in this way, in the long run it will be a tiring struggle in which they exhaust themselves emotionally. But if in the circumstances you see the call of God who invites you to dedicate all your strength and you follow this call, then your life will become a full and fruitful woman's life; a life for love, an activity in which your strength comes to its development, a spiritual motherhood, because the bridal love of God embraces all of God's children. (Stein, 1998).

The whole change of life that was coming for women is glimpsed in the recognition that St. Paul VI (1965) made towards women at the Closing of the Second Vatican Council and the last words were:

Women, you who know how to make the truth sweet, tender and accessible, dedicate yourselves to make the spirit of this Council permeate institutions, schools, homes and everyday life (...) Women of the whole universe, Christians or non-believers, to whom life is entrusted at this grave moment in history, it is up to you to save the peace of the world.

Today is a time when the nature of the woman linked to the experience of motherhood and her vocation to donation is deeply questioned. Their incorporation with full rights into all professional fields in culture, science, art and the highest positions of political and social responsibility, offers a painful contrast with the

experience of many women who see family reconciliation and the care of their own lives relegated to second place. One example: immigrant women who make great sacrifices to offer their children opportunities for progress and a decent standard of living, fleeing situations of violence and poverty. There is a cruel paradox: how a majority of women have left their young children in their home countries with their own mothers or sisters, to come to developed countries to care for other women's children and the elderly. Another example: women who feel obliged to be the best professionals, and at the same time, the best wives and mothers at home and lose their serenity in this useless desire to be superwomen.


The woman of the 21st century: agent of the solidarity economy and the ethics of care

In general, the so-called ethics of care is proposed within the framework of civil society and the solidarity economy (Elzo, 2014) as an alternative to consumerism and individualistic society; it is a model that places the care of life and the importance of emotional dimensions, relationships and interest in the person at the centre of moral life.

As opposed to ethics that seek the purely formal (such as Kantism), the merely legal (such as some interpretations of the ethics of law), or that decide on the basis of individual or social benefits (such as utilitarianism), the ethics of care seeks to focus on the subject, on their relationships and affections, on their way of "imbibing" an ethical situation or problem, and on their desire to decide in the way that most favours the well-being of the other, even above abstract rules that fail to understand the emotional dimensions of each situation (Pascual, 2021).

Traditionally, women's predisposition to adopt caregiving roles has been relied upon as a natural way of acting. This may explain, in part, why the majority presence of women continues to be perpetuated in professions directly related to the care of dependent persons, domestic help, health care and child education.

Participación femenina por ocupaciones en 2018



Fuente: INFORME ANUAL DE EMPLEO CEPYME - RANDSTAD 2018 (Elaboración propia a partir de los micro-datos de la EPA y los totales de población activa)

Many voices, especially in the ranks of feminism, have criticised women's differentiated orientation towards service as reductive and promoting injustice. Women, according to these authors, do not think only in terms of affection and responsibility, nor are men reduced to making calculations based on law or universal principles.

People with functional diversity, especially women, suffer institutional violence at all levels. Many of those who are in a situation of dependency have not been able to pay social security contributions because they have been working in the care or service sector. Now, those who have families are in turn cared for by the women around them. And these other current caregivers, also women for the most part, do not receive recognition for their work, since in many cases it is not valued or, since it is done on a voluntary basis, it is not perceived as productive work, but as something that "is just the way it is, the law of life". What is not productive, the time spent caring does not count. We have assumed that things are the way they are and we have little critical spirit to change them. In turn, the most disadvantaged people, people with disabilities or caregivers themselves have little scope to unite and raise their demands (Botwin, 2017).

The claims of gender ideology defend that social roles and the attributions of ethical behaviour between men and women are the result of education and even of a discriminatory situation in which women have always been relegated to service duties and domestic needs.

Fernando Pascual points out in this way that the ethics of care cannot be ethics only for women, but that it responds to the deepest needs and demands of every person. Human beings, by their very nature, are called to exist from others and for others.

An ethical action that does not take into account the other in their value and dignity as a human being does not correspond to the true good, which we can all discover, men or women, from the heart that loves others for what they are and for what they mean to us (Pascual, 2021).

It is not a discriminatory sign to recognise that women may have a special predisposition or capacity to live in this way. It is an opportunity to propose to everyone, men and women, to think and act in a way that welcomes the other as being valuable in oneself.

Women ask for and manage micro-credits to set up small businesses in developing countries (Castro Fernández, 2003). They have also been protagonists in the foundations of religious orders that work, not only in developed countries, but especially in the missions in developing countries, dedicated to the most needy. They are committed to the so-called "economy of solidarity or economy of care for life", as opposed to the economy of monetary return.

InteRed is a non-governmental development organisation working in 16 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It was founded in 1992 promoted by the Teresian Association, from which it takes its socio-educational perspective as a reference. Its aim is the promotion of each and every person, with special attention to the most impoverished and excluded. It relies on education as an eradicator of poverty, inequality and exclusion. It works in development projects giving priority to the education of women, with an evangelical approach of ecofeminism, global citizenship and interculturality.

The CST encourages the support and stimulation of solidarity economy organisations to respond to the distressing situations of poverty. It encourages us to denounce and to put an end to the situations of injustice that devastate the planet, our common home, which cries out because of the destruction that we human beings are inflicting on it, and also to human beings, especially women and children, who are subjected to slavery, disdain and discrimination and whose lament we want to silence. As Zervino says, they are the wounds of Jesus in today's world that cry out for:

The migration of unaccompanied children and the forced division of families; the refugees caused by wars and conflicts who live in subhuman conditions; the trafficking of people for prostitution, dishonest work, organ trafficking and renting of wombs; the victims of the arms and drug trade; women wounded, abused, discriminated against by macho cultures and also by hedonistic cultures that seek

in abortion and in the reduction of the poorest peoples the solution to the lack of an adequate distribution of wealth; the families without shelter, without land, without education, without food and without work when science and technology applied to an integral ecology would allow us to live fraternally and taking care of our common Home (Zervino, in Martínez, 2019).

This commitment is what a true social conscience in people, opinion groups in networks, NGOs, political parties, communities, companies, local administrations, governments of countries and international organisations puts together a new ethics of care.

St. John Paul II in his encyclical *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* urges awareness of individual and collective responsibility. He points to the disconcerting realisation of our most recent period in history: Alongside the intolerable miseries of underdevelopment and the growing pockets of poverty in the so-called Fourth World, we find a kind of over-development, equally unacceptable, because, like the first, it is also contrary to the common good and to authentic happiness.

This over-development, which consists in the excessive availability of all kinds of material goods for some social categories, easily makes men slaves of "possessions" and immediate enjoyment, with no other horizon than the multiplication or continuous substitution of the objects they possess by other more perfect ones. It is the so-called civilisation of "consumption" or "consumerism" that brings with it so much "waste" or "rubbish" (John Paul II, 1988, no. 8).

The outbreak of the pandemic seems to have brought about a sudden awareness in this sense, making the technological society numbed by virtual leisure look at what really matters.

The XXVI Training Course in CST, promoted by the Episcopal Committee for Social Pastoral and the Paul VI Foundation in 2019, was an impulse for reflection and dissemination of the model of civil economy, as a paradigm for sharing experiences of solidarity economy and public policies aimed at achieving social justice within the framework of the Welfare State.

History at the present time places great expectations on the participation of women as leaders to make this compromised model of society possible. (Fuentes Alcántara, 2020).

Suffering reminds us that the service of faith to the common good is always a service of hope, looking forward, knowing that only in God, in the future that comes from the risen Jesus, can our society find solid and lasting foundations. In this sense, faith goes hand in hand with hope because, although our earthly dwelling is destroyed, we have an eternal mansion, which God has already inaugurated in Christ, in his body (cf. 2 Cor 4:16-5:5). The dynamism of faith, hope and charity (cf. 1 Thess 1:3; 1 Cor 13:13) thus enables us to integrate the concerns of all people in our journey towards that city "whose

builder and maker was to be God" (Heb 11:10), because "hope does not disappoint" (Rom 5:5). In unity with faith and charity, hope projects us towards a certain future, which is situated in a perspective different from the illusory proposals of the idols of the world, but which gives a new impulse and strength to live each day. (Francis, 2013, no. 57).

Psalms 84 sings that "mercy and faithfulness meet, righteousness and peace kiss each other": While faithfulness springs from the earth, righteousness looks down from heaven. That is to say, the only and definitive justice can only be expected from God. Only in the Christian hope is complete justice promised, which reaches all those who have been treated unjustly throughout history. It is the promise of the beatitudes. (Catechesis on the Psalms of John Paul II).

Conclusions

Women have been a fundamental link in the relationship between God and humanity throughout the centuries. In Genesis this link is already manifested at the time when Eve is expecting a child and feels that she has been blessed by God (Stein, 1998) and, later on, Mary, with her divine maternity, will be the bridge to the most sublime, being the Mother of all. Sacred Scripture speaks to us of the strong woman, the one who is able to raise the family, do the housework and also to be a transmitter of peace and conciliation with those around her. The Gospel speaks to us of the group of "good women" when referring to that silent, loving and faithful female companionship to Jesus Christ.

At the Congress on "The Role of Women in the Church" organised by the Latin American Academy of Catholic Leaders (2020) when interviewing Paola Binetti, one of the participants, she said:

The contribution of women is the same in the Church as it is in society: It depends to a large extent on her individual characteristics, just like the man, and partly on her capacity to be a woman in her generative dimension, capable of including also different people, of understanding their needs in an empathic way, of having a helping relationship in which the ethics of the cure is set out, the capacity to take care of others. In religious life, women's orders have taken care of sickness and disability: in hospitals and home care.

This feminine specificity is based on the so-called feminine disposition of St. John Paul II and presenting all that women have given throughout history, founding religious orders, creating schools, associations, collaborating in parishes and doing volunteer work and social action. This work has not always been recognised, as numerous testimonies and letters of the Popes have shown.

The access of women to the world of work, in spite of the added difficulty of combining work and family, has not meant the abandonment of their vocation of service to those who suffer, to the care of the sick and to the Catholic Church.

The 21st century has shown how women have reached all spheres of society (at least in the West) since some closed doors were opened to them until the beginning of the 20th century. Taking into account this new situation, which has been achieved with the effort and sacrifice of many women, their presence in peace processes and in decision-making should be taken into account more.

On 4 February 2019 at the celebration of International Women's Day (organised by the World Union of Catholic Women's Organisations), speaking about human fraternity, the president, Maria Lia Zervino said:

Women in the Church during the pontificate of Pope Francis have a special place. Many, many Catholic women want vindication. I do not think so. We have to act out of conviction. We can, because of our suitability, be at the service of the Church on all fronts and Pope Francis is right when he says that we have to be in places of decision making, because we can perfectly help in decision making in discernment, in listening, in courage... we need with the World Union of Catholic organisations, to take up this challenge of Father Francis.⁸

This can be achieved. Just as there were great women, in other times, like St. Teresa of Jesus (who was able to reform the Carmelite Order with the difficulties of that time), St Elizabeth of Hungary (who combined her reign with dedication to the poorest) or St Teresa of Calcutta (who has gone down in history for her love for the most needy and who was honoured in India with a state funeral when she died).

Today there are also great women who work in the midst of these hard times to reconcile their jobs with their family responsibilities. Others, from the religious vocation, in the cloister or in the missions, many of them making up for the lack of vocations, which supposes their untiring dedication in multiple humanitarian and assistance works or maintaining Catholic schools with few resources; and why not, remember the group of the "good women", those elderly ladies who silently accompany Jesus Christ in the parishes, collaborating in the liturgical activities, in Caritas and in the assistance to the most disadvantaged.

For all these reasons and looking at the very difficult situation that humanity is suffering, women will always be a light within the Catholic Church, to show the world the Love of God, through charity in welcoming, tenderness and care, which is the reflection of the person they have met, Someone who has said to them: Come and follow me.

⁸ This video plays the interview to Maria Lía Zervino president of of the World Union of Catholic Women's Organisations at International Womens' Day. <https://youtu.be/p9d-AQSTtefl>.

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