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STUDIES AND ARTICLES

DECIPHERING LATIN INSCRIPTIONS OF VALCAMONICA: A GLIMPSE OF THE ROLE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AN ALPINE VALLEY IN THE ROMAN AGE

*Monica Pavese Rubins**

Abstract

The article explores the condition of the woman and children in the society of Camunni. The importance of the patronymic, the low number of female names and the lack of daughters names in the family lists on Latin funerary inscriptions of Valcamonica suggest a patriarchal society. When a woman becomes eventually a wife, a mother or a grandmother, she deserves a place on a funerary inscription. Meanwhile, women of Valcamonica appear alone on sacred and honorary inscriptions, when they can pay out of their own pockets for an inscription.

Key words: *Valcamonica, Camunni, Latin inscriptions, woman, children, society*

Background and context

Valcamonica is a valley in the middle of the Alps and extends from Iseo Lake to the Tonale Pass in Lombardy, North of Italy. The valley has a long history that runs from the last Ice Age through the Roman Empire, to present times. During the first century BC, the Romans arrived in Valcamonica, which was then inhabited by the Camunni, people with a specific local culture and strong Celtic character.

The valley stands in the middle of an area occupied by several ethnic groups (Etruscans, *Raeti*, *Enganei*, Celts Cenomans). The origins of the language of Camunni has different interpretations, according to some scholars it's Rhaetic (Battisti, 1959: 227), to others North-Etruscan (Mancini, 1982: 223-231), instead to some others that's a separate original language, the Camunian (Morandi, 1982: 208-209; Tibiletti Bruno, 1978: 89). From the V century BC the analysis of grave goods show the presence of Celtic style brooches (*fibulae*) and swords (Ardevino 2002; Rossi 2004), but slowly they left the place to weapons, brooches, pottery and objects that show a strong Roman influence.

Under Augustus, Rome started to rule the valley, which was slowly integrated into the Roman Empire until it became a fully Roman administrative and economic centre. Almost two hundred Latin inscriptions offer a perspective on the daily life of Valcamonica in Roman times, as the official Latin written sources mention Valcamonica sparingly (Plinius, *Nat. Hist.*, III, 133-139; Strabo, *Geogr.*, IV, 6, 8; Dio Cassius, *Hist. Rom.*, LIV, 20, 1), the *Camunni* who became Roman citizens strongly continue to quote proudly their Camunian origins (*origo*) in Latin Inscriptions up to the II century AD¹.

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¹ About identity and integration in the alpine valleys, particularly about the Anauni, see Buonopane, 2011: 141-150.

Valcamonica was characterized by some small villages scattered throughout the territory outside the two main centres (Pavese Rubins 2014: 47-89), one political-administrative in Cividate Camuno (*Civitas Camunnorum*) (Mariotti 2004), the other one, in Breno, religious with a sacred area dedicated to a female Goddess, perhaps Minerva (Rossi 2010). The voting unit for the Camunni, as Roman citizens who have right to vote in Valcamonica, was the tribe *Quirina*, different from Brescia and Valtrompia (*Fabia*), Bergamo (*Voturìa*), Trento and Bolzano (*Papiria*).

A few inscriptions are dated back to the first part of the I century AD, but mostly are dated to the second half of the I century AD and the first half of the II century AD. The epigraphic production diminished drastically during the III century AD, probably because of a hard political, economic and social situation, combined with a broader diffusion of new funeral rituals. It's indeed during the III century that the first barbaric invasions passed through the Alps and an economic recession spread all around the Roman Empire (Rossi, 2010: 433; Zerbini, 1999: 32).

The society of Camunni: a strong patriarchy

An analysis of the society of Camunni under Roman rule offers certainly an interesting glimpse of the alpine families outside the official Roman history. Valcamonica shares strong analogies with the territory of Trento for its morphology (mountains, river, valleys midway toward Central Europe) and the Swiss Valais for the same cultural alpine substratum¹.

Latin inscriptions let us understand something more about the local society. A limit is that just a few people had the money to pay for an inscription, so it cannot indeed offer a whole picture of the valley. The analysis of grave goods and coins in the necropolis shows that the local people were generally not very wealthy². Furthermore, about one third of the Latin inscriptions cannot unfortunately support any demographic data as they don't report names or contain unbridgeable lacunae. The presence of boundaries in all the necropolis of Cividate Camuno and Borno makes us also suppose that some stones didn't bear inscriptions or specific signs as the space belonged to a whole family³.

The corpus of inscriptions of Valcamonica counts so far about 170 names, if we consider also the names on the pottery marks (Pavese Rubins, 2014: 390-412). The names on the inscriptions can be a good starting point to assemble the pieces of the puzzle of the local society, together with the information we receive from other Roman material sources. First of all the personal names tell us a lot about the origins

¹ About Trentino under Rome, see Zerbini, 1999: 32; about the Roman Valais, see Paunier, 1991: 147-149 and Wibl , 2001: 79-93.

² Two exceptions are in Lovere, near Iseo Lake, where a tomb has been found with a whole trousseau in silver, and in the necropolis associated to the main political-administrative centre, Cividate Camuno, where just an *obolus* of Charon has been found on a gravestone of a cremation burial under Claudius (Fortunati, 1986: 114, 116).

³ Nearby in the territory of Tridentum, funerary inscriptions with just the initials or the first part of the family name seem to indicate that they refer to the same family and there was no need to repeat it inside the same common funerary space in the same necropolis (Zerbini, 1999: 27-29).

of the families¹. The local names confirm that the indigenous elites have been gradually assimilated into the Roman culture and have progressively Latinized their Camunian names². The local society shows a strong bond with the father and the ancestors. As other scholar in other contexts have pointed out well, in small societies of hunters-gatherers the social legitimation was built according to two main lines, the first one following a same tradition and the second one following common social and family relations bound together by the same religion and habits (Giddens, 1995: 4-5; Creighton, 2006: 81). The names of Roman Valcamonica show a strong patriarchal society and a considerable attachment to traditions. The patronymic indicates own identity, as a unique line of succession from the forefathers³. On a sacred inscription in a remote mountaintop close to Pescarzo, even a centurion prefers to write his name in the short form associated to the name of his father, (*Cerialis* son of *Plada*), as willing to follow a local tradition and identification⁴. A bilingual inscription in Sale Marasino (CIL V 8896; Gregori, 1990: 258 D032, D085, D0898; Pavese, 2006: n.133; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 304-305) and the several Latin inscriptions engraved above the Prehistoric graffiti on the rocks (Pavese Rubins, 2014: 308-315) are evidences of the attachment to the pre-roman Camunian customs.

The importance of the patronymic and the low number of female names on funerary inscriptions suggest a patriarchal society⁵, where the women started to have a role in society just as a wife, afterwards as a mother and grandmother. In Rome, many inscriptions show a quite higher consideration for women, if they have the traditional attributes of the ideal Roman matron, which are modesty, chastity, purity, good

¹ Some are local (*Fenestellii*, *Lessi*, *Saeconii*, *Sasii*, *Pladicii*, *Teudicii*), with names without comparisons outside the valley, others are common in other areas of the Empire (*Antistii*, *Antonii*, *Apronii*, *Claudii*, *Decii*, *Domitii*, *Gavii*, *Laronii*, *Lucretii*, *Munatii*, *Purpurarii*, *Statii*, *Valerii*), a few others are ascribable to immigrated manpower and artisans (*Appii*, *Laetili*, *Petronii*, *Vettii*). Some are freedmen with personal names of Greek origins (for example *Stephon* and *Elpis*), and a few others are soldiers with Roman citizenship (*Statii*, *Valerii*). About the society of Valcamonica under Rome, in general, see Pavese Rubins, 2014: 121-184.

² The indigenous *Plada* is the forefather of the *Pladicii* family, as well as *Lea* gives the name to the *Lessi*, *Teudus* to the *Teudicii*, *Seccus* to the *Saeconii*, *Sassus* to the *Sasii*.

³ The same use of indigenous patronymic for Roman citizens can be found in some Latin Inscriptions of Roman Britain (Creighton, 2006: 81).

⁴ As a matter of fact, the centurion *Cerialis* chooses the short form of his name, even if he was certainly a Roman citizen with the *tria nomina* (CIL V 4951; Inscr.It. X, V 1195; Forni, 1992: 186; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 288-289 n.9: *Cerialis Pladae filius* / *cent(urio) cob(ortis) Alpinae* / *aram refecit l(ibens) m(erito)*). In Valcamonica the Pre-roman name of the father is very often mentioned in a full name of a Roman citizen, as it appears on the inscription of C.Claudius, son of *Sassius/Sassus*, priest of Augustus and a member of the Quirina tribe, dated to the first half of I century AD and found in Cividate Camuno (CIL V 4960; Inscr It. X V 1199; Abelli Condina, 2012: 29 n.24; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 291-292 n.11: *C(aius) Claudius* / *Sassi filius*) *Quir(ina)* / *sacerd(os) Aug(usti)* / *d(e) p(ecunia) s(ua)* / *res p(ublica) tribunal* / *fecit et columnam* / *mutavit*).

⁵ In Roman civil law, the patriarchal family had a specific legal character and identity; it was a corporation perpetuating itself intergenerationally as a single unit identifiable through patronymic and gentile nomenclature (Mantena, 2010: 77).

housekeeping, beauty, industriousness (Paoli, 2006: 102; Giorcelli Bersani, 2004: 207-213). Among the Celtic societies, women seem not to have been treated as equals, although compared especially with their Greek equivalents, noblewomen enjoyed considerable freedom of action and even power (James 2005: 66). Meanwhile, according to Caesar, despite sharing money and gains, Celtic men had the power over their wives' life and death (Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, 6, 19).

The patriarchal society has recently been an interesting object of research while focusing on gender differences in matrilineal and patriarchal societies. Among the Maasai tribe of Tanzania, the men are strongly dominating and «wives are said to be less important to a man than his cattle. For example, daughters are not counted in response to static fixtures handed down from pre-history» (Gneezy, Leonard, & List, 2009: 1639-1640)¹. According to Hogson, Maasai men's control of livestock gave them control of women (1999: 41-65). From the Neolithic, the subsistence of the inhabitants of Valcamonica was mainly based on pastoralism, agriculture and hunting (Anati, 1982a: 288; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 255-256)². Archaeological excavations outside a house from the I century BC in Pescarzo, confirm local pastoralism, as sheep and goat remains have been found near the house (Ardovino, 2002: 14-16).

Female gender in Roman Valcamonica

Almost 80% of people quoted on inscriptions of Valcamonica are males. The numbers correspond to the ones in *Tridentum* with 23% (Zerbini 1999: 42), but not in Brescia where female names were a bit more (30%) (Gregori, 2000: 194). We can suppose that the lack of female names indicate a less social consideration. We cannot have precise data about the social organisation and the gender relations, as a specific literature and anthropological studies about the necropolis of Valcamonica don't exist, but we can suppose that women were buried inside the funerary fencing of a family together with children and the rest of the family, often without their recorded names. A possible gender imbalance has been also claimed about the Valcamonica rock carvings during Later Prehistory, as only four per cent of human figures were recognisable as a female (Anati, 1982: 240). According to Anati, this imbalance shows a low social status for the women in the Prehistoric society of *Camunni* (1964: 240)³, similarly to what could be assumed by the analysis of inscriptions in Roman times. The north of Italy has indeed produced several Gravettian burials in the Prehistory, mostly male adolescents and adults, with a strong underrepresentation of children and

¹ About the role of women among Maasai, see Spencer, 2004 and Mitzlaff, 1994.

² In general, about the economy of alpine valleys from the Neolithic, see Paunier, 1991:151; Frei Stolba, 1988: 143-159.

³ Bevan strongly disagrees with Anati's position as she perceives the Iron Age women's roles equally important to those of men, both in term of economic survival and the social transmission of culture and that "a lower visibility on rock art might potentially mean the opposite – that the under-represented sex was simply to special or important to depict" (2006: 77, 61). Despite Bevan's interesting argumentations about the important contribution of women in agriculture and home-based work in Pre-roman society, I cannot see a high social consideration of women in the Latin inscriptions of Valcamonica, as women are clearly underrepresented as previously in the rock art of Iron Age.

females (Mussi, 2002; Milisauskas, 2012: 82). In the site of Balzi Rossi on the Ligurian coastline between Ventimiglia and Menton, as well, the number of grave for women is openly inferior to that of graves for men, because of their marginal importance in the local Palaeolithic society (Gamble, 1999: 409).

Many inscriptions of Roman Valcamonica list just male names, without mentioning any woman. Furthermore, the woman usually appears in second or third position in the list of deceased, after the husband and the sons. In just one case in Ossimo, the *duovir* *L. Sasius Secundus* dedicates a funerary inscription to the wife *Rufia Tertia*, which appears in first position¹. Another inscription from Esine shows a woman (*Sextia Secunda*) who receives a special treatment as her name is listed immediately after her husband, the *sevir flavialis* *P. Valerius Crispinus* and before her son *P. Valerius Numisius*². In the territory of *Tridentum*, the same tendency has been claimed as the women's names are placed after all other members of the family (Zerbini, 1999: 42), instead in Brescia the woman seems to enjoy higher visibility as her name is always before her sons and other relatives, but after her husband (Gregori, 2000: 194). In Valcamonica, an unknown man lists even his mother before his wife in Cividate Camuno³.

Women from Valcamonica are never commemorated as well-deserving (*bene merentes*), which in Rome – and in other smaller realities as Venosa – was very common as epithet to a deceased wife during the II century AD (42% of total) (Nielsen, 1999: 179-185; Pani, 1999: 23.)⁴. Just in one case a husband, the *duovir* *L. Sasius Secundus*, shows his appreciation to the departed wife *Rufia Tertia* with the adjective *incomparabilis* (incomparable)⁵. Just in another case, a woman is said *pientissima mater* by his son *Pontius Bubalus*⁶.

In the funerary inscriptions of couples (wife and husband) too, the women are always in second position, even if they commissioned the inscription themselves. This

¹ CIL V 4967; Inscr. It. X V 1206; Suppl.It. n.s. 8, 186 (1206); Pavese Rubins, 2014: 299-300 n.17: *Rufiaes / Te[r]tiaes / L(u)cius Sasius Quir(ina) / Secundus Iivir / i(ure) d(icundo) / uxori / incomparabil(i) / et sibi et suis v(ivus) f(ecit)*.

² CIL V 4968; IB 804; Inscr.It. X V 1207; Albertini, 1975: 210; Abelli Condina, 1986: 38 n.42; Suppl. It. N.s.8, 186 (1207); Gregori, 1990: 172 n.A266, 001, 185 n.A295, 022, 011, 049; Gregori, 2000: 24, 69, 156, 162-163; Pavese, 2006: n.89; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 144-145, 400, 407: *P(ublius) Valerius / Crispinus / (sex)vir Flavia(lis) / sibi et / Sextiae Sexti fil(iae) / Secundae uxori et / P(ublio) Valerio Numisio f(ilio)*.

³ AE 2002: 576; Mariotti, 2004: 181 n.2; Pavese, 2006: n.40; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 160: *---/sibi et Cluviae / Laeci f(iliae) matri et / Mennicae Fausti f(iliae) / uxori / et suis*.

⁴ According to Nielsen (1999: 181) the epithet *bene merens* occurs so frequently that it can be mainly applied as a formula and not as a meaningful epithet.

⁵ CIL V 4967; Inscr. It. X, V 1206; Bertolini Panazza, 1980, I: 199; Abelli Condina, 1986: 44 n.65c; Suppl. It. 8: 186, n.1206; Gregori, 1990: 162, n.A238, 002 and 167 n.A252, 004; Gregori, 2000: 77, 153, 242; Pavese, 2006: n.77; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 299-301 n.17: *Rufiaes Te[r]tiaes / L(u)cius Sasius Quir(ina) / Secundus (duo)vir / i(ure) d(icundo) uxori/ incomparabil(i) / et sibi et suis v(ivus) f(ecit)*.

⁶ Epigraphica XVII, p.84 n.2; Inscr. It. X V 1220; Abelli Condina, 1986: 57 (19, 2); Suppl. It. N.s.8: 186 (1220); Gregori, 1990: 145 n.A222, 001; Pavese, 2006: n.42; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 319 n.37: *[---P]ontiu[s---] / [---Bu]balus matr[i] / [---pie]ntissimae*.

confirms the leading position of the *pater familias* in the Camunian society. The mother, the grandmother and the mother-in-law are always after their husbands. In the very last position we find the aunts and the sisters¹. It's not easy to understand the link between the members of a family, like in the inscription of the *Purpurarii*, a group of freedmen who trade in textiles in Ossimo, whose portraits above the epigraph depict a couple without *conubium*².

Another interesting aspect is women's social mobility. Sometimes we see the union of a Roman citizen and an indigenous woman, perhaps in the first time of Romanization of the valley, as the case of the aedile *L. Decius Primus* and his wife *Lessa Cloesa* of Losine, who has a local indigenous name and who is listed after both their sons, the decurions *L. Decius Reburus* and *Sextus Decius Primus*³.

Some parallels recur with the Etruscan society. While all men list their own personal achievements and public honours, all women list the names of their relatives (husband, children, parents, parents-in-law) with their public duties or achievements as part of their own female curriculum (Rallo, 1989: 132, 137). In Valcamonica, an emblematic case is that of the wife of *Rutumanna*, a gladiator of Capo di Ponte, who is so proud of her husband who has died without being defeated twenty-three times, that she forgets to mention her own name and indicates just her social position as a wife.⁴ Another woman, whose name is lost due to a fracture of the stone, dedicates a long inscription to herself and to her *Laronii* family, composed by the husband, parents-in-law and sons, the first one listed as an *Equus Publicus*⁵.

¹ A sister – *Medussa Graeci f.* – to the sister *Cussa Graeci f.* and his husband *Ponticus Germani f.*, where the name of the brother-in-law is indeed in first position (CIL V 8896; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 304-305 n.21). Among a group of public slaves, *Publicia Melitines* receives an inscription from the brother *Publicius Valentinus* and the sister *Publicia Valentina* (AE 1991, 859 = AE 1999: 740; Valvo, 2010: 312 n.125; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 395). A son dedicates an inscription to the father *Sega*, the mother *Lea*, to the son *Clevius* and to the aunt *Segessa* (CIL V 4717; Inscr.It. X V 527; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 306-307 n. 22).

² Inscr.It. X V III: 675; Abelli Condina, 2012: 9 n.4; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 302-303 n.19: *Ti/berio) Purpurar(zo) Saturn(ino) / Purpurariae Ti(berii) l(ibertae) / Arbusc(u)lae / Purpurariae Ti(berii) l(ibertae) / Eclog(a)e / Ti(berius) Purpurarius Cerast(es) / V(ivus) f(ecit) i(n) f(ronte) p(edes) XII i(n) a(grum) p(edes) XIII.*

³ CIL V 4963; Inscr. It. X, V, 1201; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 298-299 n.16: *V(ivus) f(ecit) / L(ucius) Decius Quir(ina) / Primus aed(ilis) sibi / et L(ucio) Decio Reburro / et Sex(to) Decio Prim[o] / filius decurion(ibus) / et Lessae C(h)loesa[e] / uxori et [e] / --.*

⁴ Gregori, 1990: 151 n.C195a; AE 1991: 224, n.851; Gregori, 1991: 45-52; Gregori, 2000: 261; Morretta, 2004: 129-130; Pavese, 2006: n.121; Valvo, 2010: 313-314 n.126; Gregori, 2011: 147-152; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 303-304 n.20: *D(is) M(anibus) Rutumanne (!) / ret(iario) ppugnarum / XXIII invicto / uxor bene merent(i).*

⁵ Inscr.It. X, V 1204; Abelli Condina, 1986: 74 n.10; Suppl. It. N.s.8, n.1204: 186; Gregori, 1990: 107 n.A136, 001 and 003-005, 136 n.198, 005; Gregori, 2000: 127, 134; Pavese, 2006: n.25; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 393: *[sibi] / [et T(ito) Laronio – filio] / Qui(ina) Primo / [--ma]rito optimo / [et Laro]nio T(iti) filio Quir(ina) / [--]iano equo public(o) / [et – La]ronio T(iti) f(ilio) Quir(ina) Rufino / [filii]s piis(s)imis / [et -]Laronio Hilarioni / [et Oct/Fl]aviae T(iti) filiae Secundae / soceris.*

The daughters are never included in the family lists, while the sons can be one, two or even three per inscriptions¹. The only exception has been found in Bienno and belongs to the young *Elpis* who has a Greek name and her portrait is dated back to Hadrian's time². Her family's origins are clearly not Camunian, and probably they are freedmen coming from abroad, and not originally locals. Children don't seem, by the way, to be generally of interest to the local community. As in the territory of Tridentum³ and Brescia⁴, the analysis of all known Latin tombstones of Valcamonica reveals clearly the lack of children. Meanwhile, we cannot really say with confidence if a child could be one of the listed people on a gravestone, as the biometric data are missing. Just two inscriptions from Valcamonica can certainly be referred to two children. The first is the one with the portrait of *Elpis*, as already mentioned, the second one is an Early Medieval Christian inscription (V-VII century AD) which was engraved on a stone near *S. Siro* parish church and which is also a unique case in Valcamonica for the biometric indications of the deceased⁵. That's a memory of *Iustus*, who died at the age of eight⁶. We also don't know if in Valcamonica there was the

¹ Three brothers on a funerary inscription in Borno: *Tresus / Endubronis f(i)lius / Tiro / arbitrat(u) / Endubronis patris / et Silonis et / Secundi fratrum / t(estamento) f(ieri) i(ussit)* (CIL V 4958; Inscr. It. X V 1226; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 127-128).

² CIL V 4971; IB 808; Inscr.It. X V 1213; ABELLI CONDINA 1986b, p.33: Suppl. It. N.s.8, 1213 p.186; Gregori, 1990: 226 n.C097a, 225 n. C087 and 245 n.287; Gregori, 2000: 36, 38, 40-41, 51, 57, 79, 92; Pavese, 2006: n.83; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 401: *Elpidi / Fronto e[---] / par[entes] / Pbo+[---]*.

³ Just two children are known (1% of total) in the Latin inscriptions of the territory of *Tridentum* under Roman rule (Zerbini, 1999: 36).

⁴ Children in Latin inscriptions from Brescia are very uncommon (Gregori, 2000: 193-195).

⁵ The only Camunians who quote their age of death are the ones died outside Valcamonica. 1. a woman Ursic(i)na [---] *va* in Bedriacum (Calvatone, Cremona) at 51 years old (Epigraphica 1980, XLII: 187-190; AE 1984: 431; Gregori, 1990: 185 n. A142, 004; AE 1996: 234 n.724; Sartori, 1996: 81-84; Durando, 1997: 108 n.40; Gregori, 2000: 327-328; Pavese, 2006: n.134; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 409: *[---]a et Ursic(i)na / [---] civis Camunna / [quae vi]xit annos LI / [---] in coningio / secu<n=M>do / [vixit] annos X [---]*). 2. a soldier Sextus Apronius Valens in Carnuntum (Pannonia) at 35 years old (AE 1978, 631; Ö.Jh 1935, 29, c.305 n.189; Abelli Condina, 1983: 84 n.32; Gregori, 1990: 43 n.A024, 001; Forni, 1992: 194 n.111; Gregori, 2000: 175 n.14; Pavese, 2006: n.137; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 153, 390: *Sex(tus) Apro/nius Sex(ti) f(i)lius/Quir(ina) Valens / Camun(nus) mil(es) / leg(ionis) XIII G(eminae) M(artiae) / V(ictricis) an(norum) XXXV / stip(endiorum) XI b(ic) s(itus) e(st) / t(estamento) f(ieri) i(ussit) h(eres) f(aciendum) c(uravit)*). 3. an unknown soldier in Ravenna 49 years old (CIL XI 42; Forni, 1975: 227 n.8; Gregori, 1990: 270 n.E009; Pavese, 2006: n.135; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 151: *[---] / nat(ione) Camunn(us) / milit(avit) ann(os) XXIII / vixit ann(is) XXXIX / hunc titulum / fec(erunt) Cale et Saturnina libert/ae sibi et patron(o) / de se / bene merenti/ interveniente Bae/bio Sero vet(e)ran(o) h(erede)*; 4. a scribe-soldier C.Valerius Valens in Kranion, Achaia (Greece) at 35 years old (AE 1978, 777; Gregori, 1990: 191 n.A295, 074; Pavese, 2006: n.136; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 307-308 n.23: *C.Valerius C(ai) f(i)lius Quir(ina) tribu) Valens Cam(unnus) / mil(es) leg(ionis) VIII Aug(ustae) (centuria) Senuci(onis) vix(it) a[nnos] / XXXV mil(itavit) an(nos) XIII h(er)es ex testamento*).

⁶ AE 1991: 224 n.852; Valvo, 1992: 67-71 n.11; Pavese, 2006: n.123; Valvo, 2010: 314 n.127; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 402: *Iustus vix(it) a(nnos) IIIIX (in) D(e)o semper / (in) C(h)r(i)s(t)o Sentius vix(it) [---] / Iustus vix(it) a(nnos) IIX (in) D(e)o S(emper) Segundinus (fecit)*.

same use of interring the children near their own house as in Paleovenetian settlements (Brogiolo, 1999: 32).

Between the V and the VI century AD, a group of eighteen children (78%) and a few adults (22%) have been intentionally buried in the area of the theatre and amphitheatre of Civitate Camuno, where it seems distinctly intentional the aim to inter together stillborn babies and children in the same location (Mariotti, 2004: 78; Ravedoni & Di Martino, 2004: 323-327). During the Republic in Rome, as well, children and young people were disproportionately less in the necropolis, as they were indeed socially less important, instead the interments of children became a current trend in Rome from the I century AD, when children became socially more important as they were seen as the continuation of a family (Rallo, 1989: 134-135). At present we can just suppose that the lack of inscriptions clearly referred to children can indicate a low social position of children who didn't deserve a special memory, as well as women. Similarly, in the society of Etruria, the most common social structure is based on patrilineal kinship, with women admitted in the tombs just as wives or mothers (Rallo, 1989: 141).

If the woman seems undervalued in the funerary inscriptions, female wealth and benefaction are shown by their honorary and sacred inscriptions which are witness of their successful participation in the civic life due to their status, money or esteem. Women appear alone in all sacred and honorary epigraphs that show a certain economic independence and the possibility to pay a commission autonomously. In Valcamonica, in any case, women with a recognised social status are scarce (about 0,5%). There is just one wealthy woman *Clodia Av(---)* who leaves in her last will an amount of money to the Republic of Camunni to build an unknown monument¹. Outside Valcamonica, the overwhelming majority of the inscriptions for women's civic roles comes from the most densely urbanized and romanized regions, as central Italy (46%) and Proconsular Africa with Numidia (25%), but in the alpine province and Gaul the percentage falls to 3-5% (Hemelrijk, 2015: 18).

In conclusion, women in Valcamonica seems to have a marginal role before marriage. When they become eventually wives, then mothers and grandmothers, they are allowed a place in a funerary inscription.

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¹ CIL V 4964; IB 800; Inscr.It. X V 1202; Gregori, 1990: 72 n.A082, 0023; Gregori, 2000: 151, 196, 222, 263; Pavese, 2006: n.31; Pavese Rubins, 2014: 391: [---] / Clodia [---] / Av[---] / a re [publica] / Camunn[orum] / cui in h[oc] / pecuniam le[gavit] / t(estamento) p(oni) i(ussit).

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Abbreviations

AE = *L'Année épigraphique* (1888-). Paris: Presses universitaires de France.

CIL = *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (1863-). Berlin: Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences.

INSCR. IT. = *Inscriptiones Italiae* (1931-). Rome: Ist. Poligrafico dello Stato.

SUPPL. IT. = *Supplementa Italica*, n.s. (1981-). Rome: Ed. Quasar.

TESTIMONIES OF THE GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TRAVELERS ABOUT THE ROMANIANS IN THE 18TH CENTURY

*Iulian Oncescu**

Abstract

Among the numerous foreign testimonies left by the Western travelers about the Romanians in the 18th century, there are also those of the German and Austrian travelers. Out of these travelers who went through the Romanian area and wrote about the Romanians in the 18th century, we shall mention here: Georg Franz Kreybich, Johan Wendel Bardili, Erasmus Heinrich Schneider von Weismantel, Frederic Ernest de Fabrice, Ludwig Nicolas Allard, Tiepolt, Peter Heinrich Bruce, Andreas Jäschke, Zacharias Hirschel, Nicolas Ernst Kleemann, Johann Friedel, Johan Martin Minderer, Ignaz von Born, Joseph II, Friedrich Wilhelm Von Bauer (Bawr), Maximilian Franz von Habsburg, Karl Friedrich von Magdeburg, Geor Lauterer, Marianne von Herbert Ratkeal, Jenne Lebprecht, Wenzel von Brognard, Ernst Friedrich König, Cyntznyo, Karl von Götze, Johann Christian von Struve, Johann von Hofmannsegg. This paper aims to deal with the German and Austrian travelers who have come through the Romanian area in the 18th century and have left, under various forms, testimonies about the Romanians, the accent falling on the larger works.

Key words: *foreign testimonies, German and Austrian travellers, Romanians, 18th century, memoires, histories*

An important category of Western travelers who came through the Romanian area in the 18th century was represented by the German and Austrian travelers. These travelers' testimonies, beside the French and the English ones (Oncescu, 2013: 33-38; Oncescu, 2015: 21-28), represent an important source for the Romanians' history. Evidently, these testimonies of the German and Austrian travelers offer to us, just as in the case of other Western travelers, extremely relevant information on various aspects of the 18th century Romanian society. The German and Austrian travelers' testimonies about the Romanians and about their passage through the Romanian area in the 18th century, shorter or more extended, appear under various forms: from letters and reports, memos, briefings, to ample travel relations. These testimonies, almost totally published, in the course of time, by their authors or posthumously by other authors appear under the form of simple mentions, fragments, distinct chapters in memoirs of some German and Austrian travelers that follow a certain itinerary and during a certain stage of it have passed through the Romanian area.

Distinct works dedicated to the Romanians belonged, however, as one can see, to authors/travelers who lived for a longer period of time in Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania. Sure, that the Western society the traveler was coming from, his tuition, his mission, the period of time spent among the Romanians, as we have shown, have

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clearly left their mark on their testimonies about the Romanians. Thus, in the framework of these testimonies, a special role goes to the ampler works about the Romanians and the Romanian area, works that were published later on as a fruit of their own observations, more or less extensive books, which can be classified as travel memoirs.

Out of the German and Austrian travelers who came through the Romanian area in the 18th century and left a series of testimonies about the Romanians, we shall remind of: Georg Franz Kreybich (1662- approx.1736), Johan Wendel Bardili (? – 1730), Erasmus Heinrich Schneider von Weismantel (1688-1749), Frederic Ernest de Fabrice (? – 1727), Ludwig Nicolas Allard (? – 1728), Tiepolt (? – 1711), Peter Heinrich Bruce (1692-1751), Andreas Jäschke și Zacharias Hirschel (18th century), Nicolas Ernst Kleemann (1731 – after 1800), Johann Friedel (1752-1789), Johan Martin Minderer (? – 1812), Ignaz von Born (1742-1791), Joseph II (1740-1790), Friedrich Wilhelm Von Bauer (Bawr) (1731-1783), Maximilian Franz von Habsburg (1756-1801), Karl Friedrich von Magdeburg (approx. 1730-1803), Geor Lauterer (1745-1784), Marianne von Herbert Ratkeal (18th century), Jenne Lebprecht (?-after 1790), Wenzel von Brognard (? – 1788), Ernst Friedrich König (? – 1788), Cyntzno (?-1788), Karl von Götze (1743-1806), Johann Christian von Struve (? – post 1803), Johann von Hofmannsegg (1766-1849). Next, we shall present a few details concerning the passage of these German and Austrian travelers through the Romanian area but also the testimony left by them after their voyage here. Thus, mentions under various forms, less extensive and of lesser importance, have been left by: Georg Franz Kreybich, Wendel Bardili, Erasmus Heinrich Schneider von Weismantel, Frederic Ernest de Fabrice, Ludwig Nicolas Allard, Tiepolt, Peter Heinrich Bruce, Andreas Jäschke and Zacharias Hirschel, Johan Martin Minderer, Ernst Friedrich König, Cyntzno, Johann von Hofmannsegg. Georg Franz Kreybich arrived, after the year 1691, in the context of his voyages through Europe and in Transylvania and Wallachia (in the years 1698, 1700, 1707, 1710, but also later, between the years 1719 and 1721). His travelogues were published later on, in the year 1870, in Prague, and more relevant details about the Romanians are presented in the context of his voyage of the year 1698 in Wallachia (*Călători străini*, 1983: 125-130). On the occasion of a mission from Bender (Tighina) to Stockholm, in the year 1709, Johan Wendel Bardili had the occasion to pass through the Romanian area as well. His voyage through Moldavia and Maramureș was reminded in his travel relation published in the years 1714-1715 (*Călători străini*, 1983: 264-285). Erasmus Heinrich Schneider von Weismantel came through Moldavia, after the year 1709, and later on he will put down in a campaign diary the period spent here (*Călători străini*, 1983: 310-363). Baron Frederic Ernest de Fabrice crossed the Romanian area several times between the years 1710-1714, and his notes about these voyages were going to be published after a while in a tome of correspondence printed later, in the year 1760, in Hamburg (*Călători străini*, 1983: 404-412). Pieces of news about the Romanians and the Romanian area appear as well in the Campaign Diary (*Jurnal de campanie*) of Ludwig Nicolas Allard drafted during the Russian campaign in Moldavia, from the Prut River, against the Turks, of the year 1711, a diary that was published later on in the year 1893 (*Călători străini*, 1983: 433-442).

Baron colonel Tiepolt is the author of a relation of the Prut River campaign (1711). His diary completes that of Allard (*Călători străini*, 1983: 448-458). Peter Heinrich Bruce arrived near the Romanian area on the occasion of Peter the Great's campaign in Moldavia at Prut against the Turks of the year 1711. His memoirs were published later on in London in the year 1782 in English, and in German at Leipzig in 1784 (*Călători străini*, 1983: 495-502).

The German artisans, Andreas Jäschke and Zacharias Hirschel, travelled in Transylvania and Wallachia in the year 1740 (*Călători străini*, 1997: 249-252). Johan Martin Minderer accompanied the Russian army in the war between Russia and Turkey of the years 1768-1774 arriving under these circumstances in the Romanian area. In his work published in the year 1790, Minderer provides information on the Romanians, as well. (*Călători străini*, 2000: 83-89). Ernst Friedrich König lived in the Romanian area since the year 1774 until the year 1786, securing the position of consul of the Habsburg Empire in the Romanian Principalities. Under these circumstances and given the nature of his position, he drafted several reports on all that was happening in the Romanian area (*Călători străini*, 2001: 800-808). Cyntznyo was in the Romanian area during the Austro-Russian-Turkish war (1787-1792), drafting in this context a report. The travel relation of Johann von Hofmannsegg of 1793-1794, where he also leaves testimonies about Banat and Transylvania, was to be published in the year 1800 at Görlitz (*Călători străini*, 2001: 860-862). In this context, more relevant 18th century testimonies of the German and Austrian travelers about the Romanians and about their passage through the Romanian area on various occasions or on diverse missions were left by Nicolas Ernst Kleemann, Joseph II, Maximilian Franz von Habsburg, Karl Friedrich von Magdeburg, Marianne von Herbert Ratkeal, Wenzel von Brognard, Karl von Götze. Thus, the Austrian traveler Nicolas Ernst Kleemann passed through the Romanian area on several occasions (before the year 1770), and his brief testimony about the Romanians was going to be published in Vienna in the year 1773 in a work which actually included his relations of the trips he took especially in the the South-East of Europe and in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The work was reedited in several editions in the course of time (1783, 1818), a translation into French (1780) but also in other languages (Dutch, English, Russian, Italian) being known (*Călători străini*, 1997: 620-621). Regarding his travelogue describing his voyages through the Romanian area of the year 1768, it was dedicated especially to his voyages on the Danube, bringing into discussion the conditions of navigation on this river, the way people were travelling but also other aspects concerning the abusive procedures of the Ottoman custom workers, the populations met in the context of this voyage and their way of living (*Călători străini*, 1997: 621-624). Another Austrian traveller, this time a more famous one, Emperor Joseph II (1740-1780) visited Banat and Transylvania three times (in the years 1768, 1770, 1773). After the first of these trips, Joseph II wrote a memoir, and following the one of 1773 he left a travelogue. In this travelogue, Joseph II put down every day what he had noticed on the occasion of his voyage in the provinces of his empire, the names of the localities he went through and observations and appreciations concerning the Romanians of Banat and Transylvania (*Călători străini*, 2000: 124-142; Sassu, 1928: 377-393, 425-440; Negru, 1943: 66-110).

In the year 1777, the brother of the Emperor Joseph II, Maximilian Franz von Habsburg also took a trip in the Romanian area, visiting Banat. After this visit, he drafted a diary in which he provides information about the Romanians. Maximilian Franz von Habsburg actually dictated, during his voyage, to his secretary, the aulic counsellor Adam von Weingarten, a series of observations regarding some aspects related to the abusive exploitation of the forest fund in the regions of Sasca and Moldova Nouă (recommending in this context measures for the protection of the forests, as well), the arrangement of the water course of the Bega Canal (which was flooding and created damages in the floodable plain of Tisza, Timiș and Beghei).

Out of this travelogue, much later on, at the end of the 20th century (in the year 1997), we also find a series of considerations of the Austrian traveler regarding the regime of the detainees in Timișoara, the fortifications of this city, and the fortifications of Arad. Maximilian Franz von Habsburg left three pieces of general information and these these appreciations trying to imitate the style of the diaries of his older brother, Joseph II, but his diary is more modest and less brilliant. At the same time, one can note that the solutions proposed by the Austrian traveler but also his spirit of observation are less sharp compared to those of the future emperor of the Habsburg Empire, Joseph II (*Călători străini*, 2000: 260-265; Feneșan, 1997: 215-233). Another Austrian traveler, Karl Friedrich von Magdeburg took several trips in the Romanian area, especially on the Danube but also in Oltenia (*part of Wallachia*) in the years 1777-1778. Details about these voyages in the Romanian area were left behind by several reports, which remained for a long time in manuscript and were published much later on. The mission of this Austrian traveller, a professional of the military force, in Oltenia in the year 1778, was going to be particularly important in the context in which the Habsburg Empire wanted to reannex this Romanian province that had belonged to it as well in the past (during the period 1718-1739). In fact, by Magdeburg's mission, they reevaluated the economic possibilities of Oltenia, after the last Russian-Turkish war (1768-1774) that had taken place as well in this area also after the annexation of a part of Moldavia in the year 1775 (known later on under the name of Bukovina). It is known the fact that in the year 1771, Turkey had been ready to cede to Austria, by means of a secret treaty, Oltenia, but the Austrians preferred Bukovina, annexed in the year 1775, to be able to make the connection between their possessions (Transylvania and the Polish Galitia).

Out of the diary of the Austrian traveler, we find out that, during the respective period, Oltenia was dried out of resources after the Russian-Turkish war (1768-1774) especially that according to his own testimony, its inhabitants were submitted to a double exploitation (of the Ottoman Empire, to which they were obliged to deliver cereals, big and small cattle at very low prices but also of their own administration and of the Phanariote rulers) and were ready to emigrate to Transylvania. The report contains, therefore, a series of data on the economic life but also on the administration and guardianship of the province. Magdeburg studied and researched during his information mission in Oltenia also the ways of communication (on land and on water), for the perspective of a transport of artillery, ammunitions and provisions from Transylvania or the Habsburg Empire in this part of Wallachia.

In this context, the Austrian traveller proposed some measures of improvement of the navigation on the Olt River, at the same time indicating the fact that the monasteries in Oltenia could be transformed in hospitals. Magdeburg did not forget to mention the state of spirit of the population, stating that the whole population of Oltenia wanted the coming of the Austrian troops in the province, especially, as he had mentioned, because of the conditions imposed by the Ottomans and the Phanariote rulers (*Călători străini*, 2000: 266-276; Docan, 1913-1914: 603-611; Popescu, 1928: 397-400; 442-447). Near the end of the 18th century, in the year 1785, on the occasion of a voyage from Istanbul to Vienna, Marianne von Herbert Ratkeal, another traveler of Austrian origin went through Wallachia and Transylvania.

This voyager woman did not leave any testimony on her passage through the Romanian area or about the Romanians, yet relevant details in this sense (especially in the case of her travel through Wallachia) were presented by Stephan Ignaz Raicevich, a Austrian consular agent in the Romanian Principalities. The details of this report can be found in Raichevich's correspondence with his hierarchic superior of Constantinople, the internuntium Peter Philipp von Herbert Ratkeal, who was the traveler's husband. It is precisely in this context of diplomatic subordination that the consular agent from Bucharest strongly insisted at the reigning prince of Wallachia, Mihail Suțu to greet baroness Marianne von Herbert Ratkeal and her children with great honours at the court from the Wallachian capital, receiving her in a manner worthy of the wife of a representative of the Court from Vienna, especially seeing that Turkey was at that moment in good relations with Austria. Although at that moment, in general, there was no greeting protocol for receiving at the Phanariote courts a diplomatic representative of a great European power (the Romanian Principalities having no external policy of their own and no right of diplomatic representation except by means of the Ottoman Empire), and especially for receiving the wife of a great representative of Austria in Turkey, the reigning prince of Wallachia, Mihail Suțu, on the kind request of the Austrian consular agent Raichevich, gave a written order in this sense on 6/17 May 1785. In this order of the reigning prince, was clearly mentioned the way the greeting ceremony intended for the entry of baroness Marianne von Herbert Ratkeal in the capital of Wallachia, but also the dignitaries in charge with the mission of accomplishing the orders received by this princely order (*pitac*). About the way she was greeted at the passage of the Danube, about the way she traveled through Wallachia, about the way she was greeted by the reigning prince Mihail Suțu at Bucharest, about the meetings she had in the capital of Wallachia and other significant details of her visit of the year 1785 in the Romanian area we find out, as we were mentioning, from the report of Raichevich, yet this aspect needs no rendering, especially as it does not represent the baroness's testimony about the Romanians and about her voyage in the Romanian area at the end of the 18th century (*Călători străini*, 2000: 697-700). Another Austrian traveler, Wenzel von Brognard, took several information trips in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire (Moldavia, Wallachia, Serbia, Bosnia, Dalmatia), going, on these occasions, through the Romanian area (1783, 1786), and as a consequence of these travels, he also left a testimony about the Romanians. Practically at the end of the mission had in the year 1786, Brognard handed over to his superiors from the Foreign Affairs of the Habsburg

Empire a report (actually the diary of his travels along the western Black Sea Coast, on the Danube and in Wallachia).

This diary of his voyage of the year 1786 remained for a period of time in manuscript at the Archives of Vienna, being published in Romania in the year 1930, in a work elaborated by Gheron Netta, as annex of it (*Expansiunea economică a Austriei și explorările ei orientale (The Economic Expansion of Austria and Its Explorations in the East)*, București, 1930, p. 188-120, being preceded by a short abstract, p. 123-131). This diary of the Austrian traveler contains a detailed description of the Dobrujan coast of the Black Sea, especially in point of navigation, but also an appreciation concerning the Turkish fortifications encountered, a description of the important localities visited from Dobruja and Wallachia, offering at the same time diverse details on the population, the state of the roads, the Wallachian trade (export and import and commercial relations with Brașov City, from Transylvania) (*Călători străini*, 2000: 731-751).

During the last decennium of the 18th century, colonel baron Karl von Götze passed through the Romanian area several times (between the years 1790-1791, 1791-1792). In this context, having a mission to accomplish in the Ottoman Empire, the German traveler, a man in the army, travelled through Banat, Wallachia and Transylvania, on the road leading from Berlin to Istanbul, but also on return road, the other way round (Istanbul-Berlin). His diary remained in manuscript at the archives in Berlin, the author remaining unidentified until the 19th and the 20th century, when it came into the focus of the Romanian historiography. The details of this travelogue of Karl von Götze remind of the riches seen in the Romanian area, but also about the poverty of the Romanian peasants, especially in Transylvania and Banat. The German colonel had the occasion to also visit the Wallachian capital, where he was received by the reigning prince Mihail Suțu (*Călători străini*, 2001: 1012-1045; Holban, 1988: 697-708). Other significant fragments, as well as some chapters in their works published later on, or even special works devoted to the Romanians and the passage of German and Austrian travelers through the Romanian space, were written by Johann Friedel, Ignaz von Born, Geor Lauterer, Jenne Lebprecht, Johann Christian von Struve. A special mention should be made in this context of the testimony of the Austrian traveler, the mineralogist Ignaz von Born, a testimony published later on. Regarding the work of Ignaz von Born, it obviously carries the mark of the author's preoccupations, and goes further to studying the riches of the Banat and Transylvania subsoil, but at the same time, it also presents important aspects about the Romanians, their occupations, their way of life. As I received in 1770, Born, an official of the Habsburg Empire, made a study trip to the Romanian space and to Hungary, investigating the mines. The results of this journey were given in the form of letters, which he sent to J. Ferber, the famous mineralogist of the time, which he later published under the title *Briefe uber mineralogische Gegenstände auf seiner Reise durch das Temeswarer Banat, Siebenburgen, Ober-und Nieder Hungarn....geschrieben*, in Frankfurt and Leipzig, in 1774. Born's work was well received aroused great interest in the scientific world, thus being quickly translated into English (London, 1777, in the volume *Travels through the Banat of Temeswar, Transylvania and Hungary* in the year 1770, a volume that he publishes together with J. Ferber-his side, offering, in addition to Born's, a summary of the mineralogical history of Bohemia), Italian (Venice, 1778) and French-Paris, 1780 (Born, 1777: 7-227, 231-320;

Călători străini, 2000: 90). The work contains, in addition to strictly specialized information (descriptions of rocks, explanation of the way in which mining was exploited, both the popular and the organized one, and the analysis of the form through which labor is organized, with the signaling of the methods used to the detriment of the workers and the means and a series of marginal observations (signaling the negative effect of mining on the environment of forests in general).

The precarious and quite risky working conditions of workers due to the indifference of the management of these mines are shown by Born. The Austrian traveler shows that only the Romanian workers risked working in the uncertainties of practical improvised mines with rather rudimentary machinery, being exposed to accidents, at the same time pointing to their difficult living conditions and the fact that they were most often exploited by more intermediaries.

Born is quite interested in Romanians, although his ideas about their origins are very confusing. Instead, the German traveler quite fairly describes their way of life with accurate assessments of the port. It also makes harsh appreciations for the Romanians' religion, especially for the Orthodox priests. Descriptions of places visited in Romanian space are generally quite arid, by the Austrian traveler Ignaz von Born (*Călători străini*, 2000: 91). Another German traveler, Jenne Lebprecht, who made several trips to the Ottoman Empire and other areas of the Southeast European region, went on three occasions (1785, 1786, 1787). He published his travel accounts (made by the Ottoman Empire, Moldova, the Romanian Country, and Serbia) in 1788, initially at Pesta and then in Frankfurt and Leipzig (1790), and in this work reminded the Romanians (*Călători străini*, 2000: 729-730). Clearly, his journey from Frankfurt, which seems to be his hometown, to Constantinople, but also in the opposite direction from Constantinople to the German space, has gone through the Romanian space but more relevant details give us his second passage here (1786), describing Wallachia, customs, economy, inhabitants, agricultural production, animals, justice, the system of governance and the penal system. In much of these memoirs left by Jenne Lebprecht, they took information from Stephan Raichevici, but they also contain a series of personal observations made during the journey. The German traveler states that everything in the Romanian space (Moldavia and Wallachia) was of good quality. He was impressed by the richness of the soil, the quality of wine, the abundance of fruits and vegetables, the low prices of products (exported to the Ottoman Empire), the large number of cattle. Jenne Lebprecht notes that the inhabitants worked little, carelessly in his opinion, being intrigued by this state, not understanding that the peasant was not interested in his work because of the low prices obtained from the sale of the products and that only a few had their land, the rest working for this land is used for boyars, not paying here for taxes. The German traveler noticed that peasants' way of life was rudimentary, but they ate tasty food, meat, birds, and venison. Although Jenne Lebprecht was overwhelmed by people's indifference to work the land, of a generous nature, he considered that the peasants were the most oppressed category because of the despotic regime of the rulers, of the taxes paid. Regarding the riches of Wallachia, the German traveler was impressed by the beauty of the forests, which provided the abundant wood for the Galați shipyard and for export, the existence of large herds of cattle (oxen, cows) and small sheep they supplied, besides

meat, many products to the export. Especially appreciates the horses. When it comes to religion, he remembers that most of the Romanians were Orthodox, the faith often mingling with superstition, describing at the same time their clothes (Căzan, 2004: 153-156; Iorga, 1988: 257-260). However, General Johann Christian von Struve, who was in the service of Russia, passed several times through Romanian space, especially through Moldavia during 1791-1793. His *Journal*, published in Gotha in 1801, contains various information about the Romanians (Căzan, 2004: 147-148; *Călători străini*, 2001: 1117-1143; Pascu, 1940: 1-80).

Out of all these testimonies of the German and Austrian travelers about the Romanians and about their passage through the Romanian area in the 18th century, a special mention deserves to be made of the work published by the German traveler Friedrich Wilhelm von Bauer (1731-1783), *Memoires historiques et geographiques sur la Valachie*, published in Frankfurt/ Leipzig in the year 1778. Friedrich Wilhelm von Bauer (1731-1783), a German naturalized in Russia, a general in the Russian army (an army present then in the Romanian area) during the Russian-Ottoman war (1768-1774), gives in this work the amplest data about Wallachia (Bauer, 1788, Carra, 1781, 201-368; Karadjia, 1924, 225; Carra, 2011, 109-197; *Călători străini*, 2000: 144-184).

The German general had initiated, in the circumstances of the military conflict between Russia and Turkey (1768-1774), the project of the creation and the publication of a large *Geographic and Military Atlas*, drawing, with the help of his staff officers, the maps of the areas where the Russian-Turkish war was taking place – Moldavia, Wallachia, Podolia, Volhynia and Crimea, Bulgaria and the Black Sea straits. Despite all the efforts made, given the lack of funds, Bauer only managed to publish the first map, that of the principality of Moldavia, a map that was going to be published in Amsterdam, in the year 1781. However, although he did not publish the map of Wallachia, the German traveler managed to publish the content that was intended to be published along with this map, namely information appeared under the form of a work issued in the year 1778 (*Călători străini*, 2000: 143-144).

Thus, the work *Memoires historiques et geographiques sur la Valachie*, by Friedrich Wilhelm von Bauer (Bawr) is structured into five great chapters, each divided into several subchapters, approaching: Chapter I. *THE POSITION OF WALLACHIA*, (Bauer, 1778: 5; Carra, 2011: 113), Chapter II. *GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNTRY* (Climate, Position, Rivers, Mountains, Soil, Wine, Fruits, Forests, Animals, Insects, Mines, Political divisions of the country, Inhabitants, Sciences, Crafts, Religion, Trade), (Bauer, 1778: 6-31; Carra, 2011: 115-132), Chapter III. *ABOUT GOVERNANCE. ABOUT THE ERA OF THE RULERS* (Way of ruling and succession, Bowing the country, About tribute, About justice, About the administration of the country, Division of land according to the right of ownership, About clerics in general, About the Metropolitan or the Archbishop, About the Râmnic and Buzău Bishops, About monasteries and priests, About boyars, About relegates, About the servants or soldiers of the country, About merchants, About peasants, Gypsies, About ranks and titles, About the Divan, About the ruler's house, About the Lady's court, About the boyar's widows), (Bauer, 1778: 32-68; Carra, 2011: 133-162), Chapter IV. *ABOUT THE INCOME AND EXPENSES OF WALACHIA* (About finances in general, About old finances, About the way old

income was collected, New Finances, Different names of taxes and their administration, Tributes, mucarer and help, About guilds, About Monasteries, About Priests, The Foreigners, The Boyars, The Servants, Spring and Autumn Zaherea, Tax on sheep, Tax on agricultural products, Tax on the vines, Tax on cattle of the foreigners, Tax on tobacco, Salt mines, Customs, The Lady's income, The domain called Cășla Vizirului, The income of Cășla vizirului, The income of this feud, The conclusions of the chapter), (Bauer, 1778: 69-103; Carra, 2011: 163-188), Chapter V. *THE CENSUS OF THE TOWNN AND OTHER PLACES IN WALLACHIA* (Foreword, Slam Râmnic County, Buzău County, Secuieni County, Prahova County, Ialomița County, Ilfov County, Dâmbovița County, Argeș County, Brăila Vilayet, Giurgiu Vilayet, Turnu Vilayet, Romanai County, Vâlcea County). (Bauer, 1778: 104-228; Carra, 2011: 189-197; Teuceanu, 2010: 205-208). These chapters were preceded by an *Introduction* in which Bauer justified the necessity of his work and of drawing up maps in general, arguing that from his own experience he saw how inaccurate and wrong were the maps of the lands that had been the battle theatre during the Russian-Turkish conflict of 1768-1774. That is why he wanted to correct the mistakes of the geographers and showed that those who helped him with these maps and gathering the necessary data for the accompanying texts of these maps were his chief officers, the county governors of Wallachia, the imperial academy of Russia. For the historical part of Wallachia, Friedrich Wilhelm von Bauer showed that he had been helped by several people, but the decisive help was given by the log-in-law Mihail Cantacuzino, who worked at that time in drawing up a history of the Principality. At the end of this Introduction, the German traveler shows what his work would contain and shows that any mistake or confusion in the work was excused, especially in times of war.

“The utility of good maps which would facilitate the precise knowledge of the countries, it is very well known to be further demonstrated. I have learnt through personal experience how incomplete and full of mistakes the maps are and the knowledge that we have about these countries which served as a territory for the present war between Russia and the High Porte; as a result, I wrote this work, which I am presenting to the public, in which I tried to complete and improve what other geographers have overlooked or done incorrectly. My stay in these countries and the duties of my job helped me. For this purpose, I have had the chiefs of Defence make up maps that are as correct and precise as the war allowed them to be; and to prove their exactness, I have compared them with the clarifications given by the governors or rulers of each county; the help given by the imperial academy of science [...]. The sources for the state of the provinces that I am about to describe are the archives, on which I had several people look into, among which Prince Cantacuzino and his logothete or the chancellor of Wallachia, which were presented very detailed. This logothete combined deep knowledge of his language with the one of French language and especially with a lot of intelligence and talent. But, limited only to my intentions as a geographer, I have only gathered what was connected to the goal I have set in this work, without trying to pierce through the obscurity of the chronicles, of historical times and of the origins of these peoples [...]. If a mistake or confusion appeared in this work in spite the attention and care I used, I hope that it would be taken into consideration the fact that it was written in the middle of the war and interrupted by thousands of other duties related to the position I was invested at that time” (Bauer, 1778: 1-4; Carra, 2011: 109-111).

As far as the Romanians/Walachians were concerned (the inhabitants of Wallachia), Friedrich Wilhelm von Bauer, based on the collected evidence and

especially his own observations, stated that there was no doubt that they came from the Roman colony, which Emperor Traian had settled in this area of Europe after defeating the natives (Dacians) that the name of the Romanian and the language had been preserved in this space, although he had found himself as other peoples in the way of the barbarous invasions. Certainly Bauer, the Wallachian language has suffered some influences over time, and it was sprinkled with words of unknown origins, but its Latin character is still preserved. The Romanians/Wallachians were described by the German traveler as usually tall and well-built, strong and temperate, with rare diseases (even the plague, very widespread in the Ottoman Empire).

Wilhelm von Bauer, sadly observed that such a beautiful country, with such a fertile land under a lucky sky, was very poorly populated, although the land could, according to its estimations, feed five or six times as many inhabitants as had at that time. The German Traveler also pointed out the causes of the decrease of the population of Wallachia: the harsh/despotic rulers of the Turks, the various taxes the Phanariot ruler had in general put on a part of the inhabitants in order to pay the annual tribute to the Ottoman Empire and at the same time, to buy influential friends in Istanbul for the reign, the tyrannical way in which these victories were assembled, the abuses by the boyars, the wars the Ottoman Empire carried very often in this space, which obviously disturbed the peace and the unfolding of life under normal conditions. All these causes forced the Romanians to emigrate, to leave the territory of Wallachia, usually going to Transylvania.

The wars also destroyed towns and settlements in general, which were flourishing, and the Walachians found difficult to resume everything. The daily routine of Romanians was appreciated by Bauer as simple without being spoiled, obviously borrowing from the Oriental world, especially in terms of clothing, their diet was temperate, and based on simple meals, Romanians preferred vegetables and fruits.

The houses in which they lived, especially the ones of the great boyars, were also built and arranged according to the Turkish model, women being generally hidden from the eyes of the stranger. The German traveler appreciated that in Romania the vices and virtues intertwine. The Wallachians were very welcoming but at the same time kept to themelevs when meeting foreigners, and this hospitality was much appreciated especially because there were few inns in Wallachia, rarely hearing about murder, theft or other wrongdoing. Generally, the Wallachians were valiant and good warriors, they liked the wine and the hunting, and the latter helped them to become very good shooters. Of course von Bauer appreciated that all these qualities and virtues were found in the greatest number of inhabitants, sometimes missing from the great boyars who most often resembled the Turks and accused them of forging money, intrigue, scheming. The boyars were described in this context by the German traveler as tyrants, oppressing the weak, obviously the peasants, but among them there were people worthy of his esteem. Bauer showed that in Wallachia, legally, all Romanians/Wallachians were free, except gypsies, who were wanderers and had no homeland. The gypsies noted that the latter, the gypsies had their own language but knew Romanian, were Christians, but they were totally different from the other Romanians (Carra, 2011: 124-126; Gavrilă, 2004: 88).

We can not conclude this short paper without reminding another 18th-century

testimony of a Swiss traveler who spoke German on Romanians and his passage through Romanian space, it is that of Franz-Joseph Sulzer, but this testimony later published in the year 1781 in the form of a work specifically designed as a source of information for Romanians in Austria (*Geschichte des Transalpinischen Daciens – Istoria Daciei Transalpine*), represents a criticism and even an offense against the Romanians, the author having a rather subjective than objective position, due to personal repudiations and permanent discontent with the affairs conducted in the Romanian space. (*Călători străini*, 2000: 454-472, 473-475; Căzan, 2004: 143-145).

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THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY

*Defrim Gasbi**

Abstract

The article deals with the Monarchy of Austro-Hungary, split into two distinct units, which were ruled by a common emperor. It focuses on the Austro-Hungarian dualism as a system of multinational government, featuring two great nations, formed under the crown of the Austro-Hungarian kingdom as a monarchy between the Austrian Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom in 1867 and continued as such until 1918. The 19th century in the Balkans was dominated by the rise of nations and clashes of great interests and rivalries over the area. In many cases, the major European powers stood behind conflicts in this area, and in order to achieve their goals they not only encouraged disputes between the Balkan people and their Ottoman rulers, but also among Balkan states or nations themselves.

The Great Powers, by exploiting the ethno-nationalistic ideas of local elites in accordance with their geopolitical, religious and other motives and interests, supported their own satellites. Namely, Russia supported the creation of a greater Bulgaria and a greater Serbia, while England that of a greater Greece and France that of a greater Serbia.

The article concludes that the recognition of politics followed by Austria-Hungary at the time (almost similar to the policy followed by other Great Powers with a direct interest in the fate of Ottoman holdings) enables us to conclude that the attitudes and actions of “great” chancelleries of Europe were a prevailing factor in determining the fate of the Balkan peoples.

Key words: *The Habsburg Dynasty, Austro-Hungary Monarchy, Vienna Congress, Emperor Franz Joseph, Foreign policy Austro-Hungary*

Introduction

The Habsburg dynasty began to be called “Austria” by the mid 17th century. In 1703 Prince Eugene of Savoy introduced the term “monarchy” for Austria. *Through the law of Chancellor Rajbi, introduced on December 21, 1867, the representation of all states of monarchy, common affairs and the way of their treatment changed* (HHStA 1867: 20/12).

According to Jelavich, Austro-Hungary or the Double Monarchy, split into two distinct units, which were merged in the person of a common ruler who was the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary (Jelavich, Jelavich, 1986: 1804-1920), in an entity known as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Monarchy¹ or double state, KUK Monarchy (Königliche und Kaiserliche). The Austro-Hungarian dualism² as a system

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¹ Monarchy – The form of government, in which the highest authority is in the hands of the king or a monarch; A state that is ruled by a monarch. There are: absolute monarchies, constitutional monarchies, absolute (parliamentary) monarchies (Fjalor i shqipës së sotme, botimet Toena, Tirana, 2002, p. 802).

² Dualism is built and operates according to the principles and aims of dualism as a system of governance of multinational states (Fjalor i shqipës së sotme, botimet Toena, Tiranë, 2002, p. 270).

of multinational government, featuring two great nations, was formed under the crown of the Austro-Hungarian kingdom as a monarchy between the Austrian Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom in 1867 and continued as such until 1918.

This dualistic relationship between Austria and Hungary is considered a product of a compromise reached in the Habsburg parliament (1867), which was granted to divide the power, with Austria and its empire on one side, and Hungary and the executive branch on the other, thus benefiting both sides. This finding is best expressed by Deak, one of the key figures of the Hungarian politics of the time, who states that Austria with its existence is necessary “as much as our existence is for Austria” (Ramadani, 2012: 17).

“After the establishment of the Dual Monarchy in 1867 and the internal state consolidation, Balplatz was subjected to permanent pressure of military circles trying to guide the foreign policy toward a latent expansion into the Balkan Peninsula. The Austria-Hungarian Consul Benjamin Kalay, with the knowledge of Emperor Franz Joseph I, (ruled 1848-1916), offered the Serbian government a draft proposal for a treaty on an alliance directed against the Ottoman Empire” (Rizaj, 2011: 109).

The establishment of Austria-Hungary resulted from the deep crisis of Austria's absolutist feudalism and failures inside and outside of it, which forced it to accept the dualistic concept of state rule. With a border on the Leith River, the country was divided into the Austrian part (Upper and Lower Austria, Tirol with Vorarlberg, Steiermark, Korushka, Kranjska, Gorica, Gradiska and Bukovina) and the Hungarian part (Hungary with the annexation of seven cities and independent Croatia), Bosnia and Herzegovina (occupied in 1878 and annexed in 1908), all under the common rule of the Austro-Hungarian regime (Jugoslovenski Leksiografski Zavod, 1974: 60).

Jelevich claims that after being defeated by Prussia, the Habsburg Government was completely reorganized in the Ausgleich (compromise) of 1867. The Austrian empire would be divided into separate administrative and territorial parts, with equal statuses and organizational political units. There would be a common foreign policy and an army (Jelevich, Jelavich, 1986: 223). This Austro-Hungarian monarchist arrangement was an interesting and unique model within itself, as a character, as a direction, and as political and juridical governance.

In terms of foreign policy, Austria was forced to make concessions to Germany and Italy. Due to the defeat in the war with Prussia in 1866, Austria was forced to allow Bismarck to solve the problems of the Germans outside Germany according to his own plans, while also forced to give Venice to Italy. This defeat in foreign policy brought in early 1867 the agreement between the Court and the majority of the Hungarian Assembly, based on the dualist organization of the Monarchy, an agreement that remained in force until its destruction. The primary purpose Austro-Hungarian Agreement of 1867 was the successful establishment of its own domination in the Balkans (Rizaj, 2011: 111) the conquering of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would enable geo-strategic preconditions for Dalmatia. The essence of regulation, which, ever since 1868, was called Austro-Hungary, consisted of the common foreign policy and the military, while limited agreements were also foreseen on some basic issues of economy. In other areas, both one and the other part of the state were completely independent, having their own parliament and government. Most of the Hungarian Assembly (Deak, Andrash) favored dualism. (Enciklopedia e Jugosllavisë, 1984: 405).

“The Austro-Hungarian Dualist Monarchy, created as a multinational state, was one of the largest states of the time. The Dualist Monarchy came second, after Russia, with an area of 621,538 km². In terms of its population, it came third, after Russia and the Empire German. In a territory of 676 616 km², in 1910, there were 51,356,465 inhabitants” (Jugoslovenski Leksiografski Zavod, 1974: 60).

The Monarchy built the fourth largest industry of the time, following the United States, the German Empire and the United Kingdom (Schulze, 1996: 295). The data above imply that Austro-Hungary during 51 years of governance under the name of a monarchy, was very strong in economic and political terms and at certain times it was an international political factor in designing the political map of small states of the Balkans and beyond.

Through the constitutional law, Austria-Hungary established the highest court for Bohem, Dalmatia, Lower Austria, Salzburg, Steiermark, Crete, Bukovina, Mahren, Schlessien, Tyrol, Forarlberg, Gorz and Gradiska, Istria and the city of Trieste with its surroundings (HHStA, 1867: 468).

After lengthy reviews in the highest circles of the Monarchy, it was decided that the governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina be entrusted with the joint government. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy managed to win in the Berlin Congress the mandate to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and rule over it (Enciklopedia e Jugosllavisë, 1984: 408). The Polish region of Galicia, together with the approximately similar-sized Slovak and Croatian territories within Hungary, enjoyed a considerable autonomy status with unique governing structures. These autonomous divisions were legally set in such a way that they extended to the legal aspect of citizenship. For example, a citizen holding Hungarian citizenship and passport could not hold Austrian citizenship and passport at the same time (Monika, 2005: 1542). Galatia should remain a separate state unit under Polish power (Tejlor, 2001: 180, 405).

The defeat in the war of 1859 was for Austria the beginning of the constitutional crisis period. The conservative Aristocracy firmly opposed Austria's federal regulation on the basis of ethnic units. In support of the thesis on “historical and political individuals” in Hungary, the Assembly and parishes are called, the old administration is applied and the Hungarian becomes an official language; in Croatia, the assembly and parishes are also renewed. Croatia has its own representative in the Vienna government and the Croatian is used in administration in Croatia. The Serbian Vojvodina was seceded and given to the Hungarians, while Srem returned to Croatia. *Despite all these, the Croatian Parliament decided on August 5, 1861, with majority of votes, that Croatia not accept joint affairs with Austria* (Enciklopedia e Jugosllavisë, 1984: 405).

The Dualist Monarchy always maintained the separation of parliaments. All laws, even the compromise act of the creation of the Dualist Monarchy in 1867, was obliged to go to two separate parliaments. It was mandatory for these legal acts be published in the eight official languages respectively. From the monetary point of view, the two Kingdoms had a common currency, but from a fiscal point of view they were entirely independent entities (Flandreau, 2006: 10).

In spite of the Hungarian Kingdom unification, the state preserved the boundaries between the Habsburg-dominated territories intact. In 1867, Austria and Hungary reopened customs negotiations (a rule was established that included balance

agreements at the end of each decade) to calculate and split customs benefits between the two countries. Direct customs and duties increased the Finance Ministry's budget and made it possible to pay the employees, build large constructions, pay school contributions, and other expenses and needs of the state (HHStA, 1875:289). In Bach decade of absolutism, which was openly applied, with the patent of December 31, 1851, the regime in social terms varies significantly from the pre-March regime. The feudal system remained annulled, though the former feudalists received reparation, the customs border between Hungary and other countries (1850) was lifted and thus created a unique customs area for the entire Monarchy, accelerating the development of capitalism. Politically speaking, it was a regime of total absolutism, without a parliament and without councils, without elections, even on municipal councils, without freedom of press, rallies or unity. The administration and judiciary system become fully centralized and bureaucratic.

In fact, dualistic monarchy was formed at a time when peoples were becoming aware, in the national sense, to create independent and powerful states. Thus, since its founding and throughout its existence, this multinational monarchy politically encompassed eleven ethnic groups, distinct from one another. Vienna became the capital of Austria, while the Buda city the capital of Hungary. In 1873, Buda joined the neighbouring towns of Pesht and Obuda, and Budapest was formed as the new and common capital of Hungary (Kann, 1974).

Hungarian nationalism was resurrected in 1876 by Ausgleich (compensation) which created dualistic monarchy and granted great autonomy to Hungarian crown lands. The Hungarians no longer felt the need to cooperate with Croats or Serbs, because they could be jeopardized by a possible confrontation. Serbia, however, fell under great pressure from the north (Misha, 2007: 124).

The unitary Austrian empire (1804-1867) also ruled some territories of Northern Italy, between the states of the German Confederation (these territories were taken in 1859 from Prussia).

Along with multinational factors, an element that influenced the constitutional changes in the organization of the Dual Monarchy was due to the great Hungarian dissatisfaction from Vienna's dependence. Austria largely led the "Vienna Congress"¹ and created the "Vienna Concert"² Convention.

Hungary was suffering the dissatisfaction resulting from the Viennese repression, as well as the Russian support for a liberal Hungarian revolution (1848/49). However,

¹ The Vienna Congress (1814-15) was the International Conference on Peace that resolved the European issue after Napoleon's defeat. It continued to gather during the One Hundred Days of Napoleon's Return to France (March-June 1815). The main powers were Austria, represented by Metternich, Britain, represented by Castlereagh, Prussia, represented by Frederick Wilhelm III, and Russia, represented by Alexander I. Talleyrand represented France's Louis 18th. The congress gave its consent for inclusion in a new kingdom of the Low Lands (today Belgium). On the other hand, the Habsburgs regained all their possessions, including Lombardy, Venice, Tuscany, Parma and Tirol (*Enciklopedia e përgjithshme e Oksfordit*: Instituti i dialogut dhe komunikimit, Tirana, 2006, p. 649)

² The Vienna Congress was called "Vienna Concert" because of the important developments in science, art, culture and technology.

this was not the only source of problems. Under these circumstances, in the summer of 1859, Tsar Nicola I said he was willing to help Franz Joseph on behalf of the Holy Alliance (Misha, 2007: 55). Although in August of that year the Hungarian revolution was suppressed, the Hungarians were forced to accept dualism. In terms of foreign policy, Emperor Franz Joseph began to approach the Russian Emperor Tsar Nicola I.

By the end of 1850, a considerable number of Hungarians supported the Hungarian Liberal Revolution and were willing to accept the Habsburg Monarchy. They agreed on a unification known as the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713. This pragmatic agreement marked only the unification of foreign and defence policy.

Unification was indispensable, especially after the Austrian “break-up” in Königgrätz, the Austrian government concluded that it was necessary to join Hungary in order to regain the status of a Power. Austrian Foreign Minister Friedrich Fredinand von Beust and Hungarian aristocracy leader Ferenc Deak were involved in this process. The compromise negotiation was led by Austrian emperor Franz Joseph himself. The Hungarians sought and, in response, received the emperor Franz Joseph's crowning as King of Hungary, but with the condition of establishing separate parliaments to legislate for the territory of the Hungarian Kingdom. “*By means of the fundamental law the Reformation of the Reich was changed from February 26, 1861*” (HHStA 1867: 20/12).

Austria and Hungary each had their own constitutions and state bodies. Common were just the ruler, the army, the foreign affairs, and their funding (Jugoslovenski Leksiografski Zavod, 1974: 61).

The Finance Ministry in fact had unique responsibility only for the diplomatic service, the army and the joint fleet. All other financial areas were separately allocated to the entities. By 1867, the budget allocation was 70% for Austria and 30% for Hungary, negotiable every ten years. Periodic negotiations ended a year before the end of the Dual Monarchy, in 1917 (Kronenbitter, 2003: 150).

While the common army, at the request of the Hungarian government, changed the name to königlich-ungarisch (namely “imperial-royal”) only after 1889 Parliaments remained separate, just as the executive branch and prime ministers. Coordination between the two parliaments was under the authority of the Emperor (in theory), but, in fact, this authority had many limitations.

What was called Emperor's ruling part was solely linked to responsibilities of the army, the fleet, the foreign policy and the unified customs regime. Of course, this political system created in several cases overlapping and consequently often reduced the dynamics and the ruling efficiency of the Monarchy (Cohen, 2006: 53). Especially, the armed forces suffered the consequences of overlapping in many aspects of recruitment, the relevant legislation, the transfer of the army deployment, the civilian participants in the army, and so on. Also, a half-century coexistence produces a lot of debate among both sides on issues of tariffs, budgets, and finance (common treasury).

In the structure of the Dual Monarchy the legal system draws attention. In the Kingdom of Hungary, the justice system was separate from the executive one.

From the point of view of the local system, the Kingdom of Hungary was divided into communes, municipalities and districts. All these structures had two parts, the


legislative and administrative power, with enough self-government (Article of Encyclopedia Britannica, 1911).

The aristocratic class in this Dual Monarchy soon became quite rich and luxurious, especially benefiting from the development of trade and industry. Meanwhile, the urban middle and upper classes sought power, and would therefore support every revolutionary initiative for change in Europe. These strata were national-liberal, so they demanded independence and liberalism, not a centralized monarchist system, and more economic-commercial and fiscal initiatives. This impacted the Dualist Monarchy as well as Germany to have more liberal economic policies and practices. At the time, these strata were called bourgeois or “liberal leftists” and began to be represented in parliaments, both in Vienna and in Budapest.

These national-liberal forces were gradually supported by major industrialists, bankers, businessmen, and most of the press publishers of the time. However, the political struggle between the national-liberals and the conservative aristocrats undermined all the while the political life of the Dual Monarchy (Enciklopedia e Jugosllavisë, 1984: 406).

In foreign policy, Austro-Hungary was reoriented towards its expansion in the Balkans. Bismarck endorsed that policy and defended it with the 1879 agreement on the Austro-Hungarian coalition (Cohen, 2006: 53). Despite its half-century life, this monarchy broke down on October 31, 1918, after the end of World War One, when new, modern states were formed such as Austria, Hungary, SKS (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro) Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and some other regions of Italy, Poland and Ukraine.

Status



Constitutional Law on the Establishment of the Supreme Court

Valid for Bohemia, Dalmatia, Galicia, lower Austria and above Ens, Salcburg, Shtaiernmark, Kernten, Krain, Bukovina, Mähren, Schlesien, Tyrol with Forarlberg, Görz, and Gradiska, Istria and city of Trieste with its surroundings.

With the approval of both Chambers of the Imperial Council adopted the following constitutional law:

Article 1

The decision on conflicts of power and disputes over the public rights issues in the Imperial Council Chamber will be brought by a supreme court.

Article 2

The Supreme Court definitively decides on conflicts of jurisdiction:

a) between judicial authorities and the administration if a matter in special cases is resolved in a legal and administrative manner;

b) between state representatives and senior government authorities, if each has a claim to the right of deciding on and accessing administrative matters;

c) between the autonomous bodies of different countries in relation to their particular order and administrative matters.

Article 3

The Supreme Court definitively decides on:

a) the requirements of countries and kingdoms individually and in general, if such requests made by a municipality, corporate bodies or individual persons in one of the countries or kingdoms mentioned cannot be solved by regular legal means;

b) citizens' complaints on violation of their political rights when this right is legally established.

Article 4

On whether the decision of a case belongs to the Supreme Court, this is decided by the Supreme Court itself and its decisions conclude any other appeal or representation of the legal process.

If a decision is to be rejected by the Supreme Court before a judge or administrative representatives, this decision will no longer be postponed due to legal incompetence.

Article 5

The Supreme Court has its headquarters in Vienna and consists of the President and his representatives, who are appointed forever by the Emperor, then by 12 members and 4 deputies, proposed by the Imperial Council, and 6 members and 2 deputies proposed by the House of Representatives, then by 6 members and 2 deputies, these proposed by the upper chamber. The proposal will be made so that each country will be presented by 3 professionals.

Article 6

A separate law will lay down more detailed provisions on the organization of the High Court, on its process and on the implementation of its decisions and decrees.

From the House of Representatives, at 7 d.M. fully accepted with the third reading.

Vienna, December 7, 1867 (HHStA, 1867: 468).

Member of Parliament Dr Schleger though there is a need to define the expression "common pragmatic issues" that implied the signatures of Austrian law on December 21, 1867, and that of the Article 12 of the Hungarian law of 1867 (HHStA, 1867: 136).

Conclusion

The 19th century in the Balkans was dominated by the rise of nations and clashes of great interests and rivalries over the area. In this context of interdependence between the two factors, each had its own specificity, yet the main weight remained with the domestic Balkan factors. The European factor in the Balkans, including Austria-Hungary, has had undisputed interests especially against Ottoman holdings in the European part. In many cases, the major European powers stood behind conflicts

in this area, and in order to achieve their goals they not only encouraged disputes between the Balkan people and their Ottoman rulers, but also among Balkan states or nations themselves.

The situation of uncertainty that prevailed initially in Southeast Europe created the opportunity for intellectual elites of the Balkan peoples to process projects for a greater Greece, greater Serbia, greater Bulgaria, etc. The Great Powers, by exploiting the ethno-nationalistic ideas of local elites in accordance with their geopolitical, religious and other motives and interests, supported their own satellites. Namely, Russia supported the creation of a greater Bulgaria and a greater Serbia, while England that of a greater Greece and France that of a greater Serbia.

In the second half of the 19th century alongside other Great European Powers stood the double-crowned monarchy of Austria-Hungary. The recognition of politics followed by Austria-Hungary at the time (almost similar to the policy followed by other Great Powers with a direct interest in the fate of Ottoman holdings) enables us to conclude that the attitudes and actions of “great” chancelleries of Europe were a prevailing factor in determining the fate of the Balkan peoples. Not all the Great Powers expressed the same interest in the Balkans during the second half of the 19th century. Directly interested to devour as much from the Ottoman dominions and to ensure the most favorable position against rival powers were Russia, Austria-Hungary and later Italy.

The rivalry between the great powers was noticed in the field but was mostly present in international diplomatic forums, conferences and conventions. So great was the role of these international forums that often their main documents would decide on the independence of new Balkan states, which in many cases were more likely to lie within boundaries presenting the interests of one or another of Great Powers, including their political, economic and military aspirations, than the interests of the people who shared those demarcation lines.

The Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans was antagonistic from its onset to the Russian one, and later would face the rivalry of Italian politics in the Adriatic. The great influence of historical processes taking place inside multiethnic empires such as the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian Empire itself also determined the foreign policy of the latter. The emergency of ethnic groups that developed their national awareness showed that supranational empires were being mined from within.

Austria-Hungary had an ambivalent attitude in its foreign policy towards the Balkans during the second half of the 19th century, which often depended on the attitudes of the other Great Powers. Even the first serious project of the Great Powers for the division of Southeast Europe, the 1807 Tilsit project that affirmed Austria's ownership over Bosnia and Serbia, alerted Vienna that it would have to accomplish its objectives in the area not only through rivalry but also in alliance with other Great Powers of the time. While Vienna's objectives for the Balkans, such as the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the support for the new states to be created and the open passage to Thessaloniki to enable an access to the Mediterranean Sea were clearly defined, their implementation was hardly clear. Austria-Hungary attempted for a while to maintain the status quo in the Balkans and act when it could to intervene actively in solving the Eastern Question. This was also due the fact that

Austria-Hungary in the second half of the 19th century was unable to prevent the flow of events in the Balkans, and therefore saw it fit to cooperate with other Great Powers to achieve its own goals. It even entered negotiations for cooperation with the Balkan countries and peoples.

In the early 1850's, Austria was found in a position that is nicely summed up by its Secretary of Interior, Count Buol, "We are trying to reconcile all parties, and above all, to avoid a European complication which would be particularly harmful for us". The Austro-Hungarian stance after the Crimean war was a conservative one, as it almost required acknowledging a pre-war state. The aftermath of Crimea showed that Vienna had given up on the position of neutrality when considering its stance towards the Russian policy in the Balkans. Furthermore, the aftermath of Crimea showed that Austria-Hungary, which had entered the race between the Great Powers, was not likely to emerge victorious.

The defeat from Prussia in 1866 obliged Austria-Hungary to revise its foreign policy, and give up on its Western interests, especially in Germany. Ballplatz remained under constant pressure from military circles to channel the foreign policy towards expanding in the Balkan Peninsula. This orientation of Vienna's foreign policy aroused reactions not only among its direct rivals in the Balkans, such as Russia and Italy, but also among nationalist circles of the Balkan countries intending to expand at the expense of their neighbors' territories. Such was the case of Serbia, which among others aimed to expand over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite these Serbian goals, the Viennese diplomacy did not rule out cooperating with Serbia, but the circumstances brought about by the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 impacted the demise of the Austro-Serbian political combinations.

In the 1870's Germany joined the ranks of the Great Powers and as a powerful Empire dictated its will over the international events. The most immediate intentions of Germany were to distort the global hegemony held by England and France. Surely, the Viennese diplomacy did not delay in signing a treaty with Germany, thinking it would help the separation of spheres of interest over the Eastern Question. Furthermore, in 1873 the two Great Powers of Central Europe signed the Alliance of the Three Emperors with Russia. On the other hand, Vienna continued bilateral talks with Petersburg for the signing of joint agreements or treaties, both overt and covert, aiming to divide the Balkans into two zones of influence. Both powers, now with the consent of Germany, agreed not to intervene militarily for or against the Ottoman Empire.

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POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF REVOLUTION LEADERS AND MASSES IN RUSSIAN PROVINCE

*Elena Viktorovna Simonova**

Abstract

The article is dedicated to a complicated question concerned the role of party leaders in revolution propaganda in Russian provinces in 1917. The author observes different kinds of political mind during the revolution and activity of different groups of people in revolution events. The main role in arranging and strengthening the local revolutionary organizations played the party leaders of the central party organizations who visited provinces for a special purpose or transiently during the transit under the police supervision. But sometimes it was hard for them to rule the masses because of their political unconsciousness.

Key words: *revolution 1917, province, masses, party leaders, Russia*

Introduction

Nowadays there exists a great interest for researching the behavior of a provincial human in the conditions of the social cataclysms. The ordinary summarizing the objective reasons (hard working conditions, low level of salary and of the whole life) doesn't let us to imagine the full historical reality. According to M. Bloch, "history wants to see people" (Bloch, 1949: 18). Now many researchers try to wide their activity by this direction. Many studies are dedicated to the psychology of the individuals as of the different social groups in 1905 and 1917 revolutions. However, there exist the need to continue researching the behavioral stereotypes of the masses and political leaders in the conditions of the social transformations. This study is dedicated to the revolutionists in province, their psychological portraits and their role in the revolutions in the whole Russian Empire.

Methodology

Researching the revolution process on the local level is still relevant for contemporary Russia because the problems of social psychology, people's treatment to the power, their orientation to cooperation or confrontation, the reasons of choosing the strategy of behavior are relevant in the contemporary Russian society as the country is developing on the way of forming the civil society and increasing the people's political culture (Hasanov, 2017).

The contemporary researches testify that the scientists are more and more interested in the history of revolution as a whole and of manifestations of the process on the local level. However, researching this problem is quite difficult because of finding out the main factors among the variety of different political events' reasons

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and determination of the correlation of objective and subjective reasons. All these facts cause the big massive of the literature concerned these problems and the variety of researched aspects of the revolutionary process determined by the historians. Nowadays the researches pay a lot of attention to analyzing the macro processes (the 1st World War's influence on the increasing of revolutionary attitude of wide groups of people, their mental transformations, forms and ways of politization) and to analyzing the activity of central party and state authority, prosopography of the political leaders. Also the historians research the subjective factors of the revolutionary process. The main of them is the organizing activity of the political parties and their leaders, the political culture of the different groups of population, the influence of the mass performances on the tactics of political parties, determination the reasons of different socialistic parties' fail (mostly, the Mensheviks who were the most realistic course of Russian revolutionary democracy). For the many years the special tendency appeared in the historiography – the multi-party system in the Russian province has not been researched well enough. However, it is possible to explain the variety of political behavior of the participants of the revolutionary process only using the regional studies in the comparative aspect. As the historian Donald J. Raleigh said that it is time to refuse the point of view that Russian province was passive and secondary in the revolutionary process. It is important to enlighten the revolutionary events researching the role of social lower masses in Russian province (Raleigh, 1986).

The contemporary regional studies concern different aspects of history of revolution (the influence of WWI on regions' development, political culture and behavior of different social strata and military forces, revolutionary everyday life, the activity of the local authorities and self-government, political and social organizations), however these studies are uncoordinated and embarrass to make up the comparative analyses. For example, there exist the studies concerning all these problems but only in one region. Thus in 2000th the studies on the problems of revolution appeared based on the material from Volga region (Shestopalova, 2011; Rumjancev, 2006; Slepchenkova, 2010; Mistrjugov, 2015; Jakimov, 2008; Khvostova, 2006; Dindarov, 2002; Krasovskaya, 2002; Olneva, 2005; Lapshin, 2001; Kuznetsov, 2010) “chernozem” (black earth) regions (Oskin, 2003; Polosina, 2010; Kutsevolov, 2007; Luzikov, 2016; Kolchinsky, 2005; Gnusarev, 2015; Nikolashin, 2010; Alekhina, 2005; Karmanov, 2002), Siberia (Vasil'eva, 2011; Eremin, 2006) Dagestan (Idrisov, 2007), Taurida Governorate (Potemkin, 2005), Vladimir, Kaluga, and Ryazan' Governorates (Zhuruhin, 2010; Shherbakova, 2009; Akimova, 2007), Vladimir, Moscow, Smolensk, and Tula Governorates (Klimova, 2003), Ural (Kostogryzov, 2013; Abramovsky, 2004; Skipina, 2003; Kuchak, 2002), Transbaikalia (Mikheev, 2012).

Despite the fact that there are a lot of regional researches of the revolutionary period as the manifestation of the system crisis, the methodological researches that help to analyze the source in the special way are unique and inter-disciplinary.

The main approach of the research is social anthropology and “new social history”. The main purpose of the study is to find out psychological attitudes, views and models of behavior of the most active people in revolution (workers and peasants) and party leaders. The study is limited by Tula governorate. This limit lets us

use local approach and microanalysis to study the motivation and forms of political activity in province. Tula governorate was a typical governorate of central Russia that had the features of both Industrial and Agricultural regions. The center of governorate Tula was a big industrial city with the huge concentration of workers and in uyezds the population was occupied in agriculture. The study is based on the papers found in Tula State archives' funds (P-37 – Odojev uyezd's Berezov ispolkom (executive committee), P-97 – Tula soldiers' deputies' council (1917-1918), F.1300 – Tula governorate gendarme administration, P-1861 – Collection of Emergency Committee (VChKa) papers (1917-1928) and so on). All the papers that we are able to find in Tula archives give us the information about some features in urban and rural population's behavior during the revolutions and let to research the direct relationships of the individual character and mass political mind and the crowd psychology.

Nowadays the researchers pay a lot of attention to subjective factors of revolution process (organizing activity of political parties and leaders, political culture of different groups of people, reasons of fails and victories of political parties) (Brovkin, 1987; Anatomija revoljucii, 1994; Vlast' i opozicija, 1995; Smith, 2001; Figes, Kolonitskii, 1999; Buldakov, 1997). But it is impossible to explain different types of political activity in revolutionary process without local and regional researches in comparison.

Results

Socialists' portraits

In the researches it is customary to begin studying of the reasons of revolution 1905 with the heavy life conditions, sharpening of the contradictions between the wealthy and the poor people. In Tula region towns were the centers of the revolution, but there didn't exist any worsening of inhabitants' life (mill-hands and railway laborers and unskilled workers). Moreover, some of the parameters (for example, the demographic indices) even improved (the mortality rate slightly reduced) because of the wide-ranging activity of urban and zemstvo doctors. The urban self-government also helped to calm down the situation. The reports of the Tula town council testify that the "city chairmen": wealthy businessmen, factories' owners were bent on arranging the good relationships with the workers and making up the mechanism of peaceful solutions to the conflicts. The scope of charity was being increased. At the same time these measures were incapable to solve the economic problems quickly as they had been accumulated for many years. The little decrease of the situation (closing up a factory and the reduction of the laborers that led to the worsening of life conditions) brought to the social tenseness and the splash of economic activity: the demands to give the job, to bring down the fines.

Against the background of the economic problems the activity of the first revolutionary organizations began to expand. In Tula Governorate the first revolutionary organizations appeared in the late 1800s – the beginning of 20th century. What was the social structure of these organizations? Tula social-democratic organization until 1917 consisted of burgesses (21%), peasants turned to workers (21%), intelligentsia (doctors, engineers, white-collar workers – 15%), laborers (11,7%). It is significant that in socialists-revolutionists' organization the biggest

percent was for white-collar workers (about 30%), students (20%), schoolboys (13 %), burgesses (15 %). The quantity of peasants was only 3,2%, and it were mostly the peasants turned to be laborers and craftsmen, that means, these peasants were separated from the village. (GATO. (Tula Region State Archive) F. P-1300.op 3. d.1658. d.1659). According to the Tula Gendarme department on the eve of 1917 there existed 460 socialists-revolutionists and 563 social-democrats in Tula Governorate.

In general, the educational level of the socialists was low (the illiterate and the semiliterate people constitutes near 50%) (GATO F.P-1300. op.3. d.1658. d.1659). The active members of the organizations (people who were known by gendarmes) were people separated from the place of their birth, permanently migrating around the Governorate and the whole Russian empire. Among the socialists-revolutionists the indigenous urban citizens consisted 58% before 1917 (32% lived in Tula), after 1917 – 31%, among socialists-democrats: 41% (40% in Tula) of indigenous citizens and 61% (58% in Tula) after the revolution. Analyzing this data, we can say that revolutionists in little towns of the governorate (but not in the industrial center) were newcomers. Also all the revolutionists were concentrated in towns: of 119 socialists-revolutionists who we know from the papers only 15 lived in the villages. Of 287 people who were registered by gendarmes in 1917, 92 were migrating from village to village; others lived in the city that they had reached from other villages or cities. Among socialists-democrats (303 before 1917) only 17 lived in the village, in 1917 of 248 only 16.

Activity in cities and villages

In the provinces (in uyezds) there were not enough party organizations. For example, in Tula Governorate in 1905-1906 there acted only 3 social-revolutionists' organizations in Venev, Belev and Novosil, but they were not numerous and didn't influence the life of cities and uyezds a lot. By personal recollections and evidences of Tula social-revolutionists presented in 1920s, by February 1920 in uyezds there had been acted about 120 their organizations, and by October even 230 (GATO. F. P-1861. Op.1. D.9.). However, this information seems to be exaggerated because of the conditions when the evidences appeared and not very accurate party statistics. As a rule, the social-revolutionists' organizations worked in uyezds' cities, not in volosts.

The Mensheviks' organizations by the February, 1917 hadn't existed in the uyezds at all. The Bolsheviks had their groups in Bogoroditsk, Efremov and Dedilov in the period of the first Russian revolution. However later they disappeared and only in 1917 the Bolsheviks stirred to activity among the uyezds' peasantry. As for the gorcom's (city committee) decisions there were appointed the agitators who weekly on Sundays visited the uyezds for arranging mass-meetings and assemblies (Oktjabr' v Tule, 1957: 38).

The political activity of the socialists came to accidental or sometimes special visits to villages to organize a meeting of any party organization. In social-revolutionists' memorandum there existed the rule of obligatory membership fee, but it was not common in the real life. Attending the meetings was enough for the membership.

The expansion of the Bolsheviks party to the village began only after the establishment of the Soviet regime. The main evidence of it is the chronicle of the Bolshevik organizations' creation. Most of them in volosts and villages were created in

January – March, 1918 (Tak zakrepljalis' zavoevanija Oktjabrja, 1960: 239; Proletarskaja Pravda, 1918: 3-4; ZNITO (Center of newest history of Tula region) F.1. op.1. d.4.1.1; d.47. l.11-12). The interrelationships between Governorate committees of social-revolutionists, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks and uyezds' committees were irregular and resumed as appropriate.

In the governorate center where the political activity was higher by October, 1917 there were 2330 Mensheviks, 537 Bolsheviks, 450 social-revolutionists of the city population of 200 000 people. Despite their paucity they played the main role in Tula Soviet, in Governorate commissar of Russian Provisional Government' administration and in Tula City Duma from summer, 1917.

In the 2nd half of 1917 the growth of urban and governorate organizations became slower. In July, 1918 in the 2nd delegates' meeting of Tula Mensheviks the reporters marked the complex image of laborers' organizations' failure. Also they noticed the indifference of the wide masses to the party life: "Many members of organization didn't attend the meetings, were not interested in libraries and so on" (GATO F. P-1861. Op.1. D.9. L.55.). The tendency for damaging the socialist parties continued in 1918. This process was caused by inner factors connected with the tactics of parties and external factors connected with the Bolsheviks' pressure on the opponents.

It is complicated to observe the dynamics of socialists' organizations' development because of the state of the source base. Its distinctive feature is that in the papers of Tula Regional State Archive (GATO) there is not any information about the quantitative staff of the socialistic organization because from December, 1917 to July, 1918 the process of Bolsheviks' system of control on the political opponents had been only establishing (Kosinov, 2013; Urzha, 2016). It is possible to characterize the staff of volost', uyezd and urban Mensheviks and right and left socialists-revolutionists in December, 1917 – July 1918 only using the information of questionnaires and reports of volost', uyezd and governorate Soviets of Peasants' and Laborers' Deputies. However, the first questionnaires contained the information about the socialists' representing in the structures of new authority were filled by the deputies of volost' and uyezd Soviets only in May-July, 1918. Tula Unit of People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) collected more detailed information about the Mensheviks and right and left socialists-revolutionists in 1920-1930. That is why in last papers they wrote only the main stages of social organizations' activity: from foundation to February revolution, from February to October, 1917, brief information about the establishing of Soviet power and the socialists' attitude to it, and the state of the socialists' organization in 1922-1923. These papers were collected in order to chase the former political opponents and consist of many corrections. That is the reason why they give us the characteristics of socialists' activity with many mistakes.

After the establishing the Soviet authority in Tula the position of the socialistic organization changed. After the split of Socialists Revolutionists Party in autumn, 1917 its left wing became more popular, its representation rose not only in factories, but also in the local government. The quantity of left socialists revolutionists in Tula was 2000 people in Tula. But if the left wing had the status of the ruling party, right socialists revolutionists was losing their political position during 1918. In December their urban organization consisted of about 600 people (GATO F. P-1861. Op.1. D.9.

L.58.). After the Soviet power's establishing its quantity decreased. In January, 1918 in uyezds the mass arrests began, many members of the party went underground.

From May, 1918 the leaders of the socialistic organizations in Tula uyezd and urban government was heavily shortened. The main staff of Tula Governorate Executive Committee in July, 1918 consisted of mainly communists and left socialists revolutionists. The establishing of the Bolsheviks authority in Tula helped to consolidate their party and to force their fight against the socialists opposition. In spite of the fact that in spring, 1918 the Mensheviks and right socialists-revolutionists were quite popular among Tula population, but they were not represented in the authority. June-July 1918 was important for the political fortune of the socialistic parties of Tula governorate: the process of their forcible destruction and disintegration. Also in Tula the national socialistic groups acted: the Lettish (34 members of 1200 refugees in Tula), Polish-Lithuanian (50 members of 3000 people).

The main role in arranging and strengthening the local revolutionary organizations played the party leaders of the central party organizations who visited provinces for a special purpose or transiently during the transit under the police supervision. As the party organizations were being stronger during the revolution, the party leaders were paying more attention to the provincial organizations. The professional revolutionists were to unite the political powers from heterogeneous separated social elements keen on the political fight. According to the biography of the social organizations' leaders we can find a lot of common features. In 1917 all of them were young, had relatively high level of education, were newcomers in Tula, took active part in the political life of the city and the governorate in 1917-1918, then moved to Moscow, many of them ended their life in Gulag. When they came to Tula they were already been the professional revolutionists. For example, I.I.Akhmatov (the leader of Tula Mensheviks-internationalists) took active part in illegal work in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Shuya, was in emigration. P.F.Arsentiev (other Mensheviks' leader) had worked for party in Petrograd, Samara, Kaluga before coming to Tula, had been arrested 4 times, had spent 2 years in prison, had been sentenced to 4 years of deportation to Irkutsk governorate. The leader of Tula Bolsheviks G.N. was commanded to Tula by the Moscow committee of The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) in March, 1917 and at once he became in charge of the city Bolshevik committee. This small group of party activists of different political powers played the main role in the political life of the governorate in 1917-1918. Analyzing the lists of social-democrats and social-revolutionists made by Tula gendarmes and checked by NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) shows us that the quantity of the professional revolutionists who determined the specter of the political life was 4% by social-democrats and 3,9% by social-revolutionists (GATO F. P-1300. Op.3. D.1658. D.1659.). Witnesses said in 1920s: "The February revolution drove all the intelligentsia to the villages for working among the peasants where they took nearly all the charge and began to organize their party units".

The political "natural selection" caused the appearing in party a special kind of leadership. The leaders had to have the certain complex of moral traits, stereotypes of behavior, the "revolution" character. The most purposeful stern and rough leaders turned to be Bolsheviks. Old Bolsheviks of Uzlovaya station characterized their 32-years

old leader I.I. Ruzinsky who had taken part in revolution 1905 in Tula and had been in underground organization and army in such a way: “resolute man”, “he feels the fierce hatred against the enemies of revolution”, “he wouldn’t have mercy for his brother, if he turned out to be the enemy”. The development of the political events and the actions of Mensheviks and social-revolutionists (mostly the right-wing) says that there were not such leaders among them. In Uzlovaya station in May, 1918 the Mensheviks organization of 62 members acted. It submitted to the demand of 6 people from revolution Bolshevik committee to stop working. The whole Uzlovaya Bolshevik organization consisted of 9 people at that moment. The labour movement for re-voting of Tula Soviet (the recall of Bolsheviks delegates and the voting Mensheviks and social-revolutionists in place of them) was stopped even by the Mensheviks themselves as they did not want the bloodshed and preferred the “democratic” forms of fighting against the Bolsheviks.

The process of party establishment developed in 1917 was disturbed by the beginning of new organizations’ differentiation. Among social-revolutionists and Mensheviks the new trends appeared. Sometimes the names of these trends differed from the central tendencies. For example, in Novosil organization not only the social-revolutionists divided into right- and left-wing, but also the right-wing group divided into “liberal and social trends”. Mensheviks and social-revolutionists from Belev divided into fractions became independent from each other and united only for special purposes (for example, for the election to the City Duma).

Discussion

Political behavior of masses

At the same time the main common concerns were the food supply, imposing the 8-hours working day, the guarantee of economic rights. The growth of trade unions that had to stand for the labourers’ interests was much bigger than the growth of party units in Tula either in Tula governorate. To the middle of July in Tula there were 16 trade-unions with more than 26 000 members (Znamja truda, 1917: 2; Velikaja Oktjabr'skaja socialisticheseskaja revoljucija, 1959: 540). In meetings the workers supported party leaders that could properly capture their mood. That is why the fight between Bolsheviks and united Mensheviks and social-revolutionists was with varying degrees of success. For example, in summer of 1917 Bolsheviks often succeed the meeting to accept the resolution of disbelief to the Russian Provisional Government and Tula “conciliatory” Soviet. At the same time Tula Bolsheviks A. Kaul and S. Paradis recollected the cases when the Bolsheviks were forbidden to say speeches at meetings, pulled off from the tribunes and beaten (Jeto bylo v 1917..., 1957: 28, 116). In July, 1917 in Menshevik City committee meeting the mass’ indifference to the party’s life was marked.

The laborers of the biggest plants (Weapon and Cartridge) and railway workshops were in the field of view of the political activists, but it was impossible to cover plenty of other workers. Most of the workers didn’t make a distinction between political attitudes and thought at the level of mottos and meeting speeches. A worker of Weapons plant V.S. Murzik who later joined the Bolsheviks recalled: “In the Weapons plant there was a meeting concerning the Moscow assembly. Mensheviks and

social-revolutionists spoke at the meeting exhorted the workers to support the assembly. But I decided to oppose. Taking the floor I told workers the truth I've heard before from comrade Kaminisky”.

In the condition of economic and political crises in Tula the strike movement of workers began, and in the villages the riots of manors became oftener. In this atmosphere the socialist organizations tried to solve their own problems. The most successful of them were Bolsheviks. The worse was the situation in Russia, Tula or Tula governorate, the more successful was the agitation to pass the power to the Soviets (Proletarskaja pravda, 1917: 4; Oktjabr' v Tule: 226; GATO. F. P-174. Op.3. D.40789. L.141.). Bolsheviks' populist agitation led more and more allies who didn't know the party program but accepted the critic of the government.

The political inconsistency of Tula workers caused that the strike was perceived as the only form of every conflict solution and as a form of the contact with the administration. For example, after agreeing the economic demands of workers from the perfume factory “Floreal” the new strike began caused by the fact that one working woman was hired and the administration didn't let her to return because of her conflict with the soap-boiler and the chemist (Golos naroda, 1917: 3).

As a rule, the political consciousness of the peasantry was bordered by “the village, fields, church, neighbor manors and rural community” (Figs, 1994: 230). Most of the peasants had lack of information about the events happened outside the boundaries of their settlements. In March-April, 1917 there were the elections to the civic executive committees of Tula governorate. Merchants, countermen, teachers, landowners, doctors, soldiers and workers were elected, but the peasants among them were very rear. For example, of 46 people from Alexin uyezd executive committee 1 man was a delegate of the town council, 2 were the delegates of zemstvo, 1 was a burgess, 2 were workers of Myshegsky plant, 2 were the soldiers-engineers, 1 was a delegate of a cooperative, 10 people of uyezds, 19 were the delegates of volosts committee (every volosts had one delegate). Belev uyezd executive committee consisted of 26 people: 4 people from zemstvo, 2 townsmen, 2 delegates of the united cooperates, 1 salesman, 3 burgesses, 3 railway workers, 2 officers, 2 soldiers of local garrison, 2 convalescent soldiers, 2 teachers, 1 clergyman, 1 member of Jewish community, 1 man of Belev consumer society.

The teachers took important part in the rural political processes. Their authority among the peasants was high. In resolution of Aleksin executive committee that determined the content of volosts committees was marked that the teacher is elected without quantity limits under the discretion of volosts assemblies. All the teachers from Belev uyezd were called for the special assemblies (Golos naroda, 1917: 2). The worldview of rural teachers was formed under the influence of social-revolutionist party who were the ideological successors of the Narodniks (Anatomija revoljucii: 225). With the help of the teacher Tula peasantry learned about the agrarian program of social-revolutionists earlier than the other parties' programs.

The main forms of working among peasants of social-revolutionists and Bolsheviks were visits to the villages, arranging the meetings, village and rural communities' assemblies. The success of such a visit depended on mottos and theses of agitators. There are examples of successful agitation both of social-revolutionists

and Bolsheviks. The instructor of Moscow provincial bureau of Soviets Shevtsov described the mood of peasants in the report about his trip to Venev uyezd of Tula governorate in April, 12, 1917: “Among the peasants it is joyfully and productively to work, a special plan for organizing them isn’t necessary. In many cases the peasants are not contented with their volosts committees that mainly consist of the wealthy peasants (kulaks), rural committees don’t even exist... As a result, the peasants sit on a powder keg and are only waiting for signal for pogroms” (GATO. F.1527. Op.1. D.654.). In March-June 1917 in Tula region 480 mass actions for the decrease of rent price, 330 cattle pasture and damage on the landlords’ manors, 94 land, hays and fallow lands grabs, 20 manor grabs, 78 illegal fellings and 34 land grabs happened. In June July the peasants began to confiscate the landlords’ manors (GATO. F. P-97. Op.1. D.40. L.25.). In September the newspapers informed about the peasant disturbances in Bogoroditsk, Venev, Krapivna uyezds, peasants’ attack to the landlords’ gardens and illegal fellings in Epifan uyezd, land grabs in Odoev and Venev uyezds. Epifan uyezd commissar Uzbekov reported the illegal felling was made by the whole settlements.

Numerous demands and resolutions testify that nearly all the peasants didn’t understand political contradictions in the center and parties’ programs. The choice of a party to vote in the Russian Constituent Assembly election depended on an agitator’s visit. For example, the assembly of Berezov volost peasants decided to vote for the Bolsheviks’ list after the Bolsheviks delivered a lecture about the Constituent Assembly at the meeting (GATO. F. P-37. Op.1. D.9. L.4.). Krapivna commissar reported that the election to the uyezd zemstvo on October, 22 was disrupted because the soldiers came back from front “incited the voters basing on the fact that some people were not recorded to the voting list. Since October, 15 the pogroms and arsons of few landlords’ manors began at once” (Tul’skaja molva, 1917: 3). Some peasants said that they were forced to rob by different individuals who assured them that the only way to chase the masters away is the robbery and burning their houses to the ground”. Uyezd commissars thought that the reasons of the pogrom movement in villages were “the examples of pogroms in other Russian regions”, newspapers’ distribution, “instigation of soldiers, sailors came back from war”, villages’ tiredness of waiting the “rational authority”, peasants’ irritability of many different committees activity and plenty of resolutions impossible to put into practice; growing distrust of peasants to the existing power and doubts if the Constituent Assembly was to appear and could to change anything. The reports concluded that “in this atmosphere enmity and anger became apparent” (GATO. F. P-246 103. Op.1. D.74. L.28-29).

Conclusions

Consequently, the pogrom movement developed in summer-autumn 1917 was determined by the peasants’ own ideas about their problems. The socialists’ agitation caused the demonstrations of the accumulated discontent and indignation of peasants.

All the socialist organizations connected the solution of the problems with the problem of government. The socialists of all trends tried to use the complicated social atmosphere in their own purposes. The political illegibility of workers and peasants made them to support people who were explaining clearer and described nearest future more attractive. Because of “the connections” with the Russian Provisional

Government the authority of the Mensheviks and social-revolutionists decreased steadily, on the contrary the Bolsheviks became more popular. As Mensheviks leader Yu.Martov mentioned: “the masses were not inclined to support us and prefer to turn from “national defenders” to their antipodes Bolsheviks who are plainer and bolder, in fact they are more acceptable for wide uncultured masses because of their democratic image” (Abrosimova: 187).

Thus the peasants and workers were guided only by their long-term or situational needs. The peasantry didn't become separated from their farms and stayed indifferent to the fights of political parties. It began to fight only when it was necessary for their urgent interests. The workers of Tula plants and factories were more active, but were guided by the same principles and their participation depended on the political organizations' activity. Nevertheless, the socialists believed themselves to be the delegates of the whole people of Russia and try to speak for all of them.

It became fashionable to participate in the political life, public organizations and parties. In socialistic organizations the nucleus of professional revolutionists was forming and later there the leaders with the special features necessary for working in provinces and solving the problems in center appeared. Party establishment in provinces developed simultaneously with the economic fight of masses and often was put from above and joined with the masses during this fight.

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ROMANIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN LEBEDIN COUNTY OF KHARKIV PROVINCE DURING WORLD WAR I

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Abstract

The events of World War I are rather well-studied, but still there are a lot questions and problems requiring consideration. One of them is the stay of war prisoners on some territories of Russian Empire, and in Ukrainian provinces in particular. The status of prisoners of war of some nationalities is not studied.

The authors, using documents of zemstvo self-government, stored in the State Archives of Sumy Region, analyze the problem of the labour usage of prisoners of war in various sectors of the economy and in public works. The labour usage of Romanian prisoners of war, conditions of their detention and supervision on the territory of Lebedin County of Kharkiv Province in 1915-1917 are considered. The management system and sanitary state of the camps, as well as the legal status and life of captives are analyzed. It is concluded that the labour of prisoners of war was an important economic factor in the situation of labour resources shortage in wartime and was widely used in various sectors of the national economy.

Key words: *Romania during World War I, Romanian Prisoners of War, Romania-Russia relations, Russian Empire, Lebedin County*

The beginning of the 20th century on the European continent was marked by tragic events. The aggravation of geopolitical contradictions between Germany, Austria-Hungary on one hand and Great Britain, France and Russia on the other resulted in the first in the history of World War I, which took place from 1914 to 1918.

The events of World War I are rather well-studied, but still there are a lot questions and problems requiring research. One of them is the stay of war prisoners on some territories of the Russian Empire.

The historiography of the problem goes back to 1920s. The first publications contained information about the number of war prisoners (Anikst, 1918: 12-14; Russia, 1925: 21). The first to describe the stay of foreign war prisoners on the territory of Russia in his work "Russian War Prisoners in the World War of 1914-1918" was N. Zhdanov, the former chairman of Moscow Department of Russian Society of Red Cross, an employee of Central Board for Captives and Refugees of Council of People's Commissars of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Zhdanov, 1920:

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279-299). The chapter “The status of German and Austrian captives in Russia in pre-revolution period” considered the norms of international law as to the maintenance of war prisoners and usage of their labour, and problems of their registration in Russia. He analyzed the peculiarities of prisoners’ of war life on Russian territory, described the camps system and the life there. The author noted that “the real state of German and Austrian war prisoners in camps and at work in Russia varied greatly depending on climatic, geographical, cultural, ethnographical life conditions of some areas of European Russia and Siberia, where war prisoners were settled. While settling the war prisoners, the characteristic of tribal origin was taken into consideration. The war prisoners of German and Hungarian origin were sent to the remote and wild parts of Russia. Germans were sent to Irkutsk District and Amur River Region, Hungarians were mostly sent to Turkestan. Austrians of German origin were mostly sent to Siberia, but Austrians of Slavonic origin – to central provinces of Russia” (Zhdanov, 1920: 286).

I. Schneider’s article “Revolutionary Movement among Prisoners of War in Russia during 1915-1919” contains rich facts as to the life and work conditions of foreign war prisoners in Russia in different branches of industry and agriculture (Schneider, 1935).

The living conditions of war prisoners were partially touched upon in the article of the former war prisoners F. Valkhar and L. Forst (Valkhar, 1936).

The analysis of the internationalist movement has been the main direction since the middle of 1950s. Collections of documents as to internationalist movement among war prisoners in general and some nationalities in particular were published (Under the flag, 1970; Klevanskiy, 1965, 1967; Muratov, 1969; Zharov, 1960; Hungarian, 1968; Golub, 1958; Participation, 1967; Under the flag, 1981; Internationalists, 1971).

The summary works about the history of labour movement in Russia before and during the February Revolution of 1917 contain the information about status of war prisoners. It is necessary to mention V. Kopylov’s paper where he studies the problem of use the war prisoners’ labour and revolutionary activity of foreign working people (Kopylov, 1967).

The new stage of studying of this problem has started in 1990s and the study is still ongoing. The documents of regional archives are used, the authors analyze the problem of use of war prisoners labour in different economy branches and public works (Surzhikova, 2012, 2014; Samovich, 2008; Krott, 2012; Sheveleva, 2008; Valitov, 2014; Kalyakina, 2013; Gergileva, 2007; Vasiliyeva, 2014). A number of thesis concerning the status of war prisoners in Russia in general and in some regions in particular were defended in Russian Federation (Bezrukov, 2001; Idrisova, 2008; Nimanov, 2009; Ostroukhov, 2011; Talapin, 2005).

Some papers are devoted to the peculiarities of war prisoners settlement, life conditions and surveillance (Zharova, 2009; Nichkov, 2014; Talapin, 2009), transportation and settlement problems of war prisoners, sanitary conditions of prisoners of war camps (Chudakov, 2012; Zhurbina, 2008; Nachtigal, 2014), legal status and legal protection of prisoners of war (Nachtigal, 2014; Yereimin, 2007; Gordeyev, 2002), charity concerning prisoners of war (Bent, 1998; Dmitriyeva, 2013),

their moral and psychological condition (Ikonnikova, 2004; Kryuchkov, 2006; Surzhikova, 2009, 2011, 2012; Valitov, 2013, 2014; Samovich, 2013; Bulatova, 2011).

The problem of sojourn of prisoners of war in Ukraine is not well studied. It is considered partially by R. Nachtigal and V. Sarancha. The first author described the Austria-Hungary prisoners of war camp in Darnitsa, now a district of Kyiv (Nachtigal, 2012), the second – on the territory of Kremenchuk garrison (Sarancha, 2011). The question as to the position of prisoners of war of some nationalities is not studied. Thus, the authors of the article set an aim to analyze the stay of Romanian prisoners of war in Ukraine on the example of one county of Kharkov Province during 1915-1917.

Romania was at first an ally of Central Powers during World War I. After Brusilov Offensive of Russian Army in 1916, Romania signed an agreement with the members of Triple Entente, pursuing the aim of uniting all the lands inhabited by the Romanians in one state (Guzun, 2016).

The Romanian prisoners of war appeared on the different sides of the Eastern Front. One part of the soldiers and officers, the subjects of Kingdom of Romania, were in captivity in Germany and Bulgaria, the other part, who fought in Austria-Hungary Army (Romanians from Transylvania, Banat and Bucovina), appeared on the territory of Russia. The current paper deals with the second group of Romanian prisoners of war. The main source while writing the paper was the documents of Lebedin County Council taken from the State Archives of Sumy Region (SASR).

The exact number of Romanian prisoners of war is difficult to estimate, as the national composition of Austria-Hungary Army was rather diverse. Very often while registration of prisoners of war, the citizenship, affiliation with the enemy army and religion were taken into account. Moreover, as R. Nachtigal noted, it was not always possible to differentiate Austria-Hungary soldiers according to slavic and non-slavic origin, because Hungarian Slovaks or Romanians from Hungarian part called themselves either Hungarians or Rusyns, but Poles and Slovaks – Austrians (Nachtigal, 2014: 148).

The prisoners of war were settled in Russian provinces of European part of the country in 1914-1915, and on the territory of Ukrainian provinces in 1916-1917 (Nachtigal, 2010; Sarancha, 2011). The prisoners of war were used as a work force starting with the autumn 1914. In 1915 it was a mass phenomenon. 1916-1917 saw the maximum active use of prisoners of war labour.

In October 1914 the Emperor Nicholas II approved “Regulation on Prisoners of War” (Statute, 1914). It was based on the Hague Convention of 1907. The legal status of prisoners of war was defined. It was stated that the prisoners of war “as lawful defenders of Fatherland” should be treated humanely, and their main property and personal rights should not be infringed.

The first months of the war saw the acute lack of work force due to the mobilization to Russian Army. Thus, Council of Ministers of Russia approved the decision to use labour of prisoners of war. The documents regulating the use labour of prisoners of war in different spheres of economic activities were elaborated and approved. For example, the following rules appeared in October 1914 “On the admission of prisoners of war to work on the construction of railways by private companies” (Rules, 1915), “On the release of prisoners of war for work in private

industrial enterprises” (Concerning, 1915), “On the release of prisoners of war for agricultural work” (Rules concerning, 1915), and “On the procedure for providing prisoners of war for the execution of state and public works at the disposal of interested departments” (Rules of allowance, 1915).

These documents regulated the use of labour of prisoners of war in agriculture, industry, different provinces departments of Russian Empire; transfer of prisoners of war from military department to other departments and manufactures; defined their living conditions, work and return to military department.

The soldiers and officers taken captives in combat zone were sent to assembly stations, where they were questioned and then sent to frontline, distribution and transit stations (holding and reassignment points) and then to interior districts of the country, where they were settled in transit or stationary camps. Each prisoner of war had a card containing surname, rank, army, nationality, profession. One can find cards with more detailed information in the archives. Citizenship, religion, place of residence, age, birth year, military unit, time and place of capture, contusion, health condition (Directives, 1916-1917: 39-40).

These cards were glued in a record book of a prisoner of war, which “he has to keep and while obtaining money, things and parcels, he should show it to the head of prisoners of war to enter the sum of given money and time of giving money in corresponding columns”. The record book issued on the 1st of January 1916 by Ufa County military head to the prisoner of war of Austrian Army Petru Buvdey was found in the funds of SASR. It said that he was a Romanian, served in 41st infantry regiment, was captured on the 13th of September of 1915 in the settlement Pochay (Copies, 1916: 11-17). Probably it is Pochaev, where the battles took place exactly at that time. This fact is witnessed by the recollections of a participant of those battles published by the journal “Rodina” (1915, No. 38): “While conducting an offensive to the south of Kremenets, we attacked the villages of Berezivka – Rostoky. The enemy, in spite of our powerful machine gun and artillery fire, reached our trenches and rushed at us. As a result of hand-to-hand fight, the enemy was repulsed. After a counterattack and clenching the enemy’s flanks, our troops threw him in disorder and on his shoulders broke into his trenches. Having failed to take the attack, some Austrians fled, the rest surrendered or were killed. The number of captives exceeded 600 people. On September 9, near the village of Dverets, we captured 2 officers and 100 soldiers. The enemy carried out a number of counterattacks from the side of Pochayev during September 10, just pushing back a little our troops. The next day he attacked several times near Novy Oleksynets, but due to energetic blow he was fought back, having taken more than 3000 captives and 4 machine guns”.

The information about received letters and money transfers, earned money and given “state things” and “own things” was also entered into the record book of a prisoner of war. For example, in February and March 1916 Petru Buvdey was given a greatcoat, a uniform, a pair of wide trousers, a peaked cap, a bast shoes, foot wrapping, 2 shirts, 2 underpants. Every month he received soap.

The archival documents show that Petru Buvdey had worked on Buimerovka estate since April 1916 (Relationship, 1916: 286). In June of the same year, he and

other 26 prisoners of war were arrested for leaving workplace without permission (Copy, 1916: 445).

According to the rules permitting prisoners of war to agricultural work, not more than 10000 people were allocated to the province. The process of distribution of prisoners of war for this kind of work was as follows. Those, wishing to receive prisoners of war, submitted applications to the Zemstvo, which handed them over to the governor. The applications approved by the governor were sent further to the Special Interdepartmental Committee for the distribution of prisoners of war of the Headquarters of the General Staff (Relationship, 1916: 19).

The prisoners of war arrived at the disposal of County Zemstvo, which were to determine the conditions of their work and the amount of payment. At the same time, it was forbidden to involve captives in backbreaking labour and work related to combat operations and directed against their states.

While distributing prisoners of war for work, the zemstvos were guided by the order of the commander of Moscow Military District No. 879-1916, according to which "it was forbidden to mingle Germans and Hungarians with Slavs and Romanians while working together, as captive Romanians have to bear bullying from Germans" (Directives, orders of Kharkiv Province, 1917: 15).

The lists of prisoners of war registered in Lebedin County included Romanians, Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and Rusyns. The exact number of Romanian prisoners of war is not possible to determine. This is due to the fact that not all documents with names and surnames of captives had information about their nationality. The authors managed to identify the surnames and names of 165 Romanian prisoners of war who were in Lebedin County in 1915-1917 and 6 captive Romanians in Sumy County. Probably their number was higher. Among the documents there are reports indicating only the number of working prisoners of war. For example, 35 Romanians worked in the estates and at the factories of the county. There are lists of prisoners of war indicating the presence of Romanians, but not specifying their number.

The documents of SASR show that 285 Romanian prisoners of war were transferred from Berezovsk garrison of Irkutsk Military District to Kazan Military District in July 1915 (Copies, 1916: 43). 17 Romanians out of them were transferred at the disposal of Lebedin Zemstvo (Copies, 1916: 160; Directive of Kharkiv Governor, 1916: 23).

In 1916-1917 Romanian prisoners of war worked at Suprun sugar refinery (31 people) (Directives, 1916-1917: 152-152rev), Lantratovka estate of Chupakhov sugar refinery (19 people) (Directives, 1916-1917: 164), Aleninskoe estate of Chupakhov sugar refinery (29 people) (Copy, 1916: 213, 217; Directives, 1916-1917: 161rev-162), Mikhailovka estate of the count A. Kapnist (18 people) (Directives, 1916-1917: 155rev), Buimerovka estate of Koenig (20 people) (Relationship, 1916: 286), Budky estate of M. Chaplits (2 people) (Directives, 1916-1917: 144), estate of E. Sviatogor-Shtepin (5 people) (Relationship, 1916: 290), Bobrovo estate (10 people) (Relationship, 1916: 326), Lebedin trade school (1 person, Cook), Vasilevka estate and winery G. Glazenap (15 people), Dimitrovka estate of the Count M. Tolstoy (20 people), Vasilevka loan society (1 person), Lebedin loan society (20 people), and also Shtepovka estate of A. Velichko, Terny estate of the Prince B. Shcherbatov, Gudymy

estate of S. Sbitnev, Grintsovo estate of N. Kononenko, Verkhosulka estate of E. Puzyna, Gorky estate of the Count Musin-Pushkin, Budylyk loan society, Kulichany estate of A. Krasovskiy, Myronovka estate of K. Gladkov, K. Klius' farm in Chervlenoe village, E. Gladkova's estate, I. Kalugin's estate in Lozovaia village in Vasilevka volost, Aleksander trade school in Stepovka (Directive of Kharkiv Governor, 1916: 45-77; Directives, 1916-1917: 55).

It also should be noted that 6 Romanian prisoners of war worked at Pavlov's sugar refinery owned by P. Kharytonenko in Sumy in 1916, which was Sumy County (Nominal roll, 1919: 1-3, 10-13).

The analysis of the lists of prisoners of war kept in the State Archives of Sumy Region showed that the absolute majority of Romanian prisoners of war in Lebedin County were 20-42 years old. They were Austro-Hungarian Empire subjects and of Orthodox religion. They served in infantry regiments No. 2, 4, 8, 11, 12, 21, 22, 23, 29, 32, 33, 37, 43, 50, 62. However, most of them were military men of the 23rd infantry regiment.

Most of them were unskilled workers, but there were 2 blacksmiths – Theodore Bund and Derdi Briad (Directives, 1916-1917: 155rev) and 1 musician – Andrey Loganov Kristean (Directives, 1916-1917: 152).

The involvement of prisoners of war in agricultural and industrial work in Lebedin County began in 1915. We can read the following in the Zemstvo report "About the organization of labour of prisoners of war in support of the rural population of Lebedin County" (January 1916): "The privately owned farms already appeared in such situation last year and the way out of it was to hire workers from the areas occupied by the enemy and partly to involve prisoners of war. The experience of the past year had shown that freely-employed workers did not meet expectations and, on the contrary, the work of prisoners of war was so reliable that the majority of owners left prisoners of war for winter household jobs. The quantity of prisoners of war working in private-owned farms has rapidly increased to more than 600 people by now" (Relationship, 1916: 13-13rev, 183-183rev).

In the summer and autumn of 1916 there were 2612 prisoners of war in Lebedin County. 1878 captives worked in agriculture, 88 – in industry, and 36 fulfilled public works (Directives, orders of Kharkiv Province, 1917: 200).

In December 1916 there were 1949 prisoners in the county. There were 9 specialists in metal processing, 16 – in wood processing, 21 bricklayers, 5 shoemakers, 12 tailors (Relationship, 1916: 415rev; Directives, 1916-1917: 80-81).

The demand for the prisoners of war in the county soon exceeded the possible offer. For example, in 1917 the need was at least 5 thousand people. Private farms were particularly interested in prisoners of war, since the welfare of these farms was entirely based on the use of wage labour. Thus, 1182 prisoners of war worked in large privately-owned farms in September 1916 (Copies, 1916: 178).

The Count A. Kapnist wrote to Kharkiv Governor in July 1916: "I earnestly ask you to request one thousand of prisoners of war at the disposal of Lebedin Zemstvo for harvesting to help the families of the recruits. The failure to obtain prisoners of war now threatens with serious consequences" (Copy, 1916: 356).

Probably his request was complied. And he was allocated 113 prisoners of war, among who were 18 Romanians. They worked in Mikhailovka estate of the Count A. Kapnist (Directives, 1916-1917: 155rev).

The entrepreneurs found out themselves about the professions of prisoners of war and often demanded specific people of a certain specialty in their petitions. For example, "Terny estate of the Prince B.S. Shcherbatov needs 100 people, preferably blacksmiths, carpenters and locksmiths. The payment is 8 rubles including full provision of the estate" (Relationship, 1916: 22). Mezhirich loan society asked to send 45 people including 2 bakers, 2 shoemakers, a blacksmith, a wheelman, a beekeeper and 38 unskilled workers (Copy, 1916: 223).

However, the labour of the prisoners was also used by the poor owners who temporarily lost capable of working family members due to mobilization. 560 prisoners of war were involved in such farms (Copies, 1916: 178). The maintenance of a captive during harvesting was paid by the Zemstvo (Relationship, 1916: 27). Some peasants agreed to accept prisoners of war only on the condition that all the maintenance expenses of prisoners of war would be paid by the treasury. There is a soldier's request to give him a prisoner of war in case he would be taken to the army (Directives, orders of Kharkiv Province, 1917: 667), a soldier's complaint about the refusal to give a prisoner of war to his mother for harvesting in the archives documents (Relationship, 1916: 132-133).

The prisoners of war were sent to work to various organizations: estates, mansions, sugar refineries, loan societies, zemstvo hospitals, veterinary and feldsher's station, post stations, trade schools, food committees and outpatient clinics (Information, 1918: 9-10).

Many prisoners of war worked in sugar refineries. There were 746 such people in September 1916 (Copies, 1916:178). For example, 31 Romanian prisoners of war worked at Suprun sugar refinery (Directives, 1916-1917: 152-152rev).

The public works were a special sphere of use of prisoners of war. 49 people worked in the Zemstvo in 1916 (Copies, 1916: 178). They were used for cleaning the territory, as coachmen, domestic servants or street cleaners. Despite the numerous instructions of the superior authorities as to inadmissibility of such misuse of the labour of prisoners of war (they were allocated primarily for field work), such practice continued until 1917. A funny case happened to the son of the landowner Tsymbal N. On January 12, 1916 he was removed out from the cinema together with the prisoner of war, Mark Golberg, who was used as a coachman. The reason for that was the ban for prisoners of war to attend all kinds of entertainment (Relationship, 1916: 30-30rev).

The local population had a good opinion about the Romanians. This is proved by the statement of the manager of Buimerovka estate to Lebedin Zemstvo, dated the 3rd of March 1916, with the request to send 50 prisoners of war particularly of Romanian or Slavic origin to work in the estate. 20 captive Romanians were sent (Relationship, 1916: 51).

The prisoners of war worked 26 days a month (Relationship, 1916: 46), receiving 8 rubles of monthly wage and 10 rubles starting from the autumn of 1916. This amount was divided into two equal parts. The first part of the wage was given to a prisoner of war; the second was deducted for maintenance, guarding and clothing

(Directive of Kharkiv Governor, 1916: 98). The employer had to maintain and treat the prisoners of war at his own expense. There were penalties for poor work, it was forbidden to leave a work place without a written consent of an owner. The employer was fully responsible for the conduct and guarding of prisoners of war and had to provide acceptable standard of living for the prisoners of war.

There were conflicts between prisoners of war and employers. They were due to the fault of the both sides. The employers, often wishing to save money, did not follow the above mentioned rules for the provision of prisoners of war with food and clothing. The agronomist N. Tymchenko-Ruban reported to the Zemstvo: "The most painful aspect of relations between the owner and prisoners of war is that the record of the working days of the prisoners of war is kept at will of the owner. As a result, according to the owners' reports, many prisoners do not have 26 working days per month, but much less. Some of the captives complained to me that they were cheated" (Relationship, 1916: 350rev). The authorities tried to fight this by taking prisoners of war away from unscrupulous employers. For example, the prisoners of war were taken away from the owner G. Podoliak for poor treatment, as "prisoners had one pair of underwear, old and ragged shirts. They are fed with poor borsch with beets without seasoning, that is, there is no lard, butter, not tasty. The bread is good. The prisoners of war said with tears in their eyes that they were very poorly fed, they were not given meat, they do not receive half of the wages. They were beaten" (Relationship, 1916: 137-137rev).

Sometimes the prisoners of war were themselves to blame, because they left their work place, refused or evade working, but there were cases of lawful refusal. For example, the prisoners of war, sent to Lebedin Zemstvo trade school refused to "work for the military needs of an enemy state" (Relationship, 1916: 61), as the trade school produced wagons for the army and it contradicted article VI of the Hague Convention of 1907.

The archive documents testify the cases of return of prisoners of war by the employers, because they "turned out to be not suitable for agriculture work" (Relationship, 1916: 328), "behave badly" (Relationship, 1916: 6), "work as long as they wish and when they wish, often pretend to be sick, which was not confirmed by medical examinations. And in general, they had a harmful effect on the other fellows" (Relationship, 1916: 114).

The main forms of protest of prisoners of war against the living conditions and exploitation of their labour were refusals to work and runaways. The prisoners of war claimed against the owners for their poor maintenance and treatment. Quite often the prisoners of war refused to work, referring to the poor food quality. The investigation reports of disobedience of prisoners of war said that they wanted meat, lard, milk (Copy, 1916: 11). There were often conflicts as to "non-delivery of clothes and wages, beatings without reasons, a lot of work" (Directives, orders of Kharkiv Province, 1917: 536-536rev).

The lists of escaped prisoners of war also contained Romanians. For example, 14 out of 26 prisoners of war, who fled from Buimerovka estate of Koenig in June 1916, were Romanians (Copy, 1916: 445). At the same time 14 Romanian prisoners of war fled from the barracks of Aleninskoe estate (Copy, 1916: 154-155). They were caught

and were arrested for 7 days “for absence without official leave from work” (Copy, 1916: 271). The captives George Botinash, Theodor Shandor, Pavel Armench, Dumitru Pituts fled from Suprun sugar refinery and were captured in April 1917 (Directives, orders of Kharkiv Province, 1917: 471). The Romanians Joseph Dragota and Abel Zhinko (Shinka) escaped from E. Sviatogor-Shtepina estate in 1917. The reason for the escape was “non-payment of wages, bad food and non-delivery of clothes” (Directives, orders of Kharkiv Province, 1917: 536, 737).

The story of the Romanian prisoner of war Abraham Chibi is of great interest. He escaped from Aleninskoe estate of Chupakhov sugar refinery. The witnesses said that “Chibi, during his work, that is since the 2nd of May, 1916, behaved extremely defiantly, treated all employees roughly and impudently, repeatedly refused to work, saying that he would not work for a Russian. For such behavior, he was transferred to work to Sagaidak khutor, from where he fled on December 28, 1916” (Directives, orders of Kharkiv Province, 1917: 91-91rev). On January 23, 1917 Lebedyn County Council asked for medical care for A. Chibi. The doctor concluded, that he “has tuberculosis, anemia and can work, but he can do easier work” (Directives, orders of Kharkiv Province, 1917: 103). On February 3, 1917 he was questioned by the police inspector of Lebedin. The interpreter, the prisoner of war, Joseph Tirbu, reported that the detainee said that “he left Sagaidak village because of illness, he never refused to work” (Directives, orders of Kharkiv Province, 1917: 92). The list of prisoners of war of the landowner G. Evtushenko, dated February 6, also contained the name of Abraham Chiba. He had one pair of boots and linen (Directives, orders of Kharkiv Province, 1917: 237a).

The police tried to influence the prisoners of war who refused to work. They were arrested for 3-7 days. The security system of camps for prisoners of war could not provide the sufficient level of surveillance and, as a consequence, the number of camp escapes increased in the second half of 1916-1917. The fugitive search system was well developed and the documentation is fairly uniformed. The first document was an escape report, a profile with a fugitive features, a detention report and a fugitive’s interrogation report. The custody of the guilty prisoners of war was relatively humane. For example, we can read in the report to the Head of Kharkov local brigade: “There were cases when the prisoners of war, who refused to work, were sentenced to arrest in the zemstvo cellar, because of lack of space in the cells of the police department. They were not kept in the basement, but near it in the yard or in the street. They were given 25 kopeks per day “for bread and water”. They were allowed to go to the store and buy “bread and water”. Their own money was not taken away from them, so they felt much better there than at work. These prisoners had meetings with soldiers’ wives who chose prisoners of war to their liking. Then these prisoners of war were sent to loan societies, and then everyone already knew who would take him” (Copies, 1916: 53).

The reason to refuse to work could be a disease, which, if confirmed by a doctor’s examination, released a prisoner of war from work until his recovery. There were also numerous cases of simulation, resulting in a punishment starting from a short arrest to public excavations. Thus, among the prisoners of war, who did agricultural work in Bobrovo estate of the Counts Annenkov, two Romanians, Ion

Unicasiu and Tsiprian Pezdali, “refused completely from work allegedly due to illness” (Relationship, 1916: 326). The manager of Bobrovo estate applied to Lebedin County hospital with a request to provide I. Unicasiu with outpatient care and subsequent treatment in the hospital (Directives, orders of Kharkiv Province, 1917: 59).

Another important aspect of war captivity was the health of prisoners of war. In case of illness, the prisoners of war were sent to a city hospital or infirmaries. The most common diseases were rheumatism, tuberculosis, inflammation of the kidneys, hernia, anemia, wounds on the legs, bronchitis. There were also such diagnoses as testicular disease and mental disease (Relationship, 1916: 344). Terminally ill patients were sent back home. For example, Karl Podbelskiy was operated and cancer was diagnosed. The doctor wrote in a certificate: “Karl Podbelskiy has an incurable disease that is why he is not capable of military service and work” (Directives, orders of Kharkiv Province, 1917: 76-77).

The dead prisoners of war were buried in city cemeteries. The archives preserved the correspondence of the provincial and zemstvo authorities, dated August 1918, as to the location of the graves of deceased prisoners of war in Lebedin County. This information was requested by the Emperor and Royal Mission of Austria-Hungary in Ukraine.

“Information on the graves of deceased prisoners of war in Lebedin County” and the report of Lebedin County Council on deceased prisoners of war are of great interest. They were sent to Central Information Office on Prisoners of War in St. Petersburg. The list of 8 people contained the following information: “name, surname, troops; when and where was taken as a captive; last work place; date of death; No of grave or name and surname; state of the grave” (Information, 1918: 28). The authors studied registers of births, marriages and deaths of the churches in those settlements where the prisoners of war died and were buried, and revealed that among the dead prisoners of war there was a Romanian. The register of births, marriages and deaths of the Trinity Church of Lebedin has such a record: “Romanian prisoner of war Ioan Opincaru” died on July 25, he was read the funeral service and buried on July 26, he was 30 years old, the cause of death was consumption. There is no information about communion before death. The funeral service was conducted by the priest Aleksandr Chervonetskiy. The deceased was buried in the parish cemetery (Metrical book, 1916).

The other sources testify that Ioan Opincaru was a common soldier of the 64th infantry regiment of Austrian Army, he was of Orthodox religion. He was captured on August 30, 1914 in Rogatin. He worked in Lebedin trade school. He died on July 25, 1916 because of pulmonary tuberculosis. He was buried in Lebedin Mironositskoe cemetery according to Orthodox rite (Information, 1916: 29). The record book and 75 kopeks were left after his death (Directive of Kharkiv Governor, 1916: 2-2rev).

Lebedin Zemstvo not only forced prisoners of war to work, but it also defended their legitimate interests. The international laws provided certain standards for authorities to treat this category of people. Austrian and German subjects had an opportunity to receive letters and parcels from relatives. There are archive documents in which County Council appeals to the estate management: “The County Council asks the management to inform the prisoner of war Paul Patlutz that the Council has

received 19 rubles in his name, to receive which he must come in the shortest time” (Directive of Kharkiv Governor, 1916: 136).

In May 1916, Lebedin Zemstvo received a letter from the District Headquarters of Kazan Military District with a request “to inform how many prisoners of war out of 285, which are at the disposal of the Council, are in bad need”, as “170 rubles, sent by Romanian Embassy in Petrograd, were received by the commander of Irkutsk Military District for the “most needy” captives, who were transferred from Berezovsk garrison to Kazan Military District, the quantity was 285 people, on July 3, 1915” (Copies, 1916: 43-43rev).

The captured soldiers were allowed to send 1 post card every week and 2 letters in an envelope every month. This was provided by the correspondence rules of the Head Department of Red Cross. All letters were checked by military censors. Then, with the help of the Red Cross, they were sent to the specified countries, where they were subjected to repeated censorship and stamped, then sent to the addressee. Military censorship warned the county institutions that “a huge number of opened letters of prisoners of war contain interline invisible text” (Relationship, 1916: 208). For this purpose, sympathetic ink was used (most often milk). Some prisoners tried to write in places where, in their opinion, the censor would not check the letter (under the stamps, the inside of the envelope).

In August 1916 Romania entered the war on the side of Triple Entente, and after that Russian Government permitted Romanian Military Mission to form military units involving the prisoners of war. Several special commissions for the recruitment of volunteers were organized. However, the analysis of the documents of Lebedin County Council showed that, in autumn 1916, Romanian prisoners of war did not show any desire to “take advantage of freedom” and “work in Romania” (Directive of Kharkiv Governor, 1916: 44, 51, 53, 54, 77; Directives, 1916-1917: 58-60). A possible reason for the refusal was that prisoners of war were aware of the state of affairs in Romania. The source of this information could have been Romanian immigrants who fled to Russia, because of economic disruption and military failures. It is also possible that the owners of the prisoners of war did not want to let them go and therefore submit false information to the zemstvos.

The Romanian prisoners of war refused to join Romanian volunteer military units even in 1917. The Provisional Government promoted the formation of Romanian volunteer units. Using the natural aspiration of Romanian people to unite, some political forces tried to establish their influence among Romanian prisoners of war from Transylvania, Banat and Bucovina. They campaigned for joining the prisoners of war to volunteer military units to fight for dividing of Austria-Hungary, creating of “Great Romania”, “Romania of all Romanians”, claiming that it would be a state “based on the broadest democratic principles”. The formation place of Romanian military units was the camp in Darnitsa near Kiev. By the end of 1917, more than 10,000 soldiers and officers out of 120,000 prisoners of war had been recruited into Romanian military units. One of the reasons for the failure of the formation of Romanian volunteer units was revolutionary propaganda in the camps by Russian, Romanian, Hungarian, Yugoslav and other socialists (Internationalists, 1967: 77).

Thus, one of the main features of World War I was the wide use of the labour of prisoners of war. Their involvement in work in agriculture and industry began in 1915 and increased every year. This tendency is confirmed by regional archives documents. The role of labour of prisoners of war was shown as an important economic factor in the situation of labour resources shortage in wartime on the example of documents of Lebedin County Zemstvo of Kharkiv Province, kept in the State Archive of Sumy Region. In the opinion of the authors, the research prospect is studying the peculiarities of labour usage of prisoners of war of different nationalities.

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KING CAROL II AND THE PRIME MINISTER CONSTANTIN ARGETOIANU BETWEEN COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

*Mihaela Ilie**

Abstract

In this paper I will analyze the institutional relationship between King Carol II and the President of the Council of Ministers – Constantin Argetoianu. By examining this relationship, I will try to identify the decision-making circuit followed by the Government's decisions. The route that the executive measures followed – from simple proposals, debates, consultation of those involved, decision taken (adoption or rejection) to their transformation into decrees laws, is eloquent to see how powerful or how weak a government was and, implicitly, what was the degree of independence the Council of Ministers displayed within the executive power in relation to the King during the period concerned.

Key words: *King Carol II, Constantin Argetoianu, Council of Ministers, decision-making process, National Renaissance Front*

Introduction

The paper contains four parts; along them, the following aspects are presented and analyzed: the expectations from which the two protagonists – the King and the Prime Minister – started at the beginning of the Government, the collaboration relationship between the two and the position of each of them in the decision-making process, as well as the way the President of the Council of Ministers is removed in less than two months of government.

For the beginning, I will present the consultations and reasons leading to Argetoianu's election as Prime Minister, I will examine the arguments underlying the new governmental formula and I will emphasize the premises from which the two protagonists started the new established institutional relationship. The second part will include the meetings between the Ministers and the Monarch, underlying the attitude adopted by King Carol II and, at the same time, the position occupied by the Premier in relation to the other members of the Government; I will also analyze how simple ideas and proposals were or were not able to become decisions of the executive power, the intention being that of identifying the decisional circuit. In the third part I will present the attitude of the Prime Minister Argetoianu towards the single political party – the National Renaissance Front. It will also be examined the evolution of the position adopted by the President of the Council of Ministers regarding the responsibility that the Monarch granted to Constantin Argetoianu in assuming any unpopular decisions that the Government would take on behalf of the King. In contrast, I will also notice the attitude that Carol II had on the Premier. In the last part, I will present how the Sovereign decided to replace the leader of

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Government, a way that recalls the scenario of a comic play rather than the pursuit of justified reasons in accordance with the seriousness that was imposed at the highest political level.

The Government formation and the starting premises for King Carol II and Prime Minister Constantin Argetoianu

The international context from September 1939 was extremely delicate. Two crucial moments, unfolded in a very short period of time, put their mark on the history of that period. The Second World War started on September 1st, a conflict in which the great European powers intervened; Romania had to declare its position regarding the conflagration and, at the same time, began the preparations for a possible involvement of the country into the war (Lungu, Negreanu, 2003). At that time, the Romanian decision-makers tried to find the best plan of organizing the army (Midan, 2008: passim) and maintain a calm state among the population; regarding the foreign policy, they tried to make known their position of non-involvement and also sought diplomatic solutions to approach and maintain good relations with the European states. These are the circumstances in which occurred the assassination of Armand Călinescu, the Prime Minister in office, on 21st of September, 1939. The panic created at the highest level of Romanian politics made the King act impulsively and he imposed a Government which had as a main mission the revenge against the Legionnaires (Scurtu, Buzatu, 1999: 355-356).

The one-week period in which the Government of General Gheorghe Argeșanu functioned coincided with the period when the Sovereign, through consultations with members of the Government and some other persons that he considered to be trustworthy, sought a long term solution for the presidency of the Council of Ministers. The days from September 25th to September 27th were, as the Monarch wrote in his journal, “the most terrible days I have ever had in my life”; moreover, Carol’s pressure for choosing the name of the new Premier was doubled by the pain of losing one of his most loyal collaborators. The person to be appointed had to be fully in agreement with the continuation of the regime established by the King on 10th/11th of February, 1938 (Carol II, 1997: 231). Secondly, there were six other “qualities” that the chosen person had to possess (Carol II, 1997: 231); the one who at that time fulfilled most of those conditions was Constantin Argetoianu.

Argetoianu’s appointment was not as simple as checking the list of attributes that the Monarch asked from the future Prime Minister (Nedelea, 1991: 170). It is important to point out that he had been one of the persons close to the King, who had argued, even with concrete plans, the establishment of an authoritarian regime (Argetoianu, 2002: 117; Carol II, 2001: 47). Moreover, Argetoianu supported the Sovereign when he implemented such a political plan by accepting to enter the Government led by the Patriarch (Argetoianu, 2002: 118); he also participated in the drafting of the Constitution from February 1938 (Chivulescu, 1998: 80) and to the establishment and promotion of the National Renaissance Front (Țurlea, 2006: 40). In the last year and a half before becoming President of the Council of Ministers, Constantin Argetoianu also had held important positions such as: Minister of Industry and Commerce in the First Government of Miron Cristea (February 10th – March 30th,

1938) (Scurtu, Otu, 2003: 782), Royal counselor (Argetoianu, 2003a: 7) and starting with June 1939 he became the President of the Senate in the first Parliament of the National Renaissance Front (*Neamul Românesc*, July 8th 1939: 4; Oșca, 2014: 141).

From the constitutional perspective, the main responsibilities of the Prime Minister were drawing up the list with the appointed ministers and drafting the governmental program. In what concerned the policies that the future Government was supposed to follow, Argetoianu had not been consulted. Moreover, as we have seen, maintaining the policy that the previous Government had started was the main condition that the new Premier had to meet. In conclusion, its initial contribution from this point of view did not exist.

I will try to establish next what was the contribution of the appointed Prime Minister in regard to the second main attribution of the head of the Government? As the King himself mentioned, he had never drew up faster a list of ministers (Carol II, 1997: 233), he and Argetoianu agreeing very quickly on the names of the future Ministers. Analyzing the relationship between the Sovereign Carol II and the President of the Council of Ministers, we can see from the very beginning that the institutional relationship between them was one of subordination. Although, according to the Constitution in charge of drawing up the list of Ministers was the President of the Council of Ministers (*Constitution of 1938, 66th article*), the reality was that the King, in addition to the Prime Minister's appointment, was actively involved in forming the governmental team. However, in the case of the Constantin Argetoianu's Government the role of the Monarch was crucial and he was seconded by Ernest Urdăreanu – his trustworthy collaborator; referring to these events, Argetoianu wrote in his journal: “I let the King and Urdăreanu to do whatever they wanted” (Argetoianu, 2003b: 168).

In essence, most of the Ministers were appointed by the King, only two names being chosen by mutual agreement: Nicolae Ottescu as the Minister of Interior and Alexandru Radian at the newly established Ministry of Propaganda (Scurtu, Otu, 2003: 784-785); from the Prime Minister's daily notes we also find out that the only person he unilaterally appointed in the Government was August Philip as “Secretary of State of the Presidency [of the Council of Ministers] [n. M. I.] because he is my right hand and I do not want to be left-handed” (Argetoianu, 2003b: 168, Carol II, 1997: 234). Moreover, the position he held, that of the Secretary of State without a specific portfolio, made it clear how insignificant was Argetoianu's contribution to the formation of the Government.

Regarding the premises from which the two protagonists, King Carol II and Constantin Argetoianu, started within the partnership Monarch – President of the Council of Ministers, those were quite different. For the Sovereign, Argetoianu's appointment as Prime Minister had been imposed by the unfavorable circumstances at the end of September 1939, a decision that constituted a temporary solution to the problem. Trying to justify the decision he made, in his daily notes, the King stated that in that context, it was preferable to take a less good decision with promptness than to waste time in search of a perfect solution (Carol II, 1997: 233); the characterization that the Monarch has made to the future Premier is an unequivocal one: “It was very, very hard for me to decide, because not even Argetoianu was the most suitable for this position. He is an aged man and, therefore, he is behind the times; he is an

old-fashioned politician and this is bad” (Carol II, 1997: 232). Regarding Argetoianu’s point of view, his journal surprises his lack of modesty regarding his nomination and, at the same time, the providential role he considered he was playing: “I resisted as much as I could; but I surrender to the inability to recommend someone else to the Sovereign. At this time *no one except me* [n. M. I.] could inspire both confidence for the country and trust for Berlin, Paris, London and Rome” (Argetoianu, 2003b: 168).

The relations between the representatives of the executive power and the decision making process

In order to make an objective research on the relationship established between the King and the Prime Minister, I have to make some clarifications regarding the representatives of the Romanian executive power at that time. First of all, one must not make the mistake of analyzing the executive power of the years leading up to the beginning of the Second World War by taking as a benchmark the notions and information we have today about this branch of power. If one starts on this road, the premises will be wrong and therefore the result of the analysis will be an erroneous one, because the simplistic conclusion reached would be that Romania of those years would be a dictatorship in which the powers of the King are unrestricted. Starting, however, from the realities of the interwar period, one can notice that things are much more nuanced. That is why we need to look briefly at the role of the King within the executive power both from the point of view of the legislation in force and from the perspective of the decisions he made.

Regarding the legislation, the Constitution from 1938 mentioned both the representatives of the executive power and the relations that were established between them; thus, Article 32 states that the executive power is vested in the Monarch, who exercises it through *his Government* [n. M. I.]. We also find out from the Constitution that the Sovereign was the one who appointed and revoked the Ministers, and the President of the Council of Ministers, also appointed by the King, had the task of forming the Government.

Although we observe some ambiguity with regard to the person responsible for forming the Government – the King appoints and revokes the Ministers and the Prime Minister forms the Government – we can at least conclude that, from the constitutional perspective, the King did not exceed his powers when he actively participated in the consultations and decisions taken within the executive power. The customary law demonstrated that this way of appointing the Cabinet and, at the same time, the King involvement in governmental decisions was also used while the Constitution from 1923 was in force (Ghițulescu, 2015: 208-212); the elements of novelty do not refer to practice, but rather to the constitution provisions that were much clearer this time, describing the King as the “head of state”.

In the following, I will broadly analyze the meetings that the King had with the President of the Council of Ministers and the Cabinet members, in order to observe to what extent the Monarch was a determining factor within the executive power; at the same time, as a result of this analysis, we will be able to examine the role of the President of the Council of Ministers.

After analyzing the King's meetings with the Cabinet members, for the period under consideration, we can divide these meetings into three categories, namely: the first category – the Government meetings, attended by the majority of the members; the second category – the meetings for which the President of the Council of Ministers came together with one of the Ministers, and the third category including the meetings attended only by the Monarch and one or more Ministers. In King Carol II's daily notes we can find a lot of information about those meetings; the abundance of details in this respect confirms that the Sovereign was extremely involved in solving the problems that the executive power was facing.

It should be mentioned that this type of practice was not new for King Carol II, the same involvement being observed during the previous Governments. What is different this time is that the proportions are no longer preserved. Thus, if also during Armand Călinescu's Government we encounter all these types of meetings, the period during which Constantin Argetoianu was President of the Council of Ministers can be considered different from the previous one if we take into account the large number of the direct meetings between the King and the Ministers, and as a consequence, we can detect a fewer meetings that the Monarch had with the Prime Minister.

From the journal of the Sovereign, we find out that most of the meetings he attended together with the Prime Minister and one of the Ministers were those at which the present Minister was holder of the Foreign Ministry – Grigore Gafencu (Carol II, 1997: 237, 247, 255, 270); other Ministers mentioned by the King as attending meetings with Argetoianu were Constantin C. Giurescu – the Minister responsible for organizing the National Renaissance Front and Victor Slăvescu – Minister of Army Endowment. If we analyze the description made to Constantin Argetoianu by the Foreign Minister, the one with whom the Prime Minister has had quite frequent contacts, we will notice that Grigore Gafencu was, to say the least, unhappy about the position he had, that of the President of the Council of Ministers. Gafencu characterized him as a man who proved: “joyful simplicity” and also “annoying indifference” (Gafencu, 1991: 338). One of the events reported by Gafencu in Argetoianu's description was the first meeting with the commanders of the army in which he participated; the Foreign Minister told how surprised he was by the attitude of the Prime Minister, who, without seeking an acceptable solution, wondered whether, in order to escape the Russian occupation, it would not be better for Romania to accept the German occupation (Gafencu, 1991: 339).

Regarding the meetings between the King and one or more Ministers, as mentioned above, those were the most numerous. Most of the Sovereign – Minister meetings were not limited to preliminary consultations on various issues, and a decision would be made with the Prime Minister; the discussions led directly to a decision, most often belonging to King Carol II. In those circumstances, the decisional circuit can also be broadly identified: the problems were brought to the attention of the Sovereign by the Ministers, who sometimes also proposed solutions, but the one that had the final word was the King. It is important to point out that the King, in order to take a decision, frequently appealed to some of the people that he considered trustworthy that, most of the time, were not part of the Government (Țurlea, 2010). It can be noticed that in the decision-making process the Prime

Minister, beside the fact that he did not have a significant role, in most cases he was not even consulted.

We can therefore conclude that after September 1939, the Monarch preferred, to a greater extent, to have the control within the executive power. The “decentralization” observed during Armand Călinescu’s Government, consisting in a delegation of powers to Călinescu was replaced and the King played a more important role within the Council of Ministers.

Among the causes of this change, one can recall the lower confidence that the Monarch had in regard to Argetoianu: on the one hand to his ability to decide and act as a leader of the Government and, on the other hand, to his intentions. It can be noticed, therefore, that most of the decisions of the executive power were taken by the Monarch, often the Prime Minister’s role being different from that of the Ministers only by title.

The analysis of the attitude that the King and the President of the Council of Ministers adopted towards the regime and consequently towards each other

In order to observe the positions that both Carol II and Constantin Argetoianu adopted after the beginning of the institutional collaboration within the executive power, one must emphasize once again the main reasons that led to the establishment of that collaboration.

On the one hand, the King, extremely affected by the loss of Armand Călinescu, one of the most important supporters of the monarchical authority regime, was in a position to find, within a short period of time, a viable solution, to fill the empty place left by the great politician Călinescu. The question was whether the Monarch was ready to take over all the state power. It was obvious that until then all the decisions made by the Government had been adopted with the approval of Carol II, but until September 1939 Armand Călinescu had played *de jure* and *de facto* an important role within the Council of Ministers. His role had been sufficiently important for the Monarch not to fear that in the event of a failure of the regime set up on February 10th, 1938, the blame would be wholly owned by the holder of the Throne; moreover, in an excess of optimism, he considered that in the case of such a scenario, the whole blame should have been assumed by the Prime Minister. The importance of the decision that Carol II had to take regarding the new leader of the Government was emphasized in his notes from September 24th, 1939: “Today, the regime is in danger and, along with the regime, me and the monarchical idea” (Carol II, 1997: 230).

Returning to the above-mentioned question, it seems that the King was not yet ready to assume directly the role he played anyway, the leader of the country’s policy, both in terms of decisions on foreign policy and on the internal affairs. This justifies Constantin Argetoianu’s appointment as President of the Council of Ministers, who, besides his notoriety, held the position of President of the Senate. In his personal and somehow obsessive manner, the Sovereign wrote in his journal that by choosing Argetoianu, “the crown will be covered”.

Perhaps this desire was well-known by the politicians of the time, as Argetoianu himself writing in his daily notes: “One thing is certain: today the Crown is covered. Since the death of Duca, the King has been uncovered. Tătărescu, Goga, the

Patriarch, Călinescu were royal fantasies, simple persons interposed by the Sovereign. From this point of view, we went back to normal: from now on, those discontented will never curse the King, they will curse me because I exist (Argetoianu, 2003b: 170).

Regarding Argetoianu, as it was mentioned earlier, he had strongly wanted to become Prime Minister; this was why he had initially been very obedient to the Monarch's wishes, making compromises about the government team and the policies of the Council the Ministers (Argetoianu, 2003b: 168). However, the two protagonists fail to overcome certain divergences of opinions they had, the position of each one becoming more and more intransigent. Thus, instead of evolving, the relationship of cooperation between the King and the Prime Minister was deteriorated, each of the two seeing the other guilty of the situation.

In this respect, Constantin Argetoianu's attitude towards the National Renaissance Front was eloquent. If initially he had accepted to be actively involved in the reorganization of NRF, a revival which was essential to Monarch, his attitude modified even to the desire to get rid of the assumed task, in his opinion this mission being the duty of the party representatives. This idea was not only suggested to the members of the party in an informal setting, but was directly mentioned during a meeting of the NRF Superior Council: "Once this initiative was taken and once the Front began to move, I believe that the Government's role, without ceasing, becomes secondary to the action of the Front. Today meeting seems to me to be a kind of power transmission. We have made the first step, from now on you have to continue on your own and fulfill the purpose of the Front" (*Neamul Românesc*, October 27th 1939: 5).

The involution of the relationship between the King and the President of the Council of Ministers emerges also from the disagreements on various topics from the governmental agenda. The Prime Minister, noting in his journal various information about the measures he was taking in order to stop the prices increase, pointed out that: "with the King, however, it is difficult" (Argetoianu, 2003b: 218), suggesting that the Sovereign instead of helping, slowed him down.

A clear example of abandoning the position adopted when he was appointed as the leader of the Government was Argetoianu's opinion on the Auschnit business, an opinion highlighted in his daily notes: "Max the red one is still in Văcărești, followed by the implacable hatred that starts from above, without being clear if it is from the King, from Urdăreanu or from Malaxa... I don't know the details, as I have received the Government only on the condition that the massacres and the Auschnit process remain outside my competence and control... We clearly have dictatorship: the King should take his responsibilities" (Argetoianu, 2003b: 218). Thus, we can see that Argetoianu did not want to "cover the Crown", but rather consider that the Monarch should take responsibility for his actions.

On the other hand, Carol II's position regarding the Premier did not remain unchanged; in his journal, especially in the last period of the government, more and more notes suggested that the King manifested his disappointment for Argetoianu: "I made a very sad observation – Argetoianu's absence, who seemed to take part in everything but only very vague" (Carol II, 1997: 252); "Argetoianu, except for an inopportune observation, more absent than yesterday" (Carol II, 1997: 253); "a month

has passed since Călinescu's death, and every day that I work with Argetoianu, I feel his absence" (Carol II, 1997: 255); "one thing is certain, that I cannot continue with Argetoianu for a long time. He is too old" (Carol II, 1997: 273).

The removal of the Prime Minister Constantin Argetoianu and the formation of the new Government

The positions that the King and President of the Council of Ministers occupied in mid-November 1939 were, as it was previously underlined, irreconcilable; this is why Carol II decided to put an end to the Argetoianu government. But, before moving on to the facts, the Sovereign sought a substitute (Carol II, 1997: 272, 273), and the name on which he stopped was Gheorghe Tătărescu. The decision to restore to the post of Prime Minister the person who held this position during the longest government from Carol II's reign and, at the same time, the only full mandate of any government from 1930-1940, explained the position that the Monarch adopted. This position leaves no room for interpretation, the King wishing to bring an obedient collaborator as Prime Minister, after two short governments (Gheorghe Argeșanu – two weeks and Constantin Argetoianu – two months). The increasingly complicated foreign situation for the traditional allies of Romania and the internal government instability determined the Sovereign to appoint as the leader of the Government a politician with whom he could not get any contradictions, not taking into account how much "the crown could be covered" in this new situation.

As one can observe, the date chosen for appointing the new Prime Minister was not a coincidence. Because the meeting date of the Parliament had been previously established for November 25th, 1939 (the second reunion since the elections), a meeting for voting 260 government decrees adopted by the Government during the parliamentary holiday, Carol decided that the replacement of the Premier should take place before that date (Constantinescu, 1973: 424).

After deciding the successor and the date for changing the Prime Minister, the only question that the King had to answer was "How?" to do that. Demonstrating ingenuity, the Monarch set up a "short comedy" (Carol II, 1997: 288). Considering perhaps that if he had asked for his resignation, Argetoianu could have refused; the Sovereign decided not to take any risk and caused a governmental crisis. He decided that two of the cabinet members (Petre Andrei and Victor Slăvescu) should resign from their offices; their resignation intended to show the Premier that he no longer had authority over the Council of Ministers and the best solution was to withdraw (Carol II, 1997: 288). On November 23rd, 1939, the King noted in his daily notes: "Things happened as scheduled [...] In order not to give the public impression that everything was previously arranged, this afternoon I am meeting the Royal counselors for a so-called consultation. It is a vast farce that I play, a farce which must give the impression that I seek for a government. I need to be covered in the future as long as possible" (Carol II, 1997: 288, 289).

The comical manner in which Constantin Argetoianu was removed from the position of President of the Council of Ministers underscores the unilateral way King Carol appointed and "dismissed" the Governments.

Conclusions

Although he became a very powerful leader, creating and dissolving governments as he pleased, Carol had made an obsession with his desire “to be covered”, what for him meant that, if his political choices had been proved to be wrong (as it was the case in the summer of 1940), to have another person to blame.

From this point of view the Government of Constantin Argetoianu can be seen as a transition period, when King Carol II played a more active role within the executive power. After the loss of one of his most trusted collaborators, Armand Călinescu, the Monarch made a last attempt to simulate the existence of an independent leader of the Government, and who consequently would assume the possible failures of the Government’s policies in front of the whole country. As if he was “tired” on the one hand of all the effort he had to make in order to maintain the appearances and on the other hand of the struggle to make Argetoianu become at least in part a follower of Armand Călinescu’s policies, after only two months the Sovereign decided to replace the Prime Minister. This time the King chose a person that was previously “verified” – Gheorghe Tătărescu. His choice leads us to conclude that the Monarch, also constrained by the evolution of external events, did not want to have any more disputes with the Prime Minister; moreover he tried to remove any manifestations of disobedience from the President of the Council of Ministers. The cost of this decision was the fact that, independent of his will, the King depicted himself as the only leader of Romania, who concentrated in his hands both the royal prerogatives conferred by the Constitution, but also the attributes of executive and legislative powers.

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RECONSTRUCTION OF INTELLECTUAL AND TECHNICAL POTENTIAL OF THE VILLAGES IN KAZAKHSTAN AFTER SECOND WORLD WAR

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Abstract

Historians recognize the Second World War as a crucial historical event of the XX century that changed the destiny of many peoples. Many Kazakhs bravely fought in the front and worked hard in the rear. Although the territory of Kazakhstan had never been under occupation, its rural population stretched to the breaking point to support and provide for the Army and de-occupied republics. Therefore after the war, the Kazakh villages and agriculture were in need of reconstruction. This article explores the specifics of the reconstruction of rural districts of Kazakhstan during post war years. The research zooms in the rebuilding of the infrastructure and technical capacity of the villages, its subsequent industrialization and mechanization. Besides, the article describes the reopening of cultural, educational and medical institutes as a significant aspect of everyday rural life. The research of official documents combined with statistical data paints challenging circumstances of the post war rural reconstruction in Kazakhstan.

Key words: *Second World War, material losses, economy, mechanic-technical station (MTS), virgin lands*

Introduction

The Second World War belongs to the historical events exerting repercussions for a long time after the end. Discussing the Second World War, the researchers point at the data of fatalities and injuries and some statistical data on material loss and damage, so called “direct losses of military actions.” Later, they mention briefly indirect losses, significant changes and shifts caused by the war.

There are many insightful research papers and statistical analysis devoted to the

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issue of human and material losses as well as challenges of post-war economic reconstruction in the allied countries. However, the primary focus on the war actions and statistics on human and material losses can be considered as the drawback of such publications because they overlook the post-war problems of the reconstruction period. There are only several articles and a few books devoted to the post-war development (Kuptsov, 2015; Moreykhina, 1961; Christoforov, 2012). I.A. Litvinovsky (2014) published his monographic book on post-war economic reconstruction in the USSR. While researching the post-war industry and agriculture reconstruction, most of the experts tend to ignore un-occupied Soviet republics in general and Kazakhstan in particular.

The substantial research on post-war reconstruction of Kazakhstan leaves much to be desired since there are only brief entries in history books by G.V. Kan (2011), Zh.O. Artykbayev (2014), A. Kuzembayuly and E. Abil (2006), K.S. Karazhan (2009). The significance and importance of the current research are based on the attempt to present a comprehensive analysis and description of the technical and intellectual reconstruction of the rural districts in Kazakhstan after the Second World War.

The topic of the article will be discussed with the following goals:

- to highlight the consequences of the Second World War by the example of the anti-Hitler coalition (UK, France, USSR) and the Axis countries (Germany, Italy);
- to examine challenges of technical potential of Kazakh villages in the post-war period;
- to describe specific circumstances of the rebuilding intellectual capacity of Kazakh villages after the Second World War.

The article combines several methods such as the systemic approach to the examination of the subject and its structural elements, chronological and historical methods, content analysis of the documents and scientific works.

The consequences of the Second World War by the example of various European countries

The Second World War had a serious impact on international relations and state policies, but for most European countries the political consequences of the war were less significant than, for example, economic or demographic.

In particular, during the war years, France suffered enormous human and economic losses. During the war, 253,000 French soldiers were killed. Losses among the civilian population amounted to 412,000 (Mangold, 2012: 284). The cost of destruction of housing stock and industrial enterprises amounted to 21 billion USD. By 1945, the level of industrial production in France compared to the pre-war figures fell by almost 60%. Agricultural production decreased more than two-fold (Harrison, 2010: 97). An important fact is that for about 4 years the economy of occupied France was completely under the influence of Germany, which charged a huge occupation tribute. By 1944, the total sum of money paid by France amounted to 426 billion FRF (Le Bris, 2012: 357), which inevitably led to a budget deficit, covered by the emission of paper money, and, subsequently, to the devaluation of the franc. In addition, the country lost its entire merchant marine and navy.

Despite the fact that there were no direct military operations in the UK, the

country lost 92.7 thousand civilians and 286.2 thousand soldiers (Edgerton, 2011a). According to W. Churchill (2013: 631), during the Second World War, the British Army had 303.2 thousand people killed and missing, and this figure, taking into account India, dominions and colonies, was 412.2 thousand people. Losses among the civilian population amounted to slightly more than 67 thousand people, and losses of the merchant and fishing fleet – about 30 thousand people. The country's financial losses amounted to about 150 billion USD, of which 6.8 billion is the total cost of destruction of civil and industrial construction. The UK spent more than half of its foreign investment on warfare, and the state's external debt reached 3 billion GBP as of September 1, 1945 (Churchill, 2013: 574). In addition, the UK lost most of its international markets. Its once-powerful merchant marine fell by a quarter. Compared to the pre-war period, the decline in the coal industry was 21%, in the light industry – 50%. Taxes increased by 30% (Edgerton, 2011b: 31-32). After the war, the UK introduced a card system for basic foodstuffs such as bread, potatoes, sugar and meat. All of the above led, first, to the collapse of the British Empire. Second, the UK lost the role of world leader, giving place to the USSR and the US as superpowers. The country's losses and costs during the war led to a chronic deficit in the balance of payments, so the UK was in great need of external assistance to rebuild its economy. This assistance was provided by the US in 1947 according to the so-called Marshall Plan. The US also granted the UK a loan to be paid off in 2006 (Payne & Thakkar, 2012: 158).

Italy also suffered significant material loss during the Second World War. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, a significant part of Italian industrialists warned Benito Mussolini that the country was not ready for a long war, so it was not surprising that by the beginning of 1943 the economy of Italy was characterized by a crisis. After the war, the country was on the verge of financial collapse. The volume of industrial production barely equaled 25% of the pre-war figures, and state debt exceeded 1 trillion ITL, which was 10 times higher than the annual national income of the country (Bonner & Wiggin, 2013). In addition, according to the peace treaty, Italy was to pay 125 million USD of reparations to Yugoslavia, 105 million – to Greece, 100 million – to the Soviet Union, 25 million – to Ethiopia and 5 million – to Albania*. At the same time, domestic and external demand for Italian products, work intensity and cheap labor contributed to the fact that in three post-war years the country reached the pre-war level in industry, and in five years – in agriculture (Harrison, 2010: 112).

However, Germany and the USSR suffered the most significant losses during the war. In October 1941, speaking at the Berlin Sportpalast, Adolf Hitler declared, "I would also convey to you the gratitude of our soldiers for the excellent, first-class weapons the country has supplied to them ... We have seen to it that, in the midst of this huge war of material, the function of production has been organized in a large area, for I know that there is now no adversary who cannot be forced to yield by an available mass of munitions" (Hitler, 1941). However, as it turned out, by the

* This data is based on Treaty of Peace with Italy with Annexes, Signed at Paris February 10, 1947. Retrieved from: <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000004-0311.pdf>

beginning of 1942 the military industry of the Third Reich could no longer compensate for the damage in armaments and combat equipment suffered in the war with the USSR.

In 1943, all branches of German industry began to acutely feel the shortage of raw materials, fuel, human and financial resources. Since the second half of 1944, the level of production in industry and agriculture began to fall precipitously, and the defeat in the Second World War led to a complete economic collapse in the country. In 1946, the level of industrial production in Germany was one-third of the pre-war figure. Steel production fell seven times, coal mining – two times (Dinan, 1993: 180). At the same time, a quarter of the country's territory was annexed by the anti-Hitler coalition states, which in the post-war years sought to limit Germany's industrial potential. By the beginning of 1950, by order of the Allies, 706 industrial enterprises were dismantled (Knowles, 2014). With the exception of Upper Silesia, which as early as the 19th century turned into the second largest German industrial region after the Ruhr, it was mainly about agrarian areas. There is still no accurate data on the cost of the lost German eastern regions in 1945, including their production equipment and infrastructure. According to unofficial estimates, their infrastructure only could be estimated at around 180 billion DM (Harrison, 2010: 54).

As for casualties, according to official statistics, about 7 million Germans perished during the war – about a tenth of the total population of Germany in 1937 (Schildt, 2005: 40-49). About 4.5 million soldiers died in the war, i.e. more than 13% of the male population. Taking into account casualties from Austria as well as from the areas of German settlements in Central and South-Eastern Europe, the German military losses will increase to 5.3 million people. According to R. Overmans, in Germany, almost every eighth male – including infants and elderly – died in the Second World War (Overmans, 2012: 230). In addition, half a million civilians were killed during hostilities or bombing of German cities ((Schildt, 2005: 43).

Thus, the consequences of the Second World War involve, first of all, losses and damages suffered by the human civilization in this war. First, military actions led to huge human casualties. Second, the war caused enormous destruction and material losses to the majority of European and a number of Asian and North African states. This led not only to the depreciation of money supply and the growth of state debts, but also to declining living standards in the belligerent countries, as well as to the fact that the life of many people was put on the brink of survival. Third, the Second World War significantly changed the territorial boundaries of many countries.

Reconstruction of technical potential of Kazakh villages during post-war period

Compared to other countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, the Soviet Union suffered the most significant human and material losses. According to the 2013 data, the general number of fatalities including civil population killed in the occupied territories comprised 26,6 million people. Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic lost 706 thousand people, Ukrainian SSR – 3256,2 thousand people, Belorussian SSR – 1547 thousand, Lithuanian SSR – 437,5 thousand people, Latvian SSR – 313,8 thousand, Estonian SSR – 61,3 thousand, Moldovan SSR – 61 thousand, Karelo-

Finish SSR – 8 thousand people (Krivosheev, 2013).

The war completely ruined the Soviet economy. German armies occupied 1,5 million km² of the Soviet territory (Mazower, 2008: 211). Six republics were under complete occupation, and two republics were under partial one. In the pre-war period, those territories were the most industrially developed and most densely populated territories with 88 mln people or, in other words, 45% of all Soviet population living there. The Soviet pre-war industry on those territories produced 71% of cast iron, 58% of steel, 57% of rolled iron, and 63% of coal. The territory also had 47% of the cultivated lands and 45% of cattle (Christoforov, 2012: 327).

The war destroyed or severely damaged 1,700 cities, 70 thousand little towns and villages, about 32 thousand plants and factories (Military economy: regulation, dynamics, results and consequences, 2015: 134). For examples, the town of Belgorod had all its 3,420 residential houses destroyed. In the city of Kyiv 940 administrative and municipal buildings, 1,742 apartment buildings and 3.7 thousand private homes were destroyed. The cities of Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Novgorod and Vitebsk were 98% ruined (Cherkes & Lysenko, 2013: 559). The direct losses of the Soviet Union were estimated at two trillion 569 billion rubles (The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, 2014: 685). Despite the immediate start of the intensive reconstruction of the de-occupied territories, the industry could not reach the pre-war production levels by the end of the war. At the beginning of 1946, the agricultural production reached only 50% of the pre-war level. Coal production reached 90%, oil production – 62%, production of cast iron – 59%, steel – 67%, textile – 41%, compared to 1940 (The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, 2014: 688).

At the same time, there was a state movement to establish patronage over de-occupied territories by all national and autonomic republics, oblasts and regions. Kazakh SSR was at the forefront of the initiative and took under patronage over ten cities and 35 districts of Orlov oblast, 12 districts of Leningrad oblast, three districts of Stalingrad oblast and one district of Kalinin (currently Tver) oblast (The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, 2014: 689). More than 20 thousand miners, metallurgists, road and railway workers from Kazakhstan were assigned to work on the reconstruction of the industrial potentials of Ukrainian SSR and Belarusian SSR. Kazakh SSR sent 500 tractors and 140 steam trains to Ukrainian SSR. It also supplied 17,6 thousand cattle, 22 thousand horses, and 350 thousand sheep to the unoccupied territories (Kozybayev, 1991: 121). In the post-war period, the Kazakh SSR became the most important supporting base for the Soviet Union reconstruction and shipped metal, raw materials, building supplies, fuel, manufactured good and produce, grain seeds and breeding cattle.

It is noteworthy that the rebuilding and growth of the industry often took place at the expense of rural production. The post-war years saw negative trends in the Kazakhstan agricultural sector such as deficit of workforce because out of 6,4 mln population according to 1,939 census 1,2 mln were drafted into the Red Army (Aleksenko, 2016). Another negative trend was the lack of agricultural machinery most of which was broken or requisitioned for Army during the war. Overall, Kazakh kolkhozes, sovkhoses and mechanical stations (MTS) supplied 7,416 tractors (most of which were new), about 90% of trucks, and 110 thousand horses to the Army. It

explains why the average grain harvests in the republic during first five post-war years were as low as 5,6 dt/ha (70,4 mln tons of overall harvest), dropping to the level of 1913 (Mikhailov, 2011). The cattle farming was also in miserable condition. In 1950 there were 4,5 mln cattle, 1,5 mln horses and 127 thousand camels in the republic, while in 1940 the respective numbers were 6,5 mln, 3,5 mln and 1 mln. (Litvinovsky, 2014: 229).

During post-war years Kazakhstan agriculture suffered because of imposed required state procurement that amounted to 56% of overall production. The state acquisition quotas for grain, meat and milk increased every year while the purchase prices for these products stayed below the level of 1941.

Facing post war problems, the government of the Soviet Union headed by N.S. Khrushchev decided to plough the virgin lands of the Kazakh steppes to increase production of grain in a short period. As N.A. Nazarbayev insightfully observed the urgency of such a significant agrarian project was also caused by the fact that repression, forced collectivization, mass deportations and war crippled local farming population both morally and physically making it unable to ensure the further development of agriculture without the direct implementation of the state agrarian policy (Nazarbayev, 2004).

At the same time, the development of virgin lands was impossible without the restoration of the technical potential of agriculture because it required new roads for grain transportation, agricultural machinery, repair shops, grain elevators and storage facilities, etc.

The Kustanay region had a unique place in the development of virgin land. During that time it had 291 collective farms, 35 state farms and two horse farms. 38 machine-tractor stations (MTS) with 5,237 tractors and 1,804 combines serviced all collective farms. Most of the MTS machinery included XT3 and CT3 tractors, and “Stalin-4” combines. Also, horses and oxen were used for field work (Ternovoy, 2007: 268).

Since the numbers mentioned above were far from sufficient to meet the needs of the agricultural project, the Kazakh and Soviet leadership faced a challenge of supplying Kazakh SSR with agricultural machinery. Thus, significant material and financial resources were allocated to meet the challenge from the state and republican budgets. By the end of 1953, industry supplied Kazakhstan with more than 42 thousand tractors, 11 thousand grain combines, 22 thousand seeders and hay-gatherers (Izvozov, 2016: 47). Kustanay collective farms received 22 thousand tractors and 6 thousand combines (Ternovoy, 2007: 270). Many elevators and warehouses were under construction at the same time.

The organization of new kolkhozes preceded the development of virgin land. During 1953-1955, there were 337 new grain sovkhozes established in Kazakhstan (Saktaganova, 2014: 137). During the project, the length of roads and railway tracks increased by 14 and 2.5 times respectively. Also, 85 thousand km of electric power transmission lines were built in rural areas during that period. Besides, the Kzyl-Orda Damb on the Syr Darya river and the Ters-Ashbylak Reservoir were constructed along with the reconstruction of old and new irrigation system in the steppe. The number of collective farms grew as well. By the end of 1955, there were 2,702 collective farms in the republic with 464 MTS servicing them. The level of mechanization for grain

sowing on state and collective farms was 99%, and the level of mechanization of harvesting reached 98% (Semenova, 2012: 320).

During the early post-war years Kazakhstan's agriculture was unable to meet the rapidly growing demand for food and raw materials due to a shortage of workforce and agricultural machinery, but by 1950s Kazakhstan became one of the breadbaskets of the Soviet Union, not only restoring but increasing its potential manifold.

The rebuilding of the intellectual potential of Kazakh villages during post-war period

People were an essential component of the success of the recovery of Kazakh villages in the post-war years. Communities needed farmers, doctors, teachers, engineers, machine operators, drivers, nurses and many others. For example, in 1946 out of 334 specialists in Kustanay villages only 41 persons had higher education and 87 individuals had secondary education (Govorova, 2014: 64). Overall, in 1945 near 73% of the specialists in the Kazakhstan kolkhozes had no professional training (Zhusupov, 2014: 107).

It was not until 1954 when 2058 specialists with higher and secondary education were assigned to go to work to the newly established state and collective farms. Most of the specialists came to the virgin land project because they received Komsomol assignments. 325 of the newcomers became the directors of state farms, 330 became leading agronomists, 348 were mechanics, 344 were accountants, and 711 of them were construction engineers (Govorova, 2014: 64-65). The same year 617 specialists moved to the Kustanay region, including 36 agronomists, 56 mechanics, 525 brigade supervisors. Besides, 3,117 tractor drivers, 403 van drivers and 600 mechanics started to work in the region (Govorova, 2014: 65).

The war has done significant damage to the cultural and educational infrastructure of the villages. During 1941-1945 most schools and cultural institutions of the republic were either widely used for military and economic needs or closed because of a shortage of qualified personnel. By 1946 there were only 4184 cultural institutions functioned in Kazakhstan, which is 1,125 less compared to the pre-war years. For instance, the number of libraries decreased by 2,247 compared to the pre-war 1940 (Denisova, 2012: 9).

Taking into account the importance of culture and education, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a resolution "On Assistance Measures to the Kazakh SSR for the Political and Cultural-Educational Work" in 1945. It offered a broad program for cultural reconstruction in the republic. The goal was to quickly restore the pre-war numbers of cultural institutions, especially in rural areas. The program included plans to open a club or a reading-room in every village, to supply them with radios and to increase the number of cinema theatres.

The implementation of the program depended on the annual growth of the portion of the republic's budget allocated to social and cultural needs. Thus, in 1947 the budget of Kazakhstan was 1,723.9 million rubles, in 1948 – 1,939.3 million, in 1950 – 2,221 million, of which 40.7 million, 55 million and 66 million rubles respectively were allocated for cultural and educational programs (Saktaganova & Abdrakhmanova, 2015: 91).

Guided by the program and developing the intellectual potential of the villages, cultural institutions employed various forms of cultural and educational events such as conversations, lectures, book exhibitions, group radio listening and newspapers readings. For instance, cultural workers of the Aktyubinsk region organized more than 5,000 lectures and meetings attended by more than 90,000 listeners, mostly rural population. During the first half of 1946, 10,900 lectures were organized across the country and attended by 1.1 million people. The libraries promoted the literature on the development of agriculture, introducing the farmers to the latest achievements in the field of cattle breeding and plant selection. Created in 1946 the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR successfully researched agricultural topics and published its findings. The village clubs and library organized 5,296 various interest groups and 646 propaganda brigades by 1948 (Campbell, 2011: 320).

In late 1940's the socialist competition for the rebuilding of cultural institutions was launched in Kazakhstan. At the time, most libraries functioned out of corridors and corners of kolkhoz offices, village council building or other random places. The activists from Akmola, West Kazakhstan and Alma-Ata provinces started the movement. Most of them were Komsomol members of the collective farms of the Shortandinsky district, MTS workers and farmers of the Urdinsky district and activists of the Ilysk regional reading-room. For instance, in the Urdinsky district of the West Kazakhstan local kolkhoz workers restored all community libraries and clubs in 1946. In a short time, they repaired 10 library-reading rooms and 15 clubs, furnished and supplied them with books and musical instruments.

Within the framework of the socialist competition in Kazakhstan 124 rural libraries and clubs were built and 407 cultural institutions were restored during 1946-1947. As the initiative developed, 608 rural clubs, 326 reading rooms and 89 libraries were restored and renovated in 1948. Next year in 1949, farmers, MTS workers and rural intelligentsia of the Alma-Ata region built 134 rural clubs, 66 reading houses, 20 "red" yurts, 44 "red" corners, 59 libraries, 2 collective farms and 32 parks. The activists also supplied libraries with furniture and books. As a result of joint efforts, each library had at least one thousand books. During 1949-1960, the republic built 1079 clubs, 628 reading houses and 943 "red" corners were opened as a result of the socialist competition (Campbell, 2011: 321).

During the war, the universal compulsory seven-year education was temporarily suspended in Kazakhstan and in the USSR, significantly decreasing the school enrollment and increasing the number of illiterate population. Consequently, in 1948 200,000 children and adolescents under the age of 15 did not attend school (Matusevich, 2013: 14). During 1949-1950 academic year, the republic began to transition back to universal compulsory seven-year education in the rural areas. Also, there were evening and correspondence schools for working adults who left school before graduation. By the end of 1950s there were 363 schools for adults in the villages with 35,000 students (Matusevich, 2013: 16). However, it did not accommodate everybody who wanted to study. Besides, there was an acute shortage of premises, educational and methodological literature, curricula and, first of all, teachers. The Semipalatinsk and Ural Teachers' Training Institutes were closed as well as the Kustanay Pedagogical College during the war years. Most of the educators and

students went to fight the war. During war years, all teachers and 127 students of the Karaganda Teachers' Training Institute volunteered to defend the Motherland. The Institutes resumed work only in 1944, but despite the shortening of the length of education the country still lacked pedagogical personnel.

To meet the demand for teachers, the government developed a set of measures to attract more teachers to villages by providing them with benefits like free apartments or paid housing, free fuel, allocated plots of land. Moreover, the government ordered kolkhozes and village authorities to build houses for teachers. In general, during the first two post-war five-year plan (1946-1956) there were more than 30 million square meters of housing built for teachers, doctors and other professionals. Also, there were new schools built for 438,000 pupils.

During the war, the number of doctors and other medical personnel in the republic drastically dropped by 1.9 and 1.4 times respectively (Khalilov, 2014: 14). It can be explained by the mobilization of medical personnel to the front. Many of them were killed. After the war, some of them did not return home but stayed in Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Moldovian, Baltic and Russian republics.

The development of health care system in rural areas of Kazakhstan starts in 1946-1950. In particular, in 1946 local medical and preventive institutions were reopened in the Dzhanybek and Urdinsk districts. The Medical School was organized in Guryev (now Atyrau) region. For the first time, rural hospitals introduced massive x-ray examinations for the population and mandatory tuberculosis vaccination for newborns.

The healthcare system in the republic developed by the network of hospitals and clinics. Supported by the Ministry of Health of the USSR, the system did not take into account local specifics peculiarities, so there were some serious shortcomings. Thus, the hospitals and clinics were located often far away from the villages, and it was hard for the rural population to access them because of geographical remoteness villages in Kazakhstan. Also, the healthcare system was still insufficient lacking specialized medical care for the rural population. Unfortunately, taken in 1947 the resolution on the reorganization of all medical posts into full fledged medical offices was not carried out.

As the present exploration of the historical documents and statistical data demonstrates, the restoration of the technical and intellectual capacity of the villages was slow but steady. It took many years to bring the numbers of rural institutions of culture, education and healthcare to pre-war levels. Despite never being under occupation, the Republic of Kazakhstan faced tough challenges conditions in the post-war period.

Conclusions

For many nations, including the Kazakh people, the Second World War ended in a long-awaited victory over Nazi Germany. The joy of victory was overshadowed by the enormous sacrifices and losses suffered during the war against fascism. Despite the fact that there were no military actions on the territory of Kazakhstan, its national economy with industrial and agricultural sectors was severely damaged. Therefore, the post-war period of the history of the republic is the period of reconstruction of the

war-ravaged economy at the great physical and intellectual efforts of the population. The post-war situation in rural areas was complicated because collective farms, state farms and MTS lost thousands of qualified specialists – agronomists, veterinarians, mechanics, who enlisted in the Army and were killed in action. There was no machinery for agricultural works like sowing and harvesting leading to a drastic drop in the grain harvest in the first post-war five-year period in Kazakhstan to the level of 1913. Only due to the extensive development of virgin lands, which began in 1954 combined with 98% mechanization of state and collective farms, the harvest reached 7.7 tons per hectare.

Along with rebuilding material assets in the republic, restoring the intellectual potential of rural areas was of vital importance. In 1946-1948 rural workers rebuilt and opened 124 village libraries, 608 clubs, 407 cultural institutions and 326 reading houses so local villages could attend lectures, visit book exhibitions, listen to the radio, participate in a group. Moreover, starting 1949 the universal compulsory seven-year education was reintroduced and many evening and correspondence schools opened their doors for adults.

The post-war period of reconstruction of the intellectual and technical potential of villages in Kazakhstan is a historical time worth more attention and examination. Even though the restoration of the republic's agriculture in general and communities in particular was difficult, the development of education and healthcare system took place in the most challenging conditions. It took about a decade for Kazakhstan to become the breadbasket of the Soviet Union, a leader in cadre education and one of the most developed republics.

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THE WAR SCARE OF NOVEMBER 1968: MOUNTING SOVIET PRESSURE ON CEAUȘESCU'S REGIME

*Cezar Stanciu**

Abstract

This article brings forth further evidence from the British Archives in order to further illustrate the pressures to which Romania was subjected by its Warsaw Pact allies in the aftermath of the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia. Apparently British diplomats came in the possession of certain intelligence information indicating that a Soviet-led military intervention in Romania was being prepared for 22 November 1968. The information was seriously considered in London since the Cabinet decided to alert both the United States and Romania. Although the rumors eventually proved groundless, they illustrate conclusively the high level of tension that existed between Romania and the Soviet Union, following Nicolae Ceaușescu's decision to condemn the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Key words: *Romania, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Britain, military intervention, intelligence*

Constant tension had been mounting in Romanian-Soviet relations following Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's decision to pursue a national Communist course after 1964. Nicolae Ceaușescu's persistent denunciation of Moscow's leading role in world Communism only aggravated the tensions which reached a peak in the summer of 1968. The Romanian Communist Party (onwards PCR) sided with the Yugoslavs and the Italians challenging the Soviet control over other Communist parties and also kept close relations with China in spite the growing Sino-Soviet divergences. In May 1966, Nicolae Ceaușescu condemned the practices of the Communist International of imposing the leadership of other parties and the following year more defying gestures were directed against Moscow: the establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany, the refusal to break diplomatic relations with Israel following the Six-Day War, the constant refusal to participate in a public condemnation of the "Chinese deviation".

It was in such context that the reforms in Prague began unfolding in the spring of 1968. In the months preceding the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Romanians found themselves increasingly isolated from the other Warsaw Pact countries. The Romanian party leadership was not invited to participate in the long series of consultations which preceded the military intervention. Nicolae Ceaușescu, on the other hand, did everything possible to express his country's support for the Czechoslovak leadership, including by visiting Prague only weeks before the intervention (Mastny and Byrne 2005; Navrátil 1998).

Romanian literature on the topic emphasized the pressures Nicolae Ceaușescu was subjected to by Moscow in that period, pressures aimed at intimidating Bucharest

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and convincing the PCR's leaders that military action against Romania was possible as well. Historians Ion Pătroiu and Alexandru Oșca published relevant documents which indicated that Warsaw Pact troops were maneuvering near the Romanian borders before and after the Soviet-led intervention (Pătroiu et al. 1998: 97-98). Also Mihai Retegan, in his consistent analysis of Romania's attitude concerning the situation in Czechoslovakia stressed out the fact the Romanian party leaders were subjected to increasing pressures from Moscow and the possibility of a military intervention against Romania could not have been ruled out at that moment (Retegan 1998: 222-223). Based mostly on Western sources, American author Larry Watts described Romania's isolation from the other Warsaw Pact countries and their solidarity against what they perceived as "a Romanian threat" to the bloc's homogeneity (Watts 2012; Watts 2013; Buga 2013).

This study brings forth further evidence from the British archives which illustrate the mounting pressures to which Nicolae Ceaușescu's regime was subjected in the aftermath of the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia. In November 1968, the British diplomacy was on alert expecting a military intervention in Romania by the other Warsaw Pact members. The origin of the information was apparently an intelligence source of Polish origin and its warnings appeared to be confirmed by circumstantial evidence. Although a lucid analysis of the documents reveal that the information was clearly insufficient and/or biased, London certainly took it serious since it assumed the risk of warning the Romanians officially. Such information could not have been ignored at Bucharest and its influence on the foreign policy decision-making process should not be ignored. It is in this sense that the war scare of November 1968 should be understood: as distrustful as it may have been, Nicolae Ceaușescu could not afford to ignore such warnings.

At the time the Czechoslovak crisis occurred, British foreign policy was in a process of transformation. After 1965, British-American relations were challenged by the increasing American involvement in Vietnam which was not met with particular enthusiasm in London. Premier Harold Wilson's efforts to mediate a peace in Indochina were met with terrible suspicion by American President Lyndon Johnson and soured British-American relations for the years to come (White 2002: 110-112). Also, the dissolution of the empire caused a decline in Britain's trade relations with the former colonies and a significant increase in its trade with Europe, especially the European Economic Community (Alford 2014: 255). In this sense, improvement in British-East European relations also served Britain's political need to redefine its international role and at the same time opened new opportunities for British exports.

In what concerned Britain's policy towards Eastern Europe in 1968, the basic premise in London was that the Communist regimes were going through a process of liberalization and differentiation on national, autonomous bases. In the view of British decision-makers, as Geraint Hughes argued, Western policies had to encourage this course but with much restraint so as to avoid a negative Soviet reaction and jeopardize evolutions in the region. As far as the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia was concerned, Geraint Hughes notes that after the initial protest, London tried to put the matter aside in order to avoid further deterioration in East-West relations (Hughes

2006: 116-137). In other words, after the initial shock, British policy in the region remained unchanged. From this point of view, Romania was a very difficult case because its protest against the Soviet-led intervention had the potential to undermine efforts aimed at overcoming the crisis. Still, as Romania's protest was part of that process of differentiation and liberalization, it had to be encouraged but in such a manner as to avoid provoking the Soviets.

The fragile limit between friendship and enmity

It is conventionally considered that the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia marked the peak in Romanian-Soviet frictions up to that point. The two parties collided in 1964 for the first time, when Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej first refused to take Moscow's side in the Sino-Soviet dispute and tried to act as a mediator, a mission that was doomed to fail but emphasized Romania's independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Only weeks later, Bucharest issued the famous April Declaration which called into question Moscow's leadership of world Communism as well as the universal validity of the Soviet model of Socialism. It was in this context that the issue of Bessarabia first resurfaced in Romanian-Soviet relations. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej's decision to publish a previously unknown manuscript of Karl Marx where the philosopher referred to the unjust character of the annexation of Bessarabia by the Tsarist Empire (Buga 2013: 37). The Romanian decision to raise this issue even indirectly was breaking an unofficial mental boundary in Romanian-Soviet relations, a taboo upon which both sides had kept quiet since the end of the war and it certainly caused much distress in Moscow. When Premier I.Gh. Maurer visited Moscow in July 1964 in an attempt to appease the Soviets, Bessarabia was one of the most important topics of discussion (Buga 2012: 94-95). One year later, when N. Ceaușescu visited Leonid Brezhnev for the first time as party leader, he also raised the delicate issue of the Romanian treasure deposited in Russia during the First World War and which had been confiscated by V.I. Lenin following the Bolshevik revolution (Buga 2013: 48). It was yet another taboo in Romanian-Soviet relations that N. Ceaușescu was violating. In spite assurances of friendship, Ceaușescu's constant defiance and opposition to the Soviet Union could only raise suspicion in Moscow.

Did the Soviets take Ceaușescu seriously? A classic interpretation of the Romanian-Soviet clash over the intervention in Czechoslovakia argued that Romania had never really been in danger of being militarily occupied for the simple fact that Socialism – from the Soviet point of view – was not in danger and the regime was very stable. Without necessarily challenging this assumption which is correct in its nature, one also notices from recent literature on the topic that the Soviets were far from looking at Romania with much ease. Although researchers found it extremely difficult to investigate former Soviet archives in the Russian Federation, numerous documents did surface which portray a different image of the way Moscow regarded the Romanian challenge.

Documents published and investigated by foreign researchers demonstrate that Romania was often a topic of concern in Soviet debates on international relations taking place at the highest levels of power. In April 1968 for example, a Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union discussed the party's

foreign policy and Romania was invoked as a risk. Viktor Grishin, a member of the Politburo, referred to the efforts undertaken by the party leadership to “help the Romanian [...] leaders return to correct positions” (Kramer 2003-2004: 295). Romanian policies were regarded as a major risk especially in Ukraine where party leader Piotr Shelest was very vocal against the Romanians. During a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party which took place on 28 April 1968, Piotr Shelest accused Romania of betraying Socialist solidarity and propagating nationalist, irredentist ideas, mainly in reference to Bessarabia and North Bukovina. Shelest also stated, on an aggressive note, that the USSR “would not allow Romania to paralyze the Warsaw Pact” (Weiner 2006: 171). Mark Kramer also affirmed, following consistent research in Soviet archives, that the Soviet Union was seriously considering in 1968 the scenario in which Romania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact (Kramer 2011: 361-362). Such statements are difficult to investigate given the current situation of the Russian archives but documents from other East European archives reveal that suspicion regarding Romania’s intentions intensified during the “Prague Spring”. East German leader Walter Ulbricht went as far as to declare, in July 1968, that Romania and Yugoslavia were working together in order to allure Czechoslovakia in an anti-Soviet formula aimed at undermining Moscow’s role in the region (Mastny and Byrne 2005: 298).

Regardless of what the Soviets had in mind – as at this stage of research it is virtually impossible to establish – it remains a fact that the specter of a military intervention in Romania could not have been disregarded by the Romanians. During 1968 numerous evidences indicated that such a scenario was plausible and Romanian actions indicated that the regime was considering this outcome and making preparations in that sense. First and foremost, military documents were warning the party leadership of troop movements at the Romanian border in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Hungary and military intelligence was continuously noticing the hostility of Soviet authorities towards Romania (Pătroiu et al. 1998: 97-98). Communication between the Soviet Union and Romania was also blocked in the weeks following the intervention in Czechoslovakia and Mark Kramer cites a KGB report signed by Yuri Andropov which informed the Soviet leadership of Romania’s attempts to introduce anti-Soviet literature in the Moldavian RSS (Kramer 2001: 329-330).

Shortly after news of the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia reached Bucharest, Romanian diplomats began an intense activity abroad trying to identify foreign support and especially the measure in which Western governments were willing to support Romania in case of a similar intervention. N. Ceaușescu’s talks with I.B. Tito on 24 August 1968 focused especially on such a scenario. N. Ceaușescu asked Tito if Romania could count on Yugoslavia to keep the border open both for supplies and for a virtual withdrawal of Romanian troops in the event of a Soviet intervention in Romania (Betea et al. 2009: 168). It is well-known that Tito offered this support with the only nuance that the Romanian army would have to be disarmed when crossing the Yugoslav border in order to avoid a further provocation against Moscow. Tito also advised Ceaușescu to look for reconciliation with the Soviet and reaffirm Romania’s commitment to the Warsaw Pact (Betea et al. 2009, 170). The Romanians also explored the Western governments, especially the British and the

American, but the conclusion was that Romania, as a Warsaw Pact country, could not rely on military aid from NATO (Retegan 1998, 218). The Chinese also advised in favor of moderation and stressed out that, as much political sympathy China would have for Romania, geographical distance prevented a rapid and consistent support in case of aggression (Yong 2006: 253).

During the meeting of the Executive Committee of the CC of the PCR in the morning of 22 August 1968, the risk of a military invasion of Romania was not excluded which goes to prove that the Romanian leadership acted under the pressure of a virtual military aggression. Alexandru Bărlădeanu, one of the economical masterminds of the regime, pointed it out as clear as possible: “it is about a great power which, if we oppose it, we can expect the same calamity” (ANR, CC al PCR, Chancellery, dos. 133/1968: 11). Shortly after the meeting, N. Ceaușescu announced the establishment of armed Patriotic Guards inspired by the Yugoslav model which also revealed that he did have in mind a potential military threat. The same reasons stands behind the efforts initiated on 25 August 1968 to appease the Soviets and to reassure Moscow, just as Tito advised, of Romania’s loyalty to the Warsaw Pact. In this troubled context, it is reasonable to presume that N. Ceaușescu acted on very few certainties and many presumptions deriving mainly from a lucid assessment of Romania’s political and military conjuncture. In this sense, when analyzing the decision-making process at the top Romanian party leadership, it matters less what the Soviets actually had in mind but what the Romanians thought they did. Perceptions on a potential Soviet military menace and the reality of Romania’s absolute vulnerability in this case determined decisions more than certainties which could not be formulated at that time.

Later during 1969 and 1970, N. Ceaușescu met Leonid Brezhnev several times and tried to assure him of Romania’s loyalty and also to convince him that Moscow misunderstood Romania’s position in August 1968. Signals and perceptions in reference to Soviet intentions played a major role in his course of action. The documents presented below demonstrate the pressures to which the regime in Bucharest was subjected in the aftermath of the Soviet-led intervention in Romania and the international environment in which the Romanian Communist regime acted.

A multitude of telegrams with controversial information

On 19 November 1968 a telegram reached the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (onwards: FCO) from the British Embassy in Warsaw warning that a military invasion of Romania was imminent (NA, PREM 13/2638, Telegram no. 144 19 November 1968). According to British intelligence sources in Warsaw, orders were being prepared for an intervention in Romania on 22 November 1968 at 04,00 hours by Soviet, Polish and Hungarian troops. Air assault and tank divisions were ready to act and even the name of the Polish commander appeared to be known: a certain colonel Przesieskows. The telegram stated that the information had been double checked – there was another independent source confirming the scenario – and the initial source had a good reputation with the British because it had provided reliable information before (NA PREM 13/2638, Telegram no. 144 19 November 1968). The document’s authors express reserve nonetheless due to two factors: the motivation of

the first source to reveal such information was unknown and the reliability of the second source which confirmed could not be guaranteed (NA PREM 13/2638, Telegram no. 144 19 November 1968).

The same day another telegram arrived at the FCO from the British Delegation at NATO. Quoting Dutch intelligence sources, the document also mentioned that a military invasion of Romania by Soviet, Polish and Hungarian troops was going to occur on 22 November 1968 at 04,00 hours and also mentioned that the total strength of the Warsaw Pact forces was going to be 150,000 men. The invading troops were going to be composed mostly by airborne and tank battalions. The British delegation at NATO requested to receive further information from London on this topic (NA PREM 13/2638, Telegram no. 764, 19 November 1968).

London passed the information to Washington DC for consultation and advice – and this decision proves clearly that the information had not been disregarded. The matter was brought to the attention of President Lyndon Johnson and State Secretary Dean Rusk and was also discussed in the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) Watch Committee. The attitude in Washington DC appeared to be characterized by caution (NA, PREM 13/2638, Telegram no. 3403, 21 November 1968).

On 21 November 1968, FCO sent a telegram to the British Embassy in Bucharest advancing more information that had been obtained in the previous two days. The document stated: “there have been some other unusual moves in Eastern Europe, none of which seems of prime significance in itself but which taken together with the military developments give cause for concern. A frontier crossing point between Poland and the USSR has been closed. The heads of the three Soviet military missions in the Federal Republic of Germany are all simultaneously absent from their posts. This unusual happening may be linked with a meeting today of the East German National Defense Council. General Stemenko, the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact is in Bulgaria. It is reported that Field Marshal Grechko, the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact, is in the Southern USSR not far from Rumania at Kisinev. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR has begun transmitting continuously to all Soviet embassies long cypher messages” (NA, PREM 13/2638, Telegram no. 637, 21 November 1968).

The document emphasized that although there was no sign of further Soviet-Romanian frictions and Bucharest had lowered its criticism of Moscow in a conciliatory manner, the Soviet Union had the political and military capacity to act in Romania in anyway it pleased and was free to ignore all NATO warnings if intervention was indeed wanted in the Kremlin. As a conclusion, the document mentioned: “bearing in mind the accumulation of unusual events we cannot exclude the possibility that the moves might be a preparation for military action against Romania” (NA, PREM 13/2638, Telegram no. 637, 21 November 1968). After this initial evaluation, a second telegram was sent the next day, 22 November 1968, containing precise instructions for the British diplomats in Bucharest.

A warning for the foe

The telegram sent from FCO to Bucharest on 22 November 1968 reiterated the initial assessment according to which a military intervention in Romania could not be

excluded, though underlining that the evidence was cumulative and had a speculative character. Nevertheless, officials at FCO decided to inform Bucharest of this, which goes to prove that the matter was taken seriously at London. The telegram instructed the British diplomats in Bucharest as follows: “We think it right to ensure that the Rumanians are aware of our assessment. This should be done at the highest level possible, and in strict confidence. If you see no objection, please speak accordingly at the earliest opportunity” (NA, PREM 13/2638, Telegram no. 638, 22 November 1968).

FCO also informed its Embassy in Bucharest that British officials have contacted the Soviet Ambassador in London, Mikhail Smirnovsky and asked reassurances in light of recent “rumors” concerning Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe. Smirnovsky replied: “I know nothing about any rumors” (NA, PREM 13/2638, Telegram no. 638, 22 November 1968). The British Ambassador in Bucharest, John Edward Chadwick, acted rather quickly and asked for an urgent meeting with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, George Macovescu, only hours after being instructed to do so by London.

Chadwick told Macovescu everything he was instructed to transmit and later reported back to FCO: “He said he had already had broadly similar information from other Governments (which he did not specify) consistent with a new move against Czechoslovakia, some of the movements being designed to screen this main operation. However the information I gave about Grechko and Stemenko was new and the Rumanian Government would have to think it all over again very carefully. He said that the Rumanians had themselves heard from their own sources a rumor that an invasion was to take place yesterday. It had not happened” (NA, PREM 13/2638, Telegram no. 553, 22 November 1968).

In other words, it was Chadwick’s impression that Macovescu did not seem very concerned about the information. He also informed the British Ambassador that there were indeed official plans for some Warsaw Pact exercises involving Soviet, Polish and Bulgarian troops, but Romania did not intend to participate (NA, PREM 13/2638, Telegram no. 553, 22 November 1968).

Romania and the other Warsaw Pact countries were at the time involved in long controversies regarding the role of the alliance and the way it functioned. Moscow was keen on enlarging the attributes of the central command structures of the Warsaw Pact in order to facilitate military reactions in case of necessity and improve the efficiency of the alliance. The Romanians, on the other hand, were suspicious that all Moscow wanted in fact was to improve its control over the other Warsaw Pact countries and insisted on respecting the principle of sovereignty, namely the right of the national governments to issue orders instead of the central command structures of the alliance (Oprîș 2008: 147; Deletant 2007: 495-507). The controversies intensified after the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia when Romania decided that no foreign troops could enter or be stationed on its territory without the express approval of the Grand National Assembly, the legislative organ. The other allies argue that such a measure would terribly disturb the efficiency of reaction and further complicate the procedures for any military exercise, but in the following years Romania continued to refuse to take part in Warsaw Pact military exercises which involved movement of foreign troops on its territory.

The FCO responded to Chadwick's telegram the same day in order to share new information. Apparently the discussion between Chadwick and Macovescu convinced London that a Soviet attack on Romania was not imminent, but, as the telegram shows, officials in London continued to remain preoccupied of this possibility and were not in a hurry to rule it out. Chadwick was informed by the FCO that: "We nevertheless remain concerned over rumors of an invasion. In this situation we note various bits and pieces of information in addition to the original rumor of an invasion in the early hours of 22 November. We have an instance of a Western military attaché's not being able to travel in an area in Poland near the Soviet border. This looks more serious in the face of unconfirmed reports of military movements in the Soviet Union. And in this circumstance Red Star's report of Marshal Grechko's having been in Kishinev raises questions. Similarly we do not know what Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff Shtemenko has been doing on what appears to be a lengthy visit to Bulgaria" (NA, PREM 13/2638, Telegram no. 3423, 22 November 1968).

What was the nature of Britain's interest?

The possibility of a Soviet-led military intervention in Romania had been discussed at London immediately after the events in Czechoslovakia, but in relation to a different scenario which had Yugoslavia in its center. Apparently the long series of analyses had been started after an inquiry addressed by the Yugoslav Ambassador in London on 27 August 1968. Belgrade was interested to know what Britain's position would be in case Yugoslavia would have become the target of a Warsaw Pact aggression. The Yugoslav Ambassador also asked about Britain's attitude in the event of a similar intervention against its neighbor Romania. What the Yugoslavs wanted London to understand clearly was that a Soviet military presence at their borders – as a consequence of a military intervention in Romania – was viewed in Belgrade as a major security threat (NA, PREM 13/2638, A Soviet Treat to Yugoslavia, 5 September 1968).

Following this inquiry, the governmental circles in London started to analyze the eventual impact of such a scenario, concluding that the fall of Yugoslavia would be a major catastrophe for NATO and especially for Britain's security interests in the Mediterranean. It was also concluded that any invasion of Yugoslavia would have to be preceded by an invasion of Romania so practically Romania's situation in relation to its Warsaw Pact allies was the best indicator for Yugoslavia's future. The matter was discussed even by the Cabinet and two major conclusions were reached at that point: firstly, that NATO only paid attention to the defense of its member states and neglected the situation of neutral or non-aligned states in its strategies and, secondly, that any major initiative related to defending or supporting either Yugoslavia or Romania would have to be strongly coordinated with the Americans. Romania was therefore becoming a key piece in the British strategy to safeguard the Mediterranean.

Prime Minister Harold Wilson discussed the issue with the Foreign Secretary and the Defense Secretary on 6 September 1968 and reached a number of conclusions. These are resumed in a note of the meeting: "The invasion of Czechoslovakia had been designed to maintain the status-quo. An invasion of Yugoslavia would drastically change it. Nor were present Soviet troops dispositions such as to enable them to

attack Yugoslavia, especially since the Yugoslavians would undeniably resist. (...) A Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia would not only have profound political consequences; it would represent a major change in the military balance which NATO could not permit without risking encouraging the Russians to move against such countries as Finland, Sweden, Iran, and possibly even members of the Alliance such as Greece or Turkey” (NA, PREM 13/2638, Untitled note, 6 September 1968).

During that meeting, the Defense Secretary also advised in favor of warning the Soviets that in case of an attack against Yugoslavia, Britain would reserve its right to support that country in any way possible, including by arms supplies and military missions in support of the expect guerilla fight. The Defense Secretary also pointed out how important it was to consolidate defense measures in the Mediterranean and also to coordinate every reaction and measure with the Americans (NA, PREM 13/2638, Untitled note, 6 September 1968). At all times, though, the British Cabinet connected Yugoslavia’s situation to that of Romania’s, as it is clear from a note dispatched by London to its diplomatic office in Washington DC: “it remains our assessment that the Russians are conducting a war of nerves against Rumania and Yugoslavia rather than contemplating military action against them in the near future. The likelihood of an attack against Yugoslavia (which we would expect to be preceded by action against Rumania) must depend greatly on the political assessment of Russian objectives and of how the Soviet leaders would weigh the balance of advantage overall” (NA, PREM 13/2638, Telegram no. 7055, 6 September 1968).

A possible conclusion

First of all, the documents presented above demonstrate that London’s interest in Romania’s situation was not circumstantial, but part of a wider range of British interests and assessments. This way, it contributes to a better and nuanced understanding of the support given by the West to Nicolae Ceaușescu, as limited as that support may have been.

In what concerns the rumors of an invasion, one must bear in mind that the resources for clarifying it are mostly absent. It is only in the Soviet archives that a clear answer can be found and researchers of Communism have generally had frustrating experiences trying to access documents in Moscow, especially documents of such a delicate nature. This is why, at this point, one can only use presumptions in order to understand what happened in November 1968 and the most plausible of them is that Moscow and its allies must have produced these rumors as a mean to exercise pressure on Romania. Intoxication would have been a way to test both the West’s and Romania’s reaction to such a possibility but especially to intimidate Nicolae Ceaușescu, as Moscow had tried before by various other means. Nevertheless, a consistent conclusion that results from this was that Nicolae Ceaușescu’s regime was subjected to major pressures in order to give in from its position and get back in line with the other Warsaw Pact countries. The existence of such pressures – and their magnitude – must be considered when analyzing the regime’s decisions in any sphere.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BLACK SEA FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

*Andreea Gavrilă**

Abstract

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, but especially with the decision to expand NATO in 2002, the Black Sea became an intersection of Euro-Atlantic geopolitical and geo-economic borders. At the same time, the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to NATO (2004) and to the EU (2007) brought the two organizations into a region that has been under the influence of the Russian Federation. The aims of this article are to determinate the way that these geostrategic movements have influenced the importance of the Black Sea, not only for NATO and the EU, but also for Russia. The objectives are to identify the main reasons for which this region is so important, to describe and present the military strengthening from the Black Sea Region, and to establish the role and significance of Crimea for Russia.

From the perspective of this research, geopolitics is used to analyze the foreign policy of Russia towards the Black Sea, by seeking to understand, explain and anticipate the international political behavior of the states from the wider Black Sea region as well as of the global actors.

The main conclusion of this article is that the Black Sea plays a very important role for the Russian Federation and the placement of the Black Sea region in the focus of the strategic concerns is a requirement of the current global interest, but also an essential condition for the good evolution of relations in this region, as well as for the regional and global stability and security.

Key words: *the Black Sea, the Russian Federation, NATO, Black Sea Fleet*

Why is the Black Sea important?

In the decree of 31 December 2015, the Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined the strategy of national security of the country. The document reflects the deterioration of relations with the West after the crisis in Ukraine, stating that the United States and its allies are credited with the intention to dominate the world, and NATO appears to be the main threat to security.

The Decree and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation of December 25, 2014 allow us to analyze the Kremlin's strategic concerns and plans. Both documents describe the threat posed by NATO, as well as the reduction of Moscow's influence on the former Soviet republics.

The need to restore its former greatness and leadership among the neighboring countries is also noted, as well as the need to prevent NATO's expansion to the east. To achieve these goals, Russia's leadership in the Black Sea region is extremely important, as the region provides many geopolitical advantages.

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To ensure its leadership, Russia is taking a number of steps. First, NATO's ties with states in the region are weakened, obstacles are created for the development of their relations, and, if necessary, force will be used to stop the expansion of the alliance. Secondly, in the region, Russia is building up its military presence, competing with NATO for supremacy in the Black Sea.

The Black Sea has a special significance in Russia's strategic calculations for a few reasons. Firstly, this is an important "crossroads" in the region. Access to the Black Sea is vital for coastal and neighboring states and provides the possibility of transferring forces to neighboring territories. Domination in the Black Sea will allow Russia to transfer forces to the Eastern Mediterranean, to the north of the Middle East, the Transcaucasus and continental Europe. For example, the ships of the Black Sea Fleet provided operations in Syria.

Secondly, the region is an important transit corridor for goods and energy resources. Control over ports and sea routes will allow Russia to block these routes and to incline countries to cooperation. Moscow can also create difficulties or cut off the supply of raw materials from the Caspian Sea basin to Europe. Such actions can jeopardize the delivery of raw materials from countries such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and, most importantly, violate the EU's aspirations to receive energy resources bypassing Russia.

Thirdly, the Black Sea is the Achilles' heel of NATO on the eastern flank of the alliance. The region is very rich in cultural and ethnic diversity, and due to close neighborhood, countries have historically developed close ties with Russia. Discontent and ethnic contradictions can be used by Moscow as a pretext for interfering in the conflicts of neighbors and inciting the governments of the countries to their side. By "entrapping" NATO members, Moscow can weaken the alliance's cohesion and undermine confidence in it.

Military Strengthening in the Black Sea Region

Russia is strengthening its military power in the Black Sea. A long-term rearmament program is being carried out to ensure the limitation and denial of access and maneuver, or to create a "protective dome" over the region. Measures are being taken to prevent the emergence of enemy forces in the region and to hamper its movement. NATO efforts can be hampered by an increase in the price of cooperation in the region, the reluctance of the Allies to create a collective system for protecting and reducing the alliance's influence. The inaction of NATO will raise Russia's prestige, demonstrating its ability to compete with the West.

In the Black Sea region Crimea will become the main platform for creating a "protective dome". On the peninsula, there are such systems as the Bastion-P anti-ship missile system equipped with P-800 Onix missiles, the S-300B4 and S-400 Triumph air defense missile system. The upgrade program involves the re-equipment of old Soviet bunkers, the modernization of radar systems and the installation of advanced electronic equipment. As in the case of Russian systems in Armenia, Krasnodar and Latakia, the "protective dome" covers most of the territories of the region and the Black Sea, as well as parts of Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine.

Despite the active measures taken by Russia, its dominance in the Black Sea region faces difficulties. For example, Turkey gives Russia access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, but the long-term nature of this cooperation is not guaranteed. Contradictions create a Syrian conflict: Russia supports the Assad regime, and Turkey opposes it. The incident with the downed Russian fighter marked the unreliability of the relationship. In case of an aggravation, Moscow should make sure that Turkey remains neutral and will allow Russia to supply troops to the Mediterranean. If the path is blocked, Russian troops will be in danger. Being the second most powerful military country in the region, Turkey will be a threat to the Russian troops if they will end up in isolation. This will affect the authority of Russia and its status as a military power. Therefore, Moscow should cooperate with Ankara, strengthen bilateral ties and find a compromise.

Another troubled neighbor of Russia is Romania. Although the military capabilities of this country are not so dangerous, its desire to contribute to NATO's presence in the Black Sea region is at odds with Moscow's long-term plans. Between Russia and Romania there are several unresolved disputes: the intricate fate of Romanian treasures sent to Russia during World War II and Russia's refusal to denounce the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This partly explains Romania's accession to NATO and its cautious attitude toward Russia's intentions. To "neutralize" Romania, Russia can support pan-nationalist ideas and the concept of "Great Romania". This will lead to Romania's dispute with neighboring Ukraine and Moldova.

The creation of a "protective dome" by Russia in the Black Sea is also complicated by difficulties. Modernization of the army is expensive. State revenues fell due to lower oil prices and sanctions. In addition, Russian shipbuilding suffers because of the termination of the supply of engines from Ukraine due to the annexation of the Crimea. Therefore, the full implementation of modernization is questionable. The "protective dome" is an economical measure to counteract NATO at sea. If Russia does not fully implement the plan, the effectiveness of the "dome" will be in question.

The role and significance of Crimea for Russia

Crimea always had strategic importance, and possession of it meant control over the Black Sea and neighboring regions. The bases of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea are constantly in a very dubious legal and political situation. The Russian naval forces are much inferior to the Turkish fleet, but at the same time, because of its strategic location, the balance of power is kept between the two great countries.

The idea of creating a large fleet on the Black Sea arose immediately after the end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774, when the Russian Empress Catherine II, thought that the Russian Empire should strengthen its military presence in the Black Sea. However, small ships of the Azov flotilla were not able to resist the Turkish fleet on the high seas.

On December 11th, 1775, the decree of Catherine II was issued, in which the main directions of building the fleet on the Black Sea were determined. The construction of "twenty large warships with small needs for them" was envisaged. To this end, the commander of the Azov Flotilla Vice Admiral A.N. Senyavin was

ordered to inspect the Dnieper estuary in order to find a convenient place for the construction of shipyards.

By the Decree of the Empress on March 31st, 1778, the construction of the fleet on the Black Sea was given to the Novorossiysk governor-general, to Prince Grigory Aleksandrovich Potemkin.

In October 1782, Russian troops entered the Crimea under the command of Lieutenant-General Anton Bogdanovich de Balmen, who distributed them along the peninsula and occupied the Akhtiar Bay. A.V. Suvorov fortified Kinburn, covering the Dnieper estuary, and forced the Turkish fleet to retreat into the sea under the leadership of the kapudan-pasha himself.

The adopted measures restrained the aspirations of the Turks and pacified the Crimean Tatars. But it became absolutely clear that the independence of Crimea would not last long. Sooner or later Crimea would become either Turkish or Russian. Catherine II knew the fact that if Crimea would become part of the Russian Empire, this would solve a number of problems. This would lead to the creation of an uninterrupted border between the Black and Azov Seas, which would radically change the very defense of the southern borders, and it would strengthen Russia's influence on the Black Sea region.

On 8 December 1782, through a confidential decree she asked the Foreign Relations Commission to analyze the issue of unifying Crimea with the Russian Empire, and also "to trace a general system for reasoning our behavior with all the other powers". In other words, Catherine II, wanted to find a diplomatic solution, accepted by the great powers of the time and by the international law, to cleave Crimea to the Russian Empire.

Analyzing the political and military situation in Europe and considering the possible reactions of every major European power, the Foreign Relations Commission came to the conclusion that the unification of Crimea with the Russian Empire was considered an urgent necessity, while stressing the favorable circumstances for the realization of this unification. On the basis of this report, it was concluded that establishing a permanent fleet in the Black Sea would provide the Russian Empire with an ideal position to pursue Ottoman activities.

As a result of hard diplomatic work and the comprehensive justification supported by the movements of the Russian troops on 8 April 1783, Catherine II published the Manifesto on the unification of Crimea with the Russian Empire.

After the final documents for the unification of Crimea with Russia were signed, on 2 February 1784, the same day, a decree was signed for the establishment of the Tauride region. And already on 10 February a decree was issued for the construction of new fortifications on the southern borders, among which was to build "the fortress of Great Sevastopol". Thus, Sevastopol officially became the main place of stay for the Black Sea fleet, a trading port and fortress.

For 233 years the Black Sea Fleet has been serving on the southern borders of Russia. Through the thickness of years it is clearly visible that, without its naval forces, Russia could not have won, nor defended the Northern Black Sea coast or it could not have added Crimea to the Empire and reach the Mediterranean Sea. Russia is rightfully proud of the glorious pages of history of the Black Sea Fleet. Even now the

Black Sea Fleet continues to remain one of the main groups of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and there is every reason to believe that its role will continue to increase in the future.

The United States and its NATO partners have projects on strengthening the presence in the Black Sea, or rather, in the Black Sea region, including the Balkans and the South Caucasus. However, NATO also refuses to give all the power to Turkey, and searched for an alternative option.

Thus, following the Warsaw Summit, on the proposal of Romania and with the support of the US and Turkey, the idea of forming a NATO Black Sea fleet in Romania's territorial waters (about 4,000-5,000 NATO troops, mostly Romanians) appeared. An important component of the increased presence of NATO on the eastern flank of Europe is the Black Sea Allies' fleet.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also underlined at the Warsaw summit the importance of security in the Black Sea for NATO. It is important “not only for riparian Allies, but also for non-riparian Allies. All Allies must contribute to NATO's presence in the Black Sea”.

Although Turkey has improved relations with Russia after the jet crisis, it has not objected to NATO's plans to form a fleet in the Black Sea region. The NATO secretary-general Stoltenberg stated that: “On the Black Sea region, we have agreed to have a multi-national, Romanian-led brigade for training. And that would be a multi-national brigade with forces from different NATO allies, but the lead nation will be Romania and it will be relevant for the whole southeast of the alliance. We have also agreed to increase our presence in the air and at sea on the Black Sea. We are working on the details of this increase in presence”. Following the approval of Erdoğan for NATO's plans, the NATO secretary-general stated that these actions would fully respect the Montreux Convention. “We will make sure that the increased NATO presence in the Black Sea will happen in a way which is defensive, proportionate, and does not increase tensions in the Black Sea region”.

By the end of 2014 Russia had a more precise military doctrine. There was a special interdepartmental working group set up under the Russian Security Council, which prepared draft amendments to this important state document. Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation M. Popov noted that “This is due to the emergence of new military dangers and military threats to the Russian Federation that manifested itself in the events of the Arab spring, in the armed conflict in Syria, as well as in the situation in and around Ukraine”. He also stressed that the expansion of the NATO bloc (its third stage) is also a threat that requires adjustments to the military doctrine of Russia.

Before the unification of Crimea with Russia, the military journalist V. Shurygin wrote: “The Russian military expert community has had long and lingering debates about the future fate of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia. The most knowledgeable experts vied with each other to prove the pointlessness of the fleet's continued presence in Sevastopol, the uselessness of the existing treaty on the fleet's stay in the Crimea. They supported the early withdrawal of ships to Novorossiysk, where, even in the “bearish corner” of the Black Sea, but we can develop the fleet without looking back at anyone”.

This was considered a “sober expert appraisal”. But times have changed and Crimea became the southern strategic outpost of Russia. The Crimean peninsula, large in geographical dimensions, hangs over the entire Azov-Black Sea basin from the north. The peninsula is relatively close to the Black Sea straits with which it is possible to control the connection of the Black and Mediterranean seas, the Bosphorus Strait and the Istanbul metropolis with the surrounding areas, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. The peninsula is ideal for deploying missile defenses covering the direction of possible threats from the Mediterranean. All this gives Crimea the title of the most important strategic position of the entire Black Sea region. Without a doubt, the Crimean territory is a place of concentration of geopolitical interests of Turkey, the United States, NATO and the European Union. “This interest from many states is due to the fact that there are convenient ports on the territory of Crimea (Sevastopol, Feodosia, Kerch). Also, interest in the peninsula is caused by the fact that it is an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”, whose possession grants the right to control the entire Black Sea-Azov region”.

Ukraine has also a particular interest, since the Crimean peninsula makes it possible to control all of its Black Sea coast and adjacent regions with all their naval, air and military infrastructures.

The first task for Russia seems to be the development of Crimea as a military outpost, it is necessary to address the issues of supplying the peninsula and its transport connectivity with the territory of Russia, as some sea and ferry routes for solving the tasks are not enough. One of the most important questions to be solved was the stable and sufficient supply of fresh water, electricity to the peninsula, the development of transport infrastructure inside the peninsula, the construction of a strategic bridge over the Kerch Strait. All this is connected and intertwined with the development of the military-logistics structure for the deployment of the Russian troops in Crimea.

For Sevastopol, as for the largest base of the Russian Navy on the Black Sea, as well as other port cities in Crimea, the issues of reconstruction and modernization of port facilities are relevant. It is assumed that the two Russian naval bases – Sevastopol and Novorossiysk – will “play in tandem”, increasing the stability of the Black Sea Fleet.

On 16 September 2014, at a meeting of the Defense Ministry's board of Defense Minister of Russia S. Shoigu said that the Southern Military District will expand at the expense of the territory of the Crimean peninsula and strengthen the grouping of troops in the Crimean direction. “The military-political situation in the south-western strategic direction since the beginning of this year has changed significantly. This is largely due to the expansion of the territory of the Southern Military District after the entry of Crimea into Russia. In addition, the situation in Ukraine sharply worsened and the foreign military presence in the immediate vicinity of our border increased”.

By now, the formation of a grouping of Material and Technical Support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Crimea has been completed. It consists of a stationary and mobile component. The stationary part of the MTS is the center of the Black Sea Fleet with a system of bases and warehouses, and the mobile

unit is represented by a separate logistical support team. On the Crimean peninsula all the necessary conditions have been created for the technical support of the grouping of troops, as well as the territorial center of metrology and the laboratory for the examination and testing of naval weapons. In addition, on the Crimean peninsula, are objects of tracking for outer space and objects of missile defense.

Currently, the Russian group in the Crimea (including Sevastopol) has more than 25 thousand soldiers and officers. The fleet includes 2,739 ships, of which 43 are combat ones. It is based on the naval forces and is part of the Southern Military District (headquarters in Rostov-on-Don). Today, the district also includes the republics of the North Caucasus, the Stavropol Territory, the Astrakhan, Volgograd and Rostov regions, as well as the Kapustin Yar test site, where strategic missile tests are conducted. In the opinion of the representatives of the Association of Military Political Scientists, it is about bringing the grouping of troops to 40,000 personnel, as well as its reinforcement by amphibious forces, Special Forces and the Air Force.

The Black Sea Fleet, according to Russian military experts, is not in the best shape today, but the modernization of the Black Sea Fleet has begun and will proceed at a faster pace due to the unification of the Crimea with Russia. The fact that the Black Sea Fleet is not in a good shape was openly spoken by Russian military experts even before Crimea joined Russia. The modernization of the Black Sea Fleet began in 2013, but the full-scale reinforcement of the fleet by new ships was considered impossible due to the presence of the fleet on the territory of another state.

With the development of the crisis in Ukraine, and the growing confrontation between NATO and Russia, the role of Crimea is growing. The Russian government fully understands this and takes steps in the direction of reinforcing the Black Sea Russian Fleet. It seems that the strengthening of Crimea from a military-strategic point of view, certainly found its place in the specified military doctrine of Russia.

At the meeting of the defense ministers of the alliance, held in Brussels, Jens Stoltenberg promised to dramatically strengthen the naval presence in this region of the planet. NATO's interest in the Black Sea basin has recently become quite evident. The Alliance ships cruise through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and the number of regular naval maneuvers in the Black Sea clearly exceeds the NATO standards adopted for other seas and oceans.

The current Pentagon chief, James Mattis, affirmed that: "Each of our last three presidents has had great expectations of building a partnership with the Russian government. Each attempt has failed, not for lack of good faith and effort on the U.S. side, but because of a stubborn fact that we must finally recognize: Putin wants to be our enemy. He will never be our partner ... He believes that strengthening Russia means weakening America. We must proceed realistically on this basis." Mattis also said he supports cooperation with Russia on common interests, stating that the conversation will be conducted from "a position of strength."

In response to this statement, Russian Defense Minister Army General Sergei Shoigu warned his colleague against such statements, stressing that "attempts to build a dialogue from a position of force towards Russia are unpromising."

Nevertheless, all of NATO's current activities with regard to Russia are conducted in a power demonstrative way. This concerns not only the recent transfer

of NATO units to Poland and the Batiks, but also the actions of the alliance in the Black Sea. Just recently, there were large-scale joint exercises Sea Shield – 2017 of the navies of the NATO member countries. In the maneuvers were involved ships and units from Romania, Spain, Canada, the United States, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

At the same time, Jens Stoltenberg emphasizes that the increased presence of NATO in the Black Sea is “proportional and defensive in nature.” “We have decided that this is a necessary response to the behavior of Russia against Ukraine, because NATO’s military presence is not there to provoke a conflict but we are there to prevent a conflict”.

The excessive attention of the NATO fleet to the Black Sea basin is an irritating factor for the Russian side. The Russian Federation considers, that it also contradicts the existing agreements at the international level, in particular, the Montreux Convention adopted in 1936 that limits the stay in the Black Sea water of warships of non-Black Sea powers for a period of 21 days. In fact, only Romania, Turkey and Bulgaria can afford a permanent legal presence in the Black Sea waters.

In July 2016, at a meeting of the Russia-NATO Council, the permanent representative of the Russian Federation, under the alliance, Alexander Grushko, said that the Russian Federation considers any growth of the military activity of the bloc in the Black Sea region as a source of destabilization and not conducive to security. The Russian side also announced its readiness, in response to the strengthening of the naval grouping of NATO in the Black Sea, to do everything to ensure that the balance of power in the region was not violated.

On the same topic recently spoke the chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee Vladimir Shamanov, at a meeting with the military attachés accredited in Moscow, he recalled the sharply increased alliance budget – \$ 26 billion, and also drew attention to the fact that Russia was declared practically “the main threat to the civilized world.” “This can only cause our country's bewilderment”. The head of the Duma Defense Committee also affirmed that Russia allowed the use of NATO forces stationed on the eastern flank of the bloc in offensive operations against the Russian Federation. In this regard, Vladimir Shamanov compared the current situation with the position of Hitler, who signed a non-aggression pact, but perfidiously violated it, attacking Russia in June 1941.

Experts from the US military-analytical company Stratfor stated that Russia will have to deal with more frequent NATO sorties into the Black Sea due to the increased interest of the alliance in this region. In their opinion, the struggle for influence in the Black Sea region will only become more acute, since in the eyes of NATO this water area will receive neither more nor less strategic value. The experts of this analytical structure also spoke about Russia's superiority in the region over the forces of the alliance. In particular, such prevalence is observed in aviation and naval forces, including the underwater, which is being actively modernized. In this regard, it is evident that the outpost of the Russian Federation on the Black Sea, the Crimea, is of particular importance.

Speaking earlier this year at the board of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the head of the department Sergei Shoigu announced the completion of the formation of an army corps in the Crimea.

The creation of the supporting infrastructure of the 126th separate coastal protection brigade of the Black Sea Fleet, stationed in Perevalnoye settlement, is also completed.

According to former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, the strengthening of NATO will not change Russia's superiority in the region. "Russia has all the resources to keep the advantage in the Black Sea – both moral and material – the Force for fighting the NATO military in the Black Sea is sufficient for our fleet. The Black Sea Fleet in this region dominates."

It is obvious that the strategic value of the Black Sea will continue to grow, as all the major geopolitical actors will become aware of its importance, which will lead to the establishment and implementation of specific policies in this area.

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OGUZ'S HISTORY IN THE EXAMPLES OF FOLKLORE

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Abstract

Genealogical data reached us as legends, stories, fairy tales, poems, poetries, and oratorical speeches which tell us about origin of human, formation of nations and tribes and their disjunction, about well-known heroes' and other famous people's life, customs and traditions, political events etc. The ability of the legendary and genealogic information of the poems and legends such as "Turkmen genealogy", "Oguz-name", "The book of Korkyt Ata" can open new stage of the history. Containing the information about world outlook and religious beliefs, and etc. of Oguz tribes who populated Syrdaïya region, Aral, the north of Kaspi Sea plays considerable role in unfolding the content of the topic.

In the study, the results of archaeological excavations carried out in the towns of Oguz and data of samples of folklore were compared, and it was determined that it was the cultural heritage of cities of Zhankent, Kumkent, Shaulder, Barshinkent. It was proved that using data of folklore samples can help to unfold the historical truth.

Key words: *Oguz tribes, folklore, poems, legends, genealogy*

Introduction

It is clear that archeology science and examples of folklore, which are considered as a part of the history science have significant role in investigating the ancient history of any nations that lived in the era when there were no letter. Although it can be mostly related to the ancient era history, some cases of medieval period can be researched in considerably high degree through the examples of folklore. Volter said that "As one of the greatest philosopher said, all ancient history is a set of famous fairytales" (Vud, 1981: 9). Their descriptions are various as well. It can be a legend, for example, or a data which contains much information about the historical events of the nation and its life, that may serve as a basis for further investigation.

Genealogical data reached us as legends, stories, fairy tales, poems, poetries, and oratorical speeches which tell us about origin of human, formation of nations and tribes and their disjunction, about well-known heroes' and other famous people's life, customs and traditions, political events etc.

There are many viewpoints about genealogical data types, namely, mythical genealogical data, genealogical data of Kazakh tribes, genealogical data of exact historical person, genealogical data on ethno toponyme etc. There are plenty of genealogical and legendary data about Oguz issue, their life, customs and

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traditions ethno geological expansion, the similarity of tribes' names with some toponyme etc.

Kazakh genealogical data along with poetry and fairy tales were spiritual food of nomad people. There is a definition to the genealogical data, which says that "Genealogical data is a part of the History science, which tells us about origin of people and their expansion". Thus, it is necessary to research the history of our nation populated the wide territory for thousand years, which has common language, traditions, culture and customs, starting from ancient eras, rather than going to 5-6 centuries back.

While studying the history of Oguz, one important thing which was out of our attention is the history of cities and towns and their ethnical names which can be researched by using folklore samples (for example, "Oguz Kaghan", "Korkyt Ata", legends about cities of Zhanakent, Kumkent, "Shajara of Turkmen" of Abilghazy) of the history of Oguz. These studies shows us that analyzing the samples of folklore comparing them with archaeological data can unfold the history of cities and stories about the cities, for example, the fact that Oguz cities – Zhankent and Kumkent were demolished by snakes, one of Kypshak tribes – Kaiy whose totem was snake make Oguz tribes to move from Syrdarya riverside. This develops the scientific viewpoint about cities, and shows that samples of folklore can be used additionally to research the name of the cities and tribes.

Oguzs in the examples of folklore

The legend titled "Oguz Khan" is about a great thinker, hero and commander Oguz (Uyz, Ouyz) who united Turk and Oguz people as one state in the ancient era. This is not only genealogical data about exact person known in the history, on the contrary, it is a legend about partly legendary, partly mythical person, that is, the most ancient version of historical composition among ethical legends. The legend was published for the first time based on the Abilghazy Bahadur's work titled "Turk genealogy" (Shadjara-i-turk, 1663-1664) which was written in the 17th century (The words of grandfathers: Thousand volume, 2012: 335).

It is written about Oguz Khan's address for nation to accept Islam and his decision to kill those who will not accept Islam and use their children as slaves, as well as it is about war against other states. The following war was against Tatars, when he conquered them. The following is written about this war: "Oguz Khan attacked Tatars. Tatar Khan could not withstand with his majority army. Oguz won. Oguz Khan's army got plenty of wealth. But he had few horses to carry them back with them. There was one master among his army, who thought of constructing a trolley. He constructed trolley and put all wealth on it. Until that time the trolley was not invented. While it was moving, it made sound "kank-kank", therefore it was named as "kank" and his inventor was given a nick name "Kankyly" (Kildiroglu, 2013). Accordingly, all his generation took his name" (The words of grandfathers: Thousand volume, 2012: 11).

Thus, we can get information about formation of names of some tribes. However, considering all folklore examples as true history may confuse. As it has been for many centuries, it can conserve each era's and each period's historical events.

Therefore, when using folklore in the research of the historical events, it is necessary to pay attention to the historical significance of composition. It relates directly to the ethno name of “Zhalaiyr”. The meaning of the ethno name “Zhalaiyr” was not unfold till present and is based on the legends and stories. As current Zhalaiyr people forgot their genealogical data, in historical legends situations after Mongol conquest and during Kazakh Khanate can be seen rarely.

For example, there is a legend about Zhalaiyr people by Kishygara Salgarauly. According to him, the real name of Zhalaiyr was Kudaiberger. When he rode a horse without its bridle against enemies, he has torn apart the horse mane. Therefore, he was given a nick name Zhalaiyr (torn apart the horse mane) (Salgaryuly, 1992: 189-190). There are some legends that use other name Kabylan instead of Kudaiberger (Tolkynbekuly, 2000: 12).

The famous Kazakh writer S.Mukanov presents other legend, according to which the real name of Zhalaiyr was Zhansakal. When he was hunting he put a par this horse mane. Therefore, he was given a name Zhalaiyr (Tolkynbekuly, 2000: 12).

We cannot say that these legends totally unfold historical truth. It is impossible that Zhalaiyr's name was Kudaiberger or Kabylan as legends tell us. Because the word “Kudai” was not used in the Turk and Mongol period, its replacement of the word “Tangir” is related to the late Iranian influence. The name Kabylan cannot replace the name Zhalaiyr as well. Because, it is a name of a person, which became a slogan of Zhalaiyr tribe in the period of Kazakh Khanate. It is necessary to keep in mind that firstly, tribe is formed, and then it is given a name, only after that the slogan is taken. Zhansakal is a person in the late Kazakh genealogical data, it can be concluded that his name, therefore, cannot be Zhalaiyr (Gabzhalilov et al., 2007: 93-94).

Generally speaking, genealogical expansion of Turk people can be seen from Abilgazy Bahadur Khan's script “Turkimen Shezhiresi” along with “Oguz-name” which is common for Turk people and “Korkytata” (Oğuz, 2013). Generally, not only Oguz, but all nomadic people who pay much attention to the tribal genealogy and its organization, could keep oral history retelling tradition. Although “Oguz-name” was not written for the separate tribes' genealogy, it is considered as epic composition based on Turkish speaking people's ancient genealogical legend (Omarbekov, 2015).

Several versions of “Oguz-name” poem is known and it is indisputable that these version's author represents one of the tribes currently included in Kazakh nation, which populated the territory of Kazakhstan, namely region of Syr, Zhetisu, and Turkistan. Moreover, the poem “Oguz-name” provide us with many information about Oguz people (Omarbekov et al., 2016). Generally, there is plenty of data about Oguz Kagan. Namely, the main character of the poem Oguz Kagan's birth, reaching adulthood and being involved in governing the country, as well as, his trips to Iran, Syria, Egypt through Samarkand, Bukhara and Khorasan, bequeath to his sons (six sons from two wives) the territory conquered by him during his trips and all his wealth, and etc. stories and finding the mythological cult -a wolf beside Oguz Kagan that helped him is described. The versions of poem “Oguz-name” which reached us were written by Turkish genealogist Abilgazy Bahadur and Farsi historian Rashid-ad-Din (Rashid ad-Din Oghuz-name and Abilgazy (Khiua Khan), 1991). Some

scientists say that the version of a poem written by Abilgazy Bahadur is a copy of the script of Rashid-ad-Din who lived earlier. However, the version written by Abilgazy is widespread.

The period of the birth and upbringing of Oguz Kagan is full of many mysteries as well-known fairy tales and stories' plot. Furthermore, he is described as a person created from a sacred glow.

Islam came to the Great Kazakh Steppe in the 7th century along with Arab conquest. Whatever religion the tribes lived in this period had got, they later accepted Islam which is considered as the True religion. There were Karluk people, who accepted Islam first. This plot is presented in the poem "Oguz-name". "Three days, three nights he was not fed with his mother's milk, every night he came to his mother's dream and said: "Mom, become Muslim! If you do not become a Muslim, I will not suck your breast", no matter if I will die (Rashid ad-Din Oghuz-name and Abilgazy (Khiua Khan), 1991: 15). When he chose a bride, his first condition was to accept Islam. As we can see from the mentioned poem "Oguz-name" it can be clear what the influence of Islam was. Although, Islam is considered as the main religion among Turk people, particularly among Kazakh people, Tangirism, believing in Tangir, worship to Sun and environmental powers was priority. As famous scientists and educator Sh.Ualikhanov said: "In the 19th century Kazakh people didn't accept Islam fully", people was close to Tangirism and Shamanism (Valikhanov, 1961). Here is another question: if this pattern is also related to the society of Oguz Kagan from the poem "Oguz-name". Because, in the poem we can see the following lines: "Oguz Kagan worshiped to Tangir". In general, the words "Tangir", "sky" means "Creator", "Allah". Sh.Ualikhanov wrote: "The Sky can do whatever it wants to, it may forgive, it may punish. The state of people and nation being good or bad depends on it. The phrases like "May Tangir forgive", "The Sky punished", "May the Sky punish" are came from the Shamanism... Muslims translated the word "Tangir" to "Allah" in Shyngyz Khan's period, this word is close to the idea "Great power" in Shamanism" (Valikhanov, 1961).

Is there any sign of worshipping to the natural mysterious power? Oguz Kagan's and his two wives' six sons' names are Sun, Moon, Star, Sky, Mountain, and Sea. Three sons of his first wife were older than others and are considered as the main heirs and they were called "bozoq", and other three sons of his second wife were younger and they were called "ushoq".

Generally, the fact, that Oguz were divided into two separate groups was written in the compositions which first described the steppe people's spoken history. For example, in "The book of Korkyt Ata" written in the 15th century it is said that: "Derse who was Khan of Oguz people invited to the feasters (bek) of Ish Oguz, Tys Oguz. Kangly-kodja was searching a bride for his son Torali. "He searched for her among Ish Oguz people, but couldn't find, then he searched for her among Tys Oguz people, but couldn't find". These lines can say that Oguz were divided into two groups (Book of Korkyt Ata-Almaty, 1999: 131, 171). That is, K.Salgarauly assures the fact that Oguz consisted of two separate groups was dated far before the period of life of Korkyt Ata (Salgarauly, 2013: 112).

It is fact that the poem of Oguz was based on the history. T. Konyratbayev considering V.V. Radlov's viewpoint that Oguz Khan and Buka Khan are one person, proves that professor A.Konyratbayev's opinion that Oguz conquests were taken from the Turk Kaganate's period between the 1-3rd centuries, namely from Kapagan, Mogilan, Kultegin events (The literature of Ancient Ages, 1991: 128).

In the poem "Oguz-name" we can also see many historical data, including the territory of Oguz, tribe's consist, religious believes, conquests and many other information, which can be used as a data.

In the poem we can find the blue wolf (totem) which lead Oguz Kagan in his military trips and helped to win. The story of the fight of Oguz Kagan against Urum Kagan. In the story about wolf leading Oguz's army it is said that: "They camped and went asleep. In the morning the sunshine came in Oguz Kagan's tent. From this sunshine blue male wolf came out and it said to Oguz Kagan:

Hey, Oguz!

You will fight with Urum!

Hey, Oguz!

I will serve you! (Ogyznama, 1991: 72).

S.Sh. Kaziev in his work quotes Michael Siriets's word about the first fight of Turk before Muslims campaign and that they were led by "an animal similar to dog": "He walked in front of them, and they could not get close to him. When he wanted to go, he raised his voice and said: "Go!", I.e.: "Get up!", And they got up and followed him until he stopped, and then they settled down. And after he had led them many days, he disappeared, and anything more we have not read or heard [of it] ..." (Kaziev, 2014).

The mentioned above "Blue wolf" had later become a slogan and is considered as sacred animal for many Turk people. Therefore, from a group of genealogical legends it is obvious that Turk people's ancestors came from that sacred animal – dog and wolf (Valikhanov, 1961: 137). Say, Kyrgyz people according to the widespread legend the beauty queen and her army was created from the close relation of forty beauties and a red dog (Tuncay, 2016). N.Y. Bichurin in his book titled "The origin of Uigur" presents a legend about Urgur Khan's two beautiful daughters. Khan didn't want his daughters get married to anyone and he ordered to build a palace, where he locked them. His youngest daughter had a relationship with an old sacred wolf and later their generation had become a separate nation, which could howl and loved to sing a song all day long (Bichurin, 1950: 214-215). In the poem "Oguz-name" blue wolf is described as brave (Gültekin, 2015).

In the poem "Oguz-name", which contains much information about Oguz people, there are stories about their military trips to the west regions, and in some poems and legends there are description of Oguz people's military trips to China, Central Asian cities, Kabul and Ghazna, Kashmir, even to Egypt territory.

In the shortage of recorded data to reaserch particular period it is useful to study heritage of the samples of folklore. It is clear now that folklore and archeological data complement each other when it comes to unfold some historical events' content. As a result of legends, poems, geneological data today we can know more about the names tribes included in Kazakh people (Zhalaiyr, Kangly, Kypshak etc.), their origin (wolf, snake etc.), their beleifs, the historical truth related to their leaders's name. Contentual

features of folklore samples is that they contain a lot of information about origin of tribes and geneological origin.

Legends and stories about the origin of toponyme and tribal names

Although the history of nation is, first of all, connected with the people, it is crucial to keep in mind that the history of cities, towns, mausoleums, castles and repositories is a part of the history of nation. The true history can exist when they are investigated in complex. In ant period of history conserving the historical places and cultural heritage never lost its value. Among such cities there are the city which was visited by Mahmud Kashkari (Kashkari, 1993) and Arab travelers and known in their data as Ekiogiz (Ikioguz, Ekvius – in Zhetisu region), Sabran (Sauran), Sitkun (Sutkent), Sugnak (Syganak), Karnak, Hora-Zhuara, Zhent, Darqu etc. Other cities like Uzgent (Ozgent), Barshynkent (Kyzkala), Yangikent (Zhanakent) were famous Oguz cities located in this region.

It is known from the history that the region of Syr was prosperous place and motherland of human being. As the time passed we are introduced with valued data about it. The ancient cities, domes, towers and its remaining located in Syr region is considered as the most complex and valued signs left from Oguz period. As this tribe was the major one, which populated the area between Syr River and Torgai region between the 8th and 11th centuries, there are many historical heritages left in this region, which provides us with much information about them.

In the poems known among Turk people such as “Oguz-name”, “Korkyt Ata”, along with legends there are plenty of information about toponyme. The poem about Bamsy Bairakin “the Book of Korkyt Ata” is similar to the famous and known in Turk world poem “Alpamys Batyr” in many prospects: construction of the poem, its motive, the spirit of braveness. Banu-Sheshek– the wife of Alyp-Bamsy, who is Bamsy Bairak from the poem “Korkyt Ata”, is hero Alpamys’swife – Gulbarshyn (Barshyn Beauty) well-known among Kazakh, Karakalpak, Ozbek, Tatar, Bashkurt. According Abilgazy, Barshyn Beauty is one of the famous seven women ruled Oguz people. “According to Turkmen historians seven women ruled the country for a long time.

First of them is Altyn Gozdeki, the daughter of rich man named Sundun, hero named Salor Kazan’s wife, she is very tall. Second is rich man Karmysh’s daughter, wife of Mamysh Bek. Her name is Barshyn Salor. Her tomb is near Syr River. She was very famous. Ozbek people called her Barshyn’s Kokkeshene (Keshene is a beautiful dome)” (Rashid ad-Din Oghuz-name; Abilgazy (Khiua Khan), 1991, p.30). That is, daughter of rich man Karmysh, wife of hero Mamysh (Alpamys) Barshyn Beauty is remained as toponyme in Syr River region. One of the ancient cities remaining has a name in the history as “Barshynkent”, it is located in front of Kyzylorda city, on the left of the river. Kazakh people considered Barshyn Beauty as beautiful as Bayan Beauty from the poem “Kozy Korpesh and Bayan Sulu”, therefore, they called Barshynkent “Kyzkala” as well.

The gorgeous mausoleum of Barshyn Beauty is not far away from that city, it is below the city of Syganak, on the right side of Syr River, on the top of the hill. According to Abilgazy’s Turkmen genealogy this mausoleum was built in Oguz-Kypshak period (10-11 centuries) for Barshyn Beauty. It can be proved by the fact that people

called “Barshyn’s blue mausoleum” as “Blue mausoleum” in Kazakh (Margulan, 2007: 551).

There are many legends about the origin of the city of Shauldir located on the south Kazakhstan. According to one of them, “many years ago the city of Buzyk (currently known as Temirakkorga, Buzyktobe) was ruled by Muryndyk Khan. He was very strict and stubborn. One day Begen River decreased in size and people were in desperate need of water. And then Muryndyk Khan said: “I will give my daughter to that person who will deliver water to the city”. Muryndyk had a beautiful daughter called Duriya. Every young and old man in the city hoping to marry wise and beautiful Duriya did their best to bring water to the city. However, nobody could succeed. There was a brave and handsome man called Shamil, who grazed horses of Muryndyk. Shamil and Duriya loved each other very much. But they could not say about their feelings in the public, as he was poor man, but she was the daughter of a rich man. Shamil was very hopeful when he heard about Khan’s decision. He thought that it was the only way to get marry to Duriya. He made a shovel and came to Arys River. Whole day and night he dug a ditch. Unfortunately, after fifteen kilometers his shovel’s stick was broken because it collided with a hard thing. Its stick was made of the tree called “torangyl”. Turning nasty he broke down the stick into five pieces and threw away. The pieces of that stick were pierced in the ground and after some time they grew as a tree. Later people called this place “Bestorangyl” (five torangyl). Shamil continued digging the ground. He dug about thirty kilometers ditch and delivered through it water to the city of Buzyk. Thirsty people drunk as much water as they can. However, Muryndyk Khan failed to comply his promise and run away with his daughter to Otyrar city. But Shamil caught up with him and take Duriya away by force. Two young couple lived in the forest. They hunted and fished to feed themselves. Khan were very angry when he heard about it and sent his army to kill them. This place was called later “The village of Shamil and Duriya”. As time passed the name of this place was used in short way as “Shamildir”, later this word was transformed to “Shauldir”.

According to second version of this legend about the toponyme Shauldir, the ruler of Otyrar younger brother of Kaiyr Khan was a commander. He had the only child girl called Dur. People say “God gave commander the only child, and this child equal to all wealth of the world”. Dur and Kaiyr Khan’s son called Shamil were peers. People said about Shamil that “He was very brave and handsome. He will be more powerful than Kaiyr Khan”. Kaiyr Khan’s enemies were thinking of method to win him. They knew that to overpower him, it is necessary to use cunning, not power. Once upon a time, when Kaiyr Khan went for hunting, they gave two young people to drink a wine. Later this news reached Kaiyr Khan and his younger brother. “One of sinners is your child, another is mine, and we should punish them” they said and decided to punish them accordingly. City population divided into two parts towards the west. Along the gate there was an army with swords waiting for two. Two sinners had to ride a horse through the city. Shamil ride his horse very fast and could escape with some injuries in his shoulder and leg. Dur ride after him, but she failed to escape. The army cut off her head and her body was buried in Arystanbab. Shamil

disappeared. After this story people called this place “Shamil-Dur”. As time passed this name was changed as “Shauldir” (The words of grandfathers. Thousand volume, 2012).

In the book of Abilgazy “Turkmen shezhiresi” it is written about Zhankent city which was the capital of Oguz state. Oguz people gathered here and appointed Inal Yaum from Kaiy people as Khan and Korkyt Ata as his councilor. Information by al-Masudi refers to the IX century, when Oguz ousted Pechenegs from the Aral Sea region, they created a state with its capital Yangikent on lower part of Syr Darya (Klyashtorny, 2013).

One of the historical cities, the capital of Oguz people Zhanakent or Zhankent first was mentioned in the originally Iranian, Arab historian Ibn-Ruste’s work. Moreover, Arab geographer Ibn-Khaukal said that the main city of Oguz was Zhankent, Iranian people called it Nau-Kerde, Arab people called it El-Khariat, Sarmat people called it Dahi-Nau. This city is located on the top. The meaning of the name of this city is Yangikent – Zhanakent (New city). Its history is dated for many centuries. The city was prosperous between the second half of the 9th century and the first quarter of 11th century.

The person common for Turk people Korkyt Ata (Figure 1) was born in the city of Zhankent. As Korkyt was the owner of musical instrument “kobyz”, it is believed that this instrument was first invented in this city. Furthermore, Zhankent is closely connected with Begim (Ana) Mother’s story (Figure 2).



Figure 1: “Korkyt Ata” at kk.wikipedia – Transferred from kk.wikipedia (Public Domain).
https://kk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D2%9A%D0%BE%D1%80%D2%9B%D1%8B%D1%82_%D0%90%D1%82%D0%B0#/media/File:Qorqyt.jpg



Figure 2: “Korkyt Ata memorial” at [kk.wikipedia](https://kk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D2%9A%D0%BE%D1%80%D2%9B%D1%8B%D1%82_%D0%90%D1%82%D0%B0_%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%82%D0%BA%D1%96%D1%88%D1%96#/media/File:Korkyt-ata.jpg) – Transferred from [kk.wikipedia](https://kk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D2%9A%D0%BE%D1%80%D2%9B%D1%8B%D1%82_%D0%90%D1%82%D0%B0_%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%82%D0%BA%D1%96%D1%88%D1%96#/media/File:Korkyt-ata.jpg) (Public Domain).

https://kk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D2%9A%D0%BE%D1%80%D2%9B%D1%8B%D1%82_%D0%90%D1%82%D0%B0_%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%82%D0%BA%D1%96%D1%88%D1%96#/media/File:Korkyt-ata.jpg

There are many stories about the disappearance of Zhankent or Zhanakent, which was the capital of Oguz people. There are plenty of data about the disappearance of the city as well. It is also closely related to the history. First of them is related to the story of Begim (Ana) Mother. Begim Ana was a wife of ruler of Zhankent called Sanzhar. He doubted about his wife’s innocence and cut her two hands and put her in the prison. Begim Ana’s father heard about it and came to Zhankent city. He assured Sanzhar about his daughter’s innocence and expressed his disagreement.

There are legendary stories that tell that Zhankent city which was ruled by his son-in law was demolished by snakes.

It is clear from the history that Kypshak state included Kaiy tribe. The above mentioned city is connected with this tribe’s name. Zhankent city is known as “City swallowed by snake”, “City demolished by snake”. The above mentioned tribe “Kai” or “Kaiy” included in Kypshak Khanate had a slogan and sign – “snake”.

Dragon was a typical character of the Iranian mythology. According to the legend of the snake were originally Scythians (Pilipchuk, 2013). Therefore, we can conclude that this animation relates to ancient times.

According to legends, the reason of disappearance of the city called Kumiyan from the history was snakes’ attacks.

That is, this city’s destiny was the same as Zhankent city – it was demolished by snakes. It is clear that the legend, in some respect, is true. In the middle of the 11th

century from the history it is known that Kypshak tribes fought against Oguz state. Kimak people was included in the union of Kypshak. Data can prove that the totem of Kimak people was snake. There was a picture of snake in their flags and their sign was curled as snake.

More problematic is the definition of “people Snakes”, which with the same success can be related to Kai or Kitani. However, the Armenian historian wrote that “Snakes” attacked and defeated the “Pales”, they probably need to see Kai (or Kuna and Kai?) That have invaded the land Šārī / Sārī, unleashing a chain migration. (Stoyanov, 2013).

“Kimaks populated near Irtysh river were alien people, and the ethno name “Kimak” is book based name, which is known only among Arab, Persian-speaking informants. Their name, apparently, was “kai”. They may have received the name of Uran from Turkic-speaking tribes of Kipchak and Yemek who has lived for a long time in the territory of East Kazakhstan. Both Kai and Uranin translation means snake. Kimaks were snake people, dragon” – wrieded S.Akynzhanov (Akhninzhinov, 1989, p. 146). Although, according to Marvazi, Kuns left their land because of lack of pasture, the main reason was the following: “They were pursued by the people who were called kai. They were greater and stronger than them. Then Kuns moved to the land of Sary, and Sary moved to the land of the Turkmen. Turkmen occupied the eastern lands Guz and Guzes gone to Pechenegs territory” (Kumekov, 1972: 128).

Famous poet and researcher B.Koshym-Nogay states that in Abilgazy Bahadur’s work “Turkmen Shezhiresi” the word “Kazygurt” was mentioned several times as ethno name and once as toponyme. But genealogist the territory of Oguz people described as follows: “On the east of Oguz people – Ysyg Lake and Almalyk, on their Qibla (the south-west) there were Sairam, Kazygurt mountain, on the Temirkazyk (Polar star) direction (the north-east) there were Ulytau, Kishiktau – copper field, on the west – Syr River’s end, Yangakent, Karakum. In this location they populated for four thousand, five thousand years. The ruler was appointed from the tribe with major people (Rashid ad-Din Oghuz-name; Abilgazy (Khiua Khan), 1991). “From this data we can see that Kazygurt Mountain was situated on the north-west part of Oguz Kaganate. Therefore, it might be called “Oguz Mountain”. B.S.Koshym-Nogay concludes the following: “...here we remind that the mountain situated in the territory of Oguz Kaganate was called “Ogizmuiz” (Oguz Muiz) till present. It is not surprising that the mountain “Karazhyk” mentioned by Abilgazy Bahadur could be the same Karatau. We know, of course, that this toponyme was appeared along with the tribe’s name. Moreover, one of the rivers which takes its beginning from the mountain Karatau is called “Karazhyk” (Karazhyk=Karazhuk) (Koshym-Nogay, 2003: 223).

While investigating this problem the samples of folklore on basis of archaeological research comparative-source study analysis helps to unfold the mistery of cities’ history, that is the fact that Oguz cities such as Zhankent, Kumkent were demolished by snakes, and Kai tribe which is included in Kypshak and whose totem was snake forced Oguz to immigrate from Syrdariya riverside. During the study the cities of Oguz as Zhankent, Kumiyani, Barshynkent is described as legendary cities in

the folklore samples, and till today they have their importance and historical continuation.

Conclusion

Considering examples of folklore as historical data has many difficult and contrary sides. The researcher who investigates any issue looking through original data usually faces with two truths. First of them is exposed truth, another is hidden truth. The exposed truth is a nun disputable truth, which can be proved by exact data, and hidden truth is a truth which has no exact data to prove it, but it can be proved by historical events which were proved by exact data. When facing data from legends and stories researcher encounters with such cases.

In the history of Kazakh people the issue of the formation of Oguz ethnic in the Middle Ages and formation of its state, its territory, its cities is still not clear. Investigating this topic led us to the following conclusions:

- Oguz cities which are considered as a cultural heritage were the location of further inhabitants of “Oguz steppe”, including Kazakh Khanate;
- The cities such as Zhankent, Kumiyan, Barshynkent were described in the folklore examples, and till present has its importance as historical continuation;
- The connection of the demolition of the mentioned cities with historical events is described in the legends and stories;
- The contextual specialty of folklore examples has absorbed information about the origin of tribes, their genealogy;
- The ability of the legendary and genealogic information of the poems and legends such as “Turkmen genealogy”, “Oguz-name”, “The book of Korkyt Ata” to open new stage of the history;
- Containing the information about world outlook and religious beliefs, and etc. of Oguz tribes who populated Syrdaiya region, Aral, the north of Kaspi Sea plays considerable role in unfolding the content of the topic.

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