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A POTTERY KILN DISCOVERED IN THE ROMAN PERIOD SITE FROM REȘCA-ROMULA

Mircea Negru*

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Introduction

The archaeological site from Reșca-Romula is located on the high terrace of the Lower Olt River (Fig. 1: 1), on the territory of the villages of Reșca (Dobrosloveni Commune, Olt County), respectively Hotărani (Fărcașele commune, Olt County).

The resources of plastic clay for ceramic materials, the presence of springs from the terrace of the Teslui brook, of the gravel from the geological layer and, probably, of the forests, favoured the positioning in this place of the largest Roman urban settlements between the Carpathians and the Lower Danube. The territory of the archaeological site of Reșca-Romula is 306 hectares wide, including necropolises, and it is assumed that the Roman city of Romula was inhabited by about 6000 people.

The first information on archaeological structures in this site was made by the Austrian captain Fernando de Marsigli, who made a sketch with three rectangular fortifications (Marsigli 1726: Pl. XL).

In the middle and in the second half of the 19th century, the interest in the antiquities of Reșca-Romula determined A. T. Laurian and Dimitrie A. Sturdza to visit this archaeological site, and Bogdan Petriceicu-Hasdeu, Vladimir Blaremburg, Alexandru Odobescu mentioned this site as well, in their writings (Tătulea 1994: 8).

The first excavations in this site were practiced by the amateur archaeologist Caesar Bolliac. In 1869, he dug at the point called Dâmbul Morii, as well as in the southern tumular necropolis. Amongst the discoveries, he mentions the coins, ceramic pots and other Roman objects (Bolliac 1869: 32-39).

Archaeological digs were also carried out by Pamfil Polonic, in 1900, when he discovered a building with *thermae*, in the south-western part of the so-called Central Fortification. In 1911, A. T. Dumitrescu conducted research in the central area of the archaeological site, the south of the Teslui river. Here, he discovered a building with shaped limestone walls, which is supposed to have been the city's *curia* (Tudor 1978: 10).

Systematic archaeological researches were resumed in 1965 under the coordination of professor Dumitru Tudor.

In the central area of the city, in the so-called Central Fortification, they continued until 1992 under the leadership of Cristian Vlădescu (Vlădescu 1986). After an almost two-decade pause, the research was resumed in 2009, and with a more consistent funding since 2013 (Negru, Schuster 2016; Negru et al. 2020; Negru 2022).

In the Northern Sector of the archaeological site, the research targeted the Wall of Philip the Arab, the Ceramic Production District and the flat Northern Necropolis.

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During the researches in the ceramic production district, between 1968 and 2018, a number of 8 ceramic workshops with 25 kilns were discovered (Popilian 1997; Negru, Schuster 2016: 11; Negru 2022: 41-47). Of these, 20 kilns were for firing pots and other clay objects (lamps and ceramic figurines), respectively 5 kilns for firing building materials (bricks, tiles, tubes of different sizes).

Potter kiln no. 25/2018

In this article we will present the potter kiln no. 25 (Fig. 1: 2), discovered in 2018, within the Ceramic Workshop no. VIII. The kiln and the supply and outlet pit were identified within trenches S3 and S4, between grids -1 and 2.

The potter kiln was identified in 2013, at the depth of 0.24 m, where it was outlined an arc of burnt clay circle, with a width of 3-4 cm. It closed outside trench S3, which is why, in 2018, the trench S4 was opened.

The kiln is two-chambered, with central pillar. It consisted of fragments of rectangular bricks, glued with clay, which had the dimensions of 0.19-0.20 m, and its total preserved height was 0.87 m.

The lower chamber, in which the fire burned, was dug into the archaeological sterile layer of brown-coloured dirt. Its diameter at the base was of 0.70 m, and its height was of 0.38 m. The walls showed strong traces of firing of light brick-red shade, with a thickness of 4-5 cm. On the outside they had a whitish crust.

The upper chamber was partially preserved. It was identified at the depth of 0.24 m, from the current level of the ground and had a preserved height of 0.40 m. Also, the walls showed strong traces of firing of light brick-red, with a thickness of 3-4 cm.

The two chambers were separated by a grid made of burnt clay. Unfortunately, it was disassembled and probably thrown into the flue, where large amounts of burnt clay walls were found. On the walls of the kiln, the diameter of the grid was 1.18 m, and the thickness of 9 cm.

The flue for wood stock and the evacuation of the ashes was located in the south-western part of the kiln. It had an oval profile, with a height of 0.38/0.40 m. The walls were strongly fired, a layer of burnt clay of light brick-red with a thickness of 4-5 cm was observed. The fact that the grid misses, indicates a controlled disassembly, the kiln being abandoned, for reasons that we cannot identify.

Pit of the kiln for firing clay vessels

To the southwest of the body of the potter kiln, in the continuation of the mouth of the kiln, there was the pit through which it was fed and the ashes was evacuated. It had an irregular shape, with a total length of 2.05 m, a width of 1.50 m and a maximum depth of 1.58 m, from the current ground level (Fig. 1: 2).

The pit had three steps. The first descended from the mouth of the oven, the second was semicircular towards the southeast wall, and the third oval-shaped, the deepest, was in the south-western part.

Archaeological material

The archaeological material was discovered exclusively inside the supply and evacuation pit, an annex of the kiln. Inside, there were found many fragments of ceramic vessels and even whole ceramic vessels, large fragments of burnt clay coming from the oven, respectively ash.

Tableware (*vasa escaria*)

Fineware

Terra sigillata

Cups

Dragendorff 33/Popilian 1976 local imitations, cups, type 1, Pl. LVIII: 697-700, LIX: 701-704

Conical body cups, imitating the shape of Dragendorff 33. They have an arched rim on the outside with a rounded edge. The base has a short support ring. These outer cups have a brick-red varnish that imitates *terra sigillata* (Fig. 4: 1), sometimes it is replaced by paint (Fig. 2: 1) or the varnish is missing.

One of the cups is made of fine fabric of light-brick-red, completely fired (2: 1). On the outside, it has on the entire inner side, respectively on the outside on the upper and middle sides, a brick-red paint. It was applied horizontally with a brush, the traces of these applications being visible through the circular areas, more or less intense in colour.

The vessel is identical to one discovered in Romula in the previous period, which, however, is grey in colour and has a trace of black varnish that imitates *terra nigra* (Popilian 1976: 109, 205, Pl. LVIII: 699).

A second cup is characterized by the concave base with a very short support ring (Fig. 2: 2; 4: 2). It is identical to another item, previously discovered at Romula (Popilian 1976: 109, 205, Pl. LIX: 703).

A third cup has a slender conical body, and the rim has a groove on the inside of the vessel (Fig. 4: 1). An identical vessel was discovered at Stolniceni-Buridava, with its walls covered with a red paint (Popilian 1976: 109, 205, Pl. LIX: 704).

With regard to the presented vessels, a number of observations can be made on the technology, and their chronological framing.

These types of vessels represent local imitations of the Dragendorff 33 form, which can be supported both by the inferior fabric of the imported cups and by the varnish, of poor quality, which imitates the *terra sigillata* type. In one of the cases (Fig. 2: 2), this varnish is missing, which confirms the local production of these vessels.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis), at Romula, Drobeta and Stolniceni-Buridava, 2nd century AD (Popilian 1976: 109).

Common use pottery

Platters

Popilian 1976, type 7, Pl. LXVI: 803/Mușețeanu 2003, type 2, Pl. 17: 95, 18: 97/Suceveanu 2000, type XI, 45, Pl. 13: 3

Platters with short conical body, shoulder marked by pronounced arching, short rim, slightly tilted inwards, and the base with support ring (Fig. 4: 3-5).

The dishes are made of semi-fine fabric of brick-red, which contains fine sand and mica.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis) at Romula, 2nd-3rd centuries AD. (Popilian 1976: 122, type 7, 211, Pl. LXVI: 803), second half of the 2nd century AD – the last decade of the 2nd century AD (Negru 2022: 77, Pl. 51: 268), the first half of the 3rd century AD (Negru, Streinu 2016: 42, Pl. 43: 2352,

2367, 2286, 3542, 3544, 2542, 3543); Moesia Inferior at Durostorum, the second half of the 2nd century AD (Mușețeanu 2003: 54, Pl. 17: 95, 18: 97), Histria, 1st century AD (Suceveanu 2000: 45, type XI, Pl. 13: 3).

Popilian 1976, type 1 platters, Pl. LXVII: 808, 810. Dating: centuries 2nd-3rd AD

Platters with a short conical body, shoulder marked by pronounced arching, the very short rim is in continuation of the walls of the vessel (Fig. 4: 6-7). The vessels were made of brick-red fabric, which contains sand and mica.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Drobeta and Orlea, 2nd century AD. (Popilian 1976: type 1 platters, 122, 212, Pl. LXVII: 808, 810).

Pots with one handle

Popilian 1976 type, pots with one handle, Pl. XXXVIII: 370, 376

Pot with a heavily bulging short body. The outplayed mouth has a channel on the inside, for the lid. Decorated with grooves on the outside, except for some areas of the upper and lower parts. The base is flat, the handle is attached from the limit between the rim and the body of the vessel, respectively, by its shoulder. The vessel was made from kaolin paste, whitish in colour (Fig. 4: 8)

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Romula and Orlea, at Romula with coins from Hadrian to Severus Alexander (Popilian 1976: pots with a handle, 90, 182 Pl. XXXVIII:370, 376).

Pots with two handles

Popilian 1976 Type, pots with two handles, type 1, Pl. XXXVIII: 383-392/Brukner 1981, type 7, Pl. 101: 16-20

Pots with a bulging body, high vertical rim or slightly splayed on the outside, decorated with a groove on the outside. The small handles with a trench in the strip are attached from the rim base and the shoulder of the vessel. The base has a support ring. The maximum diameter is in the middle of the vessel (Fig. 4: 9) or in the lower part (Pl. 2: 10). During the archaeological research some pots with two handles (Fig. 2: 3-4).

The vessels were made of semi-fine brick-red fabric, containing fine sand and mica (Fig. 2: 9-10). Some of them were covered with a thin layer of brick-red paint.

The vessels are moulded from semi-fine brick-red fabric, containing sand and mica. One pot of this category was covered with a thin paint of brick-red colour (Fig. 2: 3). Another vessel, one with reduction firing, of a grey colour, being covered with inconsistent paint of blackish colour (Fig. 2: 4).

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Romula, 2nd century AD (Popilian 1976: 91, 183, Pl. XXXVIII: 382-393), the second half of the 2nd century – the first third of the 3rd century AD (Negru 2022, 88-89, Pl. 14: 236-237, 15: 238). In Pannonia inferior, at Rittium (18), Sirmium (19), Teutoburgium (20), dating in the 2nd century AD (Brukner 1981, 182-183, type 7, Pl. 101: 18-20).

Jugs

Popilian 1976, type 2a, Pl. XLII: 442-447/Brukner 1981, type 41, Pl. 144: 129/Rusu-Bolindeț 2007, type 13 G, Pl. C: 614

Jugs with globular body, wide mouth, with a vertical rim with an embossed stripe at its base and slightly oblique neck walls. The handle was attached to the neck and shoulder of the vessel. The base was with a support ring (Fig. 5: 1-3). The vessels are made of semi-fine brick-red fabric, which contains sand and mica.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Romula, the middle and the second half of the 2nd century AD (Popilian 1976: 96-97, 188, tip 2, Pl. XLII: 444, 447); the first third of the 3rd century AD (Negru, Streinu 2016: 46-47, Pl. 42: 3431), the second half of the 3rd century – the middle of the 3rd century AD (Negru 2022: 90, 275-276, Pl. 59: 242-243), Dacia Superior (Apulensis): Napoca, the first half of the 3rd century AD (Rusu-Bolindeț 2007: 424, type 13 G, Pl. C: 614); Pannonia Inferior: Mursa, 4th century AD (Brukner 1981: 184, type 41, 144: 129).

Popilian 1976, type 2a, Pl. XLII: 454

Jug with a globular body, narrow mouth, with a vertical rim with an embossed stripe at its base and the walls of the neck slightly oblique. The handle was attached to the neck and shoulder of the vessel. The base had a support ring (Fig. 4: 11-12). The vessels are made of semi-fine brick-red fabric, which contains sand and mica.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Drobeta, the middle and the second half of the 2nd century AD (Popilian 1976: 188, Pl. XLIII: 454).

Beakers

Popilian 1976, type 2, Pl. LIV: 611-612

Beaker with a vertical handle and rim, slightly facing outwards (Fig. 2: 5). The vessel is modelled from grey fabric, which contains sand and mica, and, on the outside, it has a layer of blackish paint, partially fallen.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Romula, the first half of the 3rd century AD (Negru, Streinu 2016: 51, Pl. 48: 2373), the second half of the 2nd century AD - the penultimate decade of the 2nd century AD. (Negru 2022: 91, 146, Pl. 15: 250). Sucidava, 2nd century AD (Popilian 1976: 105, 198-199, Pl. LIV: 611-612).

Cult vessels

Turibulla

Popilian 1976, turibulla type 1, Pl. LXI: 748/Brukner 1981, type 1, Pl. 62: 1, 2, 7

In the pit of the kiln, it was discovered a fragment of a *turribulum*, with the deep conical cup, the rim splayed horizontally with the vertical edge, decorated with notches on the outside (Fig. 5: 4). The vessel was made of semi-fine fabric of brick-red colour, which contains sand and mica.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Romula (Popilian 1976: censurs type 1, 116, 208, Pl. LXI: 748), the beginning of the 2nd century AD - the first half of the 3rd century AD. (Negru, Streinu 2016: 58, Pl. 61: 2742, 3583, 2681, 3175, 3920, 3392), the second half of the 2nd century AD - the penultimate decade of the 2nd century AD (Negru 2022: 92, 278, Pl. 60: 258); Pannonia Inferior: Mursa and Sirmium, the second half of the first century AD – 2nd century AD (Brukner 1981: 181, type 1, Pl. 62: 1, 2, 7).

Popilian 1976, turibulla type 4, Pl. LXII: 757

Another fragment comes from the lower part of a turribulum. It has a very short leg, delimited by the cup by a sill. The basis is flat (Fig. 5: 5). The vessel was made of semi-fine fabric of brick-red colour, which contains sand and mica.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Romula, the second half of the second century and the first half of the 3rd century AD (Popilian 1976: type 4, 117-118).

Cooking ware (*vasa conquinaria*)

Saucepans

Popilian 1976, bowl type 4, Pl. LXIV:781, 783, 784-786/Mușeteanu 2003, type I, Pl. 38:50-52/Brukner 1981, type 77a, Pl. 89:113/Honcu 2018, type 2, Pl. XV:142/Rusu-Bolindeț 2007, type CC 8 B, Pl. XCCII: 550

Saucepan with bi-conical body, the upper part is wider. The maximum diameter is in the upper part, at the shoulder of the vessel. The rim is long and splayed towards the outside (Fig. 5: 6). The vessels were made of coarse brick-red fabric, which contains a lot of sand and pebbles.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Romula, the second half of the 2nd century – the first decades of the 3rd century AD (Popilian 1976: 120, 210, type 5, LXIV:780-782, 785-786, LXV:788-789); the first half of the 2nd century AD (Negru, Streinu 2016: 53, Pl. 53:3781, 2660, 2370), Sucidava (Popilian 1976: 120, 210, type 5, LXIV:783), Stolniceni (Popilian 1976: 120, 210, type 5, LXIV:784), Slăveni (Popilian 1976: 120, 210, type 5, LXIV:787), the second half of the 2nd century – the first decades of the 3rd century AD; Dacia Superior (Apulensis) Dacia Superior (Apulensis): Napoca, Traian period (Rusu-Bolindeț 2007, 405, type CC 8 B, Pl. XCCII/550); Moesia Inferior: Durostorum, the second half of the second century AD. (Mușeteanu 2003: 104-105, type I, Pl. 38:50-52); Pannonia Inferior: Vojka, 3rd century – the first half of the 4th century AD (Brukner 1981: 181, type 77a, Pl. 89:113), Ibida, the first half of the 2nd century AD. (Honcu 2018: type 2, 86-87, Pl. XV:142).

Popilian 1976, type 5 saucepans, Pl. LXV:789

Saucepan with bi-conical body, with a very narrow bottom at the base. The diameter is in the upper part. The long rim is arched on the outside horizontally, and the base is flat (Fig. 5: 7). The dish was made of coarse fabric, coloured or grey, which contains a lot of sand and pebbles.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Romula, the first decades of the 3rd century AD (Popilian 1976: 121, 210, Pl. LXV:789).

Pots

Popilian 1976, type 3 pots, Pl. XXXIV: 340.

Pots with a bulging body, the maximum diameter is in the middle of the height of the vessel, the rim is splayed horizontally. On the shoulder, it has horizontal grooves (Fig. 5: 8-9). The vessels were made of coarse fabric, of brick-red colour (Fig. 5: 8) or grey (Fig. 5: 9), which contains a lot of sand and pebbles.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Stolniceni-Buridava, the first half of the 3rd century AD (Popilian 1976: type 3 pots, 87, 180, Pl. XXXIV: 340).

Popilian 1976, type 2 pots, Pl. XXXIV: 330-331

Pots with a bulging body, the maximum diameter is in the upper part. The rim is splayed with the oblique edge on the outside, and, on the inside, it has a channel for the lid (Fig. 6: 1-3). The vessels were made of coarse fabric, of grey colour, which contains a lot of sand and pebbles.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Romula, the beginning of the 3rd century AD. (Popilian 1976: 87, 179, Pl. XXXIV: 330-331).

Popilian 1976, type 3 pots, Pl. XXXIV: 339/Rusu-Bolindeț 2007, type CC 10 D, Pl. XCVI: 573

Pots with a bulging body, the maximum diameter is in the upper part. The thickened rim is splayed, horizontally and the edge, it is rounded on the outside (Fig. 6: 4-5). The vessels were made of coarse fabric, of brick-red colour (Fig. 6: 5) or grey (Fig. 6: 4), which contains a lot of sand and pebbles,

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Stolniceni-Buridava, 3rd century AD (Popilian 1976: 87, 180, Pl. XXXIV: 339), Romula, the last decade of the 2nd century AD - the first third of the 3rd century AD. (Negru 2022: 104, 290-291, Pl. 88: 316); Dacia Superior (Apulensis): Napoca, Traian period (Rusu-Bolindeț 2007: 411, 420, Pl. XCVI: 573, CC 10 D).

Lids

Popilian 1976, type 3 lid, Pl. LXXI:913/Sultov 1985, Pl. XLIV, 2/Jevremovici 1987, type V: 11

High conical body with a rim in the continuation of the walls, slightly splayed. Footed knob (Fig. 6: 6). The pot was made of coarse fabric, of brick-red colour, which contains a lot of sand and pebbles.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Cioroiu Nou, 2nd-3rd centuries AD (Popilian 1976: 128, 218, Pl. LXXI: 913), Moesia Inferior: *territorium* Nikopolis ad Istrum (Sultov 1985: 87, Pl. XLIV, 2); Moesia Superior: Diana-Karatas, 1st-2nd centuries AD (Jevremovici 1987: 55, type V:11).

Popilian 1976, type 4 lid, Pl. LXXIII: 927-930

Short conical body with rim in the continuation of the walls, slightly splayed. Footed knob (Fig. 3: 1-2; 3: 4-5; 6: 8).

The vessels were made of coarse fabric of grey colour (Fig. 3: 2-3) or light brick-red (Fig. 3: 4-5), what contains sand and pebbles.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Romula, the first half of the third century AD (Popilian 1976, p. 128, 219, Pl. LXXIII: 929).

Popilian 1976, type 3 lid, Pl. LXXII: 906, 908

Short conical body, slightly splayed rim. Footed knob (Fig. 6: 9). The vessels were made of coarse brick-red fabric, which contains a lot of sand and pebbles.

Bibliographic analogies and chronology. Dacia Inferior (Malvensis): Drobeta, where they were dated in the 2nd-3rd centuries AD (Popilian 1976: 128, 218, Pl. LXXII: 906, 908).

Other ceramic materials

During the research of the annex pit of the potter kiln, several ceramic tubes of a less common shape were also discovered. They have an ovoid body with cylindrical ends (Fig. 3: 6-7). We can assume their usefulness for transporting water, but they do not have identical analogues in form.

Conclusions

Ceramic production workshop no. VIII is the northernmost, according to archaeological research so far, within the northern ceramic production district of Romula.


The oven is of the oven-floor type, with two chambers. The central pillar was made of fragments of Roman bricks. The kiln grate has been dismantled, which indicates its operation before the final phase of the ceramic production district.

Based on the stratigraphy and archaeological materials discovered, it can be dated to the end of the 2nd century and the beginning of the 3rd century AD.

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1



2

Figure 1. 1. Map of Roman Dacia provinces. 2. Pottery kiln no. 25




Figure 2. 1-6. Roman pottery



Figure 3. 1-7. Roman pottery




Figure 4. 1-12. Roman pottery





Figure 5. 1-8. Roman pottery



**ACUMULAREA ȘI RISIPIREA AVERII: DISPUTE PATRIMONIALE
ÎNTR-O FAMILIE DIN MEHEDINȚI (SEC. XVII – XVIII)* (I)**

**GATHERING AND WASTING FORTUNE: PATRIMONIAL
LITIGATIONS IN A FAMILY FROM MEHEDINȚI
(17TH – 18TH CENTURIES) (I)**

*Liviu Marius Ilie***

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Abstract

Small families are often very important for understanding premodern society. The ownership of the land based on kinship can reveal very complicated relations inside the small communities; gathering the fortune and dividing it into pieces was a recurrent process that characterized the Wallachian society during 17th and 18th centuries. This study is devoted to a family from Smârdeșteț – a small village from Mehedinți county – considering their genealogy and their possession of land and Roma people. Six generations can be traced along these two centuries, the men and women accumulating and wasting the fortune along their lives. Only the first half of the 17th century is investigated in this article; a subsequent study will analyse the second half of the 17th century and the 18th century.

Key words (cuvinte cheie): familie (family); genealogie (genealogy); sat (village); județul Mehedinți (Mehedinți county); dispute patrimoniale (patrimonial litigations).

Pe lângă marile familii boierești, care prin relația lor nemijlocită cu domnia, au influențat profund istoria Țării Românești, neamurile micilor boieri au constituit rețele extinse, cu ramificații diverse, întemeindu-și relații de familie și stăpânind împreună pământul; analiza punctuală a acestor rețele poate oferi micile detalii ce întregesc tabloul general al societății valahe, în lenta sa trecere de la ev mediu la modernitate. Încă din secolul al XV-lea, sursele muntenești îi amintesc pe mehedinți, boieri aflați în marginea sud-vestică a țării, implicarea lor militară și politică în istoria Țării Românești fiind mai degrabă o urmare directă a coeziunii de grup, decât a averilor deținute de ei (Coman, 2013: 120-124).

Numărul mult mai mare de surse diplomatice care au ajuns la noi începând cu veacul al XVII-lea, în comparație cu perioada anterioară, permite decelarea unor relații de familie, care pentru secolele anterioare este aproape imposibilă. Scurta analiză ce urmează își propune câteva considerații asupra unei familii din Mehedinți în secolul al XVII-lea și al XVIII-lea. Familia era originară din satul Smârdeșteț, dar legată de mai multe sate din județele Mehedinți și Gorj; evoluția familiei pe parcursul acestor veacuri

* Textul de față a fost prezentat în cadrul ședinței de comunicări a *Comisiei de Heraldică, Genealogie și Sigilografie a Academiei Române, Filiala Iași*, din data de 11 aprilie 2023. Analiza din acest articol se oprește la mijlocul secolului al XVII-lea, cea de-a doua parte ce cuprinde a doua jumătate a aceluiași veac și secolul al XVIII-lea urmând a face obiectul unei cercetări separate.

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poate fi urmărită de-a lungul a șase generații. Tocmai caracterul acesta aparent banal, legat de disputele patrimoniale, oferă detaliile atât de necesare cercetătorului pentru înțelegerea relațiilor sociale.

O diferență trebuie făcută încă de la început între bărbații și femeile din această familie. La începutul secolului al XVII-lea, apariția bărbaților este episodică, numele lor fiind de cele mai multe ori amintit doar în calitate de martori ai unor documente; treptat, ei sunt menționați cumpărând sau vânzând sate și țigani ori judecându-se pentru avere. Componenta militară nu este pierdută nici pe parcursul secolului al XVII-lea, dregătoriile de armaș sau căpitan găsindu-se în familia lor. Într-un *cursus honorum* familial, dregătoria cea mai înaltă este aceea de vtor comis (al doilea comis); sunt de asemenea prezente cele de logofăt și paharnic, în timp ce unii dintre membrii familiei sunt amintiți doar ca postelnici.

Apariția în documente a femeilor este legată de diverse dispute patrimoniale; căsătoriile succesive au dus la apariția conflictelor pentru avere, mame, fii sau fiice vitrege judecându-se pe pământul și banii moșteniți de la bărbații decedați. Totodată, mențiunea femeilor aduce note de culoare în relațiile de familie. Dacă bărbații era doar martori, adeseori tăcuți, ai unor schimburi de posesiuni, judecați ori hotărânicii de moșii, femeile sunt cele care oferă adevăratele detalii ale disputelor patrimoniale, fiind mult mai vocale în actele de proprietate. Documentele redactate în numele lor vorbesc despre certuri între ele și „fiaștri”, certuri ce ajung nu de puține ori până la scaunul domnesc; instinctul matern reiese adeseori din aceste documente – copiii sunt protejați de mamele lor în succesiunea averii ori în risipirea acesteia pentru a rezolva probleme ivite în conflicte spontane. În analiza ce urmează, risipirea are dublul său rol de înstrăinare și împărțire.

Limitele scurtei analize de față sunt date, în primul rând, de binecunoscutul raport al surselor editate față de cele inedite, în primele șase decenii ale veacului al XVII-lea, comparativ cu următoarele patru decade ale aceluiași secol și cu cel următor. Dacă în primele șase decenii ale veacului al XVII-lea, colecțiile *DRH* și *DIR*, dublate de *Catalogul documentelor Țării Românești*, permit un studiu sistematic, după această perioadă analiza se face, mai degrabă, prin sondarea surselor de arhivă inedite ori editate în publicații mai mult sau mai puțin cunoscute. Rezultatele sunt pe măsură – mult mai sigure în prima parte a intervalului, lacunare în cea de-a doua.

Primul membru cunoscut al familiei din Smârdeșteț-Mehedinți este un anume Aldea, o serie de acte domnești amintindu-l de cele mai multe ori ca martor în diverse procese. Prima sa mențiune datează dintr-un document, păstrat în traducere românească, din 8 august 1605, printre „aldămășarii” prezenți la cumpărarea mai multor moșii, vii și curături, numărându-se și „din Smerdeți, Aldea” (Donat, Caracaș, Ghinea, Kandel 1960: 63). Martorii ce participaseră la vânzările respective erau și ei, ca și Aldea, din sate mehedintene (Corcova și Jirov) (Ionașcu, Lăzărescu-Ionescu, Câmpina, Mircea, Stănescu, Prodan, Roller 1951: 186; Donat, Caracaș, Ghinea, Kandel 1960: 45, 74; Bâzgan 2004: 115, 117).

Martor era Aldea și la cumpărarea unei moșii de către marele paharnic Lupu în 6 iulie 1615 (Ionașcu, Lăzărescu-Ionescu, Câmpina, Stănescu, Prodan, Roller 1951a: 414), precum și la plata unei datorii mai vechi, achitată la 3 septembrie 1619 (Ionașcu,

Lăzărescu-Ionescu, Câmpina, Stănescu, Prodan, Roller 1951b: 412). Când în 1626, văduva lui Stoichiță din Strâmba, fost mare dregător la sfârșitul veacului al XVI-lea și începutul celui următor (Stoicescu 1971: 91-93), lăsa mai multe sate și ocini mănăstirii Strâmba din Gorj, ctitoria sa și a răposatului său soț, Aldea din Smârdeșteț era amintit ca boier martor în cartea de danie oferită mănăstirii (Mioc 1965: 144-145; 244-245). La 20 noiembrie 1628, acesta se regăsea printre martorii prezenți la rumânirea locuitorilor din Caraula (Mioc 1969: 652), după ce, cu o jumătate de an mai devreme, la 29 mai 1628, judecase, alături de alți cinci boieri, o pricină a mănăstirii Jitianu (Mioc 1969: 202).

Cele șase documente în care Aldea era menționat ca martor sau judeca diverse pricini se întind pe aproape un sfert de secol, din 1605 până în 1628. Trebuie subliniat faptul că acesta fusese chemat nu doar în Mehedinți, ci și în județele învecinate, Gorj și Dolj, de către mănăstiri – Strâmba și Jitianu – ori de către mari dregători domnești sau rude ale acestora – Lupu, mare paharnic în timpul lui Radu Mihnea, respectiv văduva lui Stoichiță din Strâmba, mare vistiernic, mare postelnic și mare logofăt în timpul lui Mihai Viteazul și Radu Șerban (Stoicescu 1971: 91-93).

Sursele vremii îl amintesc pe Aldea fie doar cu numele său, fie ca postelnic, de fiecare data, fiind pomenit locul său de baștină – Smârdeștețul. Pe lângă acest sat, unde Aldea deținea averi funciare, el avea în posesie și rumâni într-un sat învecinat, Punghina (Bâzgan 2004: 118, anexa 40). La 15 iulie 1622, Radu Mihnea întărea sate și rumâni lui Radu logofăt din Desa. Actul domnesc, păstrat în traducere românească, descrie în partea de final a narației sale un conflict pe care Radu logofăt l-a avut cu „Aldea postelnic din Smârdeștești”; motivul disputei a fost fuga unor rumâni din Punghina, aflați în posesia lui Aldea, respectiv așezarea lor în satul Vlădaia al lui Radu. Conflictul se stingea în momentul în care Aldea primea 30.000 de aspri din partea lui Radu din Desa, acesta din urmă păstrând rumânii (Ionașcu, Lăzărescu-Ionescu, Câmpina, Stănescu, Prodan, Roller 1954: 179).

Trei documente din prima jumătate a secolului al XVII-lea permit stabilirea următoarelor două generații ce i-au succedat lui Aldea din Smârdeșteț. În documentul din 6 iulie 1615, amintit anterior, erau menționați ca boieri hotarnici „din Smârdașești, Aldea și Necula armașul” (Ionașcu, Lăzărescu-Ionescu, Câmpina, Stănescu, Prodan, Roller 1951a: 414); la 10 august 1634, era pomenit „Necole al Aldei de în Smârdeșteț” (Mioc, Carcaș, Bălan 1974: 470), așadar un fiu al lui Aldea, iar la 16 octombrie 1642 erau menționați „Cioană al doilea comis și... fratele său Ghiorghe, fiii lui Necula armaș din Smârdeștețu” (Rizescu, Olar, Bedreag, Lambru, Cotovanu 2018: 750). Aceste trei acte din 1615, 1634 și 1642 permit o reconstituire genealogică pe trei generații: Aldea (prima generație), Necula (a doua generație), Cioană și Gheorghe (a treia generație). Ținând cont că Aldea era menționat pentru prima dată la 1605, iar Necula era amintit cu certitudine ca armaș în anul 1615, începuturile familiei coboară în secolul al XVI-lea, documentele acestui veac nefiind însă prea generoase cu cercetătorul de mai târziu în privința familiei originare din Smârdeșteț.

Tot în privința înrudirilor în cadrul aceleiași familii, un document interesant, păstrat în original românesc, este cel din 2 august 1647, prin care „Ghiorghe postelnic sin Aldei postelnic ot Smârdeștiț” vinde un țigan lui lui Preda postelnic, fiul lui Dumitru

Filișanu, printre martori găsiindu-se și „Cioană comis” (Barbu, V., Lazăr, G., Rizescu, O. 2001: 239). Dacă Cioană comis trebuie să fi fost fiul lui Necula din Smârdeșteț, formula „Gheorghe postelnic, sin <fiul> Aldei postelnic din Smârdeșteț” ridică un semn de întrebare. Este singura mențiune în documentele primei jumătăți a secolului al XVII-lea al unui alt fiu al lui Aldea, altul decât Necula. Apariția în viitor a altor izvoare care să-l menționeze pe acest Gheorghe, fiul lui Aldea, sau, eventual, pe posibili urmași ai săi ar putea lămurii pe deplin situația. Pentru moment nu este exclus nici ca scribul documentului să fi încurcat gradele de rudenie, scriind „fiu” în loc de „nepot” și să-l fi confundat, astfel, pe „Ghiorghe postelnic sin Aldei” cu nepotului său de frate omonim.

În istoriografia română, Necula pare să fi stârnit mai mult interes decât tatăl său, Aldea. Nicolae Stoicescu contopea într-un singur dregător (Necula din Smârdeșteț), atât pe Necula, fiul lui Aldea, cât și pe un dregător al lui Mihai Viteazul, care apare ca mare armaș sau armaș la sfârșitul secolului al XVI-lea (Stoicescu 1971: 75). Această identificare ridică serioase semne de întrebare. În primul rând, despre originea marelui armaș al lui Mihai Viteazul nu avem nicio dovadă, localizarea sa în Smârdeșteț fiind ipotetică. În al doilea rând numele Necula, provenind din Nicolae, este unul comun în epocă, confuzia între personaje omonime fiind foarte posibilă; că Nicolae și Necula sunt nume folosite intermitent se poate observa și din numele domnesc al fiului lui Mihai Viteazul, care în intitulația documentelor sale își spune când Nicolae, când Necula (Mioc, D., Ștefănescu Ș. Adam., M., Bălan, C., Bălan, M., Caracaș, S., Cămărășescu, R., Diaconescu, O., Fotino, C., 1975: passim). În al treilea rând, identificarea genealogică, bazată pe ascendenți și descendenți cunoscuți, precum și cea bazată pe localizarea unui personaj pornind de la originea sa sau de la proprietățile deținute sunt mult mai sigure decât identificarea prosopografică. Metodologic, într-o cercetare dedicată prosopografiei în Imperiul Bizantin, Dion Smythe propunea soluția „separării” în cazul ambiguității surselor în privința identificării unor indivizi, deoarece „este mai ușor să concatenezi doi sau mai mulți indivizi care au fost separați din greșeală decât să separi indivizi care anterior au fost uniți” (Smithe, D. 2008:179). În consecință, în identificarea lui Necula am reținut acele documente în care el este amintit ca fiul lui Aldea sau tatăl lui Cionă și Gheorghe, precum și cele în care se arată că este din Smârdeșteț, lăsându-le de o parte pe cele în care apare doar un Necula armaș.

Necula, fiul lui Aldea, era amintit în două rânduri ca martor – alături de tatăl său, la 6 iulie 1615 (Ionașcu, Lăzărescu-Ionescu, Câmpina, Stănescu, Prodan, Roller 1951a: 414), respectiv la 22 august 1635, la o vânzare în Sărdănești-Mehedinți (Mioc. Bălan, Cămărășescu, Fotino 1985: 127); prima dată era menționat ca armaș, a doua oară ca paharnic. Din documentul din 10 august 1634, dat lui Barbu clucer din Poiană, aflăm că „Necole al Aldei de în Smârdeșteț” cedase un sălaș de țigani în contul unei datorii mai vechi, sălaș care ulterior ajunsese prin cumpărare în posesia clucerului Barbu (Mioc, Carcaș, Bălan 1974: 470). Filiația Aldea-Necula este cu atât mai credibilă cu cât documentul din 10 august 1634 reprezenta o mărturie comună a marilor boieri ai Țării Românești, dată în fața lui Matei Basarab, pentru averea lui Barbu din Poiana; acesta din urmă își pierduse toate „cărțile și zapisele” când hoții îi arseseră casa și-i ucisera

soția, astfel că, în stabilirea averii, dregătorii domnești trebuie să fi avut mare grijă când detrimaseră cine și ce vânduse clucerului Barbu.

Patru documente permit identificarea averii lui Necula, moștenită de fiii săi. Primul din acestea a fost emis la 25 august 1625 de către Alexandru Coconul pentru „sluga domniei mele, Cioane postelnic și fratele lui Gheorghe, fiii jupanului Necula armaș” (Ionașcu, I., Lăzărescu-Ionescu, L., Cîmpina, Stănescu, E., Prodan D., Roller, M. 1954: 557-559). Domnul muntean întărea celor doi frați, delnițe și ocini, moștenite de la tatăl lor în satele Vădeni, Arși, Poenița și Drăgoești din județele Mehedinți și Gorj (Bâzgan 2004: anexele 40, 41), precum și țigani. Aceste confirmări de averi erau făcute pe baza unor hrisoave mai vechi de la Radu Șerban și Radu Mihnea, care cel mai probabil nu acopereau decât o parte din moștenirea lui Necula, deoarece în documentul lui Alexandru Coconul se arată că „au luat ungurii cărțile lor și cu multe scule ale lor, când a venit craiul în țara domniei mele” (Ionașcu, I., Lăzărescu-Ionescu, L., Cîmpina, Stănescu, E., Prodan D., Roller, M. 1954: 557-559). Demn de menționat este și faptul că dacă în deceniul al cincilea Cioana era menționat drept comis ori căpitan, în vara lui 1625 el era doar postelnic; Gheorghe este amintit numai nominal, la fel ca în actele mai târziu.

Documentul lui Matei Basarab din 16 octombrie 1642 amintea vânzarea și răscumpărarea mai multor delnițe în satul Curtișoara din județul Gorj pe parcursul a două generații – Necula armașul din Smârdășteț le cumpărase de la Vâlsan, iar Marco, fiul lui Vâlsan, le-a răscumpărat de la Cioană și Gheorghe, fiii lui Necula. Aceștia din urmă au primit de la Marco suma de 23.000 de aspri; actul domnesc păstrează numărul de 24 de delnițe, deși editorii au observat modificarea cifrei unităților. În hrisovul lui Matei Basarab, Cioană este amintit cu dregătoria de vtori (al doilea) comis, în timp ce fratele său nu are dregătorie (Rizescu, Olar, Bedreag, Lambru, Cotovanu 2018: 747-751).

Pe aceleași două generații – Necula și fiii săi, Cioană și Gheorghe – se întinde și situația satului Aninișul din județul Gorj, așa cum este descrisă într-un alt document al lui Matei Basarab din 1 noiembrie 1644. Locuitorii din Aniniș se vânduseră vecini lui Necula armaș în timpul domniei lui Radu Șerban, pentru 40.000 de aspri gata; narația actului domnesc descrie în termenii formularului de cancelarie situația din urmă cu trei decenii: „satul Aniniș, ei au fost toți oameni cnezi, cu dedinele lor de moștenire de la strămoși de mai înainte vreme, de la întemeierea țării. Iar apoi, când a fost în zilele răposatului Șerban voievod, iar megieșii satului Aninișul, ei s-au vândut vecini, cu tot satul cu tot hotarul, din hotar în hotar, lui Necula armașul”. Ulterior, locuitorii „s-au răscumpărat de vecinie tot satul” față de „Cioană comis și de către fratele său, Ghiorghe, fiii lui Necula armașul din Smârdășteț (Barbu, V., Lazăr G., Constantin, F. M., Popescu, O. M., Vintilă-Ghițulescu, C. 2017: 758-759). *Cursus honorum*-ul familial este cel obișnuit : Necula – armaș, Cioană – comis, Gheorghe – fără dregătorie.

La 18 octombrie 1647, Cioană comis și fratele său, Gheorghe, au vândut marelui sluger Dumitru Filișanu mai multe ocini și rumâni din satul amintit mai sus, Drăgoești din Gorj, pe care le moșteniseră de la tatăl lor, Necula armașul (Barbu, V., Lazăr, G., Rizescu, O. 2001: 284); vânzarea era confirmată două zile mai târziu de Matei Basarab (Barbu, V., Lazăr, G., Rizescu, O. 2001: 288-292), iar peste un an, la 12

octombrie 1648, 12 boieri hotarnici, împreună cu Gheorma, marele ban al Craiovei, stabileau hotarele ocinei cumpărate de Dumitru Filișanu de la Cioană și Gheorghe (Lazăr, G., Vintilă-Ghițulescu, C., Iancu, A. 2006: 318-319). Hrisovul de confirmarea a vânzării din 20 octombrie 1647 este important și pentru că arată că Necula cumpărase prima ocină din Drăgoești „încă în zilele răposatului Șerban voievod, în cursul anilor 7113”; dacă actul domnesc al lui Matei Basarab nu se înșeală în privința datei, aceasta este cea mai veche mențiune indirectă a lui Necula armaș din Smârdeșteț, 7113 corespunzând intervalului 1 septembrie 1604 – 31 august 1605.

Cum apar în alte sursele de epocă Cioană și Gheorghe, fiii lui Necula? Informațiile despre Cioană sunt numeroase, Gheorghe apărând de fiecare dată în umbra fratelui său. Demn de menționat este și faptul că documentele îl pomenesc pe Cioană initial ca postelnic, iar ulterior drept comis, vtori comis ori căpitan, în timp ce fratele său apare doar cu numele – Gheorghe. Uneori Cioană apare ca boier martor, ca hotarnic, iar alteori cumpără diverse posesiuni, reglementează, alături de fratele său, moșteniri lăsate de tatăl lor ori, împreună cu Gheorghe sau singur, vinde sau schimbă țigani. Documentele primei jumătăți a secolului al XVII-lea îl amintesc pe Cioană ca martor în două rânduri – prima dată la 1 iunie 1645, la vânzarea unei ocini cu un rumân (Barbu, V., Chiper, M., Lazăr, G., 1998: 226), iar a doua oară la 16 decembrie 1649, când un anume Văsi se vindea rumân lui Nicola pârcălabul din Oravița (Barbu, V., Lazăr, G., Rizescu, O. 2002: 264). Ca hotarnic îl găsim pe Cioană în anul 1644. La 9 august, Cioană căpitan din Smârdeșteț era luat pe răvașe domnești, alături de alți 23 de boiei, pentru o hotărnicie a lui Dumitru Filișanu și a unui văr al acestuia (Barbu, V., Lazăr G., Constantin, F. M., Popescu, O. M., Vintilă-Ghițulescu, C. 2017: 699); hotărnicia s-a făcut două luni mai târziu, la 24 octombrie 1644, Violeta Barbu, editorul acestui document, observând că semnătura „Ciona căpitan” era autografă (Barbu, V., Lazăr G., Constantin, F. M., Popescu, O. M., Vintilă-Ghițulescu, C. 2017: 749). Trebuie subliniat și faptul că dacă de obicei Cioană apare în calitate de comis, aceste două documente îl amintesc drept căpitan. Într-un document nedatat în original, dar care a păstrat într-o copia sa anul 7150 <1 septembrie 1641 – 31 august 1642> se arăta că la o hotărnicie cu 24 de boieri, „Cioană comisu ot Smârdăștești” fusese înlocuit de „Drosul postelnic ot Braloștița” (Rizescu, Olar, Bedreag, Lambriu, Cotovanu 2018: 334).

Între documentele ce-l amintesc pe Cioană, o pondere importantă o au cele care fac referire la vânzarea sau schimbul de țigani. Un document românesc păstrând doar anul de la Adam 7136 <1 septembrie 1627 – 31 august 1628> consemna faptul că „feciorii armașului Nicolei, Ciona și Gheorghe”, au dat mănăstirii Tismana „o ȱigană pri nome Poba” în schimbul unui ȱigan ucis (Mioc, D. 1965: 432). O vânzare, făcută la o dată anterioară, alături de fratele său, era amintită de Matei Basarab într-un document de la 8 ianuarie 1644 (Barbu, V., Lazăr G., Constantin, F. M., Popescu, O. M., Vintilă-Ghițulescu, C. 2017: 426); în același an, la 11 octombrie, cei doi vindeau „o copilă de ȱigan”, după ce cu ceva timp în urmă o vânduseră și pe „muma copilei” (Barbu, V., Lazăr G., Constantin, F. M., Popescu, O. M., Vintilă-Ghițulescu, C. 2017: 734-735). Alți țigani ai lui Cioană și Gheorghe erau parte a unui schimb, făcut cu egumenul mănăstirii Tismana, la 25 martie 1647 (Barbu, V., Lazăr, G., Rizescu, O. 2001: 94) ori erau vânduți

lui Buliga din Ciovârnișani, mare căpitan de dorobanți, după cum reiese dintr-un document al lui Matei Basarab din 12 martie 1650 (Barbu, V., Ghițulescu, C., Iancu, A., Lazăr, G., Rizescu, O. 2003: 107).

În documentul său din 16 februarie 1647, marele comis Radu Mihalcea din Pătârlagi, menționa că în urmă cu ceva timp cumpărase o țigancă de la Cioană din Smârdeșteț (Barbu, V., Lazăr, G., Rizescu, O. 2001: 55). Radu Mihalcea deținuse dregătoria de mare comis o perioadă îndelungată de timp, între 1638 și 1655 (Stoicescu 1971: 150-152); în interiorul acestui interval, un document al lui Matei Basarab, emis la 16 octombrie 1642, îl amintea pe „boierul domniei mele, Cioană al doilea comis” (Rizescu, Olar, Bedreag, Lambru, Cotovanu 2018: 750). În cazul celor doi, relația mare comis – comis al doilea era dublată de interese, altele decât cele care priveau dregătoria propriu-zisă.

O achiziție importantă era jumătate din satul Cornățel, „de preste tot hotarul și den tot venitul și den rumâni” (Oltenia 1923: 66; Rizescu, Olar, Bedreag, Lambru, Cotovanu 2018: 497), pe care Cioană comisul îl cumpăra la 23 martie 1642. Această posesiune s-a dovedit a fi importantă nu doar pentru Cioană, ci și pentru urmașii lui, satul Cornățelul din județul Mehedinți rămânând în familia sa vreme de un secol.

Din a doua jumătate a secolului al XVII-lea în documente își face apariția Mihart, fiul lui Cioană, acesta reprezentând a patra generație a familiei din Smârdeșteț. Cum arătam mai sus, cercetarea în cazul acestuia și a urmașilor săi nu mai poate fi urmărită sistematic, principala colecție de documente interne ale Țării Românești acoperind doar câțiva ani după mijlocul veacului al XVII-lea. Destinul familiei în a doua jumătate a acestui secol și în cel următor va face obiectul unui studiu separat.

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**U.S. TRADE STRATEGY (1913-1930):
THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE**

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Abstract

This new situation regarding the transformation of the international economic structure from hegemony to bilateral opportunism has substantially modified the American trade strategy. While the United States had relied on the security provided by Britain's hegemonic leadership in the past, it was becoming necessary to adapt to the mixed interests of its main trading partner. These new constraints, manifested primarily in domestic political discourse as a fear of foreign retaliation for continued protectionism, led to the accommodative trade strategy adopted in 1913 and followed through the late 1920s. The United States therefore responded with freer trade policy of the Underwood Act as Britain's position gradually evolved within the international economic structure before the First World War. The war drastically disrupted centuries-old patterns of trade flows: money and investment, and created significant political problems that generated widespread international economic instability. As expected, both Britain and the United States adopted higher but still restricted levels of protection in the wake of the war, and Anglo-American cooperation still proved difficult. The trade strategy of the United States was also affected by the level of international economic instability generated by the fear of retaliation, rooted in the structure of bilateral opportunism, which restrained the levels of American tariffs.

Key words: *American trade strategy, bilateral opportunism, tariff acts, national commercial interest.*

Introduction

Tariff acts

Between 1912 and 1930, the United States abandoned its historic protectionist policy. The Underwood Act, approved by the administration of President Woodrow Wilson in 1913, drastically reduced tariffs and promoted the principle of freer international trade. A decade later, in an international economy reeling from its post-war ebbs, the United States modestly increased tariffs through the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922. However, tariffs remained below those of earlier phases, and this modest increase from the low levels of 1913 was incompletely compensated by a more active trade strategy and the adoption of the non-discriminatory most-favored-nation principle. During this phase of trade strategy, American policy was characterized by intense tariff containment and a high degree of international activism.

The United States dramatically departed from its historic policy of high tariff protection in the Underwood Act of 1913 which promoted the lowest tariff rates of any tariff act by enunciating the principle of reciprocal tariff reductions. Following World

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War I, in an international economy still reeling from the war, the United States raised its debt moderately through the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922. It compensated for this decline in liberalism by adopting a more active trade strategy and the nation's most favored. In terms of American tariff policy, the Fordney-McCumber Act proposed a return to traditional Republican protectionism, characterized by the restraint of tariffs at home imposed by a fear of foreign retaliation. For the first time in American history, protectionism was compromised in favor of export expansion.

In the years leading up to the First World War, the United Kingdom evolved from a hegemonic leader, whose domestic policy promoted imperial protection and preferences, to an opportunist. The relative success of the tariff reformers signaled that Britain's nearly century-long commitment to free trade at home and abroad could no longer be guaranteed.

Between 1930 and 1930, the United States took a dramatic turn toward renewed protection through the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, and passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934. Although this marked an important departure in American trade strategy, in reality marked a radical break compared to past practice. Moreover, the 1934 act was designed as a complement to protection, allowing the United States to reopen foreign markets for its exports, finally only after 1945 did the United States fully support the principle of free trade at home and abroad.

These phases of American trade strategy highlight the constraints and opportunities the United States faced in the international economic structure; how they shaped the national commercial interest and, in turn, the commercial strategy, where the role of the foreign policy executive was of particular importance in the policy-making process.

The Changing International Economic Structure

The United Kingdom was no longer a hegemonic leader since 1912. Beginning in the early 20th century, Britain's position in the international economic structure declined rapidly, and the United States overtook Britain in relative productivity in the late 1890s, and Britain's share of world trade fell from 17.5 % in 1900 to 14.1 % in 1913. As Britain's position continued to change, the structure of the international economy evolved, even before the First World War, from hegemony to bilateral opportunism.

In the early 20th century, Britain saw a small but steadily growing protectionist movement. Led by Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, tariff reformers put forward two demands: imperial preferences, in which Britain would abandon the unconditional most favored nation's principle for reciprocal tariff preferences with its colonies, and a 10 % tax on manufactured imports. In Chamberlain's view, these measures were necessary because of Britain's shaky trading position, which was largely the result of foreign tariffs designed to repel British goods. Tariff reform, according to Chamberlain, offered a way to prevent Britain's slide into „*decadence, impotence, and anarchy*” (Sykes, 1979: 41). In other words, Britain's economic self-defense required a return to protectionism and an expansion of its special trade relations with the colonies.

Throughout the antebellum era, the issue of tariff reform threatened to split the Conservative party, which contained large factions of both free traders and

reformers. The Liberal government needed to broaden the tax base if its ambitious military and social reform programs were to be adequately financed (Peel, 1913: 38).

In the ensuing election of January 1910, the Liberals retained control of the government, although the Conservatives increased the number of seats they controlled in the House of Commons. More importantly, the tariff reformers did not support the Conservative Party, perhaps in part because of the financial and political support of the protectionists against the free trade members of their own party (Williams, 1931: 22). The Conservatives remained a minority in Parliament until 1912, as the overthrow of Britain's nearly century-old free trade policy seemed increasingly inevitable.

Within the international economic structure, the new position of the United Kingdom posed a fundamental challenge to American trade policy because the proposed protective tariffs in the United Kingdom directly threatened American exports to its most important market. Although since the early 1890s Britain's share of American exports had steadily declined, the English market still represented 24.2 % of total American exports during 1913 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1975: 930-934). Even after all other major economic powers turned to protectionism, Britain's policy changed the rules of the game, promoting protectionism that also indirectly threatened American exports to other countries by delegitimizing free trade. By relinquishing its leading position in the international economy, Britain was turning inwards on its colonial trading bloc, and this new policy of imperial preferences threatened the United States with even greater consequences. In this new context, the United States had to consider the United Kingdom's new mixed commercial interests in formulating its own trade strategy because the mutual advantages to be exchanged between the United Kingdom and its colonies threatened not only America's access to the important British market, but also the ability of the United States to export to the various colonies that undermined confidence in the nation's commitment to free trade, thereby reducing the appeal of continued American freedom.

The Underwood Act (1913)

By 1913, tariff reform had become all but inevitable, and, as before, it divided Democrats and Republicans. It was also one of the first issues that divided Taft and his former supporter, Theodore Roosevelt, ultimately causing the latter to abandon the Republican Party in the 1912 election. Although certainly this new situation, helped him in the election race, Wilson did not owe his election to the Republican division. Woodrow Wilson garnered 45.2% of the popular vote and 435 Electoral College votes, compared to 29.7% and 88 votes for Theodore Roosevelt and 25.1% and 8 votes for William H. Taft (Anderson, 1981: 213).

Despite calls for reform, Roosevelt and Wilson adhered to different programs. Reflecting on his Republican ideas, Roosevelt continued to support a more paternalistic view of government and wanted to „take the tariff out of politics” (Pringle, 1931: 567) by creating an independent tariff commission to scientifically determine import duties, and Wilson rejected the concept of the commission and passed Congress a new omnibus tariff law that would bring together the principles of the „New Freedom”.

Tariff reform was based on the principle of a „*competitive tariff*” (Isaacs, 1948: 215) as published in the Democratic platform of 1912. The concept of competition was essential: the tariff should not be abolished so as to seriously injure an industry, but it should be low enough to allow „*substantial imports*” (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Ways and Means Committee, 1913: 16, 17). The Underwood Act expected to increase imports by about \$123 million, amounting to 7.4 % of total imports since 1912 (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1916: 328). Significantly, despite the tariff reduction, Wilson and the Democrats specifically rejected the doctrine of free trade and wanted to retain a modest degree of protection for American industry. During the years that the Underwood Act was in effect, average tax rates were lower than at any time since the Civil War and lower than they would have been until 1958.

Table 1
Levels of duty by tariff act

<i>Tariff act/Year</i>	<i>Level of duty on all imports</i>	<i>Level of duty on dutiable imports</i>	<i>Percentage of all imports on free list</i>
1909	20.0	41.0	51.3
1913	8.8	26.8	67.5
1922	13.9	38.2	63.5

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States - FRUS
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909, 1913, 1922)

The Underwood Act proposed to combine the liberalism with the activism of the American trade strategy developed in the previous phases. Thus, the president was authorized to negotiate trade agreements „*with a view to freer commercial relations and the further mutual expansion of trade and commerce*” (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Ways and Means Committee, 1913: 56) without limiting the executive in the scope or extent of tax reduction. In its provisions, the United States expressed its willingness to further reduce its own tariff to obtain discounts abroad and clearly identified its interests with greater openness in the international economy. To sum it up, the Underwood Act marks a significant shift in American trade strategy. Recognizing the changing nature of the international economy, the United States adopted a new liberal trade strategy and for the first time subordinated its desires for protection at home to the expense of expanding exports abroad. Therefore, Congress supported the goal of freer trade within the international economy, accepted the constraints of bilateral opportunism, and moved toward freer trade.

The Fordney-McCumber Act (1922)

With the instability created by World War I, there was little doubt that the United States would also raise its tariffs as a result of Britain’s return to protection. On his last day in office, President Wilson vetoed a proposal to raise the tariff on agricultural products, but the measure was promptly passed again and signed by President Warren G. Harding as the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921. Immediately after passage following this bill, Congress began work on a new omnibus tariff act, which was finally passed in September 1922. In the Fordney-McCumber Act, the changes occurred primarily in the

level of tariffs on all imports, which was increased from 8.8 to 13.9 %. Similarly, the average rate on imports subject to customs duties was increased from 26.8 to 38.2 %. Finally, the Fordney-McCumber Act free list was reduced from 67.5 to 63.5 %.

Also, the Fordney-McCumber Act, wrongly described by Frank W. Taussig as „*a tariff with higher rates than any in the long series of protective measures*” (Taussig, 1931: 453) seemed moderate compared to the tariff levels of the 1890s, when average tax rates was about 23.5 % on all imports and 45.7 % on dutiable imports. The instability of the international economy clearly played a major role in the desire for a new higher tariff in the United States, and was a continually recurring theme in the debates over the Fordney-McCumber bill. Both Joseph W. Fordney, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and Porter J. McCumber, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, opened the debates by appealing to the widespread instability facing the United States. The solution to this condition of instability was to raise the tariff where a protective tariff is most necessary to support American industries. In addition to managing instability through a general rate increase, the Fordney-McCumber Act also introduced a limited amount of administrative flexibility as an adjustment mechanism. Section 315 authorized the president to raise or lower all or any taxes by up to 50 % to equalize production costs. The Tariff Commission, created in 1916 under President Wilson, was charged with making the necessary investigations into the costs of production and recommending any changes the President might find necessary (Dobson, 1976: 88, 93). Section 315 was ultimately intended to reduce taxes once international economic conditions were stabilized. In practice, however, Section 315 has been used more often to increase tax rates as a result of the mandate to equalize production costs. Between 1922 and 1929, more than 600 applications covering 375 articles were submitted to the Tariff Commission. (Kelly, 1963: 16). Of these, only 47 investigations covering 55 articles were completed, of which 38 resulted in a change in duty

Throughout the war and into the 1920s, the United States maintained its commitment to nondiscrimination in international trade. In response to the European Allies' desire to organize the international economy around regional trading blocs, as announced in Paris in 1916, President Wilson recommitted the United States to the principle of non-discrimination. In the third of his Fourteen Points, Wilson made it the explicit objective of the United States to „*remove, as far as possible, all economic barriers, and establish an equality of terms of commerce among all nations consenting to peace and association for its maintenance*” (Parrini, 1969: 16). Wilson included this commitment to non-discrimination in both the Treaty of Versailles and the Charter of the League of Nations.

Between 1923 and 1929, the United States concluded twenty-two unconditional MFN treaties or agreements, including with Germany, Spain, and many of the small or newly independent European countries. Unconditional MFN treaties were concluded with Germany (1923), Hungary (1925), Estonia (1925), Salvador (1926), and Honduras (1927). Other treaties containing unconditional MFN clauses were concluded with Turkey (1923) and Panama (1926). Finally, modus vivendi recognizing the principle of unconditional MFN were obtained with Albania (1923), Brazil (1923), Dominican Republic (1924), Greece (1924), Guatemala (1924), Nicaragua (1924), Poland (1925), Lithuania (1925), Finland (1925), Romania (1926), Haiti (1926) and Latvia (1926). The United States was unable to

negotiate similar agreements with Britain or France, despite its efforts. During discussions with at least Spain, Romania, and Venezuela, the United States has explicitly threatened to invoke the criminal charges under Section 317 of the Fordney-McCumber Act. In each case an agreement was reached and the threat was withdrawn (FRUS, 1927: 635). During the Great Depression of 1873–1896, Britain failed to effectively regulate the international economy, so the success of joint Anglo-American attempts in the 1920s was not guaranteed. Indeed, given the new state of affairs—the overnight rise of the United States as a net creditor, the massive wartime destruction of European economies, the elimination of Germany as a central economic player, the fracturing of historical trade patterns—required effective new regulation. Finally, there was Anglo-American cooperation, where the two opportunists were at least partially successful.

In the post-war period, Anglo-American cooperation experienced three phases. Immediately after the war, *the first stage* of competition took shape. The most pressing problem for the Americans was Britain's attempt to revive its pre-war trade network that emanated from its financial services center in London. The United Kingdom wanted to integrate the United States into the British system, offering access to the intelligence network in exchange for a promise that the United States would not create its own global trading/financial system. The American business community trying to dominate the system from within and National City Bank trying to build its own network rejected the offer in favor of developing an all-American system. This competition reflects two different conceptions of the appropriate postwar international economic regime. The United Kingdom advocated a „closed-door” (Parrini, 1969: 142) approach to reconstruction and trade, with international exchanges being loosely governed by an international consortium. The United States, on the other hand, as the most productive country in the international economy and expecting to be the favorite in any equal struggle for world markets, wanted an „open-door” regime.

Eventually, Britain accepted the United States' position on several key economic issues, and considerable Anglo-American cooperation began to emerge. Beginning in 1920, *the second stage* began, where cooperation was more evident in efforts to stabilize the international economy and maintain an open door policy in developing regions. Between 1924 and 1926, the London Conference and the Dawes Plan temporarily resolved the issue of post-war reparations, the Treaty of Locarno helped to stabilize the European political order by resolving certain disagreements between France and Germany, and the Mellon-Berenger Agreement only temporarily resolved the war debt problem. Anglo-American cooperation in each of these cases was essential to the final outcome. The United States and the United Kingdom then turned their attention to stabilizing international currency markets. The Dawes Plan financed Germany's return to gold in 1924. Assistance from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York allowed Britain to stabilize its currency and resume gold convertibility in 1925. Similar efforts facilitated France's return to gold in 1927. The return to gold was thought of as the most important means of mitigating the instability then facing the international economy. Regarding trade and investment, Anglo-American cooperation has focused particularly on developing regions. In the Second Chinese Consortium and the Washington Conference of 1921 and 1922, Britain and the

United States united to counter Japanese efforts to secure a special position in China. Under American pressure, Britain agreed to honor the open door policy in oil development in the Middle East. The United States, in turn, became willing to allow foreign participation in the domestic oil industry (Wilson, 1971: 184).

From the mid-1920s to the 1930s, during *the third stage*, the fragile Anglo-American cooperation began to unravel. In this context, Great Britain's position in the international economic structure diminished and it became increasingly difficult for it to stabilize its overvalued sterling in the domestic economy and within the international financial network, triggering new conflicts that weakened the Atlantic partnership formed in the first half of the decade. (Hogan, 1977: 218). Consequently, each side was aware of the dangers of retaliation and restrained its own tariff levels accordingly

The Smoot-Hawley Act (1930)

Upon taking office in March 1929, President Herbert Hoover called Congress into special session to review the agricultural schedule of the tariff where there had been a decline in employment due to insurmountable competition in that industry's products (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1974: 79). The Smoot-Hawley Act, while setting higher tax rates, was not as extreme as commonly believed. It was finally passed and signed into law in June 1930, the Smoot-Hawley Act raised the average rate of dutiable imports from 38.2 to 55.3 %, the highest level in American history (Hicks, 1960: 221).

Table 2
Levels of duty by tariff act

<i>Year of tariff act</i>	<i>Level of duty on all Imports</i>	<i>Level of duty on dutiable imports</i>	<i>Percentage of all imports on free list</i>
1922	13.9	38.2	63.5
1930	19.0	55.3	65.5

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States - FRUS
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1920, 1930)

Only the Underwood Act of 1913 allowed more duty-free entry into the United States than the Smoot-Hawley bill. Because of the large free list, the average rate of customs duties on all imports was only increased from 13.9 to 19.0 %. This was the third lowest average rate of duty on all imports of the seven tariff acts examined in this study: only the Underwood and Fordney-McCumber acts were lower. Thus, although taxes were higher than ever before, they were applied to relatively few goods. However, the act still constituted a substantial upward revision of the tariff. The Smoot-Hawley Act also reinstated the earlier retaliation and flexibility provisions of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff. Section 338 authorized the president to impose retaliatory tariffs of up to 50 % ad valorem on the goods of countries that discriminated against American products. As with section 317 of the 1922 act, section 338 also authorized the president to ban all imports from the offending country if the initial criminal charges did not result in the elimination of discrimination.

Former Section 315 and renumbered as Section 336, which included the flexibility provision, generated much controversy. In 1930, liberal internationalists opposed the inclusion of the flexibility provision in the Smoot-Hawley bill, and moderate protectionists supported it. President Hoover, maintaining his confidence in the bipartisan Tariff Commission's ability to take the „tariff out of politics” (Wilson, 1971: 79) strongly supported Section 336 and threatened to veto the legislation unless the flexibility provision was included. Thus, although the Smoot-Hawley Act contained the same potential for international activism as the Fordney-McCumber Act, few had strong expectations that this result would be achieved.

Table 3 shows a comparison of the fifteen tariff lists in the 1922 and 1930 tariffs, where except for wool and manufactures thereof, which groups the raw material produced by the farmer together with the finished product, the largest rate increases are found in the agricultural grids and processed food. Specifically, agricultural products and provisions were increased by 13.76 % valorem, spirits, wines, and other beverages (which because of prohibition were mostly „others”) by 10.96 %, and sugar by 9, 36 %.

Table 3
Average rates, by schedules, in the tariff acts of 1922 and 1930 (in percentages)*

<i>Category</i>	<i>1922</i>	<i>1930</i>	<i>Increase</i>
Chemicals, oils, and paints	29.22	31.40	2.18
Earths, earthenwares, and glassware	45.62	53.62	8.00
Metals and manufactures of	33.71	35.01	1.30
Wood and manufactures of	7.97	10.49	2.52
Sugar, molasses, and manufactures of	67.85	77.21	9.36
Tobacco and manufactures of	63.09	64.78	1.69
Agricultural products and provisions	19.86	33.62	13.76
Spirits, wines, and other beverages	36.48	47.44	10.96
Manufactures of cotton	40.27	46.33	6.06
Flax, hemp, jute, and manufactures of	18.16	19.14	0.98
Wool and manufactures of	49.54	59.83	10.29
Manufactures of silk	56.56	59.13	2.57
Manufactures of rayon	52.68	53.62	0.94
Paper and books	24.72	26.06	1.34
Sundries	21.97	27.39	5.42

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States - FRUS
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922, 1930)

The Smoot-Hawley Act, justified and fueled in part by increases in foreign tariffs, served as a catalyst for greater protection within the international economy and retaliation against the United States. Thirty-three countries filed formal protests against the Smoot-Hawley Tariff even before the bill was passed. Canada increased its tariffs on certain American products and widened the margin of preference granted to British goods. In July 1930, Spain raised its tariff and in November of that year concluded bilateral treaties with France and Italy that effectively withdrew most-favored-nation

status from the United States. Italy increased its taxes on automobiles in July 1930, and in September 1931 raised almost all taxes by 15 % ad valorem and those on radios and radio equipment to virtually prohibitive levels. Italy also began to balance trade on a bilateral basis. Shortly after the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Act, Switzerland began a public boycott of American products. Beginning in July 1931, France gradually placed quotas on 1,131 previously dutiable items, or one-seventh of all tariffed goods. Britain returned to general protection in 1932.

It is difficult to determine the precise role of the Smoot-Hawley Act in spurring this wave of protectionism. Although some countries reacted almost immediately, most reprisals occurred only after a substantial period of time had passed. These gaps provided a significant period in which the United States – reaping the benefits of preemption – was effectively cut off from imports, while its export markets remained essentially at the same level of openness that had existed before 1930.

Within the Smoot-Hawley Act the most persuasive explanation links the distributive nature of the tariff to underlying changes in the structure of societal interests. Thus, increased international economic instability, the imminent end of bilateral opportunism, and the emerging structure of unilateral opportunism led the United States to adopt a modest upward revision of the tariff. These factors also reduced the fear of foreign retaliation, limited the executive's ability to appeal to foreign policy concerns, and, by focusing attention on raising tariffs on basic goods, increased pressures for protection. In other words, the difference between 1922 and 1930 lies not so much in domestic conditions as in the changing structure of the international economy.

The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) (1934)

Despite its initially proposed goals, the RTAA proposed by Franklin D. Roosevelt in March 1934 did not represent a repudiation of protection in the United States because it did not indicate that the country wanted to adopt the policies of a hegemonic leader. As might be expected from an opportunist, domestic protection remained an important objective of American trade strategy, recognizing that lower tariffs abroad and the ability to negotiate bilaterally for such reductions were necessary to restore its export markets. At its core, the RTAA merely demonstrated the United States' willingness to trade limited reductions in its own tariff plan in exchange for substantial reductions in others.

RTAA wanted to fulfill two central objectives. The first purpose of the bill was to promote international trade in foreign countries for the products of the United States as a means of assisting in the present emergency. Roosevelt wanted to find new reciprocal methods by which to begin the actual exchange of goods.

The second objective of the RTAA, stimulated by the concomitant expansion of US executive authority over foreign trade matters in the wake of the new economic situation. With regard to foreign tariffs, the American executive demanded the ability to negotiate effectively with other countries, ensuring that agricultural and industrial interests retain their rightful place in world trade. This new positioning required the American government to negotiate with other governments through a quick and decisive understanding based on a carefully analyzed program and to provide discerning opportunities in the American market for additional foreign products.

In its implementation, the RTAA was, in effect, an amendment to the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930. It further authorized the President to determine whether tariffs or other import restrictions of the United States or any foreign country were unreasonable and burdensome and restricting the foreign trade of the United States to enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign governments. All tariff changes were to be generalized to all countries that held unconditional most favored nation and national agreements with the United States. No agreement, however, could raise or lower fees by more than 50% or transfer any assets between free and chargeable programs.

In its individual provisions there were several amendments which had not been adopted in the earlier tariff acts. The President had been authorized to enter into reciprocal agreements in the acts of 1890, 1897, and 1913. The reciprocal agreements negotiated under the act of 1890 and the third section of the act of 1897 did not require subsequent congressional approval. The authority to negotiate on any and all duties was given to the President in section four of the 1897 act and in the 1913 act. The President was given discretion to vary rates by up to 50 % in sections 315 and 317 of the Fordney-McCumber tariff and sections 336 and 338 of the Smoot-Hawley tariff. Finally, the unconditional most-favoured-nation principle was adopted by the United States in 1923. The RTAA is unique, however, in delegating all these various powers to the president simultaneously. The executive therefore had much more control over trade policy under the RTAA than ever before. Despite this grant of freed-up authority, Congress nevertheless curtailed the president by limiting his authority to only three years. If the executive abused this grant, it would most likely not be renewed (Moley, 1939:12).

Twenty-two agreements and three additional agreements were signed between June 12, 1934, when Roosevelt signed the RTAA, and the outbreak of World War II. By 1939, when almost all of these agreements were implemented, the average tariff on dutiable imports into the United States had fallen from 55.2 to 37.3 %, or about 1 % below the 1922 Fordney-McCumber Act rate. The level of duties on all imports also fell from 19.0 to 14.4 %, about one-half of 1 % above the Fordney-McCumber rates. Although these reductions were considerable, the RTAA—at least in its first five years—did not constitute free trade or even a return to the liberal trade strategy adopted in the Underwood Tariff of 1913. Nevertheless, RTA A achieved its goal of expansion of American exports. By 1939, sales of American goods abroad had roughly doubled from 1933 levels (Tasca, 1938: 45).

Table 4
American Trade Strategy 1897-1934

Phase	Structure	Trade strategy	Foreign policy executive
I 1887-1897	British hegemony	Free riding on free trade; tariff transformed into tool for both protection and export expansion. particularly to Latin America;	Cleveland initiated debate in 1887; Secretary of State Blaine and Harrison lobbied for reciprocity despite congressional opposition; Cleveland also championed duty-free raw materials in 1894;
II 1897-1912	Declining British hegemony	U.S. continued to free ride on British free trade, pursuing protection and export expansion to Latin America; U.S. export horizons expanded, increasingly focused on rising European tariff;	McKinley took passive role in congressional deliberations but strongly supported reciprocity; Roosevelt allied with congressional protectionists, although he set basis for future revision; Taft failed to recognize incentives of international economic structure, out maneuvered by protectionists;
III 1912-1930	Bilateral opportunism U.S. & U.K,	Dramatic turn toward freer trade at home and abroad in 1913; under greater international instability, tariff raised modestly in 1922 and compensated by greater activism and unconditional MFN;	Wilson, strong advocate of tariff reform; Harding worked to restrain tariff increase in 1922 and adopted unconditional MFN in 1923, but his efforts were partially offset by support for protectionist tariff commissioners;
IV 1930-1934	Unilateral opportunism U.S.	Preemptive protection in 1930, but final bill higher than expected as a result of congressional logrolling; Turn toward greater liberalism and activism in 1934;	Hoover initiated call for appropriate reform but failed to understand international economic structure or restrain Congress; Secretary of State Stimson urged restraint to Hoover; Secretary of State Hull, strong advocate of RIA A, Roosevelt less clear but supportive over time;

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States - FRUS
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934)

Conclusions

Beginning with Grover Cleveland, each of the US presidents tried to increase their political influence over the tariff by defining it, at least in part, as a foreign policy issue. By appealing to his position as the primary foreign policy maker, each president increased his legitimate authority in the tariff-setting process. Faced with dominant protectionist strategies abroad against which US trade strategy could have only limited impact, the tariff again emerged as a "domestic" issue, whereas Wilson and Harding had linked the tariff to exports and larger issues of foreign policy, Hoover remained unusually silent.

American trade strategy has been dramatically altered by the change in international economic structure from bilateral to unilateral opportunism. In the late 1920s, increased international economic instability, the impending end of bilateral opportunism, and the emergence of unilateral opportunism conspired to bring about a modest upward revision of the tariff. The new constraints and opportunities of the international economic structure, however, reduced the fear of foreign reprisals that had played such an important role in the narrowing of protection between 1912 and 1930 that led to an increase in tariffs on manufactured goods, focusing attention on higher taxes on basic goods and agricultural products.

As other countries fought back against the new American strategy and world trade slowed under the pressure of sharply increased tariffs throughout the international economy, the United States' national commercial interest shifted from emphasizing protection at home to pursuing free trade abroad. In other words, the United States sought to exercise a measure of unilateral leadership and restore its export markets by reducing foreign trade barriers. This highly active trade strategy did not reflect a new commitment to free trade or hegemonic leadership. Throughout this period, the United States remained opportunistic, continuing to desire protection at home and free trade abroad, acting in its own interest regardless of the evolution of the international economy as a whole.

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GH. I. BRĂȚIANU ȘI N. IORGA.
DESPRE GÂLCEAVA ISTORICILOR ÎN POLITICĂ (1931-1932)

GH. I. BRĂȚIANU AND N. IORGA.
ON THE HISTORIANS' CONFLICT IN POLITICS (1931-1932)

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Abstract

Looking back, the political figures Gheorghe I. Brătianu and Nicolae Iorga are much in the shadow of the historians with the same names. However, in the interwar period, the two were at the forefront of public life primarily as politicians. Iorga supported Brătianu not only at the beginning of his scientific career, but also when he launched into politics. The great historian hoped his young disciple would follow his grandfather and his father as president of the National Liberal Party. The first tensions appeared after Brătianu created his own political party (June 1930) and increased in intensity after Iorga became prime minister (April 1931). Although they clashed frequently, we cannot say that an open conflict broke out between them. However, after the fall of the Iorga government, their relations remained polite, but far from the warmth of the past.

Key words: *Gheorghe I. Brătianu, Nicolae Iorga, political party, parliament, government, opposition.*

Privind retrospectiv, personajele politice Gh. I. Brătianu și N. Iorga sunt mult în umbra istoricilor cu aceleași nume. Totuși, în perioada interbelică, cei doi au fost în prim-planul vieții publice în primul rând ca politicieni. E adevărat, unii speciali, despre care toată lumea știa că au o profesie sau măcar o ocupație clară, aceea de istoric. După cum scria istoricul Ovidiu Buruiană, „poate mai mult decât în cazul lui Nicolae Iorga [...], capitalul simbolic științific al istoricului ieșean, potențat de cel al numelui [și l-aș adăuga și pe acela al tinereții¹] a fost investit în spațiul public, cu efecte însemnate asupra actorilor puterii” (Buruiană, 2013: 510).

Când Brătianu se lansa în politică, având doar „autoritatea numelui” și un grup de susținători provinciali, Iorga avea deja cel puțin două de decenii de experiență, notorietate și un loc clar, chiar dacă nu stabil, în peisajul politic. Totuși, apelând la un sofism malițios, putem spune că, de la început, Brătianu avea o forță electorală și poate chiar o perspectivă pe care Iorga nu le avusese niciodată. În iulie 1927, când tânărul de nici 30 de ani a candidat prima dată, lista PNL Iași, pe care el a figurat, a obținut cu 380 de voturi mai mult decât toate listele „partidului național (Iorga)” în toată țara².

Ca o paranteză, cred că perioada începutului politic al lui Gheorghe Brătianu se cere studiată mai în detaliu, iar afirmațiile trebuie să fie mai prudente. Oricum, teza dominantă în acest moment, anume că tânărul ar fi făcut primii pași împotriva voinței tatălui său. Știm că „recepția d-lui prof. G. Brătianu” în „organizațiunea partidului național-liberal din Iași” s-a făcut pe 11 decembrie 1926 (*Mișcarea*, 14 decembrie 1926:

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1; Scurtu, 2003: 31). În anul următor pe 7 iulie, a fost ales deputat de Iași, al doilea pe lista deschisă de președintele de atunci al organizației, Constantin Crupenski (*M.O.*, 14 iulie 1927: 9595). La 12 octombrie, „sfatul parlamentar” liberal din Iași l-a ales chiar pe Gheorghe Brătianu în locul acestuia, ceea ce, știm din mai multe surse, Ionel Brătianu nu a acceptat (Buruiană, 2013: 178; Scurtu, 2003: 32; Gruber, 2013: 20). Aici, cred că istoriografia este într-o capcană, perpetuând narațiunea lansată, câțiva ani mai târziu (*Acte, explicațiuni și precizări asupra cazului Gheorghe Brătianu. Demascarea impostorului*, 1932), de cei care, între timp, îi deveniseră adversari politici fâțiși istoricului. În sprijinul acestei variante, este citat adesea și Al. Lapedatu, care, într-o convorbire cu Ionel Brătianu, prin 1919-1920, exprimându-și „temerea că politica îl va prinde în mrejele ei, răpindu-l istoriografiei române” pe tânărul Gheorghe, ar fi primit răspunsul: „Cât voi trăi eu... nu-l voi lăsa. După aceea nu știu ce va fi...” (Ciupercă, 1988: 224-225). Revenind în 1927, ne putem gândi că, dacă bătrânul ar fi vrut să blocheze intrarea în politică a fiului său, nu i-ar fi permis candidatura și alegerea ca deputat. În acest punct, nu avem nicio informație că ar fi reacționat negativ. Există, în schimb, referiri la un fel de ucenicie. S-a spus chiar că „Sfinxul” i-ar fi atribuit un rol de emisar în negocierile politice cu Iorga, în 1926 (Spinei, 1988: 264)³, iar Constantin Argetoianu a scris că „în ultimii ani, înainte de moartea sa, Ionel și-a chemat fiul, s-a apropiat de dânsul și l-a întrebuințat ca secretar în lucrările sale” (Argetoianu, 1997a: 173).

Aceasta se potrivește cu o presupusă mărturisire a lui Ionel, pe care chiar liberalii duciști aveau să o invoce după 1930: „Gheorghe... trebuie să stea multă vreme lângă mine... spre a se deprinde... să-și întărească temperamentul... șovăitor și să dovedească reale aplicațiuni pentru viața publică” (Gruber, 2013: 21). Deci nu neimplicare în politică, ci pregătire și implicare treptată! Astfel, se poate vedea într-o altă lumină și opoziția bătrânului la alegerea tânărului în fruntea organizației Iași. Nu pare o împotrivire la asumarea oricărui rol politic, ci a acelui rol particular, în contextul dat. Sunt credibile cele spuse de însuși Gh. I. Brătianu în 1931 (după ce Duca îl atacase în Parlament și refuzase duelul): „Puțin înainte de moartea lui Ion I.C. Brătianu, organizația de Iași a partidului liberal mă proclamase, în lipsa mea din țară, președintele ei; iar dacă tatăl meu ezita să ratifice această hotărâre, pe care Vintilă Brătianu a întărit-o o lună mai târziu, e că se temea de intrigile pe care încă de atunci I.G. Duca le pregătea împotriva mea, prevăzând în mine o piedică la șefia lui viitoare” (*Mișcarea*, 5 iulie, 1931: 1; Spinei, 1988: 264). Împingerea în față a tânărului istoric a fost într-adevăr privită ca o presiune, dacă nu chiar ca o concurență directă, pentru cei de la București, care doreau succesiunea lui Ionel, Vintilă Brătianu și, mai ales, I.G. Duca. Mai era și o formă afirmare în plan național a liberalilor moldoveni, nereprezentăți în guvern, care se simțeau, nu fără motiv, marginalizați.

Nu în ultimul rând, situația „clubului liberal” de la Iași era foarte complicată. După moartea liderului G.G. Mărzescu (12 mai 1926), începuse o luptă între grupări, instaurându-se, sub conducerea vremelnică a lui Crupenshi, „un veritabil regim de pace armată, tulburat pe ici-colo de lupte de guerilla sau de încăierări între francitiori” (*Adevărul*, 28 august 1928: 3). Prin acceptarea șefiei, neexperimentatul Gh. I. Brătianu nimerea în mijlocul rivalităților, motiv pentru experimentatul I. I. C. Brătianu să fie

reticent. După moartea sa (24 noiembrie 1927), noul șef, Vintilă, care nu era nici el sigur pe propria poziție, nu a mai putut (vrut) să se opună. Așa a început pentru debutantul politic o perioadă de doi ani și jumătate ca președinte de organizație județeană, în care sunt observabile, pe de o parte ambițiile sale naționale, iar pe de alta rivalitățile ieșene. Unii dintre cei care, în toamna lui 1927, îl susținuseră tactic îi deveneau din ce în ce mai ostili. În mare, se putea vorbi de două tabere: una anti-brătienistă în frunte cu tânărul și ambițiosul Victor Iamandi, alături de C. Dimitriu și primarul Osvald Racoviță („o veritabilă triarhie care a guvernat ferm organizația liberală”) și alta de „brătienisti agresivi și neînduplecați, un fel de *die hards* ai dinastiei”, conduși de C. Toma și prefectul Ed. Lăzărescu (24 noiembrie 1927). Între acestea două avea să izbucnească luptele dure de după Restaurație.

Că Gh. I. Brătianu conta în jocurile pentru conducerea PNL o confirmă chiar Iorga. Raporturile dintre ei erau foarte bune, pornind de la colaborările istorice de mai bine de un deceniu deja. Cu Brătienii bătrâni și cu Duca relațiile erau capricioase. În toamna 1927, era mai amărât pentru că, după ce le refuzase oferta de cartel și depusese liste proprii, aceștia nu-l „lăsaseră” să se aleagă deputat (candidase în trei locuri, dar nu obținuse decât puțin peste 1%). A reacționat rapid la alegerea ieșenilor, încă nevalidată de centru, elogios la adresa tânărului, dar ușor înțepător la adresa familiei. Respingea ironic părerea că ar fi fost ales pentru că era fiul primului-ministru: „Dl. Gheorghe Brătianu e, nu trebuie să se uite, și de nimeni, că este și fiul unei admirabile femei, coborâtoare din neamul vechilor Domni ai țerii, de la cari prin Moruzești, până la cei mai vechi și mai mari, a moștenit calități cari nu se întâmplă la familiile parvenite” (*Neamul românesc*, 27 octombrie 1927: 1). Nu știm care erau parvenite, dar, ca fapt divers, amintesc că, după câțiva ani, când un alt istoric, N. Bănescu, i-a spus că are origini fanariote, Iorga s-a simțit ofensat. În aceeași perioadă, niște articole nesemnate din *Neamul românesc* prezentau situația în termenii unei rivalități pentru succesiune, în care Duca voia să îl blocheze pe Gh. I. Brătianu. „Într-un acces de disperare, în care se evaporează tactul..., încearcă să rupă întâia treaptă a ascensiunii fiului primejdios. E mai probabil însă ca d. I. Gh. Duca să-și rupă capul fragil de echivocă păpușe byzantină în această tentativă” (*Neamul românesc*, 22 octombrie 1927: 1).

După câteva zile, lucrurile erau prezentate mai nuanțat. „Rămâne deci, după socoteala d-lui Duca, larg deschisă pentru d-sa calea tradiției. D. George Brătianu fiind prea tânăr, trebuie să repete etapele carierei actualului șef. La moartea lui Ion Brătianu bătrânul, șefia partidului a luat-o Dimitrie Sturdza, ca un interegn până la venirea lui Ion Brătianu fiul. D. Duca invocă precedentul acestui interegn și cere pentru d-sa șefia până la maturizarea d-lui George Brătianu. Nu-i acordă nici șefia de la Iași, căci ea este... ultima etapă către rangul de moștenitor care ar esclude interegnul” (*Neamul românesc*, 25 octombrie: 1-2). După alte câteva zile, Iorga polemiza aparent cu „amicii... de la această foaie” care vorbeau despre lupta pentru moștenire în PNL, „întâiu fiindcă nu e o succesiune în perspectivă. Cu felul cum își cheltuiește forțele [aluzie la cunoscuta comoditate a lui Ionel, n. M.G.], șeful partidului liberal poate conta – și să-i dea Dumnezeu – cu anii lui Matusalem. Eu însumi pot conta ca la moartea mea, într-una din Camerele liberale care mă exclud, la cuvintele profund mișcate... să se adauge

sunetul profund de orgă al D-sale, perpetuu președinte de consiliu al mai multor generații de regenți fabricați și împăiați de D-sa”. Anii lui Matusalem au mai fost fix trei săptămâni. Ionel Brătianu a murit și interregnumul i-a revenit lui Vintilă, continuând cât se poate de realele lupte pentru succesiune. Oricum, Iorga răspunsese ferm la întrebarea „se poate o comparație între cei doi concurenți de care se vorbește”. „D. George Brătianu e un om de o largă cultură și de o fină inteligență, de o perfectă distincție de maniere, de o aristocratică modestie. Un om de activitate și de creațiune”, net superior nenumitului Duca, a cărui singură calitate era „nonșalanța agitată, istețimea în combinații și în exploatarea și crearea dușmăniilor” (*Neamul românesc*, 3 noiembrie 1927: 1). „Urișul” a continuat să îl elogieze pe tânăr și în anii următori, susținând sus și tare că acesta trebuie să ajungă și va ajunge președintele PNL. Evident, această pornire a fost primită de unii cu rezerve.

De exemplu, Nae Ionescu, într-o scrisoare deschisă, pune la îndoială experiența și calitățile profesorului ieșean, spunându-i direct lui Iorga: „George Brătianu nu se poate bucura de recomandarea dv. La șefia unui partid politic, decât în virtutea faptului că e fiul tatălui său” (*Cuvântul*, 20 iunie 1928: 1). Sigur, pentru Iorga descendența era mereu un argument, dar lăsa să se înțeleagă – prin judecăți de valoare – că nu era singurul. Știind ambițiile lui Iorga și trecutul său politic, nu putem lăsa neobservată aprecierea istoricului Victor Spinei, că el credea că alegerea discipolului său „i-ar conferi o influență majoră asupra uneia din principalele forțe politice din țară” (Spinei, 1988: 266). În epocă, deși s-a spus sau măcar s-a insinuat că Iorga ar avea interese politice, nu i s-au făcut reproșuri atât de abrupte, ceea ce i-a permis și lui să se apere ușor, îndepărtându-se de chestiune. De exemplu, în iunie 1928, când Gheorghe Brătianu a fost ales membru corespondent al Academiei Române, la propunerea lui Iorga, Perpessicius, fără a-i nega valoarea – sau măcar referințele – dădea de înțeles, destul de vag, că ar fi existat și alte criterii decât cele strict academice: „d-sa este astăzi... profesor universitar și membru corespondent al Academiei Române, grație, zice-se, numai meritelor sale personale” (*Cuvântul*, 20 iunie 1928: 1). Acel „zice-se” l-a stârnit pe Iorga, care a văzut în el insinuarea că „atenția Academiei s-ar fi îndreptat asupra tânărului profesor de la Iași din motive politice” și a întrebat: „poate crede cineva că aș fi vrut să curtesc astfel conducerea partidului cu care am dus cele mai grele lupte fără să mă împărtășesc vre-odată din roadele victoriei?” (*Neamul românesc*, 23 iunie 1928: 1). Evident, nu putea crede nimeni asta. Nici nu ar fi avut cum să-i „curtenească” pe Vintilă și pe Duca, de vreme ce Gheorghe le era un ghimpe în coastă. Ar fi putut însă să se pună bine cu dorita și preconizată viitoare conducere. Apropos de asta și pentru a părăsi acest punct, mai spun doar că, la fel ca în toate ieșirile sale publice, Iorga era parcă predispus la întâmplări comice. În martie 1929, comentând situația internă din PNL, istoricul credea că e „ajunul plecării d-lui Vintilă Brătianu” și voia să spună că „în partidul liberal sunt două feluri de tineri”.

În prima categorie – vedem scris pe prima pagină a organului iorghist – ar fi fost „tineri pomanagii, speță de Iași, speță de el tradiții de familie. În primul rând, viitorul șef: d. Gheorghe Brătianu” (*Neamul românesc*, 17 martie 1929: 1). Era, evident, o greșeală de tipar – bietul zețar dublase un rând – dar toată presa s-a amuzat.

Articolul a fost republicat, cu corecturi, după două zile. Gh. Brătianu intra acum în categoria acelor „tineri formați în acest partid, acei pe cari îi leagă de el tradiții de familie”. „Pomanagiii” erau alții, „speță de Iași, speță de Craiova... care au mirosit sufrageria bugetară a partidului” (*Neamul românesc*: 19 martie 1929: 2).

Mergând mai departe, în iunie 1930 s-a produs o nouă și mare cotitură în istoria politică românească, foarte importantă și pentru subiectul nostru, pentru că a adus ruptura lui Gh. I. Brătianu de partid și formarea (congresul de la Frascatti, din 15 iunie) PNL – G. Brătianu sau partidul georgist. Și aici, ca și la debutul politic al tânărului, lucrurile trebuie privite mai nuanțat. Fără a nega rolul atitudinii față de Carol/Restaurație în scindarea liberalilor, cred că a fost un factor declanșator, nu cauza profundă. 8 iunie a fost un Sarajevo. Spun asta gândindu-mă la cei trei ani anteriori în care Gheorghe Brătianu încercase să obțină șefia sau măcar recunoașterea succesiunii la șefie și, mai ales, la ceea ce se întâmplase în ultima lună, la congresul PNL din 2-4 mai (la care Vintilă fusese „aclamat” președinte) și după. Destul de marginalizat, Gh. Brătianu încercase o critică la adresa politicii școlare a dr. C. Angelescu, dar aceasta fusese respinsă de conducere. Situația s-a agravat în cursul lunii mai, ziarele scriind (după *Epoca* lui Gr. Filipescu) că „între organizația liberală din Iași, prezidată de d. George Brătianu și centrul liberal, tensiunea se accentuează pe zi ce trece” (*Neamul românesc*, 14 mai 1930: 1). Atitudinea liderului ieșean față de principele Carol fusese mereu moderată, ușor favorabilă, fără o susținere fățișă, care ar fi dus la un conflict deschis cu gruparea Vintilă-Ducă. Merită citată mărturia carlistului nr. 1, Mihail Manoilescu, anume că, pe la mijlocul lui mai 1930, „ca acțiune politică, i-am trimis, întâi, după ideea prințului, un cuvânt la Iași lui George Brătianu... anunțându-l că la întoarcerea prințului acesta va face ca evocarea trecutului în legătură cu alungarea prințului să nu apese în mod nedelicat asupra memoriei lui Ionel Brătianu și va dirija concentrarea vinovațiilor mai mult asupra lui Știrbei. Brătianu mi-a răspuns... declarându-și simpatia lui pentru prinț, dar socotindu-se prea legat de Partidul Liberal pentru a face singur vreo mișcare în favoarea prințului. Acest lucru era perfect de înțeles, căci nu s-ar fi putut cere fiului lui Ionel Brătianu să pornească el însuși direct împotriva politicii tatălui său” (Manoilescu, 1993a: 185). Restaurația s-a produs deci când situația din partid oricum fierbea, avansul lui Carol determinându-l pe istoric să iasă din expectativă și să încerce să folosească momentul pentru a prelua conducerea PNL. Că nu a reușit decât o disidență, deloc neglijabilă, e altă discuție...⁴

Atitudinea lui Iorga, care se opusese actului de la 4 ianuarie 1926, a fost – cum altfel? – favorabilă mișcării lui G. Brătianu. La o săptămână după ce Vintilă îl exclusese din PNL și la două zile după ce susținătorii tânărului ceruseră proclamarea sa ca președinte al PNL, *Neamul românesc* scria „mișcarea inițiată de d. George Brătianu câștigă teren” (*Neamul românesc*, 17 iunie 1930: 1), iar mai apoi că „în rândurile partidului liberal entuziasmul pentru acțiunea d-lui George Brătianu crește. Adesiunile curg. În câteva zile disidența va fi mai mare decât partidul!” (*Neamul românesc*, 18 iunie 1930: 1). Iorga continua în tonul anilor trecuți: „D. Gheorghe Brătianu a reacționat cu sentimentul de mândrie al unui om tânăr, al unui om de înaltă cultură și de un deosebit talent, cu conștiința de sine a lui Ion Brătianu și al coborătorului neamului domnesc al

Moruzeștilor. Mâni, izfonitul va fi șeful partidului liberal”. Amintea că „l-a văzut crescând și i-a întins o mână părintească”, dar dădea și primul semn de nemulțumire, sub forma unui sfat-avertisment: „D. Gheorghe Brătianu a scăpat de dușmani. Acum, să se ferească de prieteni. Și mai ales de cei nou-nouți care vin la d-sa pentru principii de sigur, dar și fiindcă în aier s-a răspândit un ușor miros de *altă* friptură” (*Neamul românesc*, 20 iunie 1930: 1). În *Memorii*, Iorga nota parcă puțin trist: „Ieri a fost congresul liberal al lui Gh. Brătianu. I s-au închinat foștii miei elevi de la Fontenay, supt conducerea lui Giurescu: Panaitescu, Lambrino...”. Cumva, Iorga avea acum o reacție asemănătoare celei reproșate lui Duca, în urmă cu 2-3 ani: îl accepta pe Brătianu ca succesor, dar nu îi putea admite să treacă peste capul său. Că deja venerabilul istoric se dorea, printre multe altele, și liderul unei mișcări politice de (tineri) intelectuali a spus-o chiar el. După ce nota că „tinerii istorici, conduși de Giurescu, se înscriu la el”, adăuga cumva ironic: „au găsit, în sfârșit, politică «intelectuală»” (Iorga, 1939: 9). Iar, mai târziu, le mărturisea unor vizitatori: „e o veche părere a mea această concentrare a aristocrației intelectualizate” (Iorga, 1939: 16). Oricum, și Giurescu a fost direct în amintirile sale, scriind că numărul tinerilor intelectuali strânși în jurul lui Gh. Brătianu „supără în același timp pe N. Iorga care constată, cu melancolie dar și cu ciudă, că tineretul universitar din țară, în loc să se alăture lui, urmează pe un tânăr cărturar din Iași. Resentimentul se vădi și într-un articol din «Neamul Românesc»” (Giurescu, 1976: 254)⁵. E, probabil, vorba de articolul citat mai sus, dar, o lună mai târziu, au mai urmat două în care deplângea calitatea cadrelor georgiste, pe de o parte „politicieni de pripas” precum „dd. Ifrim, Făgețel și Compania” (*Neamul românesc*, 24 iulie 1930: 1), pe de alta, foști iorghiști, trecuți la liberali în 1927, pe de alta „vechile mele cunoștințe, idealistii *à toute épreuve*, secăturile entusiaste” (*Neamul românesc*, 27 iulie 1930: 1). Avea să mai scrie, în însemnările zilnice, că „Gheorghe Brătianu-și compromite acțiunea prin calitatea aderenților cari se îmbulzesc”, ajungând, la doar trei luni de la Restaurație, să spună că îl preferă pe Vintilă „aventurii lui Gh. Brătianu care și-a strâns în jur toți fugarii”, umblând cu „șatra de propagandă” (Iorga, 1939: 16, 19).

În strânsă legătură cu aceasta, Iorga a mai vorbit de lipsa de experiență – de unde s-o fi avut? – și nepriceperea lui Brătianu⁶. La începutul anului 1931, existau numeroase zvonuri cu privire la o apropiere între Duca și Gh. Brătianu, de „pertractări” în vederea fuziunii, negate de ambele părți, ceea ce, cu doar câteva luni în urmă, l-ar fi înfuriat pe Iorga. Acum, *Neamul românesc* își făcuse un obicei de a consemna, cu ironie, zvonurile, stărnind, la un moment dat, reacția *Mișcării*, care a scris: „e bizar că redacția *Neamului românesc* ignoră ceiace știe foarte bine directorul ei politic: că o asemenea împăcare e tot ce se poate închipui mai absurd și mai puțin demn de discuție”. Răspunsul a fost că „Directorul nostru politic, d. profesor N. Iorga... nu știe foarte bine ceea ce am ignora noi, pentru că nu îl interesează evoluțiile politicianismului, chiar dacă d. George Brătianu crede altfel” (*Neamul românesc*, 20 martie 1931: 2). Dincolo de aceste mici contre și cu toate că entuziasmul, speranțele (?) sau cel puțin efuziunile publice ale lui Iorga păreau să se fi domolit, impresiile sale despre atitudinile publice ale tânărului Brătianu au rămas, în general, pozitive.

În aprilie 1931, atât Iorga, cât și Brătianu au luat parte la negocierile eșuate pentru formarea unui guvern „de concentrare” condus de Nicolae Titulescu. Imediat după ce a fost numit prim-ministru (18 aprilie), Iorga, în căutare de sprijin, i- adresat lui Gh. Brătianu (cel mai probabil 21 aprilie) „o urmă scrisă a primului meu contact ca președinte de Consiliu cu d-ta”, în termeni care aminteau de elogiile din urmă cu câțiva ani. După ce îi amintea că „am prevăzut ce vei însemna în domeniul științei și m-am bucurat... părintește de tot ce-ai ajuns a-i da” și îl asigura de prețuirea pentru „încercarea d-tale de a da vieții politice un caracter de moralitate și cultură”, îi propunea colaborarea, la modul general – „în orice formă să punem alături: eu, experiența bătrâneții mele, d-ta toată încrederea pe care o aduci țării” (*Mișcarea*, 22 aprilie 1931: 1; Iorga, 1984: 210). Mesajul – evident, destinat publicului – a fost primit și afișat cu mândrie, dinspre georgiști venind semne de disponibilitate la colaborare. Cum își închipuiau colaborarea, în acele prime zile ale guvernării Iorga, nu știm! Lista miniștrilor era definitivată și G. Brătianu nu fusese inclus. Parlamentul național-țărănist nu era încă dizolvat și nu se știa dacă urma să fie. Cert e că, chiar a doua zi după numire, Iorga nota: „La Gh. Brătianu. Ne ocupăm mai mult de studiile comune” (Iorga, 1939: 88). Dar Gh. Brătianu nu a fost singurul lider de partid căruia Iorga i-a făcut avansuri, ba chiar am putea spune că a fost unul dintre... toți? (*Neamul românesc*, 20 aprilie 1931: 4). În câteva zile, lucrurile s-au dovedit mai complicate decât se gândise marele istoric la început. După doar o săptămână, nu mai știa cum să abordeze chestiunea colaborării cu georgiștii: „[Gh. Brătianu] vorbește ca și cum un cartel ar și exista între noi. Caut să evit un răspuns clar și definitiv” (Iorga, 1939: 92). Dar tânărul era insistent și chiar în ziua dizolvării Parlamentului, „Gh. Brătianu vine pentru a cere conlucrare. Îi arăt sistemul meu. A pus de formă capetele de listă” (Iorga, 1939: 94). Sistemul lui Iorga presupunea, în acel moment, o reprezentare preponderent profesională, corporatistă, lăsând foarte puține locuri pentru partide. Nu a ieșit nici pe departe cum a vrut el, dar nici cartelul cu Brătianu nu s-a făcut. Deși a avut sprijinul Regelui și al primului-ministru pentru 30 de locuri eligibile pe listele Uniunii Naționale (ceea ce însemna, oricum, mai mult decât avusese Iorga însumat în toată cariera sa politică), negocierile au eșuat pentru că Gh. Brătianu a cerut dublu, dorind egalitatea cu liberalii duciști (*Mișcarea*, 9 mai 1931: 4; Argetoianu, 1997b: 238-239; Iorga, 1932: 49). Pe 8 mai, se anunța că PNL-GB „a hotărât să nu accepte cartelul electoral propus de guvern” și „se va prezenta singur în alegeri, sub numele său și cu semnul său” (*Mișcarea*, 8 mai 1931: 4), ceea ce a dus și la dezertarea câtorva lideri importanți, dându-i dreptate lui Iorga, când vorbise de „mirosul de friptură”. Reacția din partea puterii a fost că „guvernul nu a propus d-lui G. Brătianu nici un cartel. D-sa l-a dorit, l-a discutat și din motive de aritmetică electorală l-a socotit inacceptabil” (*Neamul românesc*, 10 mai 1931: 4).

Prima campanie electorală a georgiștilor a fost, în general, lipsită de excese, principalii inamici fiind considerați duciști (etichetați drept oportuniști, „milogi”, antidinastici etc.), iar restul guvernamentalilor, inclusiv Iorga, fiind loviți mai degrabă prin ricoșeu. Primul-ministru apărea, în același timp, ușor ironizat și victimizat, ca unul care trebuie să accepte compromisuri de dragul „uniunii naționale” (*Mișcarea*, 16 mai

1931: 1). Chiar și ironiile la formulărilor patetice din manifestul „Către țărani”, publicat de premier în *Monitorul Oficial*, se făceau tot folosind ca intermediar „inima d-lui Duca”. Iorga mai era prezentat și ca o fațadă, în dosul căreia își făceau manevrele alții, în frunte cu Argetoianu (*Mișcarea*, 20 mai 1931: 1). Liderul a explicat eșecul cartelului, acuzând, dar nu foarte violent, duplicitatea guvernanților (*Mișcarea*, 16 mai 1931: 4). În mod tradițional, s-a vorbit despre abuzurile guvernului în campania electorală, dar nu atât de vehement precum o făcuseră și aveau să o mai facă alte partide de opoziție. Și în această privință, Iorga era parcă destul de menajat, marele responsabil fiind considerat, nu fără temei, același Argetoianu. Se spunea că „administrația calcă cuvântul d-lui Iorga”, adăugându-se că „d. președinte al consiliului mai știe că partidul liberal prezidat de d. Gheorghe Brătianu îi păstrează o reală stimă și are încredere în făgăduiala că vom avea alegeri libere” (*Mișcarea*, 22 mai 1931: 4). În altă parte, se întreba: „În plină teroare electorală, dl. Iorga e mințit sau compromis metodic?” (*Mișcarea*, 28 mai 1931: 4). Nu au lipsit nici încercările de a băga zădărnici între grupările care formau Uniunea Națională: „D. profesor Nicolae Iorga sabotat în Ardeal de duciști. Un acord secret al duciștilor [cu național-țărăniștii, n. M.G.] pentru șantajarea primului ministru” (*Mișcarea*, 29 mai 1931: 4). Spre final, s-au ridicat, destul de voalat, și niște semne de întrebare asupra moralității „marelui dascăl al neamului”: „Oare d. Iorga să fie cu totul străin de ceea ce se petrece... Se pregătește să acopere astăzi cu numele lui de om onest și de patriot curat operațiunile suspecte și tenebroase ale omului dela 8 iunie. Naivi, tot mai nădăjduim încă. Nădăjduim că d. Iorga își va aduce aminte de tot ceea ce marele dascăl Iorga a propovăduit o viață întreagă...” (*Mișcarea*, 30 mai 1931: 1). În tot acest timp, în discursul puterii, Gh. Brătianu și ai lui au apărut destul de puțin, ca autori ai unor nereguli mărunte, iar, în cazul liberalilor duciști, pentru a se anunța triumfal destrămarea grupării georgiste după eșecul negocierilor pentru cartel.

Rezultatul a fost pentru georgiști cca. 6% din voturi și 12 mandate de deputat, foarte bine pentru un partid de opoziție și mai ales pentru unul nou, dar nu chiar așa cum l-au prezentat ei: „Onoarea național-liberală triumfă. O mare și decisivă afirmare. Partidul național-liberal își reia locul de căpetenie în politica națională” (*Mișcarea*, 3 iunie 1931: 1).

După alegeri și deschiderea noului Parlament, în iunie-iulie 1931, Gh. I. Brătianu și deputații săi au fost foarte vocali împotriva guvernului, cu ocazia dezbaterilor privind Răspunsul la Mesaj (Țurlea, 1991: 299-301), afirmând „devotamentul și lealitatea ce datorăm coroanei”, dar își exprima regretul că noua guvernare a început cu „excesele electorale cunoscute” și convingerea că „ideea de partid n-a eșit înfrântă” (*Adevărul*, 28 iunie 1931: 3). Brătianu a intervenit scurt, dar ferm și la Legea bacalaureatului pe care Iorga se grăbea să o treacă prin Parlament. A deplâns răsturnarea „ordinii obicinuite a dezbaterilor parlamentare”, adică discutarea unor „legi cu caracter mărginit”, înainte ca „partidele de opoziție să-și fi putut preciza punctul lor de vedere la politica generală”, a vorbit despre caracterul lacunar și imprevizibil al legii, atrăgând atenția primului-ministru „asupra turburărilor pe care le poate provoca în treburile școlare”, iar punctual, în privința prevederii despre

susținerea examenului în limba maternă, a făcut apel la istorie: „Nu trebuie ca în cadrul statului unitar român, să introducem sisteme ce aparțin altor state cu caracter federativ, nu trebuie ca aci, la răspântia imperiilor moarte... să înviem tradițiile și concepțiile defunctei monarhii austro-ungare, nu trebuie să înlocuim pajura noastră unitară, cu un vultur hibrid cu mai multe capete” (*Universul*, 27 iunie 1931: 6). Iorga s-a simțit ofensat: „Gh. Brătianu ține un discurs nedrept și insultător, în care îmi atrage atenția asupra pripei cu care am alcătuit-o, asupra lipsei de patriotism, etc.” (Iorga, 1939: 126).

Dar acestea intrau în cutuma parlamentară și cu greu putea provoca mari supărări între politicieni. Ziarul georgist *Mișcarea* a continuat să acuze abuzurile electorale, și-a întetit campania împotriva „milogilor” duciști, dar a și început să țină, în notă ironică, un inventar al erorilor, gafelor, abuzurilor „ritmului nou”, pe care pretindea că îl impune guvernul Iorga-Argetoianu. Erau, în general, mărunțișuri. Se făcea mult haz amar de măsurile haotice (circulare, rezoluții etc.) ale lui Iorga, în calitatea sa de ministru al instrucțiunii publice. De aici, schimburi de înțepături cu ziarul iorghist, *Neamul românesc*, care scria, de exemplu, că: „Cel mai puțin calificat să facă ironii pe seama acestui val de sănătate care ce se revarsă asupra politicei noastre, ne așteptam să fie d. George Brătianu. Dar citim de mult *Mișcarea* și suntem edificați. Nu e întâia deziluzie, ca să ne intereseze evoluția așa de puțin interesantă, a grupării georgiste” (*Neamul românesc*, 19 iulie 1931: 4).

Situația era cumva simetrică celei din campanie, când georgiștii loviseră mai mult în cei din jurul lui Iorga decât în Iorga însuși. Acum, Gheorghe Brătianu le apărea iorghiștilor ca unul care nu reușea să domine, ba chiar era dominat de cercul său de apropiați. Avea legătură și cu „alterarea relațiilor cu «Școala nouă» de istorie”, „interferența planurilor este evidentă” (Ciupercă, 1988: 233), după cum observa istoricul Ioan Ciupercă, măcar dacă ne uităm că unul dintre georgiștii cei mai porniți împotriva guvernului era Constantin C. Giurescu, supărat, printre altele, și pentru că nu reușise să ajungă deputat (Giurescu, 1976: 257).

Totuși, s-a ajuns repede și la tensiuni personale. Știm, dintr-o scrisoare (datată 9 iulie 1931) a lui Gh. I. Brătianu că Iorga a fost indignat și i s-a plăns de o caricatură apărută în *Mișcarea*: „Mult stimat Domnule Profesor, Nu credeam că o caricatură fără importanță – pe care am examinat-o mai de aproape după ce mi-ați semnalat-o – v-a făcut să vă îndoiiți de sentimentele ce totdeauna vi le-am arătat, indiferent de acțiunea sau de atitudinea mea politică. Sunt însă mâhnit de supărarea pe care acest incident v-a pricinuit-o, și vă rog să primiți și cu acest prilej, încredințarea sentimentelor de recunoscătoare amintire și de înaltă stimă ce le păstrez îndrumătorului generației noastre în cercetările istorice. Gh. I. Brătianu” (Gorovei, Nastasă, Țurlea, 1986: 390-391). Pe 25 iulie, întâlnindu-se la nunta principesei Ileana, Iorga nota: „Gh. Brătianu, căruia mai târziu, din cauza atitudinii infame a ziarului lui, îi dau mâna numai, fără să adaug un cuvânt” (Iorga, 1939: 143).

Pe prima pagină din *Mișcarea*, apăreau aproape în fiecare zi caricaturi înțepătoare, chiar dure, la adresa duciștilor sau a unor personaje din guvern. Negăsind niciun indiciu despre care dintre ele l-a vexat în mod deosebit pe Iorga, propun o abordare empiric-speculativă, admitând riscul de a suprainterpreta. Privind toate

caricaturile din ultima lună înainte de scrisoarea lui Brătianu, observăm că ele – fie că îl privesc sau nu direct pe primul-ministru – sunt destul de asemănătoare ca ton. Deci, dacă era greu ca vreuna să îi atragă atenția în mod special, punându-le în umbră pe celelalte. M-am oprit asupra celei din data de 3 iulie, în care văd câteva detalii de natură să îl irite pe marele istoric, chiar dincolo de circumstanțele momentului.

Formula din titlu („Regim de autoritate”) era frecventă în acea perioadă, ca referire la arbitrariul deciziilor guvernamentale, iar textul care urma („Unul din edilii Capitalei a fost suspendat «ca să învețe cum să se adreseze primului ministru»”) făcea trimitere la un caz considerat „deosebit de caracteristic pentru vremurile în care trăim” (*Dimineața*, 4 iulie 1931: 3). La sfârșitul lui iunie, un anume ing. Caragea, în numele Președinției CdM, oprișe lucrările de lărgire a Bulevardului Știrbei-Vodă (planificate în urmă cu un deceniu), determinându-l pe I. Vasilescu-Nottara (național-țărănist), consilier comunal al Sectorului Verde și delegat al primarului în chestiunea amintită, să trimită o scrisoare de protest primului-ministru – poate ironică, dar, în nici un caz impertinentă – prin care susținea continuarea lucrărilor, precizând: „sunt la dispozițiunea dv. de a vă arăta planurile și de a vă da toate explicațiunile dacă acestea vă interesează” (*Dreptatea*, 3 iulie 1931: 1). Pe 3 iulie, toată presa publica un comunicat al PCdM, care anunța suspendarea consilierului, „motivată de răgazul necesar... ca să învețe cum trebuie să se adreseze oficial primului ministru al țării”⁷⁸. S-a glumit mult, și pe bună dreptate, de absurda și ilegală măsură, sugerându-se ministrului de justiție să introducă în Codul penal un nou delict, acela de „lèse-Iorga” (*Dreptatea*, 4 iulie 1931: 1). S-a spus că astfel se poate ajunge la suspendarea, pe motiv de obrăznicie, a deputaților și chiar a miniștrilor. În caricatură, vedem un ministru pus în genunchi de șef, pentru „că l-a salutat cu stânga”. Dacă ne uităm la cutele de pe gambă, pare să aibă pantaloni, dacă ne uităm mai sus, pare să n-aibă. Este arhicunoscută obsesia anti-pornografică a lui Iorga. Dar cine era ministrul îngenuncheat? Îl putem recunoaște, mai ales prin comparație cu alte caricaturi ale *Mișcării*, pe Constantin Argetoianu, interimarul permanent de la Interne, cel însărcinat cu suspendare. El rămăsese legendar (și) pentru că, înainte cu un deceniu, tot ministru de interne fiind, îi spusese deputatului țărănist Virgil Madgearu, să îl pupe undeva. Pe cine putea îndemna acum să facă asta? Pe țărăniștii care atacau guvernul, pe cetățenii care priveau mirați sau – de ce nu? – pe premierul care îl pedepsise și cu care se afla în relații complicate.

Sfârșitul lui iulie și începutul lui august au fost fierbinți. *Neamul românesc* bănuia că un articol nesemnat din *Mișcarea*, „Un zâmbet pentru «partidul» d-lui Argetoianu”, în care era ironizată dorința ministrului de a-și crea o formațiune în jurul Ligii „Vlad Țepeș” (*Mișcarea*, 22 iulie 1931: 1), ar fi fost scris de însuși Brătianu, ros de gelozie: „e cert că zâmbetul de eri a fost galben... și l-am înțeles. De ce face d. George Brătianu imprudența să-și dea zâmbetul la gazete?” (*Neamul românesc*, 23 iulie 1931: 4). O săptămână mai târziu, Iorga nota că „«Mișcarea» urlă contra «interviewului» meu din «Manchester Guardian»” (Iorga, 1939: 148). Era o exagerare, *Mișcarea* nu tuna, ci ironiza, cum o făceau și alte ziare, acel interviu în care istoricul condamna extremismul, comenta situația europeană, vorbea despre pericolul comunist și perimarea capitalismului, dar însoțea textul cu o caricatură reprezentând un bâlci

(„Panorama «Ritmul nou». Secția atracțiilor senzaționale”) în numărul respectiv din ziarul britanic era lângă „omul de sticlă” și „femeia șarpe” (*Mișcarea*, 30 iulie 1931: 1).

Pe 3 august, o tabletă nesemnată (publicată în locul celor ale lui Iorga) din *Neamul românesc* acuza *Mișcarea* că „recurge la tot ce e mai urât în calomnie și mai josnic în insultă toată această campanie desmățată având un caracter personal înverșunat”. Menționa „o lungă scrisoare personală” a primului-ministru către „tânărul său coleg de Universitate”, la care a primit „o asigurare formală că desaproabă aceste procedee sălbătice”. În ciuda ei însă, „de a doua zi, «*Mișcarea*», vinovată de a fi presintat pe primul ministru ca un fel de cerșetor hoț, pe la Prefecturi, își relua cântecul”. E, foarte probabil, vorba despre schimbul epistolar amintit mai sus (din care nu avem decât răspunsul lui Brătianu), dat fiind faptul că o caricatură cu „cerșetorul hoț” a apărut pe 10 iunie, data scrisorii fiind 9. Finalul era de o duritate atenuată de incoerență: „Partidul adevărat liberal al d-lui Brătianu este, înainte de toate, și ca intelectual, un partid delicat” (*Neamul românesc*, 3 august 1931: 1). Două zile mai târziu, ca un bilanț al începuturilor grupării georgiste, organul iorghist scria: „Partid nou, de o delicatețe organică pe care nu o depășește decât fragilitatea convingerilor, gruparea d-lui George Brătianu a debutat printr-o confuzie, ca să se mențină într-o serie nesfârșită” (*Neamul românesc*, 5 august 1931: 1).

În toamnă, înțepăturile dintre cele două gazete au continuat cu o frecvență și o intensitate mai reduse. *Mișcarea* a continuat să urmărească și să critice diversele aspecte ale guvernării, iar *Neamul românesc* a avut comentarii, privind contactele lui Brătianu cu Maniu (*Neamul românesc*, 25, 27 septembrie, 1 octombrie 1931) și Averescu (*Neamul românesc*, 13 noiembrie 1931: 4), ceremonia dezvelirii lespezii de la Țebea ori congresul georgist din 7-8 noiembrie (*Neamul românesc*, 10 noiembrie 1931: 3).

În ceea ce îl privește pe Brătianu personal, el s-a alăturat celorlalți lideri ai opoziției, absentând „ostentativ” de la deschiderea Camerei, la 15 noiembrie (Țurlea, 1991: 304; Iorga, 1932: 81; Iorga, 1939: 232), însă a făcut parte din delegația profesorilor ieșeni, care s-a prezentat la Iorga, pe 20 noiembrie, pentru a cere plata la zi a salariilor și acordarea gradațiilor începând din 1932 (*Adevărul*, 23 noiembrie 1931: 2). Iorga a notat despre el: „imposant și sumbru. Nu-mi dă voie să spun că... eu voi râde cel din urmă” (Iorga, 1939: 236).

În ianuarie 1932, Gh. Brătianu s-a aflat pentru câteva săptămâni la Paris, unde fusese, cu puțin înainte și o delegație a PNL în frunte cu Duca, pentru discuții cu diverse cercuri, în special bancare, în perspectiva unei schimbări de putere la București. Fiind într-o perioadă în care se vorbea insistent despre formarea unui „guvern de concentrare”, iar Regele convocase o întâlnire a șefilor de partide, Iorga scria că „se râde de peregrinagiile parisiene ale lui Gh. Brătianu, care, nevrând să se lase întrecut de Duca, se face ridicul” (Iorga, 1939: 295). În timpul acesta, contrele dintre gazete continuau, dar parcă își pierduseră mult din patima din vara trecută (*Neamul românesc*, 24 ianuarie 1932: 4; 30 ianuarie 1932: 4).

Oricum, trebuie spus că dincolo de toate tensiunile putere-opoziție, georgiștii s-au implicat constructiv – chiar dacă nu fără conflicte cu guvernul (*Mișcarea*, 28 februarie 1932: 1; 1 martie 1932: 1-2) –, alături reprezentanți ai altor grupări, în

elaborarea legii asanării datoriilor agricole, fapt recunoscut și luat în serios de guvernamentali, care vorbeau de „o largă și lăudabilă înțelegere”, „reforma conversiunei” ieșind astfel „din înțelegerea cuminte a tuturor conducătorilor politici” (*Neamul românesc*, 31 ianuarie 1932: 4).

În februarie, Iorga era convins că convins că georgiștii nu pot veni la guvernare, nici în forma de concentrare, nu doar pentru „copilăria lui Gh. Brătianu” (Iorga, 1939: 249), ci și pentru că era convins că Regele era „complect desilusionat” de el (Iorga, 1939: 318). Dar, tot atunci, primea o lovitură puternică – pe care nu avea cum să nu o interpreteze și în cheie politică: „mi se arată injuriile tânărului profesor C.C. Giurescu, din gruparea lui Gh. Brătianu, în «Revista Istorică Română», cu prilejul «Istoriei Românilor și a civilizației lor»” (Iorga, 1939: 320), adăugând, pe 29: „Revista lui Brătianu apare, cu agresiunea lui Giurescu” (Iorga, 1939: 333). În plus, a și urmat o reîncingere a luptelor între gazete, Iorga suspectându-l pe Gh. Brătianu că, sub pseudonimul Timon, a scris articolul „Un scandal unic universitar”, care îl acuza de „închiderea în lanțuri a Universității”. Reacția: „Tâmpenie, care ca atâtea altele, își găsește loc în ziarul d-lui George Brătianu” (*Neamul românesc*, 3 martie 1932: 1).

La sfârșitul lunii, primul-ministru i-a răspuns deputatului Brătianu la o interpelare privind abuzurile/masacrele sovietice asupra românilor transnistreni, precizând că nu poate lua măsuri concrete, dar că „întrucât Rusia calcă în picioare principii pe care toate statele europene le-au respectat și le respectă ca principii sfinte”. Brătianu a mulțumit pentru „frumoasele lămuriri date de d. Iorga”, precizând: „nu m-am îndoit nici eu de simpatia pe care guvernul o poartă românilor de peste Nistru” (*Universul*, 29 martie 1932: 8). Iată că erau momente și circumstanțe în care se putea trece peste politica mărunță

La gravele probleme economice și mișcările sociale cu care se confrunta, fără a avea vreo soluție, era clar că guvernul Iorga nu mai avea multe zile. *Neamul românesc* consemna că „ziarul d-lui G. Brătianu scrie în fiecare zi, într-o formă care provoacă surâsuri, că guvernul este sfârșit... Închipuirea energicilor opozanți «georgiști» nu ne supără; cel mult ne înduioșează” (*Neamul românesc*, 23 aprilie 1932: 4). Într-o ședință a comitetului executiv al partidului său, Brătianu era vehement: „Ne aflăm în cea mai cumplită situație financiară... sub regimul speranțelor înșelate și al făgăduielilor nesocotite”. Dorea să ajungă la guvernare – „pornim la luptă sub semnul ofensivei și am credința nestrămutată că vom birui” – deși se declara conștient de dificultăți: „a guverna în urma jafului și a nepriceperii înseamnă trudă cumplită și cumpănă grea” (*Cuvântul*, 26 aprilie 1932: 3). Iorghiștii răspundeau ironic-amar că „proprietarul firmei «La adevăratul partid liberal»... uită să spună pe ce bază... cere guvernul”, neavând un „program de soluțiuni”. Asta era adevărat. Erau însă necredibili când îi reproșau că „păcătuiește printr-un pesimism cu totul nepotrivit, zugrăvind realitatea altfel decât e” (*Neamul românesc*, 27 aprilie 1932: 4). O lună mai târziu, aveau să spună cinic că guvernul nu se temea de un acord al opoziției „pentru un motiv foarte simplu: imensele greutatea ale ceasurilor de față nu se pot rezolvi nici chiar în acordurile dintre d-nii Duca, Madgearu, Goga, Averescu, George Brătianu și Iuliu Maniu” (*Neamul românesc*, 24 mai 1932: 4). După o săptămână, Iorga își dădea demisia.

După o nouă tentativă eșuată de guvern „de concentrare”, în frunte cu Nicolae Titulescu, Regele i-a încredințat mandatul lui Vaida-Voevod. Gh. Brătianu nu a ajuns nici în acest guvern, pentru că, din nou, a cerut prea mult: patru ministere și 100 de deputați. Iorga a lăsat o scurtă însemnare de o ironie subtilă: „Lumea nu râde” (Iorga, 1939: 414).

În doi ani, din punct de vedere politic, părerea și/sau atitudinea sa față de tânărul Brătianu se schimbaseră radical. Recunoștea că acela în care își pusese speranțele și „pe care din răspuseri încercam să-l scot înainte pentru o curagioasă hotărâre n-avea importanță”. Cel pe care îl văzuse „stăpân pe el, cu sprâncenele încruntate, cu glas poruncitor și gest care taie”, cu „ceva din siguranța tatălui său” (Iorga, 1939: 33), îi apărea acum „fără prestanță personală, cu toată dureroasa silință către gestul patern, fără elocvență și la dispoziția tuturor intriganților...”. Evident, în ambele cazuri, exagera. Din punct de vedere intelectual, Iorga avea aceeași părere despre Gh. Brătianu. Vorbea în continuare de „înalta cultură a unui istoric de solidă informație și formă literară îngrijită, format la școala Apusului” (Iorga, 1932: 7).

La alegerile din iulie 1932, cei doi istorici au depus liste proprii ale formațiunilor lor. Brătianu a fost în ușoară creștere (6,5% și 14 deputați), Iorga, într-o cădere catastrofală (2,3% și 5 deputați, printre care nu se afla și el însuși, nemaipunând la socoteală faptul că era încă în cartel cu Argetoianu).

În perioada următoare, relațiile lor au rămas politicoase, dar departe de căldura de altădată. Tensiunile aveau să fie mai mult istoriografice decât politice. Pe Iorga avea să îl necăjească mai mult *Revista Istorică Română* decât *Mișcarea*. Într-o scrisoare dinaintea alegerilor din 1933 (la care el nu se mai prezenta) scria că „un șef de guvern nu poate să-și amintească de jignirile sale personale”, dar amintea de „ofensele grosolane care mi s-au adus de revista care stă sub patronajul frumosului d-tale nume”. Dincolo de „încredințarea unei vechi simpatii, pe care nici o nedreptate n-a putut-o zgudui”, cei doi se situau pe poziții politice adverse, căci Brătianu devenise anticarlist, iar Iorga preciza: „nu pot aproba nici un atac direct su pieziș, adus regelui și aș fi luat măsuri contra oricui ar fi cutezat să le aducă” (Iorga, 1984: 211). Tensiuni politice între cei doi au mai apărut, dar Iorga nu a mai fost niciodată în postura de a lua măsuri, oricum, nu direct.

Note

¹ „Tineretea și minunatele dvs. însușiri constituie pentru noi și pentru țară testimoniul neîndoios că partidul național-liberal, reînnoindu-și neîncetat puterile și adaptându-se împrejurărilor va rămâne pe primul plan în viața publică a României, fiind întotdeauna îndreptarul luminos al marilor idealuri naționale și democratice” (*Mișcarea*, 6 decembrie 1927: 2).

² 28537 față de 28157 (*Monitorul Oficial*, 14 iulie 1927: 9564, 9595). În decembrie 1928, din opoziție, PNL a luat, la Iași, 7463 voturi, față de 70490 cât au luat Iorga și Averescu, în cartel, în toată țara (*M.O.*, 19 decembrie 1928: 10661, 10693). Cu puțin peste 1% din voturi, Partidul Național nu a reușit să intre în Parlament, Iorga susținând că a fost sabotat de guvern. Potrivit unei scrisori a acestuia către Sever Zotta, însuși Gh. I. Brătianu ar fi recoscut că „guvernul a sărit peste cal” (Țurlea, 1991: 236). Iorga avea să ajungă deputat în urma unei alegeri parțiale

din ianuarie 1928, de la Ismail, de la care atât PNL, cât și PNT și-au retras candidații pentru a-l ajuta (Țurlea, 1991: 240-241; Pepene, 1999: 201).

³ O precizare: de la sursă, știm că Iorga l-a folosit ca emisar (Iorga, f.a.: 138), nu și că Brătianu a făcut la fel. De la Iorga știm că Gh. Brătianu a fost în cărți pentru ministerul instrucțiunii din iunie 1927, de la formarea guvernului Știrbei (Iorga, f.a.: 221-222)

⁴ Totuși, nu putem exclude cu totul varianta că Gh. I. Brătianu a admis, de la început, posibilitatea unei disidențe. Însemnarea lui Iorga, în seara de 8 iunie 1930, după audiența la Rege: „A vorbit cu Gh. Brătianu, care-i va răspunde dacă vine singur ori cu o parte din partid” (Iorga, 1939: 4).

⁵ Istoricul Ioan Ciupercă a apreciat că „Iorga se arăta nemulțumit de înscrierea liberalilor la Brătianu; îi aștepta să îi întărească propriul partid” (Ciupercă, 1988: 233).

⁶ În martie 1931, scria că „[Goga] a prins la dejun neexperiența lui Gheorghe Brătianu”, iar 19 aprilie, că „vădit nu poate” „domina partidul” (Iorga, 1939: 65, 87).

⁷ Lipsește dintre acestea vreuna adresată liderilor național-țărăniști, dar se știe că, în prima fază, s-a luat în calcul posibilitatea Parlamentului ales în 1928.

⁸ „În urma unei adrese puțin respectoase, trimeasă de d. Vasilescu-Nottara, către președintele de consiliu, ministerul de interne a decis erii suspendarea d-lui Vasilescu-Nottara din calitatea pe care o deține în sectorul comunal al sectorului Verde. Suspendarea e motivată de răgazul necesar d-lui Vasilescu-Nottara ca să învețe cum trebuie să se adreseze oficial primului ministru al țării” (*Dimineața*, 4 iulie 1931: 3).

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THE LEGIONARY INSURGENCY OF JANUARY 1941 IN BUCHAREST – NEW ARCHIVE DISCLOSURES

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Abstract

In the literature of the interwar period and World War II, the severe divide between diverse political conservative trends, including authoritarian conservatism and right wing extremism, had been obvious for some time. In the historiography on the Legionary Rebellion in Romania, as it is frequently termed, of 21-23 January 1941, this perspective was disregarded, despite its considerably explanatory potential. This work takes a novel approach to this topic, analyzing with historical-archival arguments the great clash between two eminently incompatible organizations: one of the elites with authoritarian traditional leanings, and the other revolutionary, intolerant of the old hierarchies and inspired by European fascism, promoting national purification through violence and the annihilation of others. This research will reconsider some of the key notions and assumptions underpinning the disputes and emphasize a sequence of critical decision-making activities based on unstudied Romanian Secret Service data¹. Also, the work involves a critical analysis of the information regarding the legionary insurgency through the lens of interwar intelligence and their presentation to the readers, whether they are specialists or a history enthusiasts, both from a historical, analytical, and especially applied and exemplary perspective.

Key words: *Special Intelligence Service, legionary rebellion, Ion Antonescu, informative and subversive confrontations, Horia Sima.*

In the current article, I intend to introduce a new approach to the study of the legionary rebellion, beyond the classic presentations of its chronological evolution or minimizing as well as justifying the characteristic actions in favour of one of the parts involved.

Thus, the SSI² - Legionary Movement relationship (in the general context of the legionary rebellion) was analyzed under several registers or perspectives.

In the framework of the theoretical and methodological register, I mean to ensure a documented presentation of the events associated with the legionary rebellion in Bucharest and in the country by carefully grouping, on a new basis, the intelligence and legionary memoirs, the conclusions resulting from the analysis of the main works of specialty from the country and abroad.

In order to achieve this approach I analyzed, on the one hand, the testimonies and personal notes of some of the direct participants in the legionary rebellion, and on the other hand, the statements of the witnesses who took part into the events. The

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¹ Particularly the archival elements (657 files) referring to the legionary movement, which can be found in The Archives of SRI (Romanian Intelligence Service).

² Secret Intelligence Service (later - Special Intelligence Service).

analytically interpreted statements came from the intelligence staff involved in the informative-operational management of the rebellion and from the people interrogated post-factum by the state authorities.

For the same purpose, in the first part of the paper, the fundamental research questions aimed at establishing the correct correlation between the attributes and prerogatives legally assigned to intelligence structures and the informative-operative needs which may occur as a result of the risks and threats to internal state security caused by the extreme right wing groups.

Within the action and practical register presented in the second part of the research, I intend to provide pertinent answers to the questions regarding the extent to which the Romanian intelligence and public order services performed in terms of anticipatory knowledge of the members and actions of the Legionary Movement, respectively if the intelligence presented to the decision-makers in Bucharest could have substantiated the adoption, in due time, of effective measures for defending internal order and democracy against the rise and assertion of autochthonous totalitarianism.

Did Romania and the secret services have the organizational capacity to annihilate the subversive or paramilitary actions carried out by the legionnaires, especially those of extreme hardness, energetic and with a great power of seduction among young people, who could have been easily drawn into the cycle of violence? To what extent was the collaboration within the information community effective? To what extent did the political-military decision-makers, beneficiaries of the informative and analytical materials, live up to their duties and have the ability to understand the data received, to take measures accordingly, in favour of national interests? – these are other questions to which I will look for a well-documented answer.

On the other hand, from the perspective of defining this register as accurately as possible, my aim is to carry out an objective study of the participation of the intelligence structures in the creation of an unfavourable current of public opinion or support of a complex negative propaganda of the Legionary Movement, the foundation on which the extremist organization was to definitively lose his ability to access the political scene again. This objective was assumed at the institutional level by the heads of the intelligence services and had both official forms of work (i.e. participation in the inter-institutional research commission of those suspected of having taken part in the legionary rebellion, questioning of the officials, police agents and officers who witnessed the events during the legionary rebellion), as well as asymmetric and confidential forms of work (for example, negative propaganda against those who revolted and those in exile, supplying the prosecution with photographic material from the period of the legionary rebellion, keeping the legionary nuclei under special observation). Having established such objectives, the research methods were chosen to give me the opportunity to carry out substantial analyzes regarding the researched issue. At this point in the evolution of the research, the emphasis was placed on the study of files from the SRI Archives - recently declassified documents I had primary access to. It is worth noting that, although they are professionally archived in the SRI Archives on certain issues of interest, the original sources kept in this repository were not easy to study.

This shortcoming is mainly caused by the poor way in which some of them were constituted, the first 3,000 files from the SRI Archives (files that have not been micro-filmed so far) being initially described and completed under the direct coordination of the communist officials, by conscripts untrained in archiving activities. Given the fact that the Romanian Intelligence Service is only the custodian of these archival documents, the institution cannot intervene to restructure the files set up by the Security and remove procedural shortcomings.

Thus, there were often inconsistencies between the names applied to the files and their contents, or documents developed in different years, from totally different institutions, which were unjustifiably grouped within the same file (some secular, others ecclesiastical, some belonging to law enforcement institutions, and others taken from mass media) or presenting different issues.

In order to overcome these archival difficulties, I generally tried to use documents which preserve truthful information, which can withstand possible subsequent verifications in relation to other archival sources. At the same time, although they can be only found in a single original source, other information, based on their impact and the value of the depository, was not ignored and had to be corroborated with other sources and presented as hypotheses worth remembering.

In the elaboration of the article, another research method that I took into account was discourse analysis. Thus, I carefully read and examined the language used by the intelligence officers of the time, the aim being to understand as correctly as possible the way in which they perceived the historical political and military reality, the „horizontal” interactions with the exponents of the leadership or other environments which they intersected with, as well as the extent to which the language accurately transposed their communicative intentions.

We also carried out an analysis from a semantic perspective of the discourse, the resulting data being useful for drawing the most pragmatic conclusions.

Last but not least, in approaching and rendering as correctly as possible (i.e. understanding the specific aspects of the informational research of the Legionnaire Movement), I also proceeded to discussions with officers with experience in the informative community and prominent members of the national archival community, among whom I can mention reserve colonel Nevian Tunăreanu, historian and former deputy head of the SRI Central Archive, reserve general Florin Pintilie, former deputy head of the SRI Secretariate and head of the SRI Central Archive, and Cristian Anița, director of the National Archives of Romania.

Introductory aspects regarding the reorganization of the secret service in the years before the legionary insurgency

In this chapter, I intend to introduce the reader to the way in which the Romanian secret services thought and adapted forms of institutional organization aimed at making more efficient the informative-operative activity directed against the interwar right-wing extremism. Thus, I tried to present part of the legislative, self-protection measures of the institution, specific for counterinformative purposes, which ensured a correct adaptation of the intelligence community to the internal

realities and the key moments of the confrontations in the period before the legionary insurgency, especially after the proclamation of Romania as a national-legionary state.

In the economy of the work, this chapter describes the theoretical and methodological part of the activity of the Romanian intelligence services in the preamble of the violent manifestations between the legionnaires and General Ion Antonescu. Considering the increasing informational interest of foreign intelligence agencies towards Romania, as well as the social convulsions caused by the economic recession of the years 1929-1933, governmental political circles, especially the people with a decision-making role at the military and intelligence level, established the need to strengthen the counterintelligence sector.

As a result, by means of the reorganization in 1934, the Counterintelligence Section of the Secret Service acquired a better improved organizational structure, similar to the models used by the correspondent sectors in Western intelligence services such as the Intelligence Service in England, the Deuxième Bureau in France or those of neighbouring states (The Archive of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock P, file no. 17.474, volume I: 109). The Counterintelligence Section was entrusted with new duties and endowed with more qualified and numerous personnel. Moreover, for the first time in the evolution of the Romanian intelligence services, training courses were developed and taught for the professional and practical training of cadres, both in the country and abroad.

As such, from that moment on, the Counterintelligence Section began to be seen as the matrix and main pillar of the Secret Service's activity. As confirmation of this assessment, I can specify the fact that most cases of espionage or treason revealed until 1940 but also during the war, bore the imprint of the activity carried out by counterintelligence structures.

Following the same reorganization, Group III - „Social Actions” was redefined and developed as an intelligence structure with the mission of following „social, domestic and international issues” (The archive of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock P, file no. 48.34, volumes 409: 132-141). On the organizational level, this group consisted of the record department with three special agents and the „agency” composed of three teams, also divided into sub-teams.

One of the three teams, „Team I”, had in its composition two sub-teams that had as information search media, operative work directions and vectors from among the far-right and right-wing groups. Thus, we are discussing the Sub-team „Extreme right”, which dealt with the pursuit of members or sympathizers of twelve extreme right political parties and formations, such as: „All for the country”, „Fire swastika”, „Block of the 1922 generation”, „Christian Labor Party” or „Legionary Student Corps” and the „Right” Sub-team - followed eleven right-wing parties and organizations, among which the most important were „Christian National Party”, „Romanian Front”, „National Guard” or „Vlad Tepeș League”.

In other words, I can state that the Secret Service received, due to the aforementioned reorganization, legal attributes and organizational prerogatives in the field of prevention, knowledge and counteraction of actions that may disturb the peace, internal order or national security of Romania caused by the interests, actions and approaches of right-wing and extreme right-wing groups.

Since the interwar intelligence leadership valued the legionnaires as the the highest potential source of risk and threat, operative attention was primarily directed to this segment. Skillfully understanding the vulnerability of civil society and the state in front of them, Mihail Moruzov acted from the very beginning in order to recruit a human source at the level of the legionary top management, through which to obtain „intelligence” from within this environment of operative interest.

Thus, based on compromising material (having evidence that he had been infiltrated by the Abwehr in the legionary movement and supported to reach the position of Captain), Mihail Moruzov recruited Horia Sima in 1928. For further informative penetration, Mihail Moruzov paid Sima 200.000 lei monthly, and, owing to the blackmail material, he kept him under control.

As historian Radu Ioanid mentions, the relationship between the two grew over time, in which context, at the first gatherings preceding the Second World War, all the legionnaire leaders such as Horia Sima, Radu Mironovici, Vasile Noveanu or Augustin Bidianu were mobilized on place at the Secret Service and kept available for political negotiations (Ioanid, 2006: 181-182). Moreover, at the time of the clandestine border crossing attempt in 1940, Horia Sima was released, probably due to Moruzov's intervention.

After the legionnaires came to power (on September 14, 1940, Horia Sima was appointed vice-president of the Council of Ministers), it is also likely that Horia Sima ordered the silencing of Mihail Moruzov by arresting him, mainly for counterinformative reasons, to avoid revealing the relationship he had with the intelligence structures. Moreover, it seems that the assassination of Moruzov in cell no. 1 on the night of November 26-27, 1940 coincided with Horia Sima's intentions to definitively break the informative connection with the leader of the secret service, especially as a result of the operative tasks with which he had been directed at the level of legionary decision-making environments.

On the one hand, in the same period, probably motivated by the same reasons of individual and organizational self-protection, Horia Sima and the legionary commands put into practice measures to identify people infiltrated by the intelligence structures or „traitors” from the Legionary Movement.

With this motivation, on 2 September 1940, according to the provisions applied at the national level, Nicu Popescu, the head of the legionary police in Lugoj, requested the names of the police informants on behalf of the legionary command in Bucharest. The answer of the General Directorate of Lugoj Police was a negative one: „it cannot be given. The names of the legionnaire informers from 1938 until today cannot be communicated”.

On the other hand, the attitude of the leadership of the General Directorate of the Police is noteworthy, as they skilfully sent an evasive answer: „we had two informants who provided us with general information regarding the legionary movement. Their information was otherwise not sufficiently justified, which is why they have not been active since June 1940” (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 1198: 3-7). The same typical response was also adopted by the police structures in Sibiu or Blaj, which reported that they had no informants inside the legionary movement, the information on this component being

of minimal importance. Also, inventive and hard to dismantle answers were formulated by Târgu Jiu Police („we had an informant who died on August 30, 1940”) or Bucharest Police („we had only one informant, Ivasaxanco Gheorghe, who crossed the border into Bessarabia”) (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 1198: 9-14).

To the disadvantage of the informative community, other general directorates (Tulcea, Bacău) accepted without any rejection the request of the new legionary leadership (the information service for subversive movements was to be organized only in accordance with their provisions), nominating the security agents who dealt with the legionary movement and their informants (such as Stavri Akemelinte from Târgu Ocna and the priest Ștefan Dorneanu in the case of Bacău Police) (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 1198: 8).

Moreover, N. Marinescu, the head of Slatina Police, considered it appropriate to add to this list the conspiratorial names of the informants - Andrei Ionete, Romanian language teacher at Radu Greceanu Boys' High School in Slatina, called „Panduru”, who was trained to provide data on the state of spirit from the school environment regarding the legionary movement, and Emil Dănescu, unemployed, called „Fouché” (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 1198: 19).

Even a legionary project to reorganize the Secret Service dates from the period of the national-legionary government, by replacing 25% of the old staff - especially heads of sections and offices - with legionary counsellors, the stated purpose being to „steal the secrets and connections of the Service” (Pintilie, 2003: 298).

Unlike Mihail Moruzov, whose informative connection with the legionary leaders was most of the time useful for the SSI, I consider that Eugen Cristescu, his successor as head of the traditional Romanian secret service, did not agree to any collaboration, as he had no qualms in publicly exposing his revulsion towards the legionary totalitarianism. His ten-year-professional experience in coordinating the struggles of the police forces with the radical elements in the Legion unequivocally confirmed his fears in relation to their intentions of virulent parasitism of democracy.

To these were added the dangerous connections with the Gestapo, in fact the source and means by which the legionnaires could easily turn into criminal armed units.

Under these circumstances, despite the death threats received in writing from the legionnaires (Corneliu Zelea Codreanu nominated him, in „*Cuvântul*”, as one of the main contributors to the „tortures” and „blood spilled by the legionnaires”), Eugen Cristescu constantly acted for the removal of legionary elements.

And it was precisely this aversion to the legionnaires that led Ion Antonescu to appoint³ him as head of the secret service on November 15, 1940, in a tensed moment, after the antagonistic groups in the Legion (Sima and Codreanu) had fought with the weapons provided in Guttenberg canteen in Bucharest. It should also be noted that one of the fundamental conditions (Aioanei, C., Troncotă, C., 1993: 140) that Eugen Cristescu put forward to Ion Antonescu before accepting the position of

³ The appointment was made by Decree no. 157.357 of November 12 1940, signed by General Ion Antonescu and promulgated three days later by the king, by Decree no. 3765.

general director, was to prevent the representatives of the Legionary Movement from being hired in the secret service.⁴

It was the initial test for Eugen Cristescu, the exam through which he could prove that the SSI had the reaction capacity and informative infiltration capabilities that could serve the state management to deal the connection with the Legion in an effective way, an aspect that Ion Antonescu had begun to realize with more and more difficulty.

Thus, benefiting from the essential support of Nicolae D. Stănescu, the head of the Political Group in the SSI, who had recruited an informant among the people who were close to Codreanu brothers, Eugen Cristescu was able to present General Antonescu, on the same evening, a detailed report on the development of the incident, overcoming the managerial „baptism” in the new position.

A few days later, on November 19, 1940, by Decree Law no. 3,813, possibly due to the above-mentioned activities, Eugen Cristescu received the approval to reorganize the Secret Service - the occasion for the intelligence institution to change its name to the Special Information Service - by adapting the models from foreign secret services, including the German one, to the Romanian essential features (The archive of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock P, file no. 48163, volume II: 30). By means of this reorganization, the Second Counterintelligence Section maintained its old organizational structure and most of its previous attributions, including those of informative-operational monitoring of far-right and right wing groups. The changes occurred only among the staff, with new hires, appointments and, of course, a series of purges. The moment coincided with a considerable increase in the abuses committed by the legionnaires, the social and political life being practically dominated by anarchic violence. Illegal arrests, unauthorized descents, mistreatment of ordinary citizens and assassinations had become routine, flagrantly violating the political agreement supported by General Antonescu.

Appreciating that under the mentioned circumstances a violent confrontation between the legionnaires and the state institutions loyal to General Antonescu was imminent, Eugen Cristescu took, at the same moment, the decision, which would prove to be inspired, to order the set up of a covert network in the top echelons of the Legion.

Through them and the liaison agents, the operational coordination in which even some of Eugen Cristescu's relatives had been involved and assigned tasks, such as sub-commissioner Grigore Petrovici, the leader of the secret service, was creating a tactical advantage that would prove essential in the effort made by his organization and general Antonescu in order to suppress the confrontations with the legionnaires in the following year.

In parallel, right from the moment of taking over the leadership of the SSI, Eugen Cristescu coordinated, through a close collaboration within the intelligence community with the Social Police Service of the Capital Police Prefecture and the General Directorate of the Police, an extensive informative monitoring campaign of

⁴ The decision proved to be beneficial, as the legionnaires could not subordinate their SSI by infiltrating cadres or sympathizers in leadership positions, as they had done with the Security and the General Inspectorate of the Police.

the ministers, commanders, instructors and ordinary legionnaires who were valued as being willing to get involved in activities which could constitute a danger for the state authority of the type of a coup d'état (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 15-16). Their records were constantly updated and referred to the positions held within the state apparatus and in the legionary decision-making gear, respectively they contained details related to the addresses (some recorded, for counter-informative reasons, with aliases) of the places where they could be found and picked up in case of emergency.⁵

The correct intuition of the violent potential of those in the records and attention of the SSI becomes clear even through a simple comparison of the list of those monitored operatively with those wanted for arrest for involvement in the legionary rebellion. Concretely, a number of 14 legionnaires previously monitored for information can be found in the lists (partially supported by photographs made available by the General Directorate of the Police to facilitate the identification of threat vectors) that the law enforcement and intelligence structures were constantly updating, depending on the evolution of the arrest process, leaving the territory of Romania or their death/disappearance (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 10-20). Among them there were Horia Sima, Dumitru Grozea, action coordinator of the legionary rebellion in Bucharest, or Stelian Stănicel, former general secretary of the Bucharest Municipality Police and one of the „brains” of the takeover of the Capital Police Prefecture.

The truth is that, from the moment of his appointment, Eugen Cristescu intuited premises for the short-term organization of a putsch by Horia Sima, an aspect that led him to reorganize and conceive the SSI as a general information service for the head of state, in our case of Ion Antonescu. Practically, it can be stated that most of the fundamental decisions adopted by the head of the Romanian state in the period 1940-August 1944 were based on the information provided by the service led by Eugen Cristescu.

In a report drawn up by specialized cadres from the Ministry of War, on September 24, 1944, the following aspects related to the general duties, personnel, funds and technical material of the SSI were mentioned: „The Special Intelligence Service, in the form in which it functioned until August 23, 1944, was a public service, invested with the general information that interested the state leadership. To this end, its general duties consisted of procuring, verifying and completing external and internal information, according to the needs signalled by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the Great General Staff and other state authorities” (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock P, file no. 40.010, volume 136: 5).

The rich informative material collected by SSI both from its own sources and through the exchange of similar information with other states or with other Romanian civil and military institutions, was processed by the „Office of Studies and Documentation” which operated under the direct coordination of Eugen Cristescu. Information bulletins were drawn up and went directly to the Presidency of the

⁵ 62 people were subjected to the informative-operative attention of the SSI, of which 13 legionary ministers, 14 commanders, 12 instructors and 23 ordinary legionnaires.

Council of Ministers and, as the case might be, to other ministries, depending on the issues of interest.

A newsletter was presented, as a rule, every day at 12:30 and consisted of two chapters. One was about domestic events, and the second covered news on international issues. Within 20-30 pages, sometimes even 50, data was transmitted regarding the economic situation of the country, the state of mind among the workers and the activity of the political parties, especially the extremist, communist and legionnaire ones. Next to each piece of information, the credibility of the source was mentioned with the following notations: „reliable source”, „verified” or „unverified information”, „official source”, „conclusions provided by experts”, etc. (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock P, file no. 40.010, volume 136: 6-7).

If we also add the fact that many of these bulletins contain Ion Antonescu's handwriting (orders, observations, mentions regarding the need to detail the issue), we can consolidate the above-mentioned appreciation of the military.

In the same direction, the more sensitive information was presented to General Antonescu directly by Eugen Cristescu during the daily audiences he had in his cabinet. Even more interesting was the fact that, on the days when Ion Antonescu was absent from Bucharest, Eugen Cristescu avoided using the envelopes sealed by special mail and went, in case of emergency, to the place where he knew he could contact the head of state directly (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 3176: 211-230).

SSI activity during the legionary insurgency

In this chapter, I set out to reveal the context and the overall problems that the SSI had to face and that it tried to manage effectively, especially from the position of authority in the field of defense and promotion of the national security of our country, between January 21-23, 1941.

At the same time, in the second chapter I intended to unravel the riddles regarding the effectiveness of the measures taken, i.e. whether the resource used for the control and informative penetration of various groups or legionary structures was well-placed and could guide the executive towards the assumption and decision of certain measures expected to promote national interests.

Also, in this chapter, I set out to elucidate the true nature and extent of the actions related to the days of January 1941, their doctrinal and organizational justice, respectively their correct inclusion in the category of pogroms, atrocities or horrors committed in the history of humanity.

On the other hand, chapter II also intends to answer the question regarding the extent to which the SSI leadership was actively involved in suppressing the legionary insurgency.

In the context of what was presented in the previous chapter, in December 1940, General Ion Antonescu took the first measures aimed at removing the legionnaires out of the internal political scene - on December 2, 1940, he ordered the abolition of the Legionary Police, and three weeks later, the legionnaire foreign minister, Mihail Sturdza, was dismissed.

Despite the dissolution order, the Legionnaire Police did not definitively cease its activity, continuing to carry out searches, unauthorized descents or unjustified confiscation of goods. In addition, as a response to the general's measures, the legionnaires accelerated their own arming, established clandestine warehouses of ammunition and weapons, and increased the training of paramilitary structures (Trașcă, Stan, 2002: 52-55).

General Antonescu's reply did not take long to appear, after the meeting on January 14, 1941 with Adolf Hitler, who ordered additional measures aimed at solving the thorny problem of legionary radicalism.

In the above-mentioned meeting, the Romanian general declared his disponibility for a full collaboration with Nazi Germany (emphasizing in this way the additional benefits for the success of the future Barbarossa operation), under the conditions of an undeniable support in relation to the legionary conjunctural partner, who was revolutionary and unpredictable (Sandu, 2019: 394). As a result, in the same context, Adolf Hitler reiterated his direct support for the repression of the legionnaire partner, noting that internally the only desired attitude was constructive and not a repetitive revolutionary one. In order to achieve this goal, the Führer also considered a physical elimination of the elements that did not fit, a method which was not at all unfamiliar to him. Moreover, for the full alignment of Romania to his strategic objectives, Adolf Hitler confessed to the Romanian general that the relationship they had established was superior to any link with the Legionary Movement, the breaking of the latter „being no sacrifice for Germany” (Sandu, 2019 : 395).

As a reaction, the legionary general secretary, Nicolae Pătrașcu, began to mobilize and arm the legionary nests, the general hope being that a possible violent intervention would attract early career officers and the capital's population to their side.

Enthusiasm grew in intensity after the German Legation assured them that German soldiers would not get involved in Romanian internal affairs. At the same time, in order to test the reaction capacity of the masses to the calls for legionary mobilization, on January 19, 1941, in Bucharest and in the province, there were organized meetings of the sympathizers of the movement, in which the orators appointed by Horia Sima intoned „Holy Legionary Youth” and lectured on the topic of „The Struggle of Germany and Italy to establish a new European order” (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 100-108).

In the same circumstances, Ion Antonescu alerted the military structures, asking them to be prepared to initiate the elimination of the radical part of the Legion. The pretext was identified very quickly, due to the assassination of the German major Döring, logistics manager of the German troops stationed in Romania, in the middle of a group of German officers who were returning from a common meal to the Ambassador Hotel in Bucharest, by Dimitrie Sarantopoulos, a Greek who later proved to be a British spy. Being a favorable opportunity to obtain the monopoly of power, Ion Antonescu took advantage and pronounced the dismissal of the legionary general Constantin Petrovicescu from the Ministry of the Interior on the grounds of professional incapacity („he had not taken the measures required by the circumstances of the murder”, „he had not ordered security at the headquarters of the German Military Mission”), and then summoned the prefects to the capital and ordered their

replacement with legionnaires (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 100-108).

In response, Horia Sima quickly summoned the leadership of the Legionary Movement and obtained their agreement for a large-scale „solidarity” demonstration and for making a written appeal to Ion Antonescu, requesting the revocation of the dismissal order from the Ministry of the Interior.

In the same direction, on January 20, 1941, about 10,000 legionnaires publicly demonstrated for the elimination of „satanic” elements and „Masonic and Judaized persons” from the leadership of the state and the formation of an exclusively legionary government (Trașcă, Stan, 2002: doc. 25-26). According to what was established through the Security Service agency of the Bucharest Police Prefecture, the protesters had been recruited from among legionnaire students and regimented workers in the Legionary Labour Corps, being organized into marching units (at the disposal of Horia Sima) by Viorel Trifa, the president of the National Union of the Romanian Christian Students, „the commander of the Romanian students”, and Dumitru Grozea, the commander of the Legionary Labour Corps (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 109).

Understanding the possible organizational consequences that might arise if the demonstration caused disorder, Horia Sima asked the participants not to attack the general in a declarative way and to direct their efforts on the stigmatization of Rîșanu, as an accomplice and protector of the Greek assassin. Thus, during the march along the main streets of Bucharest, the participants initially sang legionary hymns and chanted „down with the vassals, down with Rîșanu”. Later, the group of demonstrators coordinated by Dumitru Grozea started chanting „WE WANT A LEGIONARY GOVERNMENT AND HORIA SIMA AS OUR LEADER” (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 109), cancelling on this basis any potential intention to maintain the legionary claims at a ponderate level.

Meanwhile, on the same occasion, a manifesto signed by the two legionary leaders was distributed, demanding „the punishment of all Masonic servants who try to hand the country over to the Jews” (<https://www.icr.ro/paris/varsovia-commemoration-of-80-years-of-the-legionary-rebellion-and-pogrom-in-Bucharest>).

Among them was, from the so-called position of protector and defender of Freemasonry and the Jews, Eugen Cristescu, the head of the Secret Intelligence Service. In relation to these, the reaction of the Romanian general was not delayed, being an intransigent and provocative one. Thus, in order to lure the legionnaires into the nets of the decisive trap, Ion Antonescu proceeded in the morning of January 21, 1941 to dismiss and purge all public order forces loyal to the movement⁶ and ordered the army and the police force to ensure the control of the most important public buildings and institutions. In order to make sure that no acts of resistance would happen on their part, General Antonescu, through the Ministry of Coordination, had requested the prefects, a few days before their replacement, to come to Bucharest for

⁶ Alexandru Ghica and Radu Mironovici were dismissed from their positions within the General Directorate of Security and Police, and all the legionary prefects and quaestors were replaced.

„important economic consultations”. At the same time, a similar order was sent to the police quaestors by Alexandru Rioșanu, summoning them, on the same day, to the headquarters of the Regional Police Inspectorates, for „informative meetings” (http://www.miscarea-legionara.net/doc_carte_era_libertatii2.html).

In the first phase, the measures presented, accompanied by the indication given to the new appointed prefects to ensure resistance - even armed - in the eventuality of an attempt to expel them, were not motivated by previous intentions of repression⁷, but rather by asymmetrical ones⁸, of definitive compromise among the population and the German political and military authorities.

According to the calculations of the Romanian general, on this basis, the legionnaires were to react to prevent the transfer of power and to abandon, in the desire to strike a decisive blow, any reason for individual and organizational self-preservation. After an action scenario set up in advance, Horia Sima ordered the teams of legionnaires, that very morning, to regain control over the prefectures and police stations and to occupy the telephone and post exchanges and some economic units (Trașcă, Stan, 2002: doc. 32).

It is not out of place to appreciate that the plans of the legionnaire leader were long conceived and constantly updated, if we were to take into account only the fact that the legionnaires kept in interception, during all three days of the rebellion, the conversations of the secret telephone no. 50 of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, or that an action coordination system had previously been established and had its headquarters in Roma Street, through the coordination of Dumitru Grozea (The archive of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 9).

In the Capital, for example, since 9 o'clock in the morning the chaos had become total, the legionary insurgents, dressed in short leather clothes (a symbolic connection with the clothing of Nazi officers cannot be denied) and armed (from automatic weapons to pickaxes, crowbars, axes and firecrackers) were taking under assault and occupation the Capital Police Prefecture, the Ilfov County Prefecture, the Telephone Palace and the Radio Society. Especially in the case of the Capital Police Prefecture, the desire for armed resistance was at its maximum level, the insurgents being determined to fight harshly the possible measures that were to be ordered against them.

Thus, with the intention of maintaining terror against those who were not part of their camp, the legionnaires entered the offices of the Bucharest Prefecture under the coordination of the legionary commissar Bădulescu, disarmed of the revolvers provided and isolated under guard the old officials of all ranks in the Hall of Festivities and they positioned themselves in defensive posture while cheering their

⁷ As Ion Antonescu had mobilized the army against the legionnaires and had ordered the military not to act unless they were provoked, the armed conflict between the two sides actually materialized on January 22, 1941.

⁸ Asymmetric intelligence measures have a different specificity than the classical one (i.e. gathering intelligence or counter-intelligence), aiming at the combinative connection of different information techniques (the operative game, counter-propaganda, the intentional transmission of fabricated or false data, the recruitment of an adversary intelligence agent, manipulation and others), in order to achieve immediate and unofficial operational goals.

leaders and reproaching the Romanian legal and police authorities. In order to strengthen this capacity, the Legionary Labour Corps, requested by the police chief Romulus Opriș by phone, sent teams with a staff of about 600 people who, as soon as they entered the prefecture, posted themselves at all the entrances and exits, in the offices, corridors and around the windows, with machine guns and grenades (SRI, stock D, file no. 650: 110). Defensive measures were also put into practice, the rebels breaking a wall that corresponded to the Lafayette Store, with the aim of being able to sneak in unnoticed, in case that they could no longer resist the summons of the army.

Those who were mobilized represented a combination of radicalized students, workers, tax collectors or tram drivers of the Bucharest Transport Service (some of them even brought by public transport service buses) who, under the excitement of the moment, did not hesitate to open fire at the first appearance of the army.

Legionnaire sacrifice teams violently tore the bars of the Prefecture and rushed with improvised weapons, pickaxes and hammers, on the tanks that came to „calm them”, being aimed at dismantling the domes and eliminating the soldiers inside. Seeing that they did not succeed, the insurgents had no qualms about detaching the tracks from the tanks, aiming their sights with the revolvers provided, respectively setting fire to one of the military machines by using fuel from the institution's radiators, even when the military personnel had not managed to evacuate (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 1).

These were facts that did not correspond to their „dignity as Romanians”, as it was remarked by a lieutenant-colonel from the Military Justice who was sent to meet them, especially as it was about people who had to ensure public order, such as the legionary quaestors Romulus Opriș (alongside Theodor Djonat, one of the leaders of the legionary defense), Ilie Stângă, Petre Nicolau and Stelian Stănicel. Moreover, as a sign of deprofessionalization, former police officers had associated with suspicious people, such as Dragomir, the head of the Prefecture Garage, a certain Ion, a former waiter who became an assistant commissioner in the institution, or Eremia Socariciu, the former general secretary of the Capital Prefecture, a person with power of action decision, who proved to be among the most radical, vocal and ferocious attackers (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 2).

Paradoxically, they had gathered in a rebel group that proposed the mass killing of old policemen, an aspect that could have happened on a generalized level if Radu Mironovici, the prefect of the Capital Police, had not opposed it.

In parallel with what happened at the Capital Police Prefecture, groups of legionnaires gathered on Calea Victoriei, singing again legionary hymns and chanting „WE WANT A PURE LEGIONARY GOVERNMENT, WE WANT HORIA SIMA TO BE OUR LEADER, DOWN WITH RIOȘANU, UP WITH PETROVICESCU”. At the same time, in order to propagate a state of unrest among the citizens, megaphones were installed and false news was constantly broadcast, in the sense that the civil and military authorities were not able to restore public order, urging the soldiers to disobey the orders of their superiors and fraternize with the rebel elements (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 110).

Anarchy dominated Bucharest completely, so until the end of January 22, 1941, organized teams of the Legionary Labour Corps occupied the police stations by force and disarmed the bureaucratic staff and public guards who were not registered in the movement. Their intentions were to compromise the functioning of the state (an aspect we can deduce from the analysis of a series of tables and documents identified, after the suppression of the revolt, in the drawers of Țigănuș, the former head of the Servant Offices), take control of the royal staff and render the king unable to intervene (obtaining a royal draw, as in the game of chess) and sabotage railway traffic in and from Bucharest through Ateliere Grivița (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 3-8).

In relation to what had happened in Bucharest, Eugen Cristescu asked the partners in the intelligence community not to take any military action before obtaining the intelligence provided by the SSI, an action directive they unanimously agreed with. Against this background, by Cristescu's order, the entire human and informative apparatus of the SSI was infiltrated in the risky neighbourhoods of Bucharest, with the aim of identifying the plans, command points and regrouping locations of the rebel teams.

At the same time, Eugen Cristescu recommended General Antonescu to adopt the tactic of waiting, advising him to request negotiations with the legionary senators. This form of work was the ideal pretext which offered the possibility of arrival in the Capital to large armed units which intervened in the following days to suppress the legionary insurgency.

Also, in the context of the discussions and negotiations with the legionary senators, the SSI was able to identify on the map of Bucharest the main points of resistance of the insurgents, by intercepting the communications which they and the legionary leaders had with Ion Antonescu.

Moreover, General Ion Antonescu's final act of decision to directly involve the army in a confrontation with the Legionnaire Movement was based on the fact that he had real-time intelligence from the secret service, regarding the intensity, the way and the position which public opinion in Romania and the armed forces related with towards the evolution of hostilities. They were aspects of superior relevance, so a superficial treatment of them could have vitiated the expected result of suppressing the rebellion⁹.

Last but not least, under the consultation of the intelligence structures, the police and military forces proceeded to ensure the physical protection of most public buildings in order to prevent attacks against them. Also, after the end of the rebellion, mixed teams were organized on sectors for the disclosure of weapon stores and goods stolen from devastated stores. The missions were executed according to a predetermined plan with the SSI, resulting in the identification of numerous weapon stores, ammunition and other goods taken during the devastation.

Referring again to the evolution of the events in Bucharest, it must be stated that the seriousness of the newly created situation was immediately understood by

⁹ This was possible under the conditions in which, during the legionary rebellion, none of the headquarters of the secret service could and were occupied by the legionnaires.

some of the moderate legionnaires, who analyzed different forms of action to limit the negative consequences on the Legion caused by the insurgency. In establishing the appropriateness of each working hypothesis, the moderate legionnaires benefited from the support of some police cadres who sympathized with the Legionnaire Movement and had counterinformative training. After the discussions between the two mentioned parties, it was agreed on to request an intervention from the German officials on the basis of which the insurgents would be evacuated and disarmed as quickly as possible, before the intervention of the army against them (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 112-113).

Thus, to prevent unnecessary bloodshed, on the same day, starting at 5:30 p.m., at the Ambassador Hotel in Bucharest, a delegation of moderate legionnaires (Colonel Ștefan Zăvoianu, Commissioner Marcel Popescu, head of Bureau 3 of the Bucharest Prefecture, which generally dealt with the movement of foreigners, Octavian Manta, former chief of police and Professor Ghilla as an interpreter) came into contact with General Erik-Oskar Hansen, commander of the German Military Mission in Romania, asking for his direct support in order to temper and end the hostilities.

The conclusion of these discussions was summarized in an address sent by General Hansen to Radu Mironovici, through which the Germans did not assume any direct intervention, but showed their availability to mediate in order to stop the hostile actions between the two parties¹⁰. Also, Erik-Oskar Hansen proposed to ensure a form of protection for those who were to continue their docility towards the Axis. On this basis, the legionary commander, who had personally kept away from the events, and several other legionary leaders – including Corneliu Georgescu, Constantin Papanace, Ilie Gârneață or Vasile Iașinschi – benefited from protection at the headquarters of the Sicherheitsdienst, led in Bucharest by von Bolschwing.

The approach initiated by the moderate legionnaires did not have the expected success because the insurgents, in the National Theater Square, greeted with gunfire the two German officers (one of them carrying a white flag) escorted by a motorcycle who had been delegated to intervene in the direction they requested (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 1-5).

The series of failures continued. That same evening, Ștefan Zăvoianu, this time accompanied by the reserve general Mehedinți, failed to change the situation of the rebels through a much-desired intervention from the part of Neubecher, the economic representative of the Reich in Bucharest, or from Baron Manfred Von Killinger, the new ambassador of Nazi Germany in our country, as they could not be found at the headquarters of the German Legation (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 6-7).

Towards the end of 21 January 1941, Horia Sima committed the decisive action error by requesting Ion Antonescu's withdrawal from politics, without having at least the informal acceptance of the German officials who supported the legionary

¹⁰ The mediation proposal was communicated to Ion Antonescu, the Romanian general agreeing to grant amnesty to the legionnaires who would lay down their arms by 5 a.m. on January 23, 1941.

cause. In this context, General Antonescu asked for Adolf Hitler's agreement to end the hostilities with the legionnaires. The Führer's response, communicated by Wilfred Fabricius, was that of a consensus regarding the energetic intervention of the army for the same purpose.

This was only an informal and consultative agreement, if we take into account only a few attitudes or operational decisions in the next intervention of the army on 23 January 1941. For example, access on the streets was prohibited, Romanian soldiers preventing communication even between the commanders of German regiments. At the same time, as the German colonel Hoffer complained, some of the Romanian soldiers had adopted a distant and repulsive attitude towards their German counterparts, meeting the German officer and the motorcyclist unit that accompanied him with „shamelessness” and „doors slammed in their faces”. Also, as reported by the German sub-lieutenant Naschristenoffizier, on duty at the Telephone House in Alba Iulia, the official conversations of the German officers were monitored and popular songs were banned in the streets (during the legionary rebellion, lieutenant-colonel Căpâlna requested the revision of the orchestral programme in Dacia Restaurant in Bucharest, where the German song Erika was sung, appreciated as legionnaire and which „sets the spirits”). (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 202: 38-40).

Realizing the danger of dissolution and being summoned by Hitler to give up resistance, Horia Sima signed on the same day, at about 5 p.m., an act of laying down arms exactly in the form in which it had been dictated by Neubecher. The content of this act was immediately brought to the attention of the legionnaires in the Capital (in the morning of 23 January 1941, at 06:30) by Vasile Biriș și Alexandru Sturdza, through a speaker installed on a Philips car and in a special issue of *Cuvântul*, but approximately 300-400 of the rebels (grouped in the courtyard of Slătari Church) did not believe its veracity, not trusting the Romanian soldiers who had arrived in tanks to meet them.

The further course of events is already known in historiography, the confrontation between the army and the rebels (on Calea Victoriei, among the legionary students who wanted to take control of the Telephone Palace, on 32-34 Roma Street, at the Capital Police Prefecture or the Headquarters of Public Guardians) resulting in abominable acts that led to the official elimination of the Legionary Movement. The results of the violences were, according to the subsequent findings of the Minister of the Interior, 261 dead people, of which 120 Jews and 21 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers (fallen in the actions to destroy the nests of the resistance legionaries) and 245 wounded citizens¹¹(Veiga, 1995: 298-301). Paradoxically, among those killed during the legionary rebellion was the director of the Palestinian Emigration Office, Moise Orekovschy (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 7519: 84). Moise Orekovschy was bestially murdered along with 14 Jews, on January 23, 1941, at the Communal Slaughterhouse on Splaiul Dâmboviței.

¹¹ In an informative report carried out by the Security Service of Bucharest Police Prefecture (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 112), other figures regarding the victims of the legionary rebellion are recorded: 240 dead and 580 injured.

The Jewish minority was the most affected one, being the favourite victim of the rebel legionnaires who took advantage of the violent actions to attack it on a large scale. In fact, during the rebellion, official statements repeatedly recorded the savage mutilation of some Israeli corpses in the Jewish neighbourhood of Dudești-Văcărești and in Jilava forest (completely disfigured corpses, having their eyes or teeth removed or tongues, ears, noses and genitals cut off), and the iconographic testimonies illustrate the extent of the degradation of places of worship and property (25 temples and synagogues throughout the country, 616 shops, 547 homes affected), but also the looting of corpses a day or two after the pogrom of January 21-22 (Sandu, 2019: 396).



Figure 1: (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no 1243, volume 4: 142)

After the consummation and suppression of the rebellion, Otto von Bolschwing, with the approval of Berlin, continued to temporarily protect some of the legionary leaders, without proceeding to hand them over to the Romanian authorities. It seems that the optics of the German military corresponded to a hidden plan of Adolf Hitler, the Führer aiming to hold Ion Antonescu in constant check by threatening a reenactment of the mentioned events. Such eventuality was maintained even later, with Nazi Germany offering asylum, on its own territory, to most of the legionary leaders, led by Horia Sima.

Moreover, between March 5 and 12, 1941, 48 legionnaire leaders were helped to get to Transylvania, disguised as SS officers, and from there they were sent to Berlin.

The involvement of intelligence structures in the reassurance of public order in the period following the legionary insurgency

In order to be able to establish exactly the impact on the Christofascist type groups of the involvement of the intelligence services in suppressing the legionary

insurgency, it is impetuously necessary to proceed to a critical analysis on the organizational and action developments subsequent to this event.

If in the first chapters of the work we investigated the internal security environment from the point of view of theoretical aspects and action manifestations, in this chapter we intend to examine and later define a typology of the actions put into practice by the intelligence community both for the purpose of preventing the resumption of hostilities by the legionnaires, as well as for calming the public opinion regarding this danger.

Such an inclusion is justifiable, as the value of an intelligence service was directly proportional to the effects, results and value of its actions. The more the intelligence service had the capacity to influence, to penetrate into realms of interest for national security or to generate changes in the security environment according to the superior objects of the state, the more significant its organizational quality proved to be.

Starting from these reasonings, we specify the fact that in the context in which the threat of the resumption of hostilities with the members of the radical core of the Legion was taking more and more shape, at the level of the intelligence community the decision was made to create, under the coordination of Ion Antonescu, a complex negative propaganda on the Legionary Movement. Through this form of work, the intelligence structures intended to manipulate public opinion in the direction of a generalized repulsion towards the legionnaires, a foundation on which the extremist organization would definitively lose its ability to step onto the political stage again.

Thus, in the first phase, in order to induce the public opinion that the direction which Ion Antonescu took into consideration was the right one, the decision was adopted to „denigrate” the legionnaires in mass media (especially by means of daily newspapers such as *Universul*), in parallel with polishing the image of the Head of State as a „conciliatory saviour”.

For example, at the initiative of Ion Antonescu, *Universul* published on February 28, 1941 the article entitled „*THE LEADER OF THE STATE is personally interested in the treatment of the detained rebels*”, in which the general was presented by the author¹² as a peacemaker, a direct observer of the way in which all the detained people were treated, apparently aiming to ensure a „*humane treatment*” for them. Moreover, in the same article, it was mentioned the marshal's concern for expediting the investigation of the detainees, so that the innocent could be quickly released. (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 25).

Later, „*for the judgment of public opinion*”, the Social Police and Information Service within the Capital Police Prefecture (probably by the same order of the marshal), disseminated the manifesto called „*WHO ORGANIZED THE REBELLION, some edifying documents*”. The manifesto, presented as the sum of three official documents, aimed to justify the punitive measures on the „*major guilt of the rebel leaders*”, General Constantin Petrovicescu, the former Minister of the Interior, and

¹² So far the thorough analysis of the archival documents has not allowed us to establish the identity of the syngraph.

Alexandru Ghika, the former Director General of the Police and Security – who were responsible for arming the legionnaires that acted to „*overturn the legal state order by force*”. (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 40).

At the same time with the measures presented, a state of defamation was permanently maintained towards the legionnaires involved, among the institutions which joined Ion Antonescu's effort in this regard being the Prosecutor's Office of the Military Tribunal. In fact, the deep involvement of the military prosecutors exceeded their legal mandate, in which they proceeded to send threats to the Capital Police Prefecture for the late handing over of some prisoners accused of involvement in the rebellion.

In parallel with the presented measures, the intelligence structures, with the support of the Prosecutor's Office of the Military Court, proceeded to launch in the mass media some statements intended to accuse the legionnaires.

At the same time, action was also taken to speed up the process of punishing the insurgents, the military prosecutors close to the intelligence community proceeded to sending threats to the Capital Police Prefecture for the late handing over of some prisoners accused of involvement in the rebellion. Among them were, in the first days after the rebellion, Ioan Steja from Mihăescu Garage service and Ioan Gropilă, turner, employee of the Malaxa factory (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 40).

Thus, the Directorate of the Security Police within the Ministry of the Interior, at the order of Major General Leoveanu, sent an urgent telegram on February 4, 1941 to the Capital Police Prefecture requesting to put at the disposal of the Technical Service the following types of photographs ordered by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (by order no. 730/1941):

- *Photographs in four copies with scenes from the rebellion in the Capital and the province/ acts of terror committed by the rebels on January 22-25, 1941:*

- a. Rebel groups: prisoners or before release;
- b. Public institutions and houses devastated by gunfire during the rebellion;
- c. Deposits and quantities of weapons found with the rebels;
- d. Warehouses or agglomerations of goods stolen by rebels;
- e. Barricades;
- f. Corpses of soldiers and citizens killed by rebels;
- g. Soldiers or citizens wounded, tortured or ill-treated by the rebels;
- h. Armament or ammunition found in storage, etc.

- *Photographs after the documents from which to see how the legionary rebellion was prepared and led, photos after the legionary brochures found with the legionaries (covers or interesting pages).*

Obviously, the data was intended to support the incriminating process directed against the legionaries. (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 30).



Figures 2-4: The Archives of SRI, stock D, file no. 1243, volume IV, leaves 30-60.

For preventive purposes, after the consummation of the legionary insurgency, at the level of the intelligence community it was considered necessary to direct important informational and technical resources to the identification of the clandestine radio channels used by the legionnaires for the eventual preparation of a resumption of hostilities with the Antonesian authorities. Such assignments were valid both in Bucharest and in the province.

As a practical result, on July 30, 1942, Assistant Commissioner Dorin Antohi from Alba Iulia Regional Police Inspectorate reported to the Directorate of the Corps of Detectives from the General Directorate of the Police that he had intercepted, on Bucharest airwaves, a clandestine radio station through which they were communicated the following:

„Communications begin, attention..

The password is Mărășești, be careful here.. the departure date is changed, the third day after date x..

The march on Bucharest is approaching, hurry; Bucharest must be taken over the next day. Water and electricity plants. Firemen know their job..arranged in this way..look for them among the people dressed as postmen.

The vile traitor Eugen Cristescu must be shot and also the executioner General Diaconescu, like a dog.

Maniu and his band of traitors. Kill Maniu, let's get rid of the peasants once and for all, done with liberalism. Everything is ready. Manhood and courage.”

In addition to this report, Alba Iulia Regional Police Inspectorate presented another communication intercepted by the head of Sighișoara Police:

„Here is the radio station of the new commission.

Firefighters know how to do their duty.

Arrange in such a way as G. Munteanu.

6 terrorists went from Sibiu region to assassinate the Leader. 5 of them live in Bucharest.

Maniu and his gang of traitors are making propaganda for the Soviets. Kill Maniu to get rid of the peasants once and for all.

The vile traitor Eugen Cristescu must be shot like a dog, as well as Diaconescu, the executioner general. How long do these lepers live and flatter the Ruler to bring assassins near him.

Finish with liberalism, shoot Gh. Brătianu, either them or Romania.

Everything is ready.

Determination, courage and manhood." (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 17-18).

The transmitted communication unequivocally reveals the dominant spirit of revenge among the legionnaires, namely the explosion of a visceral hatred towards the traditional political parties and especially towards the communist phenomenon.

On the other hand, considering that the possibility of a new confrontation with the radical legionnaires cannot be further minimized only by preventive methods, the decision was adopted at the intelligence leadership level to put into practice some offensive combinative actions, which would lead to the identification, pursuit and arrest of insurgents and radicalized elements who continued to operate within the Legionary Movement.

This task was assumed, after the rebellion, by the Special Group within the SSI. Thus, in 1942, as a result of the activity of the Special Group, 44 individuals were arrested, some of whom were previously sentenced to various punishments, others escaped from prisons or who were submitted to the judicial bodies (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 7558: 172-173).

The large number of legionnaires affected by the sanctioning measures applied by the representatives of the Special Group, respectively the wide range of incriminated activities led to a gradual decrease in their illegal activities.

Last but not least, from the perspective of the need to support the process of indictment and legal conviction of the participants in the legionary rebellion, the intelligence structures took the decision to get directly involved in the questioning of officials, agents and police officers who witnessed these events. In the context of collaboration within the intelligence community, at the special request of the prefect of the Capital Police, these informative research actions were carried out continuously until February 12, 1941.

Following them, testimonies were obtained that supported the incriminating process against the rebellious legionnaires, being confirmed aspects related to the intention of some of the legionnaire leaders to give a violent character to the confrontations with the armed forces, their involvement in hostile and unprovoked acts against the authorities, respectively with regarding the annulment, on this basis, of any steps taken by the moderate legionnaires for the cessation of hostilities.

Among those questioned in Bucharest were the following:

- agent Gheorghe I. Tălăngescu, who confirmed and detailed the aspects related to the involvement of the legionnaire commissioner Theodor Djonat in the unprovoked burning of a tank and revealed his and other legionnaires' intentions (Romulus Opriș, Ernest Crăciun, Alexandru Pană, Grigore Malcasian) to react in violent way towards the military (by ordering armed defense positions and requesting fire support from the Legionary Labor Corps);

- assistant commissioner Iosif Reinhard and agent Nicolae C. Ionescu - specified the fact that they were prevented by the legionary agent Traian Szekeris from leaving the Capital Police Prefecture and not participating in the legionary revolt, having been told that Romulus Opriș ordered all members to take part into this act of outrage. As they did not change their point of view, they were disarmed and sequestered in the offices of the institution;

- assistant commissioner Constantin Rada, who was present during the legionary rebellion at the Police Station 16, alongside Commissioner Daniel Cruțescu, detailed a series of aspects related to the violent, defiant and humiliating attitude of the 10-15 legionnaires armed with revolvers and clubs who assaulted the police station. The latter, after threatening them with death, disarmed and stripped them of their uniforms (which the occupants appropriated and dressed) and threw them into a room under the guard of two gypsies armed with pitchforks and swords. Throughout the period of seizure and detention, the two policemen were tortured by one of the gypsies who waved a sword under their noses, ironically mentioning that he was „preparing for a fencing match” (The archives of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), stock D, file no. 650: 36-41)

Personal conclusions:

I consider that the interwar intelligence structures performed in ensuring the flow of intelligence necessary to support the decision-making act of its main beneficiaries, the leaders of the Romanian state, in the key moments of the confrontations with the legionnaires.

The flow of transmission regarding the legionary actions or agitative intentions was one with speed of reaction, timely and centered on concrete action intervention measures, an aspect possible on the basis of well-placed and prepared human and informational resources.

The leaders of SSI and other structures within the intelligence community were extremely skilled, combative and connected to the realities of the time, a context which favoured the organizational development of intelligence structures, respectively their role in the state apparatus.

Although there were also some sideslips in the activity, aspects which in some cases increased the adversity between the members of the Legionary Movement and the intelligence institutions, they did not affect the quality, legitimacy, and derived efficiency of the delivered information products.

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THE ISSUE OF RECOGNITION OF AFRICAN HERITAGE IN BRAZIL IN THE 20TH CENTURY

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Abstract

After deletion of slavery in Brazil and the granting of citizenship to Afro-descendants, their incorporation into Brazilian society was not tolerated. During the first decade of the 20th century, African mores and cultures were repressed in public spaces and excluded from the project of identity construction. Brazilian national. By the action of the Black Front (Frente Negra Brasileira) through the struggles for social and civic rights and identity claims initiated at the beginning of the 20th century and continued during the second half of this century by the movements of black intellectual lobbies and Brazilian social actors, that the question of the recognition and legitimization of African heritage in Brazil will become a national concern and the subject of debate. To this end, the Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas initiated actions that will be perpetuated by his successors for the national recognition of African values inherited from slaves.

Key words: *Slavery, African heritage, Brazil, Afro descendants, Multiculturalism, Africa.*

Introduction

In the historical evolution of the three races that founded Brazil, that is to say the Indian, white and black race, the recognition and enhancement of African peoples and cultures has always been problematic. During slavery, blacks were subject to the assimilation system that began with the acquisition of Western names upon arrival in Brazil. After the abolition, everything that referred to African culture in Brazilian society was considered abject and banned from public space. Followers of Afro-Brazilian cults were repressed, the practice of Batuque and Capoeira were prohibited. Many demeaning racial stereotypes about the behavior and physical appearance of Afro-descendants affected their lives. Despite the actions carried out for the recognition of African heritage by successive Brazilian governments, until the 21st century, the affirmation of African identity in certain public spaces is still not accepted. This article intends to examine the actions that were carried out and the reasons that motivated during the 20th century the recognition of certain cultures inherited from black slaves, despite the unfavorable political and social context in Brazil at that time.

Reasons and process for recognition of African heritage in Brazil

The process of recognition of African cultures in Brazil began in the first half of the 20th century with the joint action of the social policy of the government of Getúlio Vargas and the protest movements of blacks, the lobbies of intellectuals and Brazilian social actors. . It is following these actions that African values began to assert themselves in the Brazilian public space and to participate in the construction of the national culture.

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“Racial Democracy” by Getúlio Vargas and the legitimization of African heritage

Before 1930, physical interbreeding and the mixing of cultures were thought by politicians, European and even Brazilian intellectuals as a defect that will be responsible for Brazil's backwardness vis-à-vis Western nations and North America. They thought that the fusion of the black race with the white one would demean the so-called "superior" race (white) according to the theories on the mixing of the races of Gobineau in the *Essay on the inequality of the human races*, and the writings of Gustave LeBon. These French thinkers had Brazilian supporters who supported this idea; Nina Raimundo Rodrigues, Oliveira Viana, etc. These authors demonstrated that mixed races are inferior to pure races (Mauro, 1978: 265).

It took the publication of the masterpiece of the Brazilian sociologist Freyre (Freyre, 1978, 265) to take the opposite view of these evolutionist and racist ideas in force in Brazil, in order to show the positive aspect of interbreeding in the Brazilian society on the one hand, and on the other hand, to set in motion a new way of thinking about the Brazilian "nation", of solving the problem of the social integration of the popular masses in particular, the Blacks and the Indians in the construction and development of the country without running the risk of damaging the social fabric.

As such, G. Freyre was the first Brazilian scientist to recognize that: “By all their cultural, material or spiritual traits, the black slaves were in a position to contribute much better than the Indians to the economic and social formation of Brazil; sometimes even better than the Portuguese...” (Marin, 2009: 12). This vision of Freyre will allow Blacks henceforth the right to be citizens and to participate in the construction of the Brazilian nation by bringing their cultures and their knowledge to it.

Long before, the pioneering works of the German Karl Friedrich Philipp Von Martius in the 19th century already spoke in Brazil of the "Myth of the three races" which in its conception, it was necessary to give a tiny place to blacks instead of excluding them from the national construction site. It was the works of Silvio Romero that clearly showed the contribution of black civilizations in the construction of Brazil, while those of Afonso Celso: “Why am I proud of my country?” Porque me ufano do meu país? raised the pride of being Brazilian by combining the founding races.

These previous visions thus agree with the social project of the Brazilian sociologist G. Freyre in his perception of the construction of a Brazilian society which takes into account all ethnic and racial sensitivities. Contrary to the authors opposed to interbreeding and who supported the thesis of the “biological inferiority” of Blacks and saw in them defects, G. Freyre will affirm that: “the originality of Brazil will come from the meeting of three cultures: white, black, Indian” (Mauro, 1994: 113), he will recognize the status of culture in the “black race”. In fact, what was perceived in the past as the “biological inferiority” of black people was now seen as an exotic cultural state that needed to be valued and progressively incorporated into Brazilian society (Pereira, 2008: 94).

It is from this conception of G. Freyre of Brazilian society that the idea of the elaboration of a national identity will start; foundation of the political program of “Racial Democracy” established by Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas. The purpose of this policy was on the one hand, the constitution of an original Brazilian national identity in the eyes of the world, the affirmation of "Brazilianness" to depart from the model of

European societies, and on the other hand, it was necessary to build a country where racial segregation such as in the USA would not exist and where “a new race” would be born. This vision of a mixed national identity will develop after the First World War and will gradually impose itself to the point of becoming the official ideology of the Estado Novo dictatorship.

At that time, in addition to the praise given to Afro-Brazilians and their African heritage, concrete initiatives were taken in favor of the empowerment of African cultures, we can cite the exhortation of the Brazilian authorities to men of science so that they engage in the study of African cultures. Thus, after the publication of G. Freyre's book *Masters and Slaves*, the Negro theme invaded poetry, novels, journalism and was the subject of several scientific works. Two major Afro-Brazilian congresses were organized, the first was held in Recife in 1934 and the second in Salvador in 1937, bringing together ethnographers, psychiatrists, anthropologists, linguists, historians and sociologists.

Actions of scientists and black movements for the recognition of African heritage in Brazil

From the second half of the 20th century, many researchers will study the African heritage in Brazil thanks to the questioning of President Vargas. On the occasion of the Congress of Salvador in 1937, several scientists in order to have a real knowledge of African religions went for the first time to the places of Afro-Brazilian worship, Terreiros de Candomblé or Macumba. This had the striking effect of removing the stereotypes that so-called “upper class” people had with regard to Afro-Brazilian cults. To this end, many Brazilians learned that blacks did not indulge in any indecency during their religious ceremonies. Remember that the practice of African worship was considered ostentatious and detrimental to good morals. Police repressions were frequent and the followers were hunted down, arrested, then sentenced.

Congressional, newspaper, and radio publicity for African cults helped create a climate of tolerance around the slandered religions of the colored man (Marin, 2009: 15). In addition, studies were carried out to highlight the African cultures inherited in Brazil. As Richard Marin indicates, between 1934 and 1940, the anthropologist Arthur Ramos devoted ten of the eighteen volumes of the collection he directed at the Companhia Editôra Civilização Brasileira to Afro-Brazilian culture, something unthinkable a decade earlier. In 1939, Edison Carneiro was sent by the National Museum of Rio de Janeiro to collect material on Afro-Brazilian cults and have life-size rag dolls made with the ceremonial costumes and insignia of the orixas.²

In civil society, the action of black movements and intellectual lobbies was also important in the process of legitimation and enhancement of African identity in Brazil. At the beginning of the 20th century, Manuel Querino, a black activist, self-taught ethnographer and former abolitionist, developed certain ideas about the role of black people in the formation of the Brazilian nation to awaken black consciousness. According to him, rather than being ashamed of their African origins, black Brazilians should be proud of their Africanness. For it was the Black

²The deities originate from West Africa more exactly from Yoruba religious traditions.

who had brought to Brazil the virtues of work, discipline, sociability, spirituality and the strength of civilization. All that the Portuguese had bequeathed to the Brazilian nation were the diseases of their civilization.

During the first decade of the 1980s, social movements challenged the ideology of the homogeneous nation-state inherited from independence and the policy of miscegenation. This is due to the racial discriminations and social tensions acquired from the “racial democracy” of Vargas. On the other hand, because they campaigned for the integration of blacks into class society, for egalitarian recognition in Brazilian society based on the universal idea; of the equal dignity of all citizens and respect for their differences. In this context, cultural concerns, material interests and racial identity were combined with the aim of challenging inequalities and demanding social integration and mobility.

From there, a model of society highlighting ethnocultural diversity will emerge, supported by members of the Black Movement Movimento Negro Unificado contra a Discriminação Racial (MNU)³ and a considerable number of cultural associations such as the quilombismo of Abdias do Nascimento⁴. During this period of social crisis, the black lobby demanded the introduction of the study of Africa and Afro-Brazilians in school and university curricula. In addition, he refused the date of May 13 for the commemoration of the abolition of slavery and instead proposed that of November 20 as Black Consciousness Day on the anniversary of the execution of the Afro-descendant Bantu Zumbi; leader of the quilombo de Palmarès and symbol of black resistance in Brazil.

To understand the action of black movements in the struggle to legitimize African identity and racism in the education system, it is appropriate to present some of their activities. During the 80s (1980), the black movement fought in favor of “school for all blacks” and denounced the racist policy applied in the school environment. In 1987, he led the FAE (Fundação de Assistência ao Estudante) to take measures to eliminate racism in school books. Their actions contributed advantageously to the emergence of debates on races, race relations and favored significant changes on the social and educational levels.

In keeping with the spirit of the 1996 constitution, a new law on the education system determined that: “The teaching of the history of Brazil would integrate the contributions of the different ethnic groups to the formation of the Brazilian people, especially the indigenous matrices, African and European (Marin, 2009: 15)”. Thanks also to their negotiations, multiculturalism was recognized by the 1988 constitution which ratified the ethnic diversity of the nation and gave the State the duty to “protect

³This movement is renamed Movimento Negro Unificado (MNU) and fights against racial discrimination in Brazil. Its members are recruited from the lower and middle black bourgeoisie.

⁴Abdias do Nascimento, the great figure of black activism since the beginning of the 1930s, presents his theses on quilombismo. For him, it is a question of creating a movement based on the valorization of the historical experience of the “brown” slaves grouped in quilombos. Through this mobilizing reference model which allows the recovery of the memory of Afro-Brazilians, ignored or distorted by official history, he intends to exalt the spirit of resistance and the pride of blackness.

the cultural manifestations of the natives, Afro-Brazilians and their memorial heritage, vector of identity”.

Moreover, the claims initiated since the 20th century have had positive consequences at the beginning of the 21st century. The clause of the fundamental charter supplemented the presidential decree of November 2003, providing for the attribution of property titles to the heirs of the old quilombos. In addition, the state set up the Palmarès Foundation attached to the Ministry of Culture for the promotion of Afro-Brazilian culture (Marin, 2009: 15). The culmination of Law 10639 of January 9, 2003 completed and clarified the provisions by making the teaching of Afro-Brazilian history and culture compulsory in primary and secondary schools: “The study of the history of 'Africa and Africans, the struggle of the Blacks of Brazil, the Afro-Brazilian culture and the place of the Black in the formation of the national society,

This last law recommends that the following be introduced into school curricula:

- The history of Africa and its people, the struggle of the black people in Brazil, the Afro-Brazilian culture, and the contribution of blacks in the formation of Brazilian society socially, economically and politically.
- On June 17, 2004, the National Education Council approved the national document on academic orientation entitled: “Education of Racial-Ethnic relations and the teaching of Afro-Brazilian and African history and culture” which recommends that in the courses of training of integrated primary, secondary and higher education teachers; the history of Africa and its culture, the fight against racism, xenophobia, discrimination, etc.
- Several study centers for the cause of blacks were created in the states and private universities such as NEAB (Centre for Afro-Brazilian Studies). There are thus more than 130, playing a role in the training of young researchers and the publication of didactic material.
- On March 21, 2003, the Federal Government created SEPPIR (Secretaria Especial de Políticas de Promoção d'Igualdade Racial), the Special Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality Responsible for implementing and promoting racial equality in Brazil.
- In 2004, he also created the SECAD/MEC, Secretaria continuada, alfabetização e diversidade (continuing department of literacy and diversity);oh *Coordenação geral de diversidade e inclusão educacional (CGDIE)* General coordination of diversity and educational inclusion;
- *Coordenação Geral de Educação escolar indígena*(CGEEI) General coordination of indigenous schooling education.
- The approval of the PNLD program (National Text book Program), so the work consisted in ensuring the absence in the school books of racism, prejudice or racial discrimination.

Positive discrimination policies inaugurated in the early 2000s made it possible to democratize access to university to a certain extent by establishing quotas. In addition to the educational aspect, on the political and historical level, the State made November

20, a day declared a public holiday, the “National Day of Negro Awareness” in schools. He proceeds to the attribution of lands to the heir groups of certain quilombos. In addition, television soap operas with large audiences on the slavery past, literary publications and cultural events also contributed to the enhancement of African identity. We can cite:

- The exhibition on “The Afro-Brazilian hand” presented in São Paulo then in Brasília, which recounted the participation of Blacks, since the Baroque, in national artistic production through nearly two hundred works;
- In Rio de Janeiro, the reconstruction of “History of the Negro in Brazil” by the National Library.

At the end of the 20th century, the lobby of Afro-Brazilian intellectuals for the enhancement of Afro-Brazilian identities developed intercontinental contacts between Afro-Brazilians and Africa. Thus, African teachers will teach in Brazilian schools the ancestral language, dances and music lost by Afro-Brazilians. It is in this perspective that Professor Martiniano do Bonfim establishes contacts with the Agudas; descendants of former slaves from Brazil who returned to West Africa in the 1840s. Although African colonization cooled the ties between Afro-Brazilians and their continent of origin in the 20th century, it was noted that the creation of the Center for Afro-Oriental Studies of the Federal University of Bahia undertook a new attempt to restore bilateral exchange links between Bahia and Africa. A new diplomatic policy was set up between Brazil and Africa and many Brazilian professors and researchers were responsible for academic and cultural missions in Africa. And their African counterparts did the same in the other direction.

At the beginning of the 21st century, scientific and cultural cooperation agreements were signed in 2002 between Brazil and certain African states. After the visit of the Brazilian Head of State Lula to Cameroon, Professor Joseph-Marie Essomba teaching in the History Department and his colleague André Ntonfo from the Department of Negro African Literature, all from the Faculty of Arts, Letters and Human Sciences of the University of Yaoundé I, undertook a mission of Teaching and conferences in the universities of Brazil in 2007. The main objective of this mission was to present the true face of the history of Africa and Cameroon, the history of men and civilizations. The concern was not only to allow Brazilian students and the public to discover and get to know their cultural roots,

Today, the African cultural heritage is recognized well beyond the only populations of color. It has become part of “Brazilianness”, that is obvious, even if in some public spaces the presence of black people is not yet tolerated. Nevertheless, the start of the rehabilitation process had several positive effects, in particular; a beginning of affirmation of African cultures in Brazilian society, their participation in the construction of a Brazilian cultural identity.

Recognition and incorporation of African heritage into Brazilian national culture

In Brazil, thanks to the protest movements in favor of African cultures, a renewed consideration of the African heritage was born and amplified. The esteem for African cultures will be expressed by laudatory thoughts vis-à-vis Afro-descendants and by their

contribution to the construction of the Brazilian national identity. Actions are undertaken for the affirmation of the African heritage and several elements of the African cultural and human heritage will be legitimized and erected as a national symbol in the middle of the 20th century.

Human legacy

In relation to human heritage, the Bantu slave "Zumbi", leader of the quilombo de Palmarès, was recognized nationally as the symbol of black resistance in Brazil. The commemoration of his death is celebrated on November 20 each year. And during these festivities, the whole nation mobilizes to pay tribute to the emblematic black figure of the 17th century. On this occasion, we issue stamps, medals bearing the image of the leader of Palmarès, his portrait is everywhere, he is the hero of the carnival of Salvador. It serves as a source of inspiration for the Nação Zumbi; one of the most prominent groups of the Brazilian music scene at the end of the 20th century (Marin, 2009: 20).

The highlight of its festivities in memory of black slaves is the speech of the Federal Head of State of Brazil. In the past, then Head of State, Fernando Henrique Cardoso said: "I came here to say that Zumbi is ours, the Brazilian people and represents the best of our people: the desire for freedom. [...] "Zumbi" has transcended its Afro-Brazilian character. Through the celebration of the icon of black resistance, "Zumbi", the entire Afro-descendant community of Brazil is celebrated and especially the warrior character of the Bantu, once obliterated by the racist and ideological prejudices of current scientists. in colonial Brazil and in the 19th century, who found Bantu slaves accommodating and devoid of any spirit of rebellion.

Moreover, in the Brazilian religious pantheon, there are illustrious African characters, deified ancestors: the *pretos velhos*⁵, Pai Joaquim, Pai Joao, Mae Marie Congo. These Afro-descendants in Afro-Brazilian cults are invoked by all Brazilians without distinction of race⁶. Although the North-East and the South-East are centers of their cult, we see their spread throughout the territory. With the recognition of Afro-Brazilian religions, priests now come from all social and racial strata: Portuguese, Spanish, white Brazilian, etc. Even high-ranking people frequently consult the *enganga* to know what the future held for them, the origin of their misfortunes or what course of action to follow. In fact, the *Terreiros de Candomblé*, from Macumba and Umbanda for example welcome the faithful who come from all walks of life.

In another human aspect, the cordiality and the joviality recognized to the Brazilian people are types of behaviors introduced in the Brazilian society by the Africans. In fact, during the period of slavery, it was commonly accepted that slaves of African origin precisely were more accommodating and assimilable. This would be explained by their permeability to Western culture and through the practice of their folklore. As slaves of the fields, the Bantu were more inclined and disposed to party; the proof is that it is their folklore that has survived in Brazil and is the matrix of African folk tradition in Brazilian culture. The folklore was the means by which they were easily established the contacts and the communication between the African communities,

⁵Appellation of deified black ancestors.

⁶Dona Marina Follower of Candomblé 58 years old, Deodoro-Rio de Janeiro, interview of 07-22-2014.

On the other hand, in Brazilian society, the populations of the favelado have inherited the

Africans, the way to be and to face the trials of life with joy, even when the circumstances are unfavorable while preserving a certain joy. The practice of solidarity that is significant in the favelados is another African influence rooted in the mores of Brazilians. This African reality is found in the Brazilian peripheries. For example, when you don't have bread, you can knock on the neighbor's house, or when you suddenly have a gas shortage at home, you can cook at the neighbor's house to finish preparing what you started (Neith, 2016: 7).

Cultural heritage

Regarding the African cultural heritage in the construction of Brazilian culture, several elements of folklore and culinary art were erected as a regional and national symbol by the importance and extent of their activity in Brazilian society. . Thus the Samba which was considered as an immodest dance and music is incorporated into the national culture in 1930 under the Estado Novo of G. Vargas. It became a national dance and a musical expression par excellence of the country, even a symbol of national identity inside and outside Brazil.

During the famous carnival from Rio de Janeiro, the most anticipated event is the parade of the schools of *Samba*. The "*Samba*" is *inextricably a dance* original African Bantu, transplanted to Brazil. It's the form of dance and music the best known and widespread in Brazil. In fact, the word *Samba* "is taken from the word, "*Semba*" (J. Autunes, I. Leymarie, C. Pirenne, 109) in the Kimbundu language and which designates a dance step whose movement consists in rubbing the navels, better, in touching the belly of his or her partner while dancing. In the Umbundu language, the word "*Samba*" means to be animated, excited. Similarly, in the Ewondo language, the word "*Samba*" refers to enjoyment and character. festive. This is why it is common among the Ewondo or the Beti of Cameroon to hear, "*my samba ne eying*", to say, "*I savor life*" or even "*I take pleasure in life*" or finally, "*I have fun*". This frame design exactly with the spirit festive and jubilant *Brazilian samba*.

With its recognition and legitimization, this dance was taken over by the white elite who transformed it into a "State Samba". From 1936, his parade became a civic ritual. Samba schools in Rio de Janeiro and the suburbs are institutionalized and obtain public funding. The carnival associations come under the control of the public power, which decrees that the schools must have a didactic and patriotic character (Marin, 2009: 16). In other words, that the Samba schools as a symbol of the culture of Brazil must during the carnival sing Samba which celebrates the history, the culture, the folklore and the natural beauties of Brazil (Guéron, 2008: 209). From a mercantilist perspective, the music industry through Samba music will reap enormous benefits through music production, while that of the show transforms the parade of Samba schools into a planetary event; the carnival. Now the carnival parades are presented in the internal and external tourism market as unique events in the world. They then attract thousands of tourists every year and allow the country to have considerable economic income through tourism. Likewise, these carnivals have become important moments of celebration and promotion of Brazilian culture, but also of the mixing of men, peoples

and cultures. They then attract thousands of tourists every year and allow the country to have considerable economic income through tourism. Likewise, these carnivals have become important moments of celebration and promotion of Brazilian culture, but also of the mixing of men, peoples and cultures. They then attract thousands of tourists every year and allow the country to have considerable economic income through tourism. Likewise, these carnivals have become important moments of celebration and promotion of Brazilian culture, but also of the mixing of men, peoples and cultures.

As for Capoeira, when President Getúlio Vargas first attended a performance in 1937, he approved of its practice and lifted its ban. It was legalized the same year before gaining the remarkable status of “National” sport in Brazil (Marin, 2009: 16). Remember that in the past, Capoeira was deemed criminal in the Penal Code of 1890/59 and punished by the police. Capoeiristas were constantly persecuted and hunted down. Because they were feared and considered as delinquents and thugs. After its legalization, its practice comes out of hiding to assert itself in the public space. At the beginning of the first half of the 20th century, Capoeira was transformed from street fighting into a structured system. Manuel dos Reis Machado said Mestre Bimba in his desire to make Capoeira a respectable discipline and a true martial art, he enriched it by creating the baptism ceremony during which the novice enters the family of capoeiristas and receives his initiatory name “noma de guerra”. It has the merit of having also introduced a system of graduations and throwing movements borrowed from Batuque wrestling of Bantu origin. The first Capoeira academy was opened in 1932 in the city of Salvador where the Masters, Bimba, Pastinha, Valdemar da Liberdade, Cobrinha Verde and many others regularly gave demonstrations and gave lessons. So over the years, Capoeira became a sports discipline for ambitious and middle-class youth and many schools were created throughout the territory. It was exported to Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo then to other localities in the country and in the early 80s to the United States and Europe. Now globally recognized as a martial and living art, Capoeira testifies to Brazilian cultural traditions and especially to its African cultural heritage through the languages of song and body. But also seduced by its spectacular side, its musicality and its performances. Finally, Capoeira introduces practitioners to Brazilian culture and unites it with the Bantu cultural matrix. Now globally recognized as a martial and living art, Capoeira testifies to Brazilian cultural traditions and especially to its African cultural heritage through the languages of song and body. But also seduced by its spectacular side, its musicality and its performances. Finally, Capoeira introduces practitioners to Brazilian culture and unites it with the Bantu cultural matrix. Now globally recognized as a martial and living art, Capoeira testifies to Brazilian cultural traditions and especially to its African cultural heritage through the languages of song and body. But also seduced by its spectacular side, its musicality and its performances. Finally, Capoeira introduces practitioners to Brazilian culture and unites it with the Bantu cultural matrix.

As a reminder, Capoeira was both a fight and a ritual dance, it was born around Salvador, capital of the state of Bahia. It was transplanted to Brazil by slaves from Angola and would be the modern form of the *cufuinha* war dance described by the ethnographer Dias de Carvalho (Marin, 2009: 108). Another source affirms that the term Capoeira would come from the word N'golo, that is to say the dance of the zebra taught to young people during the rites of initiation among the peoples of ancient

Congo-Angola and in the island from Luanda. She was known as *bassula*. There is a form close to this art of combat, in Cameroon under the name of *mbaya* dance, in the North-West region. In Brazil, during slavery and after its abolition, the practice of Capoeira was prohibited. The masters saw in this activity a form of resistance and inter-ethnic communication that was dangerous for the slave society. After the abolition of slavery, anyone who practiced this art was arrested and subjected to forced labor. To maintain her practice in the cities, she mutated into an acrobatic ballet of antics.

In the same perspective, the *berimbau* musical instrument of African origin which is associated with the practice of Capoeira was introduced into the musical arsenal of the country. He also became a symbol of Brazilian music. And despite being the essential and official accompaniment instrument of Capoeira, its use has spread to other musical forms in Brazil and even in Latin America. About the contribution of African musical instruments in Brazilian classical music, Abdias Do Nascimento recognizes that: "The Africans also brought several musical instruments, some of which persisted and a rein use among us today [...] those instruments added to the dramatic dances and to the folk music, generated an excitement which seduced and fascinated the composers of classical music" (Do Nascimento, 1978: 409). In effect,

Regarding the contributions of African culinary traditions in Brazilian cuisine, nationally and regionally, the *feijoada* which yesterday was a dish of slaves was elevated to the dignity of "national dish" even if it is the culinary characteristic of Rio de Janeiro. Indeed, the Center and Southeast region of Brazil received throughout its history a large number of slaves from Africa coming mainly from Angola with culinary preparations similar to that of the Brazilian *feijoada*. In contrast the typical meal *moqueca* of the Brazilian cuisine and some food Angolan becomes one of the "flagship" dishes of the Bahian culinary system. While the *mocotó* meal made with beef legs cooked with condiments marks the culinary specialty of São Paulo.

As a mark of distinction, the *moqueca* allowed the region of Bahia to differentiate itself in the culinary arts from the rest of Brazil and became a referent of regional culinary identity. The taste, the ingredients as much as the African culinary know-how will also assert themselves through Bahian cuisine. The art of cooking fish and chicken in banana leaves, the use of okra, palm oil, peppers and plantains have become established and perpetuated in Brazilian cuisine.

Thanks to tourism, African culinary influences are popularized through the culinary press and through images. Indeed, to highlight and sell the "bianity" during popular festivals such as that of *Yemanjá*⁷ or even *Senhor de Bomfim*, the tourist discourse uses African culinary symbols to show the uniqueness, authenticity and exotic dimension of Bahia. It must be recognized that the introduction of African values into the tourism economy is the work of public authorities seeking to make the cultural capital profitable through tourist activity. But the selection of popular cultures remains arbitrary in that only those that are likely to have touristic and economic interest are retained.

The initiatives undertaken by the State and civil society for the rehabilitation of African cultures in Brazil have enabled notable advances. But the struggles of identity

⁷Brazilian goddess of the sea.

and racial claims that persist indicate that there is more to do for the affirmation of African identity in the public space in Brazil. It would be important to put in development policies, an emphasis on the enhancement of the African heritage to get it out of the folkloric and exotic framework where it is confined, but also, to respond favorably to the social demands of the Afro-Brazilian communities, since the assertion of African heritage is intertwined with identity issues.

On the other hand, when we observe today's world, culture asserts itself more and more as an element with multiple and civilizational stakes. Brazil, which has a rich multicultural heritage, could use it as a mine of opportunities and wealth. Because, everything suggests that the enhancement of the African cultural matrix can be a way out to ease tensions and alleviate racial discrimination and promote social cohesion.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can retain three main ideas: the first is that the question of the rehabilitation of African cultures in Brazil began in the first half of the 20th century and accelerated at the end of the same century in a context of democratization of country. Progress has been noted through the actions of the Federal State of Brazil and civil society in favor of the recognition of African heritage, such as: the legitimization of Afro-Brazilian religions, Capoeira, Samba, African culinary art and the teaching of history that incorporated the contributions of the African matrix in the formation of Brazilian society. It was at the beginning of the 21st century that fundamental reforms were noted with the coming to power of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

The second key idea is that the recognition and effective affirmation of African heritage requires respect for differences, visibility and good representation of blacks and their culture in the Brazilian public space. And this is only possible if solutions are provided to improve the living conditions of Afro-descendant communities and their social demands. Because, everything indicates that the fact of being black considerably limits social mobility and integration into the wealthy classes, which has an impact on the social perception of the Afro-descendant and his culture. Finally, although Brazil, through its African heritage, has the assets likely to establish a dynamic of development allowing it to generate foreign exchange and impose itself on the continental and intercontinental market.

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RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT OF THE INSTITUTE OF PEDAGOGY
OF THE JOHN PAUL II CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF LUBLIN

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Abstract

The aim of the paper is to describe the main stages of development of the Institute of Pedagogy of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin and to describe the key scientific achievements of the Institute's academic staff. The content is presented from both historical and theoretical perspective. The author indicated the main stages of development of the Institute of Pedagogy of the Catholic University of Lublin in the context of the development of pedagogy in Poland. The significance of the achievements of the staff of the Institute of Pedagogy of the Catholic University of Lublin was shown in relation to the specificity of personalistic upbringing, especially in the context of the Marxist model of pedagogy dominant in Poland after World War II.

Key words: *Institute of Pedagogy of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, pedagogy, Christian personalism.*

The article presents the content from both theoretical and historical perspective. Its subject pertains to the specificity of the scientific output of the Institute of Pedagogy of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin analysed in the genetic angle. The paper introduces an understanding of the views typical of the pedagogical scientific environment of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, their sources and indicates selected aspects of their social and cultural value. The main impact is placed on the achievements of the Institute of Pedagogy of the Catholic University of Lublin in the national pedagogical work in the twentieth century, and especially on the significance for the processes of development of pedagogy and education.

The idea behind the main topic of this paper relates to the role (value, importance) that the scientific community of the Catholic University of Lublin played in the socio-cultural changes in Poland in the 1980s and 1990s, including the role of the Institute of Pedagogy of the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) in initiating changes in Polish pedagogy and education. A particular argument justifying the relevance of the subject undertaken is the fact that the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL), after the Second World War, was the only one in the entire bloc of communist countries to remain an independent centre of scientific research: it was not managed by the communist authorities and to a large extent retained its ideological and theoretical autonomy. Similarly, the Institute of Pedagogy of the Catholic University of Lublin was perhaps the only non-Marxist pedagogical centre in the bloc of countries of the so-called people's democracy. It carried out scientific research based on the concept of Christian personalism, free from the generally binding positivist-Marxist concept of doing science and from the totalitarian model of education and upbringing.

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The above mentioned argument of undertaking this particular topic is supported by the lack of more widely disseminated knowledge about the importance of the Institute of Pedagogy of the Catholic University of Lublin for the development of pedagogy, including the changes in the model of practicing pedagogy in Poland after 1998. This lack of knowledge concerns not only foreign university centres (which may be quite obvious), but also refers to native Polish institutions². The theoretical aim of paper is therefore complemented by a practical one (cf: Kudashov, Chernykh, Yatsenko, Grigorieva, Pfanenstiel, Rakhinskiy, 2017) - to popularise knowledge about the role that the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL played in the promotion of independent research and educational ideas.

The overview of research presented in this paper refers to the hermeneutic and analytical research paradigm. As a result, the answer to the following questions may be obtained: what is the genesis and the most important stages of the historical development of the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL?; what are the theoretical achievements of the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL?; what are the main theoretical categories which characterise the achievements of the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL?

The basic research material consists of theoretical publications and source documents. The research material is considerable in this aspect and covers more than one hundred years of institutional functioning of pedagogy at KUL and publication activity of the academic staff of the Institute of Pedagogy (1918-2022). It includes not only papers analysing the subject matter but also reviews of the state of art - collecting and summarizing the scientific achievements of the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL, especially the most recent publications (Rynio, & Skrzyniarz, 2011; Fel, Niewiadomska, & Skrzyniarz, 2016; Nowak, 2018; Braun, Łobacz, & Rynio 2010; Kiereś, Nowak, & Opozda, 2006; Nowak, Ożóg, & Rynio, 2003).

The article consists of two parts: the first one presents an outline of the development of pedagogy at KUL in the light of the pedagogy in Poland in the period from 1918 to the present times. The characterization of the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL and its scientific achievements was outlined in relevance to the main stages of the development of the Lublin centre. The second part of the article contains analyses of the theoretical specificity of pedagogy practiced at KUL. The key categories characterising the scientific achievements are discussed herein.

I. Socio-cultural background of Institute of Pedagogy KUL

The research and university education in the field of pedagogy conducted at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin falls into three historical periods, crucial for the development of Polish pedagogy. These include: the period before the Second World War, the period from the end of the Second World War to the early 1980s and the period from the social and political changes of the 1980s and 1990s up to the present times. Distinguishing between these periods is based both on the criterion of social and political conditions in which science functioned in Poland, and on criteria within science

² It may be thought that this situation is related to the marginalisation of the achievements of Christian pedagogy, still present in the pedagogical discourse in Poland in the first decade of the 21st century, (cf: Stępkowski, 2010: 11-15), as well as the process of idealization of the communist era in the post-war period (cf: Bureś, 2018).

- that is the specificity of the development of pedagogical academic centres (Cf.: Łobocki, 2010: 15-21; Śliwowski, 2007: 18-20.).

The first period is marked by the dates: the end of the First World War (1918) and the outbreak of the Second World War (1939). This was the time when both Catholic University of Lublin and the Institute of Pedagogy, which operated within the university, was established and developed in both institutional and theoretical sense. The University of Lublin (renamed from 1928 to: Catholic University of Lublin and since 2005 bearing the name: John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin) was established in 1918 as a Catholic university (the inauguration of the academic year took place on 8 December 1918) thanks to the efforts of Rev. Idzi Radziszewski (1871-1922). The administrative, financial and personnel support was provided by the Imperial Spiritual Academy in St. Petersburg where I. Radziszewski was employed until 1918. As a result of political changes, especially the rebirth of the Polish State (1918) and the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia (1917), Radziszewski decided to return to Poland and establish a higher education institution in the service of the reborn state and the Church (Karolewicz, 1996: 22-26).

The legal framework for the functioning of the University of Lublin was systematically sanctioned by decisions of both Catholic church and state authorities. For the first time, on 27 July 1918, at a committee meeting of the Polish Episcopate chaired by the Visitor of the Holy See, Achilles Ratti (1857-1939) - later Pope Pius XI, the project of establishing a Catholic university in the reborn Poland was accepted. The official founding act was issued by the Congregation for Seminaries and Universities on 25 July 1920, and then renewed by Pope Pius XI in 1923, 1926 and 1929. The legal acceptance of the diploma of the 'secular' faculties was officially granted to the University of Lublin on 28 June 1922. At that time, by a decision of the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment, an Examination Commission was established at the Jan Kazimierz University in Lviv to grant university diplomas to the Faculty of Law and Social and Economic Sciences. The Act on Academic Schools of 1933 officially recognised the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) as a 'private academic school', and the Catholic University of Lublin was granted full state rights on 9 April 1938 by a resolution of the Sejm and a decision of the President of the Republic of Poland, Ignacy Mościcki (1867-1946). As a result, KUL was the fifth higher education institute in the independent Poland conferring all degrees and covering the following faculties of education and research: Theology, Canon Law, Law and Social and Economic Sciences, Humanities and the Pedagogical Institute (Karolewicz, 1996: 28-33).

From the very beginning, the scientific and didactic activity of KUL was aimed at educating the intellectual and social Polish Catholic elite, functioning in the spirit of rationalisation of faith (combining faith and logic reasoning). In this context, pedagogy, from its very inception, was treated as a strategic discipline, determining the political, cultural and social shape of the reborn state (Nowak, 2018: 15). The main activity of the Catholic University in Lublin reflected in this aspect both the social needs and the intellectual tendencies prevailing in the Catholic Church at that time. Their doctrinal foundations were described in Pope Leo XIII's (1878-1903) encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (Leon XIII, 2003) of 1879 while their theoretical assumptions were developed by Catholic thinkers such as John Henry Newman (1801-1890) and Cardinal Désiré-Joseph

Mercier (1851-1926), among others. In the pre-war period, it was the collaboration with the Catholic University of Lovanium (Belgium) that mainly defined the theoretical and scientific principles of the activity of the Catholic University of Lublin. The result of this collaboration was embedded in the research conducted at the Catholic University of Lublin based on the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). This involved not only the development of the system of neo-Thomistic philosophy itself but also its application to various specific disciplines including pedagogy (Karolewicz, 1996: 19-22).

The beginnings of pedagogy at KUL are identified with the inauguration of a teacher training course (1918) and then (1920) with the employment of Dr Zygmunt Kukulski (1890-1944) and the establishment of the Department of Pedagogy (Wolk, 2018: 46; Skrzyniarz, 2016b: 150-151). Pedagogical research conducted at KUL at that time focused on the problems of the history of upbringing (especially on the activities of the Commission of National Education established in 1773, *de facto* the world's first ministry of education), on general pedagogy (theoretical and methodological foundations of pedagogy and education) and on issues of school systems including the Lublin region (See, inter alia: Kukulski, 1923; Kukulski, 1927a; Kukulski, 1927b; Kukulski, 1939). Graduates of the Pedagogical Institute of KUL from 1933 were awarded a Master of Philosophy degree in pedagogy (Skrzyniarz, 2016b: 14).

In addition to the pedagogical research carried out within the Pedagogical Institute, philosophical and theological research on upbringing was practised at the university. Particularly noteworthy in this aspect is the scholarly activity of Fr Jacek Woroniecki OP (1878-1949) who developed an original conception of upbringing referring to the work of St Thomas Aquinas. This concept is presented in a systematic form in a three-volume work entitled: "*Catholic Education Ethics*" (Woroniecki, 1995) which included a proposal for integral and personalistic education based on the category of moral virtues (See for example: Mazur, Kiereś, Skrzyniarz., & Plazińska, 2019; Wistuba OP, Magier, & Marczewski, 2022).

The second period of pedagogy at KUL falls between the end of the Second World War and the moment of socio-political change - the early 1980s. It was a time of the consolidation of communist power in Poland, the closure of non-Marxist centres of scientific, social and educational thought including efforts to closing down the Catholic University of Lublin. These tendencies were reflected in the systematic restriction of the scientific and didactic activities of the University: the development of academic staff was hindered, the possibility of publication was restricted, and cooperation with foreign centres was prohibited. The research of the Pedagogical Section conducted since 1944 at KUL within the Department of Pedagogy and the History of Education, representing Christian, integral and personalistic thought based on the values of freedom and human dignity, openly contradicted the totalitarian character of the Polish state. As a result, in 1953 the Ministry of Higher Education (Order of the Minister of Higher Education of 29 June 1953) closed the enrolment for pedagogical studies and in 1956 the Pedagogical Section at the Catholic University of Lublin was definitively forbidden (Skrzyniarz, 2016b: 14-15).

The administrative relic of pedagogical studies at KUL comprised only the general university, interdepartmental pedagogical agenda led by S. Kunowski (1909-1977). It fulfilled primarily didactic, service functions for students and academic staff

of the faculties of theology, philosophy and humanities. In terms of research, S. Kunowski continued the personalistic and Christian educational thought, thus exposing himself to constant harassment and obstructions in his scientific development (refusal to grant a professorship) and in the popularisation of the results of his research (Skrzyniarz, 2016b: 15-16).

As in the pre-war period, educational issues were also considered at KUL by representatives of scientific disciplines other than pedagogy. In the field of philosophy, it found its continuation in research works conducted in the spirit of J. Woroniecki's work: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec (1921-2008), Feliks Bednarski (1911-2006), Henryk Kiereś (1943-), Andrzej Maryniarczyk (1950-2020). On the other hand, in the field of theology (pastoral theology), specific research on upbringing in the family was initiated in the 1970s by Rev. Prof. Piotr Poręba (1908-1991). Based on the legacy of S. Kunowski, he created the first Department of Family Pedagogy in Poland focusing research on problems of empirical research of upbringing in the family as well as on the promotion of the Christian model of marriage and family (Tomkiewicz, 2006: 49-54).

The third period of the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL falls on the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. Selective, partial acceptance of the theoretical concept and pedagogical research conducted at KUL emerged along with the social and political changes in Poland. Their beginnings date back to 1981 and are related to the activities of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity". Taking into account the nationwide workers' protests, the communist authorities agreed to the establishment of a Faculty of Social Sciences at KUL with Section of Pedagogy functioning under its structures (Skrzyniarz 2016b: 14-15). Its creation was entrusted to Associate Professor Teresa Kukulowicz (1925-2014), a sociologist who had collaborated with Professor S. Kunowski since the 1950s. Initially, the staff of the Pedagogy Section consisted mainly of professors of related disciplines (sociologists, psychologists, historians, philosophers). In the course of time, research and teaching activities were based on graduates of the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL and graduates of pedagogy of other universities in Poland and Europe (Nowak, 2018: 263-348).

Since then, the steady systematic development of the Institute of Pedagogy, both administratively and academically, can be clearly observed. It is expressed primarily in new research specialisations developed by the Institute's academic staff. Another indicator of the Institute's development is the various research projects conducted both in Poland and in cooperation with many universities in the world (www.kul.pl/wspolpraca-instytutu-pedagogiki-kul,art_12932.html [18.11.2022]; https://www.kul.pl/udzial-w-projektach-miedzynarodowych,art_93054.html [18.11.2022]). As importantly, the academic staff of the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL are members of the national scientific institutions that decide on the functioning of this discipline of knowledge in Poland: the awarding of degrees and the recognition of professional diplomas in pedagogy. Specific areas of research and education conducted at the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL include the issues concerning anthropological, ethical and axiological foundations of education; the Cued Speech method of communication with deaf people- Kazimiera Krakowiak (1946-) (Krakowiak, Domagała-Zyśk, & Podlewska, 2012: 141-179), Edmund Bojanowski's (1814-1871) educational system - Maria Loyola Opiela (?) (2020: 172-

190), issues of social care and the generation of author's concepts of prenatal pedagogy Dorota Kornas-Biela (1949-) (Kornas-Biela, 2009; 2013: 193-206), the concept of open and personalistic pedagogy - Marian Nowak (1955-) (Nowak, 1999) and Christian pedagogy - Alina Rynio (1954-) (Rynio, 2021).

II. Theoretical specificity of research conducted at the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL

Despite the multifaceted and dynamic development, pedagogical research and the educational process conducted at the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL invariably refer to the concepts of Christian personalism. Regardless of the field, they focus on the following categories: person, human dignity, integral upbringing. Their theoretical foundations are embedded in anthropological, ethical and social concepts of academics such as Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950), Romano Guardini (1885-1968), Jacek Woroniecki, Karol Wojtyła (1920-2005) (John Paul II), Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński (1901-1981), Stefan Kunowski. They comprise the following main theses and scopes: 1) the conviction of the genetic and systemic relationship of pedagogy with philosophy; 2) the thesis of the normative character of pedagogy based on Christian anthropology; 3) the implementation of the model of integral education.

1) In spite of the administrative, theoretical and methodological autonomy that pedagogy possesses, its specific element relates to the conviction of the tight connection with philosophy in the genetic, historical, theoretical and methodological aspect. Bearing in mind this approach, philosophy is treated not only as an auxiliary discipline of pedagogy but as a founding discipline of pedagogy. Disregarding the multithreaded historical relationship of pedagogy and philosophy, it is acknowledged that the output of philosophy substantively defines pedagogy in terms of ontology, theory of cognition, anthropology, ethics, axiology. In these scopes it also constitutes the basis and criterion differentiating the various models of pedagogy: experimental, normative, critical, hermeneutic, structuralist, reflexive (Nowak, 2008: 236-256). It is assumed that the fundamental questions posed in the field of pedagogy are essentially philosophical questions. They refer to the subject matter of the essence of man, the nature of moral good and evil, the essence of exploration, the genesis and validity of values (Kunowski, 2001). Thus the prevailing statement evokes that it is impossible to practise pedagogy independently of philosophical determinations and demands to reject philosophy as a science for auxiliary pedagogy lead to its reduction to hidden, unconscious theoretical, methodological, ideological or world-view dependencies. In such a view, pedagogy loses its autonomy. It becomes a science subordinated to psychology, sociology, natural sciences, ideology. It is used only as a tool for the implementation of the scientific research of these sciences to practice or as a tool for indoctrination (Bronk, 2003: 63-68).

The base concept for pedagogical research conducted at the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL pertains to Thomistic personalism developed in the so-called Lublin School of Classical Philosophy. Within its framework, categories such as ontological realism, theoretical-cognitive realism, rationalism, maximalism, aretological conception of morality, conviction of the personal dignity of man,

integral conception of upbringing (Cf. Bronk, & Majdanski, 1991-1992: 367-391) are indicated as generative for pedagogy.

The starting point for pedagogical reflection based on Thomistic personalism is the conviction of the existence of a reality independent of a man's mind and the thesis of the possibility of its certain, rational cognition (discovery). Such an approach treats pedagogy as a science which on the basis of empirical and intellectual cognition discovers the regularities of upbringing (education). Discovering truth about upbringing first of all refers to exploration of the nature of the human being - the subject of upbringing. It is recognised that even the smallest errors in the anthropological aspect result in significant errors in educational models and educational practice. Importantly, anthropological knowledge in pedagogy is not limited to the psychological, social or biological level. Its fundamental scope remains the philosophical knowledge of man, describing and explaining his nature, his essence. Striving to discover the constitutive elements (qualities) of humanity is supposed to protect pedagogy both from psychologism, sociology, biologism and ideologisation and, above all, it is supposed to enable discovering the most essential, general, universal regularities of upbringing (Kiereś, 2015: 65-90).

The system of Thomistic philosophy which sets the basis for the concept of personalistic pedagogy practised at KUL, despite its rational and cognitively optimistic character, also contains a conviction about the limited cognitive possibilities of human cognition. Contrary to the dominant contemporary post-positivist views, various areas of reality that are not subject to exploration (the Absolute, the soul) are pointed out while constituting a "mystery" (Jeziorański, 2022: 26-29). Recognition of their existence enforces an attitude of cognitive humility on the one hand, and on the other opens pedagogy to humanistic knowledge and to the achievements of civilisation and culture in the broadest sense. This is especially valid for worldview and religious content which, although confessional, by definition have a limited scope of rational justification and thus also universal acceptance. Therefore, they are irreplaceable in the normative and teleological aspects of pedagogy. They have an essential, inalienable and generative function in pedagogical theory in terms of the creation of norms, principles and assessment criteria in upbringing (Kiereś, 2015: 131-144).

2) An important element determining the theoretical specificity of pedagogy practised at the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL is the recognition of pedagogy as a normative science. It is believed that just like any science also pedagogy in the first place realizes cognitive functions (goals): descriptive and explanatory, in fact it cannot be reduced to description and explication. By definition, it should transcend the level of cognitive objectives and pursue practical goals: to generate evaluations of the explored educational reality and contain postulates for its melioration³.

It is emphasised that the normative and postulative nature of pedagogy grants the value of a practical (applied) science. Their result is the coherence of pedagogy as a

³ "Therefore, the formal subject in pedagogy must be the developmental good of the human being not currently conceived, but realized in the future, oriented towards the future, thanks to which the human being can fully perfect himself and reach the end of the developmental process" (Kunowski 2001: 39).

scientific discipline. Scientist approaches typical of Anglo-Saxon and Francophone models of doing pedagogy (educational science) based on positivism reject the possibility of normativity of science. When adopting physicalism, they do not allow the possibility of judgements and postulates as they treat them as non-scientific elements, not present within science. Thus, scientific approaches not only exclude the humanities - including pedagogy practised in a humanistic manner- from the group of sciences but also respect its methodological coherence. Without an evaluative-normative level, pedagogy becomes a collection of loosely related research conducted in different models (psychological, sociological, naturalistic). To practice pedagogy in a descriptive model does not guarantee its impartiality, objectivity. On the contrary, it is treated as an "escape" from the problem of the identity of pedagogy and thus leads to crypto-objectivity, to the appearance of axiological neutrality of the knowledge of upbringing (Bronk, 2003: 47-76).

Meanwhile, pedagogy as an applied (practical) science practised in the humanistic model, according to Wilhelm Dilthey's (1833-1911) postulates, by definition contains a specific set of normative and postulative contents (Dilthey, 1982: 290-311). Their source may comprise not only inquiries carried out in the field of normative philosophical disciplines such as ethics, axiology, philosophical anthropology, but also the content of cultural and worldview provenance. On their basis, norms, evaluations and aims of upbringing are created.

3) The last element specific to the pedagogical scientific community of KUL is the integral concept of upbringing. It is perceived as a continuation of the classical model of education. It is regarded as the heir of the Greek educational tradition of "*paideia*" and the Latin idea of "*humanitas*" (Chlodna-Blach, 2020).

The underlying thesis which results from philosophical reflection on human nature constitutes the conviction of the personal dignity (value) of every human being. It is acknowledged that both educates and educators possess a personal dignity that belongs to the human being irrespective of the stage of development, psychological characteristics, specificity of the body's functioning and the social and cultural context of life. Man and his nature are the starting point for the design of educational activities. Other elements conditioning them such as social needs or economic or political conditioning are treated as secondary to the overarching category of human dignity (Łuczynski, 2018: 18-59).

The principle of respect for human dignity is referred to as "the personalist norm". It is expressed in the injunction to treat the human being as an autotelic goal of action and in the prohibition of treating anyone as a means for achieving goals other than the good of the individual. It stands against to treating a human being in an instrumental manner. As a result, any upbringing that does not respect the personal dignity of man - that does not serve man - is considered as reductionism, anti-upbringing, an action aimed at objectification (Nowak, 1999: 319-322).

The integral conception of upbringing is based on the conviction that upbringing (education) should take into account all dimensions of the ontic structure of man. Thus, it is related to biological, psychological, social, cultural, spiritual and religious aspects. Education should not be limited to any of these aspects. On the contrary, not only should it include all of them but also take into account the need

for their interaction and coexistence. Only by taking into consideration the demand for integrity can the harmonious development of the pupil be guaranteed. It is also a guarantee for the respect of the personal dignity of the human being (the pupil) which, as mentioned above, defines the essence of the process of personalistic upbringing (Nowak, 2018: 6-27).

Setting the concept of Thomistic personalism as the basis for upbringing introduces the fundamental thesis of the potentiality of human nature to the scope of pedagogical inquiry. In this view, upbringing is an activity that corresponds to the natural human striving for development - the actualisation of the potentiality of nature. Genetically speaking, upbringing is not justified by needs or social system, ideology or even individual plans and desires. Its rationale is autotelic and transcends psychological, social and cultural conditions⁴.

Integral upbringing should be implemented in all educational institutions and environments. In particular, it should be initiated by the family which according to personalism is recognised as the basic, natural, initial and multifaceted environment for upbringing and care. Other institutions such as the school, peer groups and the Church can only carry out their tasks under parental consent and in close cooperation with them (the so-called principle of subsidiarity). Their task is not to replace or compete with the family but to make up for any shortcomings (Wilk, 2002: 6-35).

The requirement for integral education is perceived as a challenge of particular importance in the present times. Namely, it is widely recognized that on one hand the education conducted in the pragmatic-intellectual model is dominant, and on the other hand, the spread of liberal education is becoming more prevailing. The pragmatic-intellectual model of education is supposed to serve the progress of civilisation, while liberal education is supposed to be a consequence of the spread of liberalism and postmodernism in Western culture. It is thought that progress and freedom, while important, should not dominate education, must not detach it from the holistic understanding of development. Pragmatic, technocratic and liberal education do not exhaust the demand for the integrity of education. They should be combined with an education based on responsibility, respect for the life and dignity of the other, respect for spiritual and religious life. In particular, the neglect of education in the moral, spiritual and religious aspects is recognised. Generally speaking, the secularisation of culture has led to the removal of these aspects outside the scope of educational work and to an exclusion due to their personal, intimate nature. Including them within the scope of education is considered to be an outdated, anachronistic approach or a manifestation of totalitarian thinking (Kunowski, 2000: 60-62, 106-107).

⁴ "Subjectivity or causality belongs to man by nature, thanks to it man is an autonomous being but it is [also - P.M.] granted to man. Its actualisation makes man - as K. Wojtyła puts it - a self-possessing and self-determining being. It is actualised spontaneously due to innate inclinations and in the field of human culture, both in its social context and in the individual life of each man" (Kiereś, 2015: 97).

Conclusions

Historically speaking, the existence of a personalist scientific community at the KUL in the period between 1945 and 1989 especially the activities of S. Kunowski and T. Kukołowicz, saved Polish pedagogy from permanent Marxist ideologisation. Additionally, it created opportunities for overcoming the crisis of pedagogy that emerged in Poland after the fall of the communist system. Back in the 1990s, it provided an opportunity for overcoming the theoretical and methodological chaos among Polish pedagogues that for decades were developing in the conviction of the exclusive validity of methodological naturalism and Marxism as the theoretical basis of pedagogy (Urbaniak-Zajac, & Kos, 2013: 8-14; Kiereś, 2015: 145-149).

In the course of time, the concept of personalistic pedagogy practised at the Institute of Pedagogy of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, although marginalised during the communist period, found its supporters in various academic centres in Poland. Nowadays, it has developed in the form of a specific nationwide scholar community with the Institute of Pedagogy of KUL playing the generative role. As a result, the personalistic pedagogical environment creates a unique, widely recognizable scientific output, accompanied by practical educational activities. Currently, promoting the idea of personalistic and Christian upbringing provides an alternative to various educational concepts. It has an impact not only on the level and content of pedagogical research but also on the dynamism of educational practice implemented by the state as well as by the Catholic Church in Poland.

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**THE CAMEROONIAN SUPPORT STRUCTURES
FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT BETWEEN CAMEROON AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION. 2003- 2018**

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Abstract

This article questions the effectiveness of Cameroonian support structures for the negotiation of the Economic Partnership Agreement between Cameroon and the European Union. It follows from this questioning that with regard to the content of the Cameroon-European Union EPA that these structures have been ineffective for Cameroon because of their weak negotiating power vis-à-vis the powerful countries of the European Union. In addition, it highlights the servile postures of Africa in general and Cameroon in particular in the negotiations of multilateral agreements with the European Union.

Key words: *EPA, negotiation support structures, Cameroon-European Union-Neocolonialism.*

Introduction

The history of trade cooperation between the European Union and the ACP countries is nearly 60 years old. It is characterized by numerous permanences and ruptures whose structural and economic factors have influenced its dynamics. It is in this perspective that trade relations between the European Union and Cameroon were also inscribed, established by the Cotonou Agreement of June 2000 (Ebalé, 2016: 19) which introduced a new framework for commercial, liberal and above all unequal, compatible with the requirements of globalization known as the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA). The latter demand the customs and even tax dismantling of imports from the European Union, the aim being to promote wider access to the market of ACP countries. Unprepared for this scenario, Cameroon, like the other ACP countries, had to equip itself with a set of structures to ensure the negotiations of this new agreement; the aim being to preserve the economic and commercial interests of Cameroon. This inevitably leads us to the formulation of the following question: have the Cameroonian support structures for the negotiation of the EPA really played their role in a critical context of Cameroon's solitary commitment to a bilateral EPA with the EU to the detriment of a regional dynamic? Attempting to answer this question will form the basis of this analysis. the aim being to preserve the economic and commercial interests of Cameroon. This inevitably leads us to the formulation of the following question: have the Cameroonian support structures for the negotiation of the EPA really played their role in a critical context of Cameroon's solitary commitment to a bilateral EPA with the EU to the detriment of a regional dynamic? Attempting to answer this question will form the basis of this analysis. the aim being to preserve the economic and commercial interests of Cameroon. This inevitably leads us to the formulation of

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the following question: have the Cameroonian support structures for the negotiation of the EPA really played their role in a critical context of Cameroon's solitary commitment to a bilateral EPA with the EU to the detriment of a regional dynamic? Attempting to answer this question will form the basis of this analysis.

Overview of the foundations and Cameroonian support structures for the EPA negotiation

Understanding the Cameroonian support structures for the negotiation of the EPA between Cameroon and the European Union requires beforehand that particular attention be given to the determinants of the said agreement on the one hand and that a presentation of the above-mentioned structures be done on the other hand. It is in this logic that it seems judicious to open this reflection by highlighting the motives for the implementation of the EPAs and by proceeding to a brief description of the structures that were put in place at the level of Cameroon in order to ensure the smooth running of the negotiations relating to this agreement.

The determinants of EPAs

The EPAs are above all reciprocal but asymmetrical free trade agreements between each ACP sub-region and Europe. This section of analysis aims to present the distant and immediate determinants of EPAs.

The distant determinants of EPAs

If the European Community was born with the Treaty of Rome, it was with the Georgetown Agreement of June 6, 1975 that the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States was created, better known as the "ACP group". " (Courrier ACP/UE July-August 2000), an entity made up of countries in many respects different but nevertheless having in common multiple interests and above all the socio-economic development of their peoples. Remember that this group is one of the very first groups made up only of poor countries on the international scene and having the objective, among other things, of "choosing their mode of management of their affairs" which in practice is only a chimera of the fact that the foreign powers always keep a hold on their bastion. Pursuant to the provisions of Part IV of the Treaty of Rome which invites the Six to cooperate with the countries maintaining special relations with them, namely links The accession to independence of the overseas countries and territories has led to the negotiation of their relations, particularly in the field of economic, scientific and cultural cooperation with the EEC, on a contractual basis. This cooperation has been enriched since 1957, both in terms of its field of application and its geographical scope. It is within this framework that the first Yaoundé Convention was signed on July 2, 1963, which provides for financial and commercial aid to the eighteen former African colonies. The second Yaoundé Convention, signed on July 29, 1969, relates to the financing of projects with a preponderance of black Africa. The Arusha Agreement of September 24, 1969 integrates three member states of the Commonwealth into the Yaoundé Convention. Faced with this unproductive situation, a succession of conventions called "Lomé Conventions" was set up. These agreements are in many ways a novelty in this "new" relationship. The first convention of Lomé was marked by its time. It reflected the relative geopolitical power of the ACP countries in the context

of the Cold War, the oil crisis and the ideological debate on the “new international economic order” which occupied people's minds at the time. Revised and updated every five years, the successive Lomé Conventions have represented, at the global level, the broadest political and financial framework offered to North-South cooperation. For a long time, the Lomé Convention was considered an innovative model of international cooperation. In many ways, it served as a pilot structure for other forms of cooperation.

The immediate determinants of EPAs

The Cotonou Agreement and compatibility with WTO rules are immediate catalysts for EPAs. The trade regime put in place by Lomé has come under progressive pressure for reasons of both efficiency and political acceptability. Despite preferential access to EU markets, ACP export performance has deteriorated over the past two decades. Diversification from traditional products also remained very limited. To this is added that the trade provisions of Lomé have been deemed incompatible with the new international rules set by the World Trade Organization. Conflicts over the banana trade regime illustrate this sensitive point. The more than mixed results of these agreements and their ineffectiveness, but also the evolution of world trade relations, have prompted the European Union, through its Green Paper, to question the mechanisms at work within the framework of Lomé (Core, 2007 , 14).

This is why it was deemed necessary to negotiate a new, much more dynamic agreement in order to start again on new foundations which would take into account the “interests” of each party. Negotiations for a new framework, which began in September 1998, culminated in the signing in Cotonou on June 23, 2000 of a general EU-ACP partnership agreement, commonly known as the Cotonou Convention. It should also be noted that the signing of the Agreement in Cotonou was done incidentally because it was to take place in the Fiji Islands in May 2000.

But the political instability which shook this country at the time, led the delegations to choose the Beninese capital. This date is to be marked with a white stone because it is now synonymous with a major historical and political event, and this for at least three reasons: first, it is the result of a long process; secondly, because the signing of the new agreement clearly demonstrates that after the disappointing outcome of the Seattle conference, it is still possible to maintain friendly and sincere relations between North and South; finally, because this date ushers in a new era in relations based on a profound reform of the spirit that drives cooperation, its objectives and its practice.

The agreement has a duration of twenty years and contains a clause allowing its revision every five years (article 95) with the exception of the provisions on economic and commercial cooperation which are subject to a specific revision procedure. It is centered on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty while contributing to sustainable development and the gradual integration of ACP countries into the world economy. It is based on a few fundamental principles, namely the equality of partners, ownership of development strategies, participation, dialogue and mutual commitment, among others. One of the great innovations of this agreement is the introduction of improved political dialogue. To a cooperation long focused on economic objectives, has gradually been replaced by a broader and somewhat more coherent framework integrating political aspects. Today, one of the

essential features of this multilateral partnership is to combine the development aid necessary for the ACP countries, trade to meet the challenges of globalization and a reinforced political dimension allowing consideration of important aspects which also have their impact on development.

The advent of the WTO in 1994 brought new provisions on trade. The legislative framework of the WTO imposes compliance with a set of principles, one of the most important of which is the most favored nation clause (MFN) which prohibits any commercial discrimination between members of the organization. The WTO has two main foundations that help to better understand the origins. First, it has a legal basis:

The granting of non-reciprocal preferences in favor of the developing countries of the ACP group alone is in fact not in conformity with the rules of the WTO and in particular with the Enabling Clause which makes it possible to derogate from the treatment of the most favored nation in favor of developing countries, but on the other hand prohibits any discrimination between developing countries that is not based on objective criteria. The GATT Enabling Clause thus allows the conclusion of preferential Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) thereafter, which are not subject to the disciplines provided for in Article XXIV of the GATT (Ebale, 2016: 45).

It has an economic basis:

The liberalization of trade at world level leads to a general lowering of customs tariffs by virtue of the MFN clause, and therefore mechanically reduces the preferential margin enjoyed by ACP countries. This phenomenon is amplified by the proliferation of trade agreements between the EU and developing regions other than the ACP countries, as well as by the successive reforms of the community's GSP. Also, to make the preferential regime granted to the ACP compatible with WTO rules, three solutions were possible: transform non-reciprocal preferences into free trade areas (FTA); grant these preferences to all developing countries or obtain a waiver from WTO rules (Ebale, 2016: 45).

But it was the first solution that was adopted and that led to the establishment of the EPAs.

Brief overview of Cameroonian negotiation support structures

In order to be able to effectively initiate the negotiations of the EPA which was henceforth to govern its commercial relations with its historic partner the EU, Cameroon, as was the case elsewhere, equipped itself with national instruments of negotiation which we designate here by Cameroonian negotiation structures.

These structures can be subdivided into two broad categories. These are structures of an official nature on the one hand, and those of an unofficial nature on the other. For the sake of synthesis, the various structures mentioned above have been inserted into a table which gives a brief overview. This table gives an overview of these different structures.

Table 1: Official and unofficial negotiation structures of the Economic Partnership Agreement between Cameroon and the European Union

Official structures	Unofficial structures
Ministerial structures	The private sector
Inter-ministerial structures	CSOs
The national assembly	Trade unions

Source : NP Medjo II, " Support structures for the negotiation and implementation of the Cameroon-European Union EPA: A historical analysis 2003-2018", Master's thesis in History, University of Yaoundé I, 2019.

The official structures mentioned in the table above were of three main types. They were ministerial, interministerial and parliamentary. From the ministerial point of view, we had the Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development (MINEPAT), the Ministry of Trade (MINCOMERCE) and the Ministry of Finance (MINFI). On the side of interministerial structures, there was: the National Committee for Monitoring and Coordination of EPA negotiations (Kaigama Akoe, 2005: 19). With regard to the parliamentary structures, there was the national assembly which, as a framework for the representation of the people, had in principle the task of controlling government action in the negotiation of this economic agreement.

As for the unofficial negotiation structures, they were essentially made up of civil society actors, who were supposed to represent the voice of the grassroots populations. It is these different structures mentioned above that had the task of conducting the negotiations for this highly controversial agreement.

The deployment of Cameroonian structures in the EPA negotiation process

One of the cardinal principles of the EPAs was negotiation between contracting parties. This required each party to have recourse to bodies or structures which were to ensure the effective safeguarding of the interests of each of them. In Cameroon, as mentioned above, these structures were divided into two main categories, namely official structures on the one hand, and non-official structures on the other. In this articulation, it is a question of presenting the various sometimes contradictory postures of these structures called to defend together the interests of Cameroon. In other words, it is a question of examining their different deployment in the field of negotiations.

The position of official structures in the process

Before proceeding to examine the position that was common to all the official structures, it would be wise for their specific role to be highlighted, if only in a synthetic way. Thus, with regard to MINEPAT, it must be said that it can be considered as the central ministerial rib which politically, strategically and economically oriented the EPA negotiations with the EU and all the different public administrations of Cameroon. He was to provide technical support while having an eye on development issues related to the EPAs². It was the technical ministry in charge of the control, the organization, the

²Ebalé, Economic Partnership Agreements..., p. 254.

coordination and even the orientation of the negotiations at the level of all the Cameroonian institutional authorities. He was the linchpin, the prime contractor of the Cameroon-EU APEB negotiations. He also played the role of trainer, informant and sensitizer of actors on EPAs. The MINCOMMERCE had set out to list the positives (the effects of expanding trade and the effects of creating trade) and the loss effects that could result from the application of the EPA for the Cameroonian economy, in particular for the trade component. These are the effects of trade diversion, the effects of widening the trade balance deficit and the effects of crowding out domestic products (Archives of the Ministry of Commerce,

Similarly, he issued warnings during debate seminars for the protection of the Cameroonian market. The MINFI, for its part, throughout the negotiations has endeavored to issue warnings in the sense that the free entry of European goods will induce a drop in the prices of local products until the end of the dismantling period, leading to an increase in imports to the detriment of domestic production. Thereafter, the end of the continuous fall in the prices of imported products, as well as the gains in competitiveness of local businesses would allow a greater increase in the production of local substitutes. Thus, the MINFI estimated in a study report carried out in 2008 that the impact of the interim EPA on tax revenue could reach 1,330 billion in cumulative loss in 2023 and 2,470 billion in 2030.

Cumulative losses on VAT on domestic products would amount to 21 billion by 2023 and 61 billion by 2030 (Archives of the Ministry of Finance, 2008). This loss of VAT would result from two opposite effects: on the one hand, the increase in production for the domestic market, and on the other hand the fall in the ex-factory price of local goods. The National Committee for Monitoring and Coordination of EPA Negotiations (CNSCN-APE) is the inter-ministerial structure created following a national seminar organized by MINEPAT in August 2003 following sensitization and raising awareness of the challenges, opportunities and dangers of EPAs to civil society actors on EPAs.³ It resulted from this seminar, a strong decision: the creation of a National Committee for Monitoring and Coordination of EPA negotiations. Consequently, it was created by a ministerial decree N° 061/CAB/PM of June 12, 2003 of the MINAEPAT as an advisory body responsible for: "studying, developing, issuing opinions and formulating all suggestions or proposal to the Government on issues relating to the conduct of negotiations relating to the European Union-ACP economic partnership agreements and the mobilization of related financing". Several missions had been entrusted to the CNSCN-APE. The aim was to: instigate and validate studies on the impact of these agreements at the national, sub-regional and regional levels:

- ensure compliance of the formal frameworks of negotiations with the Cameroonian nomenclature in terms of agreements and treaties;
- ensure synergy between international organizations, development strategies and the regional integration process;
- To prepare all the meetings planned at the national, regional and international levels and to engage, at the end of the negotiations, reflections and subsequent studies of adaptation and compatibility of the EPAs with development strategies.

³Interview with Ebalé Raymond, around 54 years old, University teacher, in Yaoundé on July 17, 2018.

It behooves us to note that the technical working groups were created within the CNSCN-APEB/CAM-UE as follows:

- a Technical Working Group on Market Access and Customs Issues (GTAD);
- a Technical Working Group on Trade in Services and Investment (GTSI);
- a Technical Working Group on Accompanying Measures (GTMA) and;
- a Technical Working Group on the Legal Text of the Agreement (GTTJA).

Other Technical Working Groups may be created as needed. The Working Groups are technical bodies of the CSCN-APE/CMR-UE, responsible for preparing any document, issuing technical opinions and formulating any suggestions or proposals to the Committee on issues related to the various areas of the Cameroon-EU Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement. Note that the lower house of Cameroon viz. The National Assembly of the State of Cameroon has authorized the ratification of the interim EPA with the EU in a rather difficult context. In fact, faced with the deadlock in negotiations at regional level between Central Africa (CEMAC, DRC and Sao Tome and Principe) on the one hand and the EU on the other with a view to signing a full EPA, the 1 October 1, 2014 deadline hung over Cameroon like a sword of Damocles. The Cameroonian parliament had controlled the process of deliberation and adoption of the bill authorizing the President of the Republic to ratify the interim EPA. The Minister of Economy, Planning and Regional Development defended this bill and justified it in these terms before the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly on July 9, 2014: "This ratification will allow Cameroon to have preferential access to all its export products on the European market, and to prevent the Cameroonian market from the harmful effects of the deterioration in the competitiveness of our products" (Archives of MINEPAT, 2003).

While civil society decried the impacts of the EPA on the ACP economy and feared its consequences on local production, employment and regional integration, the Cameroonian government, for its part, multiplied its demonization of the agreement for Cameroon. It is possible to note that the official negotiation structures, particularly the ministerial ones, follow the government policy of Cameroon very closely. Here, the question of the competitiveness of businesses and the Cameroonian economy during the negotiations and the signing of the Cameroon-EU APEB was a stumbling block. They approved the negotiation of the agreement on the sole condition that the EU provide adequate responses to compensate for the shortcomings of the Cameroonian economy. The official actors of the Cameroon-EU APEB negotiation have endeavored to ensure that the EPAs contribute effectively to the development of Cameroon, the need to deal with the problems, namely: the fiscal consequences of a free zone -exchange with the EU (Ebalé, 2016: 9) and favorable treatment in terms of rules of origin. The EPAs for these official actors, must be an instrument for the economic growth and sustainable development of Cameroon, they want a multilateral trading system based on fair, transparent and balanced rules. To do so, they call on the Member States of the European Union to urgently materialize their aid for trade commitments. In other words.

Unofficial structures

The unofficial negotiation structures of the Cameroon-European Union APEB were mainly made up of civil society organizations, namely the Association for Awareness of ACP-EU Agreements (ASAC), the Citizens' Association for the Defense of Interests Collectives (ACDIC), the Thursdays of Cotonou. As well as the actors of the private sector like the Inter-Patronal Group of Cameroon (GICAM), the Unions of Industrialists of Cameroon (SYNDUSTRICAM). Even if it is recognized that Cameroonian civil society has been slow to really take the train of participation in the EPA negotiations in Cameroon, it is clear that as the deadline draws near, a strong mobilization on their part has been noticed.

Cameroonian civil society had a position that these agreements are not good for Cameroon because they are too liberal and based on an asymmetrical trade regime; this is what transpires in the position of these few organizations raised. To implement its missions in the Cameroonian collective consciousness, ASAC organized round tables and press briefings from 2009 to 2013, a press briefing on the theme "EPA negotiations between Cameroon and the EU. What assessment and prospects after the signing of the interim agreement of January 15, 2009? ". The aim was to shed light on the position of civil society following the signing of this agreement (Private archives of Professor Raymond Ebalé, 2009). On November 10, 2010, ASAC pursues its mission by drawing the attention of public opinion in general and that of the government and parliament in particular to recent developments in APEB Cameroon-EU cooperation and their impact in the future. It is in this perspective that it is organizing a press briefing on the theme: "Cameroon-EU cooperation: recent developments and prospects since the signing of the interim EPA". The purpose of the press briefing of November 12, 2012 was to denounce the complicit silence of the government on the subject of the EPAs which will affect the entire Cameroonian population, to draw the attention of parliamentarians through whom the ratification will pass, to put in place measures to protect the production and local producers (Ebalé; 261). ACDIC has also distinguished itself through a fruitful advocacy campaign.

It was from this seminar that led to the establishment of the platform of Non-State Actors of Central Africa (Tchakam, 2007) which enabled sub-regional civil society to sit for the first time on the regional committee of negotiation (Ebalé; 262). With the resumption of EPA negotiations for a regional agreement with Central Africa, on August 4, 2016, ACDIC made Cameroon aware that it was not right to rush by opening up 80% of its market to European products. from that date. The "Thursdays of Cotonou", a framework for expression offered by the Cameroonian NSAs in September 2004 and coordinated by Mrs. Christine Andela, a well-known activist in Cameroonian civil society, (.../company). The actors of the private sector, in particular GICAM and SYNDUSTRICAM, references for the representation of companies and industries in Cameroon, did not fail to express their concerns about the changes that will occur at the economic, fiscal and social levels with the opening of markets to the EU, such as competition from subsidized agricultural products from the EU, the low export capacity of companies in the sub-region, the non-competitiveness of products from the sub-region due to the prohibitive cost of factors of production (infrastructure, etc.), export difficulties in the face of EU sanitary and phytosanitary standards, The environment not conducive

to business development, etc. Although GICAM claimed not to be totally opposed to the signing of the EPAs, however, the employers' group intended to "fight so that Cameroon does not sign bad agreements" APE-interiminaire-dans-la-coopération-multilatérale 15.html, consulted on July 13, 2021 at 8:38 p.m.), the risk being high of seeing the national economy plunge towards the precipice, as it is true that local companies have not lack the necessary expertise and even less the appropriate means to be able to compete with companies from developed countries. For GICAM, there was no shadow of a doubt that the EPAs constituted a threat to the Cameroonian economy, and it would be playing with fire to want to apply the EPAs to the State without obtaining some substantial adjustments.» (<http://www.gicamtv.org/diner-debat/accords-de-partenariat-économique-acp-ue-1205>, consulted July 9, 2021 at 11h 03min/).

Critical assessment of the action of the negotiation structures within the framework of the Cameroon-EU APEB

After several rounds of negotiations, Cameroon ended up signing and then ratifying the EPAs which entered into force on August 4, 2016. However, the content of the said agreement seems in view of the facts and even from the theoretical point of view unfavorable for Cameroon. which de facto questions the effectiveness of the Cameroonian structures responsible for safeguarding the interests of Cameroon during these negotiations. This last articulation, which closes this reflection, intends to return to the reasons for the failure of these structures.

Achievements

The combination of our readings and field investigations led us to understand that the EU used enormous means of direct and indirect pressure in the EPA negotiation process with Cameroon. Political dependence and dependence on access to the European market were decisive factors used by the EU to push Cameroon to sign a bilateral agreement while the primary vocation of the EPA was regional (Chongwang , 2003: 5). Cameroon's decision to ratify the interim EPA seems to have been largely motivated by President Paul Biya's desire to manage Cameroon's economic and commercial interests. An impetus was given from the Presidency as a factor of ratification. It is in application of this presidential instruction that the report "plan for the adaptation of the Cameroonian economy in view of the entry into force of the EPA" (Archives MINEPAT, 2013) was produced and published by MINEPAT in October 2013. The most appropriate strategy, with regard to Cameroon specifically, to allay the apprehensions and concerns generated by the EPA, would consist in accelerating the effective operationalization of the accompanying measures relating thereto. Thus, were created with the aim of recommending the appropriate support measures to mitigate the shocks induced by the implementation of the EPAs in Cameroon. The idea of anticipating the shocks of the future, relating to the signing of the EPAs, the Cameroonian public authorities have recommended some strategies in order to introduce some agility and flexibility given the vulnerability of the Cameroonian economy. Thus, several scenarios have been considered to make the EPAs more flexible and improve the chances of their implementation without this leading to harmful dysfunctions in Cameroon.

On August 13, 2013, a government meeting extended to the private sector was held, the purpose of which was to "reflect on the strategy to be adopted by the

Cameroonian economy to adapt to the EPAs that the country is preparing to ratify” (Chongwang, 2003: 6). The outcomes of this meeting were in particular the creation, on November 28, 2013, of a Committee responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Cameroon-EU Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement (CSMO-APEB), by decision No. 1023 /MINEPAT/CAB of November 28, 2013 (MINEPAT Archives, 2013), the first session of which was held on February 28, 2014 in Yaoundé, with as the fourth item on the agenda the ratification plan for the Bilateral EPA. To this end, the CSMO-APEB has an administrative managerial procedure and missions entrusted to it. It is also with a view to making profitable and maximizing the competitiveness of Cameroon's interests that the accompanying and support programs for the implementation of the EPA such as PASAPE, the Support Program for the Competitiveness of companies (PACOM), the Business Upgrade Office (BMN) support instruments such as the Agro-Food Technical Center (CTA) and joint structures for the implementation of the Cameroon-EU APEB such as the APE Committee were set up by the State of Cameroon. However, these support structures remain under the financial influence of the EU, hence their dependence. The Business Upgrading Office (BMN) support instruments such as the Agro-Food Technical Center (CTA) and joint structures for the implementation of the Cameroon-EU APEB such as the APE Committee have been set up by the State of Cameroon. However, these support structures remain under the financial influence of the EU, hence their dependence. The Business Upgrading Office (BMN) support instruments such as the Agro-Food Technical Center (CTA) and joint structures for the implementation of the Cameroon-EU APEB such as the APE Committee have been set up by the State of Cameroon. However, these support structures remain under the financial influence of the EU, hence their dependence.

Limits

The economic power of the EU is reflected by its dominant weight in international institutions, 4 of its Member States participate in the G7, note its decisive role in trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and it has 30 % of voting rights in the management bodies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Chamet, 2008: 36-44). This work allows us to see that the balance of power in the negotiation of the EPAs between Cameroon and the EU is quite unbalanced and weighs in favor of the EU. Note that reducing a negotiation to theoretical rules is impossible and vain as it is an art made of observation, deduction, synthesis, in which personal experience and intuition are as important as law and customs.

Careful observation of the official actors who are part of the cast of EPA negotiators with the EU simply shows that they are not sufficiently equipped and sufficiently prepared in the diplomacy of international economic negotiation or on technical questions relating to EPAs. . The staff of the technical groups in charge of the negotiations here are mostly weak, not seasoned in the face of the offensive and cunning negotiation diplomacy of the EU. Similarly, the EU has used negotiation tactics such as pressure from all sides, ultimatums, intimidation and even blackmail. It should be noted that, in a real negotiation, the parties deploy all sorts of tricks (psychological pressure, intimidation, deliberate lying, ultimatums, etc.) in order to

obtain an advantage over the other parties, they are often misleading and manipulative (Kotcho, 2017: 319). It would therefore be appropriate for us to say here that the EU used these strategies in the negotiation of the EPA with Cameroon to influence the course and the outcome of the negotiation process. The relations of financial dependence of the official Cameroonian negotiating structures of the EPA vis-à-vis the EU, the omnipresence of the EU in all the official Cameroonian negotiating structures also constitute a sprain or better a bottleneck strangulation for a promising negotiation. Let us also note the quarrels of leadership and conflicts of interest in certain EPA negotiation structures in Cameroon. We can mention the case of the National Committee for Monitoring and Coordinating EPA Negotiations (CNSCN-APE), which has experienced many disruptions due to conflicts of interest. Similarly, it is permissible for us to underline here the weak collusion between the official Cameroonian negotiation structures and the unofficial ones.

Conclusion

This study has come to an end. It was a question of examining the synoptic title of this article which is: "Historical analysis of Cameroonian support structures for the negotiation of the Cameroon - EU EPA (2003-2018)". In a more in-depth way, it was a question of questioning a very sensitive question and of burning topicality which is located at the intersection of international economic negotiations; the face to face of African and Cameroonian economic diplomacy with European diplomacy; public economic and trade policies of Cameroon but also to issues of neocolonialism and renegotiation of the balance of power between the countries of the South and the countries of the North on EPA issues. For this reason, we have focused on some generalities on the question of EPAs in Africa and in Cameroon, our reflection was motivated by a historicization of the EPA agreements between the EU and the ACP countries in general and in particular Cameroon, a country in which our survey was based on the support structures for the negotiation of the said agreements. From the above, it follows that the EPA agreements are not an ex-abrupto phenomenon.

They are the result of a long series of agreements punctuated by a co-construction of an offensive economic diplomacy of the EU with a diplomacy of the ACP countries, sometimes lax, passive with regard to their interests. Initiated at the very beginning of the 2000s with the Cotonou Agreements with the intention of promoting the development of ACP countries and anchoring their economies in the market of globalization. However, instead of being a panacea for African economies in negotiation with the EU, these agreements have rather appeared as a real threat. It was necessary for us in this work to identify the policies of actions, the strategies of the Cameroonian structures of support for the negotiation of the EPA with the aim of obtaining an added value in the negotiation with the EU, the purpose being the maximization of the interests of Cameroon within the framework of the said agreement.

It appears that Cameroon took the commendable initiative to set up the support structures for the negotiation of the EPA. They have tried to ensure their sovereign missions, but their results remain mixed on the whole due to the strategic deficiency of the Cameroonian negotiators, the general lack of preparation of Cameroon, the excessive administrative centralization of the file, the low degree of

complicity between public authorities and civil society, the financial dependence of negotiating bodies on the EU as well as the use of negotiating tactics by the EU. The official structures follow very closely the directives of the government policy of Cameroon. Civil society and private sector actors play an important role in negotiating management in order to find new ideas for the negotiation of EPAs with the EU in Cameroon. This category of actors, particularly caught our attention, appeared to us more offensive in the maximization of the interests of Cameroon in the negotiation of the EPA agreements with the EU but also more incisive against the passivity of the Cameroonian government policy in the negotiation EPAs. They play a role of sensitization and raising awareness among public opinion with a view to mobilizing them on the issues and challenges of EPAs in Cameroon. Civil society vehemently criticized the threats of the advent of the EPAs on the competitiveness of the Cameroonian economy and industry.

This reflection allows us to observe that in a context of transformation of the economies and institutions of the Third World and the emergence of new development problems where several countries are under strong pressure from the most powerful Western countries to adjust their macro- according to their interests, countries like Cameroon must understand that the political technology of international negotiation in the 21st century is experiencing new mutations and new orientations. Thus, it is no longer the sole prerogative of politicians and state administrators. Cameroon-EU cooperation can in no way be a "win-win" cooperation, but rather a "Winner-Loser" cooperation because it does not aim to build a mutually beneficial balance but rather a balance in which one actor wins at the expense of the other. Is it justifiable to use tactics in a collaborative negotiation where the objective is to arrive at a "win-win" consensus?

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Născut la 2 aprilie 1943 la Iași, din părinți intelectuali (la Chișinău, tatăl, Nicolae, director al Școlii Normale, a predat limba română, iar mama, Maria, originară din Basarabia, istoria), absolvent al ilustrului liceu „Nicolae Bălcescu” din Brăila, precum și al Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași (1960-1965), tânărul Nicolae Ursulescu a ales, grație mediei, Institutul Pedagogic de 3 ani din Suceava, care tocmai beneficia de înființarea în anul școlar 1964/1965 a secției Istorie-Geografie. Ca urmare a dispariției secției menționate, începând cu 1984 Nicolae Ursulescu își va desfășura activitatea la Institutul Politehnic din Iași, până în toamna anului 1989, când obține postul de lector universitar la Facultatea de Istorie-Filozofie a universității ieșene. În istoriografia noastră și nu numai, profesorul Ursulescu este considerat un deschizător de drumuri în anumite segmente ale cercetării arheologice, având o privire umanistă, largă, fiind binecuvântat cu un orizont nelimitat asupra științei și înțelegerii vieții în sine. Domnia sa a fost și este receptat ca o voce puternică în mediul academic și universitar, de numele Domniei sale fiind legate nu doar începuturile cercetărilor arheologice la universitatea suceveană, ci și o serie de realizări marcante în domeniu, ceea ce i-a adus o binemerită recunoaștere națională și internațională¹.

La 31 martie 2023 ora 12, la Iași, la Universitatea „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, în Sala H1 (arhiplină), corpul H – *Casa Catargi* – unde funcționează și Centrul Interdisciplinar de Studii Arheoistorice (inițiat de N. Ursulescu), a avut loc un eveniment aparte pentru comunitatea noastră a arheologilor. Este vorba despre omagierea celor 80 de ani de viață ai prof. univ. dr. Nicolae Ursulescu, distins dascăl al universității ieșene. Evenimentul a beneficiat de participarea unui număr impresionant de foști și actuali colaboratori, de prieteni ai Domniei sale, moderator fiind dl prof. univ. dr. Mihai Cojocariu, fost prodecan vreme de 16 ani al Facultății de Istorie, care a avut prilejul să colaboreze vreme îndelungată (administrativ vorbind) cu dl Ursulescu, pe care l-a caracterizat ca fiind un luptător, în timp ce prof. univ. dr. Gheorghe Cliveti,

¹ Vezi și: Mihai Iacobescu, *Universitatea „Ștefan cel Mare” Suceava. File de istorie (1963-2003)*, Ed. Universității Suceava, Suceava, 2003, *passim*; Emil Satco, *Enciclopedia Bucovinei*, vol. II, Editura „Princeps Edit”, Iași, 2004, p. 553; Emil Satco, Alis Niculică, *Enciclopedia Bucovinei. Personalități, localități, societăți, presă, instituții*. Colaboratori principali: Erich Beck, Adriana Chindriș, Elena Pintilei, Bogdan Petru Niculică, vol. III, Editura „Karl A. Romstorfer”, Suceava, 2018, p. 731-734; Victor Spinei, *Nicolae Ursulescu*, voce în: Victor Spinei, Dorina N. Rusu (eds.), *Enciclopedia reprezentanților scrisului istoric românesc*, vol. V (S-Z), Editura „Karl A. Romstorfer”, Suceava, 2021, p. 398-400.

membru corespondent al Academiei Române și director la Institutul de Istorie „A. D. Xenopol” din Iași, prezent în sală, l-a apreciat ca sufletist. Profesorul Cojocariu a rememorat perioadele dificile din trecutul facultății, lipsurile financiare, subliniind energia și vitalitatea profesorului Ursulescu, dedicat total meseriei și instituției.

A urmat cuvântul domnului academician Victor Spinei, vechi prieten și colaborator de o viață al profesorului Nicolae Ursulescu, care a accentuat bucuria momentului, exprimându-și speranța în imprimarea acestuia în memoria celor prezenți și nu numai, arătând că este sărbătorit unul dintre „dascăli de prestigiu ai Universității ieșene, cu reverberații naționale și internaționale”, semnalând că în volumul de studii colective, editat cu prilejul omagierii celor 80 de ani de viață, semnează oameni de știință care l-au stimat și stimează. Discursul academicianului V. Spinei s-a axat pe reliefarea diacronică a vieții și carierei profesorului Ursulescu, punctând cu precizie momente-cheie ale devenirii sale. Astfel, au fost amintite perioada de început, apoi cea universitară și timpurile recente, cu detalii care uneori au făcut deliciul publicului prezent. S-a arătat că Nicolae Ursulescu a contribuit decisiv la înviorarea și dinamizarea arheologiei ieșene, Domnia sa reprezentând unul dintre factorii de continuitate al marilor dascăli din trecut, precum Mircea Petrescu-Dîmbovița, Marin Dinu, Nicolae Gostar, Vasile Neamțu, Gheorghe Platon, specialiști de vârf, care l-au impresionat și l-au amprentat definitiv. S-a amintit de practica arheologică din anii studenției (atunci a început colaborarea dintre V. Spinei și N. Ursulescu, pe șantierele de la Cucuteni și Cătămărești), când sub coordonarea profesorilor Mircea Petrescu-Dîmbovița și Marin Dinu au fost acumulate o serie de tehnici, metode de cercetare, cunoștințe și s-au creat relații de prietenie și științifice pentru o viață. Au fost trecute în revistă și momentele mutării de la Suceava la Iași, cultura generală solidă, dar și felul de a fi, vivace, al profesorului Ursulescu. Academicianul V. Spinei a conturat elegant, citând din Oscar Wilde: „numai spiritele foarte înguste își găsesc un adăpost printr-o seriozitate excesivă”; cei care au luat contact cu N. Ursulescu îi recunosc foarte bine eleganța prezenței sociale, umorul și versatilitatea. Tenace, ambițios și înzestrat cu har, N. Ursulescu a susținut cursuri variate, a editat cărți, a întreprins săpături de rezonanță, precum cele de la Suceava, Preutești, Mihoveni, Prăjeni, Târgu Frumos, Isăia ș.a.m.d. (prezente azi pe harta arheologică a Europei preistorice), a organizat expoziții naționale și internaționale, elaborând ghiduri, cataloage și repertorii, veritabile instrumente de lucru pentru specialiști, indispensabile studiului științific.

Au fost subliniate, de asemenea, de către academicianul V. Spinei, raporturile cordiale cu mari personalități ale arheologiei europene, precum Svend Hansen, Bernhard Hänsel, Hermann Parzinger și alții, unii dintre aceștia „beneficiind” de recenzii deloc blânde, atunci când nu au fost conforme cu adevărul istoric specific regiunilor noastre, perfect stăpânit de N. Ursulescu; pe de altă parte, arheologi de renume din Europa l-au citat și recomandat în bibliografiile lor, dovadă a aprecierii ținitei științifice, a exigenței profesionale. Bun cunoscător al operei dlui Ursulescu, V. Spinei a arătat limpede că știința, istoria, nu se poate face pe metru pătrat, a unui județ, profesorul Ursulescu având, așa cum se desprinde din lista lucrărilor sale

științifice, o privire largă, diacronică și sincronă. În același timp a fost accentuată colaborarea cu Universitatea din Bari, N. Ursulescu fiind cel care a inițiat legăturile, de care au beneficiat deopotrivă cadre didactice și studenți. Nu doar profesional, ci și uman, Nicolae Ursulescu a sprijinit colegii din Basarabia în anii dificili de după 1990, a creat stagii de documentare, a sprijinit colaborarea/reciprocitatea participării la șantierul arheologic din România și Republica Moldova, în mod deosebit fiind apreciată relația profesională excelentă cu un mare prieten al arheologiei noastre, prof. univ. dr. Ion Niculiță. A fost felicitată inițiativa dlui Ursulescu de a transforma ceea ce începuse ca un volum dedicat regretatului profesor Nicolae Gostar în cartea de vizită, mai apoi, a arheologilor și specialiștilor în istorie veche și antică de la Facultatea de Istorie, periodicul *Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica*, încurajarea colaborărilor naționale și internaționale cu varii universități. S-a amintit și aplecarea lui N. Ursulescu către istoriografie, prin publicarea unor materiale originale, interpretative, în legătură cu mai vechi contribuții, semnate de iluștrii noștri cărturari Nicolae Iorga, Dimitre Onciul, Gheorghe Brătianu. Profesorul a scris elegant despre amintirea mentorilor și profesorilor ieșeni: Mircea Petrescu-Dîmbovița, Nicolae Gostar, Marin Dinu, Attila László. Nu au lipsit nici referirile la sprijinirea doctoranzilor și tinerilor arheologi în devenire, pentru mulți dintre aceștia fiind identificate, deloc facil, posturi în care să își valorifice competențele dobândite în timpul anilor de studiu. Între marile realizări se numără și cooptarea dlui N. Ursulescu în colectivul care a redactat tratatul de *Istoria Românilor* (edițiile 2001 și 2010) și *Enciclopedia reprezentanților scrisului istoric românesc*, lucrare monumentală a Academiei Române, în cinci volume, finanțată și editată de Muzeul Național al Bucovinei din Suceava, în 2021. Elogierea vieții, activității de teren și didactice a profesorului Ursulescu s-a încheiat cu un citat la care academicianul V. Spinei ține mult, extras din Voltaire: „darul cel mai frumos pe care Cel de Sus l-a făcut omenirii constă în a oferi dragostea pentru muncă”, însușire care l-a caracterizat permanent pe Nicolae Ursulescu.

A urmat alocuțiunea doamnei dr. Senica Țurcanu (Complexul Muzeal Național „Moldova” Iași), fostă studentă și colaboratoare a dlui profesor Ursulescu, care a accentuat latura umană, dedicația și deschiderea pentru tinerii de la Istorie Veche, rememorând câteva dintre momentele care le-au marcat colaborarea. Între acestea a subliniat situația dificilă din toamna anului 1989 în care profesorul Ursulescu a venit la Catedră, cu doar câteva luni înaintea prăbușirii comunismului și la doi ani de la revolta studenților ieșeni (care ceruseră „lumină să-nvățăm și apă să ne spălăm”); doamna Senica Țurcanu a accentuat sprijinul total, deschiderea bibliotecii personale, cu traduceri din texte aproape inaccesibile la acea vreme, scrise uneori pe hârtii subțiri, transparente, de proastă calitate, precum și maniera incredibilă în care N. Ursulescu reușea să capteze dragostea și aprecierea studenților; ca prim doctorand al Domniei sale, S. Țurcanu a arătat și beneficiile colaborării științifice peste ani, în cadrul unor proiecte de anvergură, expoziții, cataloage, remarcând spiritul incisiv critic, atenția pentru detalii, ceea ce i-a permis să cunoască mult mai clar atât omul cât și specialistul N. Ursulescu, despre care a spus că a beneficiat, pe deplin, de-a lungul vieții, de „îndrăzneala gândului”, ceea ce i-a permis, am adăuga noi, să fie un antemergător în

câteva domenii de substanță, reliefate minuțios de doamna Țurcanu: exploatarea preistorică a sării din saramură, N. Ursulescu fiind fondatorul arheologiei sării din România; a fost primul care a scris despre idoli androgini de la noi, despre semnificația numerelor și viața religioasă, pe baza descoperirii celebre de la Isăia; a fondat CISA (Centrul Interdisciplinar de Studii Arheoistorice”. Totodată, S. Țurcanu a vorbit despre însemnătatea unui dascăl, care excedă ceea ce scrie din punct de vedere științific un universitar, arătând că profesorul Ursulescu a pregătit, format, sprijinit, călăuzit, generații de studenți, care astăzi sunt parte vie a organismului elitei intelectuale românești, aici și peste hotare, dovadă a actului didactic, științific, a metodei, a spiritului liber și umanității de care a dat dovadă dl Ursulescu, ceea ce, în opinia semnatarului acestor rânduri, i-a conferit *unicitate* în cercurile noastre științifice și l-a făcut extrem de popular. La final, dr. Țurcanu a oferit profesorului, din partea Complexului Muzeal Național „Moldova” Iași, o plachetă „*ca recunoaștere a contribuțiilor deosebite în cercetarea Preistoriei, a eforturilor depuse pentru formarea a numeroase generații de arheologi și în semn de apreciere și mulțumire pentru susținerea necondiționată a proiectelor muzeale realizate de Muzeul de istorie a Moldovei*”.

Domnul dr. Aurel Melniciuc, manager al Muzeului Județean Botoșani a oferit, de asemenea, din partea instituției, o Diplomă de Excelență, pentru „*întreaga activitate și buna colaborare științifică cu Muzeul Județean Botoșani*”; în puține cuvinte, dar bine alese, a fost conturată contribuția definitorie a profesorului Ursulescu la cunoașterea preistoriei județului Botoșani, colaborarea cu instituția muzeală începând din 1962 – așadar în urmă cu „doar” 60 de ani – de-a lungul deceniilor legându-se prietenii și fructuoase relații științifice cu arheologi de renume de la Botoșani, precum regretatul Paul Șadurschi și doamna dr. Maria Diaconescu, reputat preistorician.

Domnul prof. univ. dr. Gheorghe Iacob de la Universitatea „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Iași a luat cuvântul și, în stilul său specific, consacrat, pe care noi arheologic l-am denumi cu ușurință „*marker cultural*”, a prezentat un număr de trei secvențe de raportare la domnul profesor Ursulescu. 1. Cei doi au colaborat vreme de peste 40 de ani, la Institutul Politehnic din Iași, la Suceava, la Universitatea ieșeană, dar și în domeniul elaborării unor lucrări de anvergură: tratatul de *Istoria Românilor și Enciclopedia reprezentanților scrisului istoric românesc*. 2. Profesorul Ursulescu este un „om temeinic, pasionat, harnic, bătaios pentru arheologie, venea cu plăcere la ore”. 3. Ca om: „un om deschis, cu umor, tonic, echilibrat”, „care știe să zâmbească și să râdă, când îl întâlnești îți face plăcere, îți oferă încredere și speranță”.

Un alt cuvânt a rostit și domnul conf. univ. dr. habilitat Dumitru Boghian (Universitatea „Ștefan cel Mare” Suceava), la rândul său prieten și colaborator al domnului Ursulescu, care a notificat apăsător că trebuie recunoscută și „preistoria sa existențială suceveană”, multe dintre calitățile umane și profesionale etalate de antevorbitori fiind formate și rodind în perioada universitară suceveană, împlinindu-se ulterior în cea ieșeană. Socotindu-l „ctitor de oameni, de instituții, de publicații, de lucrări științifice”, dl D. Boghian a mai punctat necesitatea ca „trinitatea de la Târgu Frumos” (Nicolae Ursulescu, Dumitru Boghian, Vasile Cotiugă) să finalizeze monografia sitului preistoric, care, treptat, treptat, pare a intra într-o uitare nemeritată.

Dl prof. univ. dr. Alexander Rubel, directorul Institutului de Arheologie Iași, de asemenea foarte apropiat de profesorul Ursulescu, a exprimat cu eleganță recunoștința instituției pe care o reprezintă, subliniind că numeroși foști doctoranzi ai Domniei sale au fost angajați la Institut, în cadrul departamentului Preistorie, reprezentând cadre de nădejde. Ultima alocuțiune i-a aparținut dlui dr. Adrian Poruciuc (Institutul de Arheologie Iași), care a observat, parcurgând unele dintre lucrările dlui N. Ursulescu, capacitatea acestuia de a se desprinde de vechi, de a se adapta la nou, de oferi ipoteze, fiind recunoscut în comunitatea științifică de la noi ca un specialist cu viziune.

După acest segment al manifestării omagiale, „cerneala veacurilor” a fost așternută a doua oară pentru profesorul Nicolae Ursulescu: dl conf. univ. dr. Vasile Cotiugă, continuatorul la catedră al Domniei sale, un alt mare prieten al arheologilor suceveni, a sumarizat cel de-al doilea volum omagial dedicat profesorului, cu prilejul împlinirii, la 2 aprilie, a nobilei vârste de 80 de ani. Primul volum, publicat în anul 2008, când au fost marcați cei 65 de ani de viață², a beneficiat, la rândul său, de o binemeritată recunoaștere științifică europeană, fiind astăzi prezent în cele mai importante biblioteci din Londra, Berlin, Viena, Paris, Roma, Sofia, Chișinău, Cracovia, Varșovia ș.a.

Revenind la actuala apariție editorială, arătăm că aceasta a fost realizată – în condițiile excelente cu care ne-a acomodat de mulți ani – de către prestigioasa editură Cetatea de Scaun din Târgoviște, manageriată de un împătimit de istorie și arheologie, Dan Mărgărit (soția sa, cunoscuta prof. dr. Monica Mărgărit, specialist în preistorie, cadru didactic al Universității „Valahia” din Târgoviște, semnează un studiu în acest volum). Prezentul volum omagial, intitulat sugestiv *FONTES PERENNITATIS. Studia in honorem magistri Nicolae Ursulescu octogesimum annum peragentis*, a fost elaborat în cadrul Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași, a Facultății de Istorie, Centrul Interdisciplinar de Studii Arheoistorice, fiind editat de către trei dintre discipolii Profesorului: dr. Vasile Cotiugă, dr. Felix-Adrian Tencariu și dr. Andrei Asăndulesci. Cartea este științific solidă, cuprinzând nu mai puțin de 678 pag. în format A4, incluzând 31 de contribuții științifice valoroase, semnate de 67 de autori – așa cum este rânduit în mediul academic – cu o paletă crono-istorică largă, în deplin acord cu temele abordate de-a lungul carierei științifice de profesorul Nicolae Ursulescu.

Volumul este deschis de *Tabula Gratulatoria* (pag. 11-13), în care se regăsesc nu mai puțin de 203 de specialiști în istorie și arheologie, din țară și străinătate, care au întreținut legături profesionale și umane semnificative cu N. Ursulescu. Urmează un medalion semnat de conf. univ. dr. Vasile Cotiugă, *Magistrul la ceas aniversar* (pag. 15-18), o relatare sintetică care augmentează locul, rolul, importanța și destinul profesional-uman al dlui Ursulescu. Sunt trecute în revistă principalele momente-cheie în evoluția academică și nu numai, pline de neprevăzut, realizări și uneori

² *Itinera in praeistoria. Studia in honorem magistri Nicolae Ursulescu quinto et sexagesimo anno*. Ediderunt Vasile Cotiugă, Felix Adrian Tencariu et George Bodi, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași, 2009, 355 pag.

neconvenționale opinii, ceea ce necesită, credem noi, începerea redactării memoriilor Domniei sale. Aflăm despre mentori, colaboratori, șantiere, tarele sistemului antedecembrist, despre importanța devenirii profesionale a celor aproape 20 de ani petrecuți la Suceava, desăvârșirea sub auspiciile universității ieșene, direcțiile de cercetare, tematicile abordate și contribuțiile de referință în domeniul arheologiei.

Paginile 19-47 sunt rezervate segmentului intitulat *Nicolae Ursulescu – lista publicațiilor (studii, articole, rezumatele comunicărilor, rapoarte arheologice, cronici științifice, recenzii)*, structurat cronologic/pe ani, acesta reprezentând un instrument de lucru bibliografic de referință pentru domeniul nostru, din care pot fi extrase cu ușurință informațiile necesare. Cantitativ, vorbim despre nu mai puțin de 22 de volume, 248 de articole, 245 de comunicări, care atestă o paletă largă de preocupări, de la arheologie la muzeografie, de la preistorie la istoria antică și medievală, ceea ce definește pe deplin trăsătura de universitar de excepție, polivalent.

În ceea ce privește conținutul în studii al prezentului volum omagial, desfășurat între pag. 49 și 678, cele 31 de contribuții sunt semnate de nume importante ale arheologiei naționale europene și acoperă subiecte variate, începând cu paleoliticul mijlociu din aria carpatică, continuând cu neoliticul, eneoliticul (care, desigur, în acord cu domeniul predilect la profesorului Ursulescu prevalează), epoca bronzului, epoca fierului, apoi cercetări arheologice de teren, istoriografie, toponimie, etnoarheologia sării. Trecem în revistă numele care semnează aici: Svend Hansen (Institutul German de Arheologie – directorul Secției Eurasia; Freie Universität, Berlin), Andreea Țerna, Robert Hofmann și Johannes Müller (Universitatea din Kiel, Germania), Clive Bonsall (Universitatea din Edinburgh, UK), Selena Vitezović și Dragana Antonović (Institutul de Arheologie, Belgrad, Serbia), Vitalii Rud (Institutul de Arheologie, Kiev, Ucraina), Victor Kosakivskyi (Universitatea Pedagogică de Stat, Vinnytsia, Ucraina), Olha Zaitseva (Universitatea „Borys Grinchenko”, Kiev, Ucraina), Marin Cârciumar, Marian Cosac și Monica Mărgărit (Universitatea „Valahia”, Târgoviște), Sabin Adrian Luca, Gheorghe Lazarovici și Marius-Mihai Ciută (Universitatea „Lucian Blaga”, Sibiu), Adina Boroneanț și Adrian Bălășescu (Institutul de Arheologie „Vasile Pârvan”, București), Sanda Băcuț Crișan (Muzeul de Istorie și Artă, Zalău), Cristian Virag (Muzeul Județean Satu Mare), Gabriel Tiberiu Rustoiu și Cristinel Fântâneau (Muzeul Național al Unirii, Alba Iulia), Florentin Perianu (Muzeul Național Brukenthal, Sibiu), Oana Gâză, Mirela Mihon și Doru Păceșilă (Institutul Național de Cercetare-Dezvoltare pentru Fizică și Inginerie Nucleară „Horia Hulubei”, București), Silviu Gridan (Asociația „ArheoVest”, Timișoara), Ionela Luiza Melinte, Constantin Aparaschivei, Bogdan Petru Niculică și Ion Mareș (Muzeul Național al Bucovinei, Suceava), Sergiu Popovici (Agenția Națională Arheologică, Chișinău, Republica Moldova), Vasilica Mîrza (Muzeul Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași), Attila László, Marius Alexianu, Neculai Bolohan, Vasile Cotiugă, Andrei Asăndulesci, Felix-Adrian Tencariu, Luminița Bejenaru, Radu-Alexandru Brunchi, Casandra Brașoveanu, Eliza-Ioana Crețu, Ana Drob, Florica Mățău, Mihaela Asăndulesci (Universitatea „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași), Senica Țurcanu și Loredana Solcan (Complexul Muzeal Național „Moldova”, Iași), Lăcrămioara-Elena Istina (Complexul Muzeal „Iulian Antonescu”, Bacău), Cornelia-Magda Lazarovici,

Diana-Măriuca Vornicu și George Bodi (Institutul de Arheologie, Iași), Adrian Poruciuc și Radu-Gabriel Furnică, cercetători independenți (Iași), Dumitru Boghian și Sorin Ignătescu (Universitatea „Ștefan cel Mare”, Suceava), Sergiu-Constantin Enea (Liceul Teoretic „Ion Neculce”, Târgu Frumos), Ciprian-Cătălin Lazanu (Muzeul Județean „Ștefan cel Mare”, Vaslui), Roxana Munteanu și Daniel Garvăn (Muzeul Județean Buzău), Mădălina Stănescu (Muzeul Vrancei, Focșani), Carol Kacsó (Muzeul Județean de Istorie și Arheologie Baia Mare), Vasile Diaconu (Complexul Muzeal Național Neamț – Muzeul de Istorie și Etnografie Târgu Neamț), Beatrice Kelemen și Ioana Rusu (Universitatea Babeș-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca), Daniel Ciucălău (cercetător independent, Botoșani), Dimitrie-Ovidiu Boldur (Direcția Județeană pentru Cultură, Bacău), și, semnatat postum, regretatul cercetător Stanislav Țerna. În ceea ce privește conținutul științific, volumul conține materiale de excepție, care marchează adevărate turnuri în anumite problematici/abordări de interes (artefacte paleolitice, industria materiilor dure animale, cronologie, stratigrafie, datări radiocarbon, ceramologie, abordări tehnologice, plastică antropo- și zoomorfă, ornamentarea corpului, complexe rituale, istoriografie ș.a.); deși este prin excelență un produs dedicat cercetătorilor din domeniu, volumul de față poate fi totuși accesat și de studenții profilului arheologie, care pot urmări modele de analiză metodică interdisciplinară.

Cuvântul dlui prof. univ. dr. Nicolae Ursulescu a fost nu doar emoționant, ci, prin conținut, structură și elocvență, a constituit un mesaj de viață, o privire puternică, sintetică, pragmatică, realistă, asupra destinului său uman și mai ales profesional, care a fost completat fericit de o familie împlinită, căreia i-a adus mulțumirile, la fel ca proniei cerești. Tocmai de aceea, Domnia sa a și subliniat faptul că existența sa profesională a fost condiționată de anumite evenimente, tare politice și specificități ale vechiului sistem antedecembrist, dar, din păcate, cu translări în ceea ce noi am îndrăzni să denumim „economia intelectuală” de după 1990, cu moment de referință 2010 (sau, în spusele elegante ale profesorului Ursulescu, viața sa a stat „sub spectrul unor întâmplări, sau mai bine zis imixtiuni de ordin politico-legislativ, care s-au tot schimbat”, „o viață desfășurată între întâmplări și opțiuni”). Între primele amintiri: foamea, bonurile, nelipsita lampă cu gaz, căratul apei, lipsa telefoanelor mobile și a televizorului, dar și prezența radioului/difuzorului, ca factor pozitiv în educație, prin piesele de teatru, opere, comentariile pe diverse teme, care l-au ajutat să dobândească o cultură în acea epocă. „Microbul” istoriei și aplecarea spre științele umaniste i-a fost insuflat de mama sa, care l-a întreținut cu povești, legende, mituri, în timp ce stilistica frazei, gramatica, au fost în preocuparea tatălui. De asemenea, au fost amintiți și dascălii care l-au marcat profund, oameni cu pregătire solidă, care au știut cum să ocolească elegant constrângerile vremii: învățătorul, timp de doar trei ani, Postelnicu (trimis la Canal), profesorul de istorie Gh. Robescu și cel de latină, A. Miculescu. Referindu-se la perioada dinaintea studenției, câteva gânduri au fost reliefate și ca o privire comparativă în legătură cu așa-zisa reformă a învățământului din zilele noastre, fiind accentuat faptul că profesorii pe care i-a avut până în 1960 erau aproape în totalitate formați în perioada interbelică, ceea ce a reprezentat un mare avantaj. Profesorul Ursulescu a vorbit și despre exigența profesorilor de atunci, dar și despre

necesitatea ca aceasta să fie manifestată și față de propria persoană, pentru a asigura o calitate și o evoluție pozitivă.

În ceea ce privește perioada studenției (1960-1965), Domnia sa a subliniat de la început personalitatea prof. univ. dr. Mircea Petrescu-Dîmbovița, care l-a „cucerit prin multitudinea de cunoștințe, prin pasiunea cu care căuta să le transmită studenților” și importanța participării, sub conducerea acestuia, la săpăturile de la Cucuteni – *Cetățuie și Dâmbul Morii*. Nu a fost uitat nici universitarul Marin Dinu, al cărui rol în pregătirea profesională a dlui N. Ursulescu a fost deosebit de important. Activitatea desfășurată la Suceava a fost prolifică, marcată de unicitatea oamenilor și a acestui spațiu geografic (să ne amintim aici de *Spiritus loci*, discursul de referință susținut de N. Ursulescu la 7 decembrie 2009 când a devenit *Doctor Honoris Causa* al Universității „Ștefan cel Mare” din Suceava)³, profesorul marcând momentele mai importante: varii activități de catedră, examene de admitere și licență, coordonarea primelor lucrări de licență, admiterea la doctorat, susținerea tezei (firește, cu avizul Comitetului Județean de Partid – evenimente relatate într-o notă ușor umoristic-ironică), în fața unei comisii din care făceau parte profesorii Dumitru Berciu și Hadrian Daicoviciu, coordonator fiind prof. univ. dr. Mircea Petrescu-Dîmbovița, mentorul său. A urmat povestea publicării tezei, la *Junimea* din Iași, care a solicitat o adeverință de la conducerea instituției care să confirme redactarea în afara programului, conform „indicațiilor cabinetului 2”, apoi lipsa posibilității promovării (până după 1990). De remarcat sprijinul colegilor de la Muzeul Județean de Istorie din Suceava (condus la acea vreme de prof. Octav Monoranu), care au publicat teza (doar o parte din aceasta), atât ca supliment, separat, cât și în paginile periodicului *Suceava*. Totodată au fost sumarizate etapele 1984-1989, când a activat la Institutul Politehnic din Iași și din 1989 până la momentul pensionării, în 2008, fiecare dintre acestea cu sincope, vicisitudini, dar și împliniri.

Dar să explicăm pe scurt spusele profesorului Ursulescu. Momentele de referință au fost în primul rând imposibilitatea de a accesa, din cauza legilor de atunci, bursa regională, motivul fiind apartenența părinților la breasla profesorilor, astfel fiind nevoit să ia drumul Iașului, deși la București ar fi fost mai ușor, având rude în capitală; apoi, maniera în care a ajuns să predea la Institutul Pedagogic de 3 ani de la Suceava, în contextul în care deși media îi permitea să acceseze un post în București, „dispariția” postului (fiind invocată lipsa buletinului emis în capitală) l-a așezat în fața unei alegeri: unul dintre Institutele Pedagogice de la Suceava și Constanța (posturi neafișate, o altă practică, comună și ticăloasă a sistemului). Povestea este aparent una amuzantă, dar realitatea trebuie să fi fost crudă și a influențat, prin metehnele sistemului, destinul profesional al tânărului Nicolae Ursulescu. Un alt moment a fost desființarea, în 1984, a profilului Istorie-Geografie de la Suceava, consecința fiind

³ Nicolae Ursulescu, „*Spiritus loci*” dans la *préhistoire de la Bucovine*, în *Codrul Cosminului*, S.N., XVI, 2010, no.1, p. 21-28; Mircea Ignat, *Une reconnaissance bien méritée: l'accordage du titre de Doctor Honoris Causa au professeur Nicolae Ursulescu*, în *Codrul Cosminului*, S.N., XVI, 2010, no.1, p. 167-173.

mutarea la Iași și desfășurarea activității didactice, până în toamna anului 1989, la Institutul Politehnic din Iași, unde a fost nevoit să predea un curs special (*Probleme fundamentale ale istoriei României*), care nu avea legătură cu pregătirea sa de arheolog, oarecum o cezură în activitatea sa normală; totuși, în discurs, Nicolae Ursulescu a arătat că și în acel context a căutat să se adapteze realității dure și să întrevadă posibilitățile unor acumulări științifice, să facă anumite racorduri, care până la urmă i-au fost folositoare, lărgindu-i orizontul uman și științific; i s-a întărit convingerea că arheologia este o parte a istoriei. De remarcat faptul că și în acele timpuri, în acele medii pe care le-a frecventat, a întâlnit oameni de mare valoare umană și profesională, care i-au fost model și care l-au sprijinit, între aceștia regretatul profesor Ion Agrigoroaiei (decan al Facultății de Istorie și Filozofie între 1985 și 1990) fiind menționat pentru sprijinul pe care i l-a acordat în ocuparea postului de lector la universitatea ieșeană, în septembrie 1989. Acesta a fost un moment binevenit pentru cariera profesorului Ursulescu, care treptat a ocupat pozițiile de conferențiar și profesor universitar, ajungând totodată coordonator de doctorate și, ulterior, *profesor emerit*; în evoluția de după 1990 a universității, a sprijinit înființarea catedrelor pe specialitate, a inițiat înființarea Centrului Interdisciplinar de Studii Arheoistorice, publicarea revistei *Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica*, a obținut granturi, a sprijinit colegii din muzee la realizarea unor cataloage și expoziții naționale și internaționale. De asemenea, a încurajat tinerii pe drumul arheologiei, pentru mulți reușind identificarea unor posturi în care au confirmat. În anul 2008, anul pensionării, la cei 65 de ani, în plină activitate creatoare, Domnia sa reușea să ducă la bun sfârșit numeroase proiecte personale și colective, care și-au lăsat amprenta definitiv în istoria Universității. Un ultim acces nervos al sistemului l-a constituit desființarea pozițiilor de profesor consultant, alături de catedre – legea Funeriu; prin urmare, Nicolae Ursulescu a fost îndepărtat de activitatea universitară, ceea ce, nu doar din punctul nostru de vedere, a adus un imens prejudiciu breslei arheologilor și nu numai din țara noastră, un întreg corp profesoral cu mare experiență fiind exclus, tăindu-se practic puntea de legătură cu generația următoare, creând instabilitate instituțională.

Domnul profesor Ursulescu a arătat că pe parcursul celor 60 de ani de activitate în domeniul arheologiei a trecut prin diverse experiențe, de-a lungul deceniilor și-a însușit, metodic, diferite metode de cercetare, de la cele simple stratigrafice, definite de citirea pereților secțiunilor, la practicarea casetelor, la inserarea/acceptarea/valorificarea noilor teorii și metode în cercetarea arheologică, reconstituirea vieții omului din trecut (fie el preistoric sau nu), accesul la interdisciplinaritate și rolul vital al cercetării non-invazive. A subliniat rolul definitoriu al CISA (Centrul Interdisciplinar de Studii Arheoistorice) și importanța grantului obținut în 2006, care a facilitat dotarea cu aparatură modernă, fapt care a condus la obținerea unor rezultate științifice de referință pentru arheologia românească. Privind în urmă, profesorul Ursulescu a arătat că sunt într-adevăr mulți, mulți ani, încheindu-și discursul (ca o autocaracterizare) citându-l pe Nichita Stănescu: „nu sunt bătrân, sunt străvechi”. În ceea ce ne privește, ca o concluzie a discursului, reținem că viața

(inclusiv cea științifică) este plină de neprevăzut, ceea ce necesită adaptabilitate, curaj, atitudine, multă trudă, dar și puțin noroc și prieteni de nădejde; evoluția rapidă, în doar câteva decenii, a țării noastre (de la lipsuri astăzi de neconceput precum curentul electric, la calculatoare și internet), a necesitat și evoluția individuală, corelată cu accesarea modulatorie a timpurilor, uneori cu expectative, uneori cu apăsare pe accelerație, în funcție și de sistemul politic. Tranzitarea deceniilor a avut prin urmare un *numitor comun*: voința și capacitatea de muncă a profesorului Ursulescu.

În încheierea acestor rânduri, prea puține pentru a evoca multitudinea trăsăturilor și valențelor umane și profesionale manifestate de profesorul Nicolae Ursulescu în cei 60 de ani de activitate în domeniul arheologiei, explicăm titlul ales de noi: „*Cronica de la Iași?*”. Adoptat de Bucovina, la mijlocul anilor 60 ai secolului trecut, nevoit să o părăsească din cauza uneia dintre marile erori ale sistemului antedecembrist, anume desființarea specializării Istorie-Geografie de la Suceava, ajuns în toamna anului 1989 la Facultatea de Istorie a celei mai vechi universități din România, Universitatea „Al. I. Cuza” din Iași, la rândul său, profesorul Nicolae Ursulescu a „adoptat” cu drag doctoranzi și arheologi din Bucovina, sprijinindu-i necondiționat, fiindu-le călăuză de-a lungul vieții științifice. Poate că o potrivită raportare care poate fi aici folosită, este cea la o cronică – carte de învățătură, izvor de mentalitate autentic bucovineană, sănătoasă, hrănitoare pentru suflete – *Cronica de la Arbore* a lui Toader Hrib, întemeietorul unuia dintre cele mai frumoase muzee sătești, un alt om vrednic, care a sfințit locul și vremurile. Așa nota bătrânul gospodar în jurnalul său, la 2 ianuarie 1969: „*în fiecare zi, o oră sau jumătate, să lucrezi și pentru neamul tău*”. Nu putem noi, desigur, cuantifica deceniile pe care profesorul Ursulescu le-a dăruit neamului său.

Nici posteritatea nu va putea cuprinde totalitatea realizărilor sale. Știm că unele dintre acestea sunt tainic păstrate în sufletul său, care se bucură atunci când vede foști studenți și colaboratori că au reușit în domeniul fascinant și anevoios al arheologiei. Știm că Domnia sa a dăruit, asemenea altor dascăli ai neamului nostru, timp, energie, suflet, fără rezerve. Nicolae Ursulescu, meșter iscusit în folosirea cuvântului scris sau rostit, creator al unor compoziții științifice durabile în arheologia europeană, marchează o altă generație de iluștri savanți și universitari ieșeni, o parte a sufletului acestora fiind transferată în inima sa, căci acesta este destinul marilor profesori, să transfere, arc peste timp, simbolistici, evidențe, contraste, idealuri, concepte, mesaje, care să constituie un model pentru viitorime. În noi, cei de azi, participanți sau nu la manifestarea din 31 martie 2023, a fost transferată o parte a energiei creatoare și vitale, a cuvântului ales, a sufletului, a dedicației, a onoarei și a demnității, a atitudinii de viață a Profesorului, Arheologului, Omului Nicolae Ursulescu. Răsplata pentru Domnia sa suntem noi, cei de acum și arheologii din următoarea generație.

La mulți ani, Domnule Profesor!



Domnul prof.univ.dr. Nicolae Ursulescu
între academicianul Victor Spinei (stânga) și prof. univ. dr. Mihai Cojocariu (dreapta).

Tatiana Niculescu: Regina Maria: ultima dorință, București: Cetatea de Scaun, 2021, 166 p.

*Cristian-Iulian Ceacîru**

O personalitate excepțională a istoriei românilor și unul din cei mai iubiți conducători a fost indiscutabil Regina Maria a României. În seria de cărți dedicate acesteia se înscrie și lucrarea scriitoarei Tatiana Niculescu intitulată *Regina Maria: ultima dorință*. Autoarea este recunoscută pentru faptul că a introdus în literatura română contemporană genul biografic, în lucrările sale regăsindu-se parcursul vieții unor personalități precum Nae Ionescu, Arsenie Boca, Carol al II-lea și Elena Lupescu etc.

Prezenta carte despre ultima și cea mai importantă dorință a Reginei Maria începe cu un argument și conține 12 capitole urmate de anexe. În cadrul lucrării se găsesc de asemenea și o serie de fotografii care o înfățișează pe regină în diverse momente ale vieții sale.

În *Argument* autoarea îi deslușește cititorului resorturile care au determinat-o să elaboreze lucrarea, menționând succint și structura acesteia. De remarcat faptul că, printr-o frumoasă tehnică de stilistică literară, titlul fiecărui capitol este luat din cuprinsul acestuia, fiind o destăinuire a suveranei.

În primul capitol sunt înfățișate ultimele patru zile din viața reginei care, aflată la Dresda, măcinată de boala necruțătoare, hotărăște să revină în țară, la Pelișorul ei drag. La 18 iulie 1938, în prezența copiilor săi Carol și Elisabeta, a nepotului Mihai și a unor înalte oficialități, după o lungă agonie, inima reginei încetează să bată. Din păcate, se pare la intervenția rău voită a regelui Carol al II-lea, frații săi Nicolae și Ileana ar fi fost prea târziu anunțați pentru a veni să-și ia rămas bun de la mama lor: „*Maria ar fi privit în zădar spre ușa, cu speranța că Nicolae și Ileana vor apărea*”(p.21).

Cauza morții reginei, boala care i-a pus capăt vieții au rămas până în ziua de azi controversate. Orice s-ar zice, diagnosticul oficial de ciroză hepatică, în condițiile în care regina era recunoscută pentru abținerea sa la alcool, poate fi cu greu acceptat. De altfel și regina, când i s-a adus la cunoștință diagnoza a remarcat ironică „*o fi vreo ciroză nealcoolică*”(p.30). Diversele ipoteze, chiar și cele mai puțin probabile, referitoare la cauza morții sale, sunt cu scrupulozitate prezentate în capitolul doi. Următoarea secțiune a lucrării prezintă contextul în care a fost realizat testamentul reginei, într-o perioadă tulbură în care aceasta a fost marginalizată chiar de propriul său fiu și a pierdut prieteni dragi. În testamentul care purta data de 29 iunie 1933 apărea cea mai importantă dorință de după moarte a Reginei Maria: aceea ca inima să îi fie depusă în capela de pe malul mării de la Balcic.

În următoarele trei capitole, autoarea explică din ce cauze în Europa Occidentală, din Evul Mediu până spre finele epocii moderne a existat obiceiul acesta

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al înhumării separate a inimii. Autoarea menționează care sunt cauzele acestui ritual funerar, „*două sunt principalele izvoare de inspirație ale acestui obicei: mistica occidentală a inimii lui Cristos și experiența de credință și de luptă a cavalerilor cruciați*” (p. 47). În capitolele anterior menționate sunt explicate în detaliu aceste cauze, pentru ca cititorul să fie cât mai lămurit posibil asupra esenței problemelor puse în discuție. De asemenea sunt prezentate o serie de cazuri ale unor personalități istorice care au ales ca, după moarte, inima să le fie înhumată separat de corp. De remarcat faptul că respectivul ritual a continuat și în epoca victoriană, fiind ales îndeosebi de către artiști.

În capitolul „*Îmi înalț inima spre tine, Doamne*” este prezentată relația complexă a Reginei Maria cu religia. Cititorul poate afla lucruri foarte interesante, cum ar fi religiile în care Maria, „*ca să împace pe toată lumea*” (p.81) s-a cununat religios cu Ferdinand sau adoptarea de către aceasta a credinței Bahá'í.

O emoționantă secțiune a lucrării este dedicată descrierii domeniului de la Balcic, locul atât de drag al Reginei. În capitolul final este prezentată odiseea inimii Reginei Maria în timpul de după cedarea Cadrilaterului, al regimului comunist și al revenirii la democrație. Anexele includ testamentul Reginei Maria, o scrisoare a sa din 1925 către principele Carol, precum și o listă a regilor și reginelor Angliei ale căror inimi au fost înhumate separat de corp. De asemenea este prezentată și o consistentă bibliografie selectivă legată de domeniul abordat.

Prin însăși tema aleasă, lucrarea doamnei Tatiana Niculescu este una foarte interesantă. Stilul literar folosit este unul facil de înțeles de către cititor, cercetător sau simpotrivă un simplu pasionat de istorie. De asemenea, pe alocuri, persoana care lecturează cartea efectiv este transpusă în sufletul Reginei simțind realist trăirile pe care le-a avut aceasta.

Pentru o lucrare atât de bine realizată care abordează toate aspectele subiectului, cu mare greutate se pot găsi observații. Poate că ar fi fost mai bine ca, în anexe, să fie prezentate mai multe documente legate de viața Reginei Maria. De asemenea ar fi fost utilă includerea în aceleași anexe a unor arbori genealogici atât ai familiei Mariei cât și ai Familiei Regale Române. Cu toate acestea cartea este foarte utilă tuturor celor care vor să știe cât mai multe despre una din cele mai importante și iubite personalități ale istoriei românilor.

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Reference citations

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Harrison, R.L., & Westwood, M.J. (2009). Preventing vicarious traumatization of mental health therapists: Identifying protective practices. *Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training*, 46, 203-219.

In-text citation (Harrison & Westwood, 2009)

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Damean, S.L. (2013). The Royal Family of Romania and the National Reunification War. *Analele Universității din Craiova. Istorie*, 23(1), 43-50.

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c. An article in a monthly magazine

Madu, C. (2010, March-April). A cure for crime. *Psychology Today*, 43(2), 12.

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II. Reference-list entries for books and other separately published materials

a. A book by one author

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b. A book by two or more authors

Rosenthal, R., Rosnow, R.L., & Rubin, D.B. (2000). *Contrasts and effect sizes in behavioral research: A correlational approach*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

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Subsequent citations (Rosenthal et al., 2000: 232)

Scafes, C., Șerbănescu, H., Andonie, C., Scafes I. (2002). *Armata română în războiul de independență. 1877-1878*. București: Sigma.

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Subsequent citations (Scafes et al., 2002: 151)

c. A book with no author named

The Blackwell dictionary of cognitive psychology. (1991). Oxford, England: Blackwell.

In-text citation (*The Blackwell dictionary*, 1991: 98)

d. Multiple works by the same author

Sternberg, R.J. (1990). *Metaphors of the mind: Conceptions of the nature of intelligence*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

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Sternberg, R.J. (2007). *Wisdom, intelligence, and creativity synthesized*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

In-text citation

The 1990 book: (Sternberg, 1990: 45)

The first 2003 book: (Sternberg, 2003a: 23)

The second 2003 book: (Sternberg, 2003b: 25)

The 2007 book: (Sternberg, 2007: 139)

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Damean, S.L. (2004). *România și Congresul de Pace de la Berlin (1878)*. București: Mica Valahie.

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In-text citation

The 2004 book: (Damean, 2004: 77)

The 2008 book: (Damean, 2008: 55)

e. Reference to a chapter in an edited book

Ghițulescu, M. (2014). Evoluția instituțiilor politice în timpul regimului comunist. În Damean, S.L. (coord.) *Evoluția instituțiilor politice ale statului român din 1859 până astăzi*. Târgoviște: Cetatea de Scaun.

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III. Archival Documents and Collections

a. Collection of letters from an archive

Benomar, Fr.M.C. (March 1875-December 1876). Legación en Berlin. Correspondencia confidencial y reservada con los Ministros de Estado. Cartas a los mismos (Tomo I, Signatura 9-32-7-7401). *Royal Academy of History*, Madrid, Spain.

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b. Unpublished papers, lectures from an archive or personal collection

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IV. Reference to a web source

J.G. (2016, April 11). 7 Deadly Environmental Disasters. Retrieved April 25 2016, from <http://www.history.com/news/history-lists>

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